
Agency Information

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ORGANIZED CRIME
LANSDALE, EDWARD G.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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ORGANIZED CRIME

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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R 423

Box 7

MEMORANDUM FOR DESIGNEES

Assassination Hearings

Annexed are the following which relate to this week's hearings.

(This material should be treated with extreme sensitivity.)

- (1) Schedule of Full Committee Witnesses;*
- (2) Draft of Summary Chronology and issues/questions concerning General Lansdale (a witness for July 8);*
- (3) The same for Gordon Gray (a witness for July 9); and
- (4) Summary Chronology of the actions taken in connection with Castro.

* * *

The Senators will be receiving similar material for all this week's witnesses.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
Curtis Smothers

* We will be taking, in addition, some proof from middle level personnel related to the Trujillo case. This will be summarized in writing for the Committee.

Copies to William G. Miller
David Aaron
William Bader

July 7, 1975

EXPECTED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FOR THE WEEK OF JULY 7 - 11, 1975

<u>ROOM</u>	<u>DATE & HOUR</u>	<u>TO HEAR TESTIMONY BY</u>
S-407	July 8 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Roswell GILPATRIC General E. G. LANSDALE
S-407	July 9 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Walt ROSTOW General Maxwell TAYLOR Gordon GRAY
S-128	July 10 10:00 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ Thomas PARROTT Dean RUSK Richard GOODWIN
S-407	July 11 8:30 a.m. 2:00 p.m.	{ William HARVEY Robert MC NAMARA McGeorge BUNDY

This schedule is subject to change on very short notice

This is NOT for public announcement

TO: Fritz O Schwarz and Curt Smothers
FROM: Joseph E. Digenova
DATE: July 6, 1975
SUBJECT: Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale Summary Chronology

Biographical Background

1941- U.S. Air Force
1945

1945-1963 Became regular officer in the Air Force (ultimately retired as Major General)

Eisenhower Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Administration (Secretary Thomas Gates)

1960-1961 In Vietnam doing a survey for the Secretary of Defense.

1961 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
(Secretary Robert McNamara)

1965 Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam
(Lodge)

Chronology of Events

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

1960
November 3 Lansdale present at Special Group meeting when Merchant prompted discussion of "taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara." (SG Minutes)

Cabell said that kind of program not practical and group decides not to adopt such a plan.

Yet CIA had already made contact with the Mafia. Was Cabell not informed or was he being disingenuous?

1961
Oct 6 SGA told by Parrott of 2 "other contingency plans in connection with possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene..." (Minutes of SGA).

November 3 Lansdale memo discusses major sabotage action. Indicates that present means NOT likely to cause overthrow of Cuban regime.

Before the Rockefeller Commission Lansdale denies that he was involved in sabotage and said that he and JFK and RFK tried to stop sabotage. Clearly not the case.

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R42:

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

November 31 President Kennedy in memo to Special Group summarizes major decisions re Cuba Project and appoints General Lansdale as acting Chief of Operations.

December 1 R. Kennedy tells SG that "Higher authority" *i.e., the President) has given priority to Cuba project and Lansdale is to develop long range plan to be reviewed by SG and submitted to higher authority for approval.

December 8 Lansdale presents outline of program designed to overthrow Castro regime. Uses Cubans as nucleus.

1962
January 18 Lansdale sends R. Kennedy a copy of his program review of same day and notes on an attached paper: "My review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you. I felt that you preferred informing the President privately.

January 20 Lansdale memo reflecting on 1/19/62 meeting with AG. Reflects L's own view of the severity and the importance of the remarks of the AG re pushing forward vigorously with Cuba Project. "We are in a combat situation -- where we have been given full command."

January 24 Lansdale memo for Special Group notes it is difficult to control indigenous nationals if the movement develops its own impetus.

What was the nature of this sensitive work? All plans were supposed to go to the SG-2hy not these? Was there a separate secret plan that only Lansdale, the President, and AG and a few others knew of? Was this a manner of avoiding a "reporting" requirement?

Did this reflect the pressure that Helms testified to that created what he called a feeling that "anything goes?" Yet McCone continually complained not enough being done, why?

Was there concern that these nationals if armed would assassinate Cuban leaders? Were they concerned that they could unleash something they could not control? Was this dangerous because we couldn't control what followed assassination?

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TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Jan. 24

Lansdale briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memo for record says "From the outset, General Lansdale has emphasized paramilitary operations in connection with this project."

These are inconsistent with his claim to Rockefeller Commission that he tried to stop sabotage operations.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

January 27 Lansdale Memo to AG stating need for strong decisions and evidence of his support. Efforts of Agency so far have accomplished goal re Cuba, "and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play, independently of the institutional program we are spurring." (emphasis added)

January 30 Lansdale memo Craig re "Operation Bounty" which establishes system of financial reward commensurate with position and stature of victim, for killing or delivering alive known Communists in Cuba.

February 20 Lansdale program review. Proposed plans for September will include "an attack on the cadre of the regime including key leaders. Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police -- G2 officials...CW agents should be fully considered."

