HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy
of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF HERBERT MANELL

Washington, D.C.
April 28, 1978

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Official Reporters
300 Seventh St., S.W. Washington, D.C.

554-2345 TOP SECRET
FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1978

House of Representatives

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassinations

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

HERBERT MANELL

called for examination by counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in the offices of the Select Committee
on Assassinations, Room 3370, House Office Building Annex II,
2nd and D Street, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at
1:00 p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public
in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on
behalf of the respective parties:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, Counsel

DAN HARDWAY, on the staff of the Subcommittee
TESTIMONY OF HERBERT MANELL

Whereupon,

HERBERT MANELL

was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you please state your name and
occupation for the record.

Mr. Manell. I am Herbert Manell, Staff Officer of the
CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been with the CIA?

Mr. Manell. Twenty-seven years.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Manell, have you read the letter
dated March 23, 1978, from the acting DCI to the Chairman of
the committee?

Mr. Manell. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that letter?

Mr. Manell. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Under the committee's rules, Mr. Manell,
the witness has a right to receive a copy of the deposition
that he gives to the committee. However, by virtue of the
arrangement that we have worked out with the Agency, the
Agency has asked us to obtain a waiver from each witness,
from each Agency witness, a waiver of the right specifically
to receive the transcript. You may have access to it to review
it for accuracy, but you may not have the right to actually
receive it. That is to say, we are asking you to waive the right to receive the transcript.

Are you willing to waive that right?

Mr. Manell. Do I have to waive that right?

Mr. Goldsmith. Absolutely not. However, if you do not waive the right, we will not have the deposition.

Mr. Manell. I will waive the right, then.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are testifying here today without subpoena and freely?

Mr. Manell. I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of background, the committee is mandated to investigate the assassination of the President, who did it, was there a conspiracy and to evaluate the performance of the investigative agencies, specifically the CIA and the FBI. Do you understand that?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you located in Mexico City in 1963?

Mr. Manell. I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your position at that time?

Mr. Manell. I was head of the Soviet section of the station, of the CIA station in Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your general responsibilities?

Mr. Manell. My responsibilities were basically two-fold; one being counterintelligence monitoring and to negate
the activities of the Soviets; secondly, to attempt to
recruit Soviets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you involved in any of the sur-
veillance operations that were mounted against the Soviets?

By surveillance, I mean the tap operation and the photo-
surveillance operation of the Soviet Embassy compound.

Mr. Manell. I was not personally involved.

Mr. Goldsmith. You just received the information
that came from that operation?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we get into more detail, who
was the station chief in 1963?

Mr. Manell. Win Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann Goodpasture an employee of the
station also?

Mr. Manell. She was.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were her station responsibilities?

Mr. Manell. She had many responsibilities. That
included being an assistant to the chief of station. She
was also a person who had some type of responsibility for
collecting the photos that we obtained of Soviet Embassy
activity, and I think she was also involved to some extent
in the telephone tap operations that we conducted against
the Soviets in Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say she was Win Scott's
right-hand person?

Mr. Manell. That is a question of definition there, and I don't think it is a fair question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did she have a very close working relationship with Mr. Scott?

Mr. Manell. She certainly did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on her a lot?

Mr. Manell. They relied on many of us quite a bit.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he rely on Ann Goodpasture a lot?

Mr. Manell. Yes, he did.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned Miss Goodpasture was involved in some way in the photo-surveillance operation.

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the extent of her responsibilities?

Mr. Manell. I can't really define it too well at this distance in time. I don't know whether she actually managed the people who took the photographs. That might have been her responsibility. It might have been someone else's. But she certainly did handle the finished product at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. By handling, you mean she reviewed the photographic tapes?

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. After that operation, what was her
responsibility?

Mr. Manell. I can't really tell you. I can't remember whether it was her or someone else. She might have been an alternate officer in that type of support operation. I don't think she was the principal. I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Tom Keenan was the principal?

Mr. Manell. At one time, I think he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Ann the person who brought the transcript into the station?

Mr. Manell. At times, yes, I believe she did, but I am not entirely sure. Tom did that also, and Frank Estan Cona also did that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we proceed, I guess there is one other question I should ask you.

Has anyone from the CIA contacted you in any way in reference to your testimony before the committee today or in reference to the interview that you gave us about a month ago?

Mr. Manell. Yes. I was contacted by legal counsel, who gave me advice to be absolutely forthcoming in my testimony, and he said exactly what your letter says here; that the secrecy agreement is waived for this day's session.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any other contact?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. I also take it that during the half
hour lunch break since your wife testified this morning, you did not discuss the substance of this in any way?

Mr. Manell. Just briefly. In no significant way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss the questions that were going to be asked in any way?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the telephone tap operation, approximately how many phones were tapped?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall, but we had telephone tapped in the Soviet Embassy at their commercial section, their consular section, the embassy proper, and their military attache office.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is what was referred to as their liaison operation; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a unilateral operation?

Mr. Manell. Yes, there was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did that cover a different phone?

Mr. Manell. My recollection is bad on that. I believe that the unilateral telephone taps were placed exclusively on the residences of Soviet officials. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the coverage constant with regard to these telephone taps?

Mr. Manell. The coverage was constant within the embassy,
except I think that from time to time, we might have taken
one tap off one line and put it on another. As far as the
unilateral taps, they were not constant. They were placed on
an individual for a length of time to gain information about
him, his habits, his family, his contacts, and then taken-off
and placed on someone else.

Mr. Goldsmith. By constant, what I mean is while the
tap was in operation on a particular phone, it was con-
stantly in effect? Whenever the phone call came in the tap
would be triggered?

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the policy decision as to which
phones would be covered?

Mr. Manell. Well, it was basic practice that all of the
phones that we did have covered in the embassy were just
covered naturally and normally because that is what we
wanted to have reporting on. As far as changing from one
line to another, it would have been a mutual agreement between
myself and Win Scott, or Win might have decided to change a
line.

Mr. Goldsmith. When were the people actually involved
in the operation itself, Tom Keenan, Estan Cona, Goodpasture
involved in those types of policy decisions?

Mr. Manell. Tom Keenan I don't think was ever involved
in that policy decision. I don't believe Estan Cona was
involved either. As far as Annie, I am not sure, but I
doubt that she -- she could have been involved in making a
suggestion like that, yes..

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the tap operation, what
product did you actually receive? In other words, what was
the take from that operation?

Mr. Manell. Well, the take was both in Spanish and
Russian. Russian when a Soviet communicated with another
Soviet in another part of the embassy, or a Soviet at his
residence or somewhere outside the embassy communicated with
someone inside the embassy. The Spanish product was, of
course, when a native called in to the embassy or when an
official called out.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would get, in effect, a Russian tape
or a Spanish tape of a particular conversation?

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would be done with the tape?

Mr. Manell. It was first reviewed by my wife --

Mr. Goldsmith. Before that, it would be transcribed,
would it not?

Mr. Manell. It would be transcribed first in Spanish.
The Russian language portions were indicated so that our
Russian language transcribers would transcribe it. At one
time we had a transcriber in the embassy proper in our sta-
tion to transcribe it. After that man's departure, I believe
that all Russian language translations were done outside the
embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the transcripts that you received
literal translations or transcriptions?

Mr. Manell. They were supposed to be literal, but I am
sure that shortcuts were taken when a non-essential or unin-
teresting conversation took place, but each conversation had
to be transcribed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where would the transcript be filed
after being reviewed?

Mr. Manell. They would be filed in our office, in our
registry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would any of the transcripts be sent to
CIA headquarters?

Mr. Manell. Rarely.

Mr. Goldsmith. Eventually, were the transcripts taken
from Mexico City station and sent to headquarters?

Mr. Manell. Rarely. It would only happen if there
was a rather important and interesting excerpt that we thought
headquarters needed or headquarters would have asked for.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, they would not?

Mr. Manell. As a matter of routine, they certainly were
not sent to headquarters.

Mr. Goldsmith. In speaking of files, what kind of
attitude did Win Scott have towards files?
Mr. Manell. His attitude was that most everything should be kept, recorded, filed, crossfiled, indexed. He had a penchant for having materials that some of us considered even unimportant be filed. His was the most complete registry, probably, anywhere in the world, outside of head-quarter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you served at other stations so that you could make that comparison?

Mr. Manell. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. As station chief, was Scott very competent and demanding?

Mr. Manell. He was both.

Mr. Goldsmith. Approximately how much time would pass from the moment that an intercept came in until a transcript was received?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly right now, but I would imaging possibly two, three, four days at most.

Mr. Goldsmith. It might take somewhat longer if it needed to be translated from Russian into English?

Mr. Manell. Yes. The transcript would then go out with the original tape to our transcriber.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the photo-surveillance operation, who regularly reviewed the photographs that came in?

Mr. Manell. Annie Goodpasture.
Mr. Goldsmith. Stepping back for a moment, after the transcript came in, who reviewed those at first, when they came in?

Mr. Manell. I think Annie always took an interest in reading the transcripts, but the actual responsibility for reading, analyzing the transcript at the early point of my stay in Mexico was the responsibility of my wife, Barbara Manell.

Mr. Goldsmith. I should indicate that we are always going to be discussing 1963 unless I mention to the contrary.

So your wife would read the transcripts. Would she decide to whom they would be routed?

Mr. Manell. Yes, she would, and I would also. But it was her primary responsibility to do that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now on the photos, who would review them when they came in?

Mr. Manell. Annie Goodpasture would review them. I might make mention, though, with regard to the review of telephone tap transcripts, I believe, and I certainly remember, that before the assassination of President Kennedy and certainly during the period of the latter part of the summer of 1963, my wife was not working eight hours a day and not coming in every day necessarily into the office.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you make mention of that?

Mr. Manell. Because you asked the question of who
regularly reviewed the transcripts. In that case, I would
review them.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question; who would
review them in your absence.

Mr. Manell. I would.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would those transcripts be reviewed in
chronological order?

Mr. Manell. Most likely.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many hours a day was your wife
normally working?

Mr. Manell. During parts of the tour in Mexico, she
worked eight hours a day. At times, less than that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Specifically the period of late summer
1963; early fall?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, and I haven't dis-
cussed this with her and I don't know what her recollection
is. But I know she was not working regularly during August
and September of that year.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you say she was not working regu-
larly, do you mean she was not coming in every day or that
she was coming in every day but not working eight hours?

Mr. Manell. It was that she did not work eight hours
and she did not necessarily come in every day, as I recall.
But then again, my memory is vague about that. I know she
was not working full time.
Mr. Goldsmith. I guess at this point, for the purpose of the record, you did mention before that you did discuss with your wife during lunch in some way her testimony this morning.

Mr. Manell. Principally I asked her whether she was dealt with courteously. That was my principal question.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was her response?

Mr. Manell. She was.

Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly hope that was the case.

Mr. Manell. It was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife mention to you that we had asked her about the transcripts?

Mr. Manell. Yes, but with no elaboration.

Mr. Goldsmith. She did not discuss the substance in any other way with you?

Mr. Manell. No. So, you see, there might be a variance between what she said and what I say because it is a question of recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. It seems there was a procedure whereby, as a general rule, your wife would routinely review the transcript or you would review the transcript when she was not there.

Was there a similar rule for the take from the phot-surveillance operation?

Mr. Manell. No, there wasn't.
Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Manell. Ann Goodpasture generally felt that this was her area of responsibility. While my wife and I had access to the photographs, it was mostly when Ann thought there was something important to show us that we saw the product or when we felt that we had to review the product of a certain day or certain hour to confirm or deny certain information we had that we asked to see and did see whenever we wanted the product for the particular period.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, you did not review those photographs?

Mr. Manell. True.

Mr. Goldsmith. What coordination, if any, was there between the tap operation and the photo-surveillance operation?

Mr. Manell. I don't think I understand the question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were the two operations tied in together in any way?

Mr. Manell. They certainly were if they were oriented against the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. More specifically, if something of interest came up on the transcript or tape and that person indicated he was going to be showing up at the embassy, would the practice be for the tap operation people to contact the photo-surveillance people?
Mr. Manell. If you are talking about people who
actually did that kind of work on the outside, no, that was
compartmented.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would that happen?

Mr. Manell. As far as directing what those people on
the outside did, that was coordinated within the embassy
from my section to Annie or to Win or to someone substitut-
ing for Annie.

Mr. Goldsmith. So the people from the tap operation
would contact Goodpasture or Win Scott?

Mr. Manell. It was not necessarily just the tap opera-
tion because it is a little bit misleading. For example, I
was running several double-agent operations and would
know beforehand when a meeting was to take place between the
Soviet intelligence officer and my agent.

To confirm at least a small part of what my agent told
me, I would very often want to know when that Soviet
officer exited the embassy that particular time and when
he returned. So it was not merely from telephone tap
materials that we directed activities of the photographic
surveillance, for a number of other reasons. Or, for
example, I might be working on a Soviet, for any number of
reasons, I might find it interesting or think it
would be interesting to find out when he returned to the
Soviet Embassy or whom he might contact in the Soviet Embassy.
Mr. Goldsmith. In this case, how would you get that information to the photo-surveillance people?

Mr. Manell. Probably through Ann Goodpasture.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the tap people -- getting back to my original example -- wanted to communicate information to the photo people?

Mr. Manell. There were no such things as tap people.

You mean the recipient of the telephone tap product, for example, myself, would ask Annie Goodpasture to -- well, you see the question is not actually entirely logical, because normally photographic surveillance would be continuous. I don't remember at this point the days of the week they might not have been conducted. Possibly the weekends; I am not sure. Possibly one day over the weekend. Certainly it stopped after dusk.

I am sorry, I have lost the trend of your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will try to redirect you.

If you have a person working in the tap operation who transcribes tapes and he realizes, hey, this is something important, and the substance of the conversation is someone of interest is saying he is going to the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Manell. This person would be on the outside, anyway, transcribing, and not in the station. If anything was of an emergency nature, the person was instructed to call for a visit from an officer. The officer would get the message and
come back to the station and discuss whatever that message was with the responsible officer -- say, the responsible officer for the Cuban operation or the Soviet operation or for the satellite operation -- and then action would be taken, most likely in conjunction with the discussion with Win Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was a procedure for expediting matters?

Mr. Manell. Indeed there was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the person contacted by the Spanish transcriber be Ann Goodpasture?

Mr. Manell. It could be Ann Goodpasture; it could be other people, such as Tom Keenan or Estan Cona.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned the scope of the photo-surveillance coverage. Do you know whether the coverage was constant during daylight hours, or was it coordinated with the working hours of the embassy compound?

Mr. Manell. I can't remember. I would tend to believe that it was constant. Possibly, however, they might have taken off for lunch, but that should not have been the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of the photo-surveillance operation? By that, I mean what subjects were they trying to take pictures of?

Mr. Manell. There are two different types of photo-graph operations. One was to take photographs of non-
Soviets visiting the Soviet Embassy, and the other purpose was to take photographs of Soviets meeting with other Soviets within the embassy compound so that we could, using that method and others also, attempt to identify whether they were intelligence-connected.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the non-Soviet visiting the embassy compound, was a picture taken of every one?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. A picture would be taken of every subject entering or leaving the compound?

Mr. Manell. I believe so.

I must qualify it to say that I was never in charge of that activity. The only responsibility I had for that activity was when I had a particular interest and requested certain attention be paid to that interest.

Mr. Goldsmith. Keeping that qualification in mind, is it fair to say that essentially pictures would be taken of everyone and then later on the photographs that were obtained would be reviewed in light of the purpose you have just stated?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

I would like to add one other statement to that. Win Scott, our chief of station, was the type of man who always wanted more, rather than less, done in every respect. So, in connection with the question of whether there would be
constant activity in monitoring the entrance and exit of people in the Soviet Embassy, he always wanted more, rather than less.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was the photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald ever obtained at either the Cuban Embassy or consulate or the Soviet Embassy compound?

Mr. Manell. To the best of my recollection, I don't believe a photograph was obtained.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, was Win Scott happy about the failure of the surveillance operation, the photo-surveillance operation, to pick that up?

Mr. Manell. I haven't got a clear recollection of it, but I would assume he must have been very unhappy about it. I do know that we thought we had a picture of an American who could have been Lee Harvey Oswald. It turned out that this man was not Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did you think that this person may have been Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Probably on the day of the assassination, when we reviewed our product.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to the transcripts that we have reviewed, it appears that Oswald made at least five visits either to the Cuban Embassy or consulate or to the Soviet Embassy compound; a total of five visits.

Does it strike you as surprising that, in light of five
visits having been made, he was not picked up?

    Mr. Manell. I can't verify, and I certainly can't
agree that five visits were made.

    Mr. Goldsmith. I summarized that essentially, because
I wanted to save time. If you went through each trans-
cript, it would indicate that in fact, according --

    Mr. Manell. That is your analysis, not mine.

    Mr. Goldsmith. When we get to the transcripts, we will
go into that with you. We will take that step by step at
that point.

    Mr. Manell. I can make this statement. I remember
that on the day of the assassination, when we got information
from the radio that Lee Harvey Oswald had assassinated the
President, my recollection that day was that Lee Harvey
Oswald was the man who had had contact with the Soviet
Embassy, had contact by phone. And I certainly didn't know
he had visited the Soviet Embassy.

    Mr. Goldsmith. Who at that station thought that the
station had a picture of Oswald?

    Mr. Manell. I can't remember that exactly. I would
assume it would have been Annie Goodpasture.

    Mr. Goldsmith. When was information obtained by the
Mexico City station reported to headquarters? By that, I
mean what type of information would be reported to head-
quarters and in what form?
Mr. Manell. You are covering the waterfront there.

Mr. Goldsmith. I can narrow that down. I will be pleased to. No problem.

Mr. Manell. Would you want to restrict that to the question of Americans?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if I can get it this way. Would all information being sent to headquarters be sent to headquarters by means of a cable?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other forms?

Mr. Manell. By dispatch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Dispatch and by cable would be the two essential forms?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis would you decide to send that information to headquarters by means of a cable, as opposed to dispatch?

Mr. Manell. Once again, I think you are covering the waterfront, because you are asking me to talk about all types of operations that the station engage in. It would be very often a question of just what operations were engaged in, whether it merited dispatch reporting or cable reporting.

Sometimes you would use one criteria and sometimes another. One section would use one criteria and one section
would use another with respect to whether to use cable traffic or dispatch traffic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us talk about the Soviet section. Is it fair to say that routine information would be sent by means of dispatch?

Mr. Manell. Not necessarily. It depended on interpretation. For example, I would, at times, report by cable the results of a meeting between a double-agent and a Soviet agent, even though there was no priority interest or real necessity for immediate receipt of that information at headquarters. Just a form that I preferred, because you could do it in a sort of shorthand rather than do it with long, descriptive reporting in the dispatch. Dispatch required more writing, so sometimes preference would be for cable reporting just for that reason alone.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any objective criteria that governed whether a cable would be sent or a dispatch?

Mr. Manell. Indeed there would be. If there was anything of emergency nature or anything of great significance, you would report it by cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the general rule, but are you saying that the mere fact that something was sent by cable does not necessarily mean that it was urgent?

Mr. Manell. Exactly. You are perfectly right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Once a cable is received at headquarters,
what is done with it?

Let me backstep. Who receives the cable at headquarters?

Mr. Manell. It depends on the subject matter.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your particular case, then?

Mr. Manell. Once again, it depends on the subject matter. In my case, with respect to the Soviet operation, it would be received by the host division. In this case, it was called "WH" division, Western Hemisphere Division.

Secondly, it would be received by the interested division in Soviet operations. It would then have been called, I guess it, was called the SR division at that time, Soviet Division.

Additionally, depending on the material, it could be received by other elements of the agency. For example, counterintelligence staff would receive it.

Then I can't go further, but distribution was certainly wider in most cases.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would determine that the distribution would be wider? The sender or one of the recipients or both?

Mr. Manell. It was both, because the sender had certain cryptonyms at the head of the cable which would indicate not merely the subject but the distribution.

For example, one cryptonym would necessarily indicate that the CIA staff, the counterintelligence staff, received the material in addition to all other interested elements of
the Agency.

There are also restrictive cryptonyms, such as if the matter was occasionally sensitive, the sender could restrict the distribution at headquarters. On the other hand, as far as how the headquarters element distributed cables, I can't particularly speak for that.

Then again, the cryptonyms gave the people who formulated the distribution just how wide a distribution it would have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, has anyone from the Inspector General staff ever interviewed you concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

Mr. Manell. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. Concerning the photo-surveillance operation?

Mr. Manell. Never.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any operation whatsoever in Mexico City?

Mr. Manell. No.

As a matter of fact, I was perfectly surprised that I was one of the last people ever interviewed about the assassination because, after all, my wife and I were responsible for the first message sent from the station. Everybody else was interviewed before me. The Inspector General, no one in the Agency ever talked to me about this
operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first time you were formally interviewed about it was --

Mr. Manell. -- by you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the 1977 Inspector General's Report which, among other things, evaluated the surveillance operation and attempted to explain the question that arose by virtue of the photograph being connected in some way with Oswald, and it turned out the photograph was not Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Not at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. In order for information contained in the cable to go to one of the higher-ups, the head of a division, DDO, for example, how would it get to him? Could the sender designate that?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Otherwise, if the cable went to Western Hemisphere, could that person say, "This sounds important; let me send it on up"?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would he do that directly or would he have to go through higher levels; go to his boss and then go to the next level?

Mr. Manell. It could be either way. It depended on who reviewed the cable and who made the decision. If an
analyst or desk officer reviewed the cable and wanted it sent to DDO, he would certainly do it through channels; through his branch chief, for example; possibly go to the division chief or chief of operations and make that suggestion and have it sent to DDO. Or if that type of decision started with the division chief, he would send it directly to the DDO or someone in another division or recipient of the cable to make that decision.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be any objective criteria for deciding what goes up to the top, or would this short have been a subjective decision by the particular individual involved?

Mr. Manell. It would be a subjective decision.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the tape, do you know whether anyone in the Mexico City station ever did a voice comparison of tapes for the purpose of determining whether the tape contained Lee Harvey Oswald's voice?

Mr. Manell. No, I don't think that was ever done. I don't believe it could have been done.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Manell. Tapes are normally erased after a certain number of days. So in the case of the Oswald transcript, which was absolutely unimportant -- not absolutely, but relatively unimportant -- at the time of receipt, there was no reason to keep that tape or designate it for retention.
Mr. Goldsmith. Why would the tapes be erased?

Mr. Manell. So that they could be used over again.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that if Oswald contacted the embassy in late September or early October about the time of the assassination, you are saying the tapes would have been erased routinely?

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to refer your attention to CIA No. 208. 208 refers to the page number of the document that the Agency provided us. This is paragraph 4 of a cable dated November 23, 1963. Could you read that paragraph to yourself?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In that paragraph, it says that the person who did the transcription indicates that Oswald is identical with the individual who contacted the embassy on September 28th. Do you know on what basis the transcriber was able to make that statement?

Mr. Manell. Yes. The transcriber, the Russian language transcriber, Mr. Tarasoff, was a very capable man, a man very interested in his work.

I believe that he could recall with exactness that was Oswald who called in previously, because Oswald's Russian was faulty, and he would have remembered that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether anyone went to
Mr. Tarasoff after the assassination and asked him whether it was Oswald on each tape?

Mr. Manell. No, I don't recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you do it yourself?

Mr. Manell. I don't remember. And I did not write this cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. That cable was sent by Goodpasture?

Mr. Manell. Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at these transcripts now.

I draw your attention to CIA No. 13. Would you please read that.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you describe what CIA No. 13 is?

Mr. Manell. A man by the name -- a man who identifies himself as Lee Oswals and speaks with a guard at the Soviet embassy, saying that he was at the embassy last Saturday and states that the embassy person had promised to send a telegram to Washington.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now CIA No. 13 is a transcript of a conversation involving someone who identified himself as Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is dated October 31, 1963.
Mr. Manell. Yes, it is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the name Oswald first came to your attention by virtue of this transcript?

Mr. Manell. I am not sure, but I guess it is the first time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this particular contact considered to be unusual or routine?

Mr. Manell. Routine.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Manell. During the summer period, particularly, or toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the information reported, to be just another case of an American contacting the embassy, for no significant reasons.

Mr. Goldsmith. In each case that an American contacted the embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?

Mr. Manell. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. In that case, there really should be a cable in Washington for every American for whom at least you were able to get a tentative identification?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you weren't able to identify anyone, you would not bother to send a cable?

Mr. Manell. Correct. That was a standard procedure
at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though this was considered routine, the information would be cabled up?

Mr. Manell. Exactly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would it not be dispatched up?

Mr. Manell. Because it involved an American person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying then that it was a standard procedure for dealing with Americans, and part of that procedure involved sending a cable?

Mr. Manell. Indeed.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response, if any, after seeing this transcript?

Mr. Manell. My response, or my reaction or my recollection; what is the question?

Mr. Goldsmith. What action did you take in response --

Mr. Manell. The only action I took was the action my wife took, was to send a cable to Washington summarizing the information that we had on Oswald and his contact with the embassy.

In addition, and it was also our practice, we sent memoranda to interested elements of the embassy. We also asked our headquarters for trace of an American. That was general procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. By trace, you mean a name trace?

Mr. Manell. A name trace.
Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to look at CIA 177 and tell me whether that was a cable that was sent to Washington. Was that cable sent to Washington, D. C.?

Mr. Manell. The first cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. In response to the transcript that appears in CIA No. 13.

Mr. Manell. I am not sure who wrote this cable.

My wife wrote this cable. Yes, that is the first cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the cable that would have been sent in response --

Mr. Manell. I must be wrong, because it says here there was no local dissemination of the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. I don't know if you are wrong or if you are just confused based on documents you have reviewed.

We will go into that later on.

In fact, I think there was dissemination, and you will have a chance to clarify that.

Mr. Manell. I am not sure there was dissemination. The last paragraph of this papers says no local dissemination.

Mr. Goldsmith. We will go into that.

The second paragraph of that cable makes reference to a photograph. Was that a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. We don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you ever seen that photograph?

Mr. Manell. Yes. The photograph was not of Oswald.
The assumption was made here that it could have been Oswald because a male who appeared to be an American entered the embassy on that date, but there is a correction above the date 1 October to read 2 October. So that is confusing to me at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith. But that correction could have been put in at some later time.

Mr. Manell. It could have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the cable, as it went out, reported a contact on 1 October?

Mr. Manell. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that the second paragraph makes an assumption that the photograph was of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. It makes an assumption, only an assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, was that in fact a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. No, it wasn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how that particular photograph was selected?

Mr. Manell. I don't recall exactly, but I would assume it was selected because it was obtained the very same day that Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the selection of the photograph?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall whether it was my wife or
it would have been Annie Goodpasture.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Miss Goodpasture
checked the Cuban photo production materials?

Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Refer to CIA No. 13. The person who
identified himself as Oswald said: "I was at your place
last Saturday" -- which would not have been October 1st; it
would have been September 28th. Yet the cable reports a
photograph taken of someone October 1st.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way that can be explained,
or is that just an extension of the assumption?

Mr. Manell. Just an extension of the assumption. It
is not knowledge that the photo of a male entering on the 1st
of October is identical with the person who phoned the Soviet
Embassy and said he was Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the contact by Oswald occurred on
October 1st, why did it take one week to get the cable out?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall exactly, but it probably
took some time for the people who got the information to have
it transcribed from the tape.

Secondly, since there was a Russian language portion
to that tape, this would have to have been collected and sent
out to our transcriber. That, again, may have delayed the
receipt of the information at the embassy.
Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I follow the difference between the second part of the explanation and the first.

Mr. Manell. Well, there were these steps in getting the product to the station. Number one, the material is taped.

Mr. Goldsmith. Okay.

Mr. Manell. Those people who handle the tape do not transcribe. It is sent to the transcriber for transcription of the Spanish portion. Indication is made on that Spanish portion that there is a foreign language. Assuming that they believe it is Russian, the material would then be collected by a station person who, in turn, would send it out to our Russian language transcriber.

Finally, the reason for the delay of perhaps a day or perhaps two days in sending it to headquarters may be this. The information, when received by us at the station, was not significant information or important information. There would, therefore, be no need to work on it ahead of other cases and materials of greater importance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever discussing sending this cable out with Dave Phillips?

Mr. Manell. No. He has no connection, no direct connection with my operation.

I would like to emphasize for the sake of clarity once again that while cable traffic may be considered the method
for sending significant information to headquarters, it
is not necessarily so.

Further, that in this specific case, a cable was used
to send this information to headquarters only because it
concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter that
was considered to be of importance.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could this procedure regarding Americans
contacting the Soviet Embassy be, in effect, not just at the
Mexico City station, but virtually every CIA station where
there was a Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Manell. I can't speak to that. That was the
procedure at Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about other stations that you
worked at?

Mr. Manell. Well, I would personally send the informa-
tion to headquarters by cable of an American contacting the
Soviet Embassy, yes, for a number of reasons. But to say
that this was standard CIA practice worldwide is something I
can't speak to.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the photograph referred to in
paragraph 2 was selected, do you recall whether Goodpasture
ever said "I think this is Oswald"?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it likely that what would have been
done is simply to have reviewed the photo production materials
for the purpose of taking out every non-Latin person and
then of those who were not Latins, who could not be identi-
fied, it turns out this is the only one who could not be
identified and therefore, this must be Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Well, that is an involved question, but I
can say that it is rather simple to distinguish between an
American, a normal-appearing American, and a Mexican. So
let us talk about what was taken out of the batch because
of that indication that it was an American on that particular
Friday. I will go further and say that the people we
employed to photograph persons entering the Soviet Embassy
believed they could spot an American easily, and they made
it a practice to certainly photograph that person and bring it
to our attention. One of our responsibilities was to assist
the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet
agents, particularly in America.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you now review CIA Nos. 14 and 15.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that a transcript of a conversa-
tion that took place on September 28, 1963?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. It involves a party speaking from the
Cuban Embassy to the Soviet Embassy, is that correct?

Mr. Manell. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice there is some routing indication
on this. Does your name appear anywhere on this?

Mr. Manell. My name is not on there. However, I
should have seen this. My wife -- I probably saw it because
the handwriting giving the routing indication is that of my
wife.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did your wife give you all transcripts
to review or did she select only those that she thought were
most important?

Mr. Manell. It depended on how busy I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. When, if ever, was the man speaking in
this particular conversation identified as Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Probably after receipt of the 1 October
transcript, CI No. 13.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that?

Mr. Manell. He is not identified here, is he?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, he is not? Do you have any reason
to believe that he was linked after receipt of the 1 October
transcript?

Mr. Manell. That is what confuses me, because when the
cable was sent to headquarters, it referred only to the
October 1st transcript. There is no linking in that cable to
this transcript of the 28th of September.

Mr. Goldsmith. The cable of October 8th made no
mention of any contact with the Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Manell. That is correct.
Mr. Goldsmith. Reading that transcript, is it clear to you that Oswald made three visits on September 28th to the various embassies? He is calling now from the Cuban and he indicates that he had been at the Russian earlier, and he is going back to the Russian; therefore, a total of three visits.

Mr. Manell. Well, there are two visits and the assumption that he will go back to the Soviet Embassy. It is merely an assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by the time the October 8th cable went out, this had been linked to Oswald?

Mr. Manell. By the transcriber.

Mr. Goldsmith. By the transcriber.

What about you and your wife?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the earliest time was that you did make this link?

Mr. Manell. No, I can't. Once again, let me tell you, to clarify that point, the cable that went out on the 8th reported relatively insignificant information. I would not necessarily have made the effort to do all the research necessary to determine whether this man had made a connection with other embassies. And I may not have paid much attention to the cable that went out on the 8th of October.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, the transcript of October 1st
does say the same man who called a day or so ago?

Mr. Manell. Yes, it does. And if these things were
reviewed in chronological order, it is possible that at that
time, the connection was made.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please review CIA Nos. 17 and 18 on
the translation.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you are finished with that, will
you turn the page and read the transcript relating to that
conversation of the same day, CIA No. 20, for the record.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now the two transcripts you have just
read are dated September 27, 1963. One conversation was
4:00 to 5:00 p.m.; the other one I think was 4:26 p.m. in
the afternoon; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. From the conversations contained in
those transcripts, is it clear that the man involved is at
the Cuban Embassy and he had been at the Soviet Embassy
earlier?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before we go on, we know that, accord-
ing to the transcript, if Oswald had been to the Embassy a
total of four times and if, in fact, he did return to the
Soviet Embassy; as he said he would in the September 28th
conversation, he would have been there a total of five
times. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. When were these two transcripts from
September 27th first linked to Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall. I find this rather con-
fusing because my recollection of the interview with you at
my headquarters, I didn't remember these at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying you saw these at your
headquarters; to your memory, this is the first time you
saw this particular --

Mr. Manell. I can't say. I am surprised by this.
The only thing I recollected before I looked at the files
and before my interview with you was only the 1 October
transcript. So all of this, I don't say I didn't see these
before. I do recall, however, at some point -- and this is
probably after the assassination that perhaps it came to my
attention or perhaps before -- my memory is not clear on
this. But getting to the reason why the cable of October 8th
was sent the way it was was because my wife undoubtedly only
had that information of the 1st available to her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Or if she had the earlier transcript
available, she did not make the connection?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 183.
Mr. Manell. Once again, I don't necessarily want to repeat myself, but having sent the cable of the 8th of October to headquarters, that in a case such as this one satisfied our requirement; meaning that we have identified the contact of an American with the Soviet Embassy. We have made it a matter of record and have no indication that the matter is of importance; therefore, it wouldn't necessarily prompt us, with all the other important things we were doing at this time, to devote additional effort to be complete about that relatively unimportant matter.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look now at CIA 183. I believe that is a cable dated 11 October 1963 from CIA headquarters to Mexico City station.

Why don't you skim that briefly for content and if I have a specific question on the substance, I will draw your attention to it.

Mr. Manell. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was this the cable that headquarters sent in response to the request for a name trace on Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that paragraph 1 refers to Oswald as probably identical with Lee Henry Oswald; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is an arrow pointing to the word
"Henry" and next to the arrow appears the word "sic" which is underlined.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe it is Mr. Scott's handwriting?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were these marginal notations made at the time that the cable would be received?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. By writing the word "sic", was Mr. Scott indicating that he was aware that Oswald's middle name was not Henry?

Mr. Manell. Not necessarily.

Mr. Goldsmith. What explanation would you have?

Mr. Manell. I don't really know. The only information we had was the first and last name.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Scott ever give you an indication that he knew what Oswald's middle name was?

Mr. Manell. Absolutely not.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that paragraph 2 of this cable describes Oswald as a former Russian defector; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Defector to the Russians, correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of having received information about Oswald having defected to the Russians, did that,
in any way, enhance the significance of his visit to the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did that occasion any further response by the Mexico City station regarding Oswald?

Mr. Manell. At the moment, I can't recall. What we did do was pass this information from headquarters to various elements of the American Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that point, would it have been necessary to have gone back to check the transcript? For example, the October 1st contact involving Oswald at the Russian Embassy, the telephone call; the transcriber wrote in brackets "The same man who called the other day." At that time, would either you or your wife or someone else that you know of have gone back to check the transcripts to see if, in fact, the same person had been found on the tape earlier?

Mr. Manell. I can't recall. Thinking about it at the moment, if, for example, I only felt there was one transcript, there wouldn't be any incentive to go back and see whether there were others.

Mr. Goldsmith. But the 1 October transcript did say he had called a day or so earlier?

Mr. Manell. That is right. I can't recall what I did at that time.
Mr. Goldsmith. From the state of the record as it was October 11th, headquarters had not been apprised of the contact at the Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether they were ever apprised of that contact?

Mr. Manell. Afterwards, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the assassination?

Mr. Manell. I don't believe so, but I wouldn't know. I am not sure of whether they were apprised of it or not. My belief is that they were not until after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. If they had been, there would be a cable to that effect, would there not?

Mr. Manell. Surely. There would have been a cable and not a dispatch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 182. That is a routing slip that went with the cable from headquarters, October 11th cable from headquarters, and I believe Mr. Scott's handwriting there indicates "Please set up a 'P' file"; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The P file is a local personality file?

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when Oswald's P file was set up?
Mr. Manell. Probably on that date. Now it is interesting to indicate, by the way, that Mr. Scott indicated the P file should be set up in the name of Lee Henry Oswald, even though he had written "sic" to the identification of the man by headquarters as Lee Henry Oswald. He had no argument with the identification, evidently.

Mr. Goldsmith. Noted. Thank you.

Referring now to CIA No. 19, which is one of the transcripts from September 27th, at the bottom it says "Copy, Oswald 'P' file."

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When would this have gone into his P file?

Mr. Manell. Where does it say that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Here.

Mr. Manell. This is my handwriting. It could have been -- I don't know exactly when. This is my handwriting, however.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been before the assassination?

Mr. Manell. More than likely.

Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem that before the assassination, Oswald's contact with the Cuban Embassy on September 27th had been noted.

Mr. Manell. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at CIA No. 185. That
cable requested headquarters to send a photograph of
Oswald. To your knowledge, was one ever received?

Mr. Manell. No, I don't believe a photograph was
ever received of Oswald.

Who wrote this cable? I am curious.

I wrote that cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall receiving a photo-
graph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, after the assas-
sination, Charlotte Bustof found a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for a moment to CIA 183,
paragraph 4 indicates that information concerning Oswald
be disseminated to other federal agencies, does it not?

Mr. Manell. No, to other elements of the embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, you are correct.

Why would they make that indication? Was that routine
procedure?

Mr. Manell. It was routine procedure to send it to
the FBI other than the embassy, but in this case it would
help me out with the cryptonym, who was T. P. Elide.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was the embassy.

Mr. Manell. Odyoke was what?
Mr. Goldsmith. I & S. I can tell you which ones were --

Mr. Manell. O. D. Urge?

Mr. Goldsmith. I think I know how we can solve this.

Let us look at No. 187. No. 187 is the memo that was sent by Mexico City station to the Ambassador. At the bottom of the page it lists the various agencies who received it locally.

Mr. Manell. Correct. Okay.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that an unusually wide dissemination?

Mr. Manell. The only question I have would be that of why I & S got it? Otherwise, Naval Attache, because this was a former Marine. There is that connection there, the legal attache, because the legal attache is the normal recipient of this kind of information.

Sometimes we did it to the embassy, depending on the case. So it boils down to my question as to why I & S got a copy of this or why headquarters asked us to send them a copy. That is my only query about this.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the cable received; the 11th?

Mr. Manell. Was that a weekend that followed?

Mr. Goldsmith. The 1st of October was a Tuesday.

Mr. Manell. I am talking about the 11th and the 16th.

Mr. Hardway. That would have been a Friday.

Mr. Manell. There again, you see it did not become
something of great significance that we would have imme-
diately felt we had to do it fast.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA No. 181, which is the
headquarters copy of a cable that was sent, it indicates
that Thomas Karamessines was the releasing officer.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it unusual for someone as high up
in the organization as Karamessines to be the releasing
officer for a cable of this kind?

Mr. Manell. Yes, except that there might have been
some reason that could easily explain it. For example, while
the information is not necessarily significant, yet there was
another significant piece of information that people at the
desk might have wanted the DDO to see. It could be as simple
an explanation as that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, receiving a cable at
Mexico City, who the releasing officer was?

Mr. Manell. Not at all. We don't have any indication
at Mexico City who writes the cables or who releases cables.

Who wrote this cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustof.

Mr. Manell. It was normal for a person who was an
analyst or a desk officer, as she was for the Mexico City
branch, to prepare a terse reply. It was certainly normal,
I would think, to have elements of the counterintelligence
staff coordinate the cable. It was normal, certainly, for a member of the counterintelligence section of the Soviet division to coordinate a cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. One question about paragraph 5. I believe it requests that any further contact for purposes of identification should be indicated to headquarters.

Mr. Manell. Right.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, does that help you in any way as to whether anything was ever communicated to headquarters?

Mr. Manell. No.

Let us go further to address ourselves to the question about Mr. Karamessines and why he released the cable. I can't really explain that. Otherwise, we see that it was sent out as a routine cable.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that?

Mr. Manell. Because otherwise, you would have seen the precedence of either priority or immediate. Certainly you don't see any restrictive indicators on the handling of this cable. It doesn't even indicate that it is a counterintelligence matter in the heading, and it doesn't give the restrictive indicator of an important counterintelligence case, such as Rybat, or that cryptonym is a restrictive indicator for any type of cable, if you need to restrict the information, and that is not on here, either.
The reason I am going into this at length is apparently you find it extraordinary that Mr. Karamessines signed off on this cable. I can't explain it, but I want to go further to say that the preparation and transmission of this cable indicates that there was no urgency or undue significance attached to the information.

Mr. Goldsmith. At any time that you are looking at these documents, feel free, as I see you do feel free, to give us any clarifying information.

Again, for purposes of clarification, prior to the assassination was any action taken by the Mexico City station in reference to the Oswald matter other than sending the cable to headquarters on October 8th and the dissemination that was instructed?

Mr. Manell. Nothing, to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back for a moment to the matter of the photograph, if Oswald, in fact, had gone to the embassy a total of five times -- for purposes of argument -- and making the assumption he did go back when he said he was going back, does it strike you as unusual for the photo people to have missed him five times?

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any explanation for that? I realize the photo operation was not under your control in any way, but do you have any possible explanation?
Mr. Manell. Yes, I do. The Mexicans who manned the photo facility and did it day after day, year after year, could conceivably not be performing their work as they were required to perform it. To me, that is the most straightforward explanation for the fact that we didn't receive a photo of Oswald entering the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if any of them were dismissed as a result of the failure to obtain a picture?

Mr. Manell. No, I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 188. This is a cable dated November 22nd. The third paragraph indicates, among other things, "Forwarding soonest copies of only visitor to Soviet Embassy 20 October who could be identical to Oswald."

Do you know whether the date 20 October is correct or incorrect?

Mr. Manell. Probably a mistake. I think I wrote this cable. I am not sure.

There is a correction on the following, right here. I wrote this cable. Obviously it was a mistake on my part, trying to get this information out as fast as I could.

I did, as you see, put in an immediate precedence on the transmission of this cable. As I said before, I linked the name Oswald that we heard over the radio with the Oswald who had contacted the Soviet Embassy; and therefore, I sent
this cable out as fast as I could on the 22nd of November.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the 22nd of November, you read that one Oswald contact?

Mr. Manell. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Manell, CIA No. 183, the headquarters cable, contains a description of Oswald in paragraph 1.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. After receiving this cable, were you aware that the photograph to which reference had been made in the cable of October 8th was not a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. I can't recollect what I believed at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. As of the day of the assassination, you thought that there was still a possibility that there was a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Manell. Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As it turned out, it wasn't necessary to send it. But that was our intention.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA No. 184. This was a cable from headquarters dated November 23rd. The first paragraph instructs you to review tapes and transcripts since the 27th of September.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that indicate that headquarters
was in some way aware of Oswald's contact with the embassy on September 27th?

   Mr. Manell. It certainly does.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how they would have been made aware of that?

   The reason I ask is because we have reviewed cable traffic and have not seen any cable traffic informing them of that content.

   Mr. Manell. No. There is something I can't explain, and I am trying somehow to get an explanation for it in my mind.

   As I told you before, normally the station did not forward raw transcripts to headquarters. That would have been one way for them to know the 27th of September contact.

   You say there is no other traffic?

   Mr. Goldsmith. Based on our review of the file.

   Mr. Manell. Or visit or contact by Oswald earlier than the 1st of October to the Soviet Embassy? This leaves me certainly at a loss for an explanation.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that that would have been done telephonically?

   Mr. Manell. Not likely.

   Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

   Mr. Manell. You don't telephone classified information to headquarters, normally.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible -- and I do not want to put words in your mouth -- that headquarters knew about the contact of September 28th and that they instructed you to refer to the conversation, the contact of the 27th, just for purposes of extra insurance?

Mr. Manell. I can't comment on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please refer to CIA No. 197, specifically paragraph 3.

Mr. Manell. Wht date is this cable; the 23rd of November?

Mr. Goldsmith. It is a cable dated November 23, 1963. Address your attention to paragraph No. 3.

Let me ask you whether this cable corrects the date that you had incorrectly reported in the earlier cable.

Mr. Manell. Yes, it does, to 1 October.

Who wrote this cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe the author of this cable was Ann Goodpasture; is that correct?

Mr. Manell. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the second paragraph of CIA No. 198, which is the Mexico City copy of that cable.

Mr. Manell. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The language in that paragraph indicates that the station could not compare the voice of Oswald because the first tape of his voice or his conversation had been
erased prior to the receipt of the second contact.

Mr. Manell. Correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. The way that is phrased suggests, however, that at that time, November 23rd, there was still one tape in existence. In other words, it does not say all tapes reporting Oswald contacts had been erased. It says one tape was erased prior to the receipt of the next one.

Mr. Manell. I would not give that importance or make the assumption you are making. It is not completely phrased in the cable. It merely says "station unable compare voice as first tape erased prior receipt second call." That is all it says.

I don't see how you can conclude the way you conclude.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please don't misunderstand me. I am not intending to offer any conclusions.

Mr. Manell. No, but you are indicating that a second tape was kept and not erased.

Mr. Goldsmith. What I want to do is ask whether the language there suggests that in fact that was the case.

Mr. Manell. I am saying it was not the case; probably not the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to understand,

Mr. Manell, that we are conducting a thorough review of the files and the cable traffic and we are obliged to address every question that arises based on that review.
Mr. Manell. I am sorry, but I felt you were drawing a

conclusion.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your position. I just

wanted you to understand mine, that is all.

Mr. Manell. Right.

I wonder if I might make a short statement at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Certainly.

Mr. Manell. From the questioning by you, I am led to

believe that you may have the suspicion, certainly the con-
cern, that there was a separate communication sent to the
station by headquarters about Oswald of which you have no

record.

To the very, very best of my knowledge, there was no

separate communication sent to the station with regard to

Oswald. Certainly if there was a separate communication, I

never had any knowledge of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

What about the reverse of that; separate communication

from the Mexico City station to headquarters?

Mr. Manell. Firstly, I doubt that there was, because

in some fashion I would have become privy to it. Second,
once again, I certainly know of no separate communication not

appearing in the record here that was sent by Mexico City

station to Washington.

Is that perfectly clear, that there was no side
communication, to my knowledge, from either headquarters
to the station or from the station to headquarters?

Mr. Goldsmith. I certainly understand your answer,
yes.

Turning back for a moment to the question of the
erasure of the first Oswald tape prior to the receipt of the
second. My understanding -- and we can check the appropriate
cable for confirmation of this -- is that the normal time
lag for the erasure of tapes was two weeks. If that is
correct, it would seem that the normal lag period did not
apply in regard to the Oswald contact.

In other words, the first contact was September 27th
or September 28th. The next contact was October 1st, and
the first contact tape was erased well before the two-week
period had elapsed, if in fact the cable is accurate in what
it reports that the first tape was erased prior to the receipt
of the second one.

Mr. Manell. You are correct in assuming that there
would have been, just for mechanical reasons, the existence
of the first tape in its original form prior to receipt of the
second one, because the transcription process couldn't have
been completed, since it involved the Russian language,
until after the second call was made. You are correct there.

I would just suggest here that perhaps in the heat of
writing an immediate cable on the 23rd of November, the

001030.
language by Miss Goodpasture wasn't absolutely clear. I think that the only thing she wanted to convey here, reading into this, is that no voice comparison was made because we don't have certainly on the 23rd of November either tape available.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, she wasn't necessarily being completely accurate when she said the first tape was erased prior to the receipt of the second.

Mr. Manell. I would say that the sentence does not convey her intention.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, do you know of any action on the part of anyone at the Mexico City station indicating that that person withheld information from the authorities at CIA headquarters concerning Oswald's visit to Mexico City?

Mr. Manell. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have nothing further, Mr. Manell. I would like to thank you very much for being here. I also would like to say I am sorry if we inconvenienced you today.

Mr. Manell. It wasn't your fault.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, customarily when we call someone to a hearing, a person is given five minutes at the end of a hearing to make a statement. We have called you here for a deposition in lieu of a hearing. If you would like an
opportunity to make a statement on the record, please feel
free to do so.

Mr. Manell. Your questioning leads me to two assump-
tions. One, that either at headquarters or at the
station there was a communication that is not part of the
record that you have. To the very best of my knowledge, I
believe you are incorrect in having that assumption because,
firstly, I know that I have no direct specific knowledge to
support that assumption.

Secondly, I believe that in some fashion I would have
become privy to that fact if it indeed existed.

The second point I would like to make does not bear on
what you asked me today, but what you asked during the
interview. I was led to believe that you had suspicion that
one agency of the government knew that another had more
contact with Oswald prior to the assassination than is a
matter of record and that perhaps another agency was covering
that up.

Here again, I certainly have no information to bear out
that assumption. But in this case, I wouldn't necessarily
have had the means to become privy to that kind of informa-
tion.

I think that you place emphasis on the fact that
Mr. Karamessines signed off on the name trace cable from
headquarters to the station on the 11th of October. That, I
find strange, but then again, I think that by thorough investigation on your part, you could easily determine the reason for it.

So, rather than have it become an important concern or reservation on your part, I think that you could nail that down one way or the other with a minimum of investigation.

That is it. That is the end of my statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

I have read the foregoing pages 1 through 61, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Signature is subject to corrections.

__________________________
Herbert Manell
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken Albert Joseph LaFrance, shorthand reporter, and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

My commission expires:

November 14, 1980

Albert Joseph LaFrance
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia