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**FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUIDE**

**August 1960**

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**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUIDE****TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION: GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS	2-24
A. Definition	2
B. DA Types by Origin	3-6
1. Transfers	3
2. Walk-In or Talk-In	3-4
3. D and D	4
4. Provocation	4-5
C. Goals in DA Operations	6-10
1. KUBARK	6-9
2. Adversary	9-10
D. Selection and the Four Key Tests	10-13
1. The Tests	10-12
a. Withholding	11
b. Stayability	11
c. Adversary Trust	11
d. Control of Communication	11-12

**SECRET**

**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY**

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
2. Significance of Tests	12
3. U.S. Citizens as DA's	12-13
E. Planning and Preliminary Steps	13-24
1. Estimating Adversary Goals	13
2. Information Needed for Planning	13-17
3. The Plan	17-22
4. Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides	23-24
III. THE DOUBLE AGENT AS A PERSON	25-33
A. Willingness	25-26
B. Emotional Stability	26-27
C. Emotional Attachments to Others	27-28
D. Level of Intelligence	28
E. Gullibility - Scepticism	29
F. Trustworthiness	29-30
G. Ambition	30
H. Clandestinity	30-31
I. Introversion - Extroversion	32
J. Other Traits	32
K. Summary	32-33

**KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****SECRET**

**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY**

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
IV. THE DOUBLE AGENT AS AN AGENT	34-46
A. Prior Intelligence Associations	34
B. Continuing Investigation	34-35
C. Training	35-36
D. Testing	36-40
E. Control	41-44
F. Agent Motivation	44-46
V. THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION: SPECIFICS	47-69
A. Access	47-51
B. Appetite	51-52
C. Production	52-55
D. Mirror-Reading	55-56
E. KUBARK Security	57-60
F. Adversary Security	60-61
G. Communications	61-64

**KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****SECRET**

**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY**

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
H. Finances	64-67
I. Reporting	67-69
VI. CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST	70-82
VII. INDEX	83-90

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**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****Field Guide for Double Agent Operations****I. INTRODUCTION**

For the past two years KUDESK has been engaged in a detailed analysis of KUBARK double agent cases. The results have been collated, and the findings have been disseminated within headquarters in a study which is also available to the field upon request.

This guide is intended for field use by case officers and others concerned with DA operations. It represents both the above research and the views of a number of experienced and senior KUBARK officers.

If field reporting of double agent operations includes all essentials discussed here, further research on this subject will be facilitated and further guidance will result, in a continuing cycle.

The comments and views of the users of this guide are solicited.

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**II. THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION:**  
**GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS**

A discussion of operational details appears in Part V of this guide. Here the purpose is to present basic information and principles about the beginnings of DA operations.

**A. Definition.**

A double agent is a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one to the other or about each to the other, and who is wittingly withholding significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant information is withheld from the other service. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who do not perform a service for an intelligence organization, but only for themselves, are not agents at all and therefore are not DA's. As a rule the DA has an agent relationship with both services, a fact which distinguishes him from the penetration agent, who usually serves the CI service as an agent but the target or adversary service as a staff member or in a staff capacity. Multiple agents frequently draw a variety of assignments from several services. Although they may provide counterintelligence information, and although they present difficulties in handling and security which resemble these problems in the double agent operation, the two types are distinct. The DA is usually directed against a single adversary, whereas the multiple agent resembles a private detective with a number of clients.

The part of the definition which stipulates the withholding of significant information results from the fact that an agent who tells everything he knows to both sides becomes, unless unwittingly manipulated by one of the services, an unauthorized liaison channel with the enemy. Such situations are unprofitable and cease to be operations.

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**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****B. Types of DA Operations by Origin.**

Almost all double agent operations begin in one of three ways: a walk-in or talk-in, hostile agent detected and doubled, or a provocation. KUBARK often acquires a DA case by transfer from another ODYOKE service or from liaison; when it does, it is important that the type of origin be included in the information obtained from the transferring service. A DA case can also result if one service offers recruitment to the agent of another not because of provocation or stake-out but by chance.

**1. The Transferred Agent.**

Analysis suggests that nearly two-thirds of KUBARK's DA operations begin (for KUBARK) by transfer from another service. Usually, however, the transferring service merely made initial contact with a walk-in and turned him over to KUBARK without having used him operationally. If a going operation is transferred, it is vital that the base or case officer accepting jurisdiction obtain the case records of the prior service. If these are unavailable, knowledgeable representatives of the transferring service should be debriefed as completely as possible. Flaws imbedded in the operation may make it unsuitable for exploitation or may require correction. In addition to determining origin, the KUBARK case officer should obtain the prior service's assessment of the DA, both as person and as agent. Even if the case officer considers that the earlier handling was defective, he should give due weight to such an assessment. In a few operations KUBARK has repeated the mistakes of the transferring service through failure to obtain an assessment or through ignoring the earlier record.

**2. The Walk-In and Talk-In.**

More than half of KUBARK's DA cases start because an agent of an adversary service volunteers information to a

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non-Bloc service or official. Although the danger of provocation is always present in walk-in cases, the fact remains that DA operations that have begun in this way have, as a class, proven more rewarding to KUBARK than any other type. The agent of an adversary service who approaches KUBARK and volunteers information about the adversary has a choice of a number of means of making the first contact. In addition to presenting himself physically (to KUBARK or any ODYOKE intermediary), he can send an emissary, write a letter, make a phone call, or even establish radio contact. KUBARK's problem, clearly, is to separate the walk-ins and talk-ins who are acting on their own initiative from those who are seeking contact at the instigation of a hostile service.

**3. Detected and Doubled (D & D).**

About a fifth of the DA cases handled directly by KUBARK have begun with the identification of a hostile agent, interrogation, and doubling. Analysis suggests that in peacetime D & D cases are frequently perilous and unprofitable. The agent's agreement to double, obtained under stated or implied duress, is rarely accompanied by a real switch in loyalties. The likeliest exception is the agent who served the adversary unwillingly, under pressure, and who (though afraid to approach the authorities on his own initiative) is relieved when his clandestine role is brought to light. The risk in handling D & D cases is also mitigated in joint operations conducted with liaison services that can exercise strong executive authority.

