

ARTIME; Buesn, Manuel

Volume XIII

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Third Agency Documents

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

8 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDY-1


DATE: 7 January 1965, 2130 Hours

1. AMBIDY-1 reported that [redacted] arrived from Central America and reported that Vico Starke and Frank Marshall, with the support of General Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua, were planning a coup against President Francisco Orlich in Costa Rica. A-1 planned to depart Miami for Managua at 0700 hours, 8 January on Lanica airline to check this information with General Somoza and to attempt to ensure that his equipment is not being used to carry out the coup. A-1 will have his private communications pad and promised to send us a message as soon as he talked with General Somoza and with the Orlichs and Starke in Costa Rica.
2. A-1 agreed to try to return to New York on Saturday, 9 January, for a meeting with Mr. [redacted] (Chief, WH). A-1 will call as soon as he arrives in New York at which time arrangements will be made to bring him to Washington for the meeting.
3. A-1 reported he and Al Burt had signed a non-aggression pact. A-1 feels there is little to gain from his point of view in continuing the squabble with Burt.

[redacted]
WH/SA/AMWORLD

File:
AMBIDY-1 201
Tel Conversations
Costa Rica
Eic
Brens

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		2. RI FILE NO.			
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
6. ANALYST	5. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			
PERTINENT INFORMATION					
<div> <p>14.</p> <div> <p>ARTIME, MANUEL 201-267437 SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>CIT CUBA OCC ?</p> <p>RE ALLEGATION BY ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO 201-269349 OR MRR WAS WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER THE ORDERS OF A COUNTERINTELL AGENCY OF US AND THAT SUBJ WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SINKING OF SPANISH SHIP SIERRA ARANZAZU.</p> <p align="right">R 6502082325</p> </div> </div>					
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.					

FORM 887 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-66)

TOTAL COPIES 6 BY ☐ COPY ☐ COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM

JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

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TIME

1200

BY

DM

INFO

VR, FILE, 0012

AMBID04-11 201 13 FEB 65 IN 80247
Security

SECRET 132358Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8261

RY TYPIC YOSITE AMWORLD

1. AMCLATTER/1 TOLD 13 FEB 65 BY FRANK FIORINI THAT MANUEL ARTIME'S HOUSE AT 1270 NE 85TH STREET MIAMI WAS RANSACKED DURING EVENING 12 FEB. ARTIME TOLD FIORINI THAT INTRUDERS HAD STOLEN JEWELRY, NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS AND TELESCOPIC LENS RIFLE THAT FIORINI HAD GIVEN ARTIME AS GIFT.

2. ARTIME ASKED FIORINI HELP HIM OUT BY GETTING IN TOUCH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (UNSPECIFIED) WITH REQUEST THEY KEEP MATTER QUIET. FIORINI SAID ARTIME DOES NOT WANT INCIDENT PUBLICIZED.

3. FOR SECURITY REASONS WAVE HAS MADE NO EFFORT OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, WAVE HAS RECEIVED NO OTHER REPORT ON THIS MATTER AS OF PREPARATION THIS REPORT.

SECRET

*note: Artime confirmed this
11 Feb - Event was all right
3 Feb - no
sensitive documents taken*

SECRET

PR
504 APR 65

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL CDP

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DIR CDE WAVE 8428

REF WAVE 8419 (1783360)

REF WAVE 8419

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

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PERSON UNIT ACTIVITIES

FROM INWAVE

ACTION IX/INW/BA 3

INFO VL. FILE, DDP.

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SEC ES

SECRET 181589Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8419

RYD TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD

WAVE 8261 (IN ~~69048~~)

✓ m B.004-12-17 n! 83260
Security

1. ANCLATTER/I PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REF 15 FEB 65 BY STATING RANSACKING AMBIDDY/I'S HOUSE ACTUALLY OCCURRED SOME TIME BETWEEN 1-3 FEB AND DISCOVERED BY MAID LUCY ACOSTA 3 FEB. FIORINI HOWEVER LEARNED OF RANSACKING ABOUT 1330 HOURS 13 FEB WHEN RCVD PHONE CALL FROM ANWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) WHO TOLD FIORINI THAT ALTHO HOUSE BURGLARIZED 8 FEB HE DID NOTHING UNTIL FIRST SPEAKING WITH AMBIDDY/I WHO OUT TOWN. AMBIDDY-I RECOMMENDED IDEN CONTACT FIORINI WITH REQUEST FIORINI CONTACT LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF ABLE DO SO WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

2. FIORINI, AFTER RECEIPT TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEN CONTACTED PERSONAL FRIEND FRANK CAMPBELL, FORMER CHIEF INTEL METRO, WHO ADVISED FIORINI CONTACT POLICE CAPTAIN LEE NAPIR USING CAMPBELL'S NAME. FIORINI, WHO ALSO KNOWN TO CAPTAIN NAPIR, CONTACTED NAPIR WITH IDEN. NAPIR PROMISED MAKE INVESTIGATION WITHOUT MAKING "REPORT."

3. MTG 15 FEB IDEN SHOWED NAPIR 24 PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING

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BROKEN DOOR AND LARGE NUMBER DOCUMENTS SCATTERED OVER FLOOR. IDEN

ALSO GAVE NAPIR FOLLOWING LIST MISSING ARTICLES: (A) ROLEX WRIST WATCH; (B) ANOTHER INEXPENSIVE WRIST WATCH; (C) RING WITH FOUR TWO CARAT DIAMONDS AND LARGE ZIRCON; (D) TWO EIGHTEEN CARAT GOLD NECKLACES; (E) ONE WOMAN'S IDENTIFICATION BRACELET, AND (F) ONE HIGH POWERED 300 MAGNUM RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC LENS AND TRIGGER GUARD INSCRIBED "AMBIDDY/I, LEADER OF REVOLUTION, FRANK FIORINI."

ALTHO SOME DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM A/I'S HOUSE IMPORTANT PAPERS KEPT HOUSE SAFE WHICH NOT DISTURBED. IDEN WHO CONDUCTING OWN INVESTIGATION, TOLD NAPIR IDEN SUSPECTED HOUSE REPAIRMAN WHO RECENTLY WORKED A/I'S HOUSE WALDO BADO PEREZ, 1285 NW 29TH STREET TERRACE, MIAMI. BADO WHO HAS NO REGULAR MEANS INCOME RECENTLY BOUGHT WIFE 68 CORVAIR (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4378) AND PAST WEEK MADE PERSONAL GIFTS NUMBER FRIENDS. ALSO PURCHASED FOUR NEW TIRES HIS OWN 61 FALCON (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4382).

4. IDEN ALSO LOCATED JEWELRY STORE 964 WEST FLAGLER STREET WITH A/I'S ROLEX WRIST WATCH FOR SALE. IDEN HAD WIFE A/I VISIT STORE AND PURCHASE ROLEX FOR \$200 CASH PLUS \$45 STILL OWED SALESMAN NAMED

WIFE A/I ABLE IDENTIFY WATCH BY TWO MARKS BACK

WATCH. NAPIR PROMISED IDEN WOULD HANDLE INVESTIGATION JEWELRY

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SIGRE AND SUGGESTED IDEN PUT SURVEILLANCE CUBAN COFFEE SHOP
MIAMI EL GOZO.

5. ANCLATTER/I SAID THAT IDEN HAS NO CURRENT INFO INDICATE
"ESPIONAGE" OR "REVOLUTIONARY MOTIVATION" BEHIND ROBBERY.

6. INSPECTOR (CAPTAIN) F. L. NAPIER ASSIGNED DETECTIVE BUREAU
MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL CAPT NAPIR PARA TWO
ABOVE. FRANK CAMPBELL PROBABLY IDENTICAL FRANK KAPPEL FORMER METRO
CHIEF INTEL WHO RESIGNED WORK WITH STATE RACING COMMISSION.

7. NO SPECIFIC WAVE TRACES WALDO BADO PEREZ ALTHO ONE
WALDO PEREZ REPORTED MAY 62 AS HAVING HELPED ORGANIZE PROPAGANDA
AND MILITARY PLANS LIBERATION CUBA IN CUBAN LIBERATION ARMY (UFG
992; 14 MAY 62). WAVE TRACES [REDACTED] INDICATE HE POSSIBLY
IDENTICAL [REDACTED]

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RE. FILE, DDP

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DIRECTIVE CITE ☐ 7403

SECRET

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 17 FEBRUARY ON PAA FLIGHT

301 FROM MIAMI.

SECRET

CFM

SECRET

201 84948

lit

←

24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPY 00

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FROM **JT WAVE**

ACTION **DC/WH/SA-3**

INFO **VR. FILE BDP**

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YES
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UNIT TIME DATE DAY

SECRET 201927Z

DIR WAVE 8522

DECLASSIFIED

REF: WAVE 8521 (IN 85083)

IDEN:

SECRET

20 Feb 65 IN 85084

PR

12K

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA3

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SECRET 281927Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8521

AMWORLD TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REFS: A. WAVE 8261 (IN)

B. WAVE 8419 (IN ~~8521~~)

C. WAVE 8420 (IN ~~8521~~)

1. AMCLATTER/1, AS FOLLOW UP REFS, REPORTED 19 FEB 65 THAT MIAMI POLICE CAPTAIN NAPIR PHONED FIORINI 18 FEB AND ARRANGED FOR FIORINI AND AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) MEET WITH TWO POLICE SERGEANTS FORM POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT 1145 NW 11TH STREET MIAMI. MTG HELD FROM 1330 TO 1430 HOURS 18 FEB MAYFLOWER RESTAURANT NORTH MIAMI AVENUE AND 36TH STREET WITH SERGEANTS (FNU) DOWDA AND (FNU) MCCRACKEN

OF POLICE BURGLARY SQUAD. BOTH SERGEANTS SAID NAPIR INSTRUCTED THEM EACH "KEEP CASE OFF REPORT". IDEN TOLD SERGEANTS THAT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HE AND AMWORLD BOTH CONCLUDE ROBBERY WAS "G-2 SPONSORED", POINTED UP FACT \$500 LEICA CAMERA AND TWO \$300 TAPE RECORDERS VISIBLY ACCESSIBLE NOT TOUCHED. ALSO SUSPECT SOME DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED. SURMISE INTRUDERS WANTED GIVE OUTWARD APPEARANCE ROBBERY.

2. FIORINI SAID ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUSPECT WALDO BADO PEREZ INDICATE HE FORMER BRIGADE MEMBR. POLICE SERGEANTS AND IDEN AGREE

AMB1004-1001
Security

20FEB 1965 083

3. ACCORDING FIORINI NAPIR INSTRUCTED IDEN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS IN WRITING ON STOLEN RIFLE AND MAIL REPORT TO HIM. NAPIR WANTS REPORT POSTMARKED AND ALLEGEDLY WOULD DISCLOSE CONTENTS ONLY TO CLEAR ANWORLD ANY COMPLICITY OR RESPONSIBILITY EVENT RIFLE USED BY UNKNOWN PARTY SOME FUTURE CRIME.

[illegible]

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15 SECRET

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INFO

DEBON/SA-3

WR. FILE, DDP, C/WH

S E C R E T 231620Z

DIR INFO ☐ ☐ CITE ☐ 0003

KARL TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

MANUEL ARTIME AND RAFAEL QUINTERO ARRIVED CARA FROM PACS 20

FEB PAA 513. PLANS REMAIN CARA UN ^{TIL} 24 OR 25 FEB WHEREUPON

WILL DEPART FOR COSTA RICA.

S E C R E T

CFN

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23 Feb 65 IN 85926

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TOTAL COPIES

7

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DIR [] CITE [] 7400

RYBAT T-1C YOBITE AMWORLD

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA LEFT SAN JOSE 26 FEBRUARY FOR PACY ON LACSA
629.

SECRET

CFM

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24 Feb 65 IN 86580

8 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phase-out of ARTIME Autonomous Group

1. On the night of 5 March 1965, the case officer for Manuel ARTIME Buena met with him and outlined the policy decision reached by the 303 Committee on 4 March. ARTIME was told the decision was to terminate our operational relationship in as friendly and cooperative manner as possible, but not later than 1 May 1965. The case officer had been empowered to convey this information and to conduct an exploratory discussion of the problems and possible solutions connected with a phase-out program. The two main points the United States Government was concerned with were (a) fair but reasonable demobilization support to the personnel of the autonomous group; and (b) ARTIME's assistance in insuring that the balance of power in Central America was not upset, particularly by preventing the weapons of his group from falling into the hands of political extremists or free-booters.

2. ARTIME had been on notice for several months that a phase-out might be ordered at any time, and had an inkling that the decision had been made because his regular monthly subsidy had not been received on schedule. He had obviously given the matter considerable thought and made up his mind as to his course of action when he arrived at the meeting. He began the discussion by summarizing the things he might have done had he been so inclined. Among the possibilities mentioned, he included loading up his troops and weapons and taking over Haiti as a base against Cuba, intervening in Costa Rica to bring down the liberal PLN administration in favor of a rightist junta of dissidents, or throwing in completely with General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua the weapons, personnel and equipment of the autonomous group. He has the capability of fielding an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery (4.2 mortars), supported by air and maritime elements, with a cadre of trained and combat-experienced Cubans, provided he teams up with an organization

SECRET



who can furnish about 1,000 men to flesh out the unit. Case officer acknowledged that we recognized his potential for harmful action, had considered it thoroughly, and hoped he would not do anything of the kind. ARTIME said he had also considered all the possibilities and concluded there was no point in his being childish and trying to "bite us about the ankles."

3. ARTIME accepts the decision and will cooperate in a phase-out program. He does not understand the rationale, and, of course, does not agree with the decision, but he acknowledges our prerogative to make it. If we really wish still to be friends, he is willing, just as he told Mr. FitzGerald originally. He asks only that we help him make it possible to remain friendly and makes two requests from us: (a) help take care of his men and their families until they can rehabilitate and resettle themselves, and (b) do everything possible to get his parents out of Cuba.

4. The major elements to be considered in a phase-out were discussed with the following results:

a. Personnel. The first priority is support payments to dependents which were due 1 March in the total amount of \$100,00. This must be done soonest if ARTIME is to maintain control of the situation. The next most immediate problem is re-entry permission for fifteen of his men who have been stranded in Nicaragua trying to return to the United States since December. These men were ex-filtrated "black" from the United States with our assistance and require special authority for re-entry from Department of State and Department of Justice, which we thought was arranged in early January.

The demobilization plan proposed by ARTIME seemed as realistic and effective as could be hoped for. He proposes to return the bulk of his men, approximately 200, to the United States during March and give them one month's pay on 1 April as a mustering out payment to support them and their families while they seek other employment. The balance of his men, less than 100, will be held in Central America for one month longer as a security and administrative force muster the group's equipment at Monkey Point from which disposition can be made during the month

SECRET

of April. The security force will be returned during April and will be paid a mustering out payment on 1 May. This will terminate the project.

