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DAILY SUMMARY

9 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

C O N T E N T S

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

Three independent clandestine sources have reported on the unloading of military equipment from the Soviet vessel METALLURG BAIKOV in Havana harbor on 19 or 20 November. (Page 1)

Soviet "coastal defense rockets" now belong to Cuban Army artillery forces, according to a recent speech by Raul Castro; however, Soviets still appear to be involved in the communications net which serves the cruise missile system. (Page 1)

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

In a 6-7 December speech devoted mainly to education, Castro digressed to discuss the situation resulting from Venezuela's charge that the arms cache discovered on a Venezuelan beach last month had come from Cuba. Castro implied that the arms had been planted by CIA and are being used as a pretext for new action by the "imperialists and their lackeys" against Cuba. He expressed confidence that whatever the result, the Cuban revolution will not be defeated. (Page 2)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Faure Chomon Mediavilla is replacing Omar Fernandez as transportation minister; Major Jesus Montane Oropesa will be new communications minister. (Page 3)

Heavy rainfall has apparently caused damages to military facilities in Pinar del Rio Province and hampered travel in Oriente Province. (Page 4)

THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION:

A Spanish-language daily in New York claims Madrid police are holding a self-confessed plotter against the late President. (Page 4)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

A fire on a farm near Cardenas, Matanzas Province, has destroyed one acre of henequen. (Page 4)

An attempt has been made to shoot the chief of the PURS in Velasco, Camaguey Province. (Page 5)

A militiaman arrested in Guantanamo on 3 December for suspected counterrevolutionary activities has been freed. (Page 5)

The DSE unit at Ciego de Avila has captured one insurgent and reports the surrender of another; a resident of Jucaro has been arrested for cashing an out-of-circulation 50-dollar bill. (Page 5)

Thirty-two people attempting to flee Cuba were captured by Cuban security forces on 8 December; this may be related to an earlier report which stated that an undetermined number of residents of Las Villas Province fled the country from an unknown point of embarkation. (Page 6)

Several minor incidents of sabotage have been discovered on CUBANA aircraft. (Page 6)

A DRE leader in Mexico City announced that 126 Cuban militiamen were killed in a clash with guerrillas near Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas Province. (Page 6)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

Spain has approved regularly scheduled Havana-Madrid flights by CUBANA airlines, JFK Act 6 (I)(B)  
(Page 7)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The Argentine Government and the owners of the SS ANAMAR are determined that it will not take a cargo of Soviet-purchased coffee to Cuba. (Page 7)

[ ] DEVELOPMENTS:

The [ ] informed his government on 5 December that several [ ] have been impressed by the Cuban claim that the weapons found in Venezuela last month had actually been planted there by the US. Apparently unaware that elaborate efforts had been made to erase all indications of the Cuban origin of the weapons, they wonder why Cuba would permit evidence of its involvement in sending arms to Latin American guerrillas to be traceable to Cuba. (Page 7)

The [ ] dispatched an urgent message to his [ ] on 6 December expressing misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special [ ] committee appointed to investigate Venezuela's charges against the Castro regime. (Page 8)

In relation to the investigation of the Venezuelan arms cache, the [ ] to the [ ] has been instructed not to show "sympathy or excessive understanding in relation to Cuba." (Page 9)

SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS:

A clandestine source has reported, possibly as a current rumor, that Fidel Castro visited Moscow around 15 November; there is no current evidence that he made any public appearances in Cuba around that date. (Page 9)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

Five Polish merchantmen have been assigned to Cuban run. (Page 10)

The Soviet-made AN-12 transport has landed in Cuba. (Page 10)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

The Moroccan foreign minister has received a Cuban "goodwill" mission for the second time; local expectation is that formal relations will be re-established shortly. (Page 11)

The President of Dahomey declined an invitation to attend the 1 January anniversary celebration in Cuba. (Page 11)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

The [ ] ambassador in [ ] is convinced of the accuracy of Venezuelan charges of Cuban subversion. (Page 11)

There is an additional report on the use of a Cuban transport plane to supply pro-Castro groups in Venezuela with weapons. (Page 12)