**4. The Provocation Agent.**

Provocation is the least common origin of DA cases. When employed, it has, in the past, been used by a Bloc service against KUBARK or another Western service more frequently than vice-versa. Provocation may be direct, as

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in an approach by a walk-in or talk-in, or indirect. The latter technique usually employs an agent whose access and other assets make him attractive to the adversary and who places himself in the way of recruitment without seizing the initiative. Provocation through direct approach is plainly difficult if the adversary service is sophisticated.

Even the agent whom we initially consider detected and doubled can be a provocation. We may have learned something (but not all) of the story of his ties to the adversary because the adversary wanted us to. Or the agent's confession may be partial; he may withhold, for example, one channel of communication to the hostile service and then, through that channel, tell the adversary how much he has told us.

A provocation agent establishing initial contact as a walk-in must have direct contact with the target service at least once. And the target service, if interested in the bait, is likely to try to arrange for future meetings on territory under its jurisdiction (or that of a cooperative service). Under such circumstances the provoking service usually fears some slippage of control. The provocateur who never appears - who makes contact only by mail, W/T, a go-between, or a like medium - is less likely to be acceptable to the target service, and if accepted is less likely to be trusted. But the security and control advantages for the provoking service are obviously weighty.

KUBARK use of provocation seems to be a rarity, so that the available evidence has not provided a basis for estimating our effectiveness in using the technique. Because its value has been demonstrated by others, however, personnel are urged to plan and mount, as feasible, provocation operations designed to yield counterintelligence of high quality.

5. The way in which a double agent operation starts is of continuing significance. The chances that KUBARK

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
will "get the edge" are best if the agent's prior service was with KUBARK rather than the opposition, are better than average if he is a walk-in who has not delayed in telling his story to a non-Communist official or service and who passes KUBARK testing, and are poor if a detected adversary agent has been compelled to double. As the operation develops, the case officer should not forget the significance of the way in which it started.

C. Goals: Kubark and Adversary.

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
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
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## 2. Adversary Goals.

Analysis of a number of unilateral KUBARK double agent operations has shown the following adversary objectives, listed in order of descending frequency:

- a. To obtain information on emigres and emigre groups outside the Bloc. This goal is frequently coupled with the purpose of gaining information about AIS (or other non-Communist IS) use of emigres.
- b. To penetrate the AIS or other non-Communist services.

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c. To acquire intelligence about U.S. non-intelligence personnel and organizations abroad, principally military.

d. To serve other adversary operations in a supporting role.

e. To obtain information about AIS-associated organizations abroad.

f. To assassinate or kidnap.

g. To ensure the safe return of an agent detected by the AIS.

h. To exploit for KUCAGE purposes.

i. To recruit or place an agent inside PBPRIME.

j. To establish an agent as a long-range illegal in the West.

k. To determine the fate and whereabouts of Bloc intelligence defectors.

The early discernment of the adversary's true objectives is important because determination of hostile appetite, obtaining clearances for release of information to the DA, other operational decisions, and termination and disposal require an understanding of the purposes of the opposition. Of course, the ultimate goals of the hostile service may not become evident for some time. But estimates based on targets, access, and the DA's potential are still useful.

**D. Selection and the Four Key Tests.**

1. The testing of a double agent should be continuous, and a wide choice of testing mechanisms is available. But

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before a decision is reached on accepting or rejecting a DA opportunity, asking the following four key questions will help us to strike the balance.

a. Has the potential DA told us everything? Or are there any indications of withholding? In particular, is there reason to suspect that he has withheld a communications channel to the opposition?

b. Does the prospective DA have stayability? That is, is he emotionally and psychologically stable, and are there good prospects of conducting the operation on a long-term basis? Can he sustain the anticipated stresses indefinitely?

c. Does the opposition trust him? Some indication of degree of adversary trust may be found in his length of service, the nature and level of his assignments, level of pay, and quality of communications systems provided him.

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Direct control of a DA's W/T link would require the presence of the KUBARK case officer whenever the agent receives or transmits. Although direct control is not usually feasible, monitoring all incoming and outgoing transmissions permits effective indirect control. Such monitoring has the advantage that it can be concealed from the DA.

Most agents to whom hostile services communicate by one-way voice-link are scheduled to receive broadcasts at least once a week. One preliminary test of bona fides, accordingly, is the monitoring of the next scheduled message after initiation of the double agent operation.


2. A potential DA operation need not be rejected because it fails to pass all four tests. But negative answers are danger signs, marking the elements of the case which must be regularly re-evaluated as the operation progresses.

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## E. Planning and Preliminary Steps.

1. Before a DA operation starts, a considered plan should be prepared. In its details the plan is necessarily more tentative than is most operational planning because the operational initiative rests - and should rest - almost entirely with the adversary. But usually we can estimate the goals of the opposition at or near the beginning of a DA case. If we have a good idea of what the enemy is after and if we know everything essential to our part of the case, the hidden fraction which constitutes the double life of the agent and the operation, then we can plan effectively.




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
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
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
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
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
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m. Time and support available. The base or station planning a double agent operation should consider whether enough time and support will be available. Ideally, the case officer who will conduct the operation should be staying in the field for a lengthy period, so that a transfer is not required soon after the operation has started. He should have enough time to conduct and report the case well. Assistance should be available when needed for surveillance, countersurveillance, monitoring of radio communications, control of hostile dead-drops, continuous testing and assessment of both agent and operation, and other time-consuming essentials. If time and support are inadequate, the operation may consist almost entirely of periodic debriefing of the DA, with little or no attempt to obtain information independently. Under such circumstances it may be better, at the outset, to drop other activity to make room for the case or to reject the prospective DA operation.

n. Termination and disposal. In some long-range operations no plans for termination and disposal can be made at the outset. In other cases, and especially those intended to run for shorter periods, it is best to plan the ending at the start.

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Prosecution is normally ruled out because of the necessity to avoid condonement and legal entanglement. But if a decision to prosecute can be reached at the beginning, all subsequent handling can be designed to preserve the chain of evidence and other requirements of the court. In such cases, including those involving U.S. citizens, KUBARK should either bow out, as a rule, or seek immediately the assistance of a duly constituted executive authority.

