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**REMARKS**

All information contained herein is unclassified.

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Thursday, December 11, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock a.m., in Room 318 Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mathias, Morgan, Mondale, Baker, Hart of Michigan, Hart of Colorado and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis Smothers, Minority Counsel.
The Chairman. Our witness this morning is the Honorable Edward H. Levi, Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Levi has appeared before this Committee on previous occasions and this Committee was most happy to welcome him back again this morning.

He has been asked to testify today about the future of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and especially its domestic intelligence operations.

This morning's hearing marks both an end and a beginning for the Select Committee. It is the end of a series of hearings on domestic intelligence which began in September with an examination of the so-called "Huston Plan." Those original hearings explored the relationship of the White House to the FBI and other intelligence agencies in the development of a specific plan for using illegal techniques against domestic groups.

At that time the Committee learned the details of FBI black bag jobs against domestic targets which continued at least until 1963. We learned of a "do not file" procedure in the FBI for destroying the records of these operations and the Committee was told that the FBI expanded its intelligence investigations along the lines of the Huston Plan, even after the President withdrew his approval.

Our next hearings in this area dealt with improper
activities that overlapped foreign and domestic intelligence
operations. The Director of the National Security Agency,
testified that the sophisticated surveillance operations of
that agency had been targeted against the international
communications of American citizens for domestic intelligence
purposes. This was done in direct cooperation with the FBI,
which supplied names of citizens for the NSA watchlist.

Present and former FBI officials also testified that until
1966 the Bureau undertook programs for illegally opening the
mail of innocent citizens in the search for espionage agents
and foreign intelligence. The FBI used the CIA's mail
opening program after 1966 for domestic intelligence purposes,
again sending over lists of names of American citizens who
were to be watched.

The Committee's recent hearings on the FBI itself have
raised some of the most fundamental questions that any democracy
must face. We have placed on the record deeply disturbing
information about the FBI's COINTELPRO activities over a period
of fifteen years, the attempts to discredit Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., the broad surveillance of law-abiding citizens
and lawful activities, the practices of infiltration and dis-
ruption by informants, and the political use of FBI resources
by Presidents of both parties.

The Committee's work in this area has been aided sub-
stantially by the cooperation of the Justice Department. I
would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Attorney General, to express the appreciation of the entire Committee and the staff for your assistance in making available the materials needed for this investigation. Our experience has demonstrated that the Constitutional principle of Separation of Powers has enough flexibility to allow close cooperation between the Congress and the Executive in a matter of the greatest public concern.

While our investigation is coming to an end, the task of making constructive recommendations is beginning. We have heard this week from former officials and from Director Kelley. We are exploring a wide range of proposals, including those being developed by the Justice Department. And we look forward to working closely with you on these issues.

One of the best statements of the problems we confront was made last summer by Philip Kurland, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Chicago. Professor Kurland spoke of the threats to an open, democratic society from what he called the perversion of our intelligence agencies into political police forces. He rejected the proposition that we should be satisfied that these agencies will exercise self-restraint. Professor Kurland did not deny the importance of the individual qualities of the officeholder. But he stressed the greater importance of confining our intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies to the limited functions they
were created to deal with.

The crucial responsibility lies with the Congress. "If oversight by Congress is not to be the answer," Professor Kurland declared, "it is hard to conceive of an answer." The essential requirement for Congressional oversight is information about intelligence operations, and the greatest barrier is Executive secrecy. Consequently, Professor Kurland and others have urged that we establish procedures which require the Executive to provide this information to the Congress. This may be the only way to insure the responsibility of the Executive Branch to the people through the Congress.

Therefore, we especially hope that you, Mr. Attorney General, can help this Committee and the Congress develop not only standards for the FBI, but also procedures for effective Congressional oversight to assure regular accountability.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES.

Attorney General Levi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin, let me say that I don't suppose that your statement is meant to indicate that I am committed to agree with my friend, Professor Kurland, who may not be wrong as often as many people are but occasionally is not correct.

The Chairman. No, it was only meant that I agree with him.

Attorney General Levi. Then I hope the matter can be explored more in depth.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I think that's one of the most graceful declarations of independence I have ever heard.

Attorney General Levi. Mr. Chairman, the Committee has asked me to talk with you today about the future of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I thought it might be helpful if I outline quite briefly some of the points I would like to make, some of the problems I think ought to be considered, and some of the steps we have taken.

The first point is that the statutory base for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory. The basic statutory provision is 28 USC 533 which provides that the Attorney General may appoint officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the President; and (3) to conduct such
investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General." There are other statutes, such as the Congressional Assassination, Kidnapping and Assault Act, which vest in the Bureau special responsibilities to investigate criminal violations. In addition, there are Executive orders and Presidential statements or directives which place investigatory responsibilities upon the Bureau.

A number of questions are often asked about this statutory base. It has the virtue of simplicity, but the Executive orders which deal with government employee investigations are complicated and confusing, and Presidential memoranda, or, perhaps, oral instructions from a President may be difficult to collate. I think it is important, in any case, to separate out the kinds of questions which are asked about the Bureau's authority base. Some questions are constitutional in nature, relating to the inherent power of the President; others go to the interpretation of the statutes and the relationship between the statutes and Presidential directives; others go to the failure of the statutes to define sufficiently the areas of the Bureau's jurisdiction or to spell out sufficiently -- and this is partly constitutional -- the means and methods which the Bureau is permitted to use in carrying out its assigned tasks.

The second point, related to the first, is a continuing discussion of the role of the Bureau in intelligence investigation.
or domestic security investigations. The argument is sometimes
made that the Bureau's proper role, at least in purely
domestic matters, should be limited to investigations of
committed crimes. The basic statute for the Bureau is broader
than this, as have been Executive orders and Presidential
mandates to the Bureau. The basic statute is broader since it
refers to investigations regarding official matters under the
control of the Department of Justice and the Department of
State as may be directed by the Attorney General. A disparity
is sometimes seen among the different roles of the Bureau
in crime detection, in on-going domestic security matters,
and in foreign intelligence or foreign counter-intelligence
matters. In recent days a statement by then Attorney General
Harlan Fiske Stone, who reorganized the Bureau and chose J.
Edgar Hoover as its director, has been quoted as a relevant
warning.

Stone warned, "there is always the possibility that a
secret police may become a menace to free government and free
institutions, because it carries with it the possibility
of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended
or understood. It is important that its activities be
strictly limited to the performance of those functions for
which it was created and that its agents themselves be not
above the law or beyond its reach. The Bureau of Investigation
is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals.
It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such
cconduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States.

When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous
to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty,
which it should be our first concern to cherish."

I should like to suggest that Stone's warning always
must be considered relevant to the proper conduct of the
Bureau's duties, but it does not necessarily follow that
domestic security investigations are, therefore, outside the
Bureau's proper functions. The detection of crime in some
areas requires preparation and at least some knowledge of what
is likely to be going on. What is at issue, I think, is the
proper scope, the means and methods used, the attention paid
to conduct and not views, and the closeness of the relationship
of the conduct and that which is forbidden by the laws of
the United States.

Third, I realize that some proposals, since I was
asked about this when I last appeared before this Committee,
might separate out in some fashion domestic and foreign
intelligence functions from the FBI or from one another within
the FBI. This is, of course, an issue to be looked at. I
assume it is recognized that there may be some relationship
between that intelligence which is involved in foreign counter-
intelligence work. One may lead to the other. And there may
be a relationship between foreign counter-intelligence and
foreign intelligence. If the work were separated out into
different agencies, I do not know if the decision about when an
investigation should pass from one agency to another always
could be made easily. Moreover, even so, information presumably
would pass from one agency to the other. I know that one
consideration has been that it might be decided that information
collected by some permitted means in intelligence investigations
under some circumstances should not be used in criminal
prosecutions. But if there is an exchange of information,
this must always be a consideration, whether there are separate
agencies or not, and the basic question then is one of use
and not organization. The more active concern, I believe, is
that there is a risk that conduct proper for one area may be
improper for another, and that the combination can work a
contamination. My view on this is that in any case we must
decide what conduct is appropriate and is inappropriate for each
of the areas, and we must take steps to make sure that proper
conduct is lived up to. My hope is that the fact that the FBI
has criminal investigative responsibilities, which must be
conducted within the confines of constitutional protections
strictly enforced by the courts, gives the organization an
awareness of the interests of individual liberties that might
be missing in an agency devoted solely to intelligence work.
I know the argument can be run the other way. I believe the
dangers are greater is there is separation.
Fourth, there is a question as to the proper role of the FBI in crime prevention and whether or not it should be considered authorized to take steps under some circumstances to reduce the likelihood that crimes will be committed or that serious injury to persons or property will occur.

Preventive action has raised serious questions and these must be dealt with. I suppose an initial question is whether it should be allowed at all. Yet I believe under special circumstances and with proper controls most would believe this to be a proper function.

Fifth, the problem of proper controls, supervision and accountability is all-embracing. By statute the Federal Bureau of Investigation is in the Department of Justice, and also by statute the Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice. The history is mixed, of course, and we all have a tendency to over-simplify, but it is a fair statement that there have been times in the past when the supervision by Attorneys General, granted that the Bureau must have considerable autonomy, has been sporadic, practically nonexistent, or ineffective.

I hope that is not the case now. The responsibility is a heavy one. But in any event the problem of proper controls, supervision and accountability goes beyond the Director of the Bureau and the Attorney General. I have already mentioned that in my view the statutory base for the operations of the
Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory. I think that better controls and performance can be achieved through statutory means, executive orders, guidelines, and reporting to appropriate congressional committees.

Sixth, before I come to a resume of some of the steps which have been taken, let me say I know we all realize that in the past there have been grave abuses. I am uncomfortable with a kind of writing of history, however, which sees it only in terms of the abuses and not in terms of past and present strength. It is very difficult to be fair to the past in which many institutions of government carried a share of responsibility. But more than unfairness is involved, if we are not careful, we will turn to solutions of the moment which a better reading of history might indicate are not the best solutions.

I know we must seize the moment, if I may use such a phrase in this setting. I know also that this committee realizes that a very important agency with dedicated, highly professional, greatly disciplined government servants is involved. The importance is to the security and domestic tranquility of the United States. Stone's warning was given in an act of creation. He was proud of his creation. In spite of the abuses, there is a proper place for pride. I take it our mutual work should be to nurture that pride and the conditions which justify it.
I turn now to a review of some of the steps which have been taken or are in progress. We have tried most diligently, under safeguards to protect the privacy of individuals and with an awareness of the unfairness of instant history to give a great deal of information to congressional committees.

Attorney General Saxbe made public and Deputy Attorney General Silberman and Director Kelley testified about the so-called COINTELPRO. When the FBI discovered evidence of several more COINTELPRO projects after I became Attorney General, these were revealed. One of my first acts as Attorney General, my third week in office, was to testify before a congressional committee about possible incidents of political misuse of the FBI by the White House in the past and about the nature of FBI file-keeping systems, particularly the files kept by Director Hoover in his office suite.

Director Kelley has spoken publicly and before congressional committees about incidents in the past in which FBI agents engaged in break-ins to gather or photograph physical evidence in intelligence investigations. On a number of occasions, most recently in testimony before this committee, I have described the history of the use of electronic surveillance by the FBI. We have welcomed such opportunities.

On February 26, 1975, I instructed Director Kelley to report to me any requests made of the Bureau or practices within the Bureau which he deems improper or which present the
appearance of impropriety. On February 28, 1975, Director
Kelley ordered FBI personnel to report such requests or
practices to him. In July 1975, I reaffirmed my February
directive and also asked for a report of all sensitive investi-
gative practices.

The Director promptly complied. Director Kelley has
regularly provided information on conduct by Bureau agents and
programs underway within the Bureau that could raise questions.
These matters have been reviewed and discussed with the
Department so that a consistent and appropriate policy can be
achieved.

This is a continuing process. I do not assert that we are
aware of everything about the Bureau. Nor do I suggest that
we ought to know everything. Appropriate communication,
consultation and supervision at this level have to be selective.
I make this point, which I think may sound disconcerting, not
in any way to minimize the responsibility of the Bureau to keep
the Department informed nor to minimize the Department's duty
to find out. Rather I want to be realistic about a learning
and organization problem which requires realism if it is to be
understood and perfected.

With respect to possible legislation, the Department has
in preparation various drafts of possible bills which may be
of assistance in the area of what is now warrantless electronic
surveillance. Although obtaining a judicial warrant does not
automatically eradicate the possibility of abuse, it is perceived to be an important safeguard of individual privacy interests, and we are exploring, as we said we would do, various possibilities and alternatives.
Finally, a committee within the Department of Justice, chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, and composed of representatives of my office, the Criminal and Civil Rights Divisions, the Office of Policy and Planning, and the FBI, has been working for eight months reviewing FBI procedures in many areas and drafting guidelines to govern those procedures in the future. The Committee has produced draft guidelines covering White House inquiries, congressional and judicial staff appointment investigations, unsolicited mail, and domestic security investigations. It is currently at work on guidelines covering counterespionage investigations and will later consider the use of informants, the employee loyalty program, organized crime intelligence investigations, criminal investigations, and other aspects of FBI practice. The Committee's work has been extensive and time-consuming. It has involved not only questions of proper safeguard but also of efficiency in the proper functioning of the Bureau. It has been an effort to translate into words the complicated and important mechanisms for controlling the FBI. I hope the Committee's efforts at articulation will be of use to this Committee and others as it considers drafting legislation.

You have received copies of the latest drafts of the guidelines that have been substantially completed by the Committee. These guidelines do not yet represent Department policy. There is disagreement within the Department on some
aspects of these guidelines. I have disagreed with the Committee
recommendations from time to time, and the FBI has raised
substantial questions about other recommendations, particularly
with respect to the treatment of unsolicited mail. Some of the
proposals in the guidelines could be promulgated as departmental
regulations. Congress may feel some ought to be enacted into
statutory law. Other provisions would require implementation by
executive order.

I would be glad to discuss these draft guidelines with you
in detail in response to your questions, but a brief discussion
of the guidelines on domestic security may be useful at the
outset.

The guidelines begin by attempting to impose some order
and definiteness to the domestic security field. To begin with,
these guidelines do not deal with FBI efforts to counteract
the work of foreign intelligence services operating within the
United States. Standards for determining when there is foreign
involvement sufficient to place a subject in the category of
foreign counterintelligence investigation are now being
deleted within the guidelines committee. The domestic security
guidelines also are not meant to cover security or background
investigations of federal appointees or investigations of
ordinary crimes. Under the draft guidelines, domestic
security investigations are only to be authorized when there
is a likelihood that the activities of individuals or groups
involve or will involve the use of force or violence in violation of Federal law. Domestic security investigations are to be limited to activities of individuals or groups intended to accomplish one of five purposes: overthrowing the government of the United States or of a State; interfering with the activities within the United States of foreign governments or their representatives; influencing government policies by interfering by force or violence with government functions or interstate commerce; depriving individuals of their civil rights; and creating domestic violence or rioting when such violence or rioting would necessitate as a countermeasure the use of Federal armed forces. There is also a provision for limited investigation when there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic violence which is likely to result in a request by a state for Federal armed assistance.

Currently there is no procedure requiring the review outside the FBI of all domestic intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI, though the FBI has a long-standing policy of reporting its investigative findings to the Criminal Division. Under the draft guidelines there would be a comprehensive program of reporting to the Attorney General or his designee of all preliminary and full domestic intelligence investigations. The Attorney General would be required under the draft guidelines to put a stop to any full investiga-


The standard would be that there must be specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual or group under investigation is engaged in the activities I have just listed.

Another feature of the draft guidelines is to place strict controls upon the use of any technique by the FBI which goes beyond the gathering of information. COINTELPRO was the name given the use of some such techniques. As I have said before, some of the activities in COINTELPRO were outrageous and the others were foolish. Nonetheless, there may be circumstances involving an immediate risk to human life or to extraordinarily important government functions that could only be countered by some sort of preventive action. The guidelines require that any such preventive action proposal be submitted to the Attorney General. He could authorize the preventive action only when there is probable cause to believe that the violence is imminent and when such measures are necessary to minimize the danger to life or property. The preventive action would in all cases have to be nonviolent. The Attorney General would be required to report to Congress periodically and no less often than once a year on the use of preventive action by the FBI.

I make no claim that during this rather difficult but interesting and, I must trust, promising period, we have achieved all that might have been possible. In many ways the
work has been disappointingly slow. But I do think we have
made advances in nurturing and helping to improve a structure
which will be supportive of the best efforts of the men and women
in the Department of Justice and in the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation. No procedures are fail-safe against abuse. The best
protection remains the quality and professionalism of the
members of the Bureau and of the Department.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General.
It's a very helpful statement, and does summarize the efforts
that you are making to give greater, put greater order into
the work of the FBI.

One thing that leaves me somewhat baffled is the
difference between domestic security action, for which you have
set forth the proposed guidelines, which seem to me to be
good ones, and what you call preventive action. You state
in your statement at page 12 and the top of page 13, after you
criticize the COINTELPRO program, which this Committee has
explored in some detail, you say "Nonetheless, there may be
circumstances involving an immediate risk to human life or
to extraordinarily important government functions that could
only be countered by some sort of preventive action."

In that case, why can't the preventive action take the
form of an arrest if there are circumstances involving immediate
risk to human life or to extraordinarily important government
functions?
Attorney General Levi. If it can, then that would have to be done because the guidelines specifically require that the preventive action is necessary and it can't otherwise be handled.

Now, one can think of incidents --

The Chairman. Can you give us some incidents?

Attorney General Levi. If there is the likelihood of a violent confrontation between two marching groups on a state capitol, it is conceivable that blocking off some streets, or directing signs to some other direction in an emergency situation of that kind might be useful, and I take it that is a preventive action, and I would not think unusual, by the way, for people who are properly trained in work of that kind.

The Chairman. That is a good kind of preventive action.

Suppose that there were two caravans instead of two marching groups, and that you had reason to believe that they were headed toward one another and there would be a violent confrontation once they met. Would permissible preventive action in those circumstances permit putting sand in the gas tanks of the automobiles so that neither caravan could move?

I have to ask that kind of a question after what we found out that the FBI was up to in the COINTELPRO program.

Attorney General Levi. The answer is no. Certainly there's no intention, the guidelines do not spell out, and we
have had discussions about that, what kind of precise
preventive action might be possible or might not be possible
under special circumstances.

The Chairman. This is all very vague, and suppose you
had reason to believe that a prominent figure of some kind in
a movement was about to or of a mind to incite his followers
to violence. Then in that case could you undertake to give
him a drug that would prevent him from speaking for three
weeks?

Attorney General Levi. No, of course not, but I have to
add that what the guidelines do say is that the Attorney
General has to give permission, not only does he have to give
permission, but he will have to report to the Congress, and
since quite naturally this Committee believes that reports
to the Congress are the most important thing that any agency
can do, then it seems to me you must also agree that that is
some safeguard.

The Chairman. Well, that depends upon your view as to the
kind of Committee that can do the job of surveillance.

Attorney General Levi. Well, I don't think -- this really
was my suggestion before. It takes a combination of control,
and what we have attempted to do here is to have a guideline
which strictly limits -- maybe it should limit more, preventive
action, but admits that there is an area for it. Now, maybe
we should not admit.
The Chairman. Why couldn't you do it this way, Mr. Secretary? Why couldn't you say that when preventive action is necessary, it must be open and public kind of action.

Attorney General Levi. I don't think that telling people --

The Chairman. Now, understand what I mean. You gave an open, public way of preventing two groups from meeting and clashing. Well, when that is the case, the means used are likely to be reasonable ones. But when there are secret methods of preventive action undertaken, that's when you get into potential problems, real troubles that we have seen.

Attorney General Levi. Well, we have to take that through. It may very well be that no secret ones at least beyond the immediate moment of doing would be required. It may be that one can put it that way, but I think one of the virtues of guidelines should be that they are sufficiently realistic so that they don't have to be violated under emergency circumstances.

There is a question, then, of how detailed one can make them, but it may be that the line about secrecy beyond a certain point would be good.

I should also say that the Privacy Act would itself prohibit dissemination of lies and deception, I think, to a considerable extent, if one goes back to the old COINTELPRO. So I think we are in somewhat of a different statutory situation for the moment anyway. But we have tried, in the guidelines,
in any event, to very much limit the field.

Now, whether we have limited it enough, I'm not sure.

The Chairman. Did you say that with respect to the domestic security activities of the FBI, that before such a project is undertaken, the Attorney General must give his consent or that he might be informed of prospective ongoing projects in order that he can call a given project that he doesn't find fully justified to a halt?

I didn't quite understand your question.

Attorney General Levi. Well, he has to give, he has to be informed of, I think, all of the investigations. He can terminate them all. The problem is whether he -- he doesn't have to authorize the full investigation, but he has to be informed about it and he can terminate it.

The Chairman. Now, well, you have to authorize wiretaps and electronic devices in such cases. Why shouldn't -- why wouldn't it be well for the Attorney General to authorize the initiation of programs in this particular field, new investigatory programs?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I'm trying to protect, if not myself, at least my successors. I'm not sure that it makes much difference. It makes some difference. If the Attorney General has to authorize all full investigations, he will have quite a lot of work to do. If he has to authorize all of the preliminary investigations, his desk is going to be covered
with a great many things which he doesn't know a great deal about.

The Chairman. Don't you think there should be some outside check in this area, particularly where we are not dealing with criminal law enforcement as such, but we are dealing with potential violence and you referred to as surveillance of citizens and groups of citizens for purposes of domestic security. That's a pretty fuzzy field, and we have seen how great the abuses were for a long period of time, and don't you think there should be some outside check, perhaps not with every case, the Attorney General himself, but some outside check on the agency in this general field to be sure that they are following these guidelines?

Attorney General Levi. But I've already said that I think that there ought to be reports to Congress. I don't want to word the scope of the domestic security investigations, however, quite the way you have worded them, because these guidelines which could be in part put into statute, strictly limit them. They limit them to where there is a likelihood for preliminary investigations that the activities of individuals and groups involved would use force and violence in violation of laws in particular areas.

And that is for 90 days, and then perhaps another 90 days, and the kind of investigation which can be done in a preliminary investigation is also restricted. When you go
beyond that to the full investigation, then we really have the stop and frisk standard, so that we really have come, I think, as close as is feasible. And maybe it is too restrictive; in any event, as close as is feasible to the violation of law kind of penumbra, so that it would seem to me that that was some safeguard.

Now, whether that is sufficient, I don't suppose anything is fully sufficient, but I would assume that in addition, there can be reports to Congress, and there will have to be reports to the Attorney General, and I would think that that and the lessons of history would provide quite a lot of safeguards. If the suggestion is that one should go to a Commission or to a court, I must say that I have grave doubts as to whether that is the proper solution, but if that were the case, it would be a statutory matter, and I would hope that my participation in making that decision would not be viewed as having as heavy responsibilities as those who would have to vote for it.

The Chairman. Don't you think, given the past history you have referred to, that it might be a very good idea to take these guidelines which represent to me a good faith effort on your part to bring order into this general chaos, take these guidelines and write them into the law?
Attorney General Levi. I think that undoubtedly parts of the guidelines should be made statutory. I think that the problem is, and I am sorry for this, is that it has taken so long to draft these guidelines, although I think it has been an extraordinary effort. And the way the guidelines are written one has to -- at least it is better to see them all at once because they do relate to each other. But there may not be time for that.

As I said, I know we have to seize the moment, but I do not know how long the moment is. In any event, I agree that part of the guidelines, at least, ought to be in statutory form.

The Chairman. Well, at the moment, this committee is until February 29th, 1976. And we would solicit from you as much cooperation as I know you will give, based upon your willingness in the past, to see what kind of recommendations the committee can make, because clearly the FBI does need a generic statute which it has lacked through the years and that would be the appropriate place for guidelines at this time.

Senator Hart, do you have questions?

Senator Hart (Michigan). Mr. Attorney General, good morning.

First, for a number of years in the Judiciary Committee, we have been huffing and puffing with a whole line of Attorneys General in an effort to catch them, and it is against that long
period of effort that I want this morning to first of all thank you for developing to the degree that you now have, exactly the kind of thing we have been talking about. And even as we on the committee in those days were urging guidelines and while we might not have sounded we understood how incredibly difficult it is to put down in black and white, chapter and verse, how you respond in a whole variety of problems.

And for the first time, the Attorney General has come in with a very solid piece of work that all of us appreciate.

Now in your statement, you indicate that you are working on guidelines as they relate specifically to informants and you relate that to the Department's general guidelines on intelligence that permit the use of this. Now yesterday, as you know, we discussed with the FBI Director, the possibility of getting judicial approval for informants by you.

I think all of us understand the importance in an investigation of informants. But we have heard some stories, some hair raising stories about the way that can be abused, that technique can be abused. And I, and I am sure others, suggested that informants are an extremely intrusive form of eavesdropping in terms of what can be reported.

I know that the Supreme Court has not said that informants are unconstitutional per se under the fourth and first amendments, unless you get a court warrant, but that does not prevent Congress from requiring that kind of procedure, in order
to fully safeguard the rights of privacy and expression. Now what are your thoughts on such a requirement, the requirement of a neutral, detached third party, rather than the investigating branch of the government deciding when to use targeted informants?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I am sorry to say, Senator Hart, that I do not think that the suggestion on balance is a good one. And that does not mean that I have a better suggestion. There is no doubt that informants or paid informants can be misused, because there is an area where, if that is done, the courts can step in; and one can have guidelines or statutory restrictions on that if you think of, again, reporting.

But the notion that a court would have to authorize the use of each informant and how the informant was to be used, to continue to pass on that, I think would make for mal-administration. It would impose an enormous burden on the court, and while I think we always keep looking these days for a third impartial objective person, I do not really believe that it can be the court.

Now one could think of a board or a committee. After all, the Congress set up, I think, a subversive activities board, did you not? So I suppose you might set up an informers permission board. But my impression is that you would not get very good people to be on that board and that it would not
really provide the kind of knowledgable review that you would want.

So I recognize the problem and I recognize why one might turn to that suggested solution. I do not want to take away from your time, but it is sort of interesting that special devices and protections were developed for electronic surveillance because they were said to be different from the use of informants. And now we are running the argument in the other direction and saying well, they are even more dangerous than electronic surveillance because you have the human ear right there.

So it is just an interesting point.

Senator Hart (Michigan). Well, maybe in defense of our earlier attitude, we did not know about the abuse with respect to the human technique, the number of occasions on which it has been used.

Attorney General Levi. I rather think that the fourth amendment knew more about that than it did about electronic surveillance.

Senator Hart (Michigan). The fourth amendment drafters did. But people around now --

Attorney General Levi. I feel for the objective, but I do not think -- I just think it would not work.

Senator Hart (Michigan). We are agreed that it is a difficult balance. The national security concern here and the
individual's civil liberties here -- and to balance these
claims is tough. You say you think the court is inappropriate.

Attorney General Levi. I think that would be a mistake.
I think it would also be a mistake to have the court pass on
the activities of the agents, of the Bureau's own agents who
have ears and listen and so on. I think we have to trust
someone.

Senator Hart (Michigan). But is the Director of the FBI
the fellow to trust?

Attorney General Levi. He is certainly one of the persons
that has to be trusted very much, and he has to be put in a
position where it is known that he is being trusted and what
his obligations are.

And I think if the congressional mandate and the guide-
lines and whatever else are clear enough, I have enough faith
in human nature to think that that would be abided by. I do
not think the history of the abuses shows that that kind of a
thing really was abused. There was not that kind of spelling
out. There was not that kind of direction. There were
directions in the other way really; so that I do not think the
problem -- while I do not mean to minimize the prior abuses
which were terrible -- but I do not think the problem requires
the solution of the interposition at every stage.

Senator Hart (Michigan). If we leave the discretion with
the Director of the Bureau, you would agree that there should
be a -- we always use the word effective even though we cannot define how you make it effective -- an effective system under which somebody other than the Bureau's Director would be reviewing the decisions he is making, as he affects this balance.

Attorney General Levi. I think there have to be frequent reviews and I think one has to have a situation in the Department of Justice where the Attorney General or his designee can be in a position to make that review and I think one also would hope and require that there be adequate presentation to congressional committees. You do not want to impose so many duties on the Attorney General so that he is -- so that he loses some sense of distance and objectivity on the Bureau.

That is one reason I said one has to realize that there is not full knowledge and they are different offices. But I do think the Attorney General, I hope, is some protection and the Department is and congressional committees would be too.

Senator Hart (Michigan). The earlier hearings, which reviewed some of the excesses, found some citing in the FBI handbook regulations which directs field offices and their informants to find out and report all contacts and cooperation between a group under investigation and other groups, even if the other groups are not suspected of being either extremists or subversives.
I would think that part of the investigation would be to put that down. And that is really what you are talking about. And I do not know that one should want to limit that.

Senator Hart (Michigan). Well, maybe there is not any happy solution to this, but we would be doing would be reporting on first amendment activities of the other groups that would not be eligible to be targeted.

Attorney General Levi. I think the report should not be on that. It should be rather on the effort of the group properly being investigated to gain control. And we do have a problem as to what one does with the dissemination or keeping of information, and the guidelines attempt to address that question, whether they have done so sufficiently or not.

One reason the guidelines are not all finished, when one gets to the counter or foreign intelligence guidelines and has to deal with organizations which are under active collaboration with foreign governments, and the question is whether they have extended their influence in such a way as to impose a real threat of force and violence, I do not know how effectively one can impose restrictions.

We try to do it. The proposed guidelines have not been worked out. One has to remember that if one goes back to the period when I was first in the Department of Justice, there was considerable concern as to the ability of the Japanese and the Nazis to gain control beyond those agencies which were clearly
collaborating with them into other agencies. And I just do not know that I want to say to the United States government that that is the kind of information that you may not get.

The Chairman. Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. If Senator Hart has any question which follows right along at this point, I would be glad to yield.

Senator Hart (Michigan). No.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join with Senator Hart in thanking the Attorney General for all the help he gives to this committee. Whether we call on him for philosophical treatises or for practical advice, he is always available. I think that is a very real contribution. And the way in which he helps us leads me almost to regret that I did not go to the University of Chicago law school.

Attorney General Levi. Senator, you are going to go far.

Senator Mathias. You have talked a little about the Smith Act, and about the seditious conspiracy clause in connection with the responsibilities of the FBI. And I wonder if you think there is sort of a dated aspect to these.

Attorney General Levi. Oh, of course there is and I want to say that when one talks about the looseness of the guidelines, one ought to read the statutes which came out of Congress. That is why I say that it is sort of amusing as we go around flattering each other, we all bear -- I mean all of the institutions bear responsibility.
Senator Mathias. I could not agree with you more, and I think I have said repeatedly that I think a lot of the problems that are dumped in the courts and a lot of the burdens that the courts bear have begun right here on Capitol Hill because we have not carefully sculpted the laws to make it clear what the legislative intent was. And in fact, perhaps they have been carefully sculpted to obscure the legislative intent in some cases. And the courts then are left with the burden of finally administering the law rather than either the legislature prescribing it, or the executive enforcing it.

Attorney General Levi. Not only that, you draft statutes that quite clearly say one thing, the Attorney General is then asked for his opinion which he is required to give, as to what it means to a government department. He gives it. Another House of this Congress then proceeds to make motions to hold the man in contempt for following the opinion of the Attorney General. And Professor Kurland, my good friend, says do not listen to the Attorney General, he is only a lawyer.

There is a responsibility in Congress for having statutes clear and for abiding by what they say, and if they do not like them, change them. I agree with you.
Senator Mathias. I would hope that with all the admonitions that we are giving to other people these days that we take that one ourselves, that the laws need to be more carefully written.

Attorney General Levi. Yes, it is easier to see abuses by others, I know.

Senator Mathias. Let me say that I think we need some help in this endeavor, that there are many cases in which the actions taken by Congress are criticized later when the errors might have been avoided by some cooperative action in the process.

Attorney General Levi. I meant that to be clear when I was referring to all parts of the government.

Senator Mathias. But, specifically in relation to the seditious conspiracy laws in the Smith Act, the courts have talked about the advocacy provisions of the law so strictly as to require incitement of imminent lawless action as a test and that I think does really date these acts.

Attorney General Levi. I think so. And while I want to say that in the guidelines we tried to emphasize that there is a question of how much one ought to spell out the nature of the evidence, in part, because I think that even spelling it out might have a chilling effect.

Senator Mathias. Now you have lead me right to my next question, which is whether we should put any limitations on the type of information that is to be gathered in a purely domestic intelligence investigation.
Attorney General Levi. Well it may be that one has to try one's hand at drafting them. I have.

Senator Mathias. It is a tough one, I think, but we have seen as a result of this investigation family matters, is that proper? Can you prescribe it in a general way that sexual activities, purely legal activities, but perhaps not within the mainstream of what most Americans are thinking of doing, personal relationships, all of this kind of thing --

Attorney General Levi. Well, one can try. What we did was, as I say, to provide a very tough and maybe too tough standard, because it is specific. And articulable facts, giving reason to believe that an individual is engaged in activities described in the paragraph which is force and violence to do the following things.

