JFK Assassination System Identification Form

Date:

6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY: F

RECORD NUMBER: 124-90135-10273

RECORD SERIES: HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 105-82298-108

Released under the John

. Kennedy

Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).

Case#:NW 56829 Date:

þ4-13-2018

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: USA

FROM: USA

TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 02/13/1961

PAGES: 12

SUBJECTS:

ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

RESTRICTIONS: Consulted CURRENT STATUS: Withhold

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/25/1998

OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF USA

COMMENTS: RPT; REFERRED TO USA

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Comandante - one gold star on each epaulet Comendante who is chief of a province - star with a circle

Ministry of Defense - Shield with star in center on epaulets

Militiamen Uniform: The trousers worn by both army personnel and militia-men are identical: dark olive green. However, all militiamen wear a light blue shirt of the type worn by farm workers in the U.S. All militia-men wear black French-type berets. Black low quartersshoes or either black or brown combat boots may be worn with the uniform. In general, all militia-men uniforms are fairly-well standardized. None of the militia wear ranks in line with their theme of equality. However, some of the more eccentric chiefs do wear some insignia in individual cases to advertise their positions, but the exact type or types of insignia is unknown to source.

- / 19. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCIES: 1. G-2 The Chief is Ramiro Valdes. The G-2 for the Cuban Revolutionary Forces (CRF) represents all the military and civilian agencies alike. As such he also supervised all G-2's of the other armed forces. He has unquestionable control over all investigations both within Cuba and abroad. G-2 personnel in Cuba have been likened to "gestapos". in both tactics, procedures, and power. Although source has no personal knowledge of the key G-2 personnel outside of Valdes, he is aware that most of their key personalities have been recruited from the ranks of the Socialist Youth of Cuba, a known Communist youth organization. One other facet of this organization is the fact that although Valdes is nominally the appointed head and chief of G-2, the person that answers to Castro direct on all intelligence matters is Falbio Bravo, who is the replacement personally appointed to take the place vacated by the former head who was recently killed in a light aircraft accident.
- G-5 The head Inspector General is William Galvez; nothing further to report.
- Investigations Department, Office of the Cuban Prime Minister Dissolved in late 1960 or early 1961; nothing further known.
- 4. Investigations Department, National Institute for Agrarian Réform-Antonio Nunez Jimenez, Head.
- 5. Technical Judicial Police Dissolved at some unrecalled time and was absorbed by the National Police.
- 6. Movement of Revolutionary Workers Not known to source. He believes it to be the same as the Cuban Federation of Labor (CTC).
- Committee of Revolutionary Women Vilma Espin, wife of Raul Castro, President.
- (C) \SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS: 1. The Popular Socialist Party Blas Roca - Secretary General.

The Eventy-sixth of July Movement - Emillo Aragones, Head.

- olutionary Directorate:

21. (C) ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES: Source claims that he has very little in the way of definitive information on the counter-revolutionary movements. However, he does recall having heard variously from unrecalled sources that there is an estimated 600 counter-revolutionists located within the Escambray Mountains. He does not know the names of any of the opposition leaders nor of any connections these groups may have with exile elements in the United States. Neither does he have any idea as to their planned operations or aims. What he does know is that it has been reported to him variously from unrecalled sources that because of militia raids and patrols, these counter-revolutionist have been forced to remain well dispersed; in addition, it is also reported that they are not too well equipped with the result that, to date, they have been unable to consummate any formidable attacks and therefore pose no particular threat to the Castro regime. Source is of the opinion that such forces would serve to be successful and effective if not annoying to the Castro regime but lack the proper organization and leadership.