Joint operations usually present fewer problems of termination and disposal because of the facilities available to the host service. If a unilateral DA case is to be turned over to liaison, it is usually best to do so before the dwindling equity has disappeared completely, so that there is more chance that liaison will accept jurisdiction and less chance of irritating the liaison relationship. Early transfer has two other advantages; it minimizes the amount of information which the DA acquires about KUBARK, and it facilitates legal detention in those cases in which prolonged interrogation of the DA is desirable.

- 22 -

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## 4. Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides.

A thorough testing of bona fides requires the availability of all the information outlined above and in Part IV of this guide. But in one or two initial meetings the case officer can conduct the following quick and preliminary tests, to be augmented by deeper probing as the operation develops.

c. If the agent arrived on the scene recently, any friends or relatives of his in the area should be traced quickly. If he is a provocation agent, he may have orders to establish contact with a friend or relative who has an established IS tie.

d. The agent's documents should be subjected to technical examination.

e. If LCFLUTTER is to be used at all, the first test should be made as early as possible. Refusals to undergo testing should be reported, as well as any indications that the agent has been briefed on the technique.

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f. The interviewer or prospective case officer should be on the alert during initial meetings for phrases or concepts characteristic of clandestine activity and for any other clues to prior intelligence training or experience which the agent is concealing.

g. The agent should provide dates and reasons for any arrests. Arrests in denied areas, followed by comparatively quick release, may indicate intelligence recruitment.

h. The prospective DA may be asked to sign a statement that if he is held and surfaced by the opposition or exploited for purposes of propaganda, this fact will constitute prima facie evidence of coercion. Refusal to sign may indicate hostile control, although it may also indicate timidity. If a DA operation is conducted and if the DA later remains or is detained in a denied area, where he is used for purposes of Communist propaganda, the signed statement may be useful.

It is stressed that this list of suggestions is intended to serve only as a superficial guide to assessment of bona fides before the operation is launched. Much more information about the DA as both person and agent is required for the establishment of bona fides.

- 24 -

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**SECRET****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****III. THE DA AS A PERSON**

In the opening phase of the DA operation, as was mentioned earlier, all basic personalia on the agent and selected associates are assembled, bona fides are determined or estimated, and a preliminary psychological assessment is drawn up. Somewhat later, but still early in the case, a more searching examination should be made of the agent as a person. This assessment, sent to headquarters as a separate dispatch, should include information about the following topics.

The following discussion of the psychological characteristics of double agents is based upon research and analysis of unilateral, peacetime, KUBARK cases. Our postwar experience strongly suggests that there are vital differences between peacetime DA's and DA operations and those directed in war, when patriotism, idealism, and subordination of self were more frequently encountered.

**A. Willingness to serve as a DA.**

The results of case analysis to date amply demonstrate the importance of establishing whether the agent wants to be a double or not. Those peacetime DA's who enjoy the role tend to share, in greater or lesser degree, a number of distinctive psychological and emotional characteristics. An understanding of these traits is extremely useful to the case officer. Unwilling DA's, serving either service or both against their own inclinations, are more variegated but are usually unlike the willing doubles in major respects. They usually seek - consciously or not - to end the operation as quickly as they can without damage to themselves or those emotionally close to them. Therefore a long-range plan, of indefinite duration, based upon an unwilling double agent is very likely to founder because of his personality rather than external, operational factors.

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1. In the operations studied to date willing DA's have outnumbered the unwilling in a ratio of seven to one.

2. In a majority of the KUBARK DA cases studied to date the case officers have made little or no attempt to explain in writing the kinds of persons with whom they were dealing. It is plain that case officers cannot be expected to produce professional psychiatric or psychological analyses, nor are these usually necessary. It is also clear that case officers invariably form an estimate of the agent's personality. But if the estimate is dim, unformulated, or unreported, two drawbacks result. The case officer's handling of the agent is weakened; and the quality of help from headquarters, station, or elsewhere also suffers. Our experience shows that there is a high correlation between a sound assessment and a sound operation.

B. Emotional stability.

1. More useful than a general conclusion about the DA's emotional stability is a report of the circumstances under which he is stable and unstable.

2. Willing DA's show much higher-than-average emotional stability in stress situations, which they tend to dramatize and enjoy. For example, they often show little or no reluctance to meet the adversary in a denied area. (They are apt, however, to exaggerate their coolness under fire when reporting on the adversary.) Conversely, they are less stable in slack periods than are most persons. Suffering from boredom rather than tension, they may relieve the monotony by heavy drinking, sexual adventurousness, or shady financial deals. Their dangerous restlessness evaporates, however, when they are kept busy operationally.

3. Unwilling DA's show the reverse pattern. They avoid situations of stress and are agitated by them. They

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do their best work under safe and routine conditions. DA's who are unwilling but valuable require much help and reassurance from case officers, especially in the form of detailed security safeguards.

**C. Emotional attachments to others.**

1. The voluntary double agent often seems incapable of forming lasting, adult, emotional relationships with others. His attitude toward other people is basically competitive and exploitative. Many willing DA's have been divorced at least once and have gone through a series of mistresses. Because most willing doubles are good con-men and good verbalizers, they are usually adept at creating an impression of sincere feeling, of courtesy and concern for others. Sometimes they are good enough actors to convince themselves, temporarily. Most of the time, however, they are emotionally empty. One consequence is that a KUBARK case officer handling a willing DA in time of peace should be extremely chary about concluding that esteem or friendship for the case officer plays a significant role in the agent's motivation. The DA may feel a close rapport as a result of the clandestine nature of the association rather than the personality of the case officer, but even this reaction is likely to last about as long as the agent meeting. Another practical consequence is that the location of members of the voluntary DA's family is likely to be much less important as an element of control than it may seem. The agent may feel close to one or more persons, more commonly a son or daughter than a wife or parent; but even such bonds are not typical. The defector or double who left a wife behind in a denied area and who continues to express concern is likelier to be reacting as he thinks he is expected to react than to be expressing sincere and deep feeling.

2. Unwilling DA's are unlikely to be demonstrative, but they do seek enduring emotional relationships. Their concern about members of the immediate family is likely

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to be genuine. In fact, it may have been this concern which the adversary exploited in recruiting the agent. Unwilling DA's tend either to remain aloof or to seek filial relationships with case officers.

