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DATE: 07/21/1975
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SUBJECTS:
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNSEL
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CIA

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COVERT ACTION IN CUBA

A SUMMARY WITH KEY DOCUMENTS

COPY 1 OF 5

21 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

SUBJECT: Summary of Significant Documents Retrieved from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

FROM: Loch Johnson

I have just returned from a trip to the LBJ Library where I inspected the National Security Files. I was allowed to examine the files dealing with U.S. policy toward Cuba, the Johnson Vice Presidential Security files, and NSC minutes. The Library staff sifted through the Bundy papers for me, extracting anything relevant to Cuba for my inspection.

I was not permitted to examine either the Bundy papers or the Rostow papers myself, since the Library has not yet cleared them. Similarly, I was unable to examine the Vietnam country files or the Laos country files because we have not been given authority to do so yet.

Though these roadblocks were frustrating, I found I had my hands filled for the moment simply working my way through the papers which were available. I selected 44 documents to bring home, totaling 208 pages. These documents range from a verification of information we already know to some useful new information (see Items 21 and 22, e.g.) to some startling new leads in the area of covert action (see Item 28). What follows is a capsule summary of each document presented in chronological order. High priority items have tabs marked in red.
SUMMARY OF JOHNSON LIBRARY DOCUMENTS

1. NSC Minutes, 5 May 1961 and NSC Record of Actions, 16 May 1961.

At the 5 May NSC meeting, Rusk suggested that the U. S. must take all measures to precipitate Castro's downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist influence.

On the subject of Trujillo, the President said (25 days before the dictator was murdered) that the U. S. should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls.

The 16 May Record of Actions emphasizes it was the President's view that the U. S. should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him. This same document outlines U. S. policy toward Cuba; it was agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, though specific mention of assassination is not to be found among the many options outlined.

2. Letter from Lodge to Rusk, 13 September (1963?).

In an obviously anti-Diem letter, Lodge asks Rusk to send General Lansdale to South Vietnam Nam to take charge of all U. S. relationships with a change of government. Why Lodge so confidently expected a change of government is an interesting question.

3. A note from Bromley Smith to George Christian (undated, but presumably early in the Johnson Administration, perhaps December, 1963).

A good example of the establishment of plausible deniability for the President, at the suggestion of the CIA.

4. Memo from Chase dated 2 December 1963 and probably for Bundy.

Among other things, Chase recommends "a vigorous, tough, and nasty policy" against Cuba, including strengthening the covert action program and continuing to explore "every avenue in order to make life as difficult for Castro and as expensive and unpleasant for the USSR as possible." Moreover, "We should be prepared to meet any event which might offer the opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e.g., the shooting down of a U-2)."
5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.

Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion, including unleashing of Cuban exiles and the intensification of the covert program.


This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Administration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, Ed Martin, McNamara, McCona, Helms or Des Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase.


For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language regarding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."


This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774 on Cuban Operations, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action ($47,815,122). The total covert action budget (psychological and paramilitary warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period.


The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new President on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which included a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray. Bundy recommends that Lyndon B. Johnson take "a more vigorous line toward Cuba than we have in the past."


Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while "McCona and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: "...in your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy."
11. A second copy of the above memo.


The lengthy attachment appears to be a working paper on Cuba prepared for Bundy by Rostow's staff in State. The authors (Ford and Bob Johnson) write: "If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the symptoms enough? Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?" (10). And, later, ".....if we were publicly to acknowledge [the extinction of the Castro regime] as our aim, would not a sudden blow seem a more logical way of proceeding then the application of measured pressures?" (14). The paper discusses the need for a plausible cause for action against Castro, asking the question: "Would not a better bet be to provoke one?" (16). They suggest that "something like the assassination of a prominent Latin American leader" (17a) would be sufficient provocation, if blamed on Castro, to permit U.S. action.

13. Memo, Chase to Bundy, with various attachments, no date, but probably early March, 1964. Subject: Cuba, Covert Program.

Of special interest here is the attached letter from Desmond Fitz-Gerald to Bundy, dated 6 March 1964. "Des" implies that CIA efforts to get rid of Castro were carried out "only in response to what we understand to be policy requirements...." (1). He makes the point that CIA-sponsored sabotage raids were to serve as "a sort of firing pin for internal unrest and to create the conditions for a coup." However, only five low-key raids were carried out (from August to December, 1963), followed by a three-month hiatus. Des concludes that "a covert program at this time designed to overthrow Castro is not realistic" (2). He does recommend, however, continuation of certain covert actions, each as "carefully concealed contamination of lubricants" shipped into Cuba and "similar actions" (4).

A second attachment is a "Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups", dated 30 March 1964, which underscores how truly autonomous these groups really were; the CIA had lost control over them by this time.

The third attachment is a CIA "Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba," dated "about 1/25/64." The ultimate goal of the CIA program was "to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup" (7). The time frame for the program was "about eighteen months from June 1963" (7). The report notes that the CIA has "continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate Cuba's defenses with good regularity" (13-14). The five sabotage raids on Cuba run by CIA are listed at Annex I.
The final attachment is an unsigned report on "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba," dated 21 February 1964, and probably a CIA document. It begins by citing the AG to the effect that "there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro." Without answering this question, the report sets out a series of options or courses of action under two headings: (1) "Can and Can't Live with Castro." Under the latter, the options range from covert sabotage to invasion, but do not mention assassination of Castro.


Chase still recommends "the tough, nasty, but no military intervention/blockade policy...." (7). The policy will include "a modest covert program" (11). CIA sabotage efforts will be terminated, though the Agency will continue trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potential dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the Castro regime. The possibilities of talking with Castro are viewed positively (12). Chase suggests that the realities of domestic political considerations "reinforce our national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure on Cuba...." (15).

15. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 7 April 1964.

Crimmins warns Chase that infiltration/exfiltration problems may create noise regarding U.S. covert programs against Cuba.

16. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 April 1964, with attachment.

More discussions on the possibility of opening talks with Castro. The attachment emphasizes the true autonomy from the CIA of the autonomous exile groups.

17. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 17 April 1964, with attachment (Memo, Taylor to LBJ, 21 March 1964).

The Taylor memo notes that LBJ asked the JCS on 4 March 1964 to think of new ways to (1) gain OAS support for the overthrow of Castro and (2) bring additional pressure upon Castro. Taylor concludes that the JCS "have difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact," Taylor continues, "that little remains which offers premise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military
action up to or including invasion."


Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba.


This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming completely beyond U.S. control despite CIA financial support to the groups.


Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."

21 Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1964. Subject: "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"

The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions." Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers were made to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarría, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York was to pay much of the money, and did pay the $2,500 on 25 April. Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia was involved. Cameron revealed that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squad.


Referring to the above memo from DDP to DCI, Chase notes that John Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.
"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing," notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special Group.

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations").

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.


Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noise levels and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo (see Item 19).


In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation." The AG said Justice would look into the matter.


Mc Cone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 June (See Item 21). The Bureau interviewed many people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence of such a plan (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of the country). The most interesting finding was that Lobo had in fact discussed the matter with CIA.

27. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 November 1964.

The election past, Chase et al. agreed that "we can usefully do some
basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-directed covert program.

Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE.

A contemptable proposal initiated by the Army to use germ warfare against Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should "remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage." I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable than plans for assassination.
Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).

The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating elements into Cuba.


The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA (as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere with him at this stage.


Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/Cubela plot."

32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA document.

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.

33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1965.

This memo indicates that not even Artime had his group in control. The memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as penetrating the PPP and propping up the democratic trade unionism.

34. Memo, Murat Williams (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, 23 February 1965.

Recommends immediate termination of Artime support.

35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965

Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba (presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out the Vietnam problem.
36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.

Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is considering diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Bundy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started."

38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us,"Bundy writes,"do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's recommendations said nothing about assassination.


Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."


This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their activities.


The new CIA emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him."
Memo, Helms to LBJ, 12 June 1968.

Carlos Prio, former President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to assassinate Castro. Two Cubans have infiltrated Cuba from Miami to implement the assassination. "CIA has nothing whatever to do with these attempts," writes Helms, "and learns of them only through penetration of Cuban exile groups."

Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 20 June 1968.

"CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or an assassination attempt take place, the U.S. skirts should be clean," writes Rostow. Therefore, State warned Cuban authorities via the Swiss that reports had been received on a Castro assassination attempt. So by 1968 we were warning Castro of attempts on his life!

CIA Intelligence Report, 18 November 1968.

"...there is little chance...that a plot against the (Castro) regime could succeed in the foreseeable future." (14).
RECORD OF ACTIONS
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
at its
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING
held on
May 5, 1961
(Approved by the President on May 16, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

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<th>ACTION NUMBER</th>
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<td>2420.</td>
<td>U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN</td>
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<td>Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.</td>
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| 2421.         | U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA |
|               | Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19. |
U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terrorist actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.

f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.

g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.
h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense.

i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship.

j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.

k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.
2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

1. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$400 million.

m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U. S. groups.

n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

2. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

2. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

2423. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.
2424.  U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what
 can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall
 a communist take-over in that country.

2425.  U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit
 and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told
 that we are considering inclusion of U. S. troops
 in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the
 timing to be dependent on developments during or
 after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would
 be sending recommendations to the President promptly
 on U. S. training troops in Viet Nam.
Meeting of National Security Council, 5 May 1961

The President directed the establishment of a task force to study the Iranian problem and suggested that Mr. Talbot head the group. Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Bakhtiar visited the United States comparatively recently and that a coup involving him would possibly embarrass the United States. The President discounted the possibility.

The President directed that a group study the Korean problem and report its findings within two weeks. Mr. McConaughy will head the group of Defense, CIA, State and Treasury representatives. Mr. McNamara appointed Mr. William Bundy to represent Defense.

The President asked Mr. Nitze for a report on the Cuban situation. Nitze replied that the Navy could blockade the island but results would not be immediate but rather long-range, and in the course thereof unfavorable world reaction would probably accrue. Admiral Burke pointed out that only complete interception of all ships approaching Cuba would achieve eventual success, and the job could be done with 24 ships. Mr. Rusk interrupted Admiral Burke to point out that such action would be an act of war and was wholly impracticable.

The President asked about a reported letter from Senator Goldwater in which the statement is made that the Air Force could resolve the Cuban situation. Admiral Burke replied that there had in fact been an Air Force proposal with which other services had disagreed, especially the Marines. In any case, the Air Force had made the suggestion that the Cuban problem be resolved through rather heavy and perhaps indiscriminate bombardment. The President immediately rejected such an idea, and added further that there would be no Navy blockade. He emphasized the importance of more effective watch committee action on Cuba. He also asked Mr. Dulles what new information was available on foreign equipment going into Cuba. Mr. Dulles replied that we know practically everything about the equipment, but offered no specifics. The President directed that close surveillance be continued including overflight with an American pilot. The President approved flights of a frequency of every two or three days, but suggested extreme caution.

The President suggested that all Americans be urged to leave Cuba and asked Secretary Johnson to study ways and means of exit and transit visas.
Mr. Murrow assessed world-wide reactions to the U.S. position with regard to Cuba. He felt that the departure of the clergy, the reign of terror, and such incidents as the imprisonment in the theater will result in favorable reactions toward the U.S. and tend to considerably offset the unfavorable ones. He felt that world-wide impressions of the United States were improving generally. The President suggested that the Iranian issue might be interpreted abroad as a possible result of the failure of the U.S. to act in Laos. He suggested action by USIA to discount this possible impression. Secretary Rusk suggested the overriding theme of U.S. rejection of Castro and went on to say that the U.S. must take all measures to precipitate his downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist influence.

The President asked what specific courses of action we should take to prevent the crippling influence of the Cuban fiasco, assuming that no military action by the U.S. will be taken. At the same time the President asked what circumstances would have to exist before the United States could move unilaterally against Cuba. Rusk stated that action could be taken under Article 51 of the Rio Treaty. In this connection the President asked if the U.S. could recognize the Cuban Government in Exile and what might be expected of this group. Rusk replied that such recognition was not possible because of the absence of certain essential elements of a governmental organization, identity and territory. The question then arose as to the status of the Cubans in the United States and Robert Kennedy replied that they should be designated refugees and stated that legislation exists to handle them under this designation. The Department of HEW will begin registering the refugees with the assistance of CIA. The President stated that the United States will invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act across the board as far as Cuba is concerned at such time as some overt act or incident occurs in Cuba. The President gave as an example the shooting of a United States citizen. The President would exempt from the restrictions of the Act some $30 million for food and drugs. At the suggestion of Mr. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, the drugs should be donated to the Cuban people through the Red Cross. The President suggested the acceptance of the policy to encourage all Latin American states to sever relations with Cuba and to establish a complete economic boycott. The United States however should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls. The common danger in Haiti should be included in these considerations.
Saigon, September 13

Dear Dean:

I ask that you show this letter to the President personally, as it is vital that it not get into the governmental paper mill. For maximum security I am typing it myself and am sending it to you by messenger.

What I ask is that General Lansdale be sent over here at once to take charge, under my supervision, of all U.S. relationships with a change of government here. To function efficiently he must have a staff and I therefore ask that he be put in charge of the CAS station in the Embassy, relieving the present incumbent, Mr. John Richardson.

This is said without casting any reflection on Mr. Richardson. Indeed I think of him as a devoted, intelligent and patriotic American. If his loyal support in the past of the U.S. policy of winning the war with Diem has made it difficult for him to carry out a different policy now, he has never said so or showed it. If, as I am inclined to think, Vietnamese have naturally suspected him of being pro-Diem, it has not been his fault.

My request to put General Lansdale in his place is not because I have anything but praise of Mr. Richardson, but because of my belief that we need a new face and that General Lansdale has outstanding qualifications.

But I hope John McConaught will be told that my high regard for Mr. Richardson.

CAS telegram FVS-9617, September 11, is the most encouraging report I have seen since arriving in Vietnam. And it is confirmed by a wholly independent source in whom I have great confidence.

No written answer to this letter is necessary. General Lansdale's arrival will be a more than adequate response.

I hope you will tell the President how much I value his message contained in Deptel 396.

With warm regards,

As ever yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge

Hon. Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State
The most pertinent reference to a Presidential reply at a news conference with respect to alleged agent activities of the CIA in Cuba is one dated October 31, 1963 at President Kennedy's news conference at which the following question was put to him:

Question: Mr. President, Fidel Castro claims to have captured some Americans whom he says are CIA agents, and he says he is going to execute them. Is there anything at all that you can tell us about this?

The President: No, no.

It would seem that this is the proper reply for the President to make to such a question, and we would suggest that, if the question arises at a White House news conference a similar reply be made. If the President or the press secretary wish to make a fuller statement, it might be along the following lines:

"I see no useful purpose to be served by any comment I might make on such allegations."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To George Christian

For your information
The research and
the guidance are from
CIA

From
U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

1. The objective of our policy is a free Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors; we do not intend to coexist with a Soviet satellite in this hemisphere. In moving towards this objective, we have rejected the option of unprovoked U.S. armed intervention in Cuba. Instead, we are engaged in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive and offensive in nature, which stop short of invasion.

2. Our defensive measures primarily aim at three targets. First, we are intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again a military threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end, we conduct intensive air and sea surveillance over and around Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely successful in this effort. Second, we are intent, for domestic political, as well as national security reasons, on effecting the removal of all Soviet military personnel from Cuba. To this end, we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on numerous occasions that we cannot tolerate the permanent assignment of Soviet troops to Cuba. As a result of Soviet self-interest and our pressures, there are now 4-7,000 Soviet military personnel remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65-75% from the peak reached in the autumn of 1962. Needless to say, the issue remains a highly delicate one, especially in view of the fact that at any moment the Russians could arbitrarily decide to send more troops back into Cuba.

Third, we are intent on impeding and, if possible, stopping Cuban-based and supported subversion of the Hemisphere. To this end, we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct the Latin American attention to and to assist (materially, where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba. We have had some success; one small measure is that, primarily through the use of travel controls by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop, over the past year, in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba. On the other hand, with Castro still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere and with many Latin American governments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, much remains to be done. In this regard, proper exploitation of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting whole-hearted Latin American cooperation in the fight against subversion; such cooperation is a vital key to success in this field.
3. Offensively, our ultimate target is to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. We hope we can achieve this by concentrating on three intermediate targets — intensifying Cuba's already-serious economic difficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantsness to the Soviets of maintaining Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two — isolation measures and covert measures (which, of course, also have an impact on our defensive targets).

(a) The most outstanding characteristic of our isolation measures is that they are exceedingly difficult to implement — primarily because implementation depends on the cooperation of others and not merely on U.S. will. Nevertheless, we have been surprisingly successful in implementation; while one could have reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not happened. Instead, over the past year, our isolation policy generally held the ground already made in some fields, while making further progress in others. About a year ago, only five OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now but the anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some reason to hope for further ruptures. Free World shipping to Cuba in 1963 has fallen off by roughly 60% from the 1962 level; prospects for further reduction are good. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba, reached in 1962, has generally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly successful; a dramatic demonstration of this is the fact that many Latin Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague.

The effectiveness of our isolation measures in hitting the target is impossible to gauge accurately. While Hurricane Flora, in a few days, probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a whole year, it is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now exists in Cuba and the enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's repeated and loud public protestations about our isolation policy and his serious and strenuous efforts to break out of Free World isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably hurt him, economically and politically.

(b) The most outstanding characteristic of our other chief offensive weapon, covert measures, is that its potential for bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still largely unknown. The program, which makes use of Cuban exiles and which is not yet fully underway, has already achieved a degree of success — e.g. in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities and, perhaps, in stimulating the insurgency which is evident within Cuba. As yet,
our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to inflict serious economic damage on Cuba. There are those who believe that much can be done in this regard.

4. In theory at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously pursued, will lead finally to one of the following three results, each of which constitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

(a) An overthrow of the Castro regime. (Dissident elements, most probably from the military and the bureaucracy, seize power with a direct or indirect assist from the U.S.; the people of Cuba, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethren, embrace the new group.) Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as the most likely of the three eventualities.

(b) Accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms (Cuba breaks its tie-line with the USSR, ends its subversion efforts, and perhaps, renounces its Communist ideology). While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that, such factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further economic deterioration in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of Soviet intentions, will lead Castro to believe that he has no choice but accommodation. Indeed, there is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past several months, he has made a number of accommodation noises, and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms, these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting them. Che Guevara's reported nervousness at Castro's accommodation tendencies substantiate the view that Castro's desire to negotiate is genuine and not merely a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba.

But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the least of these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation with even a reformed Castro, especially in view of Lee Oswald's pro-Castro connection. Also, it is not now possible to gauge accurately the impact of President Kennedy's death on Castro's apparent accommodation tendencies. Nevertheless, accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now, then for later.

(c) A Soviet decision to quit Cuba. This may be the most unlikely of the three eventualities. Yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (1) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet "dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of
Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how the Russians would view their eviction from Cuba either by an overthrow of the Castro regime or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would probably mix generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

5. The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if implemented rigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way or another, to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible to answer. Most people probably tend to be skeptical but there are also a number of optimists, many of whom are among the closest observers of the Cuban situation.

Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the right direction; and this, of course, is important. A vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and which would each constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political viewpoint this is probably fortuitous; a tough, but no-invasion policy is one policy which the American people appear prepared to support at this time.

6. In closing, here are a few gratuitous and unorganized observations which bear on the problem of U.S. action in the future. First, while always alert to the danger of escalation in US/USSR relations, we should continue to explore every avenue in order to make life as difficult for Castro and as expensive and unpleasant for the USSR as possible. Special attention should always be directed toward finding new ways to (1) tighten existing isolation measures, (2) conduct other forms of economic warfare against Castro, (3) strengthen our covert action program, (4) deepen the now-visible rift between Castro and the USSR, and (5) gain solid Latin American interest and support for further actions against Cuba. Second, we should continue to press hard in our anti-subversion campaign, not only for its salutary effect in Latin America but also for the effect it could have on Castro. Recognition by Castro that there is no chance for a win in Latin America could go a long way in convincing him that he must meet U.S. minimum terms. Third, we should stay flexible. We should be prepared to meet any event which might offer the opportunity of a sudden overthrow of Castro (e.g. the shooting down of a U-2). Also, we should never close the door completely to possible accommodation with Castro on U.S. terms; in this regard, Administration officials should avoid making the point publicly that we are after Castro's head per se. Fourth, we should ever be cautious about our public posture on any issue relating to Cuba. Generally speaking, we should try to keep Cuba in perspective and in a low-key. The Administration should try to convey the sense
(1) that it fully recognizes and understands the substance and extent of the threat which Cuba presents to the U.S. and the Hemisphere, and (2) that it is working hard, steadily, efficiently, confidently, successfully, and without fanfare, in controlling the threat. Conveyance of a sense of high danger, normally, should be studiously avoided.

GC

Gordon Chase
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1963

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963

1. I spoke to John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of document for the meeting.

   (a) The paper will include State's recommendation on how we plan to proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms cache issue. For example, should we push for a break in diplomatic relations among the "soft 5", a break in economic relations between Latin America and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and Cuba?

   (b) The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles, low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program). There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages of each of these courses of action, along with State's recommendation in favor or against.

   (c) John will get the paper distributed by Saturday afternoon so that the agencies will have time to consider State's recommendations before the Tuesday meeting.

2. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening. Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu.

3. Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG). Attendance at the meeting would be roughly as follows: Ed Martin, somebody from the 7th floor of State, John Mc Cone, Dez Fitzgerald or Dick Helms, Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG. Do you have any problems with such a list? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell Taylor, Ted Sorensen?

   Gordon Chase

cc: Bromley Smith
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - 6:00 P.M. Meeting

1. Attached are 2 copies of the talking points which State prepared for the Secretary. I assume that the meeting is on again. Is this right?

2. Assuming the meeting is on, the attendance list now stands as follows: (1) The President, (2) Secretary Rusk, (3) Ed Martin, (4) Secretary McNamara, (5) another DOD type, (6) Director McCone, (7) Dick Helms or Des Fitzgerald, (8) Don Wilson, (9) you, and (10) me, as notetaker.

3. In good conscience I should point out that I heard through the grape-vine that Ben Read cut State's invitation list from 3 to 2 in deference to the President's inclination to abhor a crowd. Much as I would like to attend the meeting (I have never attended a Presidential meeting) I will understand perfectly if you feel I should stay home and mind the store. If I do not hear from you, I will plan to attend.

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET
December 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Checklist of Topics the Foreign Press may raise, and shorthand answers

1. Meetings with Foreign Statesmen and your travel plans.
   I suggest that you explain exactly what you have done and why. Toughest problem is de Gaulle, where what is needed is good humored and easy acceptance that there appears to have been a misunderstanding and that we certainly have no objection if General DeGaulle feels he should not come to the United States in 1964. You yourself do not see how you can get to Europe in that same time. Nevertheless this is not a cause for alarm or despair.

2. Relations with the Soviet Union
   Your first diplomatic purpose was to assure Mikoyan and Khrushchev of your desire to sustain lines of communication opened under President Kennedy and your determination that the US will meet anyone half way for peace. You do not expect a summit meeting but you do expect to continue discussion in search of possible agreements. You will not wish to comment on specific issues, and in particular you will want to be careful about questions suggesting that the British are more optimistic than we are. The fact is that they are, but that we do not want to make an issue of it publicly.

3. South Vietnam
   Your determination to carry on the effort there has been made clear to all concerned. You and Lodge are in the closest touch. You assume that while he is on the job he will not engage in politics(!) You believe that progress is being made both here and in the field toward unity and an end of backbiting -- which you detest.

4. Cuba
   You have indeed asked for a review of Cuba policy (Max Frankel story a couple of days ago) and you regard this as one of the major continuing problems of our foreign policy. While that review is under way and until you have a chance to consider its results, you have nothing more to say than that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere.
5. Alliance for Progress

There is no higher priority on your agenda and you are working
closely with Secretary Rusk to find ways and means of increasing the
effectiveness of the Government's work on this whole subject.

6. On the Kennedy Round

You had a good talk with Governor Herter this afternoon; you
have confidence in him; the focus of discussion is now in Europe among
the members of the Six, on the agricultural issue, and this is not the time
for you to do more than to say that you have strongly supported the objec-
tives of the Trade Expansion Act right from the beginning and that you
mean to carry on toward the basic objectives set by President Kennedy
two years ago.

7. Malaysia

There is a real prospect of new adventures by Sukarno here, and you
will probably not want to say more than that the situation is one which you are
watching very closely and on which we are in very close consultation, not
only with the countries immediately concerned but with the United Kingdom
and Australia.

8. Cambodia

I think you will want to be very reserved. Sihanouk has been
making outrageous statements, but the fact is the problem is pathological
and not diplomatic, and it would be dangerous to comment even off-the-
record today.

9. Wheat Deal

You are in favor of it, but the question is still one of price
bargaining between the Russians and the traders, and your position is what
President Kennedy's was: let the negotiators negotiate.

10. Yemen and the Middle East

I think you may wish to dodge the questions by saying this is another
of the matters you are having studied and will be reviewing in the next two
days, and you would prefer not to comment tonight.

11. MLF

You are well briefed on this, and made your own position clear
in Brussels earlier this fall.

McG. B.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Support(^a)/ Collection</th>
<th>Covert Action(^c)/ Prop(^d)/ Paramilitary(^e)/ Brigade Support</th>
<th>Post-Invasion(^f)/</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$319,534</td>
<td>$131,063</td>
<td>$1,677,161</td>
<td>$318,409</td>
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<td>1961</td>
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<td>457,633</td>
<td>5,168,584</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>3,599,274</td>
<td>793,824(^d)</td>
<td>6,444,098</td>
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<td>5,343,973</td>
<td>1,738,977(^e)</td>
<td>5,786,797</td>
<td>5,038,880</td>
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<td>1964 (est.)</td>
<td>5,030,000</td>
<td>1,767,500</td>
<td>3,520,000</td>
<td>9,317,500(^f)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,586,361</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,888,997</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,596,640</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,815,122</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of equipment and supplies, rental of properties and facilities, etc.

\(^b\) Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

\(^c\) Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.

\(^d\) PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

\(^e\) Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

\(^f\) Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.

\(^g\) Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

\(^h\) Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

December 27, 1963

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M.

SUBJECT: Cuba

Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond Fitzgerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy; William Moyers; George Reedy; Gordon Chase.

The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)

1. A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. Fitzgerald and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S. Government's economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the discussion covered 6 areas.

(a) Mr. Fitzgerald described covert intelligence activities directed against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geographic spread of CIA assets within Cuba.

(b) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.

(c) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via Canada and Great Britain.
The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program. Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World governments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.

(d) Mr. Fitzgerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular uprising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet willing to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suffer heavy losses at Castro's hands.

(e) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resistance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack on a major target -- the Matanzas power plant. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that this would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as economically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Administration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.
But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than 50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak -- we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro, presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson said that the timing seemed bad -- the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more Soviet aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.

In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and because of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to develop an air strike capability.

(f) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA's program in aiding two autonomous Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, which is headed by Manuel Artima, will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is somewhat to the left of Artima, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dissidents. Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these operations -- the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control. But there are advantages too -- they operate from outside United States territory and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups.
Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. Fitzgerald agreed, that these groups operate a long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids.

2. Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief.)

(a) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly.

(b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important.

(c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S./Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations.

3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro.

(a) Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all tend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2.

(b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures -- e.g. close ports and deny U.S.-financed commodities to lines engaged in Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves.
We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba.

(c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two points about Cuba -- the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere.

(d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.

NOTE: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettlement is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.

5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache.

(a) Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas.

(b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report should be ready by about January 10.

(c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices -- we may want to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feelers.

6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

-6-

go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don't, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution.

Gordon Chase
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

1. a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

2. a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

3. a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McConne and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

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but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position
I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal,
ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish
to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

1. a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

2. a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

3. a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

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but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McC. B.
SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 18, 1964

Mr. MacGeorge Bundy: Re: Cuba Paper

Herewith the paper which Tom Mann's office asked me to send to you.

By way of background, this is a rough draft exposition of issues which need to be examined. The terms of reference briefly were these:

"One conceivable way to deal with the Hanoi and Havana problems is by imposing overt, measured sanctions against the source of aggression or convincing the authorities in those capitals that they were likely to suffer such reprisal to the point where they would cease their illegal actions..."

Under Bob Johnson for the Far East and under myself for Latin America, we attempted to get down on paper the results of an examination of an array of issues in both areas responsive to the terms of reference Walt proposed. The results of the examination of Cuba are reflected primarily in pages 5 through 17r. I suggest you may wish to glance at the index. I reemphasize this paper is a rough draft produced within a four-day time frame by several officers in S/P.

Sincerely,

John F. Ford
FSO

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III. Primary and Secondary Objectives

A. Primary

Our aim in this operation would be to end the potential of the Castro regime, and of the USSR or Communist China through the Castro regime, to extend Communist influence and power in this hemisphere. Immediately, however, a very basic problem arises: How can we hope to attain this object short of getting rid of the Castro regime itself? It is entirely possible that Castro might decide at any given moment to forewear in solemn terms any intention of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. As a matter of fact, he denies currently any such activity on his part. Conceivably, if US pressures proved effective he might go further.
further and abandon identifiable activities such as the training of nationals of other countries, the dissemination of insurrection propaganda, and insurrection inciting broadcasts. But could we have any assurance that once he had formally complied with our wishes and we had eased the pressures mounted against him, he would not quickly resume his previous course? Or that the end result of our efforts would not merely be a more effective concealment of continued Cuban manipulations?

The problem is not alone that Communists in a situation like this literally and as a matter of principle on their part cannot be trusted. There is the added difficulty of the peculiar character of Castro and certain of his closest associates. Evidently revolution is their raison d'être as political
political beings. We have every reason to believe that they
no more could give up their revolutionary agitations and
activities than they could stop breathing. We might hope that
the Soviet leaders, with their greater sense of responsibility
in a nuclear age, could be made to see the dangers and seek to
restrain Castro. But could we expect the Soviet leaders to
be effective? Such evidence as we have suggests that Castro
is quite capable of defying the wishes of Moscow. (Witness the
test-ban fiasco. Also consider Moscow's helplessness as
against the Albanians, the North Koreans, and the North
Vietnamese.) If the Soviets applied strong sanctions, it might
be another matter. But even this is uncertain. And, obviously,
the fact of Communist China adds further complications. On the
one hand, the certainty of Peiping's seizure upon any Soviet
cautions move to score points in its cold war with Moscow
would have an
inhibiting effect on the Soviets. On the other, should the Russians choose to ignore Chinese scorn and threaten to wipe their hands clean of their dangerous tool, Communist China would offer Castro an alternative, at least ideologically, and one to which he might well turn.

Perhaps of even greater moment is that the primary danger we face in Castro is not what he does in the way of distributing arms, disseminating propaganda, training subversives, and dispatching agents, but in the impact the very existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American countries. Presume, for example, that Castro did abandon all his efforts to export revolution, would this lead to an improvement of the situation in Venezuela? The simple fact is that Castro represents...
represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half. Until Castro did it, no Latin American could be sure of getting away with a communist-type revolution and a tie-in with the Soviet Union. As long as Castro endures, Communists in other Latin American countries can, to use Stalin's words, "struggle with good heart." Also, might not a massive US effort to achieve the limited objective of ending Castro's interference in other countries actually increase rather than diminish his power indirectly to stimulate revolutionary movements? Would it not suggest that except for this one thing, communist rule in Cuba, together with the military and political ties with the Soviets, was tolerable to us? Suppose again that Castro bowed to our demands in this matter. Would we not then be at a point where continued
continued hostility toward the regime was incongruous? Would we not have moved a decisive step toward granting Castro full respectability?

If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the symptoms enough? Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?

B. **Secondary**

While our major interest in the proposed operation would be to eliminate the dangers inherent in Castroism, an added consideration would be to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that not only is no money to be made from efforts to infiltrate this hemisphere, but that mounting cost and grave risks necessarily and inevitably will follow any such efforts. Quite
evidently the Soviet leaders are concerned for many different reasons with the incompatibility between their active pursuit of world revolutionary goals and Soviet national interests.

The occasion of this generalization is amply demonstrated by history and nature of the conflict that has developed between the USSR and Communist China. Our best hope for a favorable resolution of the cold war is for this concern to grow to a point where Moscow will decide once and for all that world revolution is a luxury that it simply cannot afford. Perhaps the one thing that stands in the way of such a happy decision is the prospect, represented first by the success of Castro in Cuba and second by the increasingly unstable situation in other Latin American countries, that big gains can be made in this hemisphere and at relatively little cost. If we can pull off a successful.
campaign against Cuba, this prospect would be all but obliterated.

The gain we would have made could, then, extend far beyond that of simply increasing the immediate security of this hemisphere.

It could extend to the point of decisive forward movement toward liquidation of our cold war with the Soviets. (It might also have implications for our second war, that with Communist China.)

IV. Key Issues

The Demand
1. The first of a number of basic questions that will confront us has to do with the nature of the demand we would postulate for Castro. In the case of the missile crisis of October, 1962, a factor that made for success was that our demand could be clearly and simply stated and could be satisfied by a concrete action on the part of our adversaries. It was all a matter of removing offensive weapons.
from Cuba. We could in this instance be equally straight forward if we wanted to be. We could make it a matter of Castro's "ceasing" his efforts to export revolution. But where would this leave us? As noted above, a Castro commitment to conform to this demand, even if made with sincerity which would be highly unlikely, would not take care of our problem.

And short of a sincere commitment, we could find ourselves with a whole can of worms on our hands. Castro could offer to trade a commitment, which he could well have no intention of abiding by, for a change in our policy of hostility; he could stop for a period all of the objectional activities and leave us out on a limb; he could more effectively go underground and perhaps actually increase his potential.
We might, on the other hand, make clear that nothing less than the demise of the Castro regime would satisfy us. But could we afford to be so candid? Having endured the regime for seven years, and having taken a very great deal from it, how could we justify suddenly moving for its extinction? And if we were publicly to acknowledge this as our aim, would not a sudden blow seem a more logical way of proceeding than the application of measured pressures? Also, the statement of this as our objective would maximize the chances, which although probably slight still must be taken into account, of Soviet military support of Cuba. It would, in other words, throw down the gauntlet for the Soviets and without the face saving escape hatches that would be available if our objective was stated in less sweeping terms.
Probably the most judicious course would be to justify our action on grounds of defense of the security of other American states without any clarification of when and under what circumstances we would consider the security threat at an end. Once the mounting of pressures was underway, we could gradually make clear that only a basic change in the regime or its policies would meet the needs of the situation.

The Occasion
2. A second key question is how do we justify inauguration of the measures. Would it not be essential to have a dramatic incident or action on which to peg our move? Given the context in which we would operate, that is the threat to the security of other Latin American countries, would we not require convincing and if possible, alarming evidence that the threat was real and immediate? With the possible exception
of the arms cache in Venezuela, such evidence is lacking. It may be we can make the arms cache an adequate peg. If so, however, it will be necessary to have an OAS finding in regard to the cache that will make it a plausible causus for action.

Can we arrange such a reaction when the matter is considered in March? Would it not be of the utmost importance that in addition to a formal OAS reaction, we have anguished cries for succor from individual Latin American countries, if not from Venezuela then at least from certain of the other Caribbean countries?

Should the arms cache prove a dud, which well may be the case, should we not wait until we have a satisfactory peg. Given Castro's proclivity for irresponsibility, we can sit back and wait with reasonable assurance for one to be thrown into our lap. But would not a better bet be to provoke one?
The important thing about the occasioning incident is that the more serious it is, and the more the Latin American countries themselves -- in whole or in part -- get out in front and scream about it, the less complex will be our problem with regard to Latin American support and world opinion generally. Should, for example, we rely upon past actions, including the arms cache, we would necessarily face a good deal of scepticism and apathy. The world has simply gotten too used to these, and has, among other things, discounted the actual dangers involved. Under even the most favorable of circumstances (e.g., a strong OAS resolution re the arms cache), US movement on the basis of warmed up complaints of the past will have a ring of phoniness. If, on the other hand
hand, we have something like the assassination of a prominent
Latin American leader, even if only indirectly traceable to the
Cubans, or some kind of arms clash affecting one of the
Latin American countries in which Cuban participation can be
identified or made to seem plausible, the situation would be
altogether different, particularly if we moved fast.

C. Legal justification. However dramatic and
impressive the immediate occasion for US action, we will still
face the problem of legally justifying ourselves before the
eyes of the world. This will be all the more true since we
can be certain we will be confronted with strong charges in
the UN, and since bloodshed if and as it occurs will raise the
question of whether our counter-measures are not entirely
disproportionate to the particular incident occasioning them,
whatever its nature.
Our legal position would have to rest in the first instance on the provisions of the UN Charter recognizing the right of nations to self defense and the right of regional groupings of states to establish and maintain collective security arrangements. With these Charter provisions as a base, the direct legal case could be built upon subparagraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este in January 1962.

This Resolution, with underscoring added, reads as follows:

"3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance."

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The wording of this paragraph is sufficiently broad to cover any steps the US should take, even if it moved entirely on its own. However, the force of the Resolution would be greatly increased if the OAS should specifically sanction action under the Resolution, even if only after action had begun. Moreover, the case would obviously be far more defensible if at least several Latin American states joined actively in the action program.

The fact that we have this legal cover for moving against Castro would not still, or even affect, criticism from the Communist side, or from many neutralists. The simple fact is that even if we had an air tight legal case, it would not be accepted in many quarters of the globe.