22. (C) CUBAN CIVILIAN MILITIA: Source stated that to his knowledge, there is a force of approximately 30,000 (sic) combined Castro militia and military cuba troops within Las Villas Province under the command of one Derminio Escalona. Primary mission of these troops is to counter and negate any efforts on the part of the 600 counter-revolutionaries in the Escambray Mountains from attacking any of the Castro fortifications. Although it is known that there is at least one regiment of militia assigned to each province, source has no definite/knowledge of the names of its principal or subordinate commanders, weapons, strength, status of training, etc. He does recall that the militia-comandante at Cameguey Province is one Papito Cerguera and that Raul Castro and Armando Mcosta are the Chiefs of the tactical forces within Oriente Province. Source added that consonant with OFidel Castro's concerted effort to centralize and nationalize all of Cuba, one of his prime objectives has been to nullify the potentiality and fighting effectiveness of the original Rebel Army which fought Batista. Along these lines, the former Regular Army virtually lost its identity and is methodically being replaced in strategic positions with trusted pro-Castro militia-men. Army personnel have been constantly shifted to prevent them from consolidating and they are relegated to such menial tasks as road building, crop harvesting and other such agrarian but un-military type duties. In Castro's mind, it is his intention to merge the militia with the more trustworthy elements of the armed forces into a single entity loyal only to Castro himself. Towards that end, it is source's impression that Castro has been eminently successful, since armed forces personnel and former Rebel Army forces have been so distributed and scattered and kept on the move that it is not possible for them to band together into any effective fighting group of Source added the foregoing in answer to queries and pointed questions opposition. on detailed order of battle information. His reply was that under the chaotic and total lack of organization within the Cuban Armed Forces, this confusion was designed to prevent any military coups d'etat from formulating; and since the Rebel Army had no distinct Table of Organization or strength breakdown, meither does the present armed forces or the militia follow any such distribution or orderliness. Commanders are usually district chiefs and not even they are ever totally aware of whom or how many troops they have under their control at any given time. is source's opinion that Castro has been able to continue to retain control of Cuba by taking advantage of and perhaps even fostering this anomaly of deranged disorder within the Cuban Armed Forces to impose some method to his madness.

(Classification)

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FROM FOURTH U.S. ARMY

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Lazaro Pena - known Communist Party Member
Anibal Assalante - known Communist Party Member

cuba

J0135 - 10213

- 16. (C) ORDER OF BATTLE: Source stated that because he has been virtually on a reserve status since Castro reorganized the armed forces, he is not aware of the composition, strength, organization, materiel, leadership, or training of the current Cuban Revolutionary Army. However, one fact which he is certain of is that the morale of that portion of the Revolutionary Armed Forces with which he does come in contact is decidedly low and dwindling daily; and desertions are rampant. It is source's belief, that a larger majority of the original Rebel Army is not; and has never been, Comministically inclined. As a matter of fact ideal and politics in general played little (apercance in maneup) or most of the revolutionaries; they were interested primarily in ridding Cuba of the Batista dictatorship, and with the present infiltration of known Communist elements, most of these original revolutionaries are in a quandary as to their true status. Their relationships within the Rebel Army in connection with the Castro regime have steadily worsened, mainly because of Castro's open distrust of them as brought out in his replacement of Rebel Army men in strategic positions with militia personnel. This is all part and parcel of Castro's aim of surrounding himself with only those lieutenants whom he can trust implicitly and who will follow him blindly. Source feels also that virtually all key staff position personnel in the Rebel Army have been replaced by well known communists. As examples, Comandante Felix Torres; Comandante Armando Acosta, who is in command of the Las Villas area; and Comandante Juan Escalona, the assistant to Raul Castro; are all known to be established Communist Party members.
 - 17. (C) SECURITY AND DEFENSE MEASURES IN CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS: Source stated that he is unaware of any of the security and defense measures which may be in effect in any of the following named installations. In his estimation, they are indefensible with the present capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, and can be considered to be completely vulnerable to any concentrated, organized attack.
 - 1. Airfield at San Antonio de los Banos
 - 2. Jose Marti International Airport
 - 3. La Cabana Fortress (Havana)
 - 4. Castillo de Atares (Havana)
 - 5. Campo Libertad Airfield (Havana)
 - 6. INRA Building (Havana)
 - 7. Managua Army Camp (Appr 15 miles SE of Havana)
 - 18. (C) UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIAS: Robel Army: Their uniforms are made from the same tropical worsted material which is worn by U.S. troops during the summer with the exception that they are dark olive green in color. Both officers and enlisted personnel wear identical uniforms. The cap used is identical to the U.S. Army field cap or fatigue cap without stiffeners or rank; within the Cuban Revolutionary Army, they are known as "combat caps." One other cap often used for different occasions is a garrison type cap with visor similar to that issued to the French Army. Officers are distinguished by this cap with gold braid on the visor together with rank insignia. Still others sear black French beret type caps; there is no exact uniformity in the hats or uniforms worn.