D. Level of intelligence.

1. Both willing and unwilling double agents are characteristically above average in terms of intelligence. Willing DA's usually think quickly and show cleverness; their extent of formal education (well above average) and their typical vocations suggest some depth of intelligence (but not feeling) as well. The fact that willing DA's are almost invariably without funds or property reflects not a lack of intellectual competence but a tendency to trust to their wits, not to their bank accounts.

2. Linked with high native intelligence is the voluntary DA's skill as a verbalizer. Typical overt occupations in this group are those of interpreter/translator; editor, journalist, writer, or speaker; bibliographer; teacher; and salesman. The DA may be at home in two or several languages. One drawback is that his reports, both verbal and written, may require careful stripping before the plain facts can be discerned.

3. The willing DA's combination of intelligence and unscrupulousness make him as hard to handle as a two-edged razor blade. One piece of usually applicable advice can be offered. The case officer should avoid competing with the DA. Relying on the authority inherent in his position, the case officer can best handle a clever, competitive double through calm firmness, not through evident anger. Willing DA's are likely to respond well to a stick-and-carrot or kick-and-kiss technique. "Your last report was excellent, but it was not as good as the work I expect from a man of your abilities."

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## E. Gullibility - scepticism.

1. Willing DA's are usually sceptical about the motives and abilities of others but unsceptical about themselves. They distrust others, including those with whom they are on terms of intimacy. They are frequently cynical. They tend to underrate the adversary - and presumably KUBARK - and to overrate themselves.

2. Unwilling doubles are also sceptical, though less so than the hardbitten, willing types, and they are as sceptical about themselves as about others.

## F. Trustworthiness.

1. Willing DA's can be trusted to follow instructions that coincide, in their view, with their own interests. They become unreliable if the case officer's orders conflict with their wishes. Confronted with indications or evidence of the agent's untrustworthiness, the KUBARK case officer should consider whether the unreliability is the result of the agent's loyalty to the adversary or of his own ego-centricism. The former cause ends the case or puts it on a totally different footing. The latter is merely one of the facts of DA life, to be expected and countered by independent checks and sound handling.

2. The scanty evidence available on the trustworthiness of unwilling doubles suggests that on a day-by-day basis they are more reliable than their opposite numbers. If they disagree with the case officer's instructions, as they are particularly likely to do if an element of personal risk is involved, they will usually express their concern. But if they accept an order, they will normally try faithfully to carry it out. On a long-range basis, however, unwilling DA's cannot be considered reliable, because the indefinite continuation of the operation is directly contrary to their wishes. They are prone to make deliberate or unconscious slips which will end the operation without bringing retribution down upon them.

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3. Part II, paragraph D, listed the four key questions used in deciding whether to accept a DA opportunity. One of the questions is whether the opposition trusts the DA. In the continuous task of agent assessment, the KUBARK case officer, therefore, should mirror-read. Is adversary confidence in the DA diminishing, increasing, or stable? If it is static or weakening, what can be done to bolster it?

## G. Ambition.

1. Willing double agents are ambitious in the sense of seeking immediate material rewards with little effort. Few are content to work slowly and consistently toward long-range goals. Gratification is non-deferable. They seek the immediate effect or gain, by a display of skill or cleverness, by demonstrating artistic or intellectual attainments, or by such displays of generosity as buying drinks for the house. But they lose interest when the easy satisfaction has been achieved. The case officer working with a willing DA on a long-range operation is usually well-advised to stress immediate objectives - especially those which permit the agent some ego-gratification - rather than distant goals, in which the agent may not be interested.

2. Unwilling doubles are likely to be only moderately ambitious. They are, however, far more content to move slowly toward long-range goals. Their reluctance to serve as double agents can sometimes be thawed if successful DA performance over a lengthy period can be identified with the attainment of such long-held, personal objectives as security and status. The length of required service may be less important to them than the fixing of a definite, agreed date for concluding the operation.

## H. Clandestinity.

1. In the typical willing DA, clandestinity is doing what comes naturally. He is usually accustomed to concealing

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facts from others - his wife, his creditors, the local authorities. His scepticism about the motives of others, which reflects his own exploitative motives toward others, reinforces his secretiveness. He enjoys concealing or withholding for its own sake. In the early stages of handling a willing DA the case officer may be delighted with his innate knack for the clandestine and the nimbleness of his wits. But there are two dangers. One is that the agent is prone to conceal things from his case officer too. KUBARK's need to know everything about him conflicts directly with his desire not to place himself in the power of another through divulging too much. Persistent case officer digging into his past, especially if performed formally in accordance with a PHS outline, may merely arouse his competitiveness, his desire to outwit. But encouraging him to reminisce, especially about episodes that place him in a favorable light and let him brag a little, is likely to be rewarding. Another danger is that the willing DA may resist or ignore training in operational security. He is used to depending on his natural talents to get him out of trouble. But he is intelligent enough to recognize that the adversary service is professionally clandestine and that KUBARK security training is not a denial of his aptitudes but a chance to expand them.

2. The few unwilling DA's studied to date were found to be less clandestine than the average person. They need careful, step-by-step training in security. If they are to face a situation which they consider dangerous or even unusual, they want and need a specific prior briefing by the case officer.

3. Whether the DA is willing or unwilling, the case officer should determine the kind and amount of security training needed and should supply it, being careful to tailor the training to DA purposes and avoiding training the agent for the adversary's purposes.

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## I. Introversion - extroversion.

1. The willing DA is introverted in the sense that he is much more preoccupied with himself than with the world around him. But his actions resemble those of the extrovert. He is likely to be gregarious and to dislike solitude. He prefers large social gatherings at which he can make a bid for attention or admiration. Because the wide array of contacts is sought for self-gratification, willing DA's are not likely to form firm friendships, at least not friendships involving a normal give-and-take. The aim is to exploit or impress. It has been noted that some willing DA's strike up conversations with total strangers solely to achieve a striking effect.

2. The unwilling DA is likely to be introverted. He is not typically gregarious, and his circle of friends may be small. To those few friends, as to his family, he is likely to be loyal.

## J. Other major traits.

The following additional traits of willing DA's have appeared with sufficient frequency during the analysis of past cases to merit their mention: sporadic heavy drinking (but not alcoholism); failing to react visibly to harsh reprimands or threats but nursing a consequent grudge in secret; frequent demands for money (no case was found in which a willing DA refused payment; almost all of them were importunate in trying to get more); vanity and a desire for prestige; and sexual promiscuity.