Perhaps
Perhaps, therefore, we should not base our action simply upon international understandings and agreements. In the final analysis, our case will be strongest, and will be most respected, if we make full use of the inherent right of any state to self-defense, as we did in the missile crisis of 1962. In this connection, we have and should bring into immediate play the succinctly worded doctrine enunciated by President Kennedy at his press conference on September 13, 1962. This Kennedy Doctrine, which was categorically reaffirmed on occasion of the settlement of the Missile Crisis and as a caveat limiting the no-invasion "commitment" but which seems to have slipped into the background since, reads as follows:

"But let me make this clear once again. If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities in Cape Canaveral or the lives of the American people in this
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in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to expand its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in the hemisphere or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

D. Hemispheric Coordination. Perhaps the most consequential problem the US will face will be to get maximum solidarity among the American states for its action. This, as was noted above, would be greatly facilitated if a serious new manifestation of the Cuban threat is available. Even in this circumstance, however, great difficulties will be encountered in securing the support of several key Latin American countries. Under other circumstances, i.e., action on the basis of warmed over charges, this support will more than likely be lacking.

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The fundamental question before us is, therefore, how far we are willing to go without full hemispheric support, or even in the face of important hemispheric opposition. If we are not willing to assume a certain amount of stigma with regard to a revival of "Yankee Imperialism" a la the past, which incidentally will certainly grow as our operations are drawn out, or even to risk at least a temporary and probably trying division within the family of American states, the judicious thing would probably be to refrain from action unless and until the Cubans give us a sufficiently dangerous justification as to shock and alarm all.

Should we decide that we have no choice but to risk friction with our southern allies, it will still be important that we secure the active cooperation of as many of them as possible.
possible, and to give the operation an inter-American character.

How can we best do this? One possibility would be to move for a decision for action (either as against the arms cache case or against a new incident), seeking to force through a majority vote in our favor, and after that working bilaterally with those states sharing our point of view to get an action program underway. Does not experience suggest, however, that we have a better chance of getting widespread support, and keeping down at least the formalization of opposition, if we decide upon what we need and intend to do and then tell our Latin American allies rather than ask about it? Do we not, in fact, have reason to believe that many of the governments would, in the face of their domestic political situations, prefer such a course on our part? In any event, given a conviction.
conviction on our part that action is necessary from the standpoint of our security interests and our overall political goals, can we afford to risk the delays, the dulling of the sharpness of a justification when it arises, and the general fuzzing up of issues that will inevitably follow on a regular debate-decision making process in a forum of the gamut of American states? On the other hand, can we afford to go ahead without at least the tacit approval of the hemisphere as a whole? These are key questions that must be answered.

E. The Sequence. How should the US proceed in the actual application of pressures? The underlying concept on which we would operate calls for an ascending scale of actions that would continue until the desired changes in the policies or make up
make up of the Castro regime were effected. Should we from
the opening salvo of the operation signal our overall
intention as we did in the Missile Crisis? Or should we let
our purposes unfold and develop as incidents and counter-
incidents in the campaign took place? Logically, the nature
of the causative incident should play a large part in this
determination. Should Castro be nailed with an activity of
obviously great gravity, our best tactic would seem to be to
set forth our aims and intentions in maximal terms. But if
we have to move on the basis of a minor or questionable
provocation, would it not be best to tailor one immediate
response to that order of magnitude and leave it to subsequent
Castro actions and defiances to justify stepping up the pace?
If we decide to start with mild measures, would we not need to
plan, and perhaps even make known, what sort of actions on
the part of the Cubans would be cause of further actions on
part?

Here, however, an important question arises. No matter
how we begin, whether on low or high key, do we not have to
decide from the first how far we are willing ultimately to go?

One thing that would seem axiomatic is that we cannot afford
another "Bay of Pigs" in one form or other. If we embark on a
program designed to achieve certain ends and the first measures,
whether relatively strong or mild, do not achieve those ends,
could we afford to back down and simply accept the status quo
ante, which might in practice leave Castro stronger and more
defiant than ever? But what if the difficulties proved greater
than foreseen and we found ourselves being forced nearer and
nearer to open warfare or even invasion, would our national
interest

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interest be served thereby? Or suppose Soviet reaction were more violent than anticipated, would we be prepared seriously to risk a major nuclear war? And what if we found our Latin American allies pulling completely away from us? Would we be willing to go it alone? We have to allow the possibility that the end of the road will be more hazardous than the beginning. This being so, should we get on the road in the first place unless we are willing to see the hazards through to the end, whatever they may be? Once our power and prestige are committed, can we, without unacceptable damage to our hemispheric and world position, yield our ground? Thus the basic issue becomes not what we will or will not do at the first or second stage, but what we will or will not do during the course of the whole campaign.

If we

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If we decide that there are limits beyond which we will not go, what escape routes can we provide for ourselves?

Would we be prepared to enter into a negotiated settlement whereby we would lift pressures in exchange for a verbal commitment from Castro? What if we proved unable to get even a verbal commitment? Would a feasible out be simply to drop the pressures and unilaterally declare that if such and such took place in the future, we would act with all force? Might we have as an "alternate objective" a bargain with the USSR whereby we would lay off Castro if it abandoned its ties and support?

F. Orchestration

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F. Orchestration. In the actual application of measures, we will necessarily be subject to two conflicting considerations. On the one hand, we will need to get the job done as expeditiously as possible in order to minimize the chances of adverse reactions, untoward incidents, etc. On the other, we will need to hold damage to Cuba and the Cuban people to an absolute minimum. Which of these should most affect our conduct?

Again, decisive weight might attach to the causative incident. If it is grave, our best course will probably be to move both speedily and heavily. Otherwise, would we not want to rely for at least a trial period on essentially indirect methods, adding to these only gradually and as unfolding events justify? However, are the possibilities here sufficiently great to hold out any prospects of success? We can tighten
economic screws by tougher policies toward our allies and by a campaign to keep down the hard currency price of sugar.

But could we expect these to produce any more decisive results than other economic pressures in the past? We no doubt can effect a substantial step up of clandestine and subversive activities, but probably not to a point seriously to bother the regime unless accompanied by important support from the outside, which only we could furnish.

Would it be feasible to appear to be acting with restraint while actually bearing down heavily? Would it not be possible, for example, to deploy larger scale naval forces in the vicinity of Cuba and in effect harass shipping without declaring a formal blockade? Also could we not, without any formal public acknowledgment, instigate and blithely support a "war of liberation" in Cuba, using refugees and trying to incite local residents.
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residents to action, and furnishing any and all equipment

needed and desired? Our aim in this case would not be a

single, all encompassing blow, but a succession of little but
growing successes.

As we subjected the regime to the weight of massive, but
generally unused, military forces and to a US managed and
supported internal war of liberation, we could expect (1) the
world to become accustomed, as in the case of the Communists
in so many instances, and (2) to precipitate particular incidents
of growing seriousness against which we could react with a
step up in the harshness of our measures. Thus, in time, we
could get ourselves in a position where we would be pulling
virtually all stops, but without a corresponding shock to world
opinion or a single take it or leave it challenge to the USSR.
G. Costs and Risks of Action. There can be little question that a high pressure operation against Cuba will be a costly and perhaps risky affair. At one end of the spectrum is the possibility of military involvement with the US$. We can, perhaps, heavily discount this possibility, but we cannot ignore it. The Soviet leaders are on record that they will support Cuba against any military attack. In a case of an out and out US invasion, they would be hard pressed to ignore their assurances without a severe loss of face. In case of a gradual build up of US hostility, they would find an escape much easier and would very probably take full advantage of it. But we can never be completely sure. Here, then, is a chance we would simply have to take. Are the stakes sufficiently high to take it?

US
The USSR will certainly take a licking in "international public
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public opinion." Our friends and even some of our less friendly friends, might secretly applaud our decision. But they would keep their approval to themselves. Voiced opinion will almost certainly be overwhelmingly against us. And, in truth, we will appear in a nasty light, and one which the fires from our embassies here and there would surely intensify.

We will also face many difficult days in the UN.

Whether lasting damage will have been been done to our relationship with the Latin American countries can only be surmised. Certainly we can not escape without an increase in the deep hostility of leftist inclined elements among the Latins. And there well may be a revival of real concern among even conservative circles over the bugabos of US intervention.

But among both radicals and conservatives, there should be an offsetting increase in respect, even if partly based on fear, of the US.
One immediate cost that will need to be weighed is

the interruption of the detente trend with respect to the

USSR. We can, of course, take the position, as to the Soviets

under similar circumstances, that improving relations between

the US and the USSR are not incompatible with our liquidation

of an intolerable situation on our own faculties. But at least

until the Cuban matter is finally settled, we can expect

renewed strains in our dealings with the Russians.

H. The Costs and Risks of Failure to Act. On the other

side of the coin are the fact that failure to bring Castro

to heed will: (1) increasingly complicate the problems of

ourselves and our friends in Latin America; (2) raise a real

possibility our having either to tolerate the establishment of a

Communist regime in one or more of the other Latin American

countries or use force to prevent it; (3) encourage the
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Communists, and most importantly the Communists in the USSR, to believe that this tactic of indirect aggression can and will work; (d) necessarily erode domestic and foreign confidence in the will and firmness of the US. In short, continued tolerance of the aggressive actions and intrigues of Castro in this hemisphere will represent a self-imposed but nevertheless serious handicap in our efforts to hold up our end of the cold war, and otherwise to safeguard our national security interests.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - Covert Program

1. Peter Jessup and I talked about the Special Group meeting last week, and the intention to get higher authority's decisions this week on a number of specific matters.

2. Attached is a collection of background documents which bear on the problem.

   Tab 1 - A letter, dated March 6, from Des Fitzgerald to you describing a number of decisions which need to be taken.

   Tab 2 - A memorandum, dated March 30, to the Special Group giving a status report on autonomous Cuban exile groups.

   Tab 3 - A memorandum, dated about January 25, which reviews and evaluates the current covert program. Among other things, it attempts to show how the covert program ties in with our other programs directed against Cuba.

   Tab 4 - A CIA memorandum, dated February 21, describing our possible courses of action (a) if we decide we can live with Castro, and (b) if we cannot live with Castro.

   Tab 5 - A memorandum, dated March 17, which describes the morale among anti-Castro Cubans.

3. In essence, the issues in the covert program seem to boil down to the following:

   (a) CIA now collects intelligence from within Cuba. It is axiomatic that this will go on, and, thus, no decision from higher authority is needed.

   (b) CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media are now directed at Cuba to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program.

(c) CIA is now working with State in its economic denial program.

Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program.

(d) CIA is now trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime.

Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program.

(e) CIA is now supporting two autonomous Cuban exile groups. These will be operating in the very near future. While withdrawal of our support will not prevent these groups from raiding Cuba in the short run, it will probably dry up this capability over the long run.

Higher authority may want to (1) withdraw support immediately and try, if possible, to prevent any raids, (2) withdraw support if and when the exile activities seem to be leading to an intolerable situation, or (3) continue support to the exile groups indefinitely.

(f) CIA now supports and directs a sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida; this apparatus is now standing by, waiting for something to do.

Higher authority may want to (1) disband the apparatus, (2) permit the apparatus to go ahead with its sabotage program.

(g) CIA now has the capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports.

Higher authority may want to (1) disband the program, (2) try to keep this capacity on the shelf for a while longer, or (3) permit the sabotage of Cuban ships.

4. Where do we go from here?

(a) Peter Jessup is prepared to boil down whatever documents in the folder you think the President ought to read before the meeting. Please let me know which ones.

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(b) It seems to me that we might need another paper for the meeting - perhaps a 3 or 4 page paper, which describes briefly the pros and cons of the issues listed above under paragraph 3. Such a paper might or might not include departmental recommendations. Please let me know your views on this.

Gordon Chase
6 March 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mac:

Dick Helms and I are most appreciative of the opportunity you gave us this morning for a thorough discussion of the Agency's various operational problems in connection with Cuba. It was very helpful to us and has served to clarify to a great extent our own thinking on the future of our various operational programs. It might perhaps be well to set forth, in this informal fashion, a list of the various topics which we discussed together with the considerations that appear to me to apply.

In the first place, as you know very well, although the Agency appears as the proposer of most covert action programs at the Special Group and elsewhere, we do this only in response to what we understand to be policy requirements and have no interest in either commencing or perpetuating any programs which are not demanded by policy and which are not geared to the accomplishment of a specific objective. The interdependent program of actions which we proposed last spring and which was accepted in June was based on three propositions which were accepted at the time: (a) that it was in the U.S. interest to get rid of Castro; (b) that, in attempting to do so, the U.S. did not wish either to employ overt force or to raise the international "noise level" to an unacceptable degree; and (c) that the ultimate objective of the program was not mass uprisings but to encourage disaffected elements within the military establishment and other power centers of the regime to carry out a coup.
The resulting program represented a maximum covert effort but only a minimum overall national effort which could result in overthrowing Castro. The percentage of chance of achieving this purpose was admittedly never too high even had the program proceeded on full blower. In fact the economic part of the program suffered a serious, if not fatal, reverse with the Leyland bus contract and subsequent moves by European suppliers to take advantage of Castro's improved cash position. The sabotage raids, built into the program as a sort of firing pin for internal unrest and to create the conditions for a coup, which was to be the main force leading to Castro's defeat, ran only from August to December and only five were actually conducted. The effectiveness of these five raids is certainly debatable; there are strong proponents on both sides of the argument. Regardless of how that debate might come out, however, five rather low-key raids followed by the present three-month hiatus, the latter clearly noted by pro- and anti-Castroites alike, adds up to a program of a much smaller dimension than originally envisioned which could not be expected to have had the desired detonating effect.

At the present time, as a result of a number of circumstances well known to you, Castro is in a strong upswing and the spirit of resistance within Cuba is at a very low point indeed. In my estimation, a covert program at this time designed to overthrow Castro is not realistic. Acceptance of risks and noise level of a greater magnitude than we had in mind in June would be needed to stand a chance in view of the developments since last June. This then raises the question of what should happen now to the various bits and pieces of the June program. I would like to mention these separately and refer to some of the considerations typical to each.

The sabotage raids are conducted by Cuban exile groups held and trained in Florida and entirely subject to our planning and control. There are three of these groups totaling approximately 50 men. To place them in position and recover them there requires an extensive maritime apparatus in Florida, which likewise serves intelligence agent infiltrations and exfiltrations. To maintain the raiding capability on a stand-by basis is expensive but, more importantly, the raiding groups
themselves have a relatively short shelf life; if not employed their morale deteriorates and some of the members, usually the best motivated, drop out. Replacements can be acquired and trained but their caliber and morale is in large part determined by the morale of the exile community as a whole. We probably can retain the present raiding groups at roughly their current capabilities for another month or two, although the well-known Cuban volatility is capable of causing sudden and more rapid deterioration.

In short, we will need to know within a reasonable time whether we should continue to effect repairs to and keep in being our sabotage raiding apparatus. The dismemberment of these raiding teams could be accomplished without too much shock to the exile community. It would be noticed, but, if done carefully, particularly if it coincided with the commencement of "autonomous" operations, it should not cause undue repercussions and polemics against U.S. policy.

As you know, again as part of the June plan, we are supporting two "autonomous" exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Artíme and Manolo Ray. In both cases we have gone to maximum lengths to preserve the deniability of U.S. complicity in the operation. Artíme, who now possesses the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus, has required a good deal of hand-feeding although still within the context of deniability. He will probably not be ready for his operations against Cuba before April or May of this year. He possesses most of his hardware and maritime equipment and has negotiated geographical and political bases in Central America. Manolo Ray has been handled on a much more independent basis. We have furnished him money and a certain amount of general advice. He does not possess the physical accoutrements that Artíme has and is probably not as well equipped in terms of professional planning. Ray has a better political image inside Cuba among supporters of the revolution and has recently acquired, according to reports, some of the other left-wing exile activist groups such as Gutierrez Menoyo and his Second Front of the Escambray. He is said to be ready to move into Cuba on a clandestine basis late this spring. His first weapon will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently not externally-mounted hit-and-run raids.
If U.S. policy should demand that the "autonomous" operations be suspended, we could of course cut off our support immediately. Artim and his group might or might not disintegrate at once. Manolo Ray almost certainly would continue. Both groups are based outside the United States and our only real leverage on them is through our financial support but withdrawal of this support would probably be fatal to their operations in time. A cutoff of this support, even though this support has been untraceable in a technical sense, would have a considerable impact within the exile community. U.S. support is rumored, especially in the case of Artim, and the collapse of the only remaining evidence of exile action against Castro would hit the exile community hard which is what it in turn would do to its favorite target, U.S. policy. The exile of today, however, appears to have lost much of his fervor and, in any case, does not seem to have the capacity for causing domestic trouble which he had a year or two ago. The Central American countries in which the exile bases exist would be greatly confused, although we have carefully never indicated to the governments of these countries any more than U.S. sympathy for the "autonomous" groups.

We have a capacity, which is increasing, to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports. We are emphasizing in this program the more subtle forms of sabotage as against large explosions obviously stemming from agent-placed bombs and limpets. The Cuban merchant fleet, among the most badly run in the world, can be helped along to a measurable degree by this program.

On the economic warfare front, as you know, we have for many months conducted a covert denial program based on limited capabilities directed at very narrow targets. The effectiveness of this program is dependent on the careful selection of items to be denied in terms of their critical value to a key element of the Cuban economy. Despite the virtual collapse of the U.S. overall economic denial program against Cuba, we still retain the capacity, using unofficial and covert methods, to hurt but obviously not to destroy certain bits of the Cuban economy. This effort can be complemented by carefully concealed contamination of lubricants and similar actions.

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Our program to get in touch with and subvert members of the military establishment and other elite groups in Cuba continues. Its chance of success naturally rises and falls with the state of morale inside Cuba as influenced by the success or inactivity of our other programs and the U.S. posture in general.

Our intelligence program continues at full force. It will be affected by anti-Castro morale but we believe that we can offset the effects of further deterioration in this morale by increasingly tightened and efficient operations.

We are seeking your advice to know which of the above lines of actions we should continue, which we should try to retain as a shelf capability and which to abandon. (Of course, intelligence collection would continue.) As parts of an integrated national program designed to have at least a fighting chance to get rid of Castro, they seemed to us to make sense; as separate pieces they can serve to exert some braking effect on Castro's progress, but that is about all.

Sincerely,

Desmond FitzGerald
30 March 1964

FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

TO THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members of the Special Group as to the current state of operational readiness of the autonomous Cuban exile groups which receive U.S. Government support and to indicate what might be expected of these groups in the relatively near future.

2. As part of the covert program authorized in June 1963, CIA is providing financial and some technical support to two autonomous Cuban exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Ray and Manuel Artime. In our judgment, Artime and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Ray, now possess the hardware and maritime equipment as well as the geographical and political bases in Central America needed to launch independent infiltration and sabotage operations against Cuba. Both groups also appear to have reached a state of training and psychological readiness which could impel their leaders to launch operations against Cuba at almost any time and with little or no notice to the U.S. Government.
3. The possibility of imminent unilateral operations on the part of the autonomous groups is brought to the attention of the Special Group at this time since it is related to the question of the future of CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations now under review by higher authority. This relationship was described in Part V of the memorandum entitled "Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba," dated 24 January 1964.

