Date : 09/14/98

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS

RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10126 RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS

FROM : A.P. GRAY, JR.

TO: SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TITLE: JCS 2304/171 - ACTION IN CUBA

DATE : 03/21/63

PAGES: 15

SUBJECTS: POLITICAL/MILITARY ACTION - CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: JCS Central Files, Box 4. Memo from LTC Gray to

Secretary, JCS re: Action in Cuba.


EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526 SEC 3.3(b) 54XS

DATE EXEMPTED MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 3 1 TOLE 2038

- A Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, executed, and supported overtly by US military forces could destroy the Cuban Government in being and establish in its stead a government friendly to the US. The requisite conditions of timing and execution suggest that they can be assured best by US initiation and control of the enterprise by covert means.
- Operations in accordance with the general concept presented herein are designed to create the conditions under which the US could participate in Free Cuban revolutionary activities and ultimately initiate overt large scale military operations in Cuba without subjecting the US to unacceptable censure. To achieve the desired result, however, activities of CIA, State, DOD and USIA must be coordinated in an over-all plan.
- General Concept. The calendar of events in enclosure (1) will bring these operations to fruition in about 18 months. The program could be compressed to about 15 months provided that initial decisions and initial actions required to coordinate the activities of all concerned agencies were expedited.
- a. CIA would begin as soon as practicable to introduce assets into Cuba to develop intelligence required for successful UW operations.
- b. Concurrently, State would initiate action to ensure the organization of Cuban factions into a single, cohesive political organization, and establish a Free Cuban Government in Exile, preferably in a Latin American country.
- DOD (The Military Services) in conjunction with CIA and CINCLANT would train Cuban nationals for operations with US UW forces.
- d. USIA would develop and execute a propaganda plan to support the US program.
- DOD (CINCLANT) would initiate CINCLANT 380-63 on/about 15 January 1964 by infiltrating UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military assets, establishing Z(1)(c) escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable to establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employing conventional forces.

Page 2 of 4 Pages



6(1)(e)

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(2) Cover: Adjust FY 1965 Exercise Schedule to provide for execution of QUICK KICK VI on 15 July. OPLAN for QUICK KICK VI will provide for a full scale exercise of all forces programmed for use in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63. Give wide publicity to lessons learned from earlier Command Post Exercises and announce need for full scale exercise

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Page 3 64 3 Pages

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JCS

- a. Provide over-all military guidance for the CINCs in execution of the plan.
- b. Allocate forces and funds to CINCLANT, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE, as required. Assign training responsibilities among the services for the Free Cuban armed forces.
- c. Provide intelligence information and coordination for covert aspects of the program including cover and deception.
- d. If necessary, and at the appropriate time, provide forces and authorize execution of contingency plans for overt US action in Cuba.
- e. Direct other unified and specified commanders to prepare supporting plans and provide assistance to CINCLANT as appropriate.

Military Departments

a. Army:

6(1)(c)

- (1) Train and provide UW forces for operations in Cuba.
- (2) Develop techniques and equipment for guerrilla warfare (UW)
- (3) Train army components of Free Cuban armed forces.
- (4) Maintain close liaison with the CIA and USIA.
- (5) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.
- (6) Provide as required for training Free Cuban Government military forces.
 - (7) Provide propaganda materials.

b. Navy:

(1) Train and provide SEAL, UDT, BJU and other special units as required.

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS


- (2) Maintain close liaison with CIA and USIA.
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- (5) Develop equipment and techniques for special operations and UW at sea.
 - (6) Defend GTMO Naval Base.
- (7) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.

c. Air Force:

- (1) (Train and provide Air Commando forces.
- (2) Provide airlift for army UW forces.
- (3) Maintain close liaison with CIA and USIA.
- (4) Train air force components of Free Cuban armed forces and provide aircraft.
 - (5) Develop equipment and techniques for UW.
- (6) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.

d. Marine Corps:

- (1) Train and provide forces for amphibious warfare in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.
 - (2) Develop equipment and techniques for UW.
 - (3) Maintain close liaison with CIA.
 - (4) Train marine units of Free Cuban armed forces.