Cuban Chargé Lasalle in Bolivia is reportedly supplying weapons to the leftist section of the governing party, as the serious political crisis there becomes more intense. (Page 12)

A clandestine source has reported that two Cubans are with a group of Peruvian leftists currently hiding in Bolivia, and that Castro has agreed to provide money and guerrilla training for a rival group. (Page 12)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

Three independent clandestine sources have reported the unloading of military equipment from a Soviet cargo vessel, probably the METALLURG BAIKOV, on 19 or 20 November. This vessel was suspected of carrying a military cargo long before its arrival in Cuba. (See Daily Summary of 12 November.) It carried what was probably the eighth full military cargo to arrive in Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis. One source, a retired civil engineer whose reporting has been factual and in most instances based on personal observation, reported that the METALLURG BAIKOV unloaded "large quantities of arms and military equipment" in Havana on 20 November and left the next day. Another source reported that Havana longshoremen had stated that a Soviet ship, which they did not identify, had unloaded arms at Regla Wharf, Havana, on 20 November. A third source, an educated Cuban of Western European extraction who is a resident of Havana, reported that tanks were among the equipment unloaded from a Soviet vessel that arrived in Havana on 19 November. The three sources are probably referring to the same shipment. If the report on the delivery of tanks is true, this would be the second consecutive reported shipment of armored vehicles to Cuba. The ORENBURG reportedly delivered some 45 tanks on 23 or 24 October. (See Daily Summaries of 28 and 29 October.) It has previously been reported that another probable military shipment, the ninth, is now en route aboard the SLUTSK. (See Daily Summary of 3 December.) (CIA TDCS-DB-3/658,289, 6 December, ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~)

The Soviet "coastal defense rockets" now belong to the Cuban Army artillery forces, according to a recent speech by Raul Castro. Cubans probably have been training in cruise missile operations since last spring, and the rotation and withdrawal of some Soviet naval personnel in September suggested that the cruise missile system was turned over to the Cubans at that time. [redacted] which probably serves the cruise missile system remains active, however, indicating that some degree of Soviet involvement continues. (CIA FBIS, 14 November, UNCLASSIFIED and NSA 2/-/[redacted]/R16-63, 28 August, 1963, SECRET KIMBO)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:

Fidel Castro's speech of the night of 6-7 December was on the occasion of the graduation of women teachers for the literacy campaign. He devoted most of the 99 minutes to a discussion of the development of local education in Cuba. At one point, however, he made a moderately long digression to discuss Venezuela and the situation raised by Venezuela's discovery last month of a large cache of weapons, some of which have been traced to Cuba.

Castro stated that, while "the imperialists and their lackeys" charge that Cuba is promoting subversion in Venezuela, rebellion and subversion cannot be promoted from without. The Venezuelan revolution, he maintained, stems from the Venezuelan people's own disgust with their government and with its permitting the "imperialists" to plunder Venezuela's wealth and resources. If subversion could, in fact, be promoted from the outside, why, he asked, have all the resources of imperialism failed to subvert the Cuban Government?

Betancourt, "that miserable lackey," is trying to incite the United States to take military action against Cuba, Castro charged. As a pretext the Venezuelans say they have discovered arms from Cuba on the Venezuelan coast, Castro stated. "Some of the arms," he said, "are said to have borne an effaced Cuban seal, and other arms are said to be bazookas, recoilless cannon, mortars. But Cuban mortars perchance? No! Yankee mortars! Yankee bazookas! Yankee recoilless cannon! Arms which we did not manufacture; arms which we did not buy!" Castro then went on, without specifically denying that the weapons had come from Cuba, by implying that the CIA had obtained Cuban arms from Cuban deserters and that it would not be difficult to plant these weapons in Venezuela. (Here he is obviously referring to the Belgian-made light rifles and submachineguns which have been identified as among those shipped to Cuba in 1959 and 1960.) With respect to the US-made mortars, bazookas, and recoilless rifles, Castro challenged the OAS investigating committee to "investigate thoroughly," make laboratory tests, trace the serial numbers, and then "they will be able to reach only one conclusion: that they belong to the CIA."