It should be noted that if a policy decision is made to terminate sabotage and harassment operations for the autonomous groups as well as for CIA, it will be necessary to terminate support for the autonomous groups as CIA would not be in a position to insure that they would refrain from raids and sabotage even if so requested. In fact, it now appears likely that neither group will disintegrate at once upon notification of termination of U.S. subsidies. While withdrawal of U.S. financial aid and moral support would probably be fatal to their operations in time, they are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other sources of support. In so doing and in order to prove their viability to potential supporters, they would, in their desperation, probably feel compelled to launch one or more dramatic raids against Cuba.

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REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological lift.
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lif. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchev assurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castrovite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

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These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to its
economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSC-220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. The reduction of free-world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.
B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Outside Cuba:

a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and insular surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.
G. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprisings.

D. The collection of intelligence

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

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By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measurable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

CIA's
CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. **Covert collection of intelligence** to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. **Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.**

3. **Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.**

4. **Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions.** CIA is identifying, contacting, and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. **General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance.** As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe

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that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.
Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted. All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

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1. Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.
The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months ago.
ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the
maximum leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." 
Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevara had indicated 
concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower 
and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba 
reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in 
Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia 
was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announce-
ment of the raids, the average man on the street seemed 
aesthetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following 
the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, 
and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced 
by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. 
shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with 
Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 
1964 that the 23 December Siguanas raid which destroyed a 
P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected 
Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban 
government officials and in the Western community in Havana 
has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent 
sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of 
the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside 
world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight con-
tinues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action 
against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the 
pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet 
about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban 
government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage 
against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very success-
ful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion 
needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanas 
had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered 
which depress the people, they are anxious for something to 
happen."

The
The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 35 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Firasas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate.
Cuba’s defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S./Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

As this
As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

VI
VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating, but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

B. GAS ACTION
B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

   The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

   Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

   Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.
4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in conjunction with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such an action were estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a pro forma action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be
guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.
The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.

2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.

3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maravi, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.

4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabel, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.

5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 18 others injured in the explosion.
21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.
Advantages

If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.

Disadvantages

a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.

b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages

As in 1. above.

Disadvantages

a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.

b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.
Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

**Advantages**

We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.

**Disadvantages**

a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community.

b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives).

**Advantages**

A carefully targeted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.

**Disadvantages**

We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.
### Advantages

| a. Probably feasible within OAS. |
| b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level. |

### Disadvantages

| b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms. |
| c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers. |
| d. Expensive. |

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

#### Advantages

| a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment. |
| b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used. |

#### Disadvantages

| a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups. |
| b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway. |
| c. Some noise level. |

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

#### Advantages

| a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled. |

#### Disadvantages

b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.</td>
<td>a. General ineffectiveness against targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery, Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.</td>
<td>a. High risk of capture and exposure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.</td>
<td>b. High noise level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Possibility of some Soviet response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.</td>
<td>a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B,1. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved operations and greater economic damage.</td>
<td>a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much more effective operations and real economic damage.</td>
<td>a. No deniability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Very high noise level.</td>
<td>b. Very high noise level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.</td>
<td>c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

**Advantages**

Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.

**Disadvantages**

a. Will probably not catch contraband.

b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response.

c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable.

**Advantages**

Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.

**Disadvantages**

a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America.

b. Not fatal to Fidel.

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

**Advantages**

Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.

**Disadvantages**

Must be followed by some form of effective action.
8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.</td>
<td>a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.</td>
<td>b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subservion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Proper basis for future actions.</td>
<td>a. Difficulty of clear proof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The most effective method of bringing down Castro.</td>
<td>Possible Soviet reactions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, **invade Cuba.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will bring down Castro.</td>
<td>a. Possible Soviet reaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Probable heavy casualties on both sides.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scenario for B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan
arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.
7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba, giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Bundy:

You asked to see this again,

CC
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Policy -- April to November, 1964

1. I refer to your request that I try to pull together Cuban policy over the weekend and put it in the framework of the President talking to the Government.

2. Attached is a very rough first cut of how I think the President might reasonably look at the problem.

On this first go-around, in an effort to see the whole problem, I have tried to inject a realistic dose of domestic politics; accordingly, this is not the type of paper which should be distributed very far beyond the White House. On the next go-around, we might want to frame the problem in a sanitized NSAM or in a sanitized talking paper which the President could use at an NSC meeting.

3. Please let me know how I can help.

Cc
Gordon Chase
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY 3/22/64

DRAFT

U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

April to November, 1964

I. General

The minimum objective of our Cuban policy will be a Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors (militarily or subversively) and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards this dual objective, we will continue to reject the options of unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and of an effective total blockade around Cuba - primarily because they would risk another US/USSR confrontation.

Instead, we will continue to engage in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions and pressures, both defensive and offensive, which stop short of military intervention/blockade. The application of these actions and pressures will be tempered slightly by the domestic political situation; while we do not want to appear as "coexisting with the Soviet satellite", insofar as possible, we will apply pressures against Cuba in such a way that, in the absence of unusual occurrences, we will "keep the lid on" Cuba and maintain a low temperature in the Caribbean. It is axiomatic that we will continue to be prepared and plan for the unusual - e.g. a revolt against the regime, a U-2 shoot-down, a Castro decision to eject the Russians.

Here are some details of our objectives and of the measures we will take between now and November.
II. Objective -- Containment of the Cuban Threat

We will try to insure that Cuba poses no threat to its neighbors, either militarily or subversively. To this end we will continue to take a number of defensive measures which aim at three primary targets.

A. Cuba, the Military Threat -- We will continue to insure that Cuba does not become again an offensive weapons (e.g. missiles) threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end we will continue to collect intelligence from within Cuba and to conduct intensive air and sea surveillance around and over Cuba. In this regard, we will make it clear to the Cubans that dire consequences will ensue if they interfere with our air surveillance of Cuba. We will also make it clear to the Soviets that we do not intend to tolerate a shoot-down of a U-2 by the Cubans; it is in the Soviet interest to do everything possible to prevent the Cubans from doing this.

To discourage possible Cuban military attack against its neighbors, as appropriate, we will continue to put ourselves clearly on record that any such Cuban moves will have extremely serious consequences for Cuba.

B. Soviet Military Personnel -- We will continue to try to effect the removal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba. To this end we will continue to make it eminently clear to the Soviets that we cannot tolerate the permanent assignment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. As appropriate, we will tell the Russians that they do not need a military establishment in Cuba to prevent the Cubans from shooting down a U-2.
C. Subversion -- We will continue to do everything we can to impede and, if possible, to stop Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. To this end we will make a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct Latin American attention to and to assist (materially where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problems of controlling internal insurgency and of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba.

Appropriate OAS action on the up-coming arms cache issue can take us a long way in our effort to strengthen our counter-subversion program. Specifically, we want the following.

1. We want the OAS resolution (Article 2) in flexible and general language, to warn Castro that the OAS will not stand by idly if he continues his subversive efforts. This language will be cognate with a possible Presidential statement along similar lines to the U.S. public and with a stern private warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion is leading to a highly dangerous situation. Hopefully, this language will deter Castro from further subversive actions; among other things the Russians may find it in their interest to control Castro more closely. Also, such language will provide a juridical umbrella for, and preposition the OAS and/or the U.S. to use force against Cuba in the future if it is deemed desirable to do so.

While such warning language is highly important and will be tough to get, we will not bargain away the rest of the proposed resolution in an effort to get it.
2. We want the OAS resolution (Article 4(c)) to call for the suspension of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries. This will considerably increase Cuba's difficulty in exporting subversives, especially if the Cuban/Mexican air link is cut.

This article of the resolution is of high priority but may not be tough to get.

3. We want the OAS resolution (Article 3) to call for the establishment of a surveillance system which will permit the stopping and searching in territorial waters of all vessels suspect of carrying arms and subversives; a similar air surveillance system will also be established. While there are some negative aspects to such a resolution (few, if any, arms will be found), there are good reasons for having it. First, since an arms cache is involved, we must at a minimum make a bow towards the problem of controlling arms shipments. Also, the resolution will be viewed as a tightening measure, and the fact that no further arms shipments occur can be interpreted as a result of the establishment of a surveillance system. Second, it will possibly deter Castro somewhat from sending men and arms to Latin America. Third, it will provide a peg on which to hang closer and more effective bilateral cooperation which may be called for in the future. For example, the U.S. and Venezuela may want to work out an arrangement whereby U.S. vessels can enter Venezuelan waters to assist in the seizure of a suspect vessel. Fourth, while it will give us an instrument to harass Castro marginally, it has no significant escalation implications.
This article is of medium priority but should be relatively easy to get.

4. We want the OAS resolution to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to counter Castro/Communist subversion. We want a condemnation of the Castro regime (Article 1), a renewed call for alert against Castro/Communist subversion and an endorsement of the Lavalle Committee recommendations outlining specific measures on controlling travel, funds, and propaganda for subversive purposes (Article 7).

These articles of the resolution should be easy to get, but are of low priority.

III. Objective -- Removal of the Soviet Satellite from the Hemisphere

We will continue our attempts to break the Cuba/Bloc tie-line and to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

A. General Description of U.S. Approach -- Generally speaking, we hope to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere by a series of offensive measures which will intensify Cuba's already serious economic difficulties; which will increase the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintaining Cuba; and which will stimulate directly and indirectly, internal resistance to the regime. This effort, complemented by our defensive measures, hopefully will lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which constitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere.

1. Overthrow of the Castro Regime -- By exerting pressure on Cuba, we might be able to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty, and discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the power centers of
the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt, it is likely that direct or indirect U.S. support will be needed to insure its success. Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolated from their Latin American brethren, will embrace the revolt.

2. **Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms** -- Our present policy could lead Castro to agree to break his tie-line with the USSR and stop his subversion efforts. It is conceivable that such factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures; (2) further Cuban economic deterioration in spite of Soviet aid; (3) distrust of Soviet intentions; (4) the psychological and real impact on Castro of the OAS resolution; and (5) the realization by Castro that he can never be the man he wants to be and that Cuba can never be the place he wants it to be until he comes to terms with the U.S.; will lead Castro to the accommodation option. Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines, although there are also indications that Castro presently regards his own personal survival as dependent upon his tie with the Bloc.

3. **A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba** -- A Soviet decision to quit Cuba cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (1) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a "dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will
be permitted), (3) the magnitude of Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how the Russians would view their ejection from Cuba either by the overthrow of the Castro regime, or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would conceivably be mixed generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf.

B. Specific Measures We Will Take -- In the tough, nasty, but no military intervention/blockade policy, which probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which would constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere, we will take the following measures.

1. Political Isolation of Cuba -- We will continue our efforts to isolate Cuba politically; we will continue to demonstrate that Cuba has taken a "wrong turn" and is condemned for it by the Free World, and especially by Latin America. One reason for this dimension of our policy is that there are numerous indications that political isolation wounds Castro deeply on a psychological level. Conceivably, the desire for acceptability by the West eventually will be an important factor in a Castro realization that he can't have it both ways, and in an ultimate Castro decision to eject the Russians and make peace with the West. Another reason for this aspect of our policy is that political isolation hampers Cuba's subversive activities; for example, it
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

-8-

...denies him the use of diplomatic missions in target countries to promote revolution purposes.

Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can further our policy of political isolation; accordingly, we want the OAS resolution to encourage the following steps: First, we want the remaining five OAS countries, which maintain diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba, to sever such relations (Article 4(a)). Second, we want the suspension of all trade, except food and medicines, between Cuba and the OAR's (Article 4(b)). Since such trade is already very small this step may have greater political than economic significance (although, on the economic side, it will demonstrate OAS solidarity on the question of trade with Cuba). Third, we want a general call to Free World countries to cooperate with us in our effort to isolate Cuba economically and politically (Article 5).

NOTE: In the context of the whole resolution, we regard the breaking of diplomatic relations as a matter of medium priority; furthermore, we recognize that it will be very tough to get. The priority of the suspension of trade and of the general call for Free World cooperation, is treated below in the following section.

2. Economic Denial Program -- Generally speaking, we will continue in our efforts to keep Free World/Cuban trade, particularly in critical commodities, at a low level - through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private means. To this end a special effort will be made over the next few weeks to obtain NATO, and particularly British, cooperation in
this over-all effort, especially with respect to the extension of export credit
guarantess to firms wishing to trade with Cuba.

Also, we will prepare now for the eventuality that our further efforts to
obtain voluntary Free World cooperation will not be successful. First, as a
matter of very high priority, we will push for language in the upcoming OAS
resolution which will provide a basis for possible unilateral U.S. action to
reduce Cuban/Free World commercial relations (e.g. the proclaimed list)
and, more importantly, which will encourage as many OAR's as possible to
join us in our effort (Articles 4(b), 5, and 6). It should be noted that such
language will not be difficult to get.

At present, one of the major obstacles to our effort in the field of economic
denial is the non-OAS Free World argument that the U.S. is the only country
in the Western Hemisphere which is really concerned about Cuba. To counter
this argument, we must demonstrate clearly that the Hemisphere regards Cuba
as a threat, that the Hemisphere supports the isolation policy, that the Hem-
isphere looks with disfavor upon traders who do business with Castro, and
that the Hemisphere intends to take appropriate action against such traders.

Second, sometime before the OAS consultative meeting on the Venezuelan
arms cache, we will complete a study which will project the level and type of
Free World trade with Cuba for 1964. This study will take into account our
present efforts in NATO. Third, sometime before the OAS consultative meeting
on the arms cache, we will complete a scenario of actions we can take to
increase the effectiveness of our economic denial program, in the event this is
deemed necessary. This scenario will include, but will not necessarily be limited to, a plan of action which will result in a meeting with hard-line OAR's (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador) to devise means of implementing the economic denial language of the OAS resolution. Such means, which may differ from OAR to OAR, should make it clear to Free World firms that they can't have it both ways and that they must choose between Cuba, with a population of 7,000,000 and selected OAS countries whose populations total in the hundreds of millions. In selling this proposal to the OAR's, we will point out, inter alia, that they will not be forced to sacrifice much in real terms since there will be relatively/Free World traders who will ultimately choose the Cuban market in such circumstances. Indeed, only Cuba will be seriously hurt.

3. **Free World Shipping** -- We will continue our efforts to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. **First,** we will try to ensure that the Lebanese finally effect their proposed shipping legislation. **Second,** we will continue our efforts with HMG and individual British shippers to reduce British shipping to Cuba. **Third,** we will continue our efforts to ensure that no new Free World faces enter the trade to pick up the slack which recent withdrawals have left. **Fourth,** we will keep in mind the favorable aspects of the OAS resolution (Article 4(c)) which will not permit Free World ships to call at OAS ports if they are proceeding to our from Cuba and which will therefore further discourage Free World shipping to Cuba.
4. **Air Service to and from Cuba** -- We will continue our efforts to reduce, restrict, and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from Cuba. Passage of an OAS resolution which suspends air communication between Cuba and OAR's (Article 4(c)) will be helpful in this regard.

5. **Covert Program** -- Our policy of pressures against Cuba will include a modest covert program; at the same time, this program will be consistent with our intention of "keeping the lid on" Cuba and of maintaining a low temperature in the Caribbean. **First**, we will continue to collect intelligence. **Second**, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media, directed at Cuba will continue to encourage low risk, simple sabotage, and other forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. **Third**, CIA will continue to work with State to deny to Cuba the commodities it needs. **Fourth**, CIA will continue trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime. **Fifth**, CIA will continue to support autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals. Of utmost importance in these autonomous exile operations is that U.S. involvement must be clearly deniable and that these operations will not lead to an intolerable escalation in the Caribbean (e.g. a Cuban air attack on Nicaragua). If it becomes apparent that this is not possible, withdrawal of support will be considered.

Until further notice, CIA will not direct any further sabotage efforts against Cuba. In this regard, CIA will disband, as discreetly as possible, its sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida.
CIA will keep on the shelf its capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports.

6. **Contact with Castro** -- We will establish a deniable contact with Castro and delicately inject into the very tenuous and marginal U.S./Cuban dialogue an option which Castro presently may not think exists - i.e. that we would consider assisting Cuba and guaranteeing Castro's existence if on his part he would stop his subversion and break his tie-line with the Bloc. (If consummated, such a deal would constitute a magnificent victory for the U.S. - the ejection of the Soviets from the Western Hemisphere after the penetration had been made.) There are a number of arguments in favor of talking to Castro.

*First*, while it is obviously a long shot, Castro could conceivably buy accommodation on U.S. terms. There is a substantial body of evidence which points to Castro's unhappiness with the present state of affairs and to his eagerness to negotiate a settlement. In this regard, the OAS resolution may have a special impact on Castro. If it turns out to be a tough one, the door which is now slightly ajar for Castro (deterioration of our isolation policy) and which is giving him much comfort and psychological lift, will be slammed shut. *Second*, talks with Castro will tend to intensify Cuban/Soviet tensions. *Third*, U.S./Cuban talks will tend to keep Castro cool during a time when we want the noise-level low. For example, between now and November we will be especially concerned about the possibility of Castro shooting down a U-2 and causing a pre-election flap in the Caribbean. From
past experience it is fair to say that Castro will probably act with a certain amount of restraint if he feels there is a chance we might come to terms with him.

Fourth, the disadvantages of talking to Castro appear minimal. There will probably be no leakage in view of the fact that it is also in Castro's interest to keep quiet. If there is leakage, we can probably deny it credibly - e.g. "This is too funny for words. Castro accuses us daily of trying to destroy him and hatching heinous plots against him. Many of our close allies (including Senator Fulbright) tell us we are being too nasty to Cuba in our isolation efforts. We are constantly being accused of moving faster than the OAS. This is the most incredible charge yet." In the highly unlikely event that there is leakage and we can't deny it, we can take the line which is essentially true -- e.g. "Castro wanted to tell us something and we agreed to listen. We would be derelict in protecting the national interest if we refused to listen. Our policy is unchanged. So long as Cuba continues its subversive efforts and maintains its ties with the Bloc, there can be no easing of tensions."

In going ahead with U.S./Cuban contact, we will follow at least the following basic guidelines. First, we will not, in any way, relax our present pressures against Castro. These are our bargaining levers. Second, we will ooze confidence. Castro should get the feeling that we are in no hurry and are content to continue on our present course. However, we are reasonable men and are not after Castro's head per se. Third, we will spin the negotiations out; this will not be hard in view of the communication difficulties. At the
same time, however, we will stay loose. If, per chance, it appears that we can eject the Soviets and, at the same time, believe it will benefit rather than hinder the Administration in November, we may want to speed up the time-table rather than wait to collect the dividend after November. (It might be noted that a deal with Castro before November might not necessarily be unmanageable from a domestic viewpoint. Obviously, the President could not live with a headline which reads "U.S. Accommodates with Castro." On the other hand, he might live superbly with headlines which read "USSR Ejected from Cuba" or "USSR/Cuba Tie-Line Broken." The loyal opposition would not be in a perfect position to complain. After all, they permitted the establishment of the tie-line and never could do anything about it via soft methods -- before mid-1960, or by hard methods -- after mid-1960.)

IV. **Objective -- Planning for Contingencies**

We will continue to prepare for contingencies which may occur in Cuba. We will also review all contingency plans which are in existence to ensure they
are current.