" Lansdale memo to SGA with basic plan of action notes "any inference that this plan exists could place the President of the United States in a most damaging position."

March 2 General Taylor's guidelines will be reviewed and shown to higher authority; "but in the context of information rather than a request for specific approval." Rusk notes that "once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S."

March 5 Taylor guidelines for Moggoose sent to Lansdale in draft form. "Are responsible for performance through normal command channels to the President." (The word "President" is crossed out and "higher authority" is put in its place.)

Was this genuine concern for lack of control? Was what Harvey had done a known example? (poison pills) Was what Harvey did inconsistent with control

Is this another example of attempts to isolate the President on the record from the project?

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

March 5 Lansdale memo to Goodwin asking for alternate tracks Rusk sees open to achieve Cuban objectives; plus list of pretexts Rusk sees as desirable in connection with any direct military intervention.

Is this part of "plausible deniability"

March 12 Lansdale tells SGA CIA urgently needs policy determination "on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface...there is a need for defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self defense, for training, for purposes shor of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers."

What were the guns to be used for? Were the limits" concerned with control of what was done with the guns, or with the timing of their delivery (CIA was setting up new contacts with Mafia in late March)

March 13 Lansdale memo to SGA says many agents infiltrated into Cuba "will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection...however, the CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively outside Cuba."

" Craig reports to SGA that use of BW/CW to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers "infeasible and it was cancelled."

March 16 Taylor memo re meeting of SGA with President discussing Taylor's guidelines notes "General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." Footnote says: "...group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise was given by higher authority." Footnote added one week later.

Isolating the President once again? Plausible deniability? If so why such a clumsy attempt?

April 5 SGA meeting. McCone impatient. Group consensus is that time has come to reexamine basic philosophy of project with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early overt intervention.

TOP SECRET QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

April 10 Harvey memo to McCone.cites need for less restrictive and less stultifying controls by SGA. Harvey considers Lansdale insistence to be given details improper.

April 11 At SGA meeting McCone urges speed-up of covert action schedule. "General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than restricting them to intelligence missions."

Does McCone's statement show pressure or lack of it? Lansdale's comments are inconsistent with his Rockefeller testimony.

April 12 Three pages marked alternatives I, II, III, with no attribution note: "hence, our covert activities should be directed at the...attrition of the leadership of the government, through bribery and related means, and at all other disavowable courses of action detrimental to the local regimes." (00270-00272)

" Lansdale tells Taylor "Under revised plan for Operation Mongoose, proposal for supplying arms and equipment to these (one team in place plus 7 local groups identified) will be submitted to the SG for decision, ad hoc. No proposals have been received."

May 3 SGA meeting. Harvey reports on his infiltration teams. Three are in place.

Did Harvey mention the poison pills, and other attempts on the life of Castro? If he did not why would Taylor make a special report to the President on May 7 of Harvey's report?

May 7 Lansdale memo to SGA complains of breakdown of communication with Chief of Operations. He requests that "all plans and actions with operational aspects hereafter be made known to the Chief of Operations...." If this is not done, "we invite the danger of matters falling between the chairs."

Was this an allusion to recent discovery of unknown Harvey activities? Or was it complaint that Harvey had simply not kept him informed in greater detail? Did it have to do with Harvey at all?

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

May 7 Taylor reports to President on Harvey's report to the Special Group pointing out "the very limited progress that has been made."

What limited projects?
Was this an allusion to assassination?

June 20 Harvey memo to Lansdale requesting permission from SGA for aerial resupply of infiltrated agents.

Were arms involved in the request?

July 11 Parrott memo to a superior re air resupply operations. "Exactly what supplies is it intended to provide?.. This sort of thing gets us pretty close to the moment of truth."

What is the moment of truth?
Why such concern for the nature of the supplies?

July 23 DOD working group tells Lansdale electronic intelligence should improve and provide increases information in areas such as: "plots against prominent figures."

Where does DOD get this idea?
What plots are they referring to?

July 24 Harvey memo to Lansdale outlining CIA participation in phase one. states reason they haven't done more in area of infiltration has been lack of decisiveness by "higher authority" on use of military force.

Was Harvey frustration put into action by disobeying orders?

August 8 Lansdale memo to SGA states "the major difference from phase one of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines, which kept our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area.'"

August 8 Lansdale memo to SGA concerning Harvey request for authority for major sabotage against industry and public utilities. Lansdale requested this stepped-up plan from Harvey.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

August 10 Special group meeting at which McNamara raises issue of assassination of Castro. Lansdale is present.

What was the extent of the discussion? Were people told to present plans?

August 13 Harvey memo relating to August 10 meeting states "we will produce an outline for an alternate course B for sub-

mission. Papers required from individuals for Tuesday meeting include 'Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, liquidation of leaders)'".

Lansdale understood from August 10 meeting that plans were to be prepared. Did everyone else get this impression?

August 14

McCone calls McNamara after receiving Lansdale memo insisting that it be withdrawn because no decision had been made on the subject of liquidation and Lansdale was out of order in asking CIA to consider the matter. McCone testified that McNamara agreed memo should be withdrawn.