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Lazaro Pena - known Communist Party Member
Anibal Ascalante - known Communist Party Member

cuba

10126 - 10213

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Enlisted men (stripes are gold in color):

Soldier - no stripes

Private First Class - one stripe

Corporal - two stripes

Sergeant - three stripes

Sergeant Major - four stripes (three up and one parellel)

Officers:

Sub-lieutenant - One gold bar on each epaulet

Lieutenant - two gold bars on each epaulet

Captain - three gold bars on each epaulet

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- ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTALION: According to source, a total of approximately 10,000 revolutionary soldiers have been trained in the use of anti-aircraft weapons at Pinar del Rio; militia chiefs have received identical training at Matanzas. However, the actual training sites, type and degree of training, etc., are unknown to source. He does recall it mentioned that instructors employed were mostly of Czech extraction. He denied any knowledge of a particular anti-aircraft battalion presently or previously employed in Cuba.
- 12. (C) RURAL POLICE: According to source, the Rural Police, per se, no longer exists. At one time, exact period unrecalled, there were plans made to establish such a Rural Police organization and an academy was organized to effect such a force. However, the entire matter lasted but about 30 days and was dropped completely.
- (C) SOVIET BLOC ARMS AND EQUIPMENT: Source stated that he has no personal knowledge concerning the type, numbers, capabilities, or any other information on Soviet Bloc arms and equipment which might have been brought into Cuba. He reiterated that he and his group were issued only obsolete and older equipment while all foreign and never type weapons were passed to the civilian militia.
- 14. (C) POLITICAL INFLUENCE: In source's decided opinion, at the time of his departure from Cuba, the only group which can be considered to be at all loyal to the Castro regime is the Civilian Militia, and the loyalty stems more from Castro's constant reminders to them that they are the principal force to deter invasion from outsiders than any deep seated allegiance either to Castro or his regime. With regard to the militia-men, source feels that they are composed mostly of farmers and workers and generally people without any actual combat experience. As a result, their very wearing of uniforms, standing guard duty and participating in parades are treated more in the light of boy scout games than as a formidable military force. For the same reason, source feels that, should any major opposition be imposed upon the militia, they would commence to scatter, disband, and disintegrate in disorder. Along the same lines, source feels that a majority of the key militia chiefs is not in total agreement with all of Castro's extreme policies; however, the dread and fear of imprisonment, reprisals and death are the only forces which keep them in line. Coupled with this is the undeniable fact that with the nationalization of all industries and business, they all realize that their jobs and very existence, as well as that of their families, depend to a great degree on their outward enthusiasm for militia affairs, since everything is now being controlled by the government, no matter what and where their personal sentiments might lie. Source is of the opinion that this drive for survival more than any singular allegiance to the regime is the prime motivating factor holding the militia together, and accounts for its apparent loyalty to the Castro regime.
- 15. (C) POSSIBLE DEFECTORS: In source's estimation, the following is a list of high Cuban officials who are the most apt to defect or join counter revolutionaries, if given the opportunity. Source bases this assumption on the statements made by them in his presence in reaction to current affairs in Cuba.

