

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO INS

CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO AGENT TO BE ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS

ACTION:

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to NAME

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OK but *[initials]* does
lead NAME *[initials]*
H. O. *[initials]*

62-116411-58

(F) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - [DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE] - You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called the Domestic Contact Service. JFK (1)(B)

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. This particularly applies to those situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations. We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from such visitors but we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. You therefore are authorized to establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. JFK (1)(B)

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 5 -

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a visiting Soviet-bloc national, you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection, there may be instances where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau's discharge of its internal security functions.

JFK
(1)(R)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 6 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

DATE: 10/25/65

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

JFK (1) (B)

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

NAME, [Philadelphia] Office, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Domestic Contact Service, was contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter.

JFK
(1) (B)

NAME advised he had just returned from conferences at his Agency Headquarters in Washington, where he had been advised the Bureau was directing its field offices to establish liaison with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. (JFK (1) (B))
NAME offered his complete cooperation with this office in matters of mutual interest.

Arrangements were perfected wherein Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact NAME and he will place them in contact with the Domestic Contact Service representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the Domestic Contact Service relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

JFK
(1) (B)

JFK
(1) (B)

NAME requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that CIA not be identified as the source in the event

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information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. NAME was assured that CIA's identity in this regard would be fully protected.

INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
TERRITORY COVERED BY THE [PHILADELPHIA]
OFFICE CIA [DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE]
INCLUDING NAMES OF CIA PERSONNEL.

JFK
(1)(B)

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these cases, it is anticipated that CIA representatives may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the CIA representative and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with CIA's [Domestic Contact Service] envisages the furnishing of reports and letterhead memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.

JFK
(1)(B)

SAC, Philadelphia

10/29/65

Director, FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE] JFK (1) (B)
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to your letter dated 10/25/65. JFK (1) (B)

The Bureau has been following a policy of not disseminating Bureau information to the Domestic Contact Service at a local level. This policy will continue unless you are advised to the contrary.

In the event that the local CIA office desires information concerning any subject, such requests should be directed by CIA to Bureau Headquarters.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example, -----

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN

In addition, CIA has a [redacted] office in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel. No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters. JFK (X8)

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/26/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local [redacted] office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

JFK
(1)(B)

It is possible that other field offices have working-level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to them.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

no.

10x

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

no

10x

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Intelligence Board and sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Local Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. JPK(4)(6)
The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U.S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employees which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of NAME. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

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It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate shulder-earr. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between

The two agencies have been used for decisions. So if these were the parasites who control their bureaucratic desires, they are used a creative idea, and lived the errors of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,

Sam Papich
Sam Papich

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Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: /RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

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Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources;

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum to the Director **SECRET**
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly feuded with CIA officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

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**CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)**

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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With regard to dealing with the French, we took the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Directives. CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau.

(2) SENSITIVE ON GOING OPERATION

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SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2 and 3)

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, NAME because CIA took the full responsibility for moving NAME from PLACE to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport NAME to the U. S. It should be noted that NAME was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in PLACE raised questions concerning NAME mental stability.

After NAME arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped NAME because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of NAME but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was concerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with NAME and subsequently develop the leads which led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has maintained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that NAME was mentally and physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial. NAME was a key witness. CIA has also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau. CIA has complained that the Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its cooperation and CIA has been particularly irked because the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

(4) NAME OF SUBJECT

In July, 1953, Senator NAME sought to subpoena NAME AND OCCUPATION to testify before the Senator's Committee. NAME claimed that NAME alleged communist activities were clearly documented. The most serious allegation was that had IDENTIFYING DATA. All of this was publicized. The information set forth in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information to Senator NAME. CIA officials held numerous conferences concerning the matter but charges were never made against the Bureau. What information CIA has on this particular item is not known but the Agency did know that we maintained liaison with NAME Committee.

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning NAME. This information had been furnished to us by NAME, a former official of the

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Department of Labor. When interviewed by us, NAME made several accusations against CIA. We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took the position that by disseminating derogatory information concerning his Agency, he had been placed on the spot because the NAME data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part of the Bureau.

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS
FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many of the visitors left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the public and nothing more. CIA was so informed but periodically indicated that our policy prevented the Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad. CIA never lodged an official complaint.

It should be emphasized that for the past several years there would not be any basis for any form of complaint with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention given to such officials by NAME and other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

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countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) CIA - DUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

In 1965, the Dutch Internal Security Service was in the process of investigating individuals in Holland who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The Dutch wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the Dutch had been practically nonexistent because the Dutch had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When CIA approached us, we told the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request through-diplomatic channels. We subsequently told CIA we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. We stuck to our position. CIA surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.

(8) TWO NAMES

NAME IDENTIFYING DATA, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. NAME established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, NAME who periodically called

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on us and furnished information which NAME felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through NAME continued during the period of relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and NAME clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with NAME the Agency had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between NAME organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was financed by the Agency.