Was this the first time McNamara was aware of the Lansdale memo? Had he himself made an effort to have Lansdale withdraw the memo independent of McCone's request?

"

Harvey memo to McCone reporting he called Lansdale's office and told Frank Hand of the "stupidity" of including in the Lansdale memo as a topic to be considered "liquidation of leaders." CIA would not participate in preparation of such documents pertaining to liquidation and urged that Hand recommend to Lansdale that phrase be excised. Lansdale called back to say that it had been done.

Why was Harvey so concerned? He had carried out full-scale operation against Castro in April of 1962. Was it simply the fear of having something in writing?

"

Harvey memo to DDP (CIA) notes that matter of assassination brought up in Rusk's office by McNamara. "I took careful note from the comments...and the SGA is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."

Were they expecting unwritten comments or studies on this point?

August 20

Taylor memo to SGA received by Lansdale which notes "attached papers were read and approved by higher authority today." Papers were Taylor guidelines for phase two. President told SGA favors more aggressive program. Sabotage was to be employed on selective basis under guidelines.

TOP SECRET

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

August 30 SGA requests CIA to submit list of possible sabotage targets. "The group by reacting to this list could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."

Was this an abdication of control?

September 6 At SGA meeting where Lansdale was present Bundy notes re agricultural sabotage that release of chemicals must be avoided unless it could be completely covered up.

October 4 Lansdale present at SGA meeting when AG questioned whether we were going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. AG says President dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field.

October 11 Lansdale recommends early approval of CIA plans for sabotaging Cuban shipping vessels.

October 26 Lansdale disavows any responsibility or support for the proposed infiltration of 9 teams into Cuba. "Mr. Harvey's defense of the plan was not conclusive." All teams were to be withheld. This is the Matahambre copper mine sabotage operation.

Was Lansdale kept in the dark about these operations? Numerous Harvey memos have marked as a footnote on them re Matahambre "not in Lansdale's memo." What does this mean?

October 30 McCone tells Lansdale President has decided to hold back Operation Mongoose during negotiations on Soviet missile crisis. No more sabotage of any form.

November 21 Harvey memo says that Lansdale's statement that Operation Mongoose "had had no information on this operation (Matahambre) since early October was patently false."

This was part of an escalating debate over how much Lansdale either knew or did not know about that operation. Was Harvey covering his tracks?

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QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

May 16

Lansdale tells Rockefeller Commission he tried to stop sabotage. Admits, however, that there were discussions in the SGA concerning the possibility of plans to assassinate foreign leaders. He denies, however, that any such plans were ever actually formulated.

May

Washington Post story says Lansdale "hinted strongly, but refused to confirm, that the orders to draw up plans (that may have included Fidel Castro's assassination) came from the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy." Lansdale insisted however, that "neither President Kennedy or any other Kennedy ever gave me any orders to plan the assassination of Castro."

May 31

In a New York Times story Horrock reports that "yesterday General Lansdale said that in November, 1961, AG Robert F. Kennedy ordered him to prepare a secret contingency plan to depose Mr. Castro. General Lansdale confirmed that Robert Kennedy was acting on behalf of President Kennedy." Assassination may have been considered as one of the means of removing Castro. He never received specific orders from JFK or RFK to prepare a plan to assassinate Castro.

July 3

Washington Star story by O'Leary reports that Lansdale "has named Robert F. Kennedy as the Administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for 'getting rid of' Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro." The word assassination was never used by anyone Lansdale said, but there was no doubt that the plans envisioned this as one of the means. Lansdale relayed the orders directly to William Harvey.

Lansdale gives statement to Select Committee stating that Washington Star story is a distortion of his remarks. "I can say that I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from the Attorney General...no order about taking action against Castro personally."

CommentsGAMBLING SYNDICATE: UNDERWORLD CONTACTS ESTABLISHED

Early September, 1960

EDWARDS contacted MAHEU, who agreed to contact the gambling syndicate under the guise of representing international business interests opposed to Castro. In early September, MAHEU met JOHN ROSELLI in Beverly Hills and told him that "high Government sources" desired his assistance. On September 14, O'CONNELL and MAHEU met ROSELLI in New York, and ROSELLI agreed to introduce MAHEU to "SAM GOLD" (SAM GIANCANA) who could arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba. \$150,000 was offered for successful completion of the assassination. ROSELLI declined to accept payment.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DULLES BRIEFED ON OPERATION

Mid September, 1960

EDWARDS and BISSELL briefed DCI DULLES and GENERAL CABELL on the gambling syndicate operation. EDWARDS implied that the plan would be put into effect unless DULLES subsequently told him to stop. BISSELL left the meeting certain that DULLES knew the nature of the operation.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: GIANCANA JOINS THE OPERATION

Late September, 1960

During the week of September 24, MAHEU, ROSELLI, and GIANCANA met at the Fontainbleau and Kennilworth hotels in Miami. GIANCANA was to be a "contact man", although ROSELLI did not use GIANCANA to locate Cubans employed in the operation.

