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Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-64

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## Document Information

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TO : ELDER, WALTER  
  
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Box 7

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NW 50955 DocId:32423547 Page 3

July 14, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Headquarters  
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

This will confirm the request I made on behalf of Mr. Schwarz in our telephone conversation this morning for copies of any reference in appointment books, daily diaries, calendars, logs or similar records relating to the following meetings, and any memoranda of conversation or other record thereof:

1. Meetings between Richard Helms and Robert Kennedy in the periods
  - a) November 30, 1961 - November 1, 1962
  - b) August 1, 1963 - November 22, 1963
2. Richard Helms' meeting with President Johnson regarding the three CIA Inspector General Reports
3. Meetings between Richard Bissell, McGeorge Bundy and W. W. Rostow in the period November 5, 1960 through February 15, 1961.

In addition, please provide a copy of any reference in appointment books, daily diaries, calendars or logs which relate to meetings among Messrs. Dulles, Bissell, Edwards or Cabell in the period August 1, 1960 through November 30, 1960, and any memoranda of conversation or other record of such meetings.

As we discussed, this information is needed for the hearings that are scheduled for Thursday, July 17. We will appreciate your efforts to supply this information before that date.

Sincerely,

Robert Kelley

Via Courier

RK/cm

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

R444  
FAOS

351-4016

Review Staff: 75/1616  
16 July 1975

Mr. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.  
Chief Counsel  
Select Committee To Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect To Intelligence  
Activities  
Room G-308  
Dirksen Senate Office Building  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Schwarz:

In response to your request of 14 July 1975  
about records of meetings by Agency officials (and  
confirming my telephone conversation with Mr. Kelley),  
the attached information is forwarded for your infor-  
mation.

Sincerely,

*Walter Elder*

Walter Elder  
Assistant to the Director

Attachment:  
As stated

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JUL 16 1975

CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to  
Criminal Sanctions.

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Classified by 007789  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine



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R499

16 July 1975

SUBJECT: Mr. Schwarz's 14 July 1975 request for information concerning meetings between Mr. Helms and Robert Kennedy, between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Bundy or Mr. Rostow, and a four-party meeting involving Mr. Dulles, Mr. Cabell, Mr. Bissell, and Mr. Edwards.

RESPONSE:

1. Concerning meetings involving Mr. Helms and Robert Kennedy during the periods 30 November 1961 - 1 November 1962 and August 1963 - 22 November 1963:

Our review for the above dates of memorandums of records written by Mr. Helms during the period 1951-1964 yield the following records which are attached at Tab 1:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Comment</u>
23 January 1962	"Briefing of the Attorney General"	Memo on briefing of Attorney General by Mr. Helms and three other Agency officials prior to a round-the-world trip taken by the Attorney General.
30 January 1962	CIA Officer	Memo of conversation between Mr. Helms and Attorney General.
16 October 1962	"Mr. Hoover and AELADLE"	Memo of Conversation between Mr. Helms and Mr. Papich in which Mr. Helms refers to an undated discussion with the Attorney General.
16 October 1962	"MONGOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General"	Memo on a meeting in Attorney General's office attended by the Attorney General, General Lansdale, Col. Patchell, General Johnson, Robert Hurwitch, Hewson Ryan, and Mr. Helms.
22 August 1963	"The Dunlop Case"	Memo on briefing of Attorney General on Dunlop case by Mr. Helms.

FROM

16 1975

CIA

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:  
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AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

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28 August 1963	"Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee re South Vietnam-6:15 p.m., 28 August 1963"	Memo on meeting attended by President, the Vice President, representatives of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice (Robert Kennedy), USIA, White House Staff, and CIA (Carter and Helms).
29 August 1963	"Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee re South Vietnam - Noon, 29 August 1963"	Memo on meeting attended as above.
29 October 1963	"White House Meeting on Vietnam-4:20 p.m., 29 October 1963"	Memo on meeting attended by President, Vice President, Attorney General, and participants from State, Defense, White House Staff, and CIA (Messrs. McCone, Helms, and Colby).
20 November 1963	"Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela"	Memo on separate briefings of the Attorney General and the President on Cuban Arms Cache by Mr. Helms and the former Deputy Chief of Station in Caracas.