V. Objective - Containment of Cuba as a Negative Election Issue

The measures we will take to contain Cuba as a negative campaign issue will detract little, if at all, from what our policy would probably be in the absence of an election. These measures will be essentially mitigating in character. Here are some pertinent elements:

A. Public Posture -- The picture we will portray to the American public will be one of confidence, strength, and determination: First, the U.S. is no longer directly threatened by Cuba. We are firm in our resolve to maintain this position. Second, the real Cuban threat is subversion against Latin America. While we intend to aid the Hemisphere as much as possible in the fight against subversion, the control of subversion is and must necessarily be primarily the responsibility of the target countries; in this regard, we and other OAR's are confident that we can contain the Cuban subversive threat. Third, "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere will not be permitted. Fourth, we are doing everything reasonably possible to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere by weakening the structure of the Cuban economy and by increasing the Soviet burden of supporting Cuba. These economic measures also increase Cuba's difficulties in finding the resources to support its subversive efforts. and assume that Cuba does not become an example of progress which will be copied.

B. Keeping the Lid On and the Noise-Level Down -- We will avoid actions which appear to be only marginally advantageous to the furtherance of U.S. policy and which are likely to lead to an increase of tension and temperature in the Caribbean. For example, CIA will not conduct sabotage operations, which
can be convincingly traced back to us. Or again, we will not take actions against Cuba purely for the sake of needling Castro and which bring us no concrete reward (e.g. stopping and searching Cuba ships on the high seas; non-return of Russian helicopter).

While there are excellent national security reasons for talking with Castro, these talks, as noted above, will also tend to temper violent Castro reactions to unforeseen events which are bound to occur between now and November.

C. Keeping the Pressure On Cuba -- Domestic political considerations reinforce our national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure on Cuba - pressure which is still consistent with our decision against military intervention/blockade and which is still consistent with our decision to keep the lid on Cuba.

Also, we must recognize that such things as the extent of Free World commercial relations with Cuba have become symbols to the American public of U.S. resolve not to coexist with Castro. Therefore, while the limitation of Free World/Cuban commercial relations is important on national security grounds, it takes added importance because of the domestic political situation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET
EYES ONLY

April 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Program

I talked to John Crimmins about the meeting today on Cuba's covert program. John felt that one point may not have come up sharply enough -- the President should understand that even though sabotage operations are on the shelf, it is still possible that other covert activities will create noise. For example, goof-ups in our infiltration/exfiltration pro-
gram have caused noise level problems in the past.

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - Miscellaneous

1. Autonomous Exile Groups - You might want to glance over the attached memorandum for the record which Peter Jessup drafted after your meeting with Dick Helms and Des Fitzgerald. The memo implies that we can expect to see some activity in the near future and indicates that you will ensure that the President fully understands the implications of autonomous exile group activities.

2. Talks with Castro - I have given Des Fitzgerald and John Crimmins a rundown of the Bill Attwood/Lisa Howard activities. Using a "need to know" criterion, I gave Des a minimum dosage. He read the longish memorandum covering my New York conversation with Lisa Howard. I also told him that we have not replied to Castro's message to the President via Lisa Howard.

I gave John Crimmins a pretty full treatment. He read the Bill Attwood chronology and several memos regarding my recent talks with Lisa Howard.

John and I talked about the desirability of reopening the dialogue with Cuba while Castro is at a low point. I pointed out the advantages of a slow dialogue whose timing we could control. Among other things, even if it didn't lead to the ejection of the Russians, it might prevent Castro from doing something rash between now and November - such as shooting down a U-2. John was surprisingly receptive and noted that Castro will be feeling very low during this time-frame as a result of the trial of Rodriguez, the revolution in Brazil, and the OAS resolution on the Venezuelan arms cache. He did not commit himself, but seemed more receptive than he was several months ago.

3. OAS Resolution - Ward Allen estimates that the chances are better than even that the Venezuelan arms cache will be taken up at a C/OAS rather than at an MFM (attached is a cable which gives a flavor for the problem).

Ward said that a C/OAS resolution can come out just as strongly as an MFM resolution. He guesses that we probably will be able to get about 75% of what we want. The warning article may get watered down and we probably will not get a recommendation regarding the breaking of diplomatic relations. However, we may get just about everything else.

Gordon Chase

Lyndon B. Johnson Library
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A meeting was held at 1015 on 9 April by Mr. Bundy, Desmond Fitzgerald and Richard Helms to discuss the problem of independent action by Cuban emigre groups headed by Manuel Artine and Manolo Ray. The following points were made:

Mr. Fitzgerald stated that he did not believe any verbal discussion had any chance of success with Artine in his determination to mount an operation from Central America.

Those present agreed that it was possible to block the operation by an air-sea search and by the use of U.S. Navy destroyer but that this was a drastic step.

Mr. Helms pointed out that this could write finis to the use of Cuban emigre groups and would radiate considerable fallout elsewhere.

Mr. Bundy capsuled the problem by saying his worry was whether an Artine attack would give the U.S. a hypocritical image when out of the other side of its mouth the U.S. was plumping for votes at the OAS to outlaw subversion and armed attack.

He further said that he wanted to be clear as to whether higher authority fully grasped the implications of the autonomous exile group activity as discussed at Tuesday's meeting. This he was going to check.

Mr. Bundy felt it would be extremely useful to regularly publicize Castroite guerrilla activity both in Argentina (thus far played only by the Christian Science Monitor) and in Central America as a contrasting backdrop to possible Castro slurs against Cuban exile activity.

Peter Jessup

Copy

Lyndon B. Johnson Library
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: JCS Views on Cuba

You may not have seen the attached memorandum from the Chiefs responding to your request that they examine (a) possible ways of obtaining greater support from the OAS, and (b) additional ways of bringing pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized. The Chiefs don't come up with much that is new, and our best hope for effecting a basic favorable change in the Cuban situation still appears to be one of continuing what we have been doing all along, with steady pressure on our "friends" like the British, not to give us the knife.

We will be reporting in the next day or two on the latest crane case.

McG. B.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Actions Against the Castro Government (C)

1. At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964, you directed them to concentrate their attention on possible ways of obtaining greater support from the Organization of American States (OAS) in carrying out a program directed at the eventual overthrow of the Castro government. Also, you asked that they examine additional ways of bringing pressure upon Castro beyond those presently authorized.

2. With regard to possible actions by the OAS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States Government should seek the cooperation of the other OAS members in obtaining the complete isolation of Cuba from other American States. Further, the United States should, if possible, secure broad authority for a wide range of actions under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the possible use of armed force against Cuba, should OAS members, individually or collectively, deem such action necessary to prevent further intervention and aggression by Castro. With these possible objectives for OAS action in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the text of the proposed OAS resolution which the United States has suggested that the Venezuelan Government propose for the consideration of the OAS member states. They consider that if such a resolution is adopted essentially in its present form, the United States Government will have sufficient basis for action directed at the further isolation of Cuba and for military action against Castro in case of further aggression on his part. Hence, for the time being, they have nothing additional to suggest in this field.

3. With regard to measures designed to put additional pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend a resumption of the program (which is presently approved but on which no actions are currently being taken) involving the employment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including...
the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor expanding and intensifying it while maintaining a continuing evaluation of the reactions of Castro, the communists, and the Free World. Concurrently, they favor the development and conduct of a hard-line propaganda campaign, integrated with the foregoing actions, to estrange the Castro regime from the Cuban people and the remainder of the Free World.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate United States objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. However, they have difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been previously considered, and in some cases tried. It is a hard fact that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion. They will keep this problem under continuing review and advise you should any new and promising courses of action be uncovered.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Possible Luncheon Meeting Items - Cuba

Here is a suggested Cuba menu for today's luncheon meeting, which you may want to use in full, in part, or not at all.

1. Contingency Plan for Shoot-Down of a U-2 -- In view of the most recent Cuban statements (Castro on Sunday, and Dorticos on Monday) you may want to brief the President, if he hasn't been briefed already, on our contingency planning in the event Castro shoots down a U-2. The plan is attached at Tab 1.

2. Talks with Castro -- You indicated that you might want to discuss with the President and the two Secretaries the question of resuming the tenuous and marginal dialogue with Castro. This track may have special significance in light of Castro's Sunday speech; one of its attractions is that it might tend to keep Castro's temperature low and "the lid on" over the next six months. Attached at Tab 2 is a recent staff memo which points up some of the dimensions of the problem. Attached at Tab 3 is a possible scenario for resuming the dialogue.

3. Rules of Engagement -- If you think it appropriate, you might see if the President has approved DOD's Rules of Engagement covering a situation in which the Cubans attack friendly foreign military aircraft or ships operating in the area around Cuba. An answer to DOD is over-due.

4. Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba -- You may have handled this one already. I'm not sure, however, and put it before you again, primarily in deference to Alexis Johnson; on two occasions he has suggested that the President be informed of the existence of the plan (on one occasion, he suggested that the two Secretaries be present). Attached at Tab 4 is a staff memo which briefs and covers the package from Alexis Johnson regarding contingency planning for a coup in Cuba.

GC
Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

May 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group - Cuba

1. Continued exile raids are going to make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that evokes a highly emotional response from Castro. As things stand, he seems convinced that we are tied into the raids -- as indeed we are.

2. There seem to be two things we can do.

   (a) We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says that this can't be done, I wonder if that's true. For example, the cessation of assistance and pressure on countries like Nicaragua to cease providing facilities might do the trick.

   This step is a drastic one and could lead to angry charges (in the U.S. and elsewhere) that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which we can't control, were propelling us to the brink.

   (b) We can cut off all our ties with these exile groups (e.g. money, equipment, intelligence information). The exile grapevine is a sensitive one and the word will get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, this word will get to Fidel and he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles rather than on us (specifically, a U-2). In sum, at a minimum, we might want to be impregnable to the charge that we are connected in any way with these exile activities.

3. This strikes me as an urgent problem which we should grapple with now. Moreover, there may be a good deal of support in town in favor of doing something. My talks at State indicate that Alexis Johnson, Tom Mann, and John Crimmins are also unhappy about the present trend of events.

4. You may want to initiate a discussion of this matter at the Special Group meeting today.

P.S. We might want to make a distinction between types of raids:

External,-money ones (e.g., Cuba) are bad. Internal, guerilla ones (e.g., Fidel) are good.

SECRET - EYES ONLY
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy

Subject: British Guiana and Cuba

1. British Guiana - Janet Jagan Quits Post -- As you have probably read in the cable traffic, Janet Jagan has quit her post as Minister of Home Affairs. The apparent reason is that she was frustrated because she had no concrete control over the police force, which, by the way, is predominantly African (1300 out of 1500). It is not yet clear what the significance of her step might be; it could turn out to be a negative for our side in that it may encourage the East Indians to stir up more trouble.

The situation in British Guiana does not yet seem to be excessively grim, but we seem to be watching it closely.

2. Cuba - OAS Resolution -- State says that soundings on whether to hold an MFM or a C/OAS are running in favor of an MFM. Frequently expressed reasons are (a) that an MFM meets Venezuelan desires, (b) that an MFM enhances the importance of the resolution, and (c) that the legality of sanctions taken under a C/OAS are questionable.

Mexico and Chile favor a C/OAS.

3. Free World Trade with Cuba -- State informally guesses that a projection of Free World trade with Cuba for 1964 would show exports at about $180 million; this compares with about $110-120 million in 1963.

I have been needling State to get on with some contingency planning in the event we decide that the level of trade for 1964 looks as though it may be intolerable; State is now in the process of doing a paper which might prove interesting. One idea, which is short of a proclaimed list, would be to get OAS governments not to buy from firms which trade with Cuba in significant quantities of goods. This is an interesting thought since much purchasing in Latin America is probably done on government account.

4. Execution of Anti-Castro Cubans -- Attached is a ticker indicating that the Cubans have executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA tells me that we did have a connection with the executed Cubans but that it is completely deniable. The Agency is still checking on the other two.
5. Congressman Rogers - Evasion of U.S. Radar System -- I spoke to Congressman Rogers recently about the alleged evasion of U.S. radar on May 25. He said that while he was not sure that there actually had been a flight, we should get to explore the situation thoroughly. I assured him we would look into the matter.

Aside from the public relations problem, which is probably manageable, I am still not completely satisfied myself as to what can slip through our radar system and what cannot slip through. I intend to get a DOD briefing and to obtain the results of a study which JCS now has underway. I will keep you informed.

6C
Gordon Chase
HAVANA--THREE MEN DESCRIBED AS 'MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY' HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN CUBA'S CAGUAYO PROVINCE, PREMIER CASTRO'S REVOLUTIONARY REGIME ANNOUNCED TODAY.

TWO OTHER 'CIA MEN' WERE SENTENCED TO PRISON FOR TERMS OF UNSPECIFIED DURATION.

THE EXECUTED MEN WERE IDENTIFIED AS ALBERTO O. FERNANDEZ ABRAMS, MANUEL PARADELA GOMEZ AND MARCELINO MARTINEZ TAPIA. THE TWO WHO WERE IMPRISONED ARE JORGE BERNALDEZ CUBAR AND MANUEL E. ARAYAS CAYAN, A FORMER GOVERNOR OF CAGUAYO.

THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT SAI: "FERNANDEZ, A FORMER OFFICER OF THE LIONS' CLUB INTERNATIONAL, WHO "THE MAIN CIA AGENT IN A SPY RING... WHICH RECEIVED ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND TRANSMITTED MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MESSAGES TO THE CIA.""
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders

1. The following report was compiled from information obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions. Presumably the sources of the report, in submitting this information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan.

2. A Cuban exile was approached on 2 March 1964 by an acquaintance who wished to discuss a plan, which was still in the embryonic state, to assassinate Fidel Castro. The acquaintance was described as a businessman and a shipowner who owns at least one ship which sails under the British flag, and who also has a legally sanctioned interest in distributing and placing slot machines in gambling houses. The involvement of the acquaintance in the slot-machine business brings the man in contact with elements in the underworld, primarily through his partner who is a former police officer from St. Louis and through whom there is a tie-in with elements of "Cosa Nostra." The "Cosa Nostra" elements are alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba, and they have offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000; no advance funds were requested. If the mission cannot be accomplished, or if the plan is unsuccessful, an amount not to exceed $10,000 would be paid for the travel and living expenses of five men involved in the mission. The Cuban exile commented that he believed he had been approached with this plan because of his family's wealth; he told
his acquaintance that he was not interested and suggested that an approach might be made to someone who has much more money.

3. Another Cuban exile reported that Byron Cameron, owner and operator of the M/V CAYMAN HOPE, whose address is Caribe Trading Co., Ltd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met with several Cuban exiles on 3 March 1964. Among the persons attending the meeting were Teofilo Babun Franco, co-owner of the Antillean Marine Shipping Corporation, Miami, and two of Babun's employees, Oscar Fernandez Viego and Eliseo Gomez Fernandez. Babun and Cameron are friendly shipping-business competitors in the Caribbean area. During the course of conversation at this meeting, Cameron mentioned that he was in contact with an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash; specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

4. After a preliminary discussion at the 3 March meeting, it was thought that the amount of $150,000 for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $5,000 expense money, payable in advance, was too high, and Babun felt that this situation was just another attempt to swindle patriotic Cuban exiles. Another meeting was then held on 5 March and a counter-offer of $100,000 was made for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses, payable in advance. Cameron promised to check with his contacts after returning from a trip to the Caribbean.

5. During a meeting on 15 March attended by Cameron and Babun and his associates, the following terms were agreed upon for the assassination of the Cuban officials: Fidel Castro, $100,000; Raul Castro, $20,000; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, $20,000; and $2,500 for expenses, payable in advance. The time-limit for the proposed mission would be 90 days from the date when Babun could verify, to the satisfaction of Cameron, that he had $100,000 at his disposal for the payment. The contract for payment
would be honored only upon the presentation of evidence that the three Cuban officials died at the hands of the assassins connected with Cameron's contacts.

6. In early April 1964 Eliseo Gomez Fernandez met with Jose "Pepin" Bosch. Bosch agreed to advance $100,000 and Babun and his associates would advance $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York, subsequently agreed to the terms, provided that his name was not involved. Accordingly, Babun gave Cameron $2,500 on 25 April. Cameron then advised his group, and on 25 April he reported that his group had already called its man in Cuba and told him to proceed as planned and that "their other man" would be heading for Cuba shortly. The final comment was "we hope to have some good news for you between 20 and 25 May." Lobo planned to fly to Miami on 19 May to arrange for the transfer of $100,000 to a safety deposit box, the keys to which are to be held jointly by Cameron and a confidant of Lobo.

7. The identities of the persons in the Cameron group and how they plan to proceed with this mission are not known. Babun's associates are reluctant to make any unnecessary queries because they have invested $2,500 and because Cameron made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved. Cameron revealed during the negotiations that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis, Missouri, Vice Squad who was about to retire and who has numerous connections in the Mafia. Cameron implied that "the other man" in question is in Spain. Cameron knows that he could be indicted for conspiracy and that if there is any treachery on his part, Babun and his associates would not hesitate to sink his ship, the M/V CAYMAN HOPE.

8. In late May 1964 a prominent Cuban exile who spoke with Jose "Pepin" Bosch reported that Teofilo Babun and Eliseo Gomez had a plan under way to assassinate Fidel Castro for the payment of $150,000. Bosch claimed that he had committed himself to furnish $50,000 and that he was hoping he could get the balance
of the money from the United States Government or from other sources. Bosch indicated that he believes that a quick change for the better in the Cuban situation can be brought about only by the physical elimination of Fidel Castro and that his elimination is well worth $150,000. In pursuing his attempts to raise an additional $100,000, Bosch is planning to ask Julio Lobo to contribute at least $50,000.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

- 4 -
CSDB-3/661,653

Orig: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary--Inter-American Affairs
Department of State

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Attorney General
The Department of Justice

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

June 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Assassination of Castro

1. Attached is a memorandum from CIA describing a plot to assassinate Castro which would involve U.S. elements of the Mafia and which would be financed by Pepin Bosch.

2. John Crimmins is looking into the matter, is planning to talk to Alexis Johnson about it, and feels that the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting. John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing and should go all out to stop the plot. This would involve sicking the FBI on the American criminal elements involved and intervening with Bosch.

I have not yet thought this one through and respectfully withhold judgment.

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations

1. Attached is a copy of Dez Fitzgerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations." It was apparently instigated by Tom Mann's expressed feeling that if we mean what we say under the warning paragraph of the OAS resolution (subversion is aggression), we should keep our own hands clean and cease support of autonomous exile operations. The meat of Dez's paper begins on page 5 (at the paper clip); much of his logic and conclusions, frankly, leave me stone cold.

2. In essence, my own view differs from Tom Mann's in that I dislike the raids primarily for a different reason -- i.e. because Castro now appears to have the capability to shoot down a U-2 and because I regard Castro as the type of man who can react highly emotionally and irrationally when excessively provoked. The corollary of this view is that the raids would be somewhat more tolerable (though still troublesome between now and November) if we could somehow remove Castro's shoot-down capability -- i.e. find an alternative to the U-2.