GIANCANA told MAHEU that TRAFFICANTE would serve as courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. O'CONNELL never met GIANCANA or TRAFFICANTE, but recognized them as gangsters from a newspaper article on prominent Cosa Nostra members, and reported this fact to EDWARDS.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ROMAN WIRETAP

October 1960(?)

MAHEU informed O'CONNELL that GIANCANA believed his girlfriend, PHYLLIS MCGUIRE, was having an affair with DAN ROMAN, and that GIANCANA wanted MAHEU to bug ROMAN'S room in Los Vegas. MAHEU warned that if the tap were not installed, GIANCANA would leave Miami, disrupting the operation.

O'CONNELL contacted someone at CIA, presumably EDWARDS, and received approval for having MAHEU arrange a tap (EDWARDS denies he was consulted). MAHEU passed the matter to EDWARD DUBOIS, a private investigator, who arranged for ARTHUR J. BALLETTI and J.W. HARRISON to install the tap.

SECRET

Comments

Comments

BALLETTI and HARRISON were arrested after a maid discovered the listening device. BALLETTI called MAHEU, and ROSELLI provided MAHEU with the bail money. MAHEU told EDWARDS that the FBI was investigating his association with ROSELLI and GIANCANA. EDWARDS told MAHEU that if he was formally approached by the FBI, he should refer the FBI to EDWARDS.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: WHITE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION

January, 1961

During luncheon meetings at the White House in January, BISSELL was requested (probably by BUNDY and ROSTOW) to establish an executive action capacity. The program was to develop the capability to remove foreign political leaders through the clandestine service. BISSELL assumed the mandate included assassination capability.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: PROGRAM ESTABLISHED

Late January, 1961

In late January, BISSELL asked HARVEY to establish an executive action capability. HARVEY understood the mandate to include assassination, but no specific leaders were targeted.

HARVEY expressed doubts about the feasibility of assassinations to BISSELL and HELMS. The DCI was not advised of the program at this time, and it is uncertain whether he was ever advised.

Comments

On January 26, HARVEY discussed the operation with ARNOLD SILVER. The project was named ZRRIFLE, and operated under the cover of procuring code decipher materials. Agent QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by SILVER for an operation against Lumumba, was salaried as the principle agent.

On January 26, HARVEY discussed assassination techniques with SYD GOTTLIEB of the TSD.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ORTA OPERATION

January-February, 1961

GIANCANA suggested the use of poison pills. EDWARDS and O'CONNELL discussed the pills with TREICHLER of TSD, and by February 10, the pills had been tested for their effectiveness. Shortly thereafter they were supplied to O'CONNELL, who gave them to ROSELLI. ROSELLI reported that the pills had been delivered to JUAN ORTA in Cuba. ORTA kept the pills for a few weeks, and then returned them.

POISONED CIGARS DELIVERED

February 13, 1961

TREICHLER notes reveal poisoned cigars delivered to unidentified person on February 13.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: VERONA OPERATION

March-April, 1961

Following ORTA's failure, ROSELLI told O'CONNELL that TRAFFICANTE had approached TONY VERONA, head of a Cuban exile movement fronted by the CIA. VERONA claimed to have a contact inside Cuba who worked at a restaurant frequented by Castro. \$10,000 in cash and \$1,000 in communications equipment were delivered to O'CONNELL to cover operational expenses.

MAHEU, ROSELLI, TRAFFICANTE, and VERONA met at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami, and MAHEU delivered the cash and capsules to VERONA. When the operation failed to materialize, VERONA returned the cash.

AMLASH: INITIAL CONTACT

March 9, 1961

JACK STEWART, of the Mexico City station of the CIA, met with AMLASH-1, a major in the Cuban army who was disaffected with Castro, in Mexico City on March 9. AMLASH-1 requested arms for use in operations against Castro.

AMLASH: REQUEST FOR AID IN DEFECTING

March 28, 1961

AMLASH-1 decided to defect and requested aid from STEWART. No assistance was given because of report that Cuban police aware of AMLASH-1's defection plans.

EARLY APRIL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

Early April, 1961

During early April, 1961, CIA cables reveal that an unidentified Cuban working with the agency volunteered to assassinate Castro, but was unable to enter Cuba.

BAY OF PIGS: APRIL 16-19, 1961

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: OPERATION TERMINATED

Late April, 1961

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, EDWARDS sent word to ROSELLI through O'CONNELL that the Syndicate operation was terminated, and that even if someone succeeded in assassinating Castro, there would be no payoff. The pills were retrieved.

MCCONE BRIEFING RE: ASSASSINATIONS

September, 1961

Between his nomination and confirmation, MCCONE was briefed about the Cuban operations. He was apparently not told about any assassination plans, either past or ongoing, nor about Executive Action or the Gambling Syndicate operation.

MCCONE BECOMES DCI

October, 1961

TASK FORCE W: INCEPTION

October, 1961

In October, SAM HALPERN of the Caribbean Division attended a meeting with BISSELL and GHOSE ZOGBEY, Branch Chief. BISSELL stated that he had been reprimanded by RFK and JFK for not "getting rid of" the Castro regime. He ordered HALPERN and ZOGBEY to plan an operation to get rid of Castro, placing no limitation on the means.

