
Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10127
RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-33

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/12/1976
PAGES : 111
SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY
COMMITTEE BUSINESS
DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/22/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

Vol. 2 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
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The United States Senate

R 2831

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

324-6

Friday, March 12, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Friday, March 12, 1976

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United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:25 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, Senator Walter D. Huddleston (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Hart of Colorado and Mathias.

Staff: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and David Aaron, Elliot Maxwell, Ric, Inderfurth, Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Al Quanbeck, Elizabeth Culbreath and Bob Kelley, Professional Staff Members.

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Senator Huddleston. The Committee will come to order.

Shall we go to 41(c) directly?

Mr. Aaron. I don't see why not. I think the rest of it is pretty much accepted.

Senator Huddleston. Why is this in brackets? Is there a question of whether or not this is a conclusion or whether it will be included in here?

Mr. Aaron. It's whether it ought to be included as an example of these two things.

I guess I will state my view.

Mr. Miller. 41(c)?

Mr. Aaron. 41(c).

Mr. Kirbow. About half way down, where it starts, "The Intelligence Committee staff" --

Mr. Aaron. My only point for including it is to try to make vivid the problem which is described, you know, in just plain general language in the few sentences preceding, and to add to that, this is the problem of a lot of raw intelligence suddenly impact on analysts, as well as the other problem, which is that there is this difficulty of trying to predict, essentially, acts which from the standpoint of Washington D. C. and Langley, Virginia, just don't seem rational, and it is in the hope that people will be rational and so forth.

I think there is some exception to that, because the term,

1 which is not mine but which is in the quote from the post
2 mortem, uses the term "bias," and that may have a perjorative
3 quality to it. But the reason it is included is to simply point
4 out that it is just an awfully hard problem to, you know, use
5 a rational system and to be rational men trying to deal with
6 a situation which, from our standpoints, are not rational.

7 Senator Huddleston. Both of these instances have been
8 listed in the press, have they not, as intelligence failures?

9 Mr. Miller. By Pike.

10 Mr. Aaron. The Pike committee has charged they were. The
11 community's own post mortem staff has viewed them from that
12 standpoint.

13 I am not trying to put the Committee on record as agreeing
14 that they are failures, particularly, although I don't think
15 there is much difference of opinion in the Community as to
16 whether failure to foresee the Cyprus coup as opposed to some
17 of the things that happened after it, was a kind of failure,
18 because the situation there was that they had in fact
19 predicted that if certain things took place, you know, Ionides
20 became head of the Greek junta; if Makarios moved against the
21 Greek officers in the National Guard, that really there was
22 a very good chance that there would be a coup.

23 Mr. Kirbow. Wasn't all of that furnished by the
24 analysts in the community to the highest policy levels of the
25 government?

1 Mr. Aaron. That's correct.

2 Mr. Kirbow. Several weeks in advance.

3 Mr. Aaron. That is correct, and then what happened,
4 apparently, was that -- two things happened. One, the Greek
5 press, our intelligence officers, embassy people with the
6 exception of the embassy in Cyprus, all became preoccupied
7 with what was going on with the Aegian Sea, and there was a
8 struggle between the Greeks and the Turks over the oil there,
9 and that became a hot item. And there was also concern about
10 conflict, and there was a big intelligence collection on that
11 subject. And so Cyprus became kind of a sidelight. That's one
12 thing.

13 The second thing that happened was we got some raw
14 intelligence which said Ionides has decided to cool it, don't
15 worry, and so forth. And the Agency analysts accepted that,
16 and in effect said temperatures are dropping, things are cooling
17 off and so forth, so that even though what they predicted would
18 precipitate a coup began to take place, they didn't stick
19 with their own original estimates. So they were kind of led
20 astray with both this inundation of foreign information and
21 the fact that -- that's how the post mortem put is, onto saying
22 if you want to see or if you want an example of when this
23 general point took place, the IC staff says that's at least
24 one of them.

25 Senator Huddleston. I want to make sure it was the

1 intelligence community staff that made that judgment.

2 Mr. Aaron. That is correct. In fact, that really ought
3 to be capitalized.

4 Senator Huddleston. I think it ought to be left in there
5 to give a little more flavor to the report.

6 Mr. Bader. Senator, may I speak to the other side
7 before you make that decision?

8 And Mr. Kirbow can speak for himself.

9 Senator Huddleston. I hate to be thoroughly confused
10 by the facts though.

11 Mr. Bader. I think in the beginning it is bracketed
12 because there is some disagreement among the staff as to the
13 appropriateness and usefulness of putting this in, this
14 information into this particular report. Let me separate the
15 two elements of this footnote or suggested addition to it.
16 The one goes to the question of the analytical bias. This is
17 a very difficult and complicated point to make, and as David
18 has suggested, there is the perjorative weight to the word
19 "bias." It is a complicated point to understand and analysts
20 worry about this a great deal as they approach the estimative
21 and other intelligence business because they are constantly
22 faced with the problem of how to anticipate the -- in some
23 cases how to anticipate the rational behavior.

24 The word "bias" here is used in the sense that the
25 analyst is biased in the direction of thinking that individuals

1 act rationally when they make decisions.

2 My objection to including the second half of this conclusion
3 is that it isn't really importantly related, or related at all
4 to the paragraph that it is part of. I think the first part
5 of it that has to do with Cyprus is an illustration of the
6 problems that raw intelligence in great quantity give the
7 analyst, who is working a crisis situation, is perfectly
8 appropriate, as far as the substance of it is concerned, to
9 the paragraph, the second part of which, of this analytical
10 bias I think flows from that paragraph. As a start, I think
11 you would need a great deal more explanation in the text to
12 talk about this.

13 It seems to me it is a throwaway point that comes at the
14 end of it, though I accept it as an issue.

15 As far as the intelligence community tasks, seeing this
16 as one of the reasons for failing to foresee the coup in
17 Cyprus in 1974, it is perfectly correct. That is what the
18 intelligence community staff post mortem does in fact say the
19 hesitations that some of us had, or I had about the conclusions
20 of this is that we had not done Cyprus as a case study. We
21 haven't taken testimony on it. We have the one statement
22 that comes from a credible source, which is the IC staff in
23 its post mortem.

24 Senator Huddleston. Which we are quoting.

25 Mr. Bader. Which we are quoting. So I think the

1 IC staff reference takes away most of the problems that I have.

2 My recommendation would really be here that we keep the
3 first part and drop the second part, that is, the analytical
4 bias.

5 I think the first footnote or part of the text is an
6 illustration, is an example of just what we're talking about,
7 and the rest of the part of it. I think on the second part
8 we are talking about analytical bias. There is not enough
9 text to really give the reader a sense of quite what we mean
10 about it.

11 So that would be my recommendation.

12 I think Mr. Kirbow has another view.

13 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, this was, I think, four or more
14 times, I know specifically considered by the staff with all
15 of the people that appeared to have an interest in it being
16 present, and it had been decided as a policy type matter that
17 since all of the original information had been furnished both
18 to the policy makers at the highest level, and that they
19 themselves had a requirement and were levying on the intelli-
20 gence community, on this new Aegean Sea problem, that they too
21 were being furnished great amounts of raw intelligence at their
22 request, along with the analysts fumbling this, and even
23 this last bit of raw intelligence which came from a source in
24 Athens, and by the way, a new source, not one that we had
25 relied on before or had great trust in being absolutely good, sou

1 raw evidence, was made available. The decision had been made
2 that -- the final concluding words in the paragraph discussing
3 this sort of thing would read something like the failure to take
4 effective action to prevent such invasion was a policy failure
5 and not an intelligence failure, and I think that basically
6 we don't ever hold post mortems in the intelligence community
7 on the failure of the Secretary of State or the President or
8 the Secretary of Defense to act in accordance with a policy
9 procedure. We always hold post mortems on, kind of down at
10 the level of the analyst, and what did he get and did he fail
11 to properly advise.

12 The record before this Committee, except for the post
13 mortem -- and we have no great weight given to the post mortem
14 that I can see from any evidence in the record, or anything
15 cited by the intelligence community, I just think it unfair
16 for this Committee to decide, without almost a preponderance
17 of evidence, to kind of indict those analysts that were working
18 this problem at that time, placing no blame whatever on the
19 policy makers who had exactly the same information plus all
20 of the other information that the analyst never has as to what
21 the policies of the governments really are in this case.

22 Secondly, I agree perfectly with Mr. Bader on this analyst
23 bias. Americans are the product of our background, and we
24 always weigh other people as best we can, if you are in the
25 analytical business, based upon your own experiences and

1 whatnot, and I just don't think that to rub these two together
2 here, also, it makes a good point for the Committee, if you are
3 going to use them at all, it should be put in another section.

4 And thirdly, there really hasn't been a Cyprus study or
5 even a comment from the State Department or anyone else as to
6 whether or not the information they had was adequate to meet
7 whatever decision they wanted.

8 And I just don't think it well serves the Committee that
9 we don't have a better picture, that this kind of recommendation
10 is kind of a conclusion drawn, I think, from among the staff
11 and not totally supported by investigation.

12 Mr. Aaron. Well, just let me say, I think you have heard
13 the arguments, so I want to clarify one point, and that is the
14 point about intelligence failures versus policy failures is
15 made on the paper on page 4lb. I think we all agree on that
16 statement. It simply says there is a difference between the
17 two. The U.S. had intelligence on the possibility of a
18 Turkish invasion of Cyprus in '74. The problem of taking
19 effective action to prevent such an invasion was a policy
20 question on intelligence failure.

21 I think we capture that point, and on the other point,
22 this is simply drawing on documentary evidence available to
23 the staff to illustrate a point.

24 Senator Huddleston. We also have something of a disclaimer
25 toward the effort on the reflection of the intelligence analysts,

1 it seems to me.

2 It seems to me we are talking about improving the analytic
3 operation, and it just seems appropriate to point to some
4 specific instances, especially when we are quoting some other
5 group that has a certain amount of stature. I don't know that
6 we can make that any stronger there. We could say this
7 possibility was indicated by the Committee or the intelligence
8 community staff report, or emphasize that it is the community
9 staff, the intelligence community staff itself indicated this
10 possibility.

11 Mr. Aaron. Just say "saw this as part of the problem."

12 Senator Huddleston. Yeah.

13 Mr. diGenova. The word itself also emphasizing the self-
14 analytical aspect.

15 Mr. Maxwell. The latter part of that quote, I'm not sure
16 whether it doesn't detract from the impact, saying the
17 intelligence community saw this as one of the reasons for
18 failing to foresee the coup in Cyprus, because it seems to
19 imply that analysts will make predictions based on what they
20 believe rational people will do seems a fairly straightforward
21 point, but it breaks up the impact of the earlier statement.

22 Mr. Aaron. Well, as far as the latter statement is concerned
23 I would agree with Bill's point here that it doesn't necessarily
24 flow from the thing we are talking about before, which is the
25 abundance of --

1 Senator Huddleston. You are relating two problems, aren't
2 you? You say "in this connection".

3 Mr. Aaron. It turns out that there is another problem that
4 is involved in that case. There is not really. The thing is,
5 and I agree that it is a very complicated problem. It just
6 strikes me as one which, because it is a problem, and I think
7 as Charlie says, it is a big thing that we all have to live
8 with. It is the kind of points that people need to understand
9 that this is a problem, you know. We don't make any recommen-
10 dations about how people ought to be irrational. I mean, there
11 is no way to do that. But it is just an effort to try to
12 give a different side to the problem.

13 Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, one possibility is that we could
14 separate these two, the intelligence community staff and its
15 reflection on the Cyprus problem, which flows directly, as an
16 example, from the text that goes before it, from the general
17 to the specific; and then perhaps include this analytical bias
18 point which goes to another country and makes it a separate
19 point, as part of the body of the larger paper that supports
20 this, the backup paper.

21 Mr. Aaron. See, I have the feeling is the quote read:
22 An old and familiar analytical problem," we'd all feel more
23 comfortable with the quote because it would not have the
24 perjorative little twist to it, and maybe we should -- one
25 of the things that we could do, we'd simply say, is to take

1 the quote off of "and" and just say "An old and familiar
2 analytical problem" that perhaps, I mean, we wouldn't be doing
3 much violation to the statement of the IC staff, and we would
4 not be removing the perjorative.

5 Senator Huddleston. Would it be any better to paraphrase
6 that rather than taking it in full?

7 Mr. Aaron. Yeah, we could do that, too.

8 Maybe we could do that -- why don't we take that and
9 do a paraphrase, and maybe you can put that paraphrase in
10 such a way that it would help meet the complexity of the
11 problem.

12 Senator Huddleston. You're talking about improving the
13 professionalism or effectiveness of analysis. It seems to me
14 one of the things we have to do is to find some way to overcome
15 the natural tendency of people to do what it says here, expect
16 that rationality will prevail, or expect that people won't
17 do obvious and very rational things.

18 I would like to see the reference in there somewhere, just
19 to give a little extra impetus and emphasis to this one section,
20 and I believe this whole question of analysis is one that is
21 very important.

22 Do you have any thoughts on that?

23 Mr. Inderfurth. I agree.

24 Senator Huddleston. All right, would you agree with an
25 attempt to do a little paraphrasing there instead of a quote?

1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, if I had my 'druthers,
2 I'd leave the direct quote.

3 Senator Huddleston. Well, I think the direct quote has
4 one thing going for it, and that is, it is a direct quote, and
5 it is taken from a group that is identified.

6 Mr. Aaron. I think if we just take the quote of "the
7 old and familiar analytical bias" section.

8 Senator Huddleston. The word "bias" has a connotation
9 I think that might make it hard to understand.

10 Mr. Aaron. We might have to move that little paragraph
11 to a little later, where it would fall in better.

12 Mr. Maxwell. Just for those people, for the late reader,
13 perhaps in the top paragraph on 4l, the carryover, 4lc, the
14 carryover paragraph, it may make sense to try to illuminate
15 what is the kind of policy maker's lust for the latest fact,
16 because it is not on its face, I think, so clear that the
17 policy maker would be or would want that raw fact, and yet it
18 is the latest cable or the latest SIGINT or whatever.

19 Mr. Aaron. I think we need a little introduction here
20 about policy makers want the latest news.

21 Mr. Maxwell. That's the point.

22 Mr. Aaron. And producers of finished intelligence have
23 to compete.

24 Mr. Maxwell. That's my point.

25 And the bottom paragraph, is there a need for an

1 example, or does it speak for itself, that the analysts aren't
2 in part sufficiently informed about national policies and
3 programs. I mean, one example traditionally has been covert
4 action, but I wonder if there are other examples that would make
5 that point as well.

6 Mr. Aaron. Oh, yes, there are other examples. I think
7 a lot of the -- or one of the major ones, for example, analysts
8 trying to predict or foresee or suggest the trend of our
9 relationships with Japan, were unaware of the trip to China,
10 and they never knew it was going to happen, and the Nixon
11 shocks had a major impact on a lot of other things we were
12 concerned about.

13 Mr. Maxwell. That may be a good example to capture the
14 point here, if people think it is not as clear.

15 Mr. Aaron. Well, that is my example.

16 Mr. Kirbow. But that's also the thing we take up in
17 Recommendation No. 29, that policy decisions don't feed down
18 fully or rapidly enough to keep the analysts in the main stream
19 sometimes.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps if it is going to be our first
21 recommendation, we might just add a factual example at the
22 bottom of 41c to make it clear how important that is.

23 Mr. Kirbow. The China trip may well be an example, because
24 it too is recent, it's well known, and there's nothing inflamma-
25 tory, I mean, nothing serious happened before or after. So I

1 think you can use that as an example.

2 Mr. Aaron. And of course, the China trip had impacts
3 quite beyond Japan. That's one you could look at very carefully
4 because it had a big impact on the Soviet Union and a couple of
5 other areas.

6 Now, turning -- and beyond that I don't think there are
7 any other --

8 Senator Huddleston. Well, let me suggest on 41c, the
9 first paragraph after the section we were just dealing with,
10 it seems to me we have made an unnecessarily long sentence
11 there in that one paragraph that might really have more impact
12 if we just eliminated that middle section of it.

13 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think that is just an over-
14 sight on our part. I believe we had discussed that very thing.

15 Senator Huddleston. I was wondering if (a) ought to be
16 (d).

17 Mr. Kirbow. Intelligence is the principal purpose of all of our
18 intelligence activities, and the Committee finds that such
19 collection is unacceptable --

20 Mr. Maxwell. I think, Charlie, it has to be (a). Covert
21 action.

22 Mr. diGenova. There is a point I think the Committee is
23 de-emphasizing in one of its reports that covert action is
24 that important, that it is an extreme tool to be used, and it
25 would follow therefrom that really the principal purpose would