DocId:32425004 Page 6

- 3. A Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, executed, and supported overtly by US military forces could destroy the Cuban Government in being and establish in its stead a government friendly to the US. The requisite conditions of timing and execution suggest that they can be assured best by US initiation and control of the enterprise by covert means.
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
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Page 2 of 4 Pages



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Page 3 of 3 Pages

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

JCS

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b. Navy:

Enclose Session Page 2 of 5 Pages

Session NATIONALS

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
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Hits 1-1 of 1

Hit 1 of 1

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Audit history for this Record Identification Form

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C. J-5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE

J-5 M 426-63 21 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: JCS 2304/171 - Action in Cuba (U)

- 1. The Note by the Secretaries, dated 15 March 1963, indicates that the subject report is desired by 26 March 1963. However, the comment and recommendation therein will be based mainly on the decision reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning JCS 2304/172 now on the agenda for Friday, 22 March 1963. Because of this, it is believed that more time will be required to process the paper through the Joint Staff and the Services than is now contemplated.
- 2. Therefore, it is requested that the desired date of submission of JCS 2304/171 be changed from 26 March 1963 to that of being completed as a matter of priority after a decision is reached on JCS 2304/172.

JA. P. GRAY, JR. Lt. Colonel, USA

Secretary, J-5

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JCS 2304/171

15 March 1963

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ACTION IN CUBA (U)

- 1. The attached letter from CINCLANT, Serial 00072/J581A, dated 7 March 1963, on the above subject, together with its enclosures, is referred to the J-5 for consideration in connection with the study directed by JCS 2304/176.
 - 2. A report is desired by 15 April 1953.

M. J. INGELIDO

R. C. FORBES

Joint Secretariat

EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION E.O 12958 3.4 (b) E.O 12958 3.4 (b)-MAR OF REVIEW DATE:

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JCS 2304/171

Adm. Riley (D/JS)

Gen. Reynolds (VD/JS) Gen. Collins (J-2)

Gen. Unger (J-3)

Gen. Emrick (J-5) Gen. Krulak (SACSA) Gen. Carroll (DIA)

Gen. Ingelido (S/JCS)

Col. Forbes (DS/JCS)

GROUP 3 DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

993

THE ATLANTIC COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

00072 /J581A

TOP SECRET LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 17 MAR 1963

Commander in Chief Atlantic

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj:

Concept for Political/Military Action in Cuba (TS)

Encl:

(1) Calendar of Events

(2) Concept for Cover Plan

(3) Proposed Preliminary Requirements and Task Assignments

- The purposeful application of US force last fall met with apparent success in frustrating Rússia's attempt to establish a military offensive system in Cuba. Our concern over the communist influence in Cuba, however, still remains. Continued domination of the Castro Government, primarily by the USSR, but potentially by Communist China, is increasingly unacceptable to United States interests in Free World leadership, Western Hemisphere orientation to democratic principles and military security. We are still faced with the problem of supplanting the present communist dominated Government of Cuba with a government friendly to the United States and compatible with the aims and principles of the Organization of American States.
- Resolution of the problem through an overt military invasion, while militarily feasible, would at this time jeopardize those US interests other than military security. Further, it appears unlikely that, without overt US military support, an internal revolt could achieve more than a fleeting success in light of the efficacy of communist control over the Cuban Government and military forces. It is also unlikely that any one, or group, of Latin American countries would provide the degree of support needed to assure success of a purely internal Cuban revolt.

GROUP-3 Desugraded at 12 year intervals; Most automatically declassified

AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION E.O 12958 3.4 (b)

REVIEW DATE

Page 1 of 4 Pages

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- 3. A Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, executed, and supported overtly by US military forces could destroy the Cuban Government in being and establish in its stead a government friendly to the US. The requisite conditions of timing and execution suggest that they can be assured best by US initiation and control of the enterprise by covert means.
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 escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion subversive operations
 UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations
 to create conditions favorable to establishing a Free Cuban Government on
 Cuban soil and for employing conventional forces.