Shortly after the meeting, HALPERN was introduced to GENERAL LANSDALE. HALPERN looked to LANSDALE for guidance and reported to him.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: DECISION TO APPLY PROGRAM TO CASTRO

November 15, 1961

On November 15, HARVEY and BISSELL discussed applying the ZRRIFLE capability against Castro. BISSELL also instructed HARVEY to take over EDWARDS' gambling syndicate operation.

TASK FORCE W: HARVEY TAKES COMMAND

January, 1962

HARVEY was put in charge of Task Force W in January, 1962.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: EDWARDS-HARVEY BRIEFING

February 1962

Edwards briefed HARVEY on the gambling syndicate operation in February. Details for his taking over the operation were worked out during the following month.

HELMS BECOMES DDP AND BRIEFED BY BISSELL

February, 1962

HELMS replaced BISSELL as DDP in February. BISSELL, either himself or through HARVEY, briefed HELMS on the gambling syndicate assassination plot, telling him it had been deactivated.

EXECUTIVE ACTION: AUTHORIZATION BY HELMS

February 19, 1962

On February 19, HELMS issued a memorandum authorizing HARVEY to retain QJWIN and other agents he felt necessary for ZRRIFLE; accounting for funds was to be by general category by HARVEY's certification.

SECRET

WIRETAP INCIDENT: FBI-CIA DISCUSSIONS

February-April, 1962

Sometime after BALLETTI's arrest, MAHEU informed the FBI that the ROWAN wiretap involved an intelligence operation directed against Cuba. On February 7, EDWARDS told PAPICH that the CIA would object to the use of CIA personnel or information in prosecutions, and that the introduction of evidence concerning the CIA operation would be "embarrassing to the Government." On March 23, HOOVER sent a letter to MCCONE through EDWARDS characterizing the ROWAN wiretap as involving "intelligence information" and asking if the CIA objected to prosecution of BALLETTI and MAHEU. EDWARDS forwarded the letter to HOUSTON, requesting him to inform Assistant Attorney General MILLER that the ROWAN wiretap was related to intelligence operations against Cuba. On April 16, HOUSTON requested MILLER to undertake no prosecutions for the ROWAN wiretap. HOUSTON then briefed DDCI CARTER, who said that MCCONE might be briefed in "due time". There is no indication that CARTER was told about the assassination operation or that MCCONE was briefed by any of the parties.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: HARVEY MEETS ROSELLI

Early April, 1962

HARVEY requested EDWARDS to put him in touch with ROSELLI. In early April, O'CONNELL introduced HARVEY to ROSELLI in Miami. HARVEY told ROSELLI to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with MAHEU or GIANCANA. HARVEY briefed HELMS on the result of this meeting, and thereafter kept HELMS informed of the status of the operation.

CommentsGAMBLING SYNDICATE: MEETING IN NEW YORK

April 8-9, 1962

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in New York on April 8-9. It is uncertain whether MAHEAU was present.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: WASHINGTON MEETING

April 14, 1962

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in Washington on April 14. ROSELLI was apprehensive about HARVEY and asked O'CONNELL to stay with operation.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO ROSELLI

April 19-21, 1962

TREICHLER delivered four pills to O'CONNELL on April 18. HARVEY arrived in Miami with the pills on April 21.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO VERONA

April 21, 1962

ROSELLI reestablished contact with VERONA, who claimed to have an asset in Cuba who could deposit the pills in Castro's food. ROSELLI told HARVEY that the asset intended to use the pills to assassinate Castro, Che Guevarra, and Raul Castro. HARVEY approved of the targets and gave ROSELLI the pills, who passed them on to his asset (Cuban no. 1). ROSELLI's assistant was an Italian-speaking Cuban named MACEO.

CommentsGAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF ARMS TO VERNONA

Late April, 1962

VERONA requested arms and equipment: HARVEY obtained explosives, detonators, rifles, radios, and boat radar from TED SHACKLEY, head of the JMWAVE station. The equipment was to be used in the assassination effort and to aid Cuban guerrillas.

HARVEY and SHACKLEY delivered the equipment to a parking lot in a U-Haul truck rented under an assumed name. HARVEY gave the keys to ROSELLI, who arranged to have the truck picked up by an unidentified contact. This arrangement was used because ROSELLI did not yet trust HARVEY. O'CONNELL and ROSELLI together staked out the truck.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS AND ARMS TO CUBA

May, 1962

ROSELLI kept HARVEY informed of developments. Sometime in May ROSELLI reported to HARVEY that the pills had reached Cuba, and that he believed the guns were inside Cuba.

Comments

WIRETAP INCIDENT: RFK BRIEFING

May 7-14, 1962

At RFK's request, on May 7, 1962, EDWARDS and HOUSTON briefed RFK on the first phase of gambling syndicate assassination plot. EDWARDS claims he did not know the operation was continuing; HOUSTON claims EDWARDS told him the operation had terminated. RFK was told that the operation had been terminated, and RFK stated that no operations involving gangsters should be undertaken without first notifying him. EDWARDS did not notify HARVEY of this order. RFK briefed HOOVER on May 10, criticizing the use of underworld figures and stating that it would be difficult to prosecute MAHEU or GIANCANA on any charges.