Alfredo Lagura - <u>Minister of Justice</u> Pipen Paranjo - <u>Minister of Government</u>

Faustino Perez - Ex-minister of Recuperation of Properties

(fnu) Otuski - Ex-minister of Communications

Moelio Jursoli - Secretary General of the Confederation of Cuban

Commandante Rolando Cubela - Presidente of the Federation of Uni-

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officials are the ones he deems most dedicated to opposing the United States and

its policies:

Comandante Felix Torres - known Communist Parky member Comandante Armando Acosta - known Communist Rocky member Comandante Ramiro Valdes - Chief of G-2 Foca - Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Party (Communist Party) of Cuba

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- 55. (C) ESCUELA DE CAPACITACION: Source stated that although he has heard of the existence of such a school, he has no details as to its curricula, operations or purpose.
- Almejeira. Source felt that because of his strong anti-Communist sentiments, there is a strong possibility that Almejeira will soon try to defect to the United States. The National Police is divided by lines of demarcations or zones and precincts within both provinces and towns. Source has no additional information on the National Police other than the fact that he personally saw that they were being incorporated into the army, as shown by the fact that the police are now earing army uniforms, with only a police badge to distinguish them from soldiers. The police are generally arms retained from the old Batista regime. The general headquarters of the Cuban National Police is presently located on Chacon Street in Havana. It is source's belief that the incorporation of the Cuban National Police into the framework of the military forces is part of Fidel Castro's overall aim to nationalize and centralize all agencies.
- 7. (C) DISPOSITION OF THE ARM: Source claims that the Cuban Revolutionary Army is presently composed of the same tactical forces which fought against Batista. They are stationed throughout the mountainous areas and total approximately 30,000 to 40,000 men. This Rebel Army is presently under the command of the Minister of Defense (Raul Castro). The Chief of Staff for the Army is Comandante Juan Almeida. Within the army there is a G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and G-5 setup, which is organized in the same manner as the U.S. Army. The next in command are the Comandantes of the various regiments which are located in the provincial areas of Cuba, i.e., Metanzas, Las Villas, Havana, Camaguey, and Oriente. However, according to source, there is no table of organization within the Cuban Armed Forces and all changes are periodically made at the whim and will of Fidel Castro personally. At present, the principal mission of the Cuban Revolutionary Army appears to be restricted to such tasks as operating as labor battalions in agriculture, in the constructions of schools and roads, etc. As a result, their primary function as a fighting army has been delegated to the militia. Source believes that Fidel Castro could conceivably mobilize approximately 200,000 militiamen in a show of strength but only for a limited period of time, since the militia is composed entirely of workers who cannot be spared from their employment for any sustained periods of time without causing complete paralysis of all industry. Source also estimates that Castro does have a minimum of approximately 30,000 permanent militiamen bearing arms at all times and that it is Castro's desire to have his own private army within the militia.
- 8. (C) SPECIFIC HEADQUARTERS IN HAVANA AND SANTIAGO AREAS: According to source the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Santiago is known as Santiago General Headquarters and is located at Moncada Camp, Santiago de Cuba, Oriente Province. The General Headquarters in Havana itself is located on Del Puerto Avenue in Havana and is where the Armed Forces Ministry is located. Source declared that he knew of no other major units in those areas.
- 9. (C) DEFENSE AGAINST AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS: Source stated that he has heard from unrecalled sources that in the event of an all-out attack on Cuba, it has been pre-determined that Fidel Castro would assume command of La Mabana and Matanzas Provinces; Che Guevara would command Pinal del Rio Province; Raul Castro would command Oriente Province; and Escalona would be in charge of Cameguey and Las Villas Provinces. Source claims that, other than that, no formidable defense plans have been formulated. Therefore, it is his opinion that no adequate protection of Havana or Mavana Base, the INRA Building, electrical plants, water reservoirs, and refineries has yet been devised, however, these installations are heavily guarded. Source added that he also heard from unrecalled sources that there is a large concentration of Rebel troops stationed near Guantanamo Base; however, he has no explicit knowledge or confirmation of this. In source's opinion, at present the only active defense measures being undertaken is the continuing stockpiling of weapons and an increase in active militiamen.
- 10. (C) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES: Source stated that he is unaware of any general overall augmentation plans for the increase of communications in the event of an emergency. Neither is he knowledgeble of the present communications systems other than the fact that all telephone, telegraph, radio, and televisions, plus all reads and other transportation networks, are now centralized under the control of the present government.