## K. Summary of analysis of traits.

1. The foregoing profile of willing double agents represents their psychological patterns as a group; the individual DA will naturally have his own pattern of divergency from these norms.

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2. Effective management of the DA requires an early determination of how much he wants (or does not want) to play the part. Because willing and unwilling doubles show different - and sometimes antithetical - characteristics, the determination of willingness will help the case officer to fit his treatment of the agent to the agent's personality.

3. The psychological profile of willing DA's as a class or group is that of the con-man (or, in the psychiatrist's terms, of the sociopath). The incidence of con-men is high among willing double agents in time of peace, just as the incidence of persons in rebellion against any form of authority is high among defectors. This fact is cause for caution but not for apprehension. The case officer who recognizes the dangers to himself and his service which are likely to result from the very nature of the willing double is better able to control them. And he is likely to find that the agent's stability under stress, intelligence, scepticism, and natural clandestinity are valuable assets when channeled against the opponent.

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IV. THE DA AS AN AGENT

## A. Prior Intelligence Associations.

As was stated in Part II, paragraph E 3, it is necessary for planning purposes to obtain all the facts about all the agent's intelligence experience before he became a double. The extent of that experience is likely to be one of the basic differences between the DA and the non-CI agent. If the double has not had prior contact with more than one service, the operation itself will give him some insight into a second service and thus permit him to compare and learn. The result of this extent and breadth of experience (and in some cases of considerable agent training) is that DA's are likely to be sophisticated in clandestine matters. As a result the margin of superiority usually enjoyed by the KUBARK case officer, who ordinarily has had much more training and experience than his agent, may diminish, vanish, or even be reversed. For this reason KUBARK case officers who have had little or no earlier experience in directing DA's should not be hesitant about seeking help from others at the base, from the station, and from headquarters.

## B. Continuing Investigation.

As was noted earlier, background checks and the inspection of all overt records should precede the decision to accept the case and the formulation of the operational plan. During the operation these measures should be continued, to the extent consonant with security. (Continuing checks do pose a graver security problem in some DA cases than in many other types of operations; at times the task is impossible or the risk is unacceptable. But if the DA lives outside a denied area, safe ways to continue independent probing can usually be found.) Apart from the danger of concluding that all the facts are in, that the

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
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record is complete, continued probing is required for the duration of the operation.

## C. Training.

## 1. Adversary Training.

Most of the agent training given by hostile services concerns tradecraft, and the emphasis is on communications.




## 2. KUBARK Training.

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
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c. If the agent has weaknesses as a double, corrective training will be far more effective than merely haranguing him.

D. Testing.

1. KUBARK Testing.




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
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- 38 -

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d. Most of these methods entail a significant expenditure of time and effort. This fact should be weighed at the outset, before KUBARK is committed to the operation, and should also be reflected in the planning of the operation. It is manifestly insecure to conduct a double agent operation as a series of debriefings, in which the case officer merely records the unchecked assertions of the DA.

e. Analysis of substance is useful as a testing mechanism, but only if the adversary has been identified correctly. If, for example, a double agent who is a citizen of a satellite state provides useful and valid information about one of the intelligence or security services of that state - counterintelligence of such caliber that it seems obvious that the satellite service would not willingly permit its release - KUBARK may easily misread the DA's loyalties and assume that he is "ours" when in fact he is providing the information on orders of the KGB or GRU, probably without the knowledge of the satellite service.

f. The four key tests were described above (see II D) as an aid to deciding whether or not to accept an opportunity for a double agent operation. The case officer should ask the same four questions periodically during the later phases of the operation because they constitute a sound framework for testing.

## 2. Adversary Testing.




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b. Hostile services may test the agent and operation by testing the communications channel. See pp. 61-64.

- 40 -

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
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E. Control

1. KUBARK Control.




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- 42 -

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## 2. Adversary Control.

a. A major weakness of the Communist intelligence and security service is an inadequate understanding of the principle that control rests upon an understanding of the motives of individual agents. Consequently there is an adversary tendency to pay scant heed to the agent as a person and to consider him, instead, as an instrument. In half the KUBARK DA cases studied to date, for example, the DA has alleged that his work for the adversary was totally or partially motivated by duress and fear. No other element of motivation for serving the opposition is cited by DA's as frequently. Even after allowance is made for agent exaggeration, it remains evident that adversary attempts to achieve control through duress may of themselves cause the agent to approach a Western service. Continuation of hostile pressure on the agent is likely to create in him attitudes which the KUBARK case officer can exploit to our advantage.

b. A related weakness in adversary control stems from overcentralization. The headquarters of a typical Communist service exerts tight control upon its field representatives, who often relay requirements to agents without tempering them to achieve some correlation between headquarters' needs and the agent's access and capabilities.

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Agents who have protested that assigned tasks were impossible have sometimes been told, in effect, that the case officer recognizes the lack of realism but is helpless. Such an explanation, and the attitude underlying it, militate against effective control.

c. On the other hand, the adversary services, and especially the KGB, have at times shown skill in the manipulation of political motivation for purposes of control.

**F. Agent Motivation.**

1. Analysis of double agent operations has indicated that there is somewhat more uniformity in the motives of double agents than case officers have recognized. Clearly, the reasons why the agent works for KUBARK may not be wholly identical with his reasons for serving the adversary. For example, an agent recruited under duress by a Communist service may obey its orders chiefly through fear and may serve as a double chiefly because of hostility toward the adversary. But if he is a fearful person, predisposed to yield quickly under pressure, then fear of detection and retribution in the Free World is also likely to play a part in his performance for us.

2. According to the statements of DA's and case officers, the following are the principal motives of DA's for serving KUBARK (the percentages state the number of agents reportedly thus motivated in comparison with the total number studied): monetary (77%), political (55%), pleasure in the clandestine (50%), personal (50%), self-protection (41%), ideological (23%), fear (23%), and patriotism (9%). The statements of the same agents and their case officers about their motives for serving the opposition show a very different picture: fear (50%), monetary (50%), pleasure in the clandestine (27%), self-protection (27%), and personal (14%). No political, ideological, or patriotic motives for serving a Communist service were reported in any of the DA cases studied.