On May 14, EDWARDS and HARVEY met with HELMS and advised against telling MCCONE of the assassination plot. HELMS agreed not to brief MCCONE.

On May 14, EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the file stating that HARVEY had informed him that he was dropping all plans to use ROSELLI in the future. According to HARVEY, both he and EDWARDS knew that the ROSELLI operation was continuing.

On May 14, EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the record, a copy of which was sent to RFK, summarizing the May 7 briefing of RFK.

CommentsGAMBLING SYNDICATE: 3 MAN TEAM SENT TO CUBA

June, 1962

ROSELLI informed HARVEY in June that a three-man team had been dispatched to Cuba, evidently to either kill Castro themselves or to recruit others to do the job.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: O'CONNELL CUT OUT

June, 1962

O'CONNELL left for an assignment to Japan in June, 1962. His participation in the Gambling Syndicate Operation ended at least by this time, and possibly in May.

AMLASH: RECRUITMENT AS ASSET

July-September, 1962

Meetings were held with AMLASH-1 in early August in Helsinki, in which AMLASH-1 expressed a desire to carry out operations to undermine the Castro regime, including the assassination of Castro. During the weeks of August 14-23, AMLASH-1 was met by agents in Paris and given S/W training.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: SECOND THREE-MAN TEAM SENT

September 7-11, 1962

HARVEY met ROSELLI in Miami on September 7 and 11. ROSELLI reported that the pills were still in Cuba, and that VERONA was preparing to send in another three-man team assigned to penetrate Castro's bodyguard.

SECRET

Comments

HARVEY did not notify MCCONE because he doubted that the plot would succeed.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ROSELLI PLACED IN SAFE HOUSE

October, 1962

ROSELLI claims that the CIA put him in a "safe house" in Washington, D. C. during the Cuban missile crisis.

TASK FORCE W: FITZGERALD TAKES COMMAND

January, 1963

FITZGERALD replaced HARVEY as commander of Task Force W in January, 1963, under intense pressure from either RFK or JFK to "get rid of" Castro. The Task Force for the first time considered methods of assassinating Castro. The Special Group was told of none of these plans.

TASK FORCE W: EXPLODING SEASHELL

January, 1963(?)

FITZGERALD asked HALPERN to investigate the possibility of rigging an exotic seashell to explode and placing it in an area where Castro went skin diving. The plan was dropped as impractical.

Comments**SECRET**TASK FORCE W: CONTAMINATED DIVING SUIT

January, 1963

A plan was devised to have JAMES DONOVAN, who was negotiating for the release of Bay of Pigs prisoners with Castro, to present Castro with a diving suit dusted with a fungus that would produce a disabling skin disease and contaminated with a tubercle bacilli. The plan was abandoned because DONOVAN had already given Castro a diving suit.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: COLLAPSE OF OPERATION

January 6-16, 1963

HARVEY met with ROSELLI and MACEO in Miami several times during the first half of January. The second three-man team did not embark for Cuba. ROSELLI told HARVEY that nothing was happening and that it was doubtful that anything would happen in the future.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE: TERMINATION OF OPERATION

February 11-15, 1963

HARVEY left word for MACEO in Miami that the assassination program had ended. On February 15, HARVEY met with ROSELLI in Los Angeles, where they agreed to call off the assassination plot. ROSELLI did not notify the assets that the plot had been terminated, but simply refrained from further dealing with them in any way.

CommentsPERSONAL MEETING BETWEEN HARVEY AND ROSELLI

June, 1963

In Mid-June, HARVEY, after notifying HELMS, had a personal meeting with ROSELLI in Washington, D.C. prior to HARVEY's trip to Rome.

HELMS BRIEFS MCCONE ON GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION

August 16, 1963

On August 16, MCCONE asked HELMS about relations between the Mafia and the CIA after learning of imminent newspaper articles on the topic. HELMS sent MCCONE a copy of EDWARDS' May 14, 1962 memorandum describing only the first phase of the operation. The cover memorandum stated "I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment." MCCONE did not recall hearing of the operation previously, and was told by HELMS that it "has long since been put to bed."

Articles stating that GIANCANA had been used by the CIA in an intelligence operation against Cuba appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times on August 16, and the Chicago Daily News on August 20.

CommentsAMLASH: MEETING WITH FITZGERALD

October, 1963

AMLASH-1 insisted on meeting with a senior United States official for assurances of American support.

FITZGERALD and HELMS agreed that FITZGERALD should meet AMLASH in Paris and hold himself out as a personal representative of RFK. HELMS decided that it was unnecessary to seek approval from RFK because he believed the operation was consistent with RFK's general policies toward Cuba.

FITZGERALD met CUBELA on October 29, and promised to aid any anti-communist groups which could neutralize Castro. CUBELA requested a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. FITZGERALD told CUBELA that the United States would not take part in an assassination scheme.