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Following general comments were made concerning miscellaneous subjects discussed during the interrogation:

l. (C) IDENTIFICATION OF SINO-SOVIET BLOCK PERSONNEL: Source disclaims any personal knowledge of this subject on the grounds that he has had no direct contact with foreign advisors of any type. Moreover, it is his insistent claim that what fragmentary information he can offer is based mainly on hearsay from unrecalled sources. He admits that he once heard, exact time unrecalled, that there are some Czech military advisors in both Soledad and in Pinar del Rio but he has no idea as to the exact number, locations, identifications, or equipment. It is his impression that these Czech technicians are used to instruct the militia forces in the use of small arms, anti-aircraft weapons, and to instruct the Cubans in Military Training procedures. Source further claims he is not aware of the command relationships between these technicians and the Cuban government nor does he have any knowledge of their pay or any plans for future buildup that these Bloc forces might have. To his recollection, he has never seen any Russian or Polish technicians in Cuba although he has heard that there have been some present.

With regard to the Chinese, it is source's opinion that many of them have been brought into Cuba to act as advisors in the agricultural and industrial fields. But here again, he has no notion as to the number, their locations, or exact roles. Source declared that an added difficulty is caused by the fact that all of the Chinese Communist consultants entering Cuba speak fluent Spanish so that it is virtually impossible to distinguish them from native born or immigrated Chinese since they all look alike and wear the same clothes and expressions.

He does recall that he once heard that these foreign advisors and technicians all entered Cuba under the auspices of the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP)(Cuban Institute of Friendship with other Countries) and that they are comprised of personnel from pro-communist and Communist-dominated countries, or Communist sympathizers from the Latin-American countries. He believes that there are approximately 2,000 of these visitors in Cuba at present and that they are accorded preferential treatment as exemplified by the fact that they are all quartered in the most luxurious hotels and cabanas in Cuba. Source repeated that he knew of nothing additional concerning foreign advisors since he has been in such an isolated district and has been out of contact with the main metropolis areas.

- 2. (C) MINAS DEL FRIO: Source reiterated that HE again has only hearsay information, and that to the best of HIS knowledge there are no known tactical units at this place. Individuals sent there are restricted to personnel who have committed offenses against the Castro regime. These individuals are for the most part, military personnel who have been sent there for disciplinary reasons. They are marched to the mines where they are forced to perform hard, strenuous labor and after being there for approximately a week, are marched back to their original units. This is considered to be severe punishment in and of itself since the terrain there is so rugged and difficult to traverse. Source particularly recalls the case of Commandante Genaro Arroyo, who was ordered to march there in a body together with approximately 150 officers from the Revolutionary Army. They were sent there and returned specifically as a punitive measure.
- 3. (C) EL CAMEY: Source claims he has no personal information concerning El-Caney.

tionary Army is presently equipped with Belgium made, magazine loaded, 20 round, europastic New (phonethe) Explose. We has also seen becooker than a loaded, 20 round, europastic New (phonethe) Explose (webcarried as to be a loaded). We will consider more and as well as passible and revoluces of energy types. They cause have been as such that they are hostily of exact descriptions of these weapons. However, he did state that they are hostily of weapons that had originally been used by the Rebel Army to overthrow Botista. New

weapons that had originally been used by the Rebel Army to overthrow Batista. New weapons coming into Cuba from the Sino-Soviet Bloc are issued to the militia only and include 9-mm sub-machine guns and the R-2 rifles. Here again source claims that neither his forces nor the Regular Army were given these.

