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Vol. 2 OF 3

R 2859

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

324-11A

Tuesday, March 23, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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COMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Tuesday, March 23, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 o'clock
a.m. in Room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator
Walter D. Huddleston presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Mondale,
Hart of Colorado, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Michael
Madigan, Rick Inderfurth, William Bader, David Aaron, Elizabeth
Culbreath, John Bayly, John Elliff, Burt Wides, Joseph diGenova,
Bob Kelley, Britt Snider, Charles Lombard, Walter Ricks and
Elliot Maxwell.

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if I
3 might, make one observation about the Domestic Subcommittee.
4 We have completed two or three of the so-called major findings
5 of which there will be, I think, about eight, and we have
6 completed at least tentatively the recommendations that will be
7 appended to those findings. Even though there may be some
8 further changes, I would like to suggest unless someone has an
9 objection that we be authorized to send that to the printer's
10 so that we can at least have proofs to work off of. Otherwise
11 I am afraid that if we hold everything until the last moment,
12 it will be several weeks before we can get everything done.

13 And if no one has any objections, I intend to proceed in
14 that way.

15 Mr. Miller. The findings?

16 Senator Mondale. There are two or three findings that we
17 have largely completed. The recommendations I think are largely
18 although tentatively, maybe the historical section is ready to
19 go. I don't know, but in any event, understanding that they are
20 still tentative and subject to change, I would like to send them
21 to the printer, because I think if we don't we are going to
22 have one hell of a glut.

23 Senator Hart of Colorado. Are these things liable to be
24 controversial?

25 Senator Mondale. I would guess that there may be some

1 changes and divisions of substantial nature in the recommendations.
2 There may be some other findings, but the findings are a product
3 of a bipartisan committee and staff effort and I think pretty
4 unanimously reflect views.

5 Senator Hart of Colorado. Will running proofs on them in-
6 crease the possibility of leakage?

7 Mr. Kirbow. Sir, all of these papers, as Mr. Miller
8 agreed, are going through the security section, the classified
9 section.

10 Senator Mondale. The record there is pretty good, isn't
11 it?

12 Mr. Kirbow. The record is pretty good on our previous
13 report.

14 Senator Mondale. In other words, we can change it any
15 way we want. All that is involved is the expense of changing
16 what we want to change later, but I think we are far enough
17 along so it is prudent to proceed.

18 Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling is that I would
19 not want to --

20 Mr. Miller. I think you are talking about galleys.

21 Senator Hart of Colorado. A set of the galleys to get out
22 before members have had a chance to see them.

23 Senator Mondale. I think you are correct in this. I think
24 your staff had been distributed.

25 Mr. Miller. You are talking about galleys, is that right?

1 Senator Mondale. Yes, just galleys. Yeah, all designees
2 have had them.

3 Senator Huddleston. The designees have gotten your
4 recommendations?

5 Senator Mondale. Are the recommendations out, too?

6 Mr. Schwarz. The recommendations? Sure.

7 Mr. diGenova. No, no, we haven't had any.

8 Senator Mondale. I am talking about sending to the
9 printer's the findings that we have completed of the Subcommittee.

10 Mr. Schwarz. The detailed report is the thing we were
11 talking about.

12 Senator Mondale. That's the only thing you want to send?

13 Mr. Schwarz. That's the only thing.

14 Senator Mondale. All right, I stand corrected. In other
15 words, just the reports.

16 You don't want to send those findings?

17 Mr. Schwarz. NO, I don't think we are going to do that
18 because they are going to come to the full Committee next
19 week or the end of this week.

20 Senator Mondale. All right, I stand corrected. You see,
21 the staff report on such things as King, COINTELPRO --

22 Mr. Schwarz. Informants.

23 Senator Mondale. Have been completed, right?

24 Mr. Schwarz. About four of them have gone through a
25 process which includes complete approval by majority and minority

1 counsel, and tendering to designees for all other comments for
2 incorporation. It is only those that I would propose sending
3 to the printer's, to get that mechanical thing going. King is
4 not yet at that stage. Some others like Charlie wants to comment
5 on NSA, he will have a chance to do that.

6 Senator Mondale. And even that, these will still be in
7 galley form and subject to change.

8 Okay, that is what I will do then.

9 Senator Huddleston. Well, we will do the same on our
10 side.

11 Did you want to say something?

12 Ms. Culbreath. Yes, I wanted to make a comment about
13 when Senator Mondale was talking about sending the recommendations,
14 if it is going to be the full report, it may not be as relevant,
15 but having worked with the galleys on the assassination report
16 that we did before we had really reviewed them, they are
17 extremely difficult to work with if you are going to be making
18 any changes, and I just point that out as a cautionary note. They
19 are hard to read and they are cumbersome, and it is just very
20 hard if you are going to do any substantive rewriting at all
21 with the galleys.

22 Senator Mondale. Well, I guess we are not going to do that.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Liz, these have gone through an editing
24 process, but when you get your find hand on them, there may be
25 a little more.

1 Mr. Kirbow. I think the point should be made, Mr.
2 Schwarz, as it was the last time, if there have to be changes in
3 galleys, they have to be reset anyway, so you don't save any
4 time.

5 So those where there is going to be any controversy you don't
6 save any time.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there is nothing going where you have
8 controversy. It is only after the process of majority counsel,
9 minority counsel and all designees have been tendered copies,
10 and King, for example, has not gone because too many people have
11 comments.

12 Senator Huddleston. All right.

13 I think when we adjourned yesterday we had two matters
14 before us. One was relating to the covert action section which
15 we have new suggestions and new proposals to be made and considered
16 by the Committee. Those have been put into written form. I
17 believe all members have a copy of it.

18 I would suggest that we delay consideration of that
19 section until at least tomorrow to give time for thought since
20 it is quite a substantial recommendation.

21 We were on page 55, and Senator Mathias had proposed a
22 revision.

23 Mr. Aaron. Yes, we were on Section D, starting on page 61,
24 dealing with the structure of the CIA. I think apart from
25 Senator Schweiker's recommendation, which is somewhat independent.

1 of those questions, it would be my suggestion to the Committee
2 that we set this aside, because in the covert action options are
3 some structural proposals that might significantly affect the
4 extent to which we wanted to recommend consideration of some
5 of these others.

6 So I would set those aside as a package and consider
7 Senator Schweiker's recommendation.

8 Senator Huddleston. If there is no objection, we will move
9 in that fashion.

10 Mr. Kirbow. I do think there was a request that on page
11 62, that the citations be given so that they can be looked at
12 by the various Senators or members of the staff so they can
13 verify those recommendations.

14 Mr. Aaron. I might just make a comment on that. We are
15 in the process of doing that, but as I know the Chairman is
16 aware, the Committee did not hold hearings on a broad range
17 of options and alternatives and what have you, so that the
18 advantages and disadvantages that are represented here are
19 a combination of things that one can find in the record as
20 well as analytical comments by the staff as to what might be
21 the implications for and against these particular measures.

22 I think the important point to be made in terms of these
23 individual bullets that begin on page 62 is that they fairly
24 state the advantages and disadvantages, and if they do not, why
25 of course, we would like to do that.

1 Senator Huddleston. I think that is true, and while we did
2 not have hearings on any of these specific questions relating
3 to these, we did ask a large number of witnesses.

4 Mr. Aaron. This is, to a large extent, the staff's effort
5 to synthesize what we have learned, and if they are not satisfactory
6 we should improve them.

7 Senator Huddleston. All right, with those two matters put
8 on the position for future consideration --

9 Mr. Aaron. I would recommend we take up Senator Schweiker's
10 recommendation which really applies to a previous section, which
11 is the role of the DCI in the production of intelligence,
12 either place, and simply make for the Committee's consideration
13 the recommendation that the Directorate of Intelligence be
14 authorized to report directly to the DCI.

15 Is that a fair statement?

16 Senator Schweiker. Yes, that's right.

17 I have some minor differences, but that is really the
18 main issue as far as I am concerned right now. So I'll bring
19 that to an issue by just moving that that be in the recommenda-
20 tions and let the Committee dispose of it one way or another.

21 Senator Huddleston. Is there any objection to that
22 recommendation?

23 Hearing none, we will do that.

24 (Pause)

25 Senator Huddleston. Now, are we ready to go to the Media

1 section?

2 Mr. Aaron. Yes.

3 Now, this is a section that we have gone over at some
4 length, and I think that for the Committee's edification we
5 might ask --

6 Senator Huddleston. Are you on page 66?

7 Mr. Aaron. We're on page 66.

8 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed in detail on
9 that particular section, it has come to my attention that we at
10 one point had under consideration before the Subcommittee
11 strong recommendations from the staff, a section on labor and
12 labor unions and whatnot. This particular copy that I have
13 fails to show that at this time.

14 Was this determined by the Chairman that that would not be
15 for consideration?

16 Senator Huddleston. Where did we wind up on the labor
17 question?

18 Mr. Aaron. It was never in the draft findings and
19 recommendations.

20 Mr. diGenova. Is it in the detailed report, the classified
21 version? Wasn't there a section on that? We quibbled over
22 naming certain individuals.

23 Mr. Bader. As you will remember, it was discussed at the
24 subcommittee level at one stage. What I had in the longer
25 report, the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations,

1 etc., was a short section on labor which I said to the Subcommit-
2 tee at the time was based largely on byproduct materials that
3 came from the overall Katzenbach study, that is, what part of
4 the labor problem emerged from that larger study of educational
5 institutions and voluntary organizations and the like. I took
6 some of that material and brought it to the attention of the
7 Committee, but I thought this was the labor issue, and said at
8 the same time that the staff and me, in this case, had not
9 pursued that or explored it in any depth enough to come to
10 any real conclusions about it. In fact, you will remember the
11 section itself which is in here did not make recommendations.
12 In fact, its findings were quite tentative, and that is the way
13 it was left at that time.

14 I have never had a --

15 Senator Huddleston. Do we make reference in here to the
16 labor connections?

17 Mr. Aaron. Just on the first page. There is a statement,
18 talking about the scope of domestic activity, it notes that there
19 has in the past been collaboration with the American Trade
end 1 20 Union Federation.

21 Mr. Bader. One of the things, Senator, that I was going
22 to say in my remarks here, there has been no such collaboration
23 since 1974 when the labor-CIA relationships did in fact come
24 to an end, with the exception of some personal relationships,
25 really, or institutional -- personal relationships, I should

1 say, that were only effected through the international organiza-
2 tions of labor overseas.

3 Mr. Kirbow. Thank you, sir.

4 Senator Huddleston. I think we might, as we get through
5 this particular section, we might reconsider whether or not
6 the two references there to the collaboration with the trade
7 union, is sufficient, or whether we ought to add a paragraph
8 perhaps a little more descriptive to what the evidence
9 indicates actually occurred.

10 Mr. Bader. We can certainly come back to that, Senator,
11 as we go. The references here, the brief references to labor, were
12 really references to the full spectrum of CIA activities in the
13 pre-'67 period.

14 Senator Huddleston. Would the backup paper available on
15 this subject have any information on that?

16 Mr. Bader. Yes, the backup paper has about 14 to 16 pages
17 on CIA-labor relationships.

18 Senator Huddleston. Describing what happened in the
19 case?

20 Mr. Bader. One of the problems that emerges at that
21 time, that that section is the one section where the name of
22 the prominent American was mentioned, and nowhere else in the
23 paper are names given, and the Committee felt, I think, felt
24 it was the sense of the meeting that whatever we did with the
25 labor side, the singling out of one or two individuals was

1 probably not wise, and certainly was inconsistent with the
2 pattern of the overall paper. But it certainly is something
3 we can return to as we go through here.

4 Senator Huddleston. I think that would be appropriate.

5 Senator Mathias, we were talking about the labor involvement
6 encountered, and it is not mentioned very prominently in the
7 findings and recommendations. I think we should consider whether
8 or not we might need a paragraph on that after looking at this
9 overall section.

10 Mr. Aaron. I might suggest that we proceed here now by
11 having Bill give us a little or give the Committee a little back-
12 ground on what is a very complicated issue in which we have
13 some choices between principal and cost on the one hand and
14 clear benefit on the other, and which has a long history
15 of concern on the part of the American public and the government
16 at large.

17 Senator Huddleston. All right.

18 Mr. Bader?

19 Mr. Bader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Mr. Chairman, it has been the question of the independence
21 and integrity of American educational institutions has been
22 on the American agenda for some time. I would point out
23 to the Committee which is referenced certainly in the paper,
24 that since 1967 that the issue was very much in front of the
25 American public. The headlines here in the Washington Post of

1 16 February 1967, President Johnson Acts to Protect American
2 Academic Community, Hill Seeks CIA Probe, and at the time, Presi-
3 dent Johnson in the wake of the revelations that the CIA had
4 been using the National Student Association and also a wide
5 range of American philanthropic organizations, moved to establish
6 the Katzenbach Committee, and the President said at the time,
7 the President believed strongly that the integrity and inde-
8 pendence of the educational community must be preserved.

9 Out of the Katzenbach Committee came a series of restrictions
10 and guidelines which the Agency has very faithfully followed in
11 the period since '67. I would only make two remarks about this.
12 In the first category, I think it is certainly fair to say on
13 the basis of reviewing the contemporary literature at the time,
14 post-'67, that the American public in general thought the problem
15 of the independence and the integrity of the American academic
16 community was over as a result of the Katzenbach guidelines.

17 Let me read something from the Katzenbach guidelines on
18 the restrictions of operational use, because central to what
19 we are doing here is proposing further restrictions on operational
20 use of individuals, and after '67, this operational use was
21 restricted in certain categories, and one category was total
22 prohibition. And let me read the variety of individuals that
23 were totally prohibited, because we are now in the recommendations
24 that are before the Full Committee talking about further
25 prohibitions, so there is a consistency in this matter, and I

1 wanted to point out a few of them to you.

2 Operational use, under their instruction, is prohibited
3 for members and trainees of ACTION, Fulbright Grantees, officials
4 or employees of the International Association for Cultural
5 Freedom -- this is the old Congress of Cultural Freedom --
6 officials, employees or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and
7 Carnegie Foundations, and employees of U.S. private detective
8 investigative agencies.

9 As a result of the '67 guidelines, the Central Intelligence
10 Agency shifted its attention both to what it called offshore
11 institutional use and very heavily to the use of individuals in
12 American institutions which were not prohibited under these
13 guidelines.

14 Let me review the variety of individuals that DDO can use
15 under the present guidelines. I will just take four or five
16 of the list here: publishers, producers, journalists or
17 employees of public information media, and I will go on to
18 say that now that prohibition has been established in that
19 category for accredited U.S. journalists -- individuals engaged
20 in public relations activities, foreign delegates or employes
21 of the United Nations assigned to the U.S., staff members or
22 officials of the Red Cross Society, officials of the Vatican
23 state, U.S. Government funded professors, lecturers, students
24 and grantees. I am talking here about those who are on the
25 list where operational use is permitted: members of educational

1 or private or voluntary organizations, officials or employees
2 of the African-American Institute, and volunteers to America.
3 These, under the present guidelines of the Central Intelligence
4 Agency are in the permissible operational use category.

5 We go on to say that there have been further restrictions
6 since '67. I have already mentioned that in 1974 labor, for
7 all practical purposes, was put on the prohibited list, and we
8 now have the 1976 prohibitions on Media, and I would just read
9 one section from the Media prohibitions.

10 "CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institu-
11 tions under our Constitution, and in order to avoid any appearance
12 of improper use by the Agency, the DCI went on to say effective
13 immediately, CIA will not enter any paid or contractual relation-
14 ship with any full time or part time news correspondent
15 accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical,
16 radio or television network or station."

17 These are the two basic issues the Committee has in front
18 of us, that is, the operational use of American academics and
19 the operational use of U.S. journalists and those in the
20 media organizations.

21 Now, I turn the Committee's attention to page 69 ,which
22 is the central page as far as the scope of the use of American
23 academics are concerned, and make a few remarks about that.

24 The figures are not in dispute with the Central Intelligence
25 Agency. The Agency is now using approximately 300 American

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1 academics for operational purposes such as recruiting foreign
2 students on University campuses and writing books or propaganda.

3 Beyond these 286 there are an additional 41 academics that
4 are used in an unwitting fashion, that is, they do not know
5 that they are being used for operational purposes such as putting
6 notices on university bulletin boards, assisting in arranging
7 student interviews. We have said that we have testimony as to
8 how this unwitting relationship works, or what will happen, and
9 they have given a case here when the Agency came to testify,
10 to the fact, is that the Agency would come aboard the campus,
11 under cover, under the guise of a commercial firm. That commer-
12 cial firm would want translators or someone in the economic
13 business of one sort or another. The unwitting academic would
14 either arrange the interview or post a notice to the fact that
15 this commercial firm is on the campus.

16 Then the foreign student, he would then respond to that
17 particular add or invitation and then the Agency would proceed
18 to recruit them, if they wanted them, and I will read from the
19 text here from an Agency representative.

20 "We have what we refer to as commercial recruitment, where
21 we recruit them under the guise of a commercial firm, and the
22 man's mission is to meet the provision of economic intelligence
23 on his own country once he returns."

24 Question: "But he thinks he is working for a private firm
25 and not the CIA." or

1 CIA: "Or a group of investors. But that is a step in the fina
2 process leading to total recruitment of the individual."

3 CIA: "We hope that is not to be the case, in the case of the
4 guy that is too tough, to go all the way to the point where you
5 can stop and still have a relationship is this commercial
6 recruitment?"

7 Question: "You mean you put them in an interim step
8 before he knows he is in the Central Intelligence Agency?"

9 CIA: "Yes, that is correct. That is one form of this
10 recruitment done generally through the unwitting basis.

11 The other, the witting American academics are, let me say
12 that at some of the institutions -- there is one other individual
13 who knows that an American academic is in this process, in 82
14 of the 134 American colleges, there is one individual aware. At
15 the remaining 52, at least one university official is aware
16 of the operational use made of academics on his campus. I'm sorry
17 that is reversed. 80 institutions, no one other than the
18 individual is aware of the CIA link. At the remaining 52,
19 at least one university official is aware of the operational use
20 made of academics on his campus.

21 So in effect that is where we have it with relation to
22 the American academics, and perhaps we might discuss that first,
23 Mr. Chairman. The question is whether the recommendations that
24 we have -- and I will turn you to the recommendations section
25 for American academics on page 77, give a range of options for

1 the Committee to consider, ranging from a Committee to study the
2 use of American academics, and recommends the CIA continue to
3 use American academics for such purposes, and it moves it sort
4 of gradually to a spectrum of possible reactions of the Committee.
5 A central one is that one option is the Committee might propose
6 that there be no unwitting relationships, that the individual
7 himself know that the CIA is using him for operational purposes,
8 and the responsible official on the campus be the University
9 President.

10 I refer to, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend
11 its internal directives to include a requirement that -- this is
12 the one I am referring to -- that both the individual academic
13 and the president of the university or college be knowledgeable
14 of the clandestine relationship.

15 And we go on, the Committee recommends that the CIA
16 amend its internal directives to include a prohibition against
17 the CIA entering into a paid relationship with American academics.

18 We move right through the spectrum into total prohibition.
19 Total prohibition, of course, is not inconsistent with what the
20 CIA has done in the past with prohibitions in certain categories.
21 The issues obviously are the ones that David has raised and
22 the Subcommittee has discussed: is this tradeoff between
23 operational use which the Agency puts a very high premium on,
24 to the Committee, saying that they think that this source of
25 recruitment is vital to their operations, and on the other to a

1 concern that has been expressed in the paper and at the Sub-
2 committee level, as to what this would mean in terms of President
3 Johnson's original problem, the integrity and independence of
4 the American academic community and the image that they convey,
5 both to their students and to the world as to the integrity of
6 those institutions and the individuals within them.

7 I might say one last thing on the operational use. The
8 Agency as I have said has made this into a growth-stop, to
9 use their term. Since 1971-72 they have made a major effort.
10 The FRD, the Foreign Resources Division, is devoting most of
11 its resources it is bringing some of its very best agents
12 from abroad to work in the United States. Of the ten field
13 stations it has in the United States, eight are devoted solely
14 to recruitment of students on various campuses.

15 Mr. Kirbow. Foreign students.

16 Mr. Bader. Foreign students on American campuses, and
17 they attach, as I say, enormous importance to this. Of their
18 overall recruitments, a very high percentage of them from the
19 Agency's view come from this source in the United States, and
20 they would be most dismayed if this source were denied them.

21 On the other hand, it should be said that the Agency has
22 never done, heretofore, has not done an evaluation of the
23 usefulness of these foreign students. They began one for the
24 years '73 and '74, but that evaluation has not been completed.

25 So we, the staff, is faced with a difficult situation which

1 the Agency says and has written that these are enormously
2 valuable, they are retained, they provide good intelligence,
3 but they have not done an internal evaluation that either is
4 available at the Agency or finished at the Agency, or obviously
5 available to the Committee to that effect.

6 With that introduction, then, Mr. Chairman --

7 Senator Huddleston. So the Committee will know, the
8 Subcommittee presents a number of options here because of the
9 inability, really, to come down with a firm position on the
10 matter of academics.

11 Joe, did you have something?

12 Mr. diGenova. I just wanted to say something, Senator,
13 that Bill referred to the high percentage of recruitments. I
14 think for the Senators who were not at the Subcommittee, because
15 of their Domestic work, it should be clear that on page 69, the
16 bottom of page 69, the beginning paragraph, it indicates that
17 more than one half of the CIA's case officers are assigned to
18 this task in the United States; over 60 percent of the CIA
19 agent recruitments within the U.S. last year were foreign
20 students, and the next point is equally as important, perhaps
21 more so, that those recruitments in the United States represent
22 10 percent of the worldwide recruitment of high targets,
23 such as the U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, Eastern Europe,
24 Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.

25 Mr. Aaron. I would make one point additionally. We do not

1 know whether those hard targets in fact represent the Soviet
2 Union and China, or whether they really are what is known as
3 the soft-hard target which is Eastern Europe.

4 Mr. diGenova. Why does it say that?

5 Mr. Aaron. Because the category includes Eastern Europe
6 as well as the Soviet Union and China. We do not know what the
7 breakout is.

8 Mr. diGenova. Well, I don't understand what the point is.

9 Is that bad?

10 What does it mean?

11 We are using the word "hard target." We say the USSR,
12 PRC, East Europe. Should we not be saying that in the findings?

13 Mr. Aaron. But what we don't know yet is what the breakout
14 is. We don't know the fact were there any Soviets at all. We
15 just don't know that fact. That, of course, is important.

16 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman?

17 Senator Huddleston. There is a further problem that was
18 brought up in background information. I think a further problem
19 the Committee is going to have in regard to this section is
20 that the Agency intent will want to strike out a great deal of
21 this information, both in the background paper and from our
22 findings and recommendations, too. We may find some difficulty
23 in providing enough information to support what we recommend.

24 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, you sat through these
25 hearings. Do you have any recommendations as to which options

1 make the most sense?

2 Senator Huddleston. Well, as I say, our Subcommittee had
3 a little difficulty with this because of the problem of balance
4 and what not. It seems to be a repugnant practice, using
5 academics in this country, of recruiting young college students
6 who come to this country to participate in CIA activity. Balanc-
7 ing that, which sounds very undesirable, against which the
8 Agency claims is the productivity of such action and the need
9 for it, so because of that we couldn't come to a firm recommen-
10 dation, unfortunately.

11 Senator Mathias. You postponed it until this moment.

12 Senator Huddleston. That's right.

13 Senator Mondale. I just wondered if you had a personal
14 conclusion.

15 Senator Huddleston. My personal conclusion goes to this
16 Paragraph B on page 77, that while we recognize the problems
17 with it relating to integrity or whatever, we are not prepared
18 to totally forbid it at this time.

19 Senator Mondale. Could we add to the recommendations
20 that the follow-on permanent committee flag this problem for
21 special review and further action?

22 Mr. Miller. Because there is one thing that has become
23 evident. We really don't know what the value of these recruit-
24 ments are. There is only the assertion that they are useful,
25 but we have seen no evidence of the yield.