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3. An element of rationalization seems to be reflected in these findings. For example, an agent who finds very real pleasure in clandestinity per se is likely to be thus motivated in working for both sides, not just one. Yet nearly twice as many agents were reported to serve KUBARK for this reason as were listed under the same heading for service to the adversary. It seems likely that KUBARK case officers may consider it somewhat reassuring if an agent works for us because he likes the game but may find it threatening if he conducts espionage on behalf of a hostile service for the same reason.

4. During analysis it was also noted that agents and case officers had advanced nearly twice as many explanations for KUBARK service as for adversary service. In a significant number of operations KUBARK case officers had made no report at all on the agent's reasons for working for the opposition.

5. Some precepts can be based on these findings:

a. KUBARK should always examine and report a double agent's motives for engaging in both halves of his clandestine work.

b. Most peacetime DA's serve both sides for much the same basic reasons.

c. The examination of motivation should be as probing as the case officer can make it. The use of a label, such as "anti-Communist", is not a substitute for a searching examination of what makes the agent tick.

d. The case officer who is working with a willing DA should be slow to conclude that the agent's esteem for the case officer plays an important motivational role. Genuine esteem for others is not common among willing DA's, although many are adept at creating an impression of esteem.

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6. There has been relatively little KUBARK reporting on unconscious motives. Although lengthy and theoretical speculation on this subject may be a waste of time, the case officer's continuing assessment of the DA as a person does permit him to compare the agent's own statements about his motives with his actions, which are sometimes clues to deeper drives, of which the agent may be unaware or only dimly aware.

7. If KUBARK has accepted jurisdiction of an operation from a transferring service, that service's recorded or verbal estimate of motivation should be obtained in as much depth as possible and should be weighed carefully. Failing to benefit from earlier insights often leads to a repetition of errors in handling and control that were made by the transferring service.

8. The case officer should determine whether any of the agent's basic motives are incompatible with KUBARK's goals in the operation. He should also consider whether the DA is looking to KUBARK for satisfaction of a desire which KUBARK cannot or will not satisfy.

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
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V. THE DA OPERATION: SPECIFICS

## A. Access.




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
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- 49 -

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## 2. To Adversary Targets.

a. In the DA cases analyzed to date each agent has had believable access, from the viewpoint of the adversary, to the opposition's targets. This fact, however, seems to reflect less a careful program of recruitment than the wide range of hostile goals listed in Part II, above.

b. The list makes it clear that many of these goals are counter-intelligence objectives; penetration of Free World intelligence and security services, obtaining information on AIS sponsorship and use of various groups (RFE, VOA, refugee organizations, etc.), securing information on the emigration abroad, checking on the fate and location of intelligence defectors from the adversary service, and the like. The DA's contact with KUBARK obviously means that he has some access to one or more of these CI targets. Sometimes KUBARK case officers have tended to dismiss this fact lightly by remarking, "All he knows is my face and a cover name." As the later discussion of KUBARK security in DA cases makes clear, this observation simply does not hold for the great majority of these operations. Because KUBARK normally cannot control the kind and amount of intelligence and counterintelligence passed to the hostile service by the double agent, his access to a principal target of adversary CI makes it mandatory that KUBARK handle the operation, to the extent practicable, as though the DA

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would tell the opposition everything he learns. Hence the

c. Adversary services test the agent's access to their targets in a number of ways. The agent is usually asked to explain in detail how he acquired each significant item of information and to identify all sub-sources, witting or not, as fully as possible. In the early phase of the operation he may be given targets about which the opposition already knows a good deal, so that substance can be tested analytically. Other adversary agents may be assigned to report on him, and various other techniques of surveillance may be employed. Such adversary testing underscores the superiority of true access, which permits the agent to function normally, over hand-outs.

B. Appetite.

1. As was stated earlier, it is useful to determine the opposition's appetite, as well as goals, as soon as available information permits. Examination of the record has shown that the chances of obtaining a net profit from a DA operation are considerably enhanced if the case officer continuously assesses the nature and intensity of the adversary's appetite. If he has a strong desire to get what the agent's access promises to make available, the adversary may be inclined toward greater patience with error or delay, is likelier to plan the operation as long-range, and is more prone to expose additional assets, for such purposes as training. Here is another exploitable weakness of an over-centralized intelligence service. An inferior report on a subject of currently intense interest to the headquarters may enhance the agent's standing more than a sound report on a matter given a low headquarters priority.

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
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2. One indicator of hostile appetite is the sudden levying of a requirement on a target to which the agent has no real access. Agents who have protested such assignments have sometimes been told frankly that headquarters pressure had obliged the field unit to give the task to several agents without regard for access. If the new target is significant, and especially if widespread allocation of the target is confirmed by other DA's or other means, it is advisable to notify headquarters expeditiously.

3. As was said earlier, a notional access may awaken an ungovernable appetite. The same is true for real access, and for this reason the KUBARK case officer should attempt to foresee those topics or areas too sensitive for release to the opposition and block off the agent's access to them without his knowledge. Otherwise, as has happened, the case officer reviewing for release a sensitive report already prepared by the DA may find himself constrained to forbid its transmission. As a rule, he cannot be sure that the double agent will respect the prohibition. And there is the added danger that the adversary service will gain new insights upon learning which items were cleared for passage and which were blocked. Keeping abreast of shifts in hostile appetite will help the case officer to anticipate and avoid these risks.

## C. Production.

## 1. For KUBARK.



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


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A case officer review of this list before the meeting or its use as a check-list during the meeting may prove helpful. Analysis of production in former DA operations has shown that the number of the above topics on which each double agent reported ranged from 5 to 18, with an average of 10. Although this range is obviously dependent upon the DA's access and the life-span of the operation, it also depends upon the thoroughness of the case officer. Failure to debrief a knowledgeable DA on predecessor services or any other item listed above nullifies a principal purpose of the operation.