Gordon Chase

SECRET
SUBJECT: A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations

I. Origin of Autonomous Operations

The Integrated Covert Action Program for Cuba, approved by higher authority in June 1963, provided for "support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution" of the other courses of action approved under this program. The concept of autonomous groups derived from Mr. Walter Rostow's proposal for a "Track Two" approach to Cuban operations. Parallel to the regular CIA-controlled and disciplined Cuban teams, CIA would extend financial aid and a minimum of advice and guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Manuel Ray. Implicit in the autonomous concept is the understanding that the leadership would possess a degree of operational self-determination which in certain circumstances, such as during the recent overflight crisis, could conflict with U.S. security interests.

In addition to a number of informal conversations between State Department and CIA officers concerning the practical application of the autonomous concept, Messrs. Alexis Johnson and Edwin Martin indicated to Mr. Richard Helms on 26 December 1962 their desire that CIA proceed as soon as feasible to provide "Track Two" assistance to Mr. Manuel Ray.

As incorporated into the June 1963 program, the following "rules of engagement" were set forth to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations:

(1) It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

(2) The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed.

(3) All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

(4) The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.
(5) The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

(6) These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

In a letter dated 6 March 1963 to Mr. McGeorge Bundy reviewing various operational problems in connection with Cuba, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald made the following observations pertaining to autonomous operations:

"As you know, again as part of the June plan, we are supporting two "autonomous" exile groups headed respectively by Manuel Artime and Manolo Ray. In both cases we have gone to maximum lengths to preserve the deniability of U.S. complicity in the operation. Artime, who now possesses the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus, has required a good deal of hand-feeding although still within the context of deniability. He will probably not be ready for his operations against Cuba before April or May of this year. He possesses most of his hardware and maritime equipment and has negotiated geographical and political bases in Central America. Manolo Ray has been handled on a much more independent basis. We have furnished him money and a certain amount of general advice. He does not possess the physical accoutrements that Artime has and is probably not as well equipped in terms of professional planning. Ray has a better political image inside Cuba among supporters of the revolution and has recently acquired, according to reports, some of the other left-wing exile activist groups such as GutierrezMenoyo and his Second Front of the Escambray. He is said to be ready to move into Cuba on a clandestine basis late this spring. His first weapon will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently not externally-mounted hit-and-run raids.

"If U.S. policy should demand that the "autonomous" operations be suspended, we could of course cut off our support immediately. Artime and his group might or might
not disintegrate at once. Manolo Ray almost certainly would continue. Both groups are based outside the United States and our only real leverage on them is through our financial support but withdrawal of this support would probably be fatal to their operations in time. A cutoff of this support, even though this support has been untraceable in a technical sense, would have a considerable impact within the exile community. U.S. support is rumored, especially in the case of Artiago, and the collapse of the only remaining evidence of exile action against Castro would hit the exile community hard which is what it in turn would do to its favorite target, U.S. policy. The exile of today, however, appears to have lost much of his fervor and, in any case, does not seem to have the capacity for causing domestic trouble which he had a year or two ago. The Central American countries in which the exile bases exist would be greatly confused, although we have carefully never indicated to the governments of these countries any more than U.S. sympathy for the "autonomous" groups."

This letter, including the paragraphs cited above, was submitted to the Special Group on 30 March 1964. On the same date, another memorandum entitled "Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups" was presented to the Special Group to alert that body to the fact that both the Bay and Artiago groups had reached a stage of operational readiness in which actions against Cuba could be expected at any time. The memorandum also advised the Special Group as follows:

"The possibility of imminent unilateral operations on the part of the autonomous groups is brought to the attention of the Special Group at this time since it is related to the question of the future of CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations now under review by higher authority. This relationship was described in Part V of the memorandum entitled "Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba," dated 24 January 1964, submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. The paper also noted that if a policy decision is made to terminate sabotage and harassment operations for the autonomous groups as well as for CIA, it will be necessary to terminate support for the autonomous groups as CIA would not be in a position to insure that they would refrain from raids and sabotage even if so requested. In fact, it now appears likely that neither group will disintegrate at once upon notification of termination of U.S. subsidy. While withdrawal of U.S. financial aid and moral support would probably be fatal to their operations in time,
they are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other sources of support. In so doing and in order to prove their viability to potential supporters, they would, in their desperation, probably feel compelled to launch one or more dramatic raids against Cuba."

On 13 May the Port of Pilon in southern Oriente was struck by one of Artima's commando groups. Warehouses were severely damaged and, according to an official Cuban announcement, approximately 70,000 tons of sugar valued at about one million dollars were destroyed. We understand that Artima is planning another raid on two radar installations early in June.

Hannel Ray departed on 13 May for Cuba amid a major publicity campaign sparked by the New York Times. Ray's exact whereabouts are not known as of this writing, but it is believed that he has not yet landed on Cuban soil.
II. Current Status

Against this background, the question of continued U.S. support for these autonomous groups has once again been raised. It has been suggested that a reappraisal of autonomous operations would be in order if, as a result of an OAS resolution on the Venezuelan arms cache, aggression is to be redefined to include subversion. It is argued that the U.S. should, if it is to exploit the OAS resolution, not itself engage in the proscribed activities. The U.S. would have to adopt a "clean hands" position vis-a-vis Cuba and this state of cleanliness must be maintained indefinitely if the U.S. is to remain in a position to apply sanctions against Castro should he again be caught red-handed.

III. Considerations Affecting U.S. Support to Autonomous Groups

It is assumed that it remains U.S. policy to get rid of Fidel Castro by any acceptable means. If this premise is correct the first task of the policymaker in examining the issues herein presented is to balance the two courses of action proposed — i.e., (a) a continuation of autonomous operations and (b) an exclusive reliance on OAS sanctions — in terms of their effectiveness in achieving our basic purpose.

When the June 1963 program, of which autonomous operations are a part, was approved by higher authority, it was agreed that this program presented the maximum that could be done along covert lines; that each part of the program supported each other; and that the eventual success of the program would rest on the simultaneous application of all of the courses of action agreed to, including sabotage and harassment, and their interaction on each other. Although no assessment of chance of success of this program could be presented on a percentile basis, it was understood that the program would not have been appropriately tested if not given a full 18 months to run.

In January 1964 unilaterally controlled sabotage operations were stood down, but this partial erosion of the program has been in some measure compensated for, at least in psychological warfare terms, by the recent widely reported activities of the autonomous groups which reached a climax of sorts with the Pilon raid and Ray's reported departure for Cuba under dramatic circumstances.
Despite the truncated nature of the program, it appears to us that there have been many indications of success. We have been able to establish a direct correlation between the series of minor sabotage operations during the latter part of 1963 and a rise in internal resistance and sabotage. The Pilon raid and news of Bay's plans to return to Cuba has again set off military alerts and other internal measures not observed in Cuba since the October 1962 missile crisis.

The fact that Castro was willing under such slim provocation to strip his factories and cane fields would indicate a degree of psychological threat operating on his regime far out of proportion to the physical threat or risks taken by us.

The legal path involves reliance upon some form of CAS resolution applying future sanctions against Cuba in the event she is once again caught red-handed in subversive activities. In the final analysis the application of these sanctions will rest with the U.S. after further consultation with the CAS. Clearly the punishment contemplated is the U.S. use of armed force whether it be by way of blockade, invasion or selective destruction of Cuban targets. Will the U.S. propose such action and will the CAS in the final analysis approve it?

It is submitted that a clear choice need not be made between these two alternatives. Having already denied ourselves unilaterally controlled raiding actions and having taken precaution not to leave provable fingerprints on the autonomous operations, may we not proceed along both tracks in their current direction, denying stoutly our involvement in the illegal activities and thereby greatly increasing the odds of achieving our national purpose? We are certain to be accused of responsibility for other exile activities in which we are not involved. Our innocence will be as difficult to establish as would our involvement in the case of our autonomous operations.

IV. Consequences of Terminating U.S. Support for Autonomous Groups

If as a consequence of following the "legal track" it is felt that U.S. support to autonomous groups should cease, the following considerations should be weighed in reaching a final decision:
(1) It must be assumed that suspension of support to autonomous groups will come as a bitter blow to the leaders who will lose no time in making public their views and interpretations of this action. The cessation of support will be interpreted as a further indication that the U.S. is no longer interested in the active liberation of Cuba and is moving in the direction of rapprochement and accommodation with the Castro regime. The effect of this will be to demoralize further the anti-Castro Cubans both inside and outside Cuba and to sap what resistance spirit still remains. We have had many reports to the effect that highly placed persons inside Cuba now feel that Castro's greatest mistake was his break with the U.S. Perhaps even Fidel believes this also. A cessation of anti-Castro raids and other operations would immediately be read as a sign of U.S. detente with Castro and a consequent prestige-restoring victory for Castro's tight-rope policies.

It must also be expected that the significance of ceasing support of these groups will be exaggerated and misinterpreted in Latin America and Europe, thereby setting off another round of diplomatic, political and economic moves toward an accommodation with the Castro regime. In this atmosphere, it is possible that even the credibility of the OAS resolution may be adversely affected. One can only guess at the domestic repercussions of this publicity, but it is likely that anti-administration elements will attempt to exploit the situation to their political advantage, particularly if it comes before the November elections.

(2) The governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, after being assured by U.S. officials that support of Artime and Ray would not conflict with U.S. foreign policy, have afforded these groups base facilities on their soil. If it is decided that U.S. support for autonomous groups should cease, it follows that the U.S. would have to advise these governments that their continued support of the groups has become detrimental to U.S. policy. Without such advice these governments would continue to support the autonomous groups.

(3) As pointed out in the 30 March memorandum to the Special Group cited above, it appears likely that neither one of the autonomous groups will disintegrate immediately after notification of termination of U.S.
aid. In order to demonstrate their viability to potential supporters and contributors, these groups are likely to feel compelled to continue and perhaps step up these raids, in defiance of U.S. wishes if necessary. It is possible that the frustration and indignation that would flow from a termination of support would lead to a choice of activities on the part of these groups that would have a higher "noise level" than at present, including revelations of past U.S. support.

(4) Adoption of the "legal track" as a basis for dealing with the Castro problem and the attendant application of the "clean hands" thesis would have ramifications for covert activities directed against Cuba that go far beyond autonomous raiding operations. Infiltration and caching operations for subversive purposes such as those presently being attempted by Bay would also be included. The principle of "clean hands" must also be applied to all covert maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations for intelligence collection purposes as well as caching operations for internal intelligence and resistance operations. This would result in a reduction in our intelligence collection and support capabilities. To emphasize this point, it is worth recalling that the "Zex incident" in October 1963, one of the most widely publicized and commented-upon operations in the past two years, involved only an infiltration and caching operation. No sabotage or other form of violence was contemplated for this mission. Yet the exposure of the mother ship and the resulting publicity constituted as much a violation of the "clean hands" principle as any sabotage mission. Thus, little useful purpose would be served in terminating support to autonomous groups in order to adhere to the "legal track" and "clean hands" concepts while other covert operations, equally susceptible of being exposed as "subversive" in nature, involving maritime infiltration and caching, continue as before.

V. Conclusions

Termination of U.S. support for the autonomous groups will not necessarily assure the cessation of externally-mounted commando raids on Cuba. In fact, it is likely that the first reaction of the autonomous groups will be to conduct higher "noise level" activities than at present,
including, perhaps, revelations of past U.S. support. There may also be exile raids with which we have no connection, e.g. the SFAs or Alpha 66 — for which the U.S. would automatically be blamed.

Adoption of the "legal track" would have ramifications for covert operations extending far beyond autonomous raiding actions. Maritime infiltration/exfiltration for intelligence and caching operations, both autonomous and unilateral CIA, would have to be included in the ban if the "clean hands" principle is to be applied in a consistent and meaningful manner.

The cessation of autonomous commando operations — the only remaining external sabotage activity since unilateral CIA operations of this type were stood down in January 1984 — would effectively kill the remaining chances of carrying out the objectives of the Integrated Covert Action Program initiated in June 1983.

While the cost would be high, it might well be worth the sacrifice if the U.S. is prepared for armed intervention in Cuba and if the CAS will unequivocally support it.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group - Autonomous Exile Groups

I understand there will be a general discussion of autonomous exile groups at the Special Group meeting today. Here are a few points which you might find useful.

1. There are a number of disadvantages in the status quo. First, at best, these raids will make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that can evoke a highly irrational response from Castro. As things stand, Castro seems convinced that we are tied into the raids -- as indeed we are. Second, at worst, these raids could touch off a U-2 shootdown and a first class Caribbean crisis. As a matter of fact, is is probably more likely that autonomous raids will produce a shoot-down than that they will produce an overthrow of the Castro regime. In this regard, it can be argued that even without autonomous raids, the odds against a shootdown are not all that good. Third, Tom Mann would probably argue that the continuance of autonomous raids would make more difficult the enforcement of the warning language in the OAS resolution -- i.e. our own hands should be clean.

2. Assuming we don't like the status quo (I, for one, do not), there seem to be the following courses of action open to us.

(a) We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says this can't be done, this may not be true. For example, the cessation of assistance, increased U.S. surveillance of the Caribbean, and pressure on Nicaragua and Costa Rica would probably do the trick.

But this is a drastic step and would lead to angry charges in the U.S. and elsewhere that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which are out of our control, were propelling us to the brink.

(b) We can search harder for an alternative to the U-2. With Castro's shootdown capability removed, the raids would probably be somewhat more tolerable -- though still troublesome between now and November. (State and DOD are still looking into the possibilities of alternatives to the U-2. Preliminary reports, however, are not particularly hopeful.)
SECRET - EYES ONLY

(c) Using our support as leverage, we can try to discourage the exile groups from making raids of the higher noise-level variety — e.g., externally-mounted raids are bad but internally-mounted raids, which smack less of U.S. involvement, are O.K.

(d) We can cut off all U.S. ties with these exile groups — e.g., money, equipment, intelligence information. The exile grapevine is reportedly a sensitive one and the word would get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, the word will also reach Castro, and if further raids occur (as CIA says they will), he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles and not on us.

In cutting off support, we can take the line with the autonomous groups that we have been disappointed with such things as highly colored press conferences; misinformation about intentions (Artme told us he was going to attack one place and he attacked another); and indiscreet conversations (Ray with Tad Szulc). After due consideration we have decided in favor of a "hands-off" policy. We wish the exiles well, but they are on their own from here on in.

One argument against this course of action is that Artme and Ray will blab to the world that they had been getting support from the U.S. This might not be an insuperable obstacle — e.g., we survived a similar and more potent situation in 1963 when we cut off the CRC's water.

3. John Crimmins tells me that the Special Group may be faced with some decisions this afternoon. Manolo Ray recently asked the U.S. Government for three things — (a) a special grant, (b) our influence with the Puerto Ricans in getting them to allow Ray to move a boat from Puerto Rico, and (c) our assistance in getting the Dominican Republic to allow Ray to establish a base in that country.

As I see it, we might be able to meet 3(a) and 3(b) without excessively prejudicing further actions to change the status quo. 3(c), which involves talking to a third party, seems another story, however. We might not want to tie our hands in this way until we are certain that we are not going to change from our present course.

Gordon Chase

SECRET - EYES ONLY
22 June 1964

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964

Reference: Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on
overall subject of Cuba.

1. In accordance with the decisions made in paras 4 and 7 of
reference minutes, the undersigned, at the direction of Mr. Bundy,
met with the Attorney General for what he identified as a preliminary
meeting.

2. In regard to Major Oliva, The Committee had reached the
conclusion that the Attorney General was the person with the most
prestige and influence who would be likely to dissuade subject from
seeking support at this time for large scale, high noise level operations
against Cuba. When this proposal was made to the Attorney General he
indicated his high regard for the Major and stated that he was not
willing to reject his overtures unless alternatives were offered. It was
pointed out that since Oliva was an activist and a man of strong purpose,
he was not likely to accept alternatives. The Attorney General stated
that he would be willing to discuss the matter at a forthcoming 303
Committee meeting.

3. In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged
underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of
assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that
these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice
that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action
could be construed as condonation. The Committee's finding that this
was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General
indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter.

PETER JESSUP
19 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders

1. This memorandum is for your information in response to a 303 Committee query of 30 July 1964 regarding the status of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate Cuban government leaders.

2. The following is a summary of the investigation to date.

3. Subsequent to CIA's dissemination of information regarding "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders" (report disseminated by CIA to the 303 Committee and selected key officials as CSDB-3/661, 653 dated 10 June 1964), the Federal Bureau of Investigation has interviewed all of the people involved in the plot except Byron Cameron. Cameron is now in Mexico on a business trip; he may possibly return to Miami on 7 August at which time the FBI plans to interview him regarding the plan. The FBI has not decided if it will interview CIA's other source or if it will re-interview all of the people involved in the plan.

4. The FBI, as a result of its investigation, has disseminated a total of seven (7) reports regarding this matter. A summary of these reports follow:

   a. Teofilo Babun Selman specifically denied to the FBI that he had any involvement in, or knowledge of, any plan to assassinate selected Cuban government officials. He admitted contact with Julio Lobo Olavarría, but denied discussing the plan with him and stated that Eduardo García Molina was present during the meeting with Lobo and that García could verify his statements.
b. Eduardo Garcia Molina advised the FBI that he knew of the plan and that he was present when Babun discussed it with Lobo.

c. Julio Lobo Olavarria advised the FBI that Babun had told him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to contribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds, but later declined. Lobo also told the FBI that he had discussed the plan with CIA.

d. Jose M. "Pepin" Bosch informed the FBI that he had heard of the plan in general terms and that he had reported it to the CIA. He denied that he had agreed to furnish funds for the plan.

e. Eliseo Gomez Fernandez informed the FBI that he had no knowledge of the plan.

f. Ceferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga informed the FBI that he had no knowledge of the plan.

g. Major John Doherty of the St. Louis, Missouri, City Police Department advised the FBI that he is now in charge of the Field Operations Division of the St. Louis Police Department and formerly was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated that he had no idea as to who would be involved with the Mafia and who would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of Cuban government officials.

h. All other people interviewed by the FBI denied knowledge of the plan.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - Miscellaneous

John Crimmins, Des Fitzgerald, Joe Califano, and I met to talk about miscellaneous Cuban problems. Here are some of the items which came up.

1. Aranzazu Incident - John Crimmins said that we have completed our "investigation" of the Aranzazu incident and that the Spanish have now asked us to give them our evaluation of the various reports we have furnished to them. John is now working on a paper of talking points he will use with the Spanish (he wants to keep it oral if possible). The general pitch he will probably want to use will take into account such facts as (a) that we want to give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably evaluate Artipe as the prime suspect. Specifically, such points as the following might be made to the Spanish: First, while we cannot rule out the possibility that the Cubans sunk the Aranzazu, it is probably more likely that the exiles did it. Second, there are a number of exile groups that have the capability of doing the job. Third, the most likely of the exile groups is probably Artipe. But the fact that Artipe's boat was in Curacao would seem to rule him out; and even if this could be explained, we could still not prove that Artipe is the culprit. Fourth, (if pressed) by a process of elimination, the attack would seem to have come from the Dominican Republic (the Spanish already strongly suspect this - see attached cable). In any event, we are sure it did not come from the U.S.