Page 2 of 4 Pages

- f. DOD would provide necessary support to establish the Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil on about 15 July 1964. Once established, even tenuously, the Free Cuban Government would request US assistance.
- g. CINCLANT on about 15 July would begin mobilizing forces for US conventional operations in Cuba (see cover plan in enclosure (2)).
- h. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-63 would be executed on about 26 July 1964, followed by D-Day of OPLAN 316-63, or other approved military plan, on about 3 August 1964.
- i. JCS would prepare and execute a cover plan for the over-all operation. It is suggested that the items in enclosure (2) be included therein.
- 6. This conceptual plan would provide for:
- a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion, in that order, if necessary.
- b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.
- c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.
- d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in Exile and the final, decisive military action.
- Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.

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TO FOREIGH HEMIONALS

- f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.
- g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.
- h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964.
- 7. If this concept is approved, I intend to proceed with the preparation of detailed military operational plans. As a prerequisite to the planning, answers to the following questions are required:
- a. Can CIA provide timely intelligence on Cuba and develop the assets necessary for UW operations to be initiated on 15 January 1964?
- b. Can the State Department take the steps necessary to effect the organization of a Free Cuban Government in Exile and establish that government in Latin America in sufficient time to fulfill the requirements of the time scale illustrated in enclosure (1)?
- 8. In the event that 7.a. and 7.b. above are considered feasible and those agencies are authorized to proceed with the necessary actions, enclosure (3) is proposed as a preliminary planning basis for task assignments for those and other agencies' participation in the over-all plan.

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Enclosure (1) to CINCLANT Sector 0,0072 of 7 M/P 1963	Develop & Execute: Supporting Propaganda Plan for US Program (Radio Station in Caribbean) (V. O. A.)	1/1/bkgANize///TRAin/////th/Xorces/balamadon/Support FCG3	\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	V=1/OP/ASSETS/////XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 64 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov	Calendar of Events

Concept for Cover Plan

- 1. General: The concept for operations in Cuba is based on an assumption that overt military operations against Cuba at this time would be inimical to US international political interests. The US will resort to overt military operations only in a favorable political climate.
- 2. Objectives: The objectives in this plan are to:
- a. Create a political climate suited to initiating US overt military operations.
 - b. Provide a cover for unconventional warfare operations in Cuba.
- c. Provide a cover for the mobilization of forces for large scale conventional operations in Cuba.
- 3. Concept: It will be necessary, in order to safeguard US objectives and interests, that US covert military operations be conducted behind the facade of an apparently strong, independent Free Cuban Government in Exile.
 - a. Establish Free Cuban Government.
- (1) Action: Provide strong political support to organization of the Free Cuban Government.
- (2) Cover: Publicly disavow any association with the Free Cuban Government although expressing sympathy with its aims.
 - b. Develop Military Force.
- (1) Action: Provide facilities, equipment and training for a Free Cuban Government military force.
 - (2) Cover: Decry violations of US Neutrality Act.
- (3) Action: Provide funds necessary to support development of mailitary force.

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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(4) Cover: Approve a fund raising campaign by a Free Cuban Government organization to provide a credible explanation for wealth required for self-evident assets used in training and maintaining the force.

c. Establish Free Cuban Government in Latin America.

- (1) Action: Develop factual chronology of communist subversive activities in Latin America and solicit OAS support for military operations against Cuba.
 - (2) Cover: None.
- (3) Action: Select a Latin American country amenable to the suggestion and suited to US interests and encourage that country to spearhead anti-Castro movements and provide a base for operations of the Free Cuban Government and its military force.
- (4) Cover: Because of repeated violations of US Neutrality, encourage Free Cuban Government to leave the US.
- (5) Action: Continue active support of Free Cuban Government military training, operations and logistics.
- (6) Cover: Increase the Military Assistance Program for the Latin American country supporting the Free Cuban Government.
- (7) Action: Provide a trained US Army composed of Cuban nationals for UW operations with Free Cuban Government or US forces.
- (3) Cover: Discharge Cuban nationals from US military forces after having completed an honorable tour of military duty.
- d. Mobilization of US Military Force for Large Scale Conventional Operations.
- (1) Action: Mobilize forces needed for timely execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63 (or other selected operation).