Castro then attempted to show the "brazenness" and inconsistency of those who would use the Venezuelan arms cache as a pretext to invade or to blockade Cuba when for more than four years the very same kind of subversive activity as is now being charged to Cuba has been perpetrated against Cuba--without any hemispheric attempt to punish the aggressors.

FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH - cont'd

"Things have changed quite a bit," Castro declared, "to attack or to blockade Cuba now would not be easy; we can defend ourselves; we are calm; we know what we have to defend ourselves with." Then, in an implied reference to the Soviet shipment of strategic missiles to Cuba last year, Castro declared: "When we hear some of these lackeys of imperialism talking so calmly about invading Cuba, when it has been only one year since the October crisis, they are once more proving us right and are once more justifying Cuba's taking defensive measures; this talk led to the October crisis." Castro then declared that "these men are so deceived by their own propaganda that...they cannot conceive of what any invader would meet here." A war against Cuba, he said, "would not end while there was a single mercenary soldier treading on our soil."

Castro then returned briefly to his views as to how peace can be assured in the Caribbean. "Whatever they want to discuss with Cuba," he said, "let them come and discuss honestly with Cuba; because we have stated the indispensable prerequisites for a peaceful atmosphere...in the Caribbean." Thus far, however, "they have answered with aggressions on top of aggressions." This course, he said, "is doomed to failure." (CIA FBIS Havana, 7 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

A shake-up in the Cuban cabinet has moved Faure Chomon Mediavilla to the post of transportation minister; he succeeds Capt. Omar Fernandez, whose ministry was recently under attack by Castro for alleged inefficiencies and "vices." Major Jesus Montane Oropesa is replacing Chomon as communications minister.

Chomon, who served as Castro's first ambassador to the Soviet Union, took over as communications minister in March 1962. He is currently a member of the National Directorate of PURS. Fernandez, his predecessor, is reportedly moving to an unspecified position in the Ministry of Industries under Che Guevara.

Montane took part in the attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1953 and followed Castro to exile in Mexico. He took part in the GRANMA expedition of 1956 when he was captured and imprisoned. After the revolution, he reportedly received only a minor post in the government because he had talked too much in prison. His most recent post, dating from at least August 1962, has been as number two man in the Tourism Institute (INIT). He is said to be an ardent Marxist-Leninist, who preaches it at every opportunity. (UPI 63, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED; background information: SECRET)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

Intercepted Cuban military messages of 7 December indicate that serious rain damage has occurred in both Pinar del Rio and Oriente provinces. Five unidentified military units in Pinar del Rio reported the extent of damage to their defensive fortifications and facilities in messages to the operations officer, apparently at fourth army headquarters in Pinar del Rio. More than half the trenches had been destroyed, the shelters and command posts at most of the units reporting had suffered serious damage, and division headquarters reported that, while its facilities were still in good condition; the roads leading to it will have to be repaired. Meanwhile, in Oriente Province, intercepts indicate that torrential rainfall had caused the rivers to flood making travel difficult and had forced the closing of the Baracoa airport. [REDACTED] 2/SL [REDACTED] R302-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO)

THE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION:

The Reuters correspondent in Madrid has advised the US Embassy that he has been queried by a New York client about an 8 December El Tiempo report that Spanish police have detained a Cuban national--45-year-old Enrique Pascual Ruedolo Gongora, alleged to have arrived in Spain via an IBERIA flight from New York on 23 November--in connection with a plot against the late President Kennedy. Local police have confirmed detention of Ruedolo. However, they claim that he arrived in Spain on 29 November and to the best of their knowledge has absolutely no connection with the assassination. They maintain that he was expelled from the United States for undetermined reasons and is being held because he has been unable to arrange onward travel to Cuba. CAS is pursuing the matter in Madrid. (Am Emb Madrid, 1155, 7 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

A fire on 6 December on a farm near Cardenas, Matanzas Province, destroyed approximately one acre of henequen. The chief of the Matanzas Bureau of Public Order (BOP) informed Havana in an 8 December intercepted message that the fire, "supposed to be sabotage," was put out by the Cardenas fire department. [REDACTED] 2/YJ [REDACTED] R146-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