John Crimmins plans to clear his talking points with the Special Group before he talks to the Spanish.

2. Special Group Items - Des mentioned that a dissident group of Army people inside Cuba have contacted Artipe's people; reportedly, they have picked Artipe because they feel that anyone with his resources must have the support of the U.S. Government. Des feels that we should let this contact develop and, in this connection, he believes that the Special Group should permit the continuation of our support to Artipe for another 60 or 90 days and, if absolutely necessary, allow Artipe to make one more attack (more or less controlled by CIA) on Cuba. If we drop Artipe precipitously, the dissident group in

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Copy
Cuba will assume that Artimé is not worth contacting and their willingness to express dissidence may tend to dry up. In all of this discussion, Des emphasized that he is no great admirer of Artimé and that the above is not an Agency device to keep Artimé's group alive. This item will probably come before the Special Group on Thursday.

Des also mentioned the possibility of passing on to Dorticos, in an unattributable, deniable fashion, the message that, while the U.S. cannot live with Fidel Castro, it might well be able to live with Dorticos. Des feels that Cuba is in terrible shape, that Dorticos knows it, and that a move like this could conceivably produce a big dividend. At best, it will start Dorticos plotting; at worst, (if Castro finds out) it will help to sow some seeds of dissension and distrust. This item will probably come up at a later Special Group meeting.

3. Erosion of Cuban Economy - Des was very hopeful that Cuba will be in very bad economic shape by the end of 1965. To this end, CIA has arranged to have shipments of faulty additives sent to Cuba; some of this is going in already, and some is on the way. Emphasizing the extreme sensitivity of the operation, Des said that the effect on large amounts of Cuban machinery could be brutal.

The point was made that there was, these days, a general recognition by the European missions in Cuba that the Cuban economic situation is grim and that, in fact, the isolation policy is not entirely a farce. To some extent, this realization coincided with the timing of the recent Cuban restrictions on credit.

4. British Channel to Castro - John Crimmins said that Patrick Gordon-Walker, in his meeting with Secretary Rusk, suggested that the British would be pleased to act as a middle man for a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba. The Secretary has asked John to look into the desirability of this. The initial feeling of the group was that it was not a good idea. Among other things, if we want to establish a dialogue with Castro, there are better channels than the British.

5. Basic Review of Cuban Policy - The group agreed that, with November 3 behind us, we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba. To this end, John Crimmins agreed to write a paper which would outline the major problems and the possible options, including accommodation. This will be ready in a few days' time and will be distributed for comment. We can then decide where to go from there.
Des Fitzgerald said we should consider the re-institution, in the near future, of the "unilateral" CIA-directed covert program which had scored a number of hits last year. The group agreed, however, that a decision on this should probably wait until some of the basic review work on Cuba had been completed.

Gordon Chase
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba

In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS.

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square Dance," I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could undertake such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dance" were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of "Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

R. C. BOWMAN
The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number above.

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TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET

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REPORT BY THE J-5

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

SQUARE DANCE (U)
Reference: JCS 2304/244

DEcision

1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 12 of this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-C4, dated 9 November 1964, to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Wheeler (C/JCS)        Gen. Burchinal (D/JS)
Adm. McDonald (CGO)         Adm. Davis (DS/JS)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)           Adm. Mustin J-3
Gen. Greene (CGO)           Gen. Emrick (J-5)
Gen. Palmer (JCS/CPA)       Gen. Anthia (SCASA)

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DocId: 32423484  Page 175
SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, 1
US Army, to consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of 2
Staff recommend to the President that the United States 3
covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5
to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, 6
stated that the President would be advised of any new and 7
promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure 8
upon the Cuban regime.

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent 10
a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding a 11
study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime 12
by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chief 13
of Staff, US Army, recommended that the Joint Staff accomplish 14
interagency coordination on the study proposals; and that 15
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16
by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint 17
Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations 18
of the study and consider that the outline program therein 19
provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20
supporting programs and plans for participating agencies. 21

4. On 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered 22
the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed 23
to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation 24
of a report.

* Attachment to JCS 2304/244
** Enclosure to JCS 2304/213-3

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DocId: 32423484 Page 176
5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some of the issues of the proposed actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and merits consideration by other appropriate governmental agencies as another option, in concert with other actions, for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are possible political consequences which could result from proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.

10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-agency coordination.

11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclusions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Captain J. O. Sherman, USN J-5, Extension 78926.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in responding to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a study which examines world sugar economics and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane plant parasite, Bunga. Subsequently, the economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert means would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.

4. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involvement in such a program, they believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A hereto.

5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum (Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)
APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of convertible currency as it had before the program was undertaken. The arguments and rationale in favor of the economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. However, world economics is a most complex subject and involves many variable factors. The important points on economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate agencies in the government having responsibility for such matters.

2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake, politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime for economic reasons alone. Success of the proposed actions would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro Government and would be an additional means of exerting pressure against that government.
3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by
the study. The approval for implementation of such a
concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war
methods and would require a major change in national
policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the
event of discovery. There is also an obvious political
risk associated with this proposal. Should any credible
evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political
loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart
from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence
of the United States in international organizations such
as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States would be impaired seriously.

4. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the
President apprised of the capabilities of the military
establishment. The subject study presents measures which
should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after
coordination with appropriate government agencies it would
represent another option for positive actions against the
Castro regime.

5. NSAM 213, dated 6 January 1963, established a
committee to coordinate the management of all aspects
of US policy toward Cuba. The President looks to the
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs
for the effective coordination of the execution of policy
decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses
of action. The subject study should be referred to this
committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to
reporting to the President.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to provide military advice to the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that a matter such as the proposals under consideration, be sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that they would continue to review the problem of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the President would be advised if any new and promising courses of action were uncovered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, and proposes a phased interagency program which would:

   a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 production level.

   b. Expand US influence in the world sugar market by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses.

3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in the study are within existing or attainable military capabilities. Several actions are proposed. Key among these is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly disavowing US involvement.
4. Mindful of the risks attending such actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposals of the study and believe that they offer an option for exerting new pressures against Castro. They believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunge into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.

5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request that the concept and actions proposed in the outline program of the study be coordinated by your committee with other governmental departments and agencies. Upon completion of your review and coordination, it is further requested that your comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
APPENDIX C

Army Report on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

(See Attachment to JCS 2304/244, beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1
A Report by the J-5
on
SQUARE DANCE (U)
FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

R. C. FORBES
J. E. MANSFIELD
Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED: Without Attachment

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
1st Corrig to JCS 2304/244-1
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba

1. I refer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting.

I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While I do not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached memo, they indicate that Item 5 was approved. My own strong recollection of the follow-up from the meeting was that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop, if indeed we do want to stop it. In any event, you will be able to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives his status report.

CC

Gordon Chase

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

April 7, 1964

U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and exfiltration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.
   Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this program be continued.

2. Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selective economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.
   Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.
5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food). **Recommendation:** It is recommended that these programs be continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. **Recommendation:** Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them. **Recommendation:** Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Artime

I talked to John Crimmins again about the Artime situation. Here is the picture up to now.

1. If we decide to try to stop Artime, the most appropriate scenario appears to be as follows:

(a) A decision to stop him must be made by 9:00 A.M. on Thursday morning.

(b) Locate the Artime ship by plane tomorrow morning. (It is not certain that we would be able to find it, but we think we probably could.)

(c) Send three fast destroyers from Gitmo to the scene.

(d) These destroyers would circle and shadow the Artime ship. John Crimmins guesses that the chances are 50-50 that this sort of approach would be successful in deterring Artime; presumably, he would be afraid that the security of the operation was jeopardized.

2. As for the desirability of interfering with Artime, State, Defense, and CIA all oppose. The main arguments, in their bare bones, are as follows:

(a) Interference will be interpreted as a case of aiding Castro and, as such, will probably be very hard to justify to all sorts of audiences (e.g. Latin America, Congress, the American people). We could hardly expect Artime to keep it quiet.

(b) The operation would have to take place relatively close to Cuba. Conceivably, this could bring Cuban forces into the picture.

(c) Artime could use the opportunity to get us involved. To the Cuban Government, the destroyers might look like cover for Artime and Artime could use us.
3. All things considered, it seems to me that the best course is to sweat this one out (Artine may not make it even if we leave him alone - e.g., the usual mechanical difficulties), and to work in the future on ways to stop Artine before he gets so far along in his operation and so close to Cuba. If you feel differently, please let me know immediately and I will crank up a special Special Group meeting for tonight or for 8:00 A.M. tomorrow morning. (For your information, the knowledgeable people around town on this one are Vance, Fitzgerald, and Crimmins.)

GC
Gordon Chase

12/30/64
Al's goin' with me into force on this one.
GC
January 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Artimé's Contact with Dissident Leader

I went to a meeting with John Grimmins and a couple CIA types to hear about a recent Artimé meeting in Europe with a Cuban dissident named Cubela. Here are the barebones of the Artimé/Cubela meeting, as reported by Artimé to a CIA agent.

1. Cubela told Artimé that there are three groups in Cuba with which he has contact and which are ready to act against Castro. First, there is a group which Cubela heads himself. Second, there is a group headed by a man named del Gado who is a fairly high-level official in the Cuban Government. Third, and most important, there is a group headed by Frias, the Commander of the Western Army. This army is the largest in Cuba and consists of roughly 75,000 people. At the least, the Frias group seems to include the Deputy Commander of the Western Army and the Commander of the Artillery of the Western Army. (We don't know how loyal the Army would be to Frias in the crunch.)

Cubela told Artimé that there are others who are ready to act. One of these is Machado, the Minister of Health.

2. Cubela and Artimé agreed tentatively on the following scenario for removing Castro:

   (a) On D-Day minus 30 days, Artimé would try to step up his attacks on the coast, largely for psychological purposes. There would not have to be many attacks to make a large psychological impact since the dissidents could count on Castro to over-react.

   (b) Before D-Day, Artimé would infiltrate people into Pinar del Rio to make a "safe area." What this would amount to is an area to which the dissidents could run in case their attempt at a coup failed.

   (c) On D-Day minus 7 days, Artimé would himself enter Cuba.
(d) On D-Day there would be a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be neutralized.

(e) After the coup, a junta would rule the country. The junta would be made up of 3 internal dissidents, Artine, and 2 lesser-known political prisoners who are now on the Isle of Pines. Artine would be President of the junta. (The CIA agent explained that Cubela and other internal dissidents feel that they need Artine. They have a guilt complex about the fact that they have been living with Castro for so long without apparently doing anything about it; they feel that, with Artine, the U.S. would accept the new regime.)

3. Artine said that he would be meeting in Europe again with Cubela in about a month to discuss the plan further.

4. As for the timing of D-Day, Artine said he was thinking of March 13 (Fidel will be speaking at the University on that day), which is an important historical date for the group (the DR) which Cubela represents; he says he has not yet suggested that date to Cubela.

CIA will be sending over to us a more detailed paper regarding the Artine/Cubela conversation on Wednesday. Also, the subject will be discussed at the Special Group meeting on Thursday since, among other things, it has an obvious bearing on the decision of whether or not to cut off Artine's water immediately because of the raid he is now threatening to make.

It is pertinent to note that Cubela is not an unknown quantity to CIA. They have been dealing with him for three years; to the best of CIA's knowledge, he has never given them bad information. At the same time, CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artine/Cubela plot. (I think this is fair in view of the fact that we really don't know much about the plot; indeed, it may be that Artine and Cubela don't know the answers to a lot of hard questions - e.g. How much muscle could the Commander of the Western Army really muster?)

Gordon Chase
MEMORANDUM FOR: The 303 Committee

SUBJECT: Future of CIA's Cuban Paramilitary Program; Proposed UDT Sabotage Operation

1. This paper requests approval for recommendations concerning CIA's paramilitary program which are contained in paragraph 11.

2. Beginning in 1961, CIA developed a major capability for paramilitary operations against Cuba. A substantial number of Cubans have been selected and intensively trained in all aspects of paramilitary work, including commando tactics and sabotage. Considerable use was made of this capability at one time but since early 1964 the force has, due to policy considerations, been restricted to small infiltration operations aimed at the development of internal intelligence agents, radio operators and support agents. While this activity has been successful, only a small percentage of the trained personnel has been employed, the remainder being held in training or other non-operational pursuits. The costs involved in this stand-by status are considerable.
3. The issue now arises, in connection with efforts to reduce both personnel and funds devoted to the Cuban paramilitary program, whether this capability should be maintained on its present scale or substantially reduced.

4. This issue does not, however, arise as a result of budget considerations alone. There remains the serious problem of the maintenance of the morale and motivation of the Cuban paramilitary agents who are not being used as originally envisaged. These agents are highly selected and have shown an unusual degree of motivation; by the same token, however, they are becoming discouraged at inaction in direct proportion to their desire to help liberate their country. Furthermore, those who are content with the present inaction, and with whom we have less problems as a result of inactivity, are the least desirable elements; on the other hand, those who have the highest motivation are increasingly likely to quit, either to seek other employment or to engage in paramilitary adventures of their own. Particularly affected are the members of the commando group, the underwater demolition team, and crews of various clandestine infiltration sea craft.

5. Some types of operations which the paramilitary assets are capable of conducting have been judged by the
303 Group to be clearly unacceptable under present circumstances. Others are in a borderline category because of the lesser risks involved. We are submitting an operation of the latter type for approval at this time.

6. The proposed operation would use the underwater demolition team to sink Cuban navy patrol vessels or other Cuban targets of opportunity, which firm intelligence shows are frequently located in the Port of La Isabela. The team, consisting in toto of eight highly trained underwater demolition men, would be divided into three sub-teams of two men each, plus a two-man boat crew. The team would approach the harbor during darkness in a 50-foot Swift or similar vessel until it reaches a point three miles north of La Isabela. At this point it would embark on a smaller boat in which it will slowly proceed to Caye Arbolito, a small island near the mouth of the harbor. The boat and crew would remain hidden on the island; after a brief reconnaissance and final briefing by the leader, the team itself would swim into the harbor. It would then split into three sub-teams and attach charges to the hulls of Cuban vessels lying at anchor. Pre-set timing devices would explode the charges five hours after placement. The team would leave the target area and upon returning to the island, be

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completion of the review (which we think will come out positive), the CIA is continuing, in a somewhat restrained fashion, its efforts (a) to penetrate the PPP, (b) to keep the PNC/UF coalition alive, (c) to support the Justice Party, and (d) to prop up the democratic trade unionism in BG.

3. BG Rice Exports - There is a glut of rice in BG these days and we are working overtly and covertly on ways of moving some of it into the export market. This is important; as you may recall, one of Cheddi's major claims during the campaign was that only the PPP was able to dispose of BG rice (grown primarily by East Indians).

4. Cuba - Artime Group Attacks Cuba - Artime's group, apparently against Artime's orders (he is in Europe), attacked some fuel tanks in Cuba on February 2. They apparently fired at the tanks with 50 caliber machine guns and 57 millimeter cannons and caused little, if any, damage; no one was caught during the debacle.

Later in the week, the group had the hare-brained idea of going into Cuba, capturing a couple hostages and holding them as an exchange for the captured Menoyo. For a variety of reasons (including some wiser heads in the group), this particular plot never hatched.

Gordon Chase

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER JESSUP, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Support for the Artine Group

Ambassador Thompson has approved the enclosed memorandum for Members of the 303 Committee, which strongly recommends withdrawal of support for the Artine Group. We believe you will want this memorandum circulated to Members of the 303 Committee.

It will be noted that the Department recommends that this action be taken immediately and that support be terminated as of February 28.

Murat W. Williams
Deputy Director for Coordination
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Attachment:

Memorandum for the 303 Committee.
MEMORANDUM

February 23, 1965

TO: Members of the 303 Committee

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Support from Artimé Group

The Department of State strongly recommends that, in light of recent developments in the activities of the Artimé group, the 303 Committee adopt immediately the following course of action with respect to that group:

1. Artimé will be notified without delay that, in conformity with previous statements made to him, US support for his group will be terminated as of February 28, with phasing out of US assistance to be carried out as quickly as possible.

2. Artimé will be notified immediately, with respect to his dealings with Curbela concerning the "internal operation", that (a) it is our firm estimate that under present circumstances such an operation is impractical, unrealistic and almost certain to fail; (b) we cannot be certain that the participation by internal Cuban elements is not a provocation and a trap; and (c) in any case, we want it clearly understood that we cannot and will not make any commitments in advance concerning US support for such an operation.

3. Through both diplomatic and Agency channels, the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican and Dominican Governments will be informed discreetly, but clearly, that (a) we are in no way supporting Artimé; (b) he is on his own; (c) any arrangements made with, or facilities provided to, Artimé by the Governments concerned are strictly between them and him; and (d) we would understand and would have no objection if the Governments concerned were to refuse assistance to him or withdraw present assistance from him.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNNY

SUBJECT: Caribbean and Other

Here are a few items which came up while you were away and which you may want to know about.

1. BG - Greenwood's New Look - Attached at Tab 1 is a cable from BG reporting on Greenwood's recent trip to BG. It is a pleasant thing to read in that it tells about Greenwood's growing disenchantment with Cheddi and growing admiration for Burnham. Even divided by half, it sounds good.

2. BG Rice and our Covert Help - In order to help BG get rid of its rice export bottleneck which is causing serious difficulties for Burnham, we are in the midst of working out a deal whereby BG can sell some rice to Latin America. It is going to cost us $200,000 to break the bottleneck - i.e., to pay the difference between what BG has gotten from Cuba in the past and what Latin America is willing to pay now. Needless to say, this is all quite covert.

3. Cecil King - As of possible interest, attached at Tab 2 is a cable reporting Del Carlson's conversation with Cecil King. King mentions a talk with Bill Tyler and you; he also makes a strong pitch in favor of a PPP/PNC coalition.

4. Secretary Rusk and Policy - The Secretary recently told John Crimmins that he wants no new initiatives on Cuba policy for the time being. Apparently, he wants to keep the temperature low while we are sorting out our Vietnam problem.

5. Cuban Deals with Spain and Morocco - Cuba recently concluded long-term sugar agreements with Spain and Morocco. The Spanish are willing to buy sugar at a higher price than the Russians are willing to pay (so they can sell ships), and this especially bugs us. Some details on these two deals are at Tab 3.

6. Covert Program - You are likely to be faced with a full Cuba menu at your next Special Group meeting. First, State will probably want to cut off Artime's water and stay as far away as possible from any internal Cuban dissidents; CIA may feel differently. Second, there may be some discussion of whether or not...
it is desirable to maintain the CIA paramilitary capability which is presently on the shelf. CIA will probably say "no" (fish or cut bait) and State will probably say "yes" (with world scene hotting up, it may be good to have this capability in reserve). Third, State, CIA, and DOD may ask permission to offer some low-risk assistance to the new exile group, RECE (Oliva and Freyre). I am against but thus far I seem to be alone. My memo to John Crimmins on the subject is attached at Tab 4.