2. Concerning a four-party meeting involving Messrs. Dulles, Cabell, Bissell, and Edwards at some time during the period 1 August 1960 - 30 November 1960:

Mr. Dulles' calendar bears an entry for 25 November 1960<sup>0</sup> showing that his schedule for that day included a budget meeting with the DDCI (then Gen. Cabell) the DDP (then Mr. Bissell) and the DDS (then Col. White). (See Tab 2). There is no entry for a four-party meeting involving Edwards during that period.

3. Concerning any meetings between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Bundy or Mr. Rostow between 5 November 1960 - 15 February 1961:

We have been unable to locate any record of such meetings.

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23 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Briefing of the Attorney General

1. The Attorney General was briefed for sixty minutes this morning in preparation for his trip. Mr. FitzGerald covered Japan and Indonesia, Mr. Critchfield spoke on Iran, and Mr. Murphy briefed on Berlin.

2. Pursuant to your request, I asked the Attorney General if he had had an opportunity to discuss with the Secretary of State the possibility of a stopover in Taiwan. He said that he had raised this matter and that it had been decided that he should push on with his voyage and not stop in Taipei.

3. I gave the Attorney General photographs and biographical sketches of our Station Chiefs in [ ] Taipei, Hong Kong, Djakarta, Teheran, Rome, Berlin, and The Hague. He said that he would make an effort to see our senior representative in each stop he makes and asked that appointments to see him be made through his Special Assistant, Mr. John Seigenthaler, who will be traveling with him. I am sending a cable to the field covering these contact instructions.

4. The briefing seemed to go satisfactorily, we answered the questions which appeared to interest the Attorney General, and we are sending him the report on Communist China derived from the documents captured abroad. He indicated a particular interest in seeing this paper.

Richard Helms  
Chief of Operations, DE/P

cc: DE/P

18 1075  
RHelms/ecd - 23 Jan 62Distribution: Orig & 1 - addressee  
1 - DD/P chrono  
1 - DD/P subject ✓**SECRET**

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30 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CIA Officer

I spoke with the Attorney General on 30 January 1962 and told him that we planned to worsen the CIA officer's condition along the lines set forth in cable. He asked if this would make the /so sick that he would not be fit to travel if released. I told him that this would not be the case, that what we wanted to do was to make him look peaked rather than be the healthy, robust-looking man he is now. The Attorney General inquired if we thought this would do some good. I replied that high Indonesian authorities have become very concerned when the ulcers first developed last fall and that they had overruled the doctors in insisting that the /CIA officer be taken to Bandung for hospitalization in a cooler climate. I summarized by saying that I could not see how it could do any harm and might do some good. At this point, the Attorney General agreed that we should go ahead.

*mt*  
Richard Helms  
Chief of Operations, DD/P

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16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Hoover and AELADLE

1. Mr. Sam Papich, FBI Liaison representative, came to see me at 5:15 P. M., 15 October. He referred to the telephone call which the Director had placed to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover but which was taken by Mr. Belmont in Mr. Hoover's absence from the city. Mr. Papich said that the Director's request that Mr. Hoover see AELADLE had been taken up with him upon his return. Mr. Papich stated that Mr. Hoover's answer was "No".

2. In explanation, Mr. Papich indicated that Mr. Hoover felt that AELADLE wanted to see him simply on the basis of ego and that there was no useful information to derive from such an encounter. I pointed out to Mr. Papich that the last time the Attorney General saw AELADLE, he emphasized to me that one should play up to the ego of an individual such as AELADLE. This rejoinder simply caused Mr. Papich to smile.

3. Mr. Papich ended this part of our meeting by saying that Mr. Hoover was consistent in his policy not to receive defectors, agents, criminals, or other controversial figures. I told Mr. Papich that Mr. Hoover's refusal clearly had implications as far as AELADLE's cooperation with the FBI is concerned. Mr. Papich said he realized this.

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Elder for the DCI  
1 cc - Chief, CI  
1 cc - Chief, SR  
1 cc - DD/P

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16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MONROOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONROOSE consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Harson Ryan of CSIA, and the undersigned.
2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation MONROOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONROOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONROOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).
3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.
4. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONROOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans

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with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I retailed my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRG who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Henson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.