On 6 December the Department of State Security (DSE) unit in Moron informed provincial headquarters in Camaguey that on 5 December "they tried to shoot down the chief of the PURS in Velasco...he escaped unharmed. Full details will be sent by letter." The message did not indicate to whom "they" referred. [ ] 2/YJ [ ]/T922-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

The militiaman who was arrested in Guantanamo on 3 December for suspected counterrevolutionary activities (see Daily Summary, 6 December) has been freed. Sector E headquarters in Mayari Arriba informed First Army headquarters in Santiago on 5 December that Esteban Mendez Almaguer and Jose Joiret Aria, both identified as natives of Quijada, were released by the DSE. The reason for their release was not given. [ ] 2/LR1 [ ]/R197-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

The DSE unit at Ciego de Avila has captured one insurgent and reports the surrender of another. On 6 December the DSE provincial headquarters in Camaguey was informed that the insurgent Demetrio Armas Izquierdo was captured near Jatibonico. The message stated that Armas "was reportedly active in the Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara areas, and most recently in Camaguey. He belonged to an insurgent band led by one Carlo." The same message reported the surrender of Edmundo Almeida (see Daily Summary, 5 December), "previously associated with the bands of Juan Alberto," to the DSE unit at Jatibonico.

In addition, on 7 December Ciego de Avila reported the arrest of Jesus Marquez, a 39-year-old resident of Jucaro. Marquez is said to have cashed an "out-of-circulation 50-dollar bill, which he received from the US on 4 December 1963." [ ] 2/YJ [ ]/R138-63, 6 December and 2/YJ [ ]/R140-63, 7 December, SECRET KIMBO)

An undetermined number of residents of Vegas de Palmas, San Antonio de las Veultas and Agiada de Moya, Las Villas Province, recently fled the country from an unknown point of embarkation. Central Army headquarters in Santa Clara informed Havana that the persons from Vegas de Palmas had been identified as: Lucina Manso, Rodobaldo Monteagua, and Moises Monson Garit, an ex-private in the revolutionary armed forces. Also mentioned as escapees were Feliz Perez, Inoes Lima. [ ] 2/SL [ ]/R301-63, 8 December, SECRET KIMBO)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

In possible connection with the preceding item, 32 people attempting to flee Cuba were captured by Cuban security forces on 8 December. Fifth Army Headquarters in Camaguey informed Havana that a maritime patrol of the coastal vigilance observation post captured a boat carrying 32 individuals in the area of Cayo Mariquibay, north of La Bahia de Punta Alegre. On the boat, which had left Caibarien three days earlier, government agents found Cuban and US monies as well as personal belongings. (USN 56, 2/SL, [ ] - R303-63, 9 December, SECRET KIMBO)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

A trained clandestine source who is a civil aviation expert with the Cuban Ministry of Transportation reports that several minor incidents of sabotage have been discovered on CUBANA aircraft. On 15 November a CUBANA IL-14 made a round-trip flight from Rancho Boyeros Airport to Nueva Gerona without a storage battery. The source comments that serious trouble would have resulted if one engine had stopped or had been feathered while en route. This incident may be related to various acts of subtle sabotage against CUBANA aircraft, such as stuffing exhaust tubes with rags or obstructing carburetor intakes.

In addition, the source reports that a CUBANA Britannia aircraft was sabotaged by Algerian personnel during a recent flight to Algiers. The hydraulic line was fractured forcing the crew to use manual controls to lower the landing gear for a stop in Madrid. (CIA IN 75941, 8 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)

Press dispatches from Mexico City report that a leader of the Revolutionary Students Directorate (DRE) announced that 126 Cuban militiamen had been killed in a clash with guerrillas 12 miles south of Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas Province. Angel Gonzales said that "belated underground reports just received" indicated that the clash took place in mid-September when a guerrilla force ambushed a militia unit and killed 11 militiamen. The guerrilla forces lost 18 men, including Negro guerrilla leader Andre Startabull and three captains identified as Carlos Roca, Julio Garcia, and Sergio Perez. The Castro regime then sent 5,000 men supported by tanks, mortars, and helicopters to destroy the guerrillas. After two weeks of fighting, the entire guerrilla unit was destroyed but not until 115 other militiamen had been killed. There is no confirmation from COMINT or other sources of any action of the magnitude reported by the DRE. (AP-131, Mexico City, 7 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