AMLASH: DECISION TO PROVIDE RIFLES

November 19, 1963

A memorandum for the record by SANCHEZ dated November 19 states: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling CUBELA he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include . . . high powered rifles with scopes. . . ."

SECRET

CommentsAMLASH: PREPARATION OF POISON PEN

November 20, 1963

HALPERN requested GUNN to prepare a pen rigged with a syringe for injecting a deadly poison, Blackleaf 40. HALPERN believed that AMLASH could use the pen against Castro more effectively than a rifle. The SGA was not told about the operation.

AMLASH: TRANSFER OF POISON PEN

November 22, 1963

FITZGERALD met with AMLASH in Paris on November 22, gave him the poison pen, and recommended that Blackleaf 40 would be an effective poison. AMLASH-1 was disappointed, and requested that weapons be deposited at a friend's farm in Cuba.

AMLASH: ARMS DELIVERY

March-June 1964

A cache of arms was delivered to Cuba for AMLASH on March 17-21; in the week of June 9, another cache containing two FAL automatic rifles was landed in Cuba.

CommentsAMLASH: ARTIME CONTACT

December, 1964

SANCHEZ met AMLASH-1 in Paris on December 6-7 and indicated that the United States could not provide assistance for his assassination attempt. It was contrived to put AMLASH-1 in contact with ARTIME in the hope that ARTIME would provide AMLASH-1 with a silenced weapon. On December 30, ARTIME met AMLASH in Madrid, and ARTIME agreed to furnish a silencer.

AMLASH: WEAPON DELIVERY

February 11, 1965

On February 11, the Madrid station cabled: "On 10 or 11 of February CUBELA is to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from ARTIME's secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now in Madrid." A cable on February 12 reported that "ARTIME had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to CUBELA in Madrid."

AMLASH: TERMINATION

June, 1965

CIA terminated all contacts with the AMLASH group because it felt that too many people knew about the AMLASH operation.

AMLASH ARRESTED

March 1, 1966

CUBELA was arrested on March 1, 1966 and tried for planning the assassination of Castro.

MEMO FROM HELMS TO RUSK REGARDING AMLASH

March 7, 1966

In response to Havana Presna Latina news release of March 5, 1966, recounting AMLASH-1's arrest and trial, HELMS wrote RUSK on March 7 that the CIA had been in contact with AMLASH-1 from 1961-1965, but that the CIA was not involved in a plot with AMLASH-1 to assassinate Castro, and that it never encouraged AMLASH-1 to attempt such an act.

LONG COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

May-June, 1966

The Committee headed by Senator LONG investigating invasions of privacy intended to call MAHEU. The Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice informed the CIA, and the CIA's General Counsel arranged to have MAHEU excused from testifying.

Comments

ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS

Week of May 12, 1966

On May 12, ROSELLI flew to Washington, D. C. and met with EDWARDS. ROSELLI told EDWARDS that he had been approached by FBI agents who revealed that they knew he was in the country under an assumed name by slipping a picture of him in his youth under his door. ROSELLI indicated that he was afraid other gangsters might take action against him if he talked to the FBI. EDWARDS believed ROSELLI wanted EDWARDS to inform the FBI of ROSELLI's concerns.

CIA INFORMS FBI OF ROSELLI DEVELOPMENTS

May 12-18, 1966

EDWARDS advised HOWARD OSBORN, CIA Director of Security, of his May 12 meeting with ROSELLI. OSBORN informed SAM PAPICH, FBI liaison with the CIA, of the meeting, and on May 18 briefed HELMS. HELMS instructed OSBORN to work closely with the FBI and to instruct him if evidence of a "quid pro quo" developed. OSBORN admitted to the FBI that "ROSELLI has CIA in an unusually vulnerable position and that he would have no qualms about embarrassing CIA if it served his own interests."

ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS

Late May, 1966

ROSELLI phoned EDWARDS and explained that the FBI was trying to blackmail him. ROSELLI contends that he did not request any assistance from HARVEY.

CommentsCIA PREVENTS EDWARDS FROM TESTIFYING

December 21, 1966

PAPICH informed EDWARDS that ROSELLI was living in the United States under an assumed name, and that the FBI wanted to obtain ROSELLI's cooperation in an investigation of the Mafia under threat of deportation. The FBI desired EDWARDS' testimony regarding receipt of the picture by ROSELLI. OSBORN informed PAPICH that the CIA would object to the subpoena of EDWARDS for this purpose or as an intermediary to solicit ROSELLI's cooperation. HOUSTON and HELMS concurred in this position.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT

April 25, 1967

HELMS requested the Inspector General to look into assassination plots against Castro pursuant to an inquiry by PRESIDENT JOHNSON. The report was submitted to HELMS on April 25, and HELMS briefed the PRESIDENT on its contents, but did not give him a copy.

The Report concluded that the CIA had been involved in a plot involving underworld figures to assassinate Castro.