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a greater relegation and also in his being put under greater relegation and also in surveillance by Castro's people. Fidel took no action against HIM because, HE feels, that Fidel would have been in a bad position to justify any such action in the public opinion. He then started planning HIS departure because HIS opposition to Castro was creating a situation in which sooner or later HE would be put in jail. HE fought Batista in order to overthrow a dictatorship and establish a democracy in Cuba. Further, due to his opposition toward Castro's communistic actions, he was being charged both in newspapers, radio, and rumors among the people, that he was with counter revolutionary elements in bombings in Havana and groups that had fled to the Escambray Mountains. In HIS opinion, these were tactics of Castro's regime to build up the people so as to throw him in jail. He then arranged all his plans for departure and left Cuba in January 1961. Foreign Travel: In 1957, a trip to the United States to contact Prio Socarras and Faure Chaumon. In 1959, a trip to Miami for a reception by the Mayor of Miami. During this trip he also visited Chicago and New York. In July 1960, a trip to Spain. This time he carried a diplomatic passport, but it was a vacation trip, which was to last about 30 days. However, after being in Spain for a few days, HE was forced to leave the country because HE was suspected of being an agent of Castro on an unknown mission. HE then went to France and then to Belgium. In Belgium, HE visited a group of Spanish Nationals, who were friends of HIS. After a few days he was picked up by the police, together with HIS friends, and put into jail. HE was in jail "incommicado" for about six days when HE was then deported. HE returned to France since he was afraid HE would be re-arrested if he traveled through Madrid. While in France, he contacted the National Bank in Cuba to send him some more funds since his money was depleted by then. In the same message, he requested permission to return via the United States but both requests were disapproved. In the end, he made arrangements with a ticket agency in France for passage on credit and commenced his return trip through Portugal. Upon his arrival in Lisbon, he was again detained, searched, and investigated. From Lisbon, his route took him by way of Santa Maria, where he was again searched, interviewed and a surveillance was conducted on him. Because of the many delays enroute, SUBJECT decided to

CHARACTER: a. Description - 5'10" in height; 133 lbs in weight; brown eyes; brown hair; slight build; light complexion; wears a mustache; has a scar in the middle of the lower lip which starts there and continues towards the middle of the chin.

expenses for it out of his own pocket.

return to Cuba by plane, which he did accomplish. According to source, this entire trip spanned the period of approximately one month, and he paid for all

Characteristics - Though thin and slight in build, he has a tendency to swagger. He can be considered to be handsome. He is a heavy smoker and prefers non-filtered cigarettes. Does not drink at all but enjoys dancing and "all kinds of women." He has a pleasant smile and is a good conversationalist.

Interrogation and questioning does not faze him.

c. Weaknesses - SUBJECT's lack of education, finesse or polish is apparent. Although quite glib and probably very influential in his speech, he encounters difficulty in expressing himself in other than the most routine and ordinary of matters. He also demonstrated poor retention for details such as dates, times and names.

Strong Points - He probably makes up for his lack of finesse in conversation, Despite his slight build, his good looks, masculine appearbearing and charm. ance, and convancing manner probably stands him in good stead among the feminine

Low managed, he does not seem to be as excitable or telligent leader of head to de de a special shows the marks of a professional

volutionists.