Spain has approved regularly scheduled Havana-Madrid flights by CUBANA airlines, according to an intercepted message of 7 December. It was previously reported that the Spanish Government was unwilling to reduce these flights because it believes the connections are vital to Spain; however, the Foreign Ministry said it would limit CUBANA flights to Havana-Madrid-Havana without stops in Algiers or Prague, and would refuse landing to Soviet-built CUBANA aircraft. (See Daily Summary of 18 November.) It has also been reported that CUBANA is assured of capacity passenger loads for the Havana-Madrid service and plans to pool air freight from all of Western Europe for delivery to Havana via Madrid; thus assuring full payloads both ways. (See Daily Summary of 4 December.) (NSA 2X/O [redacted] T211-63, 8 December, SECRET SABRE; Background information: NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

Argentina is reportedly attempting to stop one of its ships--the SS ANAMAR--from delivering a cargo of coffee to Cuba, despite the fact that there are currently no legal restrictions against Argentine ships calling anywhere in the world. The ANAMAR left Brazil on 1 November with a cargo of Brazilian coffee, purchased by the USSR and destined for Cuba. (See Daily Summary of 8 November.) The Argentine Foreign Ministry informed US Embassy officials that it was determined to prevent the ANAMAR from going to Cuba because of potential unfavorable press reaction. Argentina wants to avoid legal and financial entanglements in the matter; however, it is determined to stop the ship and is reportedly even considering some type of provocation which would force the ship to put into Puerto Rico. The owners of the ANAMAR are equally adamant that the ship will not go to Cuba; reportedly they had agreed to ship coffee from Brazil to some Central American country to pay some back bills, and were only informed later that the shipment would go to Cuba. According to the owners, the ship is now lying off the coast of Brazil awaiting resolution of the problem. The owners reportedly stated they will sink the ship rather than go to Cuba. (Am Emb Buenos Aires 1017, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

[redacted] DEVELOPMENTS:

[redacted] reported to his government from Washington on 5 December that several [redacted] have been impressed by the Cuban claim that the weapons found in Venezuela last month had actually been planted there by the United States.

██████████ DEVELOPMENTS - cont'd

These ██████████ stated, "are wondering whether the Cuban Government would be so stupid as to send to Venezuela arms with the inscription 'Cuban Army' and the insignia of Cuba engraved on them" as indicated by the Venezuelan photographs shown at the ██████████. These delegates believe, ██████████ went on, that if Cuba had actually sent the arms to Venezuela it would first have removed any indication of their origin. This account indicates that the ██████████ and the others of whom he speaks are apparently unaware that considerable effort had, in fact, been made to erase all evidence of the Cuban origin of these arms. The 31 submachine guns found in the cache had their serial numbers and other identifying marks recently ground off. Venezuelan technicians, using a highly technical process, were able to raise the serial numbers and the Cuban shield on some of the weapons. In independent tests, US technicians were able to raise the numbers and shields on three of these weapons. The numbers correspond to those of weapons known to have been delivered to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. Similarly, in the case of the 81 light automatic rifles of Belgian manufacture found in the cache, all identifying marks had been obliterated. In this case, one-fourth inch of molten brazing alloy had been used to cover the places where the numbers had been ground off and it was not possible to restore the numbers. However, Venezuelan military authorities have noted that these weapons are unique to those manufactured expressly for the Cuban Government by Belgium's Fabrique Nationale in 1959, when Cuba ordered 22,500 such weapons. (NSA 3/0 ██████████ T2041-63, 6 December, TOP SECRET DINAR; background data: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The ██████████ dispatched a "personal, urgent, and confidential" message to his ██████████ on 6 December expressing certain misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special ██████████ fact-finding committee with respect to the Venezuelan charges against the Castro regime which the committee was named to investigate. The ambassador reported that he had just received "strictly confidential information" that the prevailing opinion within the committee is that it must investigate the entire subject of Cuban subversive activities in Venezuela, not limiting itself to the evidence on the Cuban origin of the arms cache found in Venezuela last month.