5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Elder for the DCI and DDCI  
1 cc - Chief, TFW  
1 cc - DD/P

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22 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Dunlop case

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, I briefed the Attorney General at 10:15 A. M. today on the Dunlop case at NSA. The information I had as of that time consisted only of the following: that the man had been under suspicion, that he had committed suicide some weeks ago, and that on 21 August his widow had turned over to CIC of the Army certain classified documents which she had found in the attic of her house. These documents were not identified.

*W*  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

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28 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee<sup>\*</sup> re South Viet Nam —  
6:15 P. M., 28 August 1963

1. The President came from his meeting with the Civil Rights leaders in the Cabinet Room to his office and summoned into the Cabinet Room the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other members of the Executive Committee remained in his office. After about fifteen minutes, the President returned to his office with these three gentlemen, giving no indication as to what aspects of the South Viet Nam situation they had been discussing. He simply announced that three telegrams were being sent to Saigon:

- A) A personal message to Ambassador Lodge from the President. (No. 269)
- B) A general message from the Department of State to the Ambassador. (DepTel 260)
- C) A telegram from General Taylor to General Harkins. (JCS 3385-63)

2. Governor Harriman pressed for stronger instructions designed to remove the Nhu's from the SVN Government. The President indicated that he wanted to get Washington and the field lined up on a coordinated approach to the problem and that in light of a message from General Harkins he wanted to proceed as outlined in the aforementioned messages. He ended the meeting by stating that the Executive Committee would meet again at noon, 29 August.

\* President, Vice President

State: Rusk, Harriman, Hilsman, Holting  
Defense: McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Krulak  
Treasury: Dillon  
Justice: Robert Kennedy  
USIA: Marrow

Distribution:

DDCI - Mr. Elder for the DCI  
C/FE

White House: Bundy, Forrestal, Clifton, Smith  
CIA: Casper, Helms

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

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29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee re South Viet Nam --  
Noon, 29 August 1963.

1. The meeting had before it Saigon BuTel 375 from Ambassador Lodge and MACV cable 1566 from General Harbison, as well as CIA reports of the Conain/CIA officer talk with Generals Minh/Thiam and another CIA/officer talk with Bui Diem and General Le Van Kim.

2. There was again what has become the usual presentation by the various participants as to the desirability of a quick coup against Diem/Nhu, the effort to save Diem but unload Nhu, and the deliberate approach of attempting to ascertain whether or not the SVN generals have a coup plan and the capabilities for carrying it out. It gradually became the sense of the group that General Harbison should be instructed to confirm to the SVN generals that the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the United States Government. In addition, it was felt desirable to attempt to find out through Conain's talk with General Kim, scheduled for 30 August (Saigon time), what the SVN generals were in fact planning to do. General Taylor felt strongly that General Harbison should be asked to pass on whatever the generals proposed as to its military feasibility. He wanted to be sure before other actions are taken that a coup is actually lined up. There was concern that the SVN generals were maneuvering to get the United States to do their planning for them, and the consensus appeared to be that every effort should be made to see that this is an SVN coup and not one run by the Americans. It was felt that any announcements about the stopping of United States aid or the loading of 7th Fleet movements should be held up pending more information about SVN coup planning. It was agreed that the Agency would discuss with Mr. Hillsman certain ideas which we might implement to either get a coup started or help carry it out. (Plans are now being developed and will be discussed with State late today.)

3. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was to be drafted by the White House Staff for Presidential approval.

4. The White House, State, Defense, and CIA were asked to hold only one file each which contained policy/operational telegrams involving the President personally.

Reponse: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
Reponse: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
Reponse: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

(Signed) Richard Helms  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:

Orig - DDCI - Mr. Elder for the Director  
1 cc - C/F3

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\* Present Here: ...

The President, Vice President  
State: Rusk, Harriman, Hillsman, Molting  
Defense: McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor Krulak  
Treasury: Dillon  
CIA: ...  
White House: Bundy, Forrestal, Clifton, Smith  
CIA: Carter, Helms

... (faint text)

... (faint, mostly illegible text block)

... (faint, mostly illegible text block)

... (faint, mostly illegible text block)

**SECRET**  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

August 29, 1963

**AGENDA**

Meeting with the President on Vietnam

August 29, 1963 -- 12:00 P.M.

