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TAB C

SOVIET VIEWS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC

The recent discussions with Premier Khrushchev and the Soviet response to Peiping charges following the test ban agreement provide insights into the balance that Soviet policy must strike between private views of Soviet national interests and public views which tend to emphasize Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement.

While there is a clear difference in emphasis, the public and private dialogue are not inconsistent. They are quite comparable to the position which the Administration has had to take in connection with the Soviet Union on the one hand and with the United States Senate on the other.

Private Views

In private, Premier Khrushchev has made Soviet views clear on the following issues:

(1) Khrushchev is not interested in destroying rockets or strategic aircraft.

"Harriman referred to further steps that could be taken. Said some people were thinking of what was called in technical terms separable first stage. Such stage could include cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons uses and perhaps dismantling certain percentage nuclear weapons on each side and making fissionable materials thus derived available for peaceful uses. Wondered whether Khrushchev had any interest in this and commented such steps might reduce Sov military expenditures. Khrushchev replied he had no interest whatsoever; moreover, he could say Sovs would never agree to this. U.S. position on this matter was well known and had been stated over many years. Sovs had also stated their position, and still held that position. No results could be derived from such an approach. After all, why should Sovs destroy their bombs in which they put so much money; why should Sovs destroy some bombs and build others. Bombs could be destroyed only under a disarmament arrangement. Sovs could not squander their money, particularly as their money was people's money. Sovs were no capitalists, and to capitalists such an arrangement would of course mean no loss. U.S. should not waste its time developing such proposals; they were totally unrealistic." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.)

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(2) Khrushchev is not interested in a separate agreement to stop production of fissionable material.

"Harriman noted Khrushchev had neglected his reference to cut-off. Khrushchev said such arrangement would be of no use. Other people would say cut-off could yield no result in a situation where U.S. and USSR had accumulated enough bombs to blow up whole world. Others would say they did not possess such material and therefore must produce it. Thus, this too was waste of time. As for USSR, it had stopped expanding its production fissionable materials and now producing such materials at same rate as before. Although he did not know when precisely this would happen, it very possible Sovs would stop production fissionable materials in near future; however, that would be without any agreement and Sovs would not tell anybody about it. Sovs had enough such materials and U.S. was probably in same position. What Sovs were now engaged in was refabrication all bombs on basis results latest tests." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.)

(3) Khrushchev is interested in stopping the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

"Harriman said we believed world would be safer if no more nuclear powers develop, and certainly if China did not develop nuclear capability. Hoped Sovs could get Chinese adhere to treaty before they became nuclear power. Also, hoped by time China acquired the ability develop nuclear powers, more comprehensive control of armaments could be had. Khrushchev agreed and said Sovs making effort prevent increase in number nuclear powers. However, these efforts would of necessity be weak until agreement on disarmament had been reached." (Reference - Harriman's July 27 cable from Moscow, No. 365.)

(4) Khrushchev is interested in saving money.

"Khrushchev wished to suggest that military budgets be frozen at levels of, say 1963. He believed this would be reasonable and would give to peoples hope that governments were at last showing common sense and doing something to arrest arms race and not add fuel to fire." (Reference - Harriman's July 16 cable from Moscow, No. 154.)

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Public Views

In contrast to the private discussions with Premier Khrushchev, Soviet response to Chinese charges distributed by TASS on August 20 indicate the position Soviet leadership is taking within the world Communist movement.

The Balance of Power

"Yes, the position of the Soviet Union on the question of ending nuclear weapons tests did not become fossilized; it adapted itself to the changes in the balance of power in the international arena, to the successes in the strengthening of the defense potential of the USSR and of all the countries of the socialist community, and took into account everything that is generally known as the realities of the nuclear age in their entirety.

"In the first years when nuclear weapons appeared in the arsenal of the United States, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly--and, in view of that, the security of the socialist countries was endangered--the Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that the main task was to deprive the United States of that advantage. This aim could be achieved either by completely banning nuclear weapons, which would have been tantamount to taking away these weapons from the only nuclear power of that time, the United States, or through developing our own nuclear weapons, which would help to insure the security of all the socialist countries.