[ ] DEVELOPMENTS - cont'd

The committee members, the ambassador stated, insist that it is essential for the Venezuelan Government to "present proof of the general Cuban conspiracy" against the Venezuelan Government if the case against Cuba is to be proven. The [ ] added that "one of the most important members of the committee" had stated that the Venezuelan evidence on the Cuban origin of the arms cache is not airtight and that the arms could actually have been resold by Cuba to someone else some years ago or stolen from Cuban arsenals.

The [ ] then stated that the editor of a "very important US magazine" had asked him in all seriousness on 6 December whether the arms could not have been planted in Venezuela by the CIA, as Castro has charged. The editor added that this question had been asked of him by "important persons" with whom he had discussed the problem. The [ ] used this to emphasize to his foreign minister that he believes the Venezuelan Government must not dismiss this suspicion lightly. He pointed out that important persons in the United States, both in government and the press, have pointed out Venezuela's evidence on the arms cache may provide "the first opportunity" to confront the threat of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere. These individuals may be critical of the Venezuelan Government, the [ ] warned, if its sticks to its demand that the investigation be limited to the arms cache evidence. (NSA 3/0/[ ]/T514-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

The [ ] to the [ ] was informed of his country's position on the investigation of the Venezuelan arms cache, according to a 2 December intercepted message. The Foreign Ministry informed him that he was to "avoid any attitude which might seem to leave [ ] isolated in a position which could be interpreted as one of sympathy or excessive understanding in relation to Cuba." On the other hand, he was instructed not to "openly state the opinion that the matter falls exclusively under the competence of the Venezuelan security authorities." The delegate was advised to delay his departure "until the situation is clarified." (NSA 3/0/[ ]/T206-63, 6 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS:

Fidel Castro may have been in Moscow about 15 November for talks with Premier Khrushchev, according to a civil aviation expert who is apparently passing on a rumor he heard in Cuba. The source reported as background that Castro has not appeared on Cuban TV and did not meet people he apparently would have met if he had been in Cuba.

SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

There have been no reported Castro appearances around 15 November. On 7 November he talked with a group of students at Havana University and on 19 November he reportedly visited a PURS meeting in Matanzas. However, between these two dates there is no current evidence that he appeared on Cuban radio or TV, and Hoy carried no reports of his personal appearances in Cuba. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that he was indeed in Cuba in mid-November. (CIA IN 75946, 8 December, SECRET)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

Warsaw has assigned five merchantmen with a capacity of 44,000 tons to the Cuban - Central American trade, according to an announcement by Havana television. The ships, one of which is refrigerated, will be operated by CUBALCO--the Rostock-headquartered joint company chartered by Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Cuba to carry goods between Cuba and the northern satellites. In the words of Havana television, "the enterprise will be responsible for guaranteeing supplies to the first socialist country of America, thereby contributing to the defeat of the US economic blockade against Cuba." (CIA/FBIS, 7 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

Soviet air defense and Cuban civil air voice communications on 7 December reflected the arrival in Cuba of a Soviet-made AN-12. (See Daily Summary, 6 December). The following day, Prensa Latina announced that "the Cuban air force" had acquired a four-engine, turboprop craft with a 14,000-ton freight capacity for use in a service between Moscow and Havana. Prensa Latina said that the plane would be used to carry freight between the two capitals and "three or four stops at cities not yet announced by the Cuban consolidated aviation enterprise."

The references to the AN-12 being acquired by the "Cuban Air Force," followed by statements attributed to CUBANA officials as to its future employment, raise confusion as to whether it is to be used primarily for military or civil air purposes. As pointed out previously, however (see Daily Summary of 3 December), the AN-12 can be used interchangeably in both types of service. Its employment in bringing military cargoes to Cuba from the Soviet Union would be hampered, however, by range factors which would require it to refuel at two or more nonbloc airports between Cuba and the USSR. At these airports the aircraft could be subject to cargo inspections. (USA-71, 2/DG/ [redacted] R-853-63, 7 December, SECRET KIMBO; CIA/FBIS, Havana, 8 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