1. Policy -- Ambassador Lodge's reply
2. Defense -- General Harkins' reply
3. Intelligence -- CAS cable
4. Next steps
5. Document control

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3-5536

29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Vietnam  
4:20 P.M., 29 October 1963

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Vice President  
Attorney General

State Secretary Rusk  
Under Secretary Harriman  
Under Secretary Johnson  
Mr. Mendenhall

Defense Secretary McNamara  
General Taylor  
General Krulak  
Mr. William Bundy

White House Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Michael Forrestal  
Mr. Brownley Smith

CIA Mr. John A. McCone  
Mr. Richard Helms  
Mr. William E. Colby

1. The meeting opened with a CIA briefing on the disposition of military forces in the Saigon area and a discussion of the different coup groupings active in Vietnam. The President directed that a message be sent to Saigon presenting the specifics of this briefing for the concurrence or comment of Ambassador Lodge and General Harbison, as the figures indicated that any coup attempt in Saigon would meet considerable GVN resistance.

2. Secretary Rusk commented that Dien and Nhu must know a good deal about the coup talk and that both sides in a coup would be apt to ask the United States for assistance. We would have the problem of being silent or taking a position against prolonged fighting leading to a possible civil war. He pointed out that civil war

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would disrupt the conduct of military operations against the VC. He believed we should minimize our involvement in this coup and allow Ambassador Lodge to return on schedule. The President commented that Ambassador Lodge's departure need not be delayed but that General Martins should be placed in charge if any coup should begin. He and General Taylor commented that the problem was not an overall balance of forces but that the role of few leaders would be decisive in a coup situation. It was suggested that General Martins, Charge d'Affaires Trueheart and CAS chief act as a committee to direct any coup operation. Mr. McCone countered with the view that CAS chief should not be involved in such a policy-making function although he would be in a position to provide technical advice to General Martins and Trueheart as well as carry out their instructions in the operational field.

3. The Attorney General commented that a coup in Vietnam was not one in which the United States could take a hands-off position since we were involved in the success or failure of the war there. He expressed concern that the present course of action was putting the whole future in the hands of relatively unknown generals. He pointed out that President Diem was a fighter and would probably react most sharply and adversely to the United States. He stated that we should know more about this coup and that failure could spell disaster. He felt that the United States was risking too much based on flimsy evidence.

4. General Taylor commented that his impression was that the military were not interested in politics but only in getting on with the war. He added that even a successful coup would have a bad short-term effect on the war since the confusion and changes of personnel such as province chiefs would lead to a setback. Mr. McCone stated that he agreed with General Taylor that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum and confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup. The President questioned whether such wide changes in province chiefs would necessarily have to follow a successful coup. Secretary Rusk stated his belief that a quick, successful coup would bring better leadership to Vietnam. Governor Harriman stated his belief that unless a change in government was brought about, the war will run down and be lost since Diem does not have the leadership qualities necessary to carry the country to victory.

5. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup, we should discourage its launching. He asked that we list the key units and our estimate of their

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loyalties and if the balance was not clearly indicative of a quick victory, we should reconsider. In this connection he agreed that Ambassador Lodge might delay his departure from Saigon long enough to make such an investigation. Secretary McNamara stated Ambassador Lodge would read this as a change in his basic instructions and in his belief that up to now we would support or at least keep hands off a coup. He commented that Ambassador Lodge will have some difficulties in passing over the leadership of the coup effort to General Harkins since General Harkins has been brought very little into recent planning and discussions. He asked that Ambassador Lodge be given the option as to when he would depart. Secretary Rusk reiterated the basic criteria for United States action, i. e., that we would not stimulate a coup but that we would not thwart one if it offered the prospect of increased military effort in the war, popular support and improved working relations with the United States. The President agreed that Ambassador Lodge should determine his own departure time.

6. After a separate drafting session, the meeting resumed to go over a draft telegram with the President. He directed a number of changes, particularly to bring out his belief that what we say to the generals could be highly decisive as to whether they launch a coup and that this action is not entirely out of our hands. Secondly, he wanted to emphasize that the burden of proof must be on the coup forces and whether they have the strength to win quickly. If not, we should discourage them. Mr. Bundy expressed concern regarding the security of these meetings on Vietnam and the absolute importance of keeping these discussions secret. He further directed that any policy telegrams from any Agency be cleared with the White House and that the White House be given a copy of operational traffic which might in any way indicate policy judgments.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms/William E. Colby  
DD/P C/PB