"The Soviet Government demanded the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons; and, when this demand was rejected by the Western powers, it started to develop its own nuclear weapons, which were called upon to become a good additional guarantor of the independence and security of all the countries

of the socialist community, to make the imperialists lose the taste for aggression against the socialist states. Naturally, in those years, the banning of tests of nuclear weapons without simultaneous destruction of those weapons possessed by the United States would not have been in the interests of the socialist states. It would have brought to a halt the development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and perpetuated the American nuclear monopoly.

"But the situation did not remain unchanged. As a result of intense efforts of the Soviet people, of Soviet scientists, in developing their own nuclear weapons, the American nuclear monopoly was smashed, the world socialist system received its own nuclear shield, the imperialist powers lost the material basis for conducting a policy of nuclear blackmail, a policy "from a position of strength" vis-a-vis the socialist countries. This also put into new prospective the question of the nuclear weapons test ban. Now the continuation of nuclear testing could only lead higher and higher the spiral of the nuclear arms race in which the socialist countries, and all peace-loving states, to be sure, are not interested. At the same time, with the new balance of power the nuclear test ban would perpetuate not the American nuclear monopoly but the fact of its liquidation, not the unilateral advantage of the imperialist camp but the new balance of power in the area of nuclear weapons.

"The Soviet Government has already called attention of the CPR Government to the simple truth that life does not stand still, that science and technology are developing rapidly, and that something which was unacceptable yesterday may turn out to be useful and even very useful today. Underlying this are definite material factors of great

significance, connected with important and major steps of the Soviet Government to strengthen the defense capacity of the USSR, the security of all the socialist nations. These steps, which included also the tests of the latest types of nuclear arms, including the most powerful ones existing in the world, have reliably insured the security of the socialist commonwealth. We now possess all the necessary requisities for further maintaining our defense potential at the proper level which is or may be required by the situation. And when we speak about that, we do so knowing the facts of the matter.....

"Of course now we cannot divulge such things, for instance, as the concrete results of the tests of nuclear weapons we carried out in 1961-62, the data on the calibers of the nuclear warheads in our arsenal, the purpose of specific nuclear combat devices of which the Soviet Union has plenty, where these means are deployed, and so forth. That would be against the security interests of the Soviet Union and of all the socialist states, including the security interests of the CPR.

"And if the Chinese leaders, by saying that in recent years the situation did not change but that the USSR policy on a test ban allegedly did, and in a way are thus goading the Soviet Union to demonstrate objectively the recent changes in the balance of nuclear strength and for the sake of that divulge the defense secrets of the USSR.

"But if for some reason, the Chinese leaders really doubt that the Soviet Union does possess powerful nuclear weapons necessary for the defense of all socialist states and are not satisfied with our explanations, they could at least study the statements highly placed U.S. military leaders made only several days ago in the American congress, as well as the statement of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.".....

Diffusion and the Chinese Atomic Program

"It follows from the 15 August statement of the CPR Government that the Chinese leaders are greatly displeased with the Soviet Union for not giving China samples of atomic weapons. It looks as if annoyance with this policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states of not spreading nuclear weapons explains the attacks of the CPR leaders on the USSR's foreign policy measures aimed at lessening international tensions and consolidating peace, and especially their attacks on the nuclear test-ban treaty.

"More than once the Soviet Government took measures to convince the CPR Government that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons meets the interests of peace, the interests of all socialist countries, among them the interests of the CPR. As history would have it, the Soviet Union is the only socialist country that produces nuclear weapons.

"By its foreign policy the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its nuclear might reliably stands guard over the interests of the world socialist commonwealth, over the interests of the peoples fighting for social and national liberation. Whether one or more socialist countries would be added to the number of nuclear states, that would make no material change in the defense potential of the socialist camp--provided, of course, the socialist camp is regarded as a single whole. But with each new capitalist state getting hold of nuclear weapons, the danger of a nuclear war will increase. The possibility that the number of socialist owners would increase whereas the number of nuclear states in the imperialist camp would remain unchanged is precluded, and to build one's calculations on that means to build them on sand.

"It would be naive, to say the least, to assume that it is possible to conduct one policy in the West and another in the East, to fight with one hand against the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, against the spreading of nuclear weapons in the world, and to supply these weapons to China with the other hand.