Now, that may be too restrictive. Now, if one starts to say what kind of things can one look at which might suggest and lead you to see these things, I do not know. And I suppose we all have to admit that public attitudes about activities and therefore maybe the activities themselves mean different things at different times.

And maybe one has to have a different set of rules created from time to time and one of the notions of the guideline would be, I think, to do that.

I am not in favor of Congress every year deciding whether it is against homosexuality or particular other aberrant sexual
conduct.

And therefore this can be included or not included as the winds blow. I think that would be probably not legislatively very desirable.

Senator Mathias. Let us suppose, however, just for the sake of discussion that these activities are the proper scope of a domestic intelligence investigation and that that investigation is conducted and its object is obtained and the investigation is closed, then what should happen to this material, given the infinite capacity of the government today to store and retrieve information?

Attorney General Levi. Well, the guidelines attempt to go in the direction that after a period of time that material should be done away with.

Senator, you have often posed questions for me to think about and this is another one that I think we ought to think about together: that is the destruction of information. It is also the destruction of evidence which might be used to show abuses by the Bureau.

So --

Senator Mathias. If I knew the answer I would not ask the question.

Attorney General Levi. If I knew the answer I would give it.

But, I am saying, because I think it is a very important
question --

Senator Mathias. I think what you suggest is a very pertinent, very current consideration, that if you destroy all the files, you can do more than all the perfumes of Arabia in washing out the blood.

Attorney General Levi. The guidelines do move in that direction. There is an argument about the time for the destruction of information.

Senator Mathias. There is a concurrent question: if files are retained for any period of time, are they open for the purpose of name checks during that period, which is a related but really a separate question, for background checks, for employment checks, that kind of thing.

Attorney General Levi. Well you could have selective sealing of files and I suppose selective destruction of items. But it is a very difficult thing.

Senator Mathias. I would like to explore briefly your thoughts on a subject we have discussed with other witnesses at some length. And that is whether you believe that a warrant requirement for beginning a domestic intelligence investigation would meet the standards in the Fourth Amendment if it required less than probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, probable cause to believe that a crime has been or was about to occur.

Attorney General Levi. I think the question really
would be what the warrant would enable the obtainer to do.

Under the guidelines, just opening a preliminary investiga-
tion, what can be done is not very much. It is so much less
than a full investigation. So, I think I would turn the
question around.

I think the court would really wonder why you want the
warrant. And it certainly would clog the courts.

Senator Mathias. The intrusion of an informant, for
example, into a political discussion, or any other activities
is a much greater intrusion than a bug or a wiretap in that
same conversation.

Now, would this be, would the placement of an informant
be that kind of activity?

Attorney General Levi. Well, you see, the preliminary
investigation does not really allow new informants, so, as I
say, it is quite limited.

And I did respond that I understand there is a problem
about the human ear, the human eye, which we discussed last
and time. But, I doubt when you are going for a warrant that in
each one of those cases is feasible.

And I think we have to be grown up enough not to feel that
we always have to go to the courts. Now, that may make us feel
that there is a lack of protection. But I think a greater
protection is to curtail the scope of the investigations to
make sure that they are held to a high standard and to control
dissemination of the information.

Senator Mathias. Well, I think that is the proper test: whether you can embark upon what are obviously immature reactions to events.

I do not think the Fourth Amendment itself is subject to a test of maturity or immaturity, but --

Attorney General Levi. No, I do not think the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant.

But I understand the argument that it is better, it is sometimes better to put a man on the moon, because he will know more than a machine. So you are saying the same thing in terms of informers.

Senator Mathias. Finally, let me just return to the Smith Act for a minute, which, as I understand it, requires incitement to imminent action to overthrow the government by violence.

If a domestic intelligence investigation can begin with far less, only a theoretical advocacy of some change --

Attorney General Levi. I do not think it should begin with a theoretical advocacy of change.

Now, if you asked me whether it ever does, my answer is I do not know. But I do not think it should begin with that.

Senator Mathias. Well, I think that between those two positions, there is a danger of First Amendment violations. And I like your position. I am not arguing with you --

Attorney General Levi. Well, we wrote this domestic
security investigation guideline because I was disturbed by the prior draft as not being tough enough and I think that I may now have come out with something that is too restrictive. I am not sure. And this is a proper process of discussion and back and forth, not only here but with the Bureau and I hope that one can get something from it that is useful.

Senator Mathias. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Levi, I think the most faithful question that this Committee, our Congress and our government must face is whether we are going to step beyond the Stone line permitting investigative agencies to go beyond matters of law enforcement, matters of so-called "internal security."

If we decide that we must, then I am persuaded we should only do so based upon unarguable evidence that an exception is needed and then to grant such an exception only under the severest and closely defined standards, and, if possible, under court supervision.

If we fail to do that, I am convinced that this Committee has failed and that in another 50 years, there will be hearings just like this in which the excesses that we have uncovered will have been repeated.

And, I say that because I think anything we do has to stand the test of what we have learned. And what we have
learned is that the power to use the police for politics is a seductive and irresistible one. No President, no attorney general can resist it. Few have.

But we have now found that it is not a partisan issue. The Presidents of both political parties, a director who served under Presidents of both political parties, they were absolutely unable to resist the right to snoop into the private affairs of Americans not to enforce the law but in order to gain some political advantage.

This is, I think if you look at human history, this has happened everywhere. Which is why we adopted the Bill of Rights. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was set up precisely because it happened in World War I and we had the scandal of the Palmer Raids and all the rest.

And when I look at these vaguely defined guidelines, I have to ask would they stand up under the direct orders to the contrary from a President of the United States. Would they stand up in the face of a willful director who is angry or hostile or suspicious about some of these political ideas, the next Martin Luther King.

My feeling is that based upon what we have learned, without any doubt, if you swept away, as quickly as a sand castle being overrun by a hurricane, they would mean nothing.

What we decide to do cannot be tested by the words, but by our notions of how human nature works when empowered in this
way to play god with the American people.

That is the test and it has got to be tested by what happens when the nation is in frenzy and in fear and it has got to be tested by what people do when they do not think they are going to be caught.

And, for that reason, I see the step beyond the 'Stone Step' namely beyond the enforcement of the criminal law, is not a step forward, but a step off a cliff, right back into the morass that we find ourselves in today.

If you look at this record, it is a horrible one. I mean the way Martin Luther King was hounded and harrassed is a disgrace to every American. That this country once took all the Japanese and put them in internment camps we now know is one of the blackest pages in American history. And it is that kind of record that whatever we do has to be tested against.

And, I think for that reason we have to draw a line, the line that Judge Stone suggested, and if we do grant exceptions, they have to be specifically and rigidly and unquestionably drawn, because there is no point in talking about oversight if the standards are not understandable.

And these laws have to be so clear that the Attorney General and the director of the FBI would have to say when the President calls, "I am sorry, Mr. President, but we cannot do it, it is against the law."

If they are not able to say that, I am convinced we will
right back here, someone will, those who follow us, 50 years from now, holding hearings similar to these.

Would you respond to that?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think, like the Stone statement, it is a good admonition. As I tried to say in my statement, I do not think the Stone standards indicates that there should not be domestic security investigations because the Stone standard talks about items within the proper jurisdiction of the Bureau and violations of law and if you are going to have an investigating agency which is going to be at all responsible in those areas, they have to know some things which are related, closely related to violations of particular kinds of law.

And I do not believe that the standards that have been drawn up are as vague as your statement, perhaps, suggests, because, when one uses the standard of the stop and frisk case, that is the standard, very close and perhaps too close.

So, I think in terms of the Stone standard, it probably meets it.

So, that I am not sure that there is this big gap, because this says specifically, "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or individuals acting in concert are engaged in activities" described in that paragraph. Those are activities of force and violence in violation of criminal statutes.
So -- and I should remind you, as I know I do not have to, that, as we said before, Congress has passed some rather broad criminal statutes.

Senator Mondale. Oh, yes.

Attorney General Levi. And the Stone standard is not very meaningful if you do that.

Senator Mondale. Well, the question now is once we know what has happened, and we know the abuse that arises when people have this unlimited, ill-defined power, what do we do if possible to try to prevent its recurrence? That is the issue that faces you. That is the issue that faces me and I am convinced that guidelines written by the executive can be rewritten by the executive, and if not by you, by those who follow. And they will mean absolutely nothing against the will of a willing president, a willing attorney general, or a willing director, absolutely nothing because they do not have the force of law.
Attorney General Levi. There's no disagreement. I don't think I should apologize for having ventured into the drafting, into having the guidelines drafted. It seems to me that that had to be done. I certainly do not take the position that parts of them should not be put in statutory form, and I certainly do not take the position that some of them should not be put in Executive Order form.

I think we ought to use all the devices, those devices where more permanence is wanted and those devices where there might have to be changes from time to time.

Senator Mondale. Now, Mr. Levi, are you persuaded that you have personally reviewed the specific instances of abuses by enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI? Are you personally confident that your guidelines fit and meet and prevent a recurrence of those abuses?

Attorney General Levi. The guidelines are not completed.

Senator Mondale. No, have you personally looked through those materials?

Attorney General Levi. At all the abuses? Certainly not.

Senator Mondale. Well, certainly not, you say. Mr. Schlesinger, confronted with a similar problem, sent a wire to all of his CIA facilities and said, give us all the examples that you know of in which our laws and our authority have been abused. Have you done anything like that?

Attorney General Levi. I have done several things.
Senator Mondale. Have you done anything like that?

Attorney General Levi. I am trying to answer.

Senator Mondale. All right, proceed.

Attorney General Levi. We have an investigation going on of the COINTELPRO and COINTELPRO-like activities. We have a communication, several from me to the Director, where he thinks there is sensitive or irregular materials to call it to my attention. We have -- so that I think that we have done both things that were done by Mr. Schlesinger.

I assume that Mr. Schlesinger's behavior was purified the CIA. I really do not know.

Senator Mondale. Well, let us take the most celebrated case of abuse, Dr. King. Has someone in your Department read the FBI's whole file in this?

Attorney General Levi. I cannot answer that question.

Three people now are going through the entire file.

Senator Mondale. FBI file?

Attorney General Levi. Yes.

Senator Mondale. The entire FBI file?

Attorney General Levi. So far as I know, yes.

Senator Mondale. Are you sure of that?

Attorney General Levi. So far as I know, yes. If the question suggests that they cannot get at the file, that is really not the problem. The problem might be that there are so many files which may be in a variety of other files and
references that it may be difficult, but there is not a problem
about their getting access to the files, and they tell me they
are doing it. I have not myself done it.

I have some feeling myself that I do not want to read
the Martin Luther King file. I wanted to regard it, in fact,
out of the sense of proprieties and privacy as sealed because
it seems to me that it was appropriate for the sake of the
privacy of Dr. King to have that material disposed, and I saw
no point in my personally reading it.

Senator Mondale. In other words, you are of the understand-
ing that all of the FBI and other investigative Justice Depart-
ment files of Dr. King have been reviewed?

Attorney General Levi. No. I am saying that I was
sufficiently disturbed about it so that I am having them all
reviewed.

Senator Mondale. You said you asked the Director of the
FBI, Mr. Kelley, for improprieties. Have you gotten a report
on that?

Attorney General Levi. We have had some reports on where
he thinks there are sensitive matters.

Senator Mondale. Do you have a complete report on impro-
prieties?

Attorney General Levi. I do not know that I would put it
that way because there is a problem of what is an impropriety;
where there are sensitive issues which he thinks may raise a
question, my belief is that he now brings them to me.

Senator Mondale. What was your request to him?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I do not have the precise statement.

Senator Mondale. I mean, what were you trying to get from him? Was that evidence of FBI improprieties? A record of what had happened?

Attorney General Levi. Well, there are problems of misbehavior, of what I would regard as misbehavior, or might regard as misbehavior, and when one deals with matters of this kind, it is a learning process because the words do not always carry the same meaning.

I was told when I came to the Department that the COINTELPRO project had been completely reviewed and exposed. After I was in the Department, I discovered -- and I think partly as a result of miscommunication to the Director -- that they had found other items in the COINTELPRO project, and those were reported to this Committee and to other Committees, but the point is that you might have projects which go beyond the confines of the COINTEL project, which might still involve similar behavior.

Senator Mondale. Was it your testimony, if I heard you correctly just now, that this Committee has received the reports given you by Director Kelley in response to your request?

Attorney General Levi. No, I did not say that. I said that this Committee received, I believe, a letter from me
describing the additional COINTELPRO projects.

Senator Mondale. Not just COINTELPRO. As I understand
your statement on page wight, "I instructed Director Kelley to
report to me any requests made of the Bureau or practices
within the Bureau which he deemed improper or which the
appearance of impropriety, and then on February 28 Director
Kelley ordered the FBI personnel report such requests or pract-
tices to him," and I think you indicated that you have received
some in response to that inquiry.

Attorney General Levi. I say here, The Director promptly
replied he has regularly provided information on programs
underway within the Bureau which could raise questions.

Senator Mondale. Did you get a report to him in response
to that request?

Attorney General Levi. I have gotten reports from him.
That is what this sentence says. He has provided information
on conduct that could raise questions.

Senator Mondale. Ordered the FBI personnel to report
such requests or practices to him. Now, has that been done?

Attorney General Levi. Yes, he did report them.

Senator Mondale. He ordered it. Did he get the report?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I believe he did because I
think that was one of the reasons that that the additional
COINTELPRO items surfaced.

Senator Mondale. Was this just limited to COINTEL?
Attorney General Levi. No.

Senator Mondale. Now, can we have those reports?

Attorney General Levi. I do not think they are very many of them, but I assume you can have them. The only thing is that it is hard to, it is a continuing process, and there are -- I would probably not think they would raise questions of misconduct but more be a matter of sensitive questions.

Senator Mondale. Well, I would like to have the reports that came to Director Kelley in response.

Attorney General Levi. Well, that I do not know about.

Senator Mondale. But, I am asking you as the head of the Justice Department if we could get those reports?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I do not know if you can or not, but we will certainly consider it.

Senator Mondale. Why not?

Attorney General Levi. Because I think that it is one thing to give reports of that kind in confidence to a Committee of this kind and another thing to make them public.

Senator Mondale. The CIA gave theirs to us. Why cannot you?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I am not in the CIA. I do not care to be. I do not wish to be.

Senator Mondale. Do you consider that a good answer?

Attorney General Levi. I -- yes, I consider the answer as good as the question.
Senator Mondale. Well, I think that kind of arrogance is why we have trouble between the Executive and the Legislative Branch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I understood Senator Mondale's question to be whether you would furnish certain documents to the Committee, not if you wished then to be made public or not that he was asking that the Committee make them public. I do not know that we have had any problem in the past with the Department in getting information of this kind.

Attorney General Levi. I apologize to Senator Mondale if I appeared arrogant. I thought that somebody else was appearing arrogant, but I apologize.

The point is that if you ask agents to report on what they may think is misconduct, if they think that that is going to be made public, that would, I believe, to be very chilling. I, personally, have no reason to not want to give it to a Committee if it is to be kept in confidence. I do not know what the Bureau's position on that would be, and my relationship with the Bureau is that I like to discuss these matters with them before giving a definitive answer because I am not that arrogant.

The Chairman. Well, leaving all personal references aside, I think that you know that when this Committee has asked and received information in confidence, it has kept the confidence.

Attorney General Levi. And we have tried very hard to give
you information.

The Chairman. So that ought not to be any problem, and I would appreciate your following up Senator Mondale's request because I regard it as an important one and not a frivolous one, and in that connection let me say just before we move on to further questions that sometime ago, in early August, you sent a letter to me in which you requested from the Committee -- this seems appropriate now because it is a request in reverse -- you requested of the Committee information that was contained in our files, transcripts and testimony which might bear upon investigations currently being conducted by this Department.

You did not get a written reply to that letter, but, as I think you will recall, we met shortly later -- and I think Judge Tyler was present, and I was present at the time -- and this subject was touched upon, and I said that the Committee wanted to cooperate in making available whatever information we could that would be helpful to the Department and that there would be a follow-up in which Mr. Schwarz and Mr. Smothers would corroborate with representatives of your Department to find out the best way for proceeding to implement the Justice Department's request.

Since then you have sent several more letters. Just recently we have received more letters relating to more targeted matters, including Dr. Martin Luther King matter and the Chilean matter.
I simply want to assure you, as a matter of public record, that the Committee, having considered this earlier request, is fully willing to cooperate in any way, and we will see to it that procedures are now worked out so that there will be no further delay. Our preoccupation with the assassination investigation and the issuance of the Committee's report has prompted our time, but we think that these requests are important, and we stand ready to work with the Justice Department in making all relevant information available.

Attorney General Levi. I am delighted to have that assurance.