CIA CONCERN ABOUT ROSELLI PROSECUTION

August-December, 1967

On August 11, PAPICH informed OSBORN that ROSELLI would shortly be arrested on gambling charges, and that EDWARDS was desired as a witness. The CIA objected to EDWARDS' appearance.

Comments

On October 22 and 27, ROSELLI requested HARVEY to serve as his attorney, asking "why the agency could not do as much for him as it did for BOB MAHEU" in connection with the Long Committee. (HARVEY was no longer employed by the CIA).

On December 8, HARVEY reported that "ROSELLI will maintain his trust unless he is convicted and the threat of deportation arises."

COLBY MEMO ON ASSASSINATION

August, 1969

In August, COLBY issued a memorandum to all Deputy Directors stating that "the CIA will not engage in assassinations or induce, assist or project to others that assassination be employed."

TOP SECRET

CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS

EARLY PLANS TO HARASS CASTRO

March-July, 1960

Discussion of plans to sabotage Castro's speeches by contaminating air of radio studio with a substance resembling LSD and by impregnating Castro's cigars with a chemical to produce temporary disorientation. Plan to cause Castro's beard to fall out by placing thallium salts in his shoes progresses as far as testing the chemical on animals.

GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION INITIATED

August, 1960

In August, 1960, DDP BISSELL requested SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, Chief of the Office of Security, to establish contacts with gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba for the purpose of exploring capacity for assassinating Castro. EDWARDS told the case officer for the operation, JAMES O'CONNELL, to contact ROBERT A. MAHEU, a private investigator with syndicate connections. EDWARDS and BISSELL discussed various forms of poisoning with CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief of TSD.

POISON CIGARS

August 16, 1960

EDWARD GUNN, Office of Medical Services, receives cigars with orders to contaminate them with lethal material. The cigars are contaminated with Botulinum Toxin by RAY TREICHLER, TSD.

Comments

TOP SECRET

July 6, 1975

GORDON GRAY

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1942-1947 U.S. Army (Pvt. to Captain)

1949-50 Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army)

1950-51 Special Assistant to President TRUMAN

1951 Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy Board, which involved close contact with intelligence community

1951-55 President, University of North Carolina

1955 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA)

1958 Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

1958-61 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)

1961-75 Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK

Chronology of Events

1959

November 4 Special Group discusses Allen Dulles' "Cuba Propaganda Project" for use of radio transmitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project) would meet with high level approval" provided it was acceptable to the President of Mexico. (SG Minutes)

Gray represents President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings.

Issues and Questions

1960

February 17

Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes)

March 9

GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of "whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes)

April 7

"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic." Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military intervention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)

April 28

GRAY said "the opinion had been expressed to him" that DILLON should be "Chief of Staff" for all Cuba activities. (SG Minutes)

June 30

GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the Castro government." (SG Minutes)

July 1

Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The memo said: "approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBENFOM."

July 21

GRAY said "his associates" would favor the development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes)

August 12

BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before "higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes)

Did such consideration involve assassination plotting?

Did US support TRUJILLO's opponents out of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic?

General atmosphere of vehement opposition to CASTRO.

Was the Special Group aware of this action? Was the President aware of the plan? Purpose of weapons?

"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisenhower.
Does sabotage imply the further step of assassination?

1960

MEMORANDUM

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Issues and questions

August 16

Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p.21)

August 25

After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this ... It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)

August
(approx)

BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p.14)

September 8

During brief discussion of CONGO developments, "GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)

November 3

GRAY, DOUGLAS, and MERCHANT take the view that events in Cuba, "have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective." GRAY suggested "using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt intervention." "MERCHANT asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless ... /I/t would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously." General CABELL concluded this operation was highly dangerous" and "beyond capabilities." (SG Minutes)

Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES aware of this?

Is this a circumlocutions order for assassination from the President? An indication that at the least, assassination was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?

Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or ALLEN DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by anyone outside the DDP?

Against LUMUMBA personally?

Was a simultaneous assassination of the three Cuban leaders ever planned or initiated?

Note that prior to this CIA had already made the contract with the MAFIA to kill CASTRO. (1) Was Deputy DCI CABELL excluded from knowledge? (11) Or was he misleading the Special Group?

TOP SECRET

1960

UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

Issues and questions

November 30

GRAY'S "associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala" (training of Cubans). GRAY'S "friends" want to focus the organization of Cuban operations: Ambassador WILLAUER, on overt side and BARNES, on CIA covert side, were chosen. (SG Minutes)

December 28

GEAY tells Special Group that "his associates" want a special meeting on Cuba on January 2.

December 29

BISSELL outlines two-pronged covert activities plan "directed against the TRUJILLO regime ... He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) GRAY was present.

1961

January 12

Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHALIT "that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)

Late Jan.-
Early Feb.

DDP BISSELL asks WILLIAM HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability, including the capability to assassinate political leaders.

With the President?

Was CIA or the Special Group planning or supporting an assassination of TRUJILLO?

Were these assassination-type weapons? If not, was this Special Group action used as implicit authority for subsequent provision of weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO?

Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated or authorized during the EISENHOWER Administration?

TOP SECRET