"The position of the CPR Government, set forth in the statement of 15 August, can be understood only in the sense that the Chinese leaders do not care how the nuclear weapons spread among the capitalist countries as long as the CPR leaders get a chance to lay their hands on a nuclear bomb and see what it is like.

"And the CPR can now rely on the means of defense which have been developed through the efforts of the Soviet people and which reliably serve the purposes of defending the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

"This is why the most reasonable policy for the CPR in the present conditions--if, of course, its desires and potential are to be commensurate-- would be to devote its efforts to the development of the national economy, science, technology, and agriculture, devoting them to raising the welfare of the Chinese people, to meeting their vital needs. The Chinese people are experiencing many privations, and this is why such a course in the policy of the Chinese leaders would be more beneficial to the Chinese people, would be more appreciated by them and correctly understood throughout the world.

"It cannot be effaced from the memory of the peoples that at the critical moments, when the aggressive quarters put the world on the brink of war, the Soviet Union without hesitation threw in all its international weight, all its military might, to stay the hand of the aggressor raised over a small or big country geographically distant or close to us.

This was the case in the period of the Suez crisis. This was the case during the events around Syria and Iraq in 1958. This was the case in the period when tension flared up in Taiwan Strait--and the Chinese leaders, the Chinese people, certainly remember it. This was also the case during the crisis in the Caribbean area when the Soviet Union, by its rocket-nuclear might, shielded revolutionary Cuba. Perhaps the Chinese leaders consider that all these were moments of "tranquility." But we can say bluntly that nobody but they are in accord with this. These steps of the Soviet Government were also an expression of genuine proletarian internationalism, not the one on which Peking likes to expound and which is backed by nothing but noisy slogans and paper resolutions.

"It has everything to administer a devastating rebuff to anyone who would infringe on the security of the Soviet Union or its friends and allies. But no incantations from Peking will draw the Soviet Union to the road of madness to the road of irresponsible playing with the lives of hundreds of millions of people."....

Race

"The outcry against the nuclear test-ban treaty is widely used in Peking for the propaganda of a Peking-invented version about a "special" community of interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

"As if foreseeing the present attempts of the Chinese leaders to erect walls within the international communist and national liberation movement, separating it by the token of the color of skin as if foreseeing their striving to separate the liberation struggle of the

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people from the revolutionary movement of the international proletariat, V. I. Lenin wrote: "He who takes the standpoint of nationalism, naturally goes as far as to want to surround with a Chinese wall his nationality, his national working class movement, unabashed by the fact that it will be necessary to build separate walls in each city, place, and village, unabashed by the fact that by his tactics of division and fragmentation he reduces to naught the great call for cohesion and unity of proletarians of all nations, races, and languages.".....

Conclusion

"The Soviet Government does not abandon hope that the CPR leaders will weigh once more all the consequences of their present policy contradicting the interests of cohesion of the socialist countries and the interests of peace, and would bend efforts for the CPR again to take its place in the rank of states engaged in tireless struggle to prevent thermonuclear war, for peaceful coexistence and for the freedom and independence of the peoples.".....

The keystone of the Soviet position is the view that the Chinese should not develop nuclear weapons but rely upon the Soviet "shield" which defends the Socialist camp. While this theme has underlain Soviet statements for some time, this is probably the most unambiguous statement the Soviet's have issued. In defending their position, the Soviet Union not only takes the view that the Chinese are ideologically wrong but that they are ignorant of the facts, particularly the facts regarding nuclear weapons. The Soviet language describing the negotiation is not phrased in terms of Communist camp and the Capitalist camp or Eastern powers and Western powers for they state "for the first time an international agreement (has been) worked out by three nuclear powers.

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Although discussed in a low key, this statement is significant in the open Soviet rebuttal of Chinese racist claims "about a 'special' community of interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

Finally, probably most important are the Soviet statements implying that the present balance of strategic power is in the Soviet favor.

If the Soviet Union is to gain the freedom to seriously negotiate with the United States, she must, in public, maintain her position both as leader of the international Communist Party and as a nuclear power. Soviet statement of August 20, 1963, indicates that she is clearly trying to do so. Her acceptance of this proposal should make it possible for her to accelerate this trend.