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Page 2 of 3 Pages - SPECIAL HALL

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Page	3 of 3 Pag		TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Proposed Preliminary Requirements and Task Assignments

Implementation of the concept requires close cooperation and direct liaison between State, DOD, JCS, the Military Departments, CIA, USIA, CINCLANT, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE in developing plans, assets and for timely initiation of necessary actions. Some of these are listed below.

STATE

- a. Identify principal Cuban refugee factions and leaders. Coalesce these factions and effect formation of a Free Cuban Government in Exile either within the US or preferably in a Latin American country.
 - b. Urge OAS recognition of the Free Cuban Government thus formed.
- c. Encourage the early organization of Free Cuban armed forces drawn from refugee elements to be located in some sympathetic Latin American country for training.
- d. Provide a front organization of Cuban refugees ostensibly as a fund collecting agency to support the Free Cuban Government in Exile and to account for the armed forces assets.
- e. Arrange for the recognition of the Free Cuban Government and provide for timely and overt assistance for Free Cuban Government armed forces by the US.

DOD

- a. Provide budgetary assistance, planning direction and support of the military departments for their participation in this program.
 - b. Provide assistance to the CIA in its support role in the plan.
- c. Maintain liaison between military commands and other government agencies involved in supporting this plan.
- d. Supervise research, development and test of new equipment and techniques.

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Page 1 of 5 Pages

TO FOREIGN NAVIONALS

JCS

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a. Army:

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- (5) Train and provide forces as directed by JCS in support of CINCLANT Contingency OPLANs.
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 - (7) Provide propaganda materials.

b. Navy:

(1) Train and provide SEAL, UDT, BJU and other special units as required.

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DocId:32425004 Page 24

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- (2) Maintain close liaison with CIA and USIA.
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- (5) Develop equipment and techniques for special operations and UW at sea.
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 - (3) Maintain close liaison with CIA.
 - (4) Train marine units of Free Cuban armed forces.

SUM 100072

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TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CIA:

- a. Develop and provide assets in Cuba preparatory to introduction of UW forces.
- b. Provide intelligence to DOD and armed forces as appropriate for Cuban matters.
- c. Conduct subversion and sabotage in Cuba as directed and within capabilities of resources.
- d. Maintain close liaison with those elements of US armed forces as specified herein.
- e. Maintain close liaison with the State Department and assist in locating and identifying those elements among Cuban refugee groups who are reliable and those whose political motivations would be inimical to this plan.
- f. Provide assistance to the military departments training Cuban armed forces units.
- g. Develop CIA indigenous assets in Cuba as directed, to support a general uprising.
 - h. Develop equipment and techniques in support of these tasks.

USLA:

- a. Maintain close liaison with State, CIA, DOD, JCS, CINCLANT and CINCARIB.
- b. Develop and execute propaganda and information programs in consonance with and responsive to the general needs of the over-all plan and specific requirements of the other participating agencies.
 - c. Develop equipment and techniques in support of these tasks.

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Page 4 of 5 Pages

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CINCLANT:

- a. Plan and execute the military operational tasks of the plan as directed by the JCS (OPLANs 380, 312, 316).
- b. Maintain close liaison with CIA, USIA, CINCARIB and CINCSTRIKE.
- c. Exercise control of those forces assigned by the JCS in support of the resultant plan.
 - d. Coordinate the timing and efforts of CIA, USIA and CINCARIB.
- e. Advise the JCS on the status of military actions in Cuba as appropriate and recommend necessary changes in schedule and concept of employment of forces.

CINCARIB:

- a. Plan and coordinate training of Free Cuban armed forces in the selected Latin American country.
- b. Administer the military assistance program (MAP) in support of Free Cuban Armed Forces training.
- c. Maintain close liaison with CIA and CINCLANT in all matters related to this program. Support CIA establishments in Latin America as directed by JCS in support of this program.

CINCSTRIKE:

- a. Train and deploy forces as assigned by the JCS in support of the resultant plan.
- b. Maintain close liaison with State, CIA, USIA, CINCARIB and CINCLANT.

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TO FOREIGH NATIONALS

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