The Moroccan foreign minister has received a three-man Cuban "good-will" mission for the second time and the Istiqlal's Nation claims that a resumption of formal diplomatic relations is imminent, according to the US Embassy in Rabat (see Daily Summary for 29 November and 6 December). According to a semi-official account of the meeting, which took place on 4 December, the Cubans reasserted their desire to normalize relations and professed a lack of hostile intentions against the Moroccan Government--which severed formal relations after Cuban "technicians" arrived in Algeria on 22 October. "Informed sources" in Rabat claim that the government is considering the Cuban demarché with "attention." The Nation explains that the Cubans now recognize that Morocco has not been the aggressor in the Algerian conflict and that they are "repentant" over their precipitous action in aiding Ben Bella. (Am Emb Rabat, 866, 6 December, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

The President of [ ] declined an invitation to attend the 1 January anniversary celebration in Cuba, [ ] in conversation of 3 December. The [ ] in [ ] received the invitation from his Cuban counterpart; however, the president declined because he said it was "hardly possible" for him to be in Cuba in January. It is not clear if [ ] will designate an official representative to the celebration. [ ] 6/12/1963, 6 December, SECRET SABRE)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY:

The [ ] ambassador in [ ] informed his government, in an intercepted 2 December message, that he is convinced of the accuracy of the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban subversion in Venezuela. He pointed out that the heavy voting in Venezuela's 1 December national election demonstrates that the legal opposition in Venezuela is not implicated in the violence and terrorism. He also stated that the Castro regime is so thoroughly repudiated by Venezuelan public opinion that the Venezuelan Government has no need to use artificial means to stimulate anti-Castro feeling there. The [ ] ambassador pointed out that many Venezuelan Communists are in Cuba and from there "they permanently incite rebellion" in Venezuela and Cuban propaganda supports their efforts. (NSA 3/O/Z [ ] T104-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY - cont'd

There is additional information on Cuban use of a DC-4 aircraft allegedly to supply Venezuelan guerrillas with weapons through British Guiana. A clandestine source who is a civil aviation expert and affiliated with the Cuban Ministry of Transportation reports hearing rumors to the effect that the recently refurbished CUBANA DC-4 with CUBANA registry number CUT-785 has been issued a "Guiana license," presumably a license for operation in British Guiana, and has been operated by military personnel. He adds that "it is said that clandestine flights have been made to Venezuela." The same source had previously reported the refurbishing of this plane and some others and indicated that extra fuel tanks had been installed on them. (CIA DD/P IN 75942, 8 December, SECRET/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The Cubans are reportedly involved in the serious political crisis now under way in Bolivia, where a split between President Paz' section of the governing party and the leftist sector led by Vice President Lechin threatens serious civil disorder. Cuban Chargé Lasalle has given two boxes of arms to leaders of the left section of the party for use in the Catavi-Siglo mining area, according to information received by a clandestine source. The source, a medium-level member of the left section of the governing party who has excellent contact with national leaders of that section and who is apparently trusted by Lasalle, was given this information by a Bolivian labor leader who added that he had personally received the arms from Lasalle. The source reports that the arms are of German origin and had been stored in Lasalle's house in La Paz. (CIA DD/P La Paz, IN 76093, 8 December, SECRET)

Two unnamed Cubans are reportedly with a group of 18 members of the Peruvian Army of National Liberation (ELN) who are currently hiding in Bolivia, according to a usually reliable medium-level member of the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) who is in regular contact with MIR leaders. The members of the ELN may have been returning from training in Cuba, since several such groups from that movement have gone there in the past. According to Gonzalo Fernandez Gasco, leader of the MIR, his group will help them return to Peru by providing them with the necessary documentation. In return, the weapons owned by the ELN--automatic weapons and "San Cristobal" carbines--will be turned over to the MIR, reportedly in accordance with an order from Fidel Castro. Once the ELN youths are back in Peru, the MIR will look after them and try to convert them to the cause. The object is to eliminate the ELN as a rival force.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY - cont'd

Possibly related to this reported plan to upgrade the MIR is a report from the same source that Fernandez said on 6 December that Castro recently sent money to the MIR leaders and offered to train more of its members in Cuba. Fernandez said that in the future, groups of MIR members will go alternatively to North Korea and to Cuba for guerrilla warfare training. (CIA Lima TDCS-3/566, 662, 6 December, and TDCS-3/566,947, 8 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