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission. - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of NAME. In MONTH, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator NAME had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives.

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(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL -

In YEAR the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in Brazil. Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in Brazil, had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information.

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

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SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(Continued from page 10)

(14) CODE NAME

In May, YEAR the Bureau's double Agent in the captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that he was to have a meeting in PLACE during the period

DATE A question arose as to whether CIA should be informed concerning the double Agent's travel to PLACE It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA.

What is important here is that CIA established contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the Soviet in PLACE The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational in PLACE and we did not coordinate with the Agency.

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if NAME could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that NAME give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make NAME available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

(16) CASE OF NAME

On July 9, YEAR, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that NAME a CIA employee in PLACE, had been involved in an affair with a FOREIGN girl. According to NAME allegedly had furnished information to the FOREIGN girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed NAME involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that NAME involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind.

(17) NAME OF CASE

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to FOREIGN Government intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, NAME, who was in a position to make available highly important FOREIGN documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in PLACE had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in PLACE had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

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(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National Review." The publication carried a column authored by an unidentified individual who was making derogatory references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the author as *NAME* a former CIA employee. CIA investigation indicated that *NAME* was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents. In checking on *NAME* CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as *NAME* former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and *NAME* former Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information as it might have pertained to *NAME* in this particular matter. CIA may have additional data not revealed.

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information indicating that one of our informants on the Mexican border was in a position to travel to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or his trip to Cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The Agency could charge that we were operating outside of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency.

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The monograph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN PLACE

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in PLACE. At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in PLACE. In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in PLACE with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that the CIA Chief in PLACE was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest.

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in PLACE bearing in mind that in a place such as PLACE, it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with FOREIGNERS. Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in PLACE without coordinating with CIA.

(22) CODE NAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE
OPERATION

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CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION -

Continued from page 15

(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one NAME who was harrassing CIA in the Miami area. NAME allegedly was seeking information concerning the Agency's covert operations. We told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within the Bureau's jurisdiction. CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U. S. intelligence operations.

(24) SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

CIA became very irked when we restricted dissemination of our SENSITIVE DOCUMENT to two copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material. The Agency never made an official issue of this matter. The Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated *DATE*, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the *FOREIGN* Intelligence Service concerning *KGB* operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive ~~FOREIGN~~ sources ~~CODENAME~~. We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad, CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the ~~FOREIGN~~ Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency.

(27) TITLE OF BOOK
AUTHOR

BOOK AUTHORED BY

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that ~~AUTHOR~~ in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. ~~AUTHOR~~ contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that ~~AUTHOR~~ preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. ~~AUTHOR~~ subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA.

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate.

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the SOURCE He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information.

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The actual fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was subsequently corrected.

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with NAME to discuss allegations made by NAME a Soviet defector, relative to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. NAME was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are officials in CIA who continue to be seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the Agency and have not discarded NAME's allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA has developed any substantive evidence to support NAME's allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots and attacks which were directed against the Vice President and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

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to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA. Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable of the referenced communication. As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that *NAME AND TITLE* CIA, was attached to Vice President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage in Latin America.

(33) *NAME OF SUBJECT*

The captioned individual is a criminal informant whom we have been utilizing to very significant advantage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable criminal intelligence and has been a key witness in prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. We acquired access to *NAME* through CIA. A covert CIA operator in New York City had become acquainted with *NAME* saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence, and then conferred with *NAME* CIA. *NAME* contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we subsequently acquired the services of *NAME*. Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions with regard to the exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses. CIA has felt that through a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity to describe CIA's organization, objectives, and operational problems. Furthermore, it has been expressed that Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over-all orientation on the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field. When the matter has been brought up for any discussion by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guidelines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

This is an area where discussion with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assistance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is not only important as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and which falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services. Our work in the positive intelligence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants, and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

In *DATE*, CIA requested the Bureau to install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary residences of two *FOREIGN* Government officials visiting the U. S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on NAME who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the FOREIGN Intelligence Service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the PLACE

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

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There also have been instances, but cases cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 11, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a letter be directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States. Purpose of this letter is to protect Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments it may have concerning current use of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and CIA. Director instructed "Prepare same and let me see it."

We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called "ground rules" drawn up between Bureau and CIA in January, 1966, with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. At that time Vice Admiral Raborn was head of CIA and we are enclosing a copy of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention.

In letter we have also pointed out the Bureau's primary responsibility concerning internal security of the United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence, we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other interested agencies. Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms may desire to make after reviewing this matter, including the 1966 agreement.

A copy of the 1966 "ground rules" between CIA and the Bureau is attached to this memorandum for the Director's information.

ACTION: If the Director approves, the attached letter to Helms should go forward.

OK

January 19, 1966

JFK
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions.

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI.

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development.

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved.

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad.

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent.

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March 11, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

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this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a selective basis developed sources, both live and technical, providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and officials of the Government.

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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