7. Communications Security Survey - The BOB study group has finished with the Ranch and has completed about 2/3 of the Washington portion of its work. The balance should go fairly quickly in view of the fact that we recently blasted loose the information which the group needed on the telephone system at the White House and EOB. The group will probably not examine the emergency locations. There is not much there that they can usefully do and it does not seem worth the time and effort to override Ted Clifton's objections; besides, this less urgent task can be done at some future date.

The group is running behind schedule (report due on March 1). They asked for another month, and I gave it to them; I'm fairly confident they will meet the new deadline.

Gordon Chase
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artimo Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artimo, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluctant line on cutting off Artimo. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artimo up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artimo quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the
Mr. Bundy

March 4, 1965

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-
promise its position on Atime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop
aid to Atime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give
them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of
its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple
months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the
small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:
(a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will
not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they
are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.
We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have
liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that
$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having
Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble
between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might
be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man
wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the
job if it needs doing.

While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them
invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-
traption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose
CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD
that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability
to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this
capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a
very short space of time.

Gordon Chase
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

In response to your request, the attached summary statement concerning U.S. policy toward Cuba has been prepared by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. It has been approved by Assistant Secretary Vaughn and Deputy Under Secretary Thompson.

Grant G. Hilliker
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.
Summary Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

.. Present Policy and Courses of Action: Our ultimate objective has been to replace the Castro regime. The immediate objectives have been (a) to reduce the will and ability of the Soviet-supported regime to organize Latin America in a form inimical to our interests and (b) to prevent the use of Cuba as an offensive base. In practical terms, we have been (a) trying to maintain pressure in order to exacerbate Cuban internal economic and political conditions; (b) trying to strengthen the Latin American ability to withstand subversion; and (c) hoping for the breaks that might produce a major change which would serve both the immediate and ultimate objectives.

Our principal pressures have been economic (the economic denial effort) and paramilitary (externally mounted hit-and-run sabotage and harassment actions, either directly under Agency control or through "autonomous" groups). Both kinds of pressures have been exerted only partially. The application of some economic denial measures has been inhibited, and the introduction of others ruled out, by the judgment that the risks of incurring political costs in our relations with allies outweighed the advantages to our Cuban policy. Similarly, the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started, and the program of the "autonomous" groups was abandoned after a reasonable trial, because of the decision that the damage to our broad interests, especially our relations with the USSR and the Vietnamese situation, would be disproportionate to benefits which we might obtain in terms of our Cuban policy. (In the case of the "autonomous" groups, moreover, there were, in practice, very limited benefits.) The overflights issue has also been a major factor in the calculation. These judgments have been influenced by the belief that developments in Cuba and Latin America were moving, even though slowly, in the right direction.

With respect to Cuba, this belief seems no longer to be warranted. According to very recent estimates, the Cuban economy improved in 1964 and will probably continue to move upward in 1965, principally because of increased sugar production. The economy is probably now back at or close to the pre-Castro level. Our economic denial program, limited by broad political considerations, has had only partial effects. In 1964, when Cuba was flush with foreign exchange, we were unable to prevent its acquisition of Western goods up to the limits of its exchange availabilities. In 1965, Cuban imports from the Free World will almost certainly be sharply down as a result, not of the denial program, but rather of exchange stringencies brought about by the very low world price of sugar. It is certainly true that we have prevented sales of critical commodities, that we have persuaded the
major Western powers to withhold further official credit facilities on the basis that Cuba was not credit-worthy and that we have hampered the development of the economy. But it has been a constant, scrambling struggle to do even this, and there are very recent reports that the British and the French are considering granting large amounts ($50 million each) of credits. Moreover, we have always been faced with the possibility that the Soviets will simply make additional foreign exchange available to Cuba. The large (6 million tons) sugar crop, the signs of economic revival in Cuba, the continued Soviet assistance, and the general lack of sympathy with our economic denial efforts indicate that the program, as constituted at present, will become more and more difficult to carry out and less and less effective. With the decrease in external economic pressures, the prospects for continued economic progress become brighter, even though the economy will probably continue to be far from healthy for the next one or two years.

With respect to the internal political situation, the regime is subject to some stresses, but its control is firm. Morale among anti-Castro elements is low because of the efficiency of the security apparatus and the apparent permanence of the regime.

Externally, frictions between Castro and the Soviets and the Chinese exist and are potentially helpful. The community of interest is so great, however, as to override current difficulties. In the subversion sector, Cuba, with Soviet acquiescence, if not encouragement, has been trying to step up the pace. At least in the short term, the Dominican crisis probably has improved the atmosphere in Latin America for general Communist subversion. In spite of his uneasiness about our intervention in the Dominican Republic as an augury for himself, Castro almost certainly will try to capitalize on the situation and to intensify subversive efforts.

We have three gross options: (a) to continue our present programs; (b) to increase pressures; or (c) to adopt a "softer" line.

a. A continuation of our present policy will probably mean that, barring some fortuitous development, we will progressively lose ground in terms of our objectives. We will, however, incur relatively few risks with respect to other national objectives.

b. On the assumption that we do not intend to resort to military action, we can increase pressure by either taking additional economic measures or returning to paramilitary activities. The ex-
banded economic program could include (1) putting foreign firms trading with Cuba on a US proclaimed list, thus prohibiting business transactions in the United States (high political costs in our relations with our allies and limited effectiveness); (2) formally denying US Government contracts to foreign firms trading with Cuba (moderate political costs and potentially moderate effectiveness); (3) vigorously applying the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in areas hitherto considered politically sensitive (moderate political costs and quite limited effectiveness); and (4) financially assisting Free-World sugar producers to compete with Cuba (small political costs, high financial costs and moderate effectiveness). In the paramilitary field, the Agency could undertake a variety of actions involving sabotage and harassment designed to inflict economic and psychological damage and to create political tensions. These measures would be effective only if vigorously and continuously executed. They would involve serious political risks, particularly in our relations with the USSR.

c. The adoption of a "softer" line would entail a fundamental change in policy toward accommodation. Basically, it would involve the acceptance of a Communist state in Latin America, with a strong effort being made to curb its aggressive tendencies, probably in favor of a "Titoist" orientation. The chances are better than even that the choice of this option would be seriously damaging to our long-term interests, particularly in Latin America.

* * * * * * * * * * *

There is a fourth, very broad choice: The cessation of Soviet support of Castro as part of a global settlement of outstanding US-USSR issues. The analysis of this option is beyond the scope of this summary statement.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Covert Action Against Cuba

1. I think you should know that Admiral Raborn has recommended reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. This matter has been considered in the 303 committee (the committee which monitors all covert operations). Tommy Thompson, Cy Vance, and I are against the recommendation, but, along with Raborn, we have agreed to report the matter to you in case you want to pursue it further.

2. The Raborn recommendation calls for the following types of operations:

   (1) Maritime raids by commando teams against coastal targets.

   (2) Use of an underwater demolition team to blow up ships in Cuban ports.

   (3) Night attacks on major Cuban merchant vessels while in Cuban territorial waters.

   (4) Air bombing of selected targets in Cuba by covert aircraft.

   (5) Deception operations designed to give the impression of imminent invasion by U.S. forces.

3. The trouble most of us see in such operations is that their international noise level outweighs their anti-Castro value. Especially with the Dominican problem before us, most of us do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba. I believe this is also the opinion of Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara. But if you feel differently, we can have the matter examined again.

McG. B.

Look at it again

Leave it alone for now
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET -- SENSITIVE

May 30, 1966 -- 1:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The noise level of Castro's charges of "threatened Yankee aggression" may go up as a result of two incidents which have occurred during the past 36 hours.

1. On Saturday night a CIA exfiltration mission ran into an ambush. The two Cuban agents being exfiltrated were captured. Two members of the exfiltration team, who went in to pick them up, were killed. The Havana radio is broadcasting stories on this incident. If past performance is any guide, the captured agents will spill the full story of their involvement. Castro can be expected to relate this incident to Guantanamo as further evidence of U.S. aggressive intentions.

2. From commint we learned of action by Cuban air and naval units against unidentified surface vessels off the northwestern coast of Cuba shortly after midnight this morning. The evidence is fragmentary. The Cubans appear to have intercepted a launch, set it on fire, and picked up two of the persons aboard. CIA assures me that none of their units were involved. They speculate that the boat may have belonged to Cuban exile free-lancers. Nothing has come out publicly on this incident yet.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET -- SENSITIVE
This is the report mentioned by the DCL at our meeting at 1100

P. Jessup 1645

7 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for the President
Mr. Walt W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum Concerning Six Cubans on an Alleged CIA Mission

The attached memorandum is from Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.
7 August 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Surfacing on 6 August 1967 of Six Cubans on Alleged CIA Mission

1. None of the six individuals surfaced in Havana on 6 August 1967 were on a mission for the CIA at the time of their capture. The men were apparently captured while on self-sponsored "family runs" or while on missions on behalf of independent exile groups (such as Alpha 66 and the Second National Front of Escambray). They were obviously being surfaced at this time for maximum propaganda exploitation before the delegates and journalists at the LASO Conference.

2. The following are the names and pertinent preliminary data on the individuals who were surfaced:

a. Francisco AVILA Azcuy

In March 1965 some thought was given to using him on an exfiltration operation. However, he was never contacted nor used by CIA.

DPOB: circa 1946, Consolacion del Norte.
AVILA arrived in the U.S. by boat in 1962, resided in the Miami area.

b. Pablo GARCIA Roqueta

There is no record of any affiliation with the Agency. He was reported in April 1967 as planning a "family run" and was hoping to contact an alleged internal clandestine group to plot the assassination of Castro.

DPOB: 24 May 1934, Las Villas Province.
c. Jose ROIG Rodriguez

Subject, erroneously reported in the press as ROY, was trained as a radio operator and in clandestine tradecraft. He participated in two operations in September 1964 and July 1965 as a member of an infiltration team. He was terminated in October 1965 and has not been affiliated with the Agency since. His termination was the result of a general cutback in Special Operations being conducted at the Miami Station.

DPOB: 28 January 1942, Havana. He was detained briefly by Cuban authorities in May 1962 on suspicion of plotting against the government. He arrived in the United States as a refugee on 21 August 1962.

d. Alberto LAUCERICA Diaz

There are no identifiable traces.

e. Vincent GONZALEZ (Nigoya)

Subject served from 5 June 1964 as an oiler on the mother vessels used in maritime infiltration operations. In this capacity he participated in some 16 operations, six on the MV ROINA, which was sold in 1966, and ten on the MV EXPLORER, which is currently being sold. He was last used on an infiltration operation on 21 March 1967. He was terminated on 30 April 1967 because of the cutback in Special Operations. It appears that he was captured while on an independent "family run" to bring relatives out of Cuba.

DPOB: 19 July 1935, Cruces, Las Villas Province. GONZALEZ was a member of the 26 of July Movement in 1960 and later of the 30 November Movement until he left Cuba in August 1961. He reportedly was arrested twice for political reasons while in Cuba. In 1963 he made a "family run" back to Cuba hoping to get his family to leave. His wife and family were reportedly still in Cuba as of May 1964.
f. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez

As of 20 February 1963, subject was used as a spotter and debriefer in the Miami area. In May 1964 he made an unsuccessful attempt to conduct an independent infiltration to bring out his family despite Miami Station warnings against such a mission. He was terminated on 9 July 1964. In September 1964 he made another "family run" and was arrested shortly after his arrival.

DPOB: 7 April 1922, Havana. RABEL is the son of a farmer and sugar planter. From 1938 to 1940 he attended High School and Tulane University in New Orleans. In March 1941 he entered the U.S. Army and was honorably discharged at the end of World War II. After graduation from the Cuban Military Academy he served as Cuban Liaison Officer with the U.S. Army Mission in Cuba in 1954 to 1956. In April 1956 he was arrested for participation in an attempted military coup against Batista. He was jailed for 35 days. He joined the Castro movement and after the Castro takeover became a captain in the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. He defected to the United States in December 1962.
NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Cuba

Last Friday I had a most interesting talk with CIA's new man on Cuba. He is Dave Phillips -- one of their more sophisticated operators who performed so well in the DR following the 1965 revolt.

Dave is revamping the Cuban operation. The apparatus mounted following the Bay of Pigs is obsolete. It was aimed at stimulating Castro's overthrow from the outside with propaganda infiltrators, supplies, etc. For this purpose they had a large and not well-camouflaged establishment in Miami. The Miami operation is being phased out. The sizeable sea-borne infiltration-exfiltration capability is being dismantled and a small, more efficient one established for stand-by use. Radio Americas on the Swan Islands is being discontinued.

The new emphasis is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. We need to know more about who his main advisers are and what they are thinking. If there is to be a change in Cuba, it is more likely to come from defections in this group. If Castro were to start looking for accommodation, one of them would be the first to know and probably the channel for feelers.

Dave agrees that Castro finds himself increasingly hemmed in. The loss of "Che" and the insurgency effort in Bolivia on the heels of the big LASO splash has been a serious blow. The outlook for the sugar crop this year is not good: only 5-5.5 million tons. Cuba is committed to deliver 5 million to the USSR alone. Relations with the Soviets are probably the testiest since the missile crisis, as reflected by Cuba's actions during the 50th anniversary ceremonies.

All this makes it most important that we:

-- develop our intelligence on what is going on inside the regime.

-- be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him.

I am happy to see as politically sensitive an operator as Dave Phillips on the Cuban job at this time.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. On 7 June 1968, Guantanamo Naval Base reported that according to a clandestine source, a group of about thirty officers and men from a nearby Cuban tank unit are planning to seize six or seven tanks, assault the communications facility and armory at the camp, and speed to the Guantanamo Naval Base seeking asylum. Along the way, they will fire against any resistance. The Base sent the informant back to the conspirators with the message that the United States does not endorse the plan, will not support it, and recommends that it not be attempted. Further, that if the operation is undertaken, the United States must have more advance notice than the forty-eight hours cited, and that the group must stop their tanks outside the fence surrounding the Base. The Guantanamo Naval Base considers the exfiltration plan feasible if security is maintained until execution time, but estimates that there is only a fifty-fifty chance of this.

2. germane to the Guantanamo report is a CIA dissemination of 1 June. According to several sources, Carlos Prio, former
President of Cuba, is sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. This developed after two Cubans exfiltrated Cuba via Guantanamo on 16 April with a message from dissident Cuban military officers at the tank and artillery battalions near Guantanamo. They offered to eliminate Castro and proclaim Prio as President; Prio in return agreed to recognize the Cuban Armed Forces as the sole security force in Cuba. Two Cubans have now infiltrated Cuba from Miami to implement the assassination. At last report - 6 June - they were in Havana. (CIA has nothing whatever to do with these attempts and learns of them only through penetration of Cuban exile groups.)

3. Not related but relevant, CIA recently evoked a radio response from Manuel Pineiro, Chief of Cuban Intelligence, to a clandestine broadcast to him. The purpose was to provide him a private communications channel, should he be or become disaffected. The possibility that Fidel Castro approved of the contact should not be discounted. Discussions are being held with the Department of State on this development.

Richard Helms
Director
MR. PRESIDENT:

I discreetly checked with Nick Katzenbach about whether Senator Mansfield or "anyone at State" was doing anything to get closer to Castro at this time. Nick responded promptly and as follows:

-- he knows nothing about Senator Mansfield's activities in this field;

-- he himself has taken only one step with respect to Castro: two men came to our base at Guantanamo; told our people that they planned to assassinate Castro; and they left to return to Cuba. CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or an assassination attempt take place, the U. S. skirts should be clean. Therefore, Nick empowered State to inform the Swiss that they might tell Cuban authorities that there had been recent reports coming to us of a Castro assassination attempt.

Nick says that exhausts his policy connection with Cuban matters.

Walt Rostow
25. There is no doubt that Castro's popularity and the morale of the civilian population have declined somewhat this year and that there have been various, isolated acts of opposition and sabotage. But no evidence exists of an organized anti-Castro effort anywhere in Cuba. Moreover, there is no evidence of unusual activity or vigilance by Cuban military and security forces. Persistent rumors among refugees that Major Armando Acosta, Major Calixto Garcia, and others are leading antiregime groups in the Sierra Maestra have proved to be the merest gossip. On 6 November, Garcia appeared at a public function in Havana and Acosta also seems to be in Castro's favor. There have been no indications, moreover, that regime officials who are certainly aware of the rumors spreading through the exile community are concerned about possible armed or organized opposition.

26. It is possible that a handful of disaffected Cubans have fled to remote areas of eastern Cuba in an attempt to escape the totalitarian controls of the regime. They may be escaped prisoners, army deserters, bandits, and brigands. It is also possible that a few exile infiltrators may have landed in Cuba. Such individuals, however, do not constitute a threat to the regime. Privately owned weapons have been very scarce in Cuba since the regime conducted several campaigns to confiscate them. It is possible—as some refugee reports have alleged—that individuals or small groups may have attempted attacks on small military outposts in the hinterlands. If that is true, or if army deserters were able to bring weapons and ammunition with them, there may be a few armed men in the hills.

27. In any case, the military and security forces could easily isolate and quickly exterminate such individuals. The Interior Ministry's Mountain Troops, which were successful by early 1965 in eliminating a few counterrevolutionary bands from the hills of eastern and central Cuba, have apparently increased their capabilities during recent years. They could call into use some of the approximately 100 air force helicopters to locate counterrevolutionaries. Thus, it is unlikely that an organized
element that posed even a temporary or isolated threat to the regime could long survive. It is likely, moreover, that as long as the military and security forces remain loyal to Castro, he can deal with threats to his position from any other internal source or combination of internal forces.

Conclusion

28. As Castro's dictatorship has become more totalitarian, civilian morale and economic conditions have deteriorated somewhat but there is no evidence of organized opposition anywhere in Cuba. It is difficult to gauge the extent of Castro's popularity; it seems, however, that regardless of the course he follows, he will retain the hard-core support of the peasants, many students and youths, and leading members of the party and mass organizations. By ceding greater power to his followers in the military and security forces, Castro has granted supreme institutional power to the group that is most loyal to him. These forces are large and efficient and can probably contain any internal threat to Castro in the foreseeable future.

29. Thus his rule is contingent only on the continued loyalty of his military entourage. Any threat to him from this group would also have to be against his brother Raul. It is extremely unlikely, however, that Raul would take part in any move against Fidel. If however, a significant number of majors were to become convinced that Fidel were either mentally or physically unable to rule and that Raul could not be separated from his brother, they could conceivably attempt to limit Fidel's power. At 42, however, Fidel is in robust good health.

30. Castro has at times vaguely discussed the possibility of reducing his role at the top, and there have been occasional reports that he may eventually step down as prime minister. He might resort to such a gesture if major economic plans failed disastrously or if civilian morale and economic conditions worsened considerably. It probably would be only a ploy, however, similar to his resignation as prime minister in July 1959, when
for a few hours he was technically out of office while the Cuban President was forced to resign. In any case, there is little chance either that Castro will voluntarily relinquish any significant part of his absolute power in Cuba or that a plot against the regime could succeed in the foreseeable future.