Distribution:

Original - The Director

1 cc - DDCI

1 cc - DD/P ✓

1 cc - DD/I

1 cc - C/PB

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JUL 16 1975  
CIA

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EYES ONLY

20 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela

1. At 5:00 P. M., 19 November, the former Deputy Chief of Station in Caracas, and I called on the Attorney General to show him one of the submachine guns which had been retrieved from the arms cache found by the Venezuelan authorities in early November on the Paraguana Peninsula of Venezuela. Last week, the Attorney General had told me that it would be most useful if the Agency were to produce some gun or other piece of military equipment which had actually been sent from Cuba to another country in Latin America. Therefore, we briefed the Attorney General in detail on the materiel in the cache and the means by which we had been able to demonstrate that the origin of the arms was Cuban. He examined the submachine gun and the supporting photographs which show serial numbers and the Cuban Army shield. While we were talking with the Attorney General, he took a telephone call in another room. Upon his return, he said that he had been speaking with the President and that we were to go to the White House within thirty minutes to show this gun to him.

2. The President was briefed on the origins of the submachine gun and on the methods used to establish that it had come from Cuba. We also described in detail what was found in the arms cache and the purposes for which the materiel was intended. We referred to the fact that mortar shells had been found wrapped in the unique air-drop gear which the Agency had devised for use at the Bay of Pigs. The President inquired about how the military equipment had been transported to Venezuela, our reply being that we believed it had been by boat since a small aluminum craft with an outboard motor had been found three hundred yards from the actual cache site. We then pointed out that President Betancourt desired to surface the finding of the Cuban arms cache at a time of his choosing prior to the Venezuelan presidential election on 1 December. The President agreed that President Betancourt should be given this opportunity. He further stated that the United States Government should do nothing about surfacing its interest in these arms until a decision has been made on what steps the United States wants to take in retaliation against Castro. He gave no suggestions as to what line of action he desired to pursue but made it clear that he would expect some recommendations to be forthcoming after the matter had been fully considered by appropriate agencies. We

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informed him that the problem was already being worked on by Alexis Johnson, Paul Nitze, and representatives of this Agency. I specifically cleared with the President showing the submachine gun and other evidence to interested officials of State and Defense.

3. It was clear that both the President and the Attorney General were intensely interested in this concrete example of Castro's export of arms for subversion. There was no opportunity with either gentleman to give a detailed briefing on other evidence of Castro subversive activity in Central and South America.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

(A briefing of Acting Secretary of State Alexis Johnson and Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin plus Mr. Nitze and other Pentagon officials is scheduled for 2:30 P. M. today.)

Distribution:

Original - Mr. Elder for The Director

- 1 cc - DDCI ✓
- 1 cc - Chief, WH
- 1 cc - Chief, SAS
- 1 cc - DD/P

SECRET

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Addendum to 20 November 1963  
Memorandum for the Record  
Subject: Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela

When the meeting ended, the President arose from his rocking chair and stood beside the coffee table looking toward the Rose Garden. I leaned over and picked up the submachine gun from the coffee table. As I did so, I said to the President on the spur of the moment, "I am glad the Secret Service did not catch me bringing this gun in here." The President's face lighted up, he grinned, and instantly reacted, "Yes, it gives me a feeling of confidence." The former <sup>DCOS Caracas</sup> and I then went out one of the French doors on to the portico and walked around to the Cabinet Room where we had left a briefcase. As we walked down the hall, we saw the President again signing mail at the corner of Mrs. Lincoln's desk. He had interrupted work on his correspondence to take us into his office for the conversation.

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

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JUL 16 1975

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RECEIVED FROM

JUL 16 1975

CIA

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		15 July 75
TO: Mr. Brody		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p>The attached copy of AWDulles' calendar sheet is being forwarded in response to your request .</p> <p>Eunice</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		

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JUL 16 1975  
CIA

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6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30			

FRIDAY

25

NOVEMBER

330 10 - The President + Mrs. 36  
 12:45 Mrs. Helms *Kenny*  
 1 - Lunch, Mr. George Allen

2 - Paul Rindesch  
 2:45 Mr. Rindesch  
 3:30 Rindesch Mtg  
 1 A.C.I. - L.P. - L.S.  
 4:30 Cabell Biscell

RECEIVED FROM:

JUL 16 1975

CIA