2. For the adversary.

a. As noted above, KUBARK must keep careful records of all classified information released to the DA. In addition, it is suggested that the case officer keep a log on all of the DA's reports to the adversary, whether classified information is included or not. If the DA reports to the adversary in writing, the case officer should take at

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least two copies of each report before approving it for release, one to be forwarded to headquarters and the other to be retained. If the DA reports verbally, the KUBARK case officer may require him to submit a written version; or the case officer may elect to write a full account. Whatever methods are used, it is important to keep close tabs on the agent's reporting to the adversary. Such a record may make it easier to detect a DA's transmittal of unauthorized information. It will certainly facilitate a comparison of hostile requirements and the DA's production for the adversary and thus make it easier for the case officer to put himself in the place of his opposite number -- that is, to mirror-read the operation. And finally, in the broadest sense, KUBARK's effective conduct of counterintelligence (including deception) requires that headquarters maintain a current and complete record of all information known to have reached adversary hands.

b. Despite the general principle that it is almost always better to require that the DA obtain on his own the information which he reports to the hostile service, some cases necessitate the release of build-up material. The twin problems of acquiring such material and obtaining clearances for its use are easier to solve if the operation has been developed according to a plan carefully designed to satisfy specific counterintelligence requirements. The ODYOKE military services, for example, will consent to release much more readily if the potential gain to national security is demonstrable.

**D. Mirror-Reading.**

1. Throughout the life of the operation the case officer should consider each development not only from his own point of view but also from that of his adversary. Only in

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this way can he estimate whether the operation looks normal to the opposition, whether the agent is making satisfactory progress, and what action the hostile service is likely to undertake at critical junctures.

2. Mirror-reading is not merely a process of putting oneself in the other man's place. It is a process of being the antagonist, as nearly as is possible, and then viewing the operation. Therefore the case officer needs to know as much as he can about the antagonist personally, the section and base in which he works, his headquarters -- in fact, his entire service. He also needs to know something of the typical customs, thoughts, and feelings of the country which the hostile service represents. Otherwise the case officer will be a mentally transplanted American, his mirror-reading out of focus and his conclusions distorted. The same distortion results from identifying the adversary service incorrectly.

3. For the kind of information that allows the case officer to mirror-read accurately he is partly dependent on the agent. He needs to draw from the agent all the details and nuances of the DA's meetings with the adversary, so that he can sense the character of the opposing case officer and the flavor of his relationship with the agent. In doing so, the KUBARK case officer must rectify distortions produced by the agent's personality. The observation that the hostile case officer is brutal and overbearing, for example, must be read one way if made by a normally confident man, another way if expressed by a fearful person.

4. A knowledge of the service as a whole and of its headquarters is particularly important for sound handling of DA operations run against Communist services because of their characteristic centralization. The operation will be misread if the KUBARK case officer attributes to his opposite number decisions actually made at a headquarters far away.

- 56 -


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E. KUBARK Security.



- 57 -


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4. As was noted in Part II, cover must be established for KUBARK, the case officer, the DA, and agent meetings.



- 58 -

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c. The double agent's cover for clandestine work for the adversary is a problem for the adversary, not KUBARK, to resolve. But the KUBARK case officer must consider the agent's cover as a double. In practise DA cover is nearly identical with cover for DA meetings. As a rule such cover does not consist of a valid reason for overt association, as it may in a positive operation, because it is necessary to conceal from the opposing service all indications of AIS association (except under such specialized circumstances as deception operations). The problem is more one of concealment than of cover. Selection of a proper meeting site or sites and training the DA in sound security practises are the best defenses. Once the adversary service learns that the DA is in touch with the AIS or even with an American, the operation may become worse than valueless.

5. Like other agents, DA's -- and especially willing doubles -- sometimes tell wives, mistresses, and others about their clandestine activities for either side or both, despite all admonitions to the contrary. DA's have been known to exaggerate their roles, in order to impress, and to confide that they are chiefs of services, undercover staff members, and the like. Discovering such indiscretions, some KUBARK case officers have merely reprimanded the agent and continued the operation as before, leaving the confidant half-in and half-out of the case.

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6. A security check-list is included in Part VIII of this guide.

**F. Adversary Security.**


1. As was mentioned earlier, the fundamental principle regarding adversary security is that the KUBARK case officer should not interfere. Adversary services have been guilty of some elementary breaches: meeting agents in their homes, exposing the clandestine status of agents to families and friends, failing to provide or even consider agent cover for trips, using ill-chosen or untrained couriers, requiring travel too frequently, and other sins. Fearing that such practises will expose the operation to local security forces, the KUBARK case officer may be tempted to tighten up his opponent's operation. But intervention by KUBARK is likely not to save the operation but to blow it, to local security, the adversary, or both. Our restraint may permit flaps or near-flaps, from the adversary's viewpoint; but experience has shown that unless a flap indicates that his agent has been doubled, the adversary is not likely to terminate. On the other hand, flaps do tend to cause the opposing service to view the agent and operation with increased scepticism and may produce periods of inactivity which are profitless for KUBARK. If the agent is somewhat sophisticated and aggressive, and if his relationship with the hostile case officer permits, he may be told to complain about sloppy handling. In any event, the underlying principle remains the same: the adversary's problems are his, not ours. If rapport is good, the DA tends to present his KUBARK case officer with difficulties created for the agent by the opposing service. And naturally, the case officer must not refer

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
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the double agent to the adversary so coldly that the DA feels rebuffed. Sympathy and perhaps non-discernible material assistance are in order, along with an explanation of why our direct intervention would imperil the agent.

**G. Communications.****1. Adversary Communications.****KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY****SECRET**

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
- 62 -

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## 2. KUBARK Communications.

a. In the unilateral, post-war, KUBARK DA cases studied to date, direct meetings between case officer and agent have been by far the commonest method of communication.

- 63 -

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Although personal contact is slightly more risky than other methods because it increases the damage that can be done by a DA who is giving the edge to the opposition, its advantages are notable. The possibilities for adversary counterintelligence manipulation of the operation are increased if KUBARK maintains communication solely by an impersonal means. KUBARK's opportunities for testing the case are largely restricted to testing its product. For this reason it is especially important in W/T, S/W, and similar operations to remember that more than one adversary service may be involved or that the opposition may not be the service that the circumstances seem to indicate. Even if the adversary is identified accurately, KUBARK's inability to assess psychologically, employ LCF LUTTER, interrogate, or otherwise probe directly greatly increases the risk of being deceived.

b. Personal meetings are sometimes supplemented by additional forms of communication, chiefly the telephone, open code mail, and S/W. A fast emergency channel is essential in most DA operations because the initiative rests with the adversary, who may require the agent to act quickly. If forced to act on his own, because he cannot reach the KUBARK case officer, the DA may wreck the operation.

c. Details of KUBARK's communication channels with the DA, like other details of our modus operandi, should be included in the reporting to headquarters. A primary reason is that such reporting enables headquarters to study the effectiveness of our methods and to make the results of such study available to others who can use them.