Hobbies - All sports generally. Professes to like chess, ping judo and "women." Claims to have learned judo by self-study. International orientation - His lack of mowledgeability on rather outstanding. However, this does not detract from his dedicate revolutionary matters. He appears to favor the United States, if any

or reliability can be placed on his remarks. PHOTOGRAPH: Being obtained and will be forwarded upon receipt

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: a. Property in Cuba; SUBJECT Club," a bar and dancing club located on Linea and

b. In 1959, SUBJECT received a contract fix

ernment for the

b. In 1959, SUBJECT received a contract from the Subscious government for the demolishment of the Old Market Place in La Valuation of the Castro government seemed arrest, trial and probable imprisonment in Julia by the Castro government seemed imminent, it was as much a fight for survival as a chance to re-organize opposition forces here in the United Stress that caused him to defect when he did. He feels strongly that he has been misled by Castro and that the 2d Front Forces certainly did not receive the creat they were due for their part in the overthrow of the Backeta die. The Since his value in Cuba had been more use here in the Jose consolidating and mobilizing resistance forces here to reduce to Union and Bodyo.

The Castro of Sufficient strength and power to return to Cuba and overthrow Castro.

asforce of sufficient strength and power to return to Cuba and overthrow Castro. He feels that with his reputation and fame as well as revolutionary experience, he can arouse all Cubans in exile to rise to a common cause and effect their return to Cuba as soon as possible. During the interim, it is his intention to gather as many men and arms as possible to prosecute their mission successfully. If paroled from the Alien Detention Facility, HE intends to contact Zenaida Marriro, the wife of the former Cuban Consul in Tampa, Florida, or Ramon Gonzales, who resides at some unknown address in Miami. He feels confident that he will be able to contact one or both of them prior to departing McAllen.

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REPORT NO. ID PAGE NO. FOURTH U.S. ARMY

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second year of high school. The only other some night training in motor mechanics at the

SUBJECT declares he has never had any steady enloyment b

12.

SUBJECT declares he has never had any steady enloyment time jobs in garages as a mechanic at the medic of 15 and 1 RELIGION: Catholic POLITICS: SUBJECT claims he does not be appointed any type and that he has never been a politics. Howe that he prefers a democratic form of politics. Howe that he prefers a democratic form of politics. Howe corrupt as the former Batista regime to the type corrupt as the former Batista regime to additionally declar contact with politics was after he had not the revolutionary for Batista in 1952 at the age of 17 and the revolutionary for a state of 1952 at the age of 17 and the revolutionary.

LANGUAGES: Spanish Speaks, reads, writes and understands fluently. any knowledge of English whatsoever. 13. POLITICS:

14. any knowledge of English whatsoever.

PAST CARTER: In 1952, SUBJECT joined the revolutionary forces in Cuba in their battle against Batista; his contribution in the conflict was as a member of the underground. SUBJECT was 17 years of age at the time, and as he recalled, most of the opposition leaders were "politicians." Their mission then included the committing of acts of sabotage and the transporting of weapons to be used against Batista. No incidents of any consequence occured during those early years (1952 and 1953). However, by 1954, the revolutionists had stockpile a large store of weapons which they had commandeered from the Allestaran warehouse located between Havana and Vedado. Raids were also conducted on the warehouses on Santa Marta and Lindero Streets in Havana. After these weapons were placed in the hands of the waiting revolutionists, they commenced their assaults on the Moncada and Goicuria Camps. Fidel Castro directed the assault on the Moncada Camp while Reyno Garcia directed the assault on the Goicuria Camp. time, the Federation of University Students organized the <u>Direcotario Revolucionario</u> under the command of Jose Antonio Echevarria.