The Chairman. Now, Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Attorney General Levi, I am pleased to see that you have announced this week the establishment of the Office of Professional Responsibility to aid in the oversight of the investigations or allegations of misconduct by different employees within the Department of Justice.

I have been interested in something along this line for some time, and I commend you for taking this lead in this area. I would just like to really ask you a few questions about the kind of concept that this is.

Originally, Attorney General Saxbe had something that at one point was labeled the Office of Special Review. I just wonder briefly how it differs and what the difference might be
in terms of structure or organization?

Attorney General Levi. Well, the differences may not be as great as I thought they were when I drafted out this new order but there are, I think, these differences. In the first place the Counsel will be in the Office of Special Responsibility unlike the person who would be in the Office of Special Review. He is in a position to directly receive complaints, and he is in a position then to directly either refer them or to make a recommendation to me about them.

As I read the Office of Special Review, the holder of that office would not have been in a position to receive complaints unless the complaint was given to him by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General.

Now, I thought that additional channel, while I hope it will not be the major channel, was an important thing to keep open, and, therefore, I wanted to make that clear. I also wanted to embody in this new order the experience that we have had. We have called in special groups to do investigating as we did with the DEA when we organized a special team, and I wanted to reflect in this order that there would be occasions when the ordinary investigative practices would not be sufficient. I wanted to have the Counsel put in the position where he could recommend that a special kind of review would be necessary through a different kind of a group, perhaps through a group assembled by him, perhaps going outside of the Department.
I think this spells it out better, although my belief now is that one could have found that probably in the prior order. It was not as clear to me.

Finally, I wanted to be sure that there was a memory in the Department and a continuation and a continual review of practices and procedures and ability to get the material from any part of the Department. I wanted to spell that out and frequent reporting, and I also wanted to have an advisory committee from the whole Department to this Counsel.

Now, as I say, as I have thought about it since, I wonder, is it that different? I think it is different. In some respects it is stronger, and I felt we should make it stronger.

Senator Schweiker. Will this office have the authority to go into, maybe, a program review like the GAO program audit, or will it be focused on primarily allegations of misconduct kind of thing or both?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think it will be focused on allegations of misconduct and on -- it will also focus on the procedures and effectiveness of review, but it is set up so that it can recommend beyond that, and if it wishes to recommend for the Department such other kinds of review then it is within the Counsel's prerogative to do that.

Senator Schweiker. And what kind of staffing is anticipated?

Attorney General Levi. I anticipate a small staff because I do not want to build up another bureaucracy with a large
investigative staff. I think that, by and large, if the Counsel makes such suggestions we will then have to find out where to go and how to deal with it. I do not want to set up another large investigating staff, which will have to be investigated.

Senator Schweiker. One of the things that came out this week -- and I am not sure that this would be subject to this new committee or office procedure or not -- but there has been a lot of discussion about the personal files of Mr. Hoover that Helen Ganty had, and I would just like to read one paragraph from the latest issue of "Time" magazine that seems to show a little bit of twist, if I understood it, because up until now, as I understood it, there were mainly personal files that Miss Ganty went through.

This latest edition says, "Before secretary Ganty could look at Mr. Hoover's office, the files, the most sensitive papers were carried off in an FBI truck to West Virginia's Blue Mountain Ridge Club, a Shennandoah Mountain hideaway used by innermost FBI officials for regular poker games, the CIA and other cronies. The papers were burned in the club's large fireplace. Precisely who ordered this destruction and carried it out has not been disclosed. The three-story club, worth $300,000, was burned down in a fire of unknown cause December 23rd. No evidence of arson has been discovered."

I guess my question here -- and maybe you have this under investigation, I do not know, but this indicates to me, if it
is true, and I do not know if it is true at all, some FBI participation in terms of separating out so that even Miss Ganty could not see some of these files, and obviously somebody had to make a decision, and obviously if the story is accurate, they were destroyed. Can you shed any light on that, or is this something that the Office of Professional Conduct would be looking into or not?
Attorney General Levi. I have asked the Criminal Division to investigate any and all of the items relating to the Department of Justice which have come before this committee. And, of course, one reason that they are rather anxious to get this material, and this certainly will be part of it.

Senator Schweiker. Can you give us any indication whether that account is accurate at this point or not?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I really cannot because I have to say that it does not -- it does not conform to my memory of the documents that I have seen. But I cannot really answer that question.

Senator Schweiker. On the matter of the Office of Professional Conduct, will it have the right to go in anywhere it feels it should go in terms of pursuing its job, as I understand what you said? In other words, following an investigation, within the Department anywhere in the field so that it should pursue it subject to what restrictions in that aspect?

Attorney General Levi. I think it will not be subject to restraints. I think it may have to be subject to negotiation.

Senator Schweiker. And it would have access to all of the material in its original form if need be?

Attorney General Levi. I think the negotiation might be whether, if need be. I can understand that there might be some sensitive information which there would be resistance to giving and so on. But I think that anything it needed it
would get.

Senator Schweiker. Would material such as their reports, would you envision that a new joint committee of Congress charged with overseeing intelligence activities might have access to that information or not?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think that is going to be dependent -- that is a touchy subject because if it is going to be public, then the way the material is obtained and the way it is written about will be in a certain way. If it is going to be kept confidential, and we know it is going to be confidential, then there are less problems, I am not sure.

Senator Schweiker. So as far as you are concerned, that is open to negotiation at this point in terms of working something out that would meet the guidelines you have in mind?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think so. There is no joint committee at present, and of course, that is one of the problems. Certainly one would hope that a reasonable exposure to what was being done would be available. But I do not really believe -- I do not really think that it is appropriate for a joint committee to be on top of exploring the files of the Bureau.

Now I know there is a great difference of opinion between some members of the committee at least on that. I think that is close to the line of managing the Bureau and I think its management really is not a legislative function. But certainly
to be advised, to have that kind of appropriate oversight to be
helpful on that, I think would be fine.

The Chairman. Would the Senator yield?

Of course it is not an appropriate function of the Congress
to mandate the FBI or to second guess their investigation of
ongoing cases. But assuredly, it is part of the responsibility
of the Congress to investigate wrongdoing and if we have reason
to believe that there is wrongdoing, within the Bureau, it may
be necessary to get to the raw files in order to ascertain
that. And that -- if that does not go to the heart of the
oversight function, I do not know what does.

Attorney General Levi. Well it is like many of the ques-
tions that we have discussed earlier. One has to be very
sensitive to the limitations because if you have an open
investigation and there is the possibility of any political
influence, either to act or not act, then I get very upset at
the notion of those going to a congressional committee.

And I think everyone can understand that kind of problem.
So it has to be balanced.

Senator Schweiker. Well, Mr. Attorney General, I can
understand protecting informants and protecting raw files. I
think that is legitimate. That is something that we would have
a responsibility in the Congress to do. But I do have trouble,
assuming that can be worked out, and I think that is a very
important point, particularly from the administration of the
Department of Justice and the FBI. But assuming that can be worked out, I do not see how you can possibly be protected; that what we just saw happen in the last 30 years will not happen again, and that your inspection force will work, or that any oversight committee will work unless we do have that kind of prerogative.

On the basis that I outlined, it just seems to me we are sort of deluding ourselves in view of what has happened, not to have that access, first for you, but secondarily for some responsible element of the Congress that would be guided by certain restrictions protecting that.

Attorney General Levi. My only suggestion is that it may be that the Attorney General should be able to see things which the congressional committee ought not to see. And I just think we have to think that through. There are stages. They are all problems of privacy. They are all problems of exposing individuals to obloquy. I think we have to take all that into consideration.

Senator Schweiker. That is all I have.

The Chairman. If we had not had access to the raw files, we would never have discovered the FBI's plan to discredit Mr. King and pick his successor. And you recognize the responsibility of this committee and we have worked out procedures which have enabled us to reach this basic evidence in ways that did not reveal informants or did not reveal agents.
And I think the guidelines of that kind could be worked out between a permanent oversight committee and then Attorney Generals so that the committee could get its job done. So I really do not believe that the problem is insuperable, and the fact that we have been able to get to the raw files when we needed to demonstrates that it can be done.

Senator Hart?

Senator Hart (Colorado). Mr. Attorney General, I would like to pursue this last question one minute further, and that has to do with raw files. It is my understanding that in the recent GAO inquiry into Bureau activities that they worked almost exclusively, if not totally exclusively, from Bureau or Departmental summaries. Is that correct, in their investigation?

Attorney General Levi. Well, that is what I understand.

Senator Hart (Colorado). And what you are saying here today is that in the future, if there is established an oversight, a permanent oversight congressional committee, that your recommendation would be that raw files reporting under some restrictions would be available; that it would be the same guidelines and the same kinds of investigation that the GAO does.

Attorney General Levi. I did not mean to assert that it would have to be based on summaries. No, I did not. I just think we have a problem as to the proprieties of what the
joint committee -- if there is a joint committee -- would want, and what we should appropriately give.

I have to say that there might be a temptation on the part of our Department of Justice to give more than it wanted to, and in later years that might be a problem. So one has to balance that.

Your committee, this committee did not ask for all of the King files. And I rather suspect that this committee had the same, to some extent at least, the same feelings of sensitivity and propriety which I had when I said I did not want to look at them because there are materials there which I really think should be regarded as secret. And that is the kind of problem one has to get into.

Senator Hart (Colorado). But as a basic proposition, you are willing to go beyond that to some degree?

Attorney General Levi. Yes, I am. Of course the Bureau might not like the idea.

Senator Hart (Colorado). Oh, I am sure they will not.

Yesterday I asked Director Kelley about the letter we received from one of your assistants, Mr. Pottinger, in connection with investigation of the King case internally. And he asked us for FBI records and documents, all materials was I think the phrase he used. The Director seemed somewhat puzzled by that, but I guess my question is: why is the Justice Department contacting this committee for FBI records?
Attorney General Levi. Well, I cannot imagine why, unless you were given the only copies.

Senator Hart (Colorado). I would be surprised if that happened.

Attorney General Levi. But if the suggestion is that he can only get them that way, and not directly from the Bureau, I think that is really incorrect because it just happens that I have specifically asked Mr. Pottinger whether he had access to all the materials and he said yes. But it may be that our form of record keeping is such that you have things where we do not know where the copies are, and you have a great deal of material.

Senator Hart (Colorado). But you have no doubt that you will get everything the FBI has on this matter?

Attorney General Levi. I have no doubt that people investigating it for me will get everything the FBI knows that it has.

As you know, it is possible that there are materials in other files somewhere.

Senator Hart (Colorado). Well, I am talking about conscious withholding.

Attorney General Levi. I do not believe there will be conscious withholding.

Senator Hart (Colorado). If or when you depart from the Department of Justice, will you do so with any degree of fear of an overly independent FBI in the future? Leaving aside the
question of the relationship that exists now, but is it a matter of concern to you about your successors; that the Bureau is too independent of the Attorney General?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I have already said that I think that there is a certain amount of distance and independence. It is probably desirable. But, of course I am concerned, of course I am concerned. I am concerned not only about the future but today.

Senator Hart (Colorado). And therefore you would suggest that Congress ought to also be concerned about that?

Attorney General Levi. I have said so. I agree.

Senator Hart (Colorado). In connection with these guidelines that we are talking about, as you know one of the very puzzling areas that this committee is in is the Huston Plan, Operation CHAOS and so on, back in the '60s and early '70s; the tendency on the part of both the Department and the Bureau and many in the White House to fear that domestic protest groups, particularly in connection with matters of race or the Vietnam War, had some outside or foreign domination or guidance or direction or support.

What do you think these guidelines should say for the future about separating genuine domestic, domestically oriented and controlled protest that is legitimate and constitutional, from the kind of official governmental harrassment that did in fact go on with very, very little substantial
support for the proposition that it was foreign dominated? What can be done about that in the future?

Attorney General Levi. It is terribly difficult for the very reason of your last phrase, in which you correctly emphasized that we do not have the guidelines on the foreign dominated organizations. The question is how close one can come to barring evidence of that domination when the purpose of the investigation in some sense has to be to obtain that very data. So I suppose that one would try to do is to use some kind of a likely standard or something of that sort as one approaches it and then a reason to believe or some such thing which we have come to temporarily on the domestic security ones, the stop and frisk standard which is a pretty stringent standard for investigation.

But I think there is a problem.

Senator Hart (Colorado). But not with judicial approval; I think that is your strong recommendation?

Attorney General Levi. I do not whether it is strong or not.

Senator Hart (Colorado). It is consistent.

Attorney General Levi. I just do not think that is the most desirable path. I think it puts an enormous burden on the court. I do not know how the court will exercise it. I doubt if it is the best way. But it may be one way.

Senator Hart (Colorado). In a hypothetical situation,
where you as the ultimate decision maker as to whether a wire-
tap should be implanted and surveillance, all of it, and the
rights of the individual who would be jeopardized, the consti-
tutional rights of that individual or that group would be
jeopardized by the proposed surveillance, wiretapping or what-
ever, what would be your own personal judgment on that where
there was an absolutely even question; there was no question
constitutional rights would infringed upon or even violated,
and yet the balancing consideration was that there might be
some evidence of criminal activity or subversion or whatever?

Would you come down on the individual or group's side, or
the other way?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I must believe that there
is a misunderstanding between us because I do not authorize
anything where I think there is a violation of constitutional
rights. So I think I must be misunderstanding.

Senator Hart (Colorado). Well, I am trying to get inside
the mind of an individual who is going to have this authority;
that you do not want an officer of the court to have, about what
outweighs what, where you do not know what information you are
looking for, and the Bureau agent is recommending a wiretap or
a mail search and he is just saying I think there may be some
evidence here that we might need, and so on and so forth.

So I have to put it in a hypothetical --

Attorney General Levi. You see --
Senator Hart (Colorado). Do you resolve differences in favor of the individual?

Attorney General Levi. I do want to say something about the hypothetical. In this first place, under Title III, the wiretaps is judicious and the legislation that we are drafting on electronic surveillance which is not a Title III matter, we are suggesting because of reasons which I think I stated before to the committee, our judicial approval.

As to mail openings, it seems to me that, at the present time at least, that would require a warrant so that—

Senator Hart (Colorado). Well, I am talking about a national security area where there is no judicial —

Attorney General Levi. I do not know of any national security authorization. I do not want to get into that area. But I do not know of a present authorization which would permit me to, without a warrant, authorize the opening of mail. So I think one has to weigh the individual rights very seriously and obviously give them emphasis. But I do not like to be suggesting by my answer that in those particular hypotheticals that the decision would be made without — or could be made or would be made without judicial review because I think in those particular examples there would be a warrant — there would have to be a warrant.

Senator Hart (Colorado). Well, I am talking about the area where there are no warrants. But I cannot frame the
hypothetical clearly enough.

Attorney General Levi. Well, it has been framed in terms of the use of informants; and where I do not think there should be a warrant, and there is not a warrant, as far as I know, and there does not have to be, in terms of constitutional requirements, at least at the present time. I think one does have to be very sensitive. I think Stone was correct and if you are going to have an agency of this kind, and it is going to survive with the proper discipline and so on, it has to be extremely sensitive to individual rights.

The Chairman. Senator Hart, do you have further questions?

Senator Hart (Michigan). Yes, Mr. Chairman, on specifics really.

On this business of congressional oversight, we have been going back and forth with you and with others earlier on the standards and guidelines of investigations.
This morning you indicated that some of the guidelines might well be in statute and others in regulation, and you suggested Executive Orders, and that gets to the point that even in the area where statutory definition of guidelines is appropriate, no matter how skilled the drafter, it will leave unanswered certain things. So, it also will have to be implemented by Departmental orders and guidelines, making even more explicit the dos and donts and safeguards.

Should not those regulations, which you or you and the Bureau or the Bureau issue to implement or elaborate on whatever we do by statute, be subject to debate and approval, at least by the Oversight Committee, which everybody assumes we will have, if not by the Congress? Is not that really the starting point for a useful oversight?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think a useful oversight can involve debate and, hopefully, it will involve approval, but if you mean by that, formal approval by a committee as a new form of additional legislation, I think it raises Constitutional questions, and I really do not know why one would want to raise those questions because it does not seem to me essential.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) Well, it may be unconstitutional to require the elections commission to come in and tell us what they propose to do to implement the rules of criminal procedure.

Attorney General Levi. Well, Senator Hart, I had been asked how Constitutional I am in various ways, and I think the
Constitution applies and should be followed, and I think there is a Constitutional question. It may be we should change the Constitution and have a form of subsequent legislation through Congressional committees.

I think there is a problem. There is an abuse. I happen to think that the affirmative action legislation, if you trace affirmative action legislation by the Congress to Executive Orders and then to the Labor Department, you have a horror story. It happens to be a horror story that some people like, but I regard it as a horror story because the deviations are quite great.