#### H. Finances.



1. The key principle in paying DA's is that the money should be used by the case officer as one of his

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instruments of manipulation and control.

- 65 -


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4. Hostile services have more frequently made payments to relatives on behalf of the agent than has KUBARK. The operational value of such payments depends chiefly on how the DA feels about the recipient. He may be grateful,

- 66 -

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
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or he may be uninterested in the recipient's welfare and inclined to view such payments as involuntary deductions from his own salary.


5. If the opposition directs the DA to take a trip or otherwise incur expenses for which he lacks funds, the KUBARK case officer should be hesitant about supplying the money. The adversary may be testing. Usually the DA should respond by explaining his problem to the opposing service.

**I. Reporting.**

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- 68 -


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- 69 -

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VI. CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST

The questions that follow are intended as a check list to be used by KUBARK case officers to ensure that none of the essentials of a double agent operation have been overlooked.


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- 71 -


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
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- 73 -


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
- 74 -

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
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- 76 -


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
- 77 -

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
- 78 -

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- 79 -


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- 80 -


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KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY



- 81 -

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY



- 82 -

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

## INDEX

	<u>Page</u>
Access .....	19-20, 39-40, 47-51
Alcoholism .....	32
Ambition .....	30
Analysis of agent production by hostile service .	40
Analysis of agent production by KUBARK .....	39, 47-48
Appetite, hostile .....	13, 19-20, 51-52
Arrests .....	24
Assessment, psychological .....	25-34, 68, 74
Attachments to other persons, emotional .....	27-28
Attitude of DA toward case officer .....	27
Audiosurveillance .....	63
Background of DA .....	71-72
Bona fides, preliminary testing of .....	23-24
Build-up material .....	40, 48, 55
Cables .....	68

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Case load .....	21, 39
Case officer's check list .....	70-82
Centralization in adversary services .....	43-44
Clandestinity in DA's .....	30-31
Communications, KUBARK .....	63-64
Communications, opposition .....	11-12, 61-63
Contact reporting .....	67, 68
Continuous investigation of DA's .....	34-35
Control, by adversary .....	19, 41, 43-44
Control, by KUBARK .....	19, 41-43, 65, 75-76
Cover .....	58-59, 66, 78
D and D cases .....	4
Dead drops .....	63
Deception .....	7
Disposal .....	21-22
Document analysis .....	14, 23

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Double agent, definition of .....	2
Duress .....	43
Exposure of KUBARK personnel and assets to DA's .....	35
Extroversion .....	32
Fabricators .....	2
Finances .....	64-67, 80-81
Four key tests .....	11-12, 39
Goals in DA operations, KUBARK and adversary .....	6-10, 13, 50
Gullibility-scepticism .....	29
Identity of DA, establishment of .....	13-14
Intelligence background of DA's .....	15-17, 34
Intelligence of DA's .....	28
Interference .....	50, 58, 60
Introversion .....	32
Joint DA operations .....	17, 22, 72-74

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Knowledge by outsiders .....	14-15, 59-60, 67
LCFLUTTER .....	23, 36-37, 61, 74
Mirror-reading .....	30, 55-56
Money .....	see Finances
Monitoring of adversary commo channels ....	42, 61
Motivation, conscious and unconscious.....	44-46
Motivation for serving KUBARK .....	44-46
Motivation for serving the opposition .....	44-45
Multiple agents .....	2
Objectives of adversary in DA operations .....	see Goals
Objectives of KUBARK in DA operations .....	see Goals
Origins of DA operations, significance of .....	3-6
Overt information on DA's, sources of .....	13-14
OWVL .....	12, 61
Parallel DA operations .....	7
Pay .....	see Finances
Peddlers .....	2

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

## Page

Penetration agents .....	2
Planning the DA operation .....	13-22
Positive production from DA operations .....	7, 8
Prior intelligence ties of DA's .....	15-17
Prior record of case .....	3, 46
Production for adversary .....	54-55
Production for KUBARK .....	52-54
Prosecution of DA's .....	22
Provocation .....	4-5
Psychological assessment .....	see Assessment, psychological
Recruitment by adversary .....	15-17
Recruitment by KUBARK of adversary staff personnel ...	6
Reporting the DA operation .....	67-69, 81
Reporting of DA's on hostile services .....	52-54
Scepticism in willing DA's .....	29
Security of the DA .....	59

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Security of KUBARK in DA operations .....	57-60, 79-80
Security of opposition in DA operations .....	60-61
Selection of DA's .....	10-11
Side-commo .....	38, 61
Spoon-feeding DA's .....	40, 49
Stability .....	26-27
Stayability .....	11
Sub-sources, identification to adversary .....	39
Support of DA operations .....	21
Surveillance of DA operations .....	38
S/W .....	61-62
Talk-ins .....	3-4
Taps, mail and phone .....	22, 63
Targets .....	see Access
Terminal report .....	68
Termination .....	20, 21-22, 49, 81-82
Testing by adversary .....	39-40, 62

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Testing by KUBARK .....	10-12, 36-39
Third services .....	72-73
Threats .....	32
Tracing .....	14-15
Training by adversary .....	35
Training by KUBARK .....	18, 31, 35-36
Transfer to KUBARK from another service ....	3, 46
Trust of DA by opposition .....	20
Trustworthiness of DA's .....	29
Types of DA cases, by origin .....	see Origin
Unconscious motives .....	46
Unwilling DA's .....	25-26
Unwitting DA's .....	2
U. S. Citizens as DA's .....	12-13
Verbal skills in willing DA's .....	28
Walk-ins .....	3-4
Willing DA's .....	25-26

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

## KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

	<u>Page</u>
Withholding .....	2, 36
W/T .....	8, 12, 37, 61-63, 69, 74

- 90 -

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

**SECRET**

**SECRET**  
KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY

KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY  
**SECRET**