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
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KAYSEN

SUBJECT: Ed Gullion's Memorandum to the President

There are three paragraphs in Gullion's memorandum which may differ somewhat from the Department's position. First, in paragraph 3, Gullion suggests the U.S. will probably have to finance the extra 2000 troops (making a total 8000-man force) which the JCS have suggested will be necessary to maintain security in the Congo. We, of course, have not had to face a decision on this issue yet. We are still trying to get others to share and we are not going to give up until we have to. Harlan Cleveland is strongly defending the 32.02% figure and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. As you probably know, the 8000 figure was arrived at by the Pentagon only when State insisted that they have a hard figure. The Military arrived at the figure on the assumption that the UN might end up with 8000 of the most ineffectual type of troops, e.g., Ethiopians and Liberians. The Pentagon readily agree, however, that 6000 Gurkha-type troops could do the same thing, especially if they were equipped with helicopters and other modern equipment. Kabede, as you probably know, is in New York now. He wants very badly to have a 10,000-man force and it may be that he can change the Secretary General's mind. We have no reports of these conversations as yet. What all of this boils down to is that we may have to have a Presidential decision on this problem but, if so, it will be some weeks from now when we can see more clearly what the situation is.

In paragraph 5 of Gullion's memorandum on economic aid, you will recall that Gullion always has been more pessimistic on this issue than almost anyone else. Our indications are that the EEC, Belgium, Germany, and the UK will be more forthcoming than Gullion thinks they will be. We still do not know what the UK, Italy, and Holland are going to do. Here again there are too many pieces of the mosaic which have not yet fallen into place to tell us exactly how we stand but, on balance, it would seem that Ed is far more pessimistic than warranted on the basis of the information we now have.

I think that paragraph 8 of the memorandum represents the true situation. However, I can assure you that EUR would never have let this statement through if they had been asked to clear the memorandum. Certainly, at the moment, the threat of Katangan secession is not serious. However, with the ever present threat of turmoil in the Congo, there could be under the right circumstances a renewed attempt by Tshombe & Co. to make another try at secession.


Samuel E. Belk

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