The cover story which ARTIME intends to use for demobilization is to inform his men that their mothership is out of commission and will require about six weeks for repairs. This is true enough so that it will be believed. He will then grant leave to all men with dependents to get their personal affairs in order before operations commence again. He will publicize the fact that it is less expensive and better for morale to send them on leave than to have men sitting around the camps with no operations to run. When all the first contingent are back home, individual notice will be given each to start looking for other work as operations have been postponed. They will be told that the salary payment of 1 April will be the last one and should be considered as a mustering out bonus. ARTIME feels this method will soften the impact and lower the noise level as the men will be home with their families and scattered throughout the community instead of being in an organized group in Central America when they realize they are being demobilized.

b. Funds. ARTIME had done his homework and brought with him facts and figures upon which phase-out costs could be estimated. These cost estimates are outlined below:

1 March - \$100,000	Dependents support and salaries
35,000	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 200 men
50,000	Accrued debts due 1 March, mainly food and other expenses for camps in Central America
<u>\$175,000</u>	(In lieu of regular monthly subsidy of \$225,000)

1 April - \$100,000	Mustering out payment for 200 men and salaries for security and administrative details
12,500	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 100 men
12,500	Estimated food and other camp expenses
<u>\$125,000</u>	

SECRET

1 May - \$ 50,000 Mustering out payments for approx. 100 men and final contractual obligations of project

\$ 50,000

c. Weapons. ARTIME agreed that it would be in nobody's interest for his weapons to fall into the wrong hands. He was asked for ideas on disposition of the arms and came up with the following suggestion which appears to be an excellent one. The mothership, MV SANTA MARIA, is in need of repairs and must go into a shipyard. Tentative arrangements have been made to put her in the yards at Galveston, Texas, some time in March or April. ARTIME can order his security detail to store the arms aboard the ship for "security" reasons before she leaves for the yard. They will simply remain on board when the ship leaves and we can take control of the ship and the weapons from that point on.

d. Maritime.

(1) MV SANTA MARIA. See above. The ship would be sailed from Monkey Point with a contract crew supplied by [redacted]

One of ARTIME's senior officers would accompany the ship as his representative, with orders to turn over control of it and the arms upon its arrival at Galveston. CIA officers, possibly [redacted] would accept custody and Office of Logistics could recover the weapons and any other equipment which might be shipped by this method. The ship would then be disposed of according to Headquarters wishes at any time after 17 April [redacted]

(2) Swifts, V-20's, Boston Whalers, rubber boats and other operational craft are all owned, technically, by ARTIME's group. He has [redacted]

He wants to retain these craft for the time being, hoping against hope that lightning will strike and he may, after all, be able to use them in the next

SECRET

two months. Case officer recommends we go along with him on this. at least for the time being, as it could be sticky legally and might antagonize him at the time when we most need his cooperation. In the end, he should be reasonable about disposition of these craft if we shoot square with him in the meantime.

(3) Support craft, LCMs, Barges, etc. Disposition arrangements to be worked out together on these craft.

c. Aircraft.

(1) DC-3. ARTIME is willing to release the

However, one month's charter payment of \$1,250 was due 1 March, and another will be due by the time the aircraft can be returned. ARTIME was reluctant to let the plane go back without payment, but also reluctant to squeeze the \$2,500 out of his budget. Case officer voiced his opinion that the owner would probably be glad to get the plane back and would not likely think it worth going to court. However, in view of the fact that it would be a "closed-circuit" transaction and would actually cost the Government nothing, it is recommended that a special authorization of \$2,500 be channeled to ARTIME for payment in order to maintain ARTIME's reputation for fiscal probity. He will surely appreciate this gesture.

(2) L-20 Beaver and Cessna-180. These aircraft technically belong to ARTIME's group and recovery would be a sticky matter, legally. ARTIME hopes to hold control of these aircraft for the time being, and it is recommended that we go along with him, saving disposition arrangements until later.

5. ARTIME again emphasized at the close of the meeting that he must have soonest the March payments for families as an absolute minimum, before he could face his people and maintain control of them in order to insure an orderly phase-out program.

cc: C/WN
DCWHD/C
C/WZ/C/CA

Carl E. Jenkins
WM/C/CA/BA

SECRET

19 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, WH remarks on Termination of AMWORLD

1. At a meeting with DCVHD/C and Mr. Jenkins on 18 March, Chief, WH expressed general satisfaction with the status of termination of AMWORLD and the plans therefor. He stated specifically that he was pleased with the cooperation of AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 and would make it a point to inform higher levels in the Agency and the U. S. Government and put a good word for them on the record. He also directed that they be told:

a. He personally appreciates their cooperation and the good sense, goodwill and maturity they displayed in accepting and executing the U. S. Government decision to terminate their operations.

b. He wants to meet with them personally, at the earliest mutually convenient time, in order to discuss the situation with them.


c. After termination of the paramilitary project is completed, he has some other ideas for ventures of mutual interest which he wishes to pursue with them.

2. The gist of the above points had been passed to AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 previously by Mr. Jenkins, and on the night of 18 March he confirmed by telephone to AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH had expressed the above sentiments.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
AMJAVA-4 201
Policy

SECRET



DISPATCH

SECRET, ~~DESENSITIZED~~

1-1

Chief, WFO

1

ON 04/03/66 01:00-01:05

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK

FOR ADVICE ONLY

Chief of Station, [redacted]

DISPATCH

PRIORITY

FREEDER/AMOROLD - Future of AMBIDDY 1/AMJAYA 4

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

Reference : DIR 98189

1. Ref cable raises a number of fundamental issues of concern to [redacted] Station. In brief, we do not welcome an activation of the movement's center [redacted] an event which would greatly complicate our operational situation. We have reasons for believing that the host government likewise would probably be embarrassed if AMBIDDY 1 chose [redacted] as a base for whatever program he is planning to undertake. Repeated failures of his attempts at [redacted] are significant in this context.

2. Since we must assume that AMBIDDY 1 has alluded to his close ties with HUBARK (and more specifically with BECKHOFF), the [redacted] may well jump to the conclusion that AMOROLD is in fact a HUBARK operation and sooner or later we would be forced to disavow AMBIDDY 1, a circumstance of which he would be bound to learn with consequent embitterment. All these predictable developments, [redacted] is most anxious to forestall. Needless to say, both BECKHOFF and OFFICE are unhappy about this situation of conflict since it involves a man whom both admire and who (in their opinion) has served GUYONE interests loyally, at times to the detriment of his abiding cause to liberate FREEDER.

3. For the above reasons, we would welcome indeed if formal and institutional ties between AMBIDDY 1 and AMJAYA 4 could be put in abeyance, at least to the extent that AMBIDDY 1 be prevailed upon to pass up [redacted] as a base of operations. This discriminatory approach reflects our awareness that

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WFO

BI/ENJCE	201-567437
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201-567437

GROUP REFERENCE TO

NYCA-12238

DATE

5 April 1966

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DESENSITIZED
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NOTES FOR HANDLING

SO1 - AMBIDDY/1
SO1 - AMJAYA/4

AMERICAN is international in scope. It is not a purely national movement. Its goal, therefore, will be to raise the political and economic standards of oppressed and activity and to attract support, especially from countries to which people. We think that AMERICA should exercise a powerful influence. Should AMERICA get involved in the activities of the anti-union strike, the State would not help but interfere with nonconformist damage to our standing with the African services. We can further predict that the American trade union movement (which is belligerently anti-AMERICAN) may view an active AMERICAN sponsored program with disfavor and would then bring strong pressure to bear on the Government to curtail or suppress the movement.

4. We realize that the Station's position, as set forth above, sends Headquarters with an exceedingly delicate task. While as a last resort we could of course drop discreet hints to [] contacts suggesting the inadvisability of affording AMBIDY I and his associates sanctuary [] we would only entertain that distasteful prospect as a last resort and with the full approval of Headquarters.

5. Another approach, only slightly less unsatisfactory, would be to restrict AMBIDDY 1's radius of activity to an extent tantamount to denying him all freedom of political action [redacted] But all in all, it would probably be best for KUBARK if AMBIDDY 1 could be dissuaded from going through with his proposed move in a manner which does not hurt his pride and which does not alienate him from KUBARK. Headquarters may be able to suggest palatable alternatives to [redacted]

6. As regards AMJAVA 4, we share some of Headquarters misgivings about surfacing him to Liaison. What prompted us to suggest this approach was a desire to overcome the difficulties which would be facing AMJAVA 4 in any case should he decide to make his home here. We are inclined to doubt that he could obtain permission to enter [] in immigrant status without powerful intercession. He would be used by the Station on projects which we (and presumably the host government) view as compatible with [] national security interests.

7. Some of the doubts raised by Headquarters are altogether valid and were considered before we made our proposal. We are least concerned, however, about the issues of dual loyalty and dual control etc., because it happens to be one of our objectives in building a more durable relationship with liaison, [redacted] to entice them into joint ventures where dual control does exist. We find AMJAYA 4 temperamentally suited (esp since his basic loyalty belongs to KUBARK) to serve as an operational link between Station and liaison, without acting to the detriment of either. Although the tenor of our relationship with [redacted] has undergone a notable improvement, there are still deep-rooted reservations and suspicions which a man of AMJAYA 4's personality traits might help to dispel.

8. With regards to the substance of our operations against PERHIN, especially those which are CE-oriented, there is a natural congruity of interests between ODYKKE and [] which renders joint pursuits in fact most desirable. More likely than not, [] will do Station the favor of facilitating the admission of AMJAYA 4 and of providing him with viable cover, maybe including official [] documentation, and let it go at that. We rather doubt that unless prodded by Station [] would avail itself of AMJAYA 4's services, let alone use him to penetrate Station's operational program. This leaves in the balance the pros and cons of surfacing a valuable KUBARK asset to Liaison.


9. The general concepts guiding [redacted] in deciding to secure the services of AMJAYA & were spelled out in [redacted] 1965.

10. In presenting Station's proposal to ANJAYA 4, the following points could be made:

- A. We do not propose that he sever his longstanding personal and political links with AMBROSY I.
- B. We do not expect that he disconnect his links with the movement, let alone cease supporting its program.

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- C. If such cases, however, are continuing evidence of political pressure, within the movement, the reason being that a man runs around as far as the last government is concerned as an independent, this evidence that LINER is officially dealing AMERICA.
- D. We would expect AMJAYA to compartmentalize himself to the extent that he treat any knowledge acquired in his association with an operational agent to the Station as privileged in the sense of not imparting it to anyone without a need to know. Specifically, this information would have to be withheld from AMJINDY 1 and other members of the movement.
- E. AMJAYA will have to make a clear choice between serving the cause of PRABENH liberation by actively associating himself with AMJINDY (a known undertaking if our reading of the situation is correct), or by continuing PRABENH's program to subvert [redacted] under Station control.



- 2.a A/1/A/1 told me A/2 went to Spain on 16 May for 3 or 4 months vacation. A/4 said later that A/2 was starting a new business in Spain and wanted him (A/4) to move over there and manage it for him. A/2 left William King, the Vice-President in charge of Maritime Sam in his absence. A/2/1 has always had ultimate control of the AMWORLD funds and has simply been exercising closer personal control of them since A/2 is gone.
- 2.b A/2/1 told me that he is selling off some of the equipment which is not suitable for his current program of Community Development/Civic Action in Latin America in order to raise money to obtain equipment and materials that will be needed. For example, he has bought 22 acres of farm land near West Palm Beach to establish a model farm for training purposes. He has been conducting evening classes for several weeks for about 20 MRR men, who are working full time at other jobs, in rural Community Development. He has gotten some training materials and advice from Prof. George Lodge of Harvard, who, according to letters from him, appears to be enthusiastic about his contact with A/1 and his organization.
- 2.c A/1 says his only political plans at this time are to try to continue holding his movement (MRR) together while he changes its emphasis and direction toward the constructive activity of help in Community Development for friendly Latin American countries and away from the PR emphasis for which we supported him in the AMWORLD program. The farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice is a planned cooperative on the east coast (Bluefields - Monkey Point) to complement a shrimp fishing cooperative and boat yard at Bluefields which he has already discussed with President Schick, who requested him to go ahead. A/1 and the MRR part in these enterprises is purely advisory in training local residents and helping them to organize and build facilities. A/4 reports, and A/1 himself admits, that he is simply feeling around now trying to get all the information and ideas he can about this new field of endeavor. (For example, A/1 just bought 300 baby chicks to work with in order to find out they can best fit into a rural development program.)
- 2.d. Of course, AMWORLD is finished and all members of the organization know it. A/1 and A/4 have both told me they have made it clear to all hands and have advised them to get jobs immediately in order to support their dependents. Most of them have done so, several going back to work for WAVE, for instance. The death of AMWORLD and the reorganization necessary to go into a new phase (Community Development) is no doubt causing a crisis in the MRR, but both leaders believe the movement will weather the crisis and survive. Mr. Tom Clines, who talked with other members of the MRR, believes the same thing, and is certain it will survive with enough support from Washington to pay for publicity, travel, and administrative costs.
- 3.a There are 5 men at Monkey Point where one cache (a platoon) of weapons is stored. The other two are located at Bluefields and at Managua, under control of the Nicaraguan National Guard. The MRR delegate at Managua is the only person who can authorize their release, and this must be on written authority of A/1 and approved by General Somoza. The 5 men at Monkey Point are simply station-keepers who, in addition to guarding the camp and weapons, are teaching the local Indians to read and write, to operate and maintain basic machinery, and to plant crops to raise their standard of living. There has been no evidence from any source of any attempts to sell AMWORLD arms or ammunition.

3.e It is not clear what this source is trying to report, but presumably he is trying to indicate that A/1 is hoarding the AMWORLD money he has been issued for his personal use. Anyone who knows A/1 knows that the last thing he will ever give up is his magazine and radio broadcasts. The ability to make speeches and have them printed and see his picture reproduced is the top requirement in his wakeup. The next most important requirement is the capability to travel and hob-nob with Heads of State and other ^{interest} at which he excels. These two attributes are of considerable ^{interest} to AMWORLD, as witness the fact that Mr. Fitzgerald has insisted on retaining these capabilities for A/1 to use in behalf of the Agency. They are certainly more important to him than money, as such, concerning which he is incredibly naive and disinterested. He is notorious for having to have somebody else go around with him to be sure he has necessary documents and money, otherwise he would never have a dime in his pocket. I checked further on this point with A/4 at our last meeting on 27 June and he said there was no evidence of A/1 pilfering the till, the problem if any was simply honest mismanagement. We should remember that A/1 has been paid a salary, with Hqs agreement and at our suggestion for that matter, of \$1,000 a month. AMWORLD/2 made it a point to deposit the check in A/1's personal account every month, and A/2 maintained de facto control of the account. A/1 told me this incident because he was amazed to find when A/2 left for Spain and turned the records of the account over to A/1, he found that he had 4 or 5 thousand dollars in the bank, the most he had ever owned in his life. In addition to this salary, it should be remembered that A/1 is a co-author of the "Bay of Pigs" book, which was worth several thousand dollars to each of the 4 co-authors.

Note: This line of reporting has been going on for at least the past 2 years in the case of A/1 and is typical of the incessant gossip and character assassination within the Cuban exile community in Miami that has been going on for the last 5 years. While certainly no paragon of virtue or of efficiency, it will take more than this to convince me A/1 is a crook. In the first place, AMJAWA/4 would be the first one to put the finger on him if he started misappropriating MRR funds or otherwise playing games that would hurt the movement. In the second place, A/1 is too disorganized to be an effective crook, even if he tried, and it would show up in more concrete form than this report.

Jan

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DIR INFO CARA BOGO SJOS MANA GUAT CITE PACY 6503

RXTYPIC AMWORLD

1. AMBIDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH HE HAD MEETING PRES LEONI IN MARCH, PRES VALENCIA 7 APRIL, AND PLANS SEE PRES ROBLES 22 OR 23 APRIL. PLANS RETURN VIA COSTA RICA FOR TALKS PRES ORLICH AND FOMIN ODUBER AND NICARAGUA TO SEE PRES SCHICK AND GEN SOMOZA. THEN TO GUATEMALA FOR MEETING PRES PERALTA AND GIVE HIM COMPLETE BRIEFING ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP PLOTTING, WHICH INCLUDES SOME FORMER HRR PEOPLE FOR WHOM A-1 WISHES DISCLAIM ANY RESPONSIBILITY. DURING WEEK 3 MAY HE HOPES MEET DAINOLD TO REPORT ON TERMINATION AMWORLD AND DISCUSS ANY OTHER

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OPICS DAINOLD WISHES.

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IN 50512
PAGE 2

2. A-1 FUTURE PLANS APPEAR INVOLVE SELLING IDEA OF PROGRAM TO CASTRO/CUBAN THREATENED COUNTRIES WHICH INCLUDE (1) INTERDICTION CUBAN INFIL OPS, (2) PENETRATE AND ELIMINATE INTERNAL CASTROITE OPS, (3) POSITIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM BASED ON "COMANDES RURALES" WHICH WAS BASIS MRR STRENGTH RURAL CUBA AND CONCEPT A-1 DEVELOPED WHICH CASTRO CONTINUED AFTER A-1 DEFECTION. HE BELIEVES SMALL TEAMS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED CUBANS WORKING DIRECTLY WITH LOCAL GOVTS COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO LATIN AMERICA COUNTER INSURGENCY PROGRAMS. FEELS WOULD BE IN ODYORE INTEREST TO ASSEST BUT WILL LEAVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO LOCAL GOVTS.

4. INDICATIONS ARE A-1 MAY ASK DAINOLD IF IN RETURN FOR OPS INTEL AND POL ACTION ON HIS PART, KUBARK CAN CONTINUE ASSIST HIM IN BROADCASTS TO CUBA, MRR MAGAZINE, DELEGATES IN CARIBBEAN AREA, AND CONTINUED CONTACT WITH THE AMLASH GROUP INSIDE CUBA (THEY ARE STILL IN COMMUNICATION). HE INSISTS HIS BASIC ORGANIZATION CONTINUES AND WILL SURVIVE, WITH SOME MEMBERS WORKING IN FLORIDA, NICARAGUA, AND OTHER PLACES, PLUS EXPANSION LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTERESTS BBY PEOPLE SUCH AS

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PAGE 3

1470 MESA, PICA-SO ARIAS, MANOLIN MERRANDEZ, ETC. A-1 AND

ARJANA-1 BOTH SAY THEY INTEND MOVE FROM FLORIDA AND ESTABLISH
RESIDENCE CENTRAL AMERICA OR VENEZUELA TO ESCAPE FATE OTHER
EXILE LEADERS WHO STAYED IN MIAMI AND ARE ONLY TO TALK, NOT
TO CONTINUE USEFUL WORK.

5. A-1 APOLOGIZED FOR ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FRANK
HE PLAYED COLOMBIA. SAID HE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BOTH
BY CUBAN WELL KNOWN KUBARK AGENT AND A-1 CONFESSED SOME
EXAGGERATION AND SLOW JOBS FOR HIS BENEFIT. HOPES REPORTS
WILL BE CONSIDERED THIS CONTEXT AND TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF
SALT. SAID HE ACTUALLY HAS NO COMMITMENT FROM COLOMBIA,
MET WITH PRES VALENCIA FOR TWO HOURS, ONE HOUR TALKING POETRY,
ONE HOUR TALKING OPS. NO DECISION BUT VALENCIA WISHES TALK
AGAIN AFTER TIME TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES. ABOUT THE SAME RESULTS
FROM VENEZUELA ALTHOUGH LEONI APPEARED MORE INDECISIVE
BECAUSE NOT SURE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.

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27 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Present Activities and Possible
Future Plans of Manuel Artimo Buena

1. Present Activities:


During the past six weeks Manuel Artimo has devoted his time to the task of disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Artimo has returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by this Agency. This includes the mother-ship, nearly all of the heavy weapons such as mortars, machine guns and artillery pieces, as well as other miscellaneous items such as communications vans and earth-moving equipment. The small arms not recovered from Artimo are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans:

During the same period Artimo has attempted to gain support for a plan by which he, and a small nucleus of his paramilitary forces, would conduct counterinsurgency-type operations against Castro-supported rebel bands operating in several Latin American countries. Artimo has outlined these proposals to Presidents Leon Valencia of Colombia and Marcos Robles of Panama, and endeavored to obtain an interview with Raul Leoni of Venezuela, but has been able to conduct conversations on this proposal only on the Venezuelan Cabinet level.

To implement such a scheme Artimo envisions using a small group of highly-trained individuals plus

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two fast motor launches originally provided to him by this Agency. Artimo would use this force to patrol the coasts of one or the other of the aforementioned countries to prevent the smuggling of arms and/or general contraband. In exchange for this service, Artimo would receive the permission of these governments to keep any arms which he might capture in the course of these patrols. In addition, he would be allowed to maintain bases of operation from which to launch attacks against Cuba. So far none of these governments has made any commitment to Artimo. He claims, however, that both Presidents Valencia and Robles have expressed interest in his proposals.

Artimo has requested an interview with this Agency, presumably to discuss his future, during which it is expected that he will bring up his scheme as outlined above.

John L. Hart
DCWH/C

HEP/WE/C/CA/EA/ADHohlfing:bh (27 Apr 65)

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28 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artimo Buesa

1. Present Activities

For the past six weeks Artimo has devoted his time to disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He has;


- a. returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by us,
- b. returned the mothership,
- c. returned nearly all the heavy weapons including mortars, machine guns, and artillery pieces.

The small arms not recovered are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans

Artimo has attempted to peddle a plan to the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian governments utilizing the nucleus of his paramilitary force. Essentially this program is the same for all three countries and involves a

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quid pro quo arrangement whereby:

a. Artimo would use his force to patrol the coast of these countries and prevent smuggling of arms and/or general contraband,

b. Artimo would receive, in exchange for this service, permission from these governments to keep any arms which he might capture and be allowed to maintain bases from which to launch operations against Cuba.

Some of the specifics follow:

Colombia

Artimo wants petroleum, food, and clothing from the government for a group to be stationed there and a beachhead to establish a camp.

If there is a landing in Cuba, Artimo wants immediate recognition by the Colombian Government as head of a government in exile.

Artimo would guarantee to wipe out smuggling and would patrol from Alaska to the Panama border. He would also guarantee to solve the guerrilla problem by using two MRG groups. One group to conduct operations against Cuba and the other to act as instructors and field advisors to the Colombian army.

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-3-

Artimo would seek private financing from wealthy Cuban exiles and Latin American sympathizers.

Panama

Artimo would start a "comandos rurales" operation, similar to that which was the base of MRR strength in rural Cuba.

Artimo would launch a civic action program and also would interdict Cuban infiltration operations.

The above plan would be carried out mainly in Chiriqui Province.

Miscellaneous

We have no information on what Artimo proposed in Venezuela but assume it is much the same as for Colombia and Panama. We also believe Artimo may ask CIA to continue to assist him in radio broadcasting to Cuba, financing the MRR magazine, and helping him maintain continued contact with the Cubela group. This would be in return for his counter insurgency program outlined above.

JOHN L. HART
PCWEL/C

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Meeting Between
Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1

1. AMBIDDY-1 went to Nicaragua on 11 May 1965 to remove his remaining men and equipment from that country and to complete secure storage arrangements for the small arms which he has retained. He has a meeting scheduled with General Peralta in Guatemala later this week and expects to be back in Miami by 17 May.

2. He hopes to meet with Chief, WH at any convenient time thereafter to report on the disbanding of AMWORLD and to discuss any other matters which may be of mutual interest. AMBIDDY-1 has indicated that he is willing to continue cooperating with the Agency by furnishing information and undertaking political action tasks as required. He hoped that the Agency, in turn, will be able to assist him in financing a limited publicity program consisting mainly of radio broadcasts and the MRR magazine. This would help to keep his movement alive and maintain him as a recognized exile leader who would thus be of continued value to the Agency in activities of mutual interest.

3. We suggest that his witting deputy, AMJAVA-4, might be invited to visit Washington at the same time to participate in other discussions concerning possible activities in the future. It would be appreciated if Chief, WH were able to set a convenient date for a meeting in order that we may notify AMBIDDY-1 in advance.

John L. Hart
DCWH/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (13 May 65)
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17 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with AMJAVA-4


1. In addition to the matter of meeting the ANWORLD Swifts on their arrival in New Orleans, AMJAVA-4 indicated he was even more interested in talking with me about AMBIDDY-1's present frame of mind and plans for the future, about some of which he is a little concerned. AMJAVA-4 intends to see AMBIDDY-1 for a few days the first part of this week and will try to get a complete and current reading from AMBIDDY-1 during this time. AMJAVA-4 wants to discuss this in detail with me prior to the meeting of AMBIDDY-1 with Chief, WH, presently planned for the week of 24 May.

2. AMJAVA-4 also wishes to discuss the two job offers he has received from the Agency, ie, a job with Caracas Station, or to go into university level training in a holding capacity for future commitment to a post-Castro Cuban regime. He has some topics for discussion concerning last-minute questions in the close-out of ANWORLD and disposition of some of the key personnel of the organization.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Policy
AMJAVA-4 201
AMBIDDY-1 201

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Meeting with AMJAV-4 in New Orleans, 21-23 May 1965


Project: AMBIDY-1 Activities

1. AMJAV-4 said he had talked only briefly with AMBIDY-1 on his return from Guatemala and Nicaragua (21 May, just before A-4 left to meet me in New Orleans). A-1 said he had talked with General Peralta in Guatemala and had disclaimed any connection with Roberto Alejos' coup plotting or the former MRR Cubans who had been involved with it. He had also outlined his proposal for Peralta to consider whereby A-1 and the MRR would undertake, at the invitation of the local government, to assist in countering Castro/Communist infiltration and subversion, and to help develop rural civic action programs as a positive counter-insurgency program. A-1 claimed that Peralta seemed very seriously interested in the proposals and appeared quite appreciative that A-1 had been able to visit him. A-1 expects that Peralta will wish to talk to him further in regard to his counter-insurgency proposals.

2. A-1 also talked again with President Schick in Nicaragua about the above proposal. Schick had thought over their previous discussion and approves a pilot program to be run on the east coast, with the rural civic action program near Bluefields. This will allow A-1 to keep a few of his men in the country to work on the program while maintaining security of the weapons he has stored there. A-1 also talked with Luis Gomez, at the latter's invitation, but indicated there was nothing new or interesting from this source.

3. A-4 is not sure himself how much A-1 has been able to accomplish in his visits in Central and South America, and how much of his reporting is wishful thinking. He is not ready, however, to call A-1 short and has watched him "selling ice-cream to Eskimos" successfully over too long a period of time.

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4. A-1 decided to come to New Orleans on the night of 24 May in order to meet the two Swift boats at Morgan City on 25 May (their latest ETA). Having done all the preliminary leg work and made all the arrangements, A-4 decided both of them would not be necessary and he planned to return to Miami the night of the 24th. I promised to contact both of them by phone on Tuesday night (25 May) to make sure the Swifts get in with no problems, and to inform A-1 a firm time for his meeting with C/WH (scheduled for 1800, 27 May).

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Guatemala
Nicaragua

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2 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Interview between Mr. George Cabot Lodge and Manuel Artimo Buesa

1. Pursuant to your conversations with Manuel Artimo on 27 May 1965, the latter has expressed a desire to meet with Mr. George Cabot Lodge in order to further discuss practical means of implementing a civic action program in Nicaragua.

2. Artimo's current plans and schedule are as follows: 2-4 June in Miami, Florida; 4-12 June in Nicaragua; 12-14 June in Panama; 14- possible trips to Colombia and Guatemala.

3. Artimo emphasized, however, that he could revise this schedule if need be in order to meet with Mr. Lodge in Cambridge, Mass. or any other location at Mr. Lodge's convenience.

(Signed) John L. Hart


John L. Hart
DCVHD/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRoHlfing:bh (2 June 65)

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
3 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WE/PO/B
ATTENTION : Mr. J. De Stefano
SUBJECT : Background Sketch on Dr. Manuel
Artime Buena

1. Manuel Artime Buena, a non-practicing medical doctor, began his political activities in Cuba during the year 1939 when he participated in the formation of a civic action type program known as the "Comandos Rurales." The Comandos Rurales actively participated with the Castro regime during its initial agrarian reform, but eventually broke with it due to Castro's shift to Marxism-Leninism. It was at this point that Artime formed the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution), a political organization which he heads up to date. The degree of Artime's activities in the civic action program was reflected by the fact that Artime, prior to his break with Castro, had been appointed a deputy in the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA) for Oriente Province. Artime's first contact with the Agency took place just prior to his open break with Castro and he was exfiltrated from the island by the Agency. Artime dedicated himself to the continued development of the MRR until called upon by the Agency to be the political representative for the Cuban Brigade 2506 which landed at the Bay of Pigs. Artime was captured and sentenced to be executed. This was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artime was among those repatriated to this country under the prisoner exchange.

2. In mid-1963 the Agency again asked Artime to head an autonomous paramilitary organization made up and trained exclusively by Cubans and funded by the Agency. Subject set

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-2-

up a series of training camps in Central America. Using the political banner of the MRR Artime's group conducted several paramilitary operations against the island of Cuba with varying degrees of success. In early 1963 by order of the 303 Committee it was decided to phase out the Agency's support to Artime since it was felt that paramilitary operations against Cuba were futile and ineffective. Although he disagreed with this decision, Artime has been fully cooperative in disbanding his organization. The paramilitary wing of the MRR is now completely disbanded, and a few political representatives remain in Central America and Florida.

3. Subject is currently attempting to re-enlist the Agency's support in order to keep his political organization intact. If approved by the 303 Committee, Artime's MRR will receive a small subsidy. Artime also plans to establish a civic action program along the lines of the Comandos Rurales in various Central and South American countries. In such an endeavor Artime would be strictly on his own without any support from the Agency.

4. It is in order to discuss this future program that Artime is anxious to meet with Mr. George C. Lodge, Jr. The undersigned, who is subject's current case officer, is ready and willing to contact Mr. Lodge directly and travel to Cambridge should this be useful. Artime permanently resides in Miami, Florida and his telephone number is: (305) 754-8144.

Carl E. Jenkins
VR/C/CA/EA

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3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/C

SUBJECT : Support for Manuel Artime and the
MRR for the month of June 1965

1. On the basis of the discussion on 27 May between Chief, WH and Manuel Artime, we are currently in the process of submitting a recommendation to the 303 Committee that we maintain contact with Artime and render support to him on a modest basis. His monthly operating budget, which he submitted to us, would enable him to keep the MRR alive as a recognized exile political organization, and would allow him, personally, to maintain his status as an important exile leader. This would, in turn, continue his access to heads of state and other leading political figures in Latin America.

2. Pending action by the 303 Committee, it is recommended that you grant approval to fund Artime and the MRR for the month of June 1965, on the basis of the following budget estimate:

a. MRR delegates

Spain	\$ 500	
Honduras	350	
Guatemala	350	
Colombia	400	
Costa Rica	350	
Venezuela	450	
HQS office expenses	800	\$ 3,200

b. Publishing costs of MRR
magazine "Tridente" \$ 2,860

c. Radio broadcasts to Cuba
in name of MRR \$ 1,805

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-2-

d. Travel costs of Artimo and MRR officers	\$ 2,000
e. Support of dependent families and survivors of MRR members (mostly in Cuba)	<u>\$ 5,000</u>
Total	\$14,865

3. If approved, these funds will be channeled through the secure AMWORLD funding channels, which are still in operation.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

John L. New
Deputy Chief, WHD/C

cc/ WH/B&F

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FORM 500 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (73)

*Fin
DR Cuba*

Miami 4 de Junio de 1965

Sra. del Consejo de Liberacion
P.O. Box 8697, Baltimore 40 Md.

Sra del Consejo:

Disculpen la molestia de solicitar de Vds.
la aprobacion de un presupuesto de emergencia para cubrir las necesidades
mas urgentes del mes de Junio desde el punto de vista netamente civil.

El presupuesto es el siguiente:

a) DELEGACIONES:

Costa Rica	_____	\$ 350.00	
Venezuela	_____	450.00	
Espana	_____	500.00	
Honduras	_____	350.00	
Guatemala	_____	350.00	
Colombia	_____	400.00	
			\$ 2,400.00

b) REVISTA "TRIDENTE":

\$ 2,860.00 \$ 2,860.00

c) Hora Radial:

\$ 1,805.00 \$ 1,805.00

d) Oficina para Hora Radial y Revista:

\$ 800.00 \$ 800.00

e) Viajes por Latino-America:

\$ 2,000.00 \$ 2,000.00

f) Ayuda al personal que se encuentra
en el interior de Cuba y familiares de
presos que nos siguen informando desde
dentro (informes como los que adjuntamos)----- \$ 5,000.00

TOTAL: \$14,865.00

Pidiendo la mayor rapidez en la aprobacion de este presupuesto de
emergencia para Junio, se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Ignacio

Ignacio

000000
MSG: C. E. JENKINS:18
UNIT: WH/C/CA/AA
EXT: 4550
DATE: 5 JUNE 1965

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 26

☐ BY ☐ LETTER TO BLANKS ☐ FILE 88

SECRET

ROUTING			
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TO: GUATEMALA CITY

INFO: JMWAVE, [REDACTED]

FROM: DIRECTOR

COMP: WH/C 3

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ NO COPY, WH 7, C/OPS, C/CA, PL,

3006, 1

TO: GUAT

INFO: WAVE, PACY, LANT

CITE: [REDACTED]

16781

REF: GUAT 4922 (IN 80580)

TYPIC AMBIDDOY ONE

1. AT MEETING WITH DAINOLD ON 27 MAY, AMBIDDOY ONE REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH PERALTA AND PONCIANO. SAID PERALTA HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. AMBIDDOY ONE SAID HE TOLD PERALTA FORMER MRR MEMBERS IN RECENT ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP ATTEMPT HAD NO CONNECTION AND NO SUPPORT FROM AMBIDDOY ONE. MAIN THRUST OF TALK WITH PERALTA WAS ON COUNTER SUBVERSION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AMBIDDOY ONE SAID PERALTA ASKED AND GOT HIS FRANK OPINIONS ON EACH SUBJECT. SAID HE TOLD PERALTA THAT YON SOSA WAS MAIN THREAT. PERALTA SAID HE UNDER CONTROL, BUT AMBIDDOY ONE TOLD HIM SO LONG AS YON SOSA SURVIVES AND HAS FOLLOWING WITH EXTERNAL CONTACT AND SUPPORT HE IS NOT UNDER CONTROL. AMBIDDOY ONE SAID PERALTA MUCH INTERESTED HIS IDEAS AND ASKED HIM COME BACK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SOON.

2. AMBIDDOY ONE ALSO TALKED WITH PONCIANO BRIEFLY. SAID PONCIANO CLAIMED ~~THESE~~ HAVE ORGANIZED SUPPORT AND READY MOVE AGAINST PERALTA. IN AMBIDDOY ONE OPINION, PONCIANO IS SIMPLY ANOTHER INVETERATE PLOTTER

(CONTINUED)

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UNIT :
EXT :
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☐ INDEX
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ROUTING

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4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF :

INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE OR

16781

WH WILL SEIZE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY IF IT APPEARS, BUT IS NOT SERIOUSLY WORKING TOWARD A COUP AT PRESENT. FYI, AMBIDY ONE CURRENTLY HAS NO CAPABILITY FURNISHING SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN MEN OR MATERIAL TO ANY COUP GROUP, EVEN IF HE AGREED, WHICH HE DENIES. ON BASIS PAST PERFORMANCE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BELIEVE AMBIDY ONE NOT LIKELY ALIGN SELF WITH ANY POLITICAL FACTION WITHOUT HDQS APPROVAL.

OSMOND FITZGERALD
S/WH

C/WH/S/Gastarola

C/WH/S

WH/C/Intel Mr. Orman (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICER

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JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/CUBA

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
7 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact of Manuel Artime with Professor George Lodge and with Col. Barrientos of Bolivia

1. I talked with Manuel Artime by phone the night of 4 June. He said he had received a call from Professor Lodge that afternoon but was not at home to talk with him. (This was obviously a follow-up from the offer made to Artime by Chief, WH to put him and Lodge together on his proposed civic action activities.) I told him there was no reason he should not return the call and arrange for a meeting with Lodge at their mutual convenience.
2. Artime said that was his first reaction, but before he could make the call another message had come in from Col. Barrientos of Bolivia asking if he could visit the country for the benefit of his advice and counsel and offering to send a Bolivian Air Force plane to pick him up and bring him to La Paz. I asked if he were acquainted with Barrientos or an expert on Bolivia and he said he knew no more about either of them than what he had read in the papers. He had no idea of the reason for the invitation, but wanted to check with us and find out if we had any requirements for him in case we wanted him to make the visit. I told him I would check with Chief, WH next morning and call him back.
3. On the morning of 5 June I called Artime. He said Professor Lodge had called him at 0700 that morning and told him he was interested in getting together with him. Lodge said he would be in Panama on 14 June, and Artime said he planned to be travelling in that area at that time and could easily meet him there. Artime told Lodge he was willing to make a trip to Boston to see him earlier and that after such a preliminary meeting, the next meeting in Panama would probably be more useful. Lodge seemed delighted and invited Artime

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


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-2-

to lunch with him on 9 June. I suggested to Arttime that he plan to meet Lodge on 9 June, stop in Washington on the way home where I could meet with him (and furnish him a briefing on Bolivia which he desperately requested). I suggested he send a message to Barrientos saying he could be in Panama on 11 June and could see Barrientos as soon thereafter as transportation could be arranged. (Arttime has a visit with President Robles of Panama scheduled about that time and can work it in, together with the meeting with Lodge on 14 June in Panama.)

4. Arttime said he had found out the background of the invitation from Barrientos. One of Barrientos' trusted aides had been to Washington or New York and in passing through Miami enroute home heard a MRR radio broadcast about countering subversion, civic action, etc. that attracted his attention. There was also a brief analysis of the situation in Bolivia which appealed to him as the best-balanced he had heard. He thereupon started asking questions about the MRR and Arttime and was referred to one of Arttime's people who turned over some copies of "Tridente" (magazine of the MRR). The aide remarked that he was going to report to Barrientos of his discovery of a Cuban exile group that seemed knowledgeable of Castro and Communist subversion operations and had some useful ideas of how to counter them. Two days later Arttime received the invitation from Barrientos.


Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/3
WH/PO/B

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING

TO	Chief, WH	DATE		ACTION	
INFO		DATE		ACTION	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	DATE		ACTION	
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT Activities in AMWORLD and of AMBIDY-1	DATE		ACTION	
ACTION REQUIRED	None. For Your Information.	DATE		ACTION	

Action Required: None. For Your Information.

1. The AMOTs have recently submitted two short reports providing some information about AMWORLD and AMBIDY-1 activities.

2. AMOT-84 reported the following in Report DD-1414, 19 May 1965, which he had acquired from Iden A, whose ultimate source of information was AMWORLD-2:

a. AMWORLD-2 left for New York with his family on 15 May 1965, this being his first step towards disconnecting himself from AMWORLD. Before he left, he handed over to AMBIDY-1 the AMWORLD money which he had in the bank.

b. AMWORLD-2 said that AMBIDY-1 was devoting all his attention to obtaining money by the sale of military equipment which he had at the camps. AMBIDY-1 had already realized U.S. \$30,000 in this manner and hoped to raise still another \$30,000. AMBIDY-1 currently had all the AMWORLD money under his absolute control and said he intended to act as treasurer of the organization.

c. AMBIDY-1 gave the impression of not being involved with any political plan. Occasionally he talked to friends about interviews with his "contacts" and about a budget for propaganda. Other times he gave consideration to propositions of friends, such as the Spaniard who acts as his chauffeur and secretary, concerning various business deals. He also talks of buying a farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice, etc.

d. The general opinion within AMWORLD is that the organization is entering a crisis and, with the separation of AMWORLD-2 from the organization, AMWORLD members would no longer continue to receive their salaries.

Attachment:
Identities, u/s/c(AMOT)

Distribution:
3 - WH/c, w/att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 June 1965	JUN 11 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-21947	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-6-95/4	


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declassification

3. In AMOT Report EE-1438, 4 June 1964, AMOT-84 further reported information he had received from Iden A, as follows:

a. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was only concerned with maintaining the small AMWORLD camp in Nicaragua, where there were weapons, ammunition, and seven men, who were there without the knowledge of the ODYOKERS. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was awaiting an opportune moment to arm as many friends as possible and leave for PBRUMEN.

b. Iden C said that there really were arms and ammunition cached in the camp in Nicaragua, but that the seven men there spent all their time looking for persons to buy the arms and ammunition.


c. Iden C also said he believed that if AMBIDDY-1 was keeping up his radio transmissions and payments to some journalists it was because they served as a cover for his commercial operations and that all the propaganda would disappear when AMBIDDY-1 had to use AMWORLD money to keep up the propaganda.



1P

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21947

Iden A - [redacted] (AMOT subsorce)
Iden B - [redacted]
Iden C - [redacted] (AMOT subsorce)



AS COPY

1/CAU.1 UFGA.21947

201-267437

To: Andy

From: George Lodge

Re: Manuel Artima

June 9

Chicken Brier

In general, Artima impressed me greatly and we got along very well. He is energetic, idealistic, enthusiastic, highly motivated and in my judgement well suited in every way to the task he intends to ~~perform~~ perform. As you know, he is 33 years old, tough-minded and filled with ideological fire. His weakness would appear to be a certain lack of ~~his~~ focus and conceptualization. He does not really have a plan but appears to be reacting to immediate crises and opportunities like a fire fighter. He and his group, therefore, need careful and thoughtful leadership and guidance to get the most out of them and to deal with problems in the proper order of priority and urgency.

He arrived late at the Business School because the taxi driver got lost. We had a quick lunch together ~~and then~~ which I had to leave early in order to be in class at 1:30. At my request he joined me in the classroom. I was giving a lecture on the role of the manager in the midst of radical change to a group of alumni who are at the School for a short seminar on international business problems. During the discussion period he spoke well and with great conviction about his work in the hills with Castro and the Cuban problem in general. He made an excellent impression.

We then talked in my office for 1½ hours. A summary of the conversation follows:

He told me of his work with the Indians on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua where he has 5 men working on community development problems including health, education, road building, rice marketing and ~~and~~ boat building. He has 10 men at his base of operations on the coast. He mentioned that he knew Enrique Pereira, a young manager in Managua closely associated with INCAE and in my judgement a good, active, properly oriented young man.

He discussed his civic action training program in Miami which has just started and in which he said he has 32 men enrolled. This is a 3-month program to prepare men for rural organization work of various kinds. He spoke of his need for help in with respect to cooperative training and especially cooperative leadership selection and preparation.

He spoke of his conversation with the Col. Feralta in Guatemala and said that after a four-day field trip he reported to the President that:

a. The Army was old fashioned, had poor ideas and was ill equipped to fight guerilla warfare or to carry out the civic action program which were urgently necessary.

b. He said he found serious subversion among the Indians largely through small radios which Cuban trained Guatemalans were giving to the Indians and which were tuned in on Radio Cuba only. He knew specifically of 5 Guatemalans engaged in this work.

c. He spoke of the danger of Sosa in the mountains and said that Feralta showed his ignorance by brushing Sosa off as a small-time operator with only a handful of men around him. Artime said he had about 25 men with him and added that this was enough to start a lot of trouble. He said he would like to begin something in Guatemala but had no specific suggestions.

He said he had 3 people working in San Jose, Costa Rica, inside what he referred to as "the Cuban community."

He has one man in Colombia organizing three cooperatives in the Cali area at the request of a local Senator who owns a sugar mill and the Cali newspaper and who Artime described as a very good ~~man~~ man. He is deeply concerned about the ~~present~~ situation in Colombia.

He is leaving shortly for Bolivia where ~~he~~ he has been invited to spend four days by the President.

During the course of the conversation I made the following suggestions which met with his enthusiastic approval:

I believe his key contribution may be in the area of rural organization and motivation. He and his men (he said he has 220 available for immediate action) need rural organization training. Only a few know much about it. I suggested therefore he investigate the cooperative training school at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, which from everything I have been able to find out in Panama and elsewhere is the best thing of its kind in the world. He said he had heard of it very favorably and mentioned he would talk with a Bishop friend of his and see if he could get some of his men enrolled in the school immediately.

I told him in some detail of our work in Veraguas Province and of Bishop McGrath's general development plans and also of the Bishop's intention to establish a cooperative training center in Veraguas. I mentioned the possibility of one or two of his men working in Veraguas alongside my men who will be there this summer and thereafter. He was extremely enthusiastic about this and suggested Nestor Izquierdo, a 29-year-old Cuban Negro whom he said had done rural organization work with him in Cuba. He spoke very highly of him. My thought was that perhaps Izquierdo might join my men during the summer with Bishop McGrath's approval, work on our cooperative project there and perhaps remain to help the Bishop set up his training center and carry on such other activities as might be useful. Izquierdo is apparently very versatile in his talents. He might go to Antigonish somewhere along the way if that seemed wise. We left it that I would see how the Veraguas project goes, would talk informally to the Bishop and would meet Artimo and possibly Izquierdo in San Salvador on August 5. At that time we would decide whether it would be wise for Artimo and/or Izquierdo to come with me to Veraguas.

He asked me to send him some books about chicken raising in Central America. Could you take care of this?

He gave me his address as 1270 NE 85th Street, Miami, and telephone as 754-8144.

All in all, I was deeply impressed by Artimo and would like to work with him.

SECRET

WH/C 65-236
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative
in [] to contact the bank in [] to cable transfer
the amount of [] to the []
[] for credit to the account of []
[]

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/DAF

HDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADHolfing:bh (8 June 65)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
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- 1 - WH/C/CA/EA

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WH/C 65-238
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : INVOVEN Deposit

For the attached voucher, it is requested that
you deposit the amount of to the INVOVEN account
of AMBIDDY-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA


Attached:
Voucher

cc: WH/BAF

DOP/WH/C/CA/EA: ADHohlfing:bh (8 June 65)
Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Enac
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

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REC. J. HANKE
RAT. WH/3/BOLIVIA
XT. 5269
DATE. 14 JUNE 1965

MESSAGE FORM

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TO LA PAZ JAGUATE

FROM DIRECTOR

COM. WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, WHICH, CI/OA, FI, FFINTZ

PRIORITY LAPA

INFO. WAVE

CIN 08

REF: DIR

19220

IDEN: MANUEL ARTIGAS, HEAD OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION, MEX.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

WE/C/CA/EA G.D. P. May
WE/C/CA/EA 20/05/65

C/WH/3

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MT. WH/3/BOLIVIA
CT. 5269
ATT. 14 JUNE 1965

MESSAGE FORM

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LA PAZ JMWAVE

SOM. DIRECTOR

W H 8 CAP
INFO VR, FILE, WHIC 8, CILOA, FI, FEIEN 12

PRIORITY LAPA

INFO WAVE

CIN OM

19219

1. AMBIDEX-1 (IDEN) REP IN WAVE APPROACHED BY AS YET UNIDENTIFIED AIDE OF BARRIENTOS (B) EARLY JUNE WHO SAID B INTERESTED HAVING A-1 COME BOLIVIA SOONEST FOR FOUR DAY VISIT GIVE B BENEFIT A-1 "ADVICE AND COUNSEL" ON CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION. AIDE SAID HAD HEARD A-1 RADIO PROGRAM WAVE ABOUT THESE SUBJECTS AND UPON RETURN LAPA TOLD B WHO THEN INVITED A-1 TRAVEL LAPA NEXT FLIGHT BOL GOVT AIRCRAFT WHICH MAKES WEEKLY TRIPS WAVE AREA. NO FURTHER INFO AVAILABLE WHETHER PRIMARY INTEREST B IN A-1 IS FOR CIVIC ACTION OR COUNTERSUBVERSIVE MATTERS.

2. TIMING A-1 TRIP BOLIVIA NOT YET CLEAR BUT MUST BE AFTER A-1 TRIP BACK MID-JUNE. A-1 HAS NOT RECEIVED FURTHER WORD ABOUT TRANSPORTATION LAPA AND ATTEMPTING PHONE CALL DIRECT TO B.

3. HQS VIEWS SHORT EXPLORATORY TRIP BOLIVIA BY A-1 AS OFFERING OPPORTUNITY SEE WHETHER COULD IN FACT HELP ON CIVIC ACTION FRONT. WE REEKEVE BELIEVE COUNTERSUBVERSION ASPECTS TOO POLITICALLY LOADED. A-1 GIVEN BRIEFING AT HQS ON BOLIVIA WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS NEED FOR JUNTA UNITY AND DESIRABILITY QUICK IMPACT PROGRAMS HELP JUNTA IMAGE WITH PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY MINERS. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS WOULD AFFECT ABILITY CARRY OUT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ALSO COVERED. DELIBERATELY AVOIDED REFERENCE TO COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE MATTERS AND A-1 CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS WHEN AND IF HE TALKS TO B THAT

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SMA DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

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INFO.

CH 8:

19219

WE WISH HIM RESTRICT SELF SOLELY TO CIVIC ACTION FIELD.

4. A-1 RESPONSIVE KIBARK DIRECTION AND NOT EXPECTED MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION KIBARK, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE SPREAD THEM ALREADY AND HAS OTHER PENDING COMMITMENTS IN HEMISPHERE. THEREFORE WE INTERESTED HAVING STATION CONTACT A-1 TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS, GUIDE HIM WHERE NECESSARY AND MAKE FINAL RECOMMENDATION TO HQS ON WHAT UTILITY IF ANY HE MAY HAVE IN BOLIVIAN SITUATION.

5. A-1 TOLD EXPECT CONTACT LAPA FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF CARL". HE WILL REMAIN AWARE NEED KEEP FACT OF CONTACT FROM BOL GOVT.

6. WILL ADVISE A-1 RE LAPA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

[Signature]
 DEMOND FITZGERALD
 C/WD

RELEASING OFFICER

WE/C/CA/EA

W/H/POE

[Signature]
 910. P. P. P.

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UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[Redacted] (30-464) (66-1902)		[Signature]
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: <p>1. Attached are copies of Geo. Lodge's report of his day with Artie - which you should find useful.</p> <p>2. Undersigned called Lodge on 14 June to tell him that we encourage Artie & his civic action training plans and secondly, that Hector meets with our approval.</p> <p>3. Any breaks in "check raising" in Central America.</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[Redacted]			14 June
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237

Use previous edition

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SIG: CARL E. JENKINS
BY: WH/C/CA/EA
DTY: 4550
DATE: 14 JUNE 65

☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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ROUTING			
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TO: CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: WH-7, CI, CI/OPS, FS, FI, NF2
SOD-6, CPSC, CI/OA, CI/PS

CARA

INFO: BOGOTA

CITE DIR

REFS: A. CARA 1040 (IN 86689)

B. BOGO 5748 (IN 82355)

1953

AMBIDDY-1

1. ~~AM~~ TOLD ZABOTH MORNING 11 JUNE HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE CHE GUEVARA LOCATION OR ACTIVITIES AND HAS NOBODY IN VENEZUELA OR ELSEWHERE TRAILING HIM. FABIO FERMIN FERNANDEZ KNOWN ONLY BY SIGHT TO A/1 AS CUBAN EXILE IN BOGOTA. NO OTHER CONNECTION.
2. SINCE HIS LAST VISITS CARACAS AND BOGOTA MARCH AND EARLY APRIL A/1 HAS TRAVELLED IN NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA IN CONNECTION RETURN OF AMWORLD MOTHERSHIP AND ARMS, DISBANDING PM ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION AMWORLD PERSONNEL. ALSO VISITED COL. PERALTA OF GUATEMALA AT HIS INVITATION TO DISCUSS CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERING PERUMEN SPONSORED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OPS. NOW HAS INVITATION VISIT BOLIVIA TO DISCUSS SIMILAR TOPICS WITH JUNTA CO-PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS. WAITING BOLIVIAN OFFICIAL FLIGHT MIAMI TO LA PAZ.

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ROUTING	
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PAGE # 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE OR

1953/

3. FOR COS INFO: A/1 HAS TRAINING COURSE IN PROGRESS AT MIAMI FOR KEY MRR PEOPLE IN CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTER INSURGENCY. APPEARS HAVE ACCEPTED FACT OF LIFE PM OPS ARE OUT AND PUTTING FULL EFFORT INTO SWITCHING MRR TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES LATIN AMERICA WHILE WAITING OTHER RESOLUTION PBRUMEN PROBLEM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs report evidence Che Guevara is in Colombia, and cite AMBIDY-1 as source of info.

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
for C/WH

WH/PO/2 *Shelley*
WH/C/CA *Whitney*
DC/WH/3 *Walt*

JOHN L. HART
DCWH/C

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FORM *LAPA3*
ACTION *WH-8* ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBES *WH* *1830* *DM*
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PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE LAPA 8370

REF: DIR 19219 *

1. NO RPT NO BOLIVIAN GOVT AIRCRAFT MAKES WEEKLY FLIGHTS TO WAVE AREA.

2. WHOLE STORY OF REF SOUNDS SUSPICIOUS. ESPECIALLY IN VIEW FACT AIDE OF KICHEER-1 REMAINS IDENTIFIED.

3. BELIEVE STATION CAN SECURELY ATTEMPT DETERMINE VALIDITY OF STORY SINCE CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN KICHEER-1, KICANAL-1, KICALIX-1, AND COSOV WILL ASK PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND WHETHER THEY NEED OTHER THAN TANG ODOKE HELP.

4. BELIEVE ENTRY OF PBRUMEN EXILE WILL DANGE REPUTATION OF JUNTA NO MATTER WHAT HIS POLITICAL COLORATION. MILGROUP AND ODWIFE IN BOLIVIA HAVE MANY COMPETENT PERSONS EXPERIENCED IN CIVIC ACTION. IF INCREASED CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS TAKE PLACE IN THE MINES IT WILL BE WITH MILGROUP AND ODWIFE FUNDS AND THEY WILL INSIST ON PARTICIPATION AND SUPERVISION.

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*Re A-I TAKING TRIP SEE WHETHER COULD IN FR
HELP ON **SECRET** CIVIC ACTION FRONT

15 JUN 65 090944

El Panama Hilton

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: 3-1988 (15 LINEAS) CABLES: HILTEL



June 15, 1966

Roger Garvey

Dear Andy:

I have just come back from a three-day visit to Veraguas where things are going along very well. There are now 9 small cooperatives in the region around Santiago. In the village of San Francisco a large training center is under construction which will house 60 persons for cooperative training courses and for other teaching in rural development. There is dormitory as well as classroom space. The building was financed as follows: \$12,000 from the German Bishops, \$6500 from the community of San Francisco itself (pop. 1000), with which is really quite remarkable and testimony to the truly unique and effective organization which the Bishop and his associates are creating in Veraguas and \$8000 is being raised in Panama. This Center will be where Father Steele will conduct regular four-month cooperative and rural development training courses for persons from all over Latin America. It will also be used for local training. Father Steele's first course was held in Panama city and was attended by 25 men from Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Panama. This course seems to be the best of its kind in Latin America.

The land has finally been broken free around San Jose. This is the first real land reform in Panama. My two men are hard at work.

I talked to the Bishop about Nestor and he was most enthusiastic. He wants him to come as soon as possible and work alongside Oswaldo Rodriguez who is the young man in charge of his development operations. His organization is called CEPAS, Center for Studies, Promotion and Social Assistance. He hopes that Nestor will be able to be the executive director and coordinator of the San Francisco Center under construction. In my view this would be an ideal assignment.

HOTELES WILTON ALBERGUE DEL MUNDO

PANAMA, REPUBLIC OF PANAMA
TELEPHONE: 2-0000 (15 LINES)
CABLE: MULTIS

would be in at the beginning of this effort which could have major effects throughout Latin America. He would be learning and also teaching. The Bishop suggested that he could use another man as well and further suggested that four of Nestor's friends from Miami might want to come and take Father Steele's course in January at San Francisco. It costs about \$60 a month, including everything.

The Bishop knew Manuel, having met him in Chicago at some meeting, and he has the highest regard for him. He suggested that he could meet Manuel and Nestor in Miami on June 28 when he will be there staying with his father-in-law step-father, Col. Harry Scheibla, 6491 Allison Island Rd., Miami Beach. I called Manuel and he and Nestor will see the Bishop on the morning of June 28. I told the Bishop that financing for Nestor could be arranged, suggesting possibly the Fundx but making nothing definite. I suggest that if all this meets with your approval you may wish to contact Manuel and/or Nestor and pin down the financial part of it. I would suggest that Nestor be paid about \$200 a month. That is what Oswaldo Rodriguez gets. Incidentally this Oswaldo is really first class — a good man to watch. You may want to just let things go as they are but in any case the Bishop expects Nestor to be financially financed somehow.

I am off to Colombia tomorrow.

All the best,

Meetings with AMJAVA-4 in Washington, 27-28 June 1965

Subject: Proposed Agency Programs

1. Following the demise of AMWORLD, AMJAVA-4 has become familiar with three other Agency programs, or proposed programs, and he asked if he could have some clarification as to just what we wanted from him and his people. I explained that there were three different functions which needed to be done and that the Agency was trying to develop programs to meet each need. The three functions concerning Cuba are:

(a) to maintain the MRR as a respected resistance organization with a political posture which is acceptable to most Cubans and not inimical to U.S. interests. We are asking approval of a minimum budget for subsidy of the MRR which will pay for its published and radio publicity matter, subsistence to survivors of MRR killed, disabled, or captured, and travel expenses for AMBIDDY-1 as the leader of the movement outside Cuba. We are trying to guide A-1 into a program of Community Development/Civic Action projects in Latin America as a means of projecting an image of the MRR and of A-1 as constructive, forward-looking people instead of simply exile counterrevolutionaries. We would hope that such activities would keep the movement together, give the members practical experience which would eventually be useful in Cuba, and in the meantime, would render useful results in countering problems of insurgency in Latin America.

(b) to prepare a managerial and executive team of specially selected Cuban exiles who would be ready to move into Cuba should relations be resumed with the United States in order to furnish effective direction of necessary governmental functions and assist the United States in denying the island to Communist control. Selected candidates would, hopefully, be fairly young as well as intelligent and capable of profiting from extensive training programs which would be designed for each to prepare him to perform a specific function in a future Cuban regime. The program would be apolitical, each person being considered as an individual and not as representative of any organization. This is the program for which A-4 is being considered for training in the field of internal security for work with the Agency in a post-Castro Cuban regime.

(c) to select and maintain a small cadre of Cuban exile paramilitary people who would be ready for emergency contingency

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-2-

situations anywhere in the world on short notice and for short periods of time. When not mobilized, the Agency would assist them in maintaining employment and supporting themselves. They would also, of course, be available for emergency operational commitment to Cuba if required. (It was explained that this was the program handled by Mr. Tom Clines of SOD, who was present and discussed it more in detail with A-4.)

2. A-4 understood that the programs outlined above were only parts of an overall concept concerning Cuba, that the first was designed to meet long-term political considerations, the second to meet long-term strategic requirements, and the third to meet current operational needs. He understood and completely agreed with each program, and agreed to cooperate in executing each of them, to the maximum of his ability. He will be happy to spot and recruit for us in each program, and will try to influence AMBIDY-1 along the lines we want him to follow. A-4 appreciated our explanations and stated that he could be much more helpful to us now that he understood what we were trying to accomplish.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

CHIEF, WH

CHIEF OF STATION, WAVE
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMBIDY-1 ACTIVITIES

FYI

AMBITAINT-1 REPORTED ON 28 JUNE 1965 THAT AMBIDY-1 WAS AGAIN ACTIVE IN THE WAVE AREA. AMBIDY-1 HAS RECONTACTED MANY OF HIS AMWORLD MEMBERS. HE HAS TOLD THEM THAT HE IS RE-OPENING THE TRAINING CAMPS FOR THOSE WHO WERE IN THE INFILTRATION TEAMS AND THE GUERRILLA WARFARE TEAMS. HE HAS STATED THAT HIS SUPPORT WILL BE RE-INSTATED ON 1 AUGUST. AMBIDY-1 HAS ALSO TOLD HIS MEN THAT HE STILL HAS MOST OF HIS WEAPONS AND SOME OF HIS SHIPS FROM THE AMWORLD PROJECT.

IS COPY

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
3 - WH/C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-22205	DATE 30 JUNE 1965																																	
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DISPATCH

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: 2-1020 (10 LINEAS)
CABLES: DELVIEL

July 2, 1965

Panama en route Venezuela

For Andy, Bill and others:

I just spoke with Bishop McGrath who saw Art in Miami last Wednesday afternoon. Art was accompanied by a man named Foss (sp?), who the Bishop said had come from Boston. Foss was not there. After a lengthy conversation, the Bishop said that he and Art agreed that the best plan to follow would be to send four or five of Art's younger men to Father Steele's cooperative-community development training course which will be held in San Francisco, Venezuela, around January 15. At the end of the course, which I believe runs four months, the Bishop could then pick one or two of the men to remain and work with him and his group. The Bishop was concerned about having someone with his project who was too closely connected with ART Art. He felt and he said Art did too that probably both Art and Foss were too well known as associates of Art's. That is why he decided on younger men who are less identified.

The Bishop said he made some discreet inquiries about Art among "friends" of his in Miami and found that he had once been the fair-haired and much admired leader of young Cubans, but that in Central America he had had a love affair with the wife of one of Batista's men which sort of took some of the gloss off as far as his followers were concerned. The Bishop said he has since married the woman and is working his way back to a position of respectability. The Bishop liked him a lot and he said they get along very well.

It sounds to me as though this is a very good plan and could lead to something of long-term value.

Genova.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF		ON TOP AND BOTTOM	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
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COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
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Remarks: 1. Attached received from Elaguer re McGrath - Out - meeting in Miami. 2. For your reference.			
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FROM: NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
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FORM NO. 237 3-61 (40)
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951 O-501885

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12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba
VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDDY-1 for Month
of July 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of for the month of July 1965 to be given to AMBIDDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

John L. Har
DOWNS/C

cc: WH/B&F

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12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Activities of AMBIDY-1, 1-10 July 1965

1. I talked to AMBIDY-1 by telephone on 2, 8 and 10 July with the gist of the conversations outlined below:


a. AMBIDY-1 had two long conversations with Bishop McGrath of Panama on 30 June and 2 July. They discussed the center for studies of rural cooperatives at San Francisco village in Veraguas Province, Panama, that is being developed under the Bishop's auspices with support from Harvard University and which has two men there at present. Prof. George Lodge is the Harvard representative and has been visiting the center. A-1 received a letter from Prof. Lodge asking for assignment of an experienced man to the staff of the center. Bishop McGrath repeated the request, saying he would like to have two men as soon as possible, with a total of six by January when he plans to increase the program. The two men selected were [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] both Negroes from Oriente Province and former Comandos Rurales. A-1 asked the Bishop what part the Panama Government played and was told they approved, although they were not directly involved. A-1 understands that the center will train students from all over Latin America and has already graduated more than twenty students from several countries.

b. The five man security force left by A-1 at Monkey Point, Nicaragua, in addition to guarding a weapons cache, continues to teach the local Indians in reading, writing, basic operation and maintenance of machinery, and rice planting.

c. The community development/civic action training program for MRR members which A-1 has been running in the evenings in Miami is about half finished. He has about twenty men attending regularly after work with several others attending whenever they can get away from their jobs. The

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class is now studying organization of rural cooperatives. [redacted] is chief instructor for this phase and will be sent to Panama as soon as the classes in Miami are completed.

d. A-1 has bought a small farm (22 acres) near West Palm Beach to develop as a model farm for his training program. He is installing generators, water pumps, and starting to raise chickens, etc. He hopes eventually to bring a few students at a time from Latin America as his program progresses to show them what can be done with small plots if proper farming techniques are used.

e. A-1 received another message from Bolivia saying in effect that the situation was still about the same and again asking if he were able to visit there. He stalled them again (at our request) and agreed to be out of town or otherwise scheduled until the matter dies a natural death.

2. The West German Government has issued scholarships paying all tuition plus \$100 per month subsistence in German universities to three of A-1's people who have been living in Spain. They will go to Germany in August to study the language for six months then begin their studies. They are Angel LAVANDERA, economics; Carlos MAYO, engineering; and Luis CAVADA, engineering. This is follow-up to the meeting A-1 had in Rome with the German Ambassador that was arranged for him by the Vatican Secretary of State last December.

3. A-1 is leaving 13 or 14 July for about 10 to 15 days visiting Central America. He will go to Nicaragua first to talk with President Schick and General Somoza, then to Monkey Point to check on the condition of the base, security of the arms he has cached there, and to observe the civic action training his men there are conducting for the local Indians. He will then go to Costa Rica to talk with President Orlich and Foreign Minister Oduber who have sent word they would like to meet with him as soon as convenient for him. From there he will go to Panama to see President Marcos Robles, who has been expecting him for several weeks. A-1 will describe the project he is about to enter with Bishop McGrath and Professor Lodge and confirm President Robles' attitude toward it. A-1 will also visit Veraguas Province and look over the training center.

4. I also informed A-1 that his proposal to maintain U. S. support for the MRR to pay for support to dependents and

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-3-

survivors of MRR people, for delegates, the Tridente, and radio broadcasting had been approved for monthly. He was gratified to receive continued support for the movement. I told him we would try to get the July payment into the bank through the old AMWORLD funding mechanism pending development of a new funding system.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDY-1 201

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FORM 408 SPECIAL PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1
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13 July 65


NICARAGUAN INVESTMENTS
(INVERNICA)

PRELIMINARY STUDY

SHIPYARD
and
REPAIR YARDS

IN THE AREA OF BRAGMAN'S BLUFF • BLUEFIELDS

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GENERAL INDEX

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I

INTRODUCTION

This industrial development plan is presented by the INVERNICA Company located in the city of Managua, D.F. (Naval District), Nicaragua.

This report is part of the preliminary study which ~~has been~~ INVERNICA has effected in regard to an investment program for the concentration of repair yards and shipyards in the Bluff-Bluefields area. These facilities will provide complete service to the fishing fleets and other boats which operate on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. The initial cost of building these facilities, with their necessary complex operational sections, is staggering. This cost, however, will be significantly reduced because ^{in view} of the equipment, experience and personnel ^{at the disposal} of INVERNICA. This study analyzes the various elements of ^{such} investment which totals US\$ 237,000 of which INVERNICA is contributing 68.4 percent and INFOCAC 28.6 percent.

^B ^{its} ^{as} ~~Identified~~ because of ~~the~~ status of a new industry in the country and the benefits which would accrue to the national economy, this plan may be classified as ^{A key} fundamental industry (Law Nr 135, Law of Protection and Stimulation for the Development of Industry, 20 March 1958) and, therefore enjoy this protection and stimulation for its full initial development.

As will be seen in this preliminary report, the necessity of modern shipyards and repair yards on the Atlantic coast is of vital importance to the survival of the fishing fleets. These fleets suffer serious operational restrictions because of the absence of ^{such} services which are common to the North American and Mexican fleets. We have the necessary equipment and technical personnel, and, moreover, the full con-

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fidence of being able to offer the most modern and efficient services,
facilities and yards in the entire Caribbean area.

13 July 1965

Braggman's Bluff, Nicaragua

Eng. Luis A. Prieto Portar
INVERNICA

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II

ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET

The primary function of the shipyard will be the construction of 20-200-ton boats ^{or} ~~from~~ steel and wood. This will include shrimpboats, lobsterboats, barges, light cargo ships, and passenger and patrol launches. The secondary function of the Combine will be to provide repair and maintenance service to all boats of this class within the Caribbean ^{of equal or better quality than that} ~~area~~ ^{area} ~~as good as the service~~ offered in Mexico, Trinidad or the United States.

To a degree, the shipyard will attempt ^{to} ~~specialization~~ ^a in the construction of 35-ton shrimpboats for favorable competition in the world market. Construction will be attempted ⁱⁿ ~~from~~ steel and ~~from~~ wood. Construction from wood will be advantageous because of the procurement of wood in large part, if not all, from the local sawmills in Bluefields. Another advantage of construction from wood is a plan for ^{mass} ~~production~~ ^{production} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ which prefabricated sections of boats will be constructed. It is possible to visualize in the near future not only the sale of fully-equipped shrimpboats but also prefabricated parts for those shipyards which do not have the necessary machinery, wood, and other items.

^{domestic} ~~The Caribbean~~ and Central American Market: There are only a few countries in America which possess the facilities for construction of boats ^{with} ~~the~~ ^{draft} ~~the shrimpboat~~ ~~outline~~. These countries are Peru, Mexico and the United States. The production in Peru is small and relatively insignificant, and its influence in the Caribbean is ^{nil} ~~negligible~~. Mexican boats are constructed from good material, but because of poor ^{workmanship} ~~labor~~, together with antiquated designs, they are subject to enormous structural fatigue in heavy seas. In the United States, the production of shrimpboats is ^{limited to} ~~covered~~.

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by five main companies ^{at an average rate} because of the annual quota of five boats per shipyard. They are excellent products with the latest fishing and navigation equipment. Nevertheless, they are costly because of the high cost of labor and raw materials in the country. Since we possess most of the wood in Bluefields, trained and competent personnel, and a superior functional boat design, we ^{will be} able to supply the necessities for a national fishing fleet, as well as to place these boats on the world market. We base ^{this opinion} ~~our conclusions~~ on preliminary calculations which prove the possibility of our ability to produce an excellent boat at less cost and superior to the North American boats.

^{Domestic}
The National Market: The immediate market for our shrimpboats is the ^{domestic} national fleet. The Booth Fisheries express great interest in ^{additional} procuring six boats as soon as possible. It plans possible expansion to 20 more boats in the next two or three years. There is also the possibility of renting or selling these boats on terms to local ^{individuals} ~~captaincies~~, as well as of stimulating investment by other ^{domestic} national capital. We estimate a national market of some 25 shrimpboats in the next three years. The demand from the rest of the Caribbean can be conservatively estimated at 40 boats, totalling 75 ^[sic] boats, which ^{be} they will ^{d/in} purchase from Mexico and the United States. With our production of 15 boats during this three-year period, it is evident that we possess a rich market here in the Caribbean area, not to mention the demand forthcoming from the Pacific and other large fishing areas.

As regards the repair yard, we estimate servicing 400 boats annually with our modern installations. Compare this ~~with~~ with the repair yard services of Schooner Key which ^{is} offering partial services to 45 boats annually.

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The plans for the Nicaraguan shrimpboat fleet this year call for 80 ~~boats~~ boats. All 40 coastal boats of all types and the total comes to 120 boats which will require repair yard services four times per year (3 ^{beachings} ^{etc} normal circumstances and 1 emergency), that is, a total of 480 ^{beachings} ^{etc} annually. The local repair yards are able to service only 100 ^{beachings} ^{etc} annually. This situation ~~has~~ ^{will} force many shrimpboats to seek repairs outside of the country, either at Honduras, Mexico or the United States, ^{with the} ~~the~~ resultant loss of fishing time and ^{foreign exchange} ~~profits~~ for Nicaragua.

^{Technical} ~~Technical~~ Limitations: The lack of local technical personnel, and time required to import various mechanical parts and materials.

Consideration ~~has been~~ for future expansion was taken ~~into~~ in designing the shipyard and repair yard. Carpentry and mechanic workshops ~~are~~ ^{are} also planned. There are two factors however which affect the overall operation. The first factor is the lack of ~~trained~~ personnel trained in steel construction of boats, but this will be overcome initially by personnel trained by the Company. The second factor will be resolved only by an efficient coordination ~~between~~ with the distribution and supply personnel of the Company in Miami. In this way it will be possible to have any spare parts or materials forwarded to Bluff within two weeks after the request is made by the local offices, (via airplane). Furthermore, plans have been prepared to stock the shipyard warehouses with spare parts.

External or Internal Competition: As regards the shipyard, there is neither external nor internal competition in Central America. The only competition we will encounter will be Mexican and North American. The following is a comparative study of this competition:

(a) Prices.	Shrimpboat (of wood, 35 tons, no motor)
Mexico	US\$ 41,000
United States	US\$ 45,000
Nicaragua	US\$ 40,000 (Planned)

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(b) Quality of Materials.

Mexico: Good materials; Bad design and ~~poor~~ construction.

U.S.A.: Good materials; excellent designs; construction depends on the Company and varies from good to excellent.

Nicaragua: Good materials; excellent designs and construction.

(c) Channels and Policy of Distribution: Even though it will be difficult to compete initially in sales in the Mexican and North American markets, because of their high duties, we will enjoy ^{an} unlimited market in the rest of the Caribbean. We will compete favorably due to the excellent position of Nicaragua with respect to Central

American, Venezuelan, Colombian, and other markets.

As regards the repair yard, it is to be noted that the foreign repair yards are ^{much} ~~less~~ ^{expensive} ~~domestic~~ than the national ones, sometimes up to 500 percent. From the study of typical costs of each repair yard we conclude that we are able to offer more service at equal or less cost. The following examples assume a typical ^{beaching} ~~grounding~~ of three days, cleaning, caulking, straightening the shaft, changing a number of ^e ~~shafts~~ of metal, ^{tightening} ~~securing~~ the framework or sternposts, ^{tightening} ~~securing~~ of the rudder and ^{scating} ~~bottom~~, and, finally, the paint:

(a) Cost

Honduras	US\$ 330	(excluding ^e straightening of shaft)
Mexico	US\$ 350	
U.S.A.	US\$ 375	
Schooner Key	US\$ 1000	
INVERNICA	US\$ 350	(planned)

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(b) Quality of Labor

Honduras Good
Mexico Good
U.S.A. Excellent
Schooner Key Common
INVERNEA Excellent (planned)

Sales Estimate: Potential sales are estimated from the following three means: The shipyard, the repair yard, and mechanical and electrical services to the community of the area in general.

(a) Costs (assuming the ^{stability} ~~stability~~ of prices in the next three years).

Shipyard: US\$ 40,000 for each shrimpboat (excluding motor); costs of other boats will be in proportion.

Repair Yard: Cost of normal ^{beaching} ~~grounding~~ US\$ 350. The cost will be higher if there are ^{problems} ~~mechanical~~ or spare parts ~~are~~ ^{are} needed.

(b) Quantity (Output)

Shipyard: two shrimpboats the first year, six the second and six the third years; all ^{domestic} ~~domestic~~ sales.

Repair Yard: 300 ^{beachings} ~~groundings~~ of a possible 400 the first year; 350 the second, and 450 the third year.

(c) Gross Income (approximate)

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year
Shipyard:	US\$ 80,000	US\$ 240,000	US\$ 240,000
Repair Yard:	US\$ 105,000	US\$ 122,500	US\$ 157,500
Miscellaneous	US\$ 5,000	US\$ 7,000	US\$ 10,000

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III

ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT

Costs of Overall Production for the First Year of Production:

In the calculation of costs, consideration is taken of the construction of two shrimpboats, complete repair and maintenance service for 300 ~~boats~~ ^{boats} ~~boats~~, and other miscellaneous service at a total of 31,000 ~~boats~~ work hours.

Production Costs:

- (a) Raw Material: The materials required for construction and repair of boats are varied and many times specialized. Following are principal materials at approximate rates:

Wood: Laurel or yellow pine: 25,000 square feet;

Mahogany, 1st and 2nd grade 20,000 square feet;

Oak, 1st grade 5,000 square feet.

Metal: Steel and Steel-2 (S.A.E.), 40 tons;

Cast-iron and other metals, 10 tons.

At a total value of US\$ 30,000.

(b) Materials:

Paints - Epoxy zinc, silver, primace, epoxy bases, latex, varnishes, copper antifouling, barnacles, etc.).
About 1800 gallons.

General hardware - Zinc, copper, iron, and steel screws and nails; washers; cotter-pins; metal, plastic and rubber tubing; polyfoam, styrofoam, and cement insulation; glass plates and Bakelite, etc.

Miscellaneous Equipment: Propellers (46" x 34"); rust-proof steel

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shafts, CMC in-line winches, anchors, batteries, ordinary and navigational lighting systems, electrical accessories, electric power plants, bilge pumps, kerosene stoves, cooling and refrigeration units, fathometers, radio-communication equipment, etc.

At a total value of US\$ 50,000.

(c) Labor:

During the first year of production the Enterprise will employ a chief of mechanics and lathe shop, two specialist mechanics, two mechanics assistants, a ~~master~~ ^{master} carpenter, three ship-carpenters, and two carpenter assistants.

At total annual wages of US\$ 32,000.

Operation Costs:

- (a) Administration Expenses: Administration personnel ^{include one} ~~include one~~ administrator-public accountant, assistant office worker, and two servicemen and maintenance managers. Together their annual wages will amount to US\$ 8,400, and ^{an} ~~an~~ annual amount of US\$ 2,000 will be kept in reserve.

Total Administration Expenses: US\$ 10,400.

- (b) Sales Expenses: Because of the nature of the Enterprise ~~there will be~~ ^{will be} no expenses incurred from sales, advertisements, etc., and, therefore, we ~~cannot~~ ^{foresee} the expenses for this section. Fixed and Variable Costs: All the expenses previously quoted may be considered as fixed costs, and only variable costs will be considered, that is, 20 percent of materials consumed by the mechanics workshops depending on the mechanical repairs. The rest is controlled by a simple system of production which will clearly show the detailed costs of construction and repairs of the boats in consideration.

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Plan of Production Costs for the Second and Third Year of Operation.

(See the following statement:)

STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS

A. Total Income:	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Shipyards Sales	⁸⁰ \$220,000	\$240,000	\$240,000
Repair Yard Sales	\$105,000	\$122,500	\$157,500
Misc. Sales	<u>\$ 5,000</u>	<u>\$ 7,000</u>	<u>\$ 10,000</u>
Net Sales	\$190,000	\$369,000	⁷ \$409,500

B. Production Cost:

Raw Materials	\$ 30,000	\$ 85,000	\$ 90,000
Materials	\$50,000	\$ 90,000	\$ 90,000
Direct Labor	\$ 32,000	\$ 40,000	\$ 42,000
Depreciation (Machinery, 20%)	\$ 10,000	\$ 10,000	\$ 5,000
Repairs and Maintenance	\$ 2,000	\$ 10,000	\$ 10,000
Fuel (Electricity)	\$ 2,500	\$ 2,800	\$ 3,000
Plant Security ¹²⁷	<u>\$ 1,000</u>	<u>\$ 1,300</u>	<u>\$ 1,300</u>
Sub-Total	\$127,500	\$239,000	\$242,300

C. Administration Expenses:

Wages	\$ 8,400	\$ 9,000	\$ 9,000
Office Expenses	<u>\$ 2,000</u>	<u>\$ 3,000</u>	<u>\$ 3,000</u>
Sub-Total	\$ 10,400	\$ 12,000 12,000	\$ 12,000 12,000

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B. Financial Expenses	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Capital	\$ 15,000	\$ 15,000	\$ 15,000
Interest	\$ 4,500	\$ 3,800	\$ 2,700
Sub-Total	\$ 19,500	\$ 18,800	\$ 17,700
C. Total Expenses	\$157,400	\$269,700	\$272,000
D. Utility Net	\$ 32,600	\$ 99,800	\$137,500

IV

IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

Employment: In the first year of production, 16 men will be employed by the Enterprise, and assigned as follows:

Administration Personnel: 4 employees (one administrator and public accountant), one office assistant, and two managers of services and maintenance).

Carpentry ~~Personnel~~: 7 employees (one chief of carpentry, three ship-carpenters, two carpenter assistants).

Mechanics ~~Personnel~~: 5 employees (one chief of mechanics and lathe-shop, two specialist mechanics, and two mechanics assistants).

The initial wages of all employees of the Enterprise will be based on their technical knowledge, years of experience, etc. This pay scale will surpass the normal in order to attract the best possible personnel to the Enterprise. A plan for increase of fixed and meritorious wages is also being planned as an incentive for the employees.

The number of personnel is expected to increase to 20 in the second

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year of production, and to 22 in the third year.

~~Under~~ the Balance of Payments: The shrimpboat fleets in Nicaragua have expanded ^{by} ~~to some~~ 10 to 15 boats annually. These boats are bought ~~entirely~~ ^{only} ~~equipped~~ from Mexico and the United States. Their total value within a period of three years extends from a minimum of US\$ 900,000 to a maximum of US\$ 2,025,000. Our production during this period will be 14 shrimpboats at a value of US\$ 560,000 which will remain in the country.

Consumer Benefits and Economic Development: At present, most of the shrimpboats in the area have no facilities for mechanical repairs, and, in most cases, no facilities for ^{beaching} ~~grounding~~. This is due in part to ^{the narrow track of} ~~the insufficient~~ ^{the} ~~marine railways~~ ^{the} ~~unimproved~~ in the local repair yards, as well as to antiquated equipment. Because of these difficulties, many shrimpboats are forced to put into Honduras, Mexico and, at times the United States for repairs.

~~Without doubt~~, It is difficult to estimate with certainty the total losses which these boats incur ^{through} ~~through~~ negotiations for entry to and departure from other countries, fuel and personnel expenses, and, of more importance, the incalculable losses in fishing time. Inasmuch as our repair yards will possess a greater capability than normally required, those boats with emergency and other types of damages will be guaranteed service. In this way we will attract to our repair yards those boats which ordinarily would seek repairs outside of the country with the ^{consequent} ~~subsequent~~ loss in foreign profits and valuable ~~time~~ fishing time in the waters of Nicaragua.

Protection and Incentive: Because of the ^{characteristics of key} ~~importance of key~~ industry (See Law Nr 135, of 20 March 1958), a shipyard ^{will need} ~~may request~~ governmental aid during the first ~~two~~ years of its development in order to assure the necessary investments required by an enterprise of such complexity and magnitude. The necessary negotiations are presently being undertaken in Managua to obtain for this

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enterprise the legal recognition of a ~~fundamental~~ industry with all governmental aid.

V

TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Designs have already been drafted for the first model in wood of a 35-ton shrimpboat, and for the first model in steel of a 36-ton shrimpboat. The general specifications for the steel boat are the following: tonnage - 30; length - 62 feet; breadth - 20 feet; draught - 8 feet; keel (bar/steel-3) 3/4 inch x 8 inches; transverse frames (plate/steel); deck 3/16 inch (plate/steel). Paint: Hart and Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosive and antifouling - a total of six coats. Refrigerator: capacity 20 tons, in shrimp-ice, constructed of styrofoam-concrete. Driving power plant: D-342 Caterpillar with supercharger. Propellers, 48 inches x 34 inches, with three stainless steel propeller blades. ~~stainless steel transmission~~ shaft, 3 inches x 14 feet. GNO in-line winch. Eight 8-volt batteries with battery charger. Kerosene cooking-range. Searchlights and navigational lights. RCA Cruiseophone 160. Ritchie, magnetic compass, model B453. Raytheon fathometer, model DE-72. Special fuel tanks in the hull, with capacity of 6,000 gals. ~~portable~~ Portable water tank, with capacity of 750 gals, etc.

Production Process: The processes in constructing boats and the services required for the boats are necessarily complex, ^{and} although the processes are immensely simplified by new methods. Below is a description of the processes to be followed in the shipyard and in the repair yard. The construction of a boat begins with the laying of the keel on the slipway, followed by the attachment of the ^{pre-formed} transverse framework to the keel. The crossbeams

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CONTINUING

and sternpost are then set in place after the framework is cut to size. The shell plating is next attached from the keel upwards in a such a manner that upon entering the water the wood undergoes a precalculated expansion which completely seals the hull without necessitating caulking. A hole is drilled for the shaft and the supports and pin for the rudder are then set in place. Following this is the flooring for the deck and ~~XXXXX~~ the steel crew's cabin, and reinforcements for the prow, stern and machine room. After all of this is completed, the secondary installations are carried out, such as the painting, electrical wiring, plumbing, masts, gavits, winches, and finally the launching of the boat. Final touch-up is effected ~~when~~ ^{with} the boat is in the water.

The process for the construction of a boat from steel is a simpler matter, and therefore less costly.

The normal process of drydock-repair service for a boat is as follows: The cradle (See diagrams Hrs 1 and 3) awaits the boat at the entrance of the ramp. With the use of maneuvering-buoys, the boat is lifted onto the cradle where it is made stationary ^{by} transverse beams. The moving cradle is brought up the ramp and the boat is then transferred from it to a lateral cradle. The boat is brought to Section Hr 1 where it is immediately scraped with electric portable brushes and high water pressure. While the hull is drying, a detailed inspection is carried out in search of worm ^{holes}. After drying, the hull is ~~then~~ ^{is} calked and a general inspection is made. Paint is applied, and while that is drying the necessary interior mechanical work is carried out. Upon termination of the final painting and a final inspection, the boat is launched. The complete operation lasts no more than two or three days in a modern drydock, and the support personnel consist of two

CONTINUING

carpenters, a mechanic, and two yard assistants, as well as the usual repair and spare parts.

Installations: As can be seen from diagram nr 1, the area occupied by the shipyard is relatively small, some 15,500 square meters. It consists of a reinforced-concrete ramp with 4-inch rail^s, and an area 150 meters long by 20 meters^{wide}. The ~~area~~ ^{area} has a depth of 7 meters. The Central Yard contains a lateral cradle (25 x 17 x 1 meters), which ~~stands on~~ ^{rolls on} a concrete base (17 x 25 x 1 meters); three sections of the cradle (42 x 20 meters) with the third section terminating near the shipbuilding ~~shed~~ ^{shed} (33 x 22 x 11 meters). Two identical buildings are planned for the ~~shops~~ ^{shop} carpentry ~~shops~~; offices and warehouses, on a total working area of 1200 square meters. A building will house two 75-kilowatt electric power plants, spare parts and general electrical equipment. A 350-gallon petroleum tank will be installed ^{underground} along side of this building to provide the fuel. A 6,000-gallon ~~prinkler~~ fresh-water tank with its well and turbine will complete the first phase of the plan. The second phase will be carried out during the year of production.

Cost of Each Section (Approx):

Retention Wall and Filling in the Swamp	\$ 1,500
Ramp	\$ 4,000
Central Yard	\$ 10,000
Base for the Lateral Cradle	\$ 5,000
Buildings for Workshops/Warehouses/Offices	\$ 12,000
Building for the Ship ^{Construction}	\$ 3,000
Building for the Power Plants	\$ 2,000
Lateral Cradle	\$ 4,000

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Three Repair Yard Cradles	\$ 12,000
Water Tank with Well	\$ 500
Electric Wiring, Drainage, Plumbing, etc.	\$ 1,000
Total -	<u>\$ 55,000</u>

Location of the Operation: It was evident from the beginning that the location of a shipyard-repair yard complex on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua had to be situated in the Bluff-Bluefields area, or at Rio Escondido. The reasons are as follows:

(a) Geo-Economical - The Bluff-Bluefields port is the only port with river and highway access to the interior of the country. (b) It is the only port with sheltered anchorage (compare this with Puerto Cabezas' exposure to the sea). (c) It is the center of the fish market (Booth and Pescanica).

These two companies attract a large number of boats and create a local demand for drydocking facilities. (d) It is a ^{year supplies} center of fuel, food, parts, and other ^{articles} (e) INVERNICA is fully aware of the potentials in the area. Without doubt, ^a ~~this~~ port ^{with deep draft and good access} ~~could have been even more advantageous.~~

~~It~~ At present, however, the sandbar of Bluff limits access to the port to boats ~~in~~ with 13 feet of draught or less (maximum of 800 tons). This greatly limits the commercial traffic to Bluefields. Possibly in the near future, the sandbar may be dredged, and we would then be sufficiently developed to offer ^{floating-drydock} services to large boats. The Port of Bluefields would then have the opportunity of becoming a prime mercantile port.

Possible Future Expansion: This preliminary study provides for the construction of an additional 90 x 35 x 7 meter building to serve as a general workshop for the three ^{slipways} ~~ships~~ ^{simultaneously}. It and for the con-

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struction of a concrete pier for jobs not requiring drydocking. This pier will be equipped with a mobile crane, and electrical and water facilities. This plan (Phase II) ^{is} ~~will be~~ tentatively ^{SCHEDULED FOR} ~~started during~~ the second year of operations. (See diagram Nr 1).

VI

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Total Estimated Investments for the Project: The estimated total sum of the project is US\$ 237,000. The breakdown of this amount is given at the end of this chapter. The ^{loan} ~~contribution~~ requested from INFOFINAC is given below under general headings:

Construction Equipment: ^{2 1/2 -} Two ~~2-ton~~ ton dump-trucks. ^{Carts} ~~Wagons~~ for concrete, concrete vibrators (we have compressors), crane bucket for concrete, ^{CANVAS} ~~tubing~~ for submerged cement work, iron piping, etc. Total value (approx) US\$ 25,000.

Construction Materials: 20,000 bags of Lone-Star cement;
100 tons of ^{reinforcing rods} ~~corrugated~~, 1/2 inch and 3/4 inch; with tie wire
15,000 square feet of zinc sheathing;

5,000 square feet of construction wood;

50 tons of rail ~~sections~~ sections, 4 inches;

64 ~~sections~~ (1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2 feet in diameter);

Railroad accessories; etc.;

Total Value of approx US\$ 40,000.

Carpentry Equipment: Table saw (2 feet x 10 feet), hand saws, ^{hinged vise} ~~hand saws~~, two 2-inch electric drills, two electric sand ^{ers} ~~ers~~, ^{table saw} ~~table saw~~ and press, 'tension boxes', two complete sets of tools and ~~an~~ electric portable equipment, etc.

Total Value of approx US\$ 5,000.

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~~Equipment~~ Equipment: US\$ 25,000 additional investment by INVERNICA, and US\$ 5,000 by INPORMIC.

Lathe for shafts (24-foot bed, 48-foot drum);

Southbend precision lathe (6-foot bed, 13-foot drum);

Two-inch Buffalo/drill, with accessories;

~~Walter-Turner~~ ^{Force} ^{Auger [?]} model Nr 3310;

Four manually-operated 20-ton hydraulic presses;

Electric Grinders;

Medium milling machines;

Twelve-inch press;

~~Differential~~

Differential systems (1 ton);

Three sets of complete die-stocks, ^{torque} ~~tension~~ wrenches, combination wrenches,

anvils, etc;

Two complete sets of gage tools, torsionmeters, calibrators, cutters,

polishing machines, automatic ^{VALVES} ~~wrenches~~, die sets, ^{one unit for testing engines} ~~etc.~~

Total Value of approx US\$ 36,500.

Characteristics of ~~company~~ Capital: INVERNICA's ~~company~~ capital is drawn from two sources, namely, total equipment and materials within Nicaragua which is valued at US\$ 150,000, and the ~~company~~ capital of the Enterprise, approximately ~~US\$ 50,000~~ US\$ 50,000.

Guarantees: Following is a general list of the equipment of INVERNICA which will be utilized in the project. This equipment for the most part is new and in full operational status, that is, INVERNICA has the necessary technical personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. In spite of the fact that this equipment is new the total ~~equipment~~ value is subject to the usual depreciation of 25 percent of the price which INVERNICA paid for the equipment in the United States. The following is exclusive of ^{freight} ~~freight~~, customs, and other fees. Since I do not have price lists, the prices are approximate.

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Construction Equipment:

- 1 D-7 Caterpillar bulldozer;
- 1 M 112 Caterpillar grader;
- 1 15-ton Little Giant crane;
- 2 75-Kw D333 Caterpillar electric power plants;
- 2 Kohler power plants;
- 1 20-ton L.C.M., with all equipment;
- 1 40-ton barge;
- 1 KVIK-MIX concrete mixer, model 6S;
- 1 1964 Willys truck;
- 1 1964 Willys Jeep;
- 1 3-ton trailer;
- 1 Compressor with Caterpillar equipment, 60 HP;
- 1 ^{Small} Compressor with ~~small~~ equipment and 9 HP Wisconsin motor;
- 2 GONDAS turbines, of 2 and 2 1/2 inches diameter, with motors;
- 1 BEARS turbine, of 1 inch, with motor;
- 10 Sets of construction tools (picks, shovels, diggers, etc.).
- Total Value of approx US\$ 90,000, less 25% depreciation.

Mechanical Equipment:

- 3 Complete sets of tools;
- 1 Granville lathe (bed 3 feet by 10 inches);
- 1 Linds/W-2000 electric aluminum welding unit;
- 1 Hobart, model AFE 260, electric welding unit;
- 2 Oxy-acetylene welding units;
- 1 Craftsman 3/4 inch drill table ^{AUGER} [?];
- 1 Craftsman aluminum ~~stuffing~~ ^{stuffing} pump;
- 8 ~~electric~~ electric drills (1 1/2 inch)

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- 5 3/4-inch electric drills;
- 2 Electric buffing and polishing machines;
- 2 Electric fine ~~cut~~ saws (portable)

Miscellaneous equipment.

At Total Approx Value of US\$ 6,500.

Miscellaneous Materials:

- 5,000 feet of high-voltage electric wiring;
- 3,500 feet of 600-volt electric wiring;
- 2,500 iron sheets, 1 and 1/2 inches by 10 feet;
chargers
- 2 electric ~~chargers~~ 12 and 24 volts;
- 3 electric transformers;
- 15 boxes of spare parts for the Caterpillar, ~~make~~ G.M., and Willys' motors;

Iron, copper, and zinc tubing; paint, plumbing fittings, 12-volt batteries, 1500, 1000, 350, 100 and 50 gallon water tanks, insulators, etc.

At Total Approx Value of US\$ 15,000.

TOTAL INVESTMENT PLAN

<u>Investment Fields</u>	<u>INVERNICA</u>	<u>INFCHEAC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
A. Installation Expenses:			
a. Construction Equipment	\$ 90,000	\$ 25,000	\$115,000
b. Construction Materials	\$ 15,000	\$ 40,000	\$ 55,000
c. Construction Materials			
Equipment	\$ 31,000 ⁵⁰⁰	\$ 5,000	\$ 36,500
d. Carpentry ^{shop} workshop			
Equipment	\$ 5,000	\$ 5,000	\$ 10,000

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	(INVERMICA)	(TYPOHAC)	(TOTAL)
B. Organization Expenses:	\$ 500	\$ ———	\$ 500
C. Working Capital:	\$ 15,000	\$ ———	\$ 15,000
D. Contingencies:	\$ 10,000	\$ ———	\$ 10,000
Total:	\$162,000 (68.4%)	\$ 75,000 (31.6%)	\$237,000 (100.0%)

Note: The land will be rented to the Booth Fisheries for a nominal fee credit is
which will be resolved once the established.

SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

A. Sources:	Installation Period	Operational Period		
		1st	2nd	3rd
1. Equity Capital	\$162,000	————	————	————
2. Medium-term loans	\$ 75,000	————	————	————
3. Sales	\$ ———	\$190,000	\$369,000	\$409,500
4. Balance from previous year	\$ ———	\$140,000	\$172,600	\$221,900
Total Sources:	\$237,000	\$330,000	\$541,600	\$631,400
B. Uses:				
5. Fixed Investment				
a. Bldgs, etc.	\$ 55,000	\$ ———	\$ ———	\$ ———
b. Machinery	\$ 41,500	\$ ———	\$ ———	\$ ———
6. Cost of Production	\$ ———	\$127,500	\$239,100	\$242,300
7. Administration Expenses	\$ 500	\$ 10,400	\$ 12,000	\$ 12,000
Total Uses:	\$ 97,000	\$137,900	\$251,100	\$254,300

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Cash and Bank Deposits(A-B):	\$140,000	\$192,100	\$240,500	\$377,100
a. Amortization of the loan	\$ ———	\$ 19,500	\$ 18,600	\$ 17,700
b. Reinvestments	\$ ———	\$ ———	\$ 50,000	\$ ———
c. Dividends	\$ ———	\$ ———	\$ ———	\$ 50,000

Balance for the Following

Year:	<u>\$140,000</u>	<u>\$172,600</u>	<u>\$221,900</u>	<u>\$309,400</u>
-------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

Note: This capital represents the value of the construction equipment, the working capital and the capital for contingencies, and is, therefore, the maximum figure. It is not necessarily true that this capital will remain intact, but we do believe that it will be no less than US\$ 115,000.

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Production Potential - Shipyard

Number of
Shrimpsboats

Planned production
Demand in Nicaragua
Plant capacity

Years

Production Potential - Repair Yard

Number of
Drydockings,
per annum

Planned production
Demand in Nicaragua
Plant capacity

Years

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VII

APPENDIX

A re-study of the necessities of the shipyard, of the extensive (and intensive) repairs which the fleets will require, and of the immense volume of maintenance, has revealed the enormous load which the ~~unskilled~~ ^{steel} and carpentry ~~workshops~~ must bear.

With the capital available to INVERICA at this time, only US\$ 25,000 can be channeled to these workshops, ^{(plus} ~~approximately~~ the US\$ 6,500 in equipment in our possession), ^{since} ~~the~~ the present emphasis is placed on construction and immediate production. Nevertheless, I believe that an additional investment in the workshops is of vital importance for less costl^y and efficient production. For ^{mass} production ~~the~~ the shipyard, naturally, requires sophisticated equipment, a significant volume of spare parts and additional capital.

We may choose to purchase this equipment with the first year's profits. But I believe that ^{it is suitable for} ~~this sum~~ ^{to} be incorporated into the plan of initial loans, requested by the enterprise.

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DIAGRAM NO. 1 - GENERAL VIEW

Storage Yard

Electric Power Plants

Warehouses

Carpentry Office Mechanical
Workshop Workshop

Shipyard
No. 1

Building for
Shipbuilding
(Planned)

Section Section Section Section Section Section
6 5 4 3 2 1

Winch 1

Winch 2

Internal Cradle

Ramp

Phase II

Phase I

Working Pier

DIAGRAM NO. 2 - MAIN BUILDINGS

Workshops and Office

Shipyard No. 1

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DIAGRAM NR. 3 - SHIPBOAT CRADLE

Specifications:

Net weight - 18 tons

Capacity - 32 tons

Length - 20 meters

Width - 10 meters

Maneuvering time - 15 minutes

Scale

meters

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1 - 3

INVESTIGACIONES NICARAGUENSES S. A.
(INVEAMICA)

ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR

VARADERO - ASTILLERO

EN EL AREA DEL BRACOMAN'S BLUFF - BLAKEFIELD

INDICE GENERAL

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I. INTRODUCCION

Este proyecto de desarrollo industrial lo presenta la Compañía INVERNICA (Inversiones Navales S.A.), ubicada en la ciudad de Managua, D. N., Nicaragua.

El contenido de este informe forma parte del estudio preliminar que ha efectuado la INVERNICA en torno a un programa de inversión de un concentrado de astilleros - varaderos en el área del Bluff- Bluefields. Dichas facilidades estarán orientadas a dar servicios completos a las flotas pesqueras y demás embarcaciones que operan en la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua. Dada la complejidad de las operaciones requeridas en los trabajos y servicios de un astillero, el costo del monto de dichas facilidades es inicialmente elevado. Gracias a los equipos, experiencia y personal técnico que posee la INVERNICA, este costo inicial se reduce enormemente. Este estudio analiza los diferentes elementos que forman parte de dicha inversión y los integra a una cifra total, cuyo valor es de US\$ 237,000.00 (DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y SIETE MIL DOLARES), con dos inversionistas: INVERNICA supliendo el 4.4% (cuatro y ocho punto cuatro por ciento), y el INFONAC supliendo el 31.6% (treinta y uno punto seis por ciento).

En por su condición de industria nueva en país, y del alto beneficio que ello conlleva a la economía nacional, este proyecto puede clasificarse de industria fundamental (Ley #135, Ley de Protección y Estímulo al Desarrollo Industrial, 20 de Marzo de 1958), y por tanto, gozar de dicha protección y estímulo para su pleno desarrollo inicial.

Como se verá en este informe preliminar, la necesidad de facilidades modernas de varadero y astillería en la Costa Atlántica, es de vital importancia a la sobrevivencia de las flotas de pesca. Dichas flotas sufren

-3-

graves restricciones operacionales debido a la ausencia de dichos servicios, tan comunes y entusiasmante brindados a las flotas norteamericanas y mexicanas. Nosotros poseemos los equipos y el personal técnico necesarios, pero aún poseemos la plena confianza de poder llegar a ofrecer los servicios, facilitados y a veces más modernos y eficientes en todas las costas del Caribe.

12 de Julio de 1961

Braggman's Bluff, Nicaragua

Ing. Luis A. Prieto Portas
INVERSIKA

II. ANÁLISIS DEL MERCADO

La función primaria del astillero será la construcción de embarcaciones de acero y madera, de 35 a 200 toneladas. Esto incluye camaroneros, langosteros, falas, cargueros ligeros y lanchones de pasajeros y de patrulla. La segunda función de la empresa, será el dar servicios de reparación y mantenimiento a toda clase de embarcaciones de esta índole en el área del Caribe, de igual o superior calidad que las ofrecidas en México, Trinidad e los Estados Unidos.

Hasta cierto punto el astillero intentará la especialización en la construcción de un camaronero de 35 toneladas de tal calidad que pueda competir favorablemente en el mercado mundial. Se intentarán construcciones en acero y en madera. La construcción en madera presenta la ventaja que una gran parte, sino toda la madera, puede procurarse en los aserraderos locales de Bluefields. Otra ventaja que posee la construcción en madera es un proceso de producción en serie, en la cual, las formas de las diferentes piezas de las naves, se construirán en grupos previstos para la prefabricación. Será posible visualizar en un futuro, vender camaroneros, no solamente completamente armados, sino también en piezas prefabricadas listas para armar por vareadores con pocas facilidades en maquinaria, madera, etc.

Mercedo nacional y centroamericano. Son pocos los países en la América que poseen las facilidades de astilleros para la construcción de embarcaciones del calado de un camaronero. Estos países son el Perú, México y los Estados Unidos. La producción del Perú es pequeña y relativamente ineficiente, y su influencia en el Caribe, es nula. Las naves mejicanas están luchas de buen material, pero de pésima mano de obra, unidos a

diseño anticorrosivos y crudos, por lo cual sufren enormes fatigas estructurales en mares crudos. En los Estados Unidos la producción de camaroneros se reduce al producto de cinco compañías principales, a razón de un promedio de unas cinco naves anuales por astillero. Son ubicaciones excelentes, con los últimos adelantos en equipos de pesca y navegación. Sin embargo, son naves costosas. Debido al alto costo de la mano de obra y materias primas del país. Ya que poseemos la mayor parte de la redera en Bluefields, un personal técnico educado y competente, y un diseño funcionalmente superior de embarcación, podremos suplir las necesidades para una flota de pesca nacional, así como también exportar dichas embarcaciones al mercado mundial. Nos basamos en cálculos preliminares, de poder producir una excelente nave, de menor costo que las naves norteamericanas, con una calidad que esperamos, sea superior.

El mercado