So, it is possible that here, if you have very general legislation and then you have Executive Orders and then you have other orders, the deviation may be very great, and I understand the problem, and I would hope that an Oversight Committee could look at it, but to have the Oversight Committee then have a veto power or a new subsequent enactment power seems to me to be a strange creation of a sub-house of, I do not know what, the Congress, and I regard it as probably not legislation, but rather an executive function.

If it is going to be legislation, I think it should be legislation.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) I am not wise, but I am wise enough not to pursue a Constitutional issue with you. I am almost tempted to have you ask the Department and the Bureau who does those
things to give us a memo on why it might be unconstitutional with respect to the point I am suggesting, reviewing and approving guidelines, interpreting statutory direction with respect to the Bureau, but not unconstitutional for us to claim, as we do and have, the right to veto rules of criminal procedure, but the Director has been burdened enough.

Attorney General Levi. We could put it back and require enactment. You could have a procedure in which after the statute, the regulations would be put before the Congress and require enactment in order to be effective.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) That would certainly be oversight. This follows up an earlier point of discussion. When we do pass a statute, we can see how the courts and the agencies are applying them because of the agencies' actions and the courts' decisions are public. It would not really affect safeguards in this area, require that the Oversight Committee be able to see the kind of documentation that had been given to you, or if it is a case of going to a court, seeking a warrant, that underlying material really would be the best basis for an Oversight Committee making the judgment as to whether the Attorney General appropriately was supplying what was intended.

Do you agree that oversight, how the statute or your guidelines or others' guidelines requires that kind of access? I know this looks way down the road.

Attorney General Levi. Yes, I think it does. Well, the
facts of life are that you cannot look much because you will
not have the time, and the facts of life are that at least
I do not think it is good administration to have Congressional
investigators plowing through an agency. So I think one has to
think about those questions.

I do believe that with proper safeguards of confidentiality,
a Committee could get such material.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) As my question implied, it would seem
to me that unless we knew the kind of argument and evidence that
an Attorney General is finding adequate to meet that standard,
we would not know whether our standards were--

Attorney General Levi. That is right. There might be
some problems. Every once in awhile there is something of
such sensitivity that it might be in a special category, I
am sure.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) On the matter of electronic surve-
illance you said some weeks ago the standards to be used with a
citizen, with an American citizen, would be, would depend on
where he is here or overseas. Perhaps that does not fairly
summarize what you said.

Attorney General Levi. No, it does not.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) All right. I will be a little
bit more fair. You said the different standards would apply
when the citizen was an agent of a foreign power, which is what
you said. Is it your view that the same standard which really
is to say does the Fourth Amendment apply equally to an American
citizen, whether he is operating at home or abroad, in terms of
the electronic surveillance that can be used by our Government,
or at the request of our Government?

Attorney General Levi. I do not think it is absolutely
clear, but my answer would be yes, but I do not think it is
clear in the decisions.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) What are the present policies
regarding dissemination of the product of electronic surveillance
when it is targeted on an embassy or a foreign diplomat, but
the device picks up non-criminal communications as to Americans?
Specifically, suppose an American is talking on the phone to
an embassy of a Middle Eastern country, and he is discussing
plans for political activities to lobby Congress for support
of action which he and other Americans plan. They might even
be discussing legislative plans of Senators who disagree with
the Administration.

If you have a national security tap on an embassy and
pick up that conversation, is that fair game for sending to the
White House simply because the tap was legal?

Attorney General Levi. The answer is no.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) On the matter of future deterrence
of unauthorized activity, we have been talking what should be
authorized and how to set up procedures. No matter how brilliantly
we draft our statutes and guidelines, the problem of human
frailty will be there. The best system will not eliminate
temptation or occasional succumbing to temptation
or transgression. Should there be specific criminal penalties
for government officers who take or approve unauthorized action
in this area?

Attorney General Levi. In the areas of what?

Senator Hart (Michigan) Government official who ignores,
averts, or violates a guideline.

Attorney General Levi. Well, there are all kinds of
penalties now, and all kinds of threats of damage suits, and
whatnot. I think it is a question of how serious the violation
is, how willful it is. I think I would have to know more
about it.

Senator Hart (Michigan) Would a good stiff penalty on
the books serve as a deterrent for possible abuse?

Attorney General Levi. It depends upon the kind of abuse
one is talking about, and, as I indicated before, the privacy
statute in itself imposes penalties now. If we are talking
about the grosser acts of some Presidents, let us say, or
others making illegal, unauthorized operations or uses, well,
I do not know what the penalty would be on the President, and
somehow or other I have a feeling that I am not sure that is
where a great penalty would make a difference.

Senator Hart (Michigan) Let us look at it from the
point of view of the fellow whose privacy has been invaded,
and violations notwithstanding, statutory or guideline rule, should he be given standing to sue for damages?

   Attorney General Levi. Well, as to whether he has standing and should be able to sue, where the conduct is illicit, there is no doubt that there will be suits. There are suits.

   Senator Hart. (Michigan) But my notes say that the court has held that unless you can show specific damages, which is a tough thing under the First Amendment, that you are barred from challenging investigation.

   Attorney General Levi. But I think that there is not, really is not any real damage. I am not sure that damages should be given. I really do not think that is the way one can --

   Senator Hart. (Michigan) How about standing to seek an injunction? Even though there is not reason for damages?

   Attorney General Levi. An injunction so that the court would be operating that segment? I would think that would be another problem as to the separation of powers, really; an injunction related to that particular person maybe. I do not think a class action telling the Department of Justice that they could never use this, that or the other device toward this group --

   Senator Hart. (Michigan) Well, there is nothing novel about seeking injunctions against the Attorney General or other departments from doing something, so I am curious about what we do about someone who is being tailed.
Attorney General Levi. Well, I thought that you were thinking about not the problem of damages so much, as to the problem of controls on the operation of the Department, and I was looking at it from that standpoint. I think there is a problem about damages. There is a problem about the rights of people who may have been injured and whether they should be notified, and I, frankly, do not know the answer to that question.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) And you do not know the answer yet on that one?

Attorney General Levi. I think it is a very mixed question, and it may be that they should be notified. I do not know how they would be notified, what the basis would be. It is not something which I care to express myself.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) Well, the mechanics of notifying somebody whose mail has been opened, that is not complicated.

Attorney General Levi. I am not talking about mail openings. I am talking about such things as in the COINTELPRO, possibly.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) Let me read you the full question to make sure we have covered this. I really thought that you had under study methods which might respond to the abuses in terms of, at least alerting American citizens whose privacy had been invaded upon.

Attorney General Levi. We do, but I am just saying that I do not know what the answer is.
Senator Hart. (Michigan) You are studying and seeking
the right answer?

Attorney General Levi. Yes.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) Well, why is there a problem?

Why is the search for the right answer so complicated in terms
of those who have the subject of COINTEL files? Now, maybe
they will read about it through these hearings, but there are
a whole slew of them.

Attorney General Levi. There has been a lot of reading
about it. There are Freedom of Information Act requests which,
obviously, reflect a knowledge on the part of some people, but
all I am really saying is that that is one of those matters
which I think one has to explore. The first reaction, and,
certainly my reaction, is that in some way they should be
notified. Then I come to the question of how do we know who
they are. Suppose nothing actually occurred. Is then the
person to be notified? Or suppose it is the kind of case where
if the person is notified, there might be embarrassment to the
person, which is conceivable, and so on? Is it appropriate
for the Department, itself, to make a tentative judgment as to
whether there was any injury or not, or is that inappropriate?

There are lots of questions in there, and my own inclination
is that they should be notified in some way, but I think it is
worth some thought.

Senator Hart. (Michigan) And that thought is being given?

Senator Hart. (Michigan). So that Martin Luther King, who would have known about a lot of things that were going on, and a lot of people whose names will never surface in connection with this Committee, who have had similar -- well, not similar, but experiences which might very well give rise to a claim.

How soon do you have to be able to figure out what, if anything, the Department's obligation is toward them?

Attorney General Levi. Senator, I really do not know. I have called together a group on that, in fact, two groups. I think whatever answer is given by the Department may well have to be the same answer that is given by other parts of the Government. That seems to me to require some further discussion. And one has to try to think through, as I say, the consequences. To notify a person that he or she was the subject of COINTELPRO at this time many years later may actually cause, perhaps, it is strange to think this, but it might actually cause embarrassment to that person now who would rather not know it, and if they had no consequence, if it had no consequence, is that a good thing to do?

Let me tell you, I was told when I came down to the Depart-
When I was President of the University of Chicago, apparently an anonymous letter was written, I gather, claiming that some professor was a Communist, and I do not know what was supposed to follow from that, but, in any event, there was and I do not know whether the letter was anonymous, but it probably was.

If I got the letter, I would have thrown it away. It would have had no consequence, and I have no recollection of it. Now, if there is such a letter and persons exist, then notification of that person, is that desirable? I just do not know.
Senator Hart (Michigan). I would suggest that the Department ought not make the judgment as to whether, to use your expression, it had no consequence to the subject. I think that would be a decision that more correctly should be made by the subject in his mind, and not the Department of Justice, as you go through that file.

I would hope there could be a resolution of which you would say to be the right answer,

Attorney General Levi. I have thought of suggesting the Congress establish some kind of a claims division. But, in any event, it is something we are thinking about.

Senator Hart (Michigan). Well, I hope we can come out of this with some teeth in what we do because you suggest perhaps criminal penalties would not be very effective, and you describe the difficulties that attach to civil remedies, and you suggest that no matter how carefully drafted --

Attorney General Levi. Well, there are civil penalties now, but I hate to think that, if guidelines are drafted and is a violation of one of the guidelines, that the consequence is a criminal penalty. Somehow or other that seems to me an inappropriate way.

Senator Hart (Michigan). It would not be a criminal penalty unless the person knowingly took action in violation of the guidelines. And if you are paid by the taxpayer, why should you not be subject to sanctions of that kind?
Attorney General Levi. I do not really see why payment
by the taxpayer --

Senator Hart (Michigan). Well, why should you not be
subject to sanctions if you knowing break the rule?

Attorney General Levi. I think my problem is that I think
you have problems of discipline in any organization, and I think
one ought to be careful not to cover the field of administra-
tive discipline in a government with criminal penalties which
I think is self-defeating. So, that is the only reason.

The Chairman. Just two subjects, Mr. Attorney General,
and then I am finished, and I will conclude the hearing.

Yesterday I asked Director Kelley about the amount of
time and money and general imposition on the overall resources
of the FBI that was represented in the many investigations they
routinely make that deal with appointees or nominees, and
people being considered for federal employment. And he said he
would supply those figures and give us some idea of how much of
the workload this represented.

It is my understanding that the FBI does these investiga-
tions only for sensitive civilian jobs, and wherever a name
check digs up information from FBI files indicating a possible
security risk. In other words, the FBI name check is there if
there is an allegation in the FBI files that a person might
have once been associated with a subversive or extremist
organization or something like that, or if the position to
which the nominee is to be appointed is regarded as sensitive.
Then the FBI does the investigation of the nominee. Otherwise, it is done by the Civil Service Commission.

I am wondering if when it comes to guidelines, that not ought to be a good place to look pretty carefully to see how much of this is really necessary. My impression in the past has been that there are many FBI checks being done for positions that could not possibly be regarded as sensitive as far as national security is concerned, and maybe we just have over-done this back in the period when we were terribly frightened, in the McCarthy years, and it has never been looked at sufficiently since to see if it still is all that necessary.

Attorney General Levi. Well, I agree and a good place to begin is with the executive order that has been modified many times on suitability for employment.

The Chairman. I do not know whether it is feasible to try to legislate here, or whether there could be a way that legislation might be helpful as a part of the basic or generic FBI law that we hope to draw up concerning this phase of the FBI's activities. But I wish you would give some thought to that, would you please?


The Chairman. The other matter that I want to deal with is that time and time again in our investigation of the intelligence agencies, including the intelligence aspect of the FBI's
work and the counterintelligence aspects, we are up against
the problem of accountability. And with the FBI, of course, we
have had the additional question of the president putting the
agency to his personal or political use; and a difficulty which
I think Senator Mondale rightly referred to -- the difficulty,
no matter what the regulations may be, and even perhaps
contrary to positions of the law, of refusing to do the presi-
dent's bidding. You know, the order of the president or the
desire of the president can be easily rationalized or some kind
of plausible excuse can be given for it that it sounds like it
might fall within the purview of the law.

And neither an attorney general or a director of the FBI
is in very much of a position to argue with the president. And
then there is a feeling of who is going to find about it any-
way.

I asked Director Kelley yesterday if he thought that
orders should be transmitted to him from the president through
the attorney general; and secondly, if orders are transmitted
to him to undertake an investigation in which the president has
expressed some interest, they ought to come in writing, and a
permanent file be kept so that the accountability is there
for review of a congressional committee or for whatever.

He said that he thought that such directives should be in
writing and that a file, a permanent file of them should be kept.
I would like to ask you how you would respond to those
questions. And I put the questions in this order: first, do
you think that if the president wants the FBI to go out and make
an investigation for him and report back to him, that that
order should be transmitted through the attorney general? And
secondly, whether you think orders of that character coming
from the president should take the form of a written order and
permanently maintained in the files of the Bureau?

Attorney General Levi. Well, I think the orders probably
should be written. Now as to the first part of your question,
the hypothetical case might be that the president has decided
that he wishes to appoint a certain person to the cabinet and
he wishes a full field investigation. Under the guidelines,
the president, the counsel to the president or associate
counsel could ask the Bureau to do that.

I would think, unless there is some particular reason,
that the attorney general should be notified as to what is
going on. I think any suggestion of any other kind of investi-
gation of an organization or something of that sort, which I
thought you were suggesting, should not come from the president
to the director, in any case, and if it did come, it certainly
should come in writing and the attorney general should be
notified.

I certainly do not want to say that the president cannot
speak to anybody he wants to speak to and there is no reason
why he should not be talking to members of the Department of
Justice. I do think it is a desirable thing when that occurs, unless it is discussing the criminal activity of the attorney general, that the attorney general be notified.

Now I think in fact, at the present time, and I maybe I would be the last one to know, but I think the communications are through the attorney general, except for the kind of investigations for appointments which might or might not come to me.

The Chairman. But it is possible that that too might be the subject of that kind of procedure, the very kind you have outlined can be the subject of a statute. And if it were, do you think the president would be bound by it?

Attorney General Levi. Oh, he might not be, but in fact he would, I would think, wish to adhere to it and it would make it easier for others to suggest that there was kind of a propriety about it.

The Chairman. Before you leave, and I want to express the gratitude of the committee for your testimony today and for your continued cooperation in this joint endeavor, but I also want to say that Mike Shaheen, who has been the liaison with the committee staff, has done an excellent piece of work and the staff wishes for me to express its appreciation to him.

Attorney General Levi. I would thank the committee and thank you, and I hope that -- you can tell Senator Mondale that I am not half as arrogant as he thinks I am.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Levi.
(Whereupon, at 1:00 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM: Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 1/2/76

1. Mr. Mintz
2. Mr. Wannall
3. Mr. Cregar
4. Mr. Hotis
5. Mr. Daly

Attached is a copy of the testimony of the Attorney General Edward H. Levi before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities on December 11, 1975. The attached copy was furnished to us by Mark L. Wolf, Special Assistant to the Attorney General in the Department.

RECOMMENDATION:

For record purposes.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-3-76 BY SECURED

Enclosure

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum 12/30/75 reported intention of House Select Committee on Intelligence (HSC) to take depositions from former FBI Special Agents (SAs) Joseph William Magee and Joseph Leo Gormley concerning U. S. Recording Company purchases made by the FBI.

Pursuant to Recommendations 2 and 3 of the above-referred-to memorandum, addresses and telephone numbers were obtained from the personnel files and furnished to Supervisor P. V. Daly of the Legal Counsel Division on the morning of 1/2/76 so that he might orally advise the HSC of the current whereabouts of Magee and Gormley. Prior to furnishing of information to Daly, Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project had telephone conversations with both Magee and Gormley, also on the morning of 1/2/76, for the purpose of alerting them to the HSC interest and with the suggestion that, if they are contacted, they might call the Legal Counsel Division for further assistance. Both indicated that they would take such action and expressed appreciation for being alerted in advance. In addition, Magee advised of certain information which is being recorded hereinafter for information purposes.

Magee advised that on a Friday, about 9/18/75, he was telephonically contacted by a Mike Epstein of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSC) who indicated a desire to talk to him immediately. Magee told Epstein that he was

62-116464
1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy 75)
1 - 67-123249 (Personnel File Former SA Joseph William Magee)
1 - 67-129682 (Personnel File Former SA Joseph Leo Gormley)
1 - 67- (Personnel File Former SA William C. Sullivan)

CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: Housey 75  
62-116464

quite busy and would not be able to see him immediately. The only information Epstein gave as to the reason for wanting to interview Magee was to get information about the early organization of the FBI Laboratory. There followed some further telephone calls between the two but they never got together for an interview at that time. However, Epstein again called Magee early during the week of 12/28/75 and asked Magee to appear for interview Tuesday, 1/6/76. The only information Epstein gave as to the subject matter of the interview was that it would be about the operations of the Bureau. Magee agreed to appearing for the interview.

It was explained to Magee that the same procedure relative to an SSC interview would apply as that for one of the HSC, and it was suggested that immediately after completing the conversation with Phillips, Magee telephone the Legal Counsel Division for further information, particularly as to waiver of the confidentiality agreement he has with the Bureau. Magee said that he would immediately call Mr. Mintz' office.

As a matter of interest, Magee also advised that, when he was first contacted by Epstein September last, he asked Epstein where the latter had gotten his name and Epstein said it was from Bill Sullivan. Magee then told Phillips that he could just not understand some of the things which he has been learning about Sullivan and he expressed dismay at some publicized reports that Sullivan had been making statements derogatory to the Bureau and the late Mr. Hoover. Magee said that at the time former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray left the Bureau, and before Mr. William D. Ruckelshaus was named to succeed him, Sullivan contacted Magee. Sullivan told Magee that he, Sullivan, fully intended to become FBI Director and that,
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Houstudy 75
62-116464

if he did, he wanted Magee to return to the Bureau to serve as Assistant Director in the Laboratory. The tenor of Magee's remarks was that he thought Sullivan was talking rather wildly in making such a job offer to him and that this applied as well to the idea of Sullivan becoming FBI Director.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information and record purposes.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/3/66 BY WRA
d

CHANGED TO

62-116395-1240X

62-116464-268X2

FEB 18 1976

Cons/Draft
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, reporting the results of an interview of FBI Special Agent Neil P. Shanahan by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
   Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
   Special Counsel for
   Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Neil P. Shanahan)

SJM:1hb/hb (10) REG-51

ST 115

E JAN 25 1976
U. S. Senate Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with
Regard to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA)
Neil P. Shanahan by SSC Staff Members

The following concerns an interview on November 21,
1975, of FBI SA Neil P. Shanahan by SSC Staff Members.

Shanahan's report of the results of the interview
is contained in a memorandum dated November 26, 1975, a
copy of which is attached.

Enclosure

1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Neil P. Shanahan)

SJM: 1hb/hb

NOTE:
The LHM setting out Shanahan's report of the
interview was furnished the Bureau by Philadelphia airtel
11/26/75 captioned "Senstudy 75."
At 11:00 a.m., November 21, 1975, Special Agent NEIL P. SHANAHAN of the Philadelphia Division of the FBI was interviewed under oath by two staff members of the above styled committee in the Old Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. Present during the interview and doing most of the questioning was Mr. ROBERT KELLY, and Mr. JOHN BAYLY, who identified themselves as staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC).

Prior to any questioning, it was explained by Mr. ROBERT KELLY that SA SHANAHAN would be testifying voluntarily and that he had a right to be represented by counsel if he so desired. Also prior to any questioning, Mr. KELLY explained that he had previously interviewed GARY THOMAS ROWE, a former confidential informant for the FBI and would be asking questions prompted by information furnished to him by Mr. ROWE.

After responding to questions of a general informative nature, such as when SA SHANAHAN handled Mr. ROWE, and the general dates of Mr. SHANAHAN’s employment and assignments with the FBI, certain specific areas were covered and recalled by SA SHANAHAN as follows:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
A question was asked concerning activities taken by SA SHANAHAN upon receipt of information from Mr. ROWE that the Ku Klux Klan was going to immediately engage in some form of violent activity. SA SHANAHAN responded that upon receipt of such information, it was immediately reported to his superiors, and evaluated to determine what immediate action, such as dissemination to local authorities, etc., was required. A question was asked in this area directly on the issue of whether anyone in the FBI instructed Mr. ROWE to engage in any violent activities. Mr. SHANAHAN responded that at no time did he, or anyone else to his knowledge, instruct Mr. ROWE to engage in any violent activity. In fact, he was often instructed to avoid engaging in violent activity.

At one point in the interview, Mr. JOHN BAYLY asked questions concerning whether SA SHANAHAN could express his opinion as to the morality or ethics involved in certain activities which Mr. ROWE had reported that he had engaged in. This question was re-phrased several times by Mr. BAYLY because of SA SHANAHAN's repeated statements that he did not understand the extent of the information sought by Mr. BAYLY.

Another critical area of questioning dealt with a statement made by Mr. ROWE that at some time during the trials of three members of the Ku Klux Klan, for killing Mrs. VIOLA LIUZZO, he had advised Mr. JOHN DOAR, Assistant Attorney General, that they had been introducing testimony from one Mr. LEROY MOTON, who was identifying himself under oath as the man present in the automobile with Mrs. LIUZZO when she was shot. Mr. ROWE had advised Mr. DOAR that Mr. MOTON was not the same man who was in the auto with Mrs. LIUZZO when she was shot. In response
to these questions, Mr. SHANAHAN testified that Mr. ROWE had at some point during these trial proceedings, seen either in person or a photograph in the newspaper of Mr. LEROY MOTON, and had advised Mr. SHANAHAN that this man was not the same man he had seen riding in the car with Mrs. LIUZZO. At the next opportunity, Mr. SHANAHAN contacted Mr. JOHN DOAR and had Mr. ROWE relate to Mr. DOAR his opinion concerning the identity of LEROY MOTON as the man present in the car with LIUZZO. Mr. SHANAHAN further testified that he did not know what, if any, impression this had on Mr. DOAR and the further content of the trial.

At a point the interview appeared to be over and Mr. KELLY and Mr. SHANAHAN conversed off the record, during which conversation Mr. KELLY related that Mr. ROWE had currently had some difficulties with Mr. DOAR and the Department of Justice after the FBI had relocated him in another part of the country and that some of the statements being made by Mr. ROWE concerned his treatment by the Department of Justice after he was no longer under FBI control. Mr. SHANAHAN mentioned that he recalled that GARY THOMAS ROWE received a written agreement signed by Attorney General NICHOLAS D. KATZENBACH, which outlined what agreement would exist between Mr. ROWE and the Department of Justice. Mr. KELLY asked Mr. SHANAHAN to go back on the record and relate this under oath, which was done. Mr. SHANAHAN testified only that he had been present during negotiations between Mr. ROWE and Mr. DOAR about this agreement and had seen the agreement furnished to Mr. ROWE prior to Mr. ROWE's testimony during the Federal trial in Montgomery, Alabama.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

   DOCUMENT | BRIEFING | ✗ INTERVIEW | TESTIMONY | OTHER

   2. DATE PROVIDED

   12/31/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

   The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of incumbent SA Neil P. Shanahan

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

   NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

   U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Information handling

   Intelligence collection

   ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

   DATE 1/3/75 DATED BY SPPR

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Interviewed regarding his handling of the former confidential informant, Gary Thomas Rowe. The questions were prompted by information furnished by Mr. Rowe.

   62-116395

   FMK: fmk

   (4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSSTUDY 75

   TREAT AS YELLOW

   [Handwritten note: 1/3/75]

3791 (6-75)
Enclosed is the original of a memorandum, with attachment, concerning an interview of FBI Special Agent Garry G. Lash by SSC Staff Members. Also enclosed is a copy of the memorandum, with attachment, for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (4)

62-116395

ST. 115

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Garry G. Lash)

SJM:1hblhbb
(10)
December 31, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
GARRY G. LASH BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

The following concerns an interview on
November 20, 1975, of FBI SA Garry G. Lash by SSC Staff
Members.

Lash's report of the results of the interview
is contained in a memorandum dated November 26, 1975, a
copy of which is attached.

Enclosure
1 - 67- (Personnel File SA Garry G. Lash)
SJM:1hb/1hb

NOTE: SA Lash furnished the LHM setting out the results
of the SSC interview by airtel 11/26/75 captioned "Senstudy 75."
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Buffalo, New York
November 26, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL
AGENT GARRY G. LASH BY
SSC STAFF MEMBERS
ANDREW POSTAL AND JEFF KAYDEN
ON NOVEMBER 20, 1975

Interview of Special Agent LASH by SSC Staff
Committee members was conducted in SSC office space.
The interview lasted from approximately 11:15 AM until
1:15 PM.

Prior to the interview SA LASH was advised of
the identity of the interviewers and that he was free to
exercise his rights at any time as guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. SA LASH was advised that he
had the right to have an attorney present and the right
to have a United States Senator present, SA LASH waived
both of these rights. He was also advised that the scope
of the inquiry would concern the handling of MARY JO COOK,
a former FBI informant, exclusively.

A court reporter was present who dictated into
a cassette recording machine during the interview.

SA LASH was not sworn.

As follows are the questions directed to SA LASH
and the answers that he provided according to the best
recolletion of SA LASH:
ANDREW POSTAL

SA LASH, what is your present employment?

SA LASH

Special Agent of the FBI

POSTAL

Where are you assigned?

LASH

Buffalo, New York

POSTAL

Were you assigned there during the Summer of 1973?

LASH

Yes

POSTAL

Did you specialize in any type of investigations?

LASH

Yes, Internal Security investigations

POSTAL

Did you have occasion to recruit Mary Jo Cook as an informant in an organization known as Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) (Characterization of which is contained in appendix hereto)?

LASH

Yes

POSTAL

Would you state why the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW was being investigated by the FBI?

LASH

I do not feel that I can answer this question within the scope of the current interview.

POSTAL

Who was your supervisor at the time you handled Mary Jo Cook?

LASH

Francis Jenkins

POSTAL

Who was your SAC at the time?

LASH

Richard Ash

POSTAL

Would you describe for us the methods of recruiting Mary Jo Cook.

LASH

Upon discovering that Mary Jo Cook had attended some meetings of the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW, I interviewed her concerning her attendance and indicated to her that I wished her to become an informant for the FBI.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Specifically, what instructions did you give her?

LASH I told her to become a member of the Buffalo Chapter of the VVAW in order that she might gather information concerning violent or radical activities engaged in by the organization.

POSTAL What specific area was Miss Cook assigned to work in?

LASH Initially she became a member of the women's group of the VVAW.

POSTAL Was this group of the VVAW engaged in any specific type of activity at the time?

LASH I believe at this point in time they were trying to develop various programs they could implement in the future.

POSTAL Did you tell her she was to obtain background information concerning individuals in the group?

LASH I told her to obtain information concerning members of the VVAW.

POSTAL What do you mean by "a member?"

LASH The VVAW did not have membership cards as such, however, I considered a person who attends meetings of the Chapter or gives financial or other support to be a member of the organization.

POSTAL What type of background information did she obtain?

LASH She obtained physical descriptions and other types of background information such as residences or employment which would allow me to differentiate between that individual and other individuals in the Buffalo area.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Did you have her provide any other information concerning individuals in the organization?

LASH I asked her to identify those individuals who had a capability of engaging in radical or violent activities.

JEFF KAYDEN What is the difference between violent and radical activities?

LASH Radical activities that are not violent are those which are illegal or infringe upon the rights of other citizens.

POSTAL Did you have another Agent present with you when you recruited Mary Jo Cook?

LASH Yes, I did.

POSTAL For what reason?

LASH It is a FBI regulation that two Agents be present during initial interviews with female informants.

POSTAL Did this Agent become a handling Agent of Mary Jo Cook?

LASH No, he did not. He was merely present during the initial interview.

POSTAL When did you first contact Mary Jo Cook?

LASH June, 1973

POSTAL Did Mary Jo Cook attend meetings of the VVAW with her boyfriend, whose name we shall not mention?

LASH I believe she did.

POSTAL Did she and her boyfriend ever give joint reports?

LASH I can not discuss that matter within the scope of this inquiry.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Miss Cook stated that the objectives of the VVAW were as follows:

To end the war in Viet Nam, to obtain better veteran's benefits, to upgrade bad conduct discharges, to obtain drug treatment for veterans. Is this correct?

LASH I believe they embraced those objectives but they also had others.

POSTAL What were the other objectives?

LASH As she described them, the destruction of U. S. imperialism and the replacement of our form of government with a socialist government, probably modeled after the government of Red China.

POSTAL Did the VVAW ever engage in violent activities?

LASH Yes.

POSTAL Could you cite some examples?

LASH The first meeting she attended, for example, concerned the planning of a disruption of a U. S. Marine Corps Armed Forces Day display in Buffalo. On other occasions actions were planned which were illegal and disruptive.

POSTAL Can you give any examples of violent activities by individual members?

LASH I recall on one occasion several members in this organization told Miss Cook that they felt the actions of an individual who was arrested for a bombing on the University of Michigan campus, which resulted in death, were justified for political purposes.

POSTAL Do you know of any violent activities that VVAW members actually engaged in since the foregoing could possibly be rhetoric?

LASH On several occasions members of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LASH VVAW have physically assaulted members of other subversive groups in the Buffalo area.

POSTAL Miss Cook has indicated that you told her that you were interested in attempts by other groups to take over the VVAW. Did this ever happen?

LASH According to information provided by Miss Cook, the Revolutionary Union (characterization of which is contained in appendix hereeto) was attempting to take over the VVAW. I was interested in this.

POSTAL What is the Revolutionary Union?

LASH The Revolutionary Union is a Maoist subversive group.

POSTAL Was the Revolutionary Union attempting to take over the Buffalo Chapter?

LASH According to Miss Cook, they were trying to take over chapters in several areas of the country and she said that they were taking over the New York City chapter, however, I cannot recall specific attempts to take over the Buffalo chapter while I was handling Miss Cook.

POSTAL Did the Revolutionary Union ever take over the VVAW?

LASH I cannot answer that within the scope of this inquiry.

POSTAL Did you consider the VVAW to be a subversive organization?

LASH Yes

POSTAL Do you know anything about "Cointelpro"?

LASH I cannot answer that within the scope of this inquiry.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Did you ever use information provided by Mary Jo Cook in any cointelpro-type activities such as getting members of VVAW fired from their jobs or telling the parents of members?

LASH No I did not.

POSTAL Did you ever take any actions against Mary Jo Cook or her family?

LASH No I did not.

POSTAL Did you ever engage in any disruptive or neutralizing action against the organization?

LASH I engaged in no disruptive activities, however, if I learned that the organization was planning something illegal I would alert the local authorities and sufficient police officers would appear at the scene to prevent trouble. I feel this neutralized any planned illegality by the VVAW.

POSTAL Did Miss Cook ever provide you with mailing lists of the organization?

LASH Miss Cook provided me with any number of lists, whether they were described as mailing lists or membership lists, I cannot recall.

POSTAL Did she ever provide you with any contribution lists of the organization?

LASH Not that I can recall.

POSTAL Did you ever tell her that you were interested in determining if the organization was receiving funds from foreign sources.

LASH I cannot specifically recall telling her that.

POSTAL Would you be interested in knowing if the VVAW was receiving funds from foreign sources?
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LASH        Yes I would.

POSTAL      Did you ever find out that the VVAW
            was getting funds from foreign sources?

LASH        No.

POSTAL      What did you do with the names that
            were contained on these lists?

LASH        I would review the lists to determine
            if there was anything significant
            contained in them and a great deal of
            them I would do nothing with and merely
            return the lists to Miss Cook. She
            provided me with a lot of material that
            I had no interest in.

POSTAL      Did she ever provide you with a
            defense pamphlet?

LASH        Not that I can recall.

POSTAL      Did she ever give you any information
            concerning VVAW defense strategies?

LASH        I believe she gave me material such
            as reprints of articles from "Psychology
            Today" and from a magazine called,
            "Counter Spy" and other information
            of that nature.

POSTAL      Did she tell you that she was working
            with the Attica Defense Committee?

LASH        Yes.

POSTAL      What is the Attica Defense Committee?

LASH        It is an umbrella-type organization
            in which individuals who are interested
            in defending Attica prisoners as well
            as individuals seeking their own ends
            have gotten together.

POSTAL      Did Miss Cook ever indicate that the
            VVAW was a conduit of mail between
            the Attica Defense Committee and prisoners
            in order to get letters in and out of
            Jail?

LASH        I don't recall her saying that.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Did she ever talk about courtroom
tactics or witnesses to be used
by the Attica Defense Committee?

LASH Not that I can recall

POSTAL Did you ever give any information she
provided to the Attica prosecutors?

LASH None whatsoever

POSTAL Did you ever give any kind of information
regarding the Attica Defense Committee
to others outside the FBI?

LASH I would pass on information concerning
demonstrations, rallies, etc. to the
local authorities.

POSTAL Did she ever talk about demonstrations
in the courtroom itself?

LASH Not that I can recall.

POSTAL Did she ever provide logistical
type information concerning Attica
demonstrations?

LASH Yes, on one occasion she was even
a "parade marshal" at a demonstration.

POSTAL Was there ever any violence at Attica
Defense Committee Demonstrations?

LASH On one occasion another group which was
marching in a demonstration planned
to march out of the parade and trash
the Chase Manhattan Bank in Buffalo
provoking the police. This information
was brought to the attention of the police
and it did not occur. And as I recall,
I also told Mary Jo Cook about this
plan and might have prevented it from
happening.

POSTAL Are any of the individuals who are actually
connected with the defense of the Attica
prisoners known to be violence-prone
individuals?
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LASH  I cannot answer that within the scope of this inquiry

POSTAL  What was the method of her providing you with reports?

LASH  She would provide me with information either in person or by telephone, which I would dictate to a stenographer, have reduced to writing and have her sign.

POSTAL  Did these reports contain background information regarding individuals?

LASH  Yes

POSTAL  What type of background information?

LASH  The same type I described before, physical data, place of employment, residence, etc.

POSTAL  Did she give you follow-up data on this background information?

LASH  Yes. If a person changed his residence or employment she would tell me.

POSTAL  Did she make conclusions in her reports?

LASH  She reported information factually, however, I believe she did make conclusions regarding the propensity for violence for individuals in the organization.

POSTAL  Miss Cook indicated that after a while she began to give you reports wherein several meetings would be reported in one report if these meetings concerned a central theme. Is this true?

LASH  As best I can recall, Miss Cook gave me reports on each individual meeting she attended.

POSTAL  Did you ever indicate to Miss Cook that you had specific questions for her from Washington?

LASH  I cannot recall saying that.
She stated that on occasion you provided her with a list of questions which she said came from Washington and sometimes she did not understand the questions.

On occasion I would ask her questions about the organization. I never gave her any list of questions that I said came from Washington. On several occasions I told her, in response to her questions, that the information she provided was sometimes sent to Washington since it pertained to VVAW nationally. I pointed out that this should calm her fears that the FBI might be getting information from informants who are not telling the true story about the VVAW. I also pointed out to her that her information being accurate would in fact offset any mis-information that might come from another informant.

Did Miss Cook ever provide out of town reports?

Yes. Miss Cook traveled to other cities and provided reports on activities in these cities.

Was she provided with the names of Agents and telephone numbers in these other cities.

Yes she was.

Was this so she could report to these other Agents?

No. She was given the number for emergency purposes only, to be utilized if she found out something that required immediate attention or if she suffered some personal emergency such as an automobile accident, etc.

During her trips to other cities and attendance at conventions, did she obtain any documents for the FBI?

Yes.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL  What was the nature of these documents?

LASH  Any number of documents and handouts were
provided to the attendees at conventions. Some of
these were pamphlets describing VVAV activities, copies
of VVAV newspapers, flyers concerning demonstrations and
activities in other VVAV chapters, etc.

POSTAL  What was the method of payment for Miss Cook's
services?

LASH  Miss Cook was paid on a COD basis for
information provided.

POSTAL  Was she paid a salary?

LASH  No

POSTAL  What determined the amount that she was
paid monthly?

LASH  She was paid on a monthly basis COD for
information provided. Inasmuch as she
provided a good deal of information every
month, she was usually paid the maximum
amount permitted by FBI Headquarters,
therefore monthly payments often totaled
similar amounts.

POSTAL  Was she instructed to pay income tax?

LASH  She was advised to treat all money
she received from the Bureau as income
and to pay appropriate taxes.

POSTAL  Was she given any instructions on how
to report her income from the FBI?

LASH  I cannot recall giving her any specific
instructions, however, if I had I would
have instructed her to report it as
miscellaneous income or income from
self-employment, something of that nature.

POSTAL  Were these instructions to conceal the
fact that she was receiving money from
confidential FBI funds?

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UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

LASH No. This would have been to conceal
the fact that she was an FBI informant.

POSTAL Did you get Mary Jo Cook a job?

LASH I aided her in finding employment.

POSTAL What were the circumstances?

LASH Miss Cook indicated that she was being
criticized by members of her group
for being a "lumpen proletariat" (PH)
for not being gainfully employed.
This is a Marxist term for anyone
being supported by their parents
or Welfare, etc. She indicated that
it would be necessary for her to find,
a job and I contacted a social
acquaintance of mine who is employed
by a Buffalo area bank, who advised that
the bank is always looking for tellers.
I advised Miss Cook to go to the bank.
She did and she got a job as a teller.

POSTAL Did Mary Jo Cook feel she was an
Agent Provocateur?

LASH No. On the contrary, I feel if anything
she was a non-provocateur since I
instructed her to act in such a way as to
prevent any violent or illegal act that might
be discussed in her presence. I think she
understood this and acted in this way.

POSTAL Why did Mary Jo Cook act as an informant?

LASH Mary Jo Cook was an actual member of the
VVAW as well as being an informant for the
FBI. She reconciled this in her mind
by feeling that she was providing
the FBI with information that was objective
and true about the organization, as well as
preventing violent individuals from taking
over the group.

POSTAL What percentage of the group did you feel
was violence prone?

LASH I do not think I can answer that.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL

You cannot give some approximation?

LASH

According to Miss Cook there were
individuals who were not interested at all
in violence, as well as individuals who were
interested in taking up the gun and
fighting in the streets as a defensive
measure assuming that a violent revolution
would be started by the establishment.
There were also individuals who were
interested in initiating violence themselves
to bring about their political goals.
What percentage of the group each of
these factions represented, I cannot say.

KAYDEN

Could you indicate the number of
violent activities that the VVAW was
involved in during the period you
handled Mary Jo Cook?

LASH

I cannot recall.

KAYDEN

Was it 2 or 25?

LASH

Between 2 and 25.

KAYDEN

Mary Jo Cook indicated that the VVAW members
were the most loving and good people she
has ever met. Did she ever indicate that
to you?

LASH

Yes.

KAYDEN

If she indicated that these people
were so loving and good, how did
you feel that they could engage in
acts of violence.

LASH

I do not mean to be facetious, but
I have read that the "Charles Manson
family" in California claim to love
each other and are very interested
in ecology and other good things.
But I believe they certainly seem
to be capable of engaging in violence.

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UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
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POSTAL Miss Cook indicates that she felt there were other informants in the group. Did you ever discuss other informants with her?

LASH On one occasion an individual came to Buffalo from another part of New York state who was suspected of being an informant. The group wanted to take action against him, however Mary Jo Cook told them they should take no action, but rather should check with VVAW members in his home area to determine if he was an informant. I believe at the time it was necessary for me to ask her about this situation immediately after it happened and she therefore suspected we had other informants in the organization.

POSTAL Did you indicate to her that if she were to quit you would put other informants in the organization who would possibly not be as truthful about the VVAW as she was?

LASH Yes. I believe I did indicate this to her.

POSTAL Why did she quit?

LASH Because she indicated that she was having nightmares and suffering actual physical afflictions due to her fears of being discovered as an informant.

POSTAL She has indicated that she has had long political discussions with you where you disagreed with her on political issues. Is this correct?

LASH Yes, this is correct.

POSTAL What prompted these discussions?

LASH She indicated on many occasions that as a member of the VVAW she was only hearing political perspective from the far left. She asked that I present her with an alternative perspective which I attempted to do. I attempted to point out that there are two sides
to every question. For example, I recall on one occasion she was told by the VVAW that Bethlehem Steel in the Buffalo area had permitted a worker to die rather than shut down a blast furnace after a worker had fallen down into the furnace area. I checked on this and told her that the true story was that the worker had had a fatal heart attack before falling into the dangerous area and that immediately after his fall everything was shut down for his rescue.

POSTAL Did she indicate to you that she was especially concerned about the atrocities at Attica Prison?

LASH Yes, she did.

POSTAL Did you ever indicate to her that you talked to someone who had been there and said there were no atrocities?

LASH I indicated to her that I had talked to a physician who had been there after the rebellion had been put down who had told me that the individuals he treated had been injured during the period the prison was in the hands of the rebellious inmates and not during the suppression of the riot.

POSTAL Did she ever discuss political parties with you?

LASH The only thing I can recall is her telling me that at some time in the future the VVAW will be a grassroots socialist party in the United States.

POSTAL Did she mention an individual named Martin Solestry (PH)?

LASH Do you mean Martin Sostre?

POSTAL Who is he?

LASH He is a prison inmate I believe in Auburn Prison.
UNITED STATES SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

POSTAL Is there a Martin Sostre Defense Committee?

LASH I believe so.

POSTAL Did she ever give you any information about the Martin Sostre Defense Committee?

LASH No

POSTAL When she wanted to quit did you try to keep her as an informant?

LASH On several occasions I convinced her that she should remain an informant but at the time of our last contact I felt that she had truly made up her mind and I made no further attempt to convince her to remain an informant.

POSTAL Did it bother you that she was reporting to you on the political activities of these individuals?

LASH I don't feel that I can answer either of these questions within the scope of the inquiry.
APPENDIX

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR/
WINTER SOLDIER ORGANIZATION

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, formed in 1967 by Vietnam veterans to protest United States involve-
ment in the war in Southeast Asia (changed name to Vietnam Veterans Against the War/Winter Soldier Organization (VVAW/
WSO) in 1973 to include non-veterans as members), has spon-
sored numerous anti-government demonstrations, some resulting in violence. The VVAW/WSO National Office (NO) and some key chapters are infiltrated and influenced by the militant Revolu-
tionary Union (RU) organization, and VVAW/WSO leaders have told members that VVAW/WSO is a revolutionary organization, not "just another group of war veterans." The current Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist oriented NO, which promotes education of the membership in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine and directs the organization into political growth along the same lines, has at VVAW/WSO National Steering Committee Meetings (NSCM), in 1974, portrayed VVAW/WSO as a mass anti-imperialist organization and a vanguard of the revolution eventually created by the masses.

VVAW/WSO leaders voted at the December, 1974 NSCM to align VVAW/WSO with the RU, which organization follows a strict Maoist line designed to bring about violent revolution in the United States.
APPENDIX

REVOLUTIONARY UNION

The Revolutionary Union (RU), founded in early 1968 in the San Francisco Bay area, is a militant semi-covert Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organization ideologically oriented towards the People's Republic of China and the teachings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung. Its objectives as set forth in its theoretical publication, "The Red Papers," and in its monthly newspaper, "Revolution," are the development of a united front against imperialism, the fostering of revolutionary working class unity and leadership in struggle, and the formation of a communist party based on Marxism-Leninism-MAO Tse-tung thought, leading to the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. Members of the RU have been identified as collecting weapons while engaging in firearms and guerrilla warfare training. As of July, 1974, RU national headquarters was located in Maywood, Illinois.
The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to the White House

Memorandum reporting the results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of incumbent SA Garry G. Lash

Interviewed regarding his handling of the former confidential informant, Mary Jo Cook, in connection with her membership in the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

62-116395

FMK: fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW
Memorandum

TO: Mr. J. B. Adams

FROM: Legal Counsel

DATE: 12/31/75

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REQUEST BY JACK FULLER FOR COPIES OF DOCUMENTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-3-00 BY SAFA

At 9:25 a.m. on December 31, 1975, Jack Fuller, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, telephonically requested assistance in locating copies of three documents previously sent to the Attorney General by the Director. Mr. Fuller said that he is compiling for the Attorney General materials relevant to questions that were asked by the Senate Select Committee concerning reports made by the Director to the Attorney General regarding sensitive matters in response to the Attorney General's instructions that such reports should be made to him by the Director.

The documents are not readily available to Fuller in the Department due to difficulties in locating them in their filing system and he only had the following general descriptions of the documents:

1. Memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated June 4, 1975, captioned "John Caputo and Others, Bribery";

2. A memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated November 21, 1975, concerning allegations that an FBI Agent was in violation of the gun control statutes in the Baltimore, Maryland, area;

3. A memorandum from the Director to the Attorney General dated July 22, 1975, which concerned Communications Intelligence Programs. This memorandum was referred to in a subsequent communication dated September 3, 1975.

JAM:mfd (5)

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee

Item 1 appears to be a matter that was handled by the Special Investigative Division; item 2 was handled by the Administrative Division; and item 3 appears to be a matter concerning the Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the concerned divisions identify the requested documents and furnish Legal Counsel a copy of each for transmission to Jack Fuller by close of business December 31, 1975.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Moore

FROM: J. H. Campbell

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR KELLEY'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 10, 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED

DATE: 12/30/75

For record purposes, attached are (1) a copy of the prepared statement which Mr. Kelley read at the outset of his December 10 appearance before the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate and (2) a transcript of the questions which were asked Mr. Kelley by the Committee members, together with Mr. Kelley's responses to those questions.

On December 10, each Field Office and Legal Attache was sent a copy of Mr. Kelley's prepared statement. A copy of the transcript of the questions and answers is being sent to each Field Office and Legal Attache today.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information and record purposes.

Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. Callahan - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enclosure
1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure
1 - Each Assistant Director - Enclosure (Sent direct)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NW 55884 DocId:32989560 Page 128
STATEMENT OF

CLARENCE M. KELLEY

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

U. S. SENATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1975
I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal security fields.

I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with law.

I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone
outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests.

I believe we have lived up to those promises. The members and staff of this Committee have had unprecedented access to FBI information.

You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence fields.

In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress.

As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's record of performance.
It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization.

The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths -- were approved.

I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year.

Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable.

The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people.
What I said then -- in 1974 -- and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States.

Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California.

The victims of these acts were human beings -- men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril -- whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government, their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their rights.

There were many calls for action from Members of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands...impatient demands...for immediate action.

FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith,
initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial
efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and
to neutralize violent activities.

In the development and execution of these programs,
mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

Our concern over whatever abuses occurred
in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were
some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying
purpose of those programs.

We must recognize that situations have occurred
in the past and will arise in the future where the
Government may well be expected to depart from its
traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi-
gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take
affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent
threat to human life or property.

In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to
be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities
by investigating only after the crime has occurred, or
should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those
instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because
of an imminent threat to human life.

Where there exists the potential to penetrate
and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of
whether or not such preventive action should be available to the FBI.

These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible manner.

Probably the most important question here today is what assurances can I give that the errors and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

First, let me assure the Committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office as Director on July 9, 1973.

Today we place a high premium on openness -- openness both within and without the service.

I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decision-making process which insures that no future program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a full and critical review of its propriety.
Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

The results of this program have been most beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined performance...and to the morale of our employees.

In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability — in his own words — "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any
requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearance of impropriety.

I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made overtures -- directly or otherwise -- to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes.

I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring any such request.

I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities over the FBI.

I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means.

Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the person who occupies the office of Director and every member of the FBI under him.
I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI.

The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields -- problems which all too often we have been left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself.

As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch.

The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been
commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee.

I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step -- a step that I believe is absolutely essential -- a legislative charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI.

Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in the past.

This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role, not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of our performance.

I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages
of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions.

I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive decision.

The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people.

Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience, the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or local -- is when demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so.

I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task.
It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violence across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges.

The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress.

In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that information needed for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there are some fundamental differences between these
investigations that should be recognized — differences in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined.

By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information — that is intelligence.

Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We
recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or its successor in this important task.

In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact.
TO:  Elmer Larson  
     Paul Daly

FROM: Ray Hornblower  
       Assistant Special Counsel for 
       Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: FBI Materials that Treasury Department Intends to Transmit to SSC, Subject to DOJ Approval

Mike Shaheen recommended that you review these FBI documents before we authorize Treasury to release them to the Senate Select Committee. Mike and I don't see any problem in releasing them. If you agree, could you send those back to this office at your earliest convenience?

cc: Paul Daly
TO: Elmer Larson
Paul Daly

FROM: Ray Hornblower
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: FBI Materials that Treasury Department Intends to Transmit
to SEC, Subject to DOJ Approval

Mike Shaheen recommended that you review these FBI documents before we authorize Treasury to release them to the Senate Select Committee. Mike and I don't see any problem in releasing them. If you agree, could you send them back to this office at your earliest convenience?

ALL FURTHER INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/30/75 BY SHAEFFER

cc: Paul Daly
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 8, 1975, containing a request for access to certain FBI materials regarding FBI investigation of lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962.

Enclosed herewith for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which is our complete response to the above request. Also enclosed for your records is a copy of this memorandum.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY ROOM"
December 29, 1975

Reference is made to SSC letter dated December 8, 1975, containing a request for access to certain FBI materials regarding FBI investigation of lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962.

In accordance with established procedures, the FBI file concerning the above has been reviewed and the pertinent material has been extracted. In order to make our response meaningful, the references to our technical coverage of foreign diplomatic establishments have been left in the excised documents. It is noted these documents are classified. Therefore, their contents should not be disclosed or released to the news media without prior FBI authority. These documents are presently available at FBI Headquarters for review by authorized SSC Staff Members.

It should be noted that the documents mentioned above are FBI letters to the Attorney General. The information contained in these letters was in all instances also furnished in substantially the same form to the Assistant Attorneys General of both the Criminal Division and the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice.

1 - The Attorney General

RDH:mjg/lhb /ll/ ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

NOTE: The SSC is also requesting documents regarding this matter from the Department of Justice. Therefore, FBI response to this request was coordinated with Steve Blackhurst of the Department. A copy of referenced SSC request is attached.
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 2, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
December 8, 1975

Michael E. Shahen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests that limited staff access be provided to all materials in the possession of the FBI and the Justice Department reflecting the dissemination of information by the FBI from the wiretaps authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy in connection with the investigation of lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962. The procedures will be the same as those used for staff access to similar materials pertaining to the so-called "17 wiretaps" under the Nixon Administration.

This request should be handled on a priority basis and expedited accordingly.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Mr. Paul Daly
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

12/8/75 request - lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962

Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: Jo Staggers
Received by: Carl Shum

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index  
FROM: FBI  

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees  

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>BRIEFING</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TESTIMONY</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
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<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. DATE PROVIDED  
12/29/75  

FOR REVIEW  

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)  

| SSC | HSC |

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)  

Memorandum  

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)  

SSC letter 12/8/75  

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)  

U  

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)  

Surveillance, electronic  

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  

DATE 11-3-75 BY SCRAPER  

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)  

Available for review by appropriate SSC Staff Members at FBIHQ materials regarding FBI investigation of lobbying activities in 1961 and 1962.  

62-116395  

FMK: fmk  

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75  

TREAT AS YELLOW  

3791 (4-75)
Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated November 21, 1975, requesting delivery of materials pertaining to authorization and purpose of certain electronic surveillances, and to our memoranda of December 1, 8, 15, and 19, which respond to Items 1 through 30 of the November 21 letter as they pertain to telephone surveillances.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds to Items 1 through 3, and 7 through 8, of the November 21 SSC letter. Item 4 deals with Martin L. King, Jr., and this information has been furnished previously to the SSC. We are assembling material in response to Items 5 and 6. Response to Item 9 was included in our memorandum of December 15, 1975, under Item 19.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
NOTE:

SSC letter of November 21, asked for material relating to authorizations and purpose of 30 telephone and 9 microphone surveillances. We have furnished information relating to the telephone surveillances by memoranda of December 1, 8, 15, and 19. This memorandum responds to Items 1 through 3, and 7 through 8, of that portion of the SSC letter dealing with microphone surveillances. We have responded to Item 4, relating to King, in previous memoranda to the SSC. We are assembling data relating to Items 5 and 6 and will respond on completion of this effort. Item 9 was included in our memorandum of December 15, 1975, under Item 19.
December 29, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION
AND PURPOSE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES
CONDUCTED BY THE FBI

Reference is made to the SSC letter of November 21, 1975, requesting delivery of materials pertaining to the authorization and purpose of certain electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI.

The SSC letter of November 21 referenced a summary chart prepared by the FBI showing electronic surveillances conducted by the FBI since 1960. This chart was furnished to the SSC by letter of October 23, 1975.

This memorandum effects delivery of documents responsive to Items 1 through 3, and 7 through 8 of the November 21 SSC letter, specifically that portion of the letter dealing with microphone surveillances. Those items are as follows:

Item 1 - Nation of Islam, 1960 through 1965 (Boston, Kansas City, Detroit, Buffalo and Seattle).

Item 2 - Elijah Muhammad, 1961 through 1965.

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES CONDUCTED BY THE FBI

Item 7 - Students for a Democratic Society, 1969.


Item 4 relates to Martin Luther King, Jr. Information dealing with electronic surveillance of King has been furnished previously to the SSC in connection with a separate inquiry.

Information dealing with Items 5 and 6 is being assembled and will be furnished as soon as possible. Response to Item 9 was handled in our memorandum of December 15, 1975, under Item 19.

1 - The Attorney General
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Addressee: 

☐ LTR ☑ LH M ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 12/29/75

U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC). Re: Request
Caption of Document: Pertaining to Authorization & Pur-
pose of Electronic Surveillances Conducted by
FBI. (SSC letter 11/21/75, Items 1-3, 7-8)

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: J. G. Stassinos Date: 1/4/76

Received by: Lyndey Oster

Title: Clerk

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-3-80 BY SO/AL/R

ENCLOSURE

02-116 395—12378
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
   for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   X DOCUMENT
   BRIEFING
   INTERVIEW
   TESTIMONY
   OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
   12/29/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   X SSC
   HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
   interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
   wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoenas, etc.)

   SSC letter 11/21/75, items 1-3 and 7-8

6. CLASSIFICATION OF
   INFORMATION (enter
   U, C, S, TS or
   Codeword)

   U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list below. Words not listed are used
   underline line for emphasis)

   Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Effecting delivery of authorization and purpose of electronic
   surveillances conducted by the FBI on Nation of Islam, 1960-65;
   Elijah Muhammad, 1961-65; National States Rights Party, 1962;
   Students for a Democratic Society, 1969; Black Panther Party,
   1970.

   62-116395
   FMK: fuk
   (4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
   IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

   TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6.75)
NW 55110 DocId:32995560 Page 156
62 -116 398 -1237X

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst  
Assistant Special Counsel for  
Intelligence Coordination  
SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request Dated December 23, 1975  

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee dated December 23, 1975, which requests FBI materials relating to Sam A. Jaffe. Please arrange an appropriate response.
Michael E. Shaheen, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.  20530

Dear Mr. Shaheen:

In connection with the Committee's investigation, I am writing to request delivery to the Committee of the following materials:

All records, files, documents or other materials relating to Sam A. Jaffe, presently residing at 6510 Bradley, Blvd., Bethesda, Md.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
John Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc:  John Hotis
Office of Congressional Affairs
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Reference is made to a letter, with attachment, from the SSC dated December 16, 1975, requesting delivery of certain materials dealing with authorization and purpose of telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens during the period 1973 through 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds to Paragraph 3 of the December 16 letter, and Items 1 through 4 of the attachment.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

I - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
The Attorney General

NOTE:

SSC letter of December 31, 1975, requested delivery of documents concerning authorization and purpose of certain electronic surveillances during the period 1973 - 1975. In a December 19, 1975 conference with John T. Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, Mr. Elliff advised Section Chief J. O. Cregar and Supervisor H. W. Porter III that our response would be sufficient if limited to American citizens only, as opposed to citizens and resident aliens. Attached to yellow is a copy of the December 31 SSC request.
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND
PURPOSE OF TELEPHONE AND MICROPHONE
SURVEILLANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICAN CITIZENS
QR RESIDENT ALIENS DURING THE PERIOD
1973 - 1975

Reference is made to the SSC letter of December 16,
1975, with attachment, requesting delivery of materials pertaining
to the authorization and purpose of certain electronic
surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens
during the period 1973 through 1975.

In a meeting with FBI Intelligence Division representa-
tives on December 19, 1975, Mr. John T. Elliff, Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force, advised that in response to
Items 1 through 4 of the attachment to the December 16 letter
it would be sufficient to furnish materials dealing only with
individuals who had been identified, by current review of records,
as being United States citizens.

Paragraph 3 of your December 16 letter requests all
materials pertaining to any surreptitious-entry conducted by
the FBI over the past five years which "was not directed at a
non-resident alien in the service of a foreign power." We
interpret this to mean entries directed at resident aliens and/or
United States citizens not in the service of a foreign power.
There were five individual targets of such entries. Three have
been included in delivery of materials effected by this memorandum.
Documents concerning authorization and purpose of surveillances

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
net without the express approval of the FBI.
RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE OF TELEPHONE AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICAN CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS DURING THE PERIOD 1973 - 1975

regarding the two remaining targets have been furnished in earlier memoranda. One target was identified as Huey P. Newton (Item 8, Bureau memorandum of December 8, 1975, responding to SSC letter of November 21, 1975), and the second target was the Black Panther Party (Item 8, Bureau memorandum of December 29, 1975, responding to SSC letter of November 21, 1975).

This memorandum effects delivery of documents responsive to Paragraph 3 of the December 21 SSC letter, and to Items 1 through 4 of the attachment to the December 21 letter.

1 - The Attorney General
TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee letter dated December 16, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting delivery of certain materials concerning electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

My initial view is that the Senate Select Committee should be given the same excised versions of the authorizing documents that the House Select Committee was given in response to its request. I would oppose giving the Senate Select Committee access to the unexcised version of these documents for security reasons.

With regard to the November 21 letter referenced in John Elliff's letter, we propose to give John Elliff access to the unexcised versions of the documents but would prefer that the Senate Select Committee be given delivery of excised versions only. Elliff's letter appears to accept this arrangement.

With regard to the request for materials concerning any surreptitious entries, the Senate Select Committee is referring to what was described as a surreptitious entry not related to a microphone surveillance in 1972 against an "Arab Terrorist Activist". This surreptitious entry was listed on an FBI memorandum dated November 5, 1975 which was in response to a request from the House Select Committee. This memorandum was delivered initially to the Senate Select Committee by mistake. Because I have not
seen the materials requested I do not know what an appropriate response to this request would be.
United States Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
(Pursuant to S. Res. 11, 94th Congress)
Washington, D.C. 20510

December 16, 1975

Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

The Select Committee requests delivery of the materials in the attached list pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens during the period 1973-1975.

In the case of surveillances directed at groups or meetings which included both non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power and American citizens or resident aliens, delivery of the materials is also requested.

In addition to the materials listed in the attachment, the Committee requests all materials pertaining to any surreptitious entry conducted by the FBI over the past five years which was not directed at a non-resident alien in the service of a foreign power.

With respect to this request and the request for similar materials made in my letter of November 21, 1975, the names of the targets may be excised. Unexcised versions of the documents should be made available for access.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
John T. Elliff, Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

Attachment
Request for Access to FBI Materials

1. For the period 1973-1975, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:
   a. foreign intelligence agents;
   b. foreign intelligence contacts;*
   c. foreign intelligence agent suspects;
   d. foreign diplomatic officials contact;
   e. foreign intelligence agent's business office.

2. For the year 1973, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:
   a. headquarters basic revolutionary group;*
   b. pro-Palestine group;
   c. Arab terrorist activist;
   d. propaganda outlet League of Arab States;
   e. West Coast fund-raising for Arab terrorist groups.

3. For the year 1974, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:
   a. headquarters basic revolutionary group;*
   b. Arab terrorist affiliate;
   c. pro-Palestine group;
d. Arab terrorist activist;*

e. propaganda outlet League of Arab States;*

f. Arab terrorist activist affiliate.**

4. For the year 1975, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:

a. Arab terrorist affiliate;*

b. pro-Palestine group;

c. Arab terrorist activist;

d. propaganda outlet League of Arab States;*

e. coverage of Arab terrorist activist meeting;**

f. pro-Chicom propaganda outlet.*

* Summary chart reveals telephone surveillance only.

** Summary chart reveals microphone surveillance only.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term; if a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   - DOCUMENT
   - BRIEFING
   - INTERVIEW
   - TESTIMONY
   - OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
   - 1/7/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   - SSC
   - MSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

   SSC letter 12/16/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)
   - U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Materials furnished pertaining to any surreptitious entry conducted by the FBI over the past five years directed at resident aliens and/or U.S. Citizens not in the service of a foreign power. There were five individual targets of such entries. Also documents concerning authorization and purpose of surveillances furnished.

   62-116395
   FMK: fmk
   (4) ORIgINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

   TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

62 1/63 3 = 1236X

NW 55110 DocId:32999560 Page 168
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Address: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☑ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 1/18/75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document:
12/16/75 request - electronic surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: [Signature] Date: 1-12-76

Received by: [Signature] Title: Staff

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

DATE 11-3-00 BY [Signature]
Reference is made to a letter, with attachments, from the SSC dated December 16, 1975, requesting delivery of certain materials dealing with authorization and purpose of telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens during the period 1973 through 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds to Paragraph 3 of the December 16 letter, and Items 1 through 4 of the attachment.

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

SEE NOTE PAGE 2
The Attorney General

NOTE:

SSC letter of December 25, 1975, requested delivery of documents concerning authorization and purpose of certain electronic surveillances during the period 1973 - 1975. In a December 19, 1975 conference with John T. Elliff, Domestic Intelligence Task Force Director, Mr. Elliff advised Section Chief W. O. Cregar and Supervisor H. W. Porter III that our response would be sufficient if limited to American citizens only, as opposed to citizens and resident aliens. Attached to yellow is a copy of the December 25 SSC request.
January 7, 1976

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND
PURPOSE OF TELEPHONE AND MICROPHONE
SURVEILLANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICAN CITIZENS
OR RESIDENT ALIENS DURING THE PERIOD
1973 – 1975

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There were five individual targets of such entries. Three have
been included in delivery of materials effected by this memorandum.
Documents concerning authorization and purpose of surveillances

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
and without the express approval of the FBI.
RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE OF TELEPHONE AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICAN CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS DURING THE PERIOD 1973 - 1975

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This memorandum effects delivery of documents responsive to Paragraph 3 of the December 21 SSC letter, and to Items 1 through 4 of the attachment to the December 21 letter.

1 - The Attorney General
TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
   Legal Counsel Division
   Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Steven K. Blackhurst
      Asst. Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee letter dated December 16, 1975

Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting delivery of certain materials concerning electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Please arrange for an appropriate response.

My initial view is that the Senate Select Committee should be given the same excised versions of the authorizing documents that the House Select Committee was given in response to its request. I would oppose giving the Senate Select Committee access to the unexcised version of these documents for security reasons.

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cc: Paul Daly
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Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mike:

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In the case of surveillances directed at groups or meetings which included both non-resident aliens in the service of a foreign power and American citizens or resident aliens, delivery of the materials is also requested.

In addition to the materials listed in the attachment, the Committee requests all materials pertaining to any surreptitious entry conducted by the FBI over the past five years which was not directed at a non-resident alien in the service of a foreign power.

With respect to this request and the request for similar materials made in my letter of November 21, 1975, the names of the targets may be excised. Unexcised versions of the documents should be made available for access.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

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   a. foreign intelligence agents;
   b. foreign intelligence contacts;*
   c. foreign intelligence agent suspects;
   d. foreign diplomatic officials contact;
   e. foreign intelligence agent's business office.

2. For the year 1973, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:
   a. headquarters basic revolutionary group;*
   b. pro-Palestine group;
   c. Arab terrorist activist;
   d. propaganda outlet League of Arab States;
   e. West Coast fund-raising for Arab terrorist groups.

3. For the year 1974, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:
   a. headquarters basic revolutionary group;*
   b. Arab terrorist affiliate;
   c. pro-Palestine group;
d. Arab terrorist activist;*

e. propaganda outlet, League of Arab States;*

f. Arab terrorist activist affiliate.**

4. For the year 1975, materials pertaining to the authorization for and purpose of non-consensual telephone and microphone surveillances directed at American citizens or resident aliens falling in the following categories:

a. Arab terrorist affiliate;*

b. pro-Palestine group;

c. Arab terrorist activist;

d. propaganda outlet, League of Arab States;*

e. coverage of Arab terrorist activist meeting;**

f. pro-Chicom propaganda outlet.*

* Summary chart reveals telephone surveillance only.

** Summary chart reveals microphone surveillance only.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   - DOCUMENT
   - BRIEFING
   - INTERVIEW
   - TESTIMONY
   - OTHER

   X  

2. DATE PROVIDED
   1/7/76

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   - SSC
   - IEC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum and enclosures.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

   SSC letter 12/16/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, 2, TS or Code word)

   U

7. ALL WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Materials furnished pertaining to any surreptitious entry conducted by the FBI over the past five years directed at resident aliens and/or U.S. Citizens not in the service of a foreign power. There were five individual targets of such entries. Also documents concerning authorization and purpose of surveillances furnished.

   67-116395

   ( ) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
   DATE 4-400 BY 3/20/76

   TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)
Address: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

Caption of Document: 12/16/75 request - electronic surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Signed: Date: 1/13/76

Received by: Signed: Title: Chief

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-3-60 BY

NW 55110 DocId:32989560 Page 180