Member Fidel Castro was forced into exile in 1955 and returned to Cuba on 2 January 1957. On 13 March 1957, the assault on Radio City and the Palace was launched. In this assault, SUBJECT was given the task of being the liaison officer between the two main assault groups. It was during this assault that his brother, Carlos was killed; the brother was leading the assault on the Palace. Following this, SUBJECT returned to the underground movement and continued to create disturbances. By the middle part of 1957, he came to the United States to contact Prio Socarras and Faure Chaumon. HIS mission with these people was a failure. By this time HE had already been appointed National Chief of the Revolutionary Directorate in charge of assaults (action). HE returned to Cuba and organized the Second Front and established quarters in the Escambray Mountains in Las Villas. HE organized this group of 15 individuals. The weapons HE had included about 19 carbines, one Thompson Sub-machinegun, one M-3 Sub-machinegun, and five Johnson rifles. HE asked the 26th of July Movement for aid but it was never granted. At that time all the aid was going to Castro who was in the Sierras. Source and HIS men remained in the Escambray Mountains untill the attack on Havana when Fidel Castro sent Che Guevera with troops for a combined final attack (1958). By this time he had approximately 3000 men fighting in the mountains. The second Front was given the responsibility of attacking through the Southern part of Las Villas while Che Guevera attacked through the Northern part. These combined attacks with Castro and other revolutionaries resulted in the overthrow of Batista. Immediately upon Castro's taking power in Cuba, the Second Front was practically disbanded. This was due to the fact that none of the members of the Second Front were pro-communist. Officers and enlisted men were placed in a sort of reserve status. However, inasmuch as the people of Cuba knew of the activities of the Second Front, Fidel Castro kept some of the high ranking officers close to him, but without any command position. Source was given two checks, one in January 1959, and the other in February 1959, in payment of his services, which he refused to accept.

HE attended many official gatherings, had bodyguards, but held no command positions. In July 1960 he was contacted by Fidel Castro and asked to make a trip to the Socialist countries, which HE refused to do. This resulted in

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COUNTRY

CUBA

GROW SUBJECT OGUTIERREZ-MENOYO, Eloy

Gallego butierrez

REPORT NO.

DATE OF REPORT 13 February 1961

NO. OF PAGES

REFERENCES

6 February 1961

U.S. Border Patrol

PLACE a 6 February 1961

DATE ACQ. Alien Detention Facility, McAllen, Texas EVALUATION F-3

G2, FOURTH U.S. ARMY FROM PREPARED BY WOODROW Y. CHIN, Capt. AI (Inf) R-SERIES NO. R-2-61

source Interrogation of Subject

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SUMMARY FULL NAME: GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, Eloy; ALIEN RECISTRATION NR: ALIASES, NICKNAMES, VARIANTS: a. Lazaro MARTINEZ Mendoza A 10 190 153 b. "GALLEGO" b.

ALIASES, NICKNAMES, VARIANTS: a. Lazaro M. PRESENT TITLE OR MILITARY RANK: Comandante

ERANCH OF SERVICE: Segundo Frente de la Sierra del Escambray

Inactive PRESENT POSITION:

DATE OF BIRTH: 8 December 1934

PLACE OF BIRTH: Madrid, Spain
NATIONALITY AND ORIGIN: Cuban Citizenship by decree from CASTRO.

9. WIFE: Single

CHILDREN: None N/A 10.

EDUCATION: Ten (10) years 11.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT None BY AUTHORITY OF G2,

FOURTH U.S. ARMY.

12. RELIGION: Catholic POLITICS: Segundo Frente de la Sierra del Escambray 13.

14. LANGUAGES: Spanish - Fluent

PAST CAREER: 1952 joined the revolutionary forces in Cuba against Batista. Fought Batista forces from the Escambray Mountains until Jan 59. Fled from CONFIDENTIAL Cuba, 24 Jan 61.

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ALL F81 INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN

GENCE REPORT

d1132-105/2 REPORT NO. ID (Classification) PAGE NO. 2 FOURTH U.S. ARMY ON THENT IA CHARACTER: Height: 5'10"
MAR & 21 Puild: Slight CONFIDENTIAL Height: 5'10" Eyes: Brown Weight: 133 lbs Hair: Brown Puild: Slight Beard: Wears Alstache 5- 2598 | EX 104 | EX 105 | EX । श्रीभीवैं। COMMENT: CONFIDENTIAL (Classification) NW 56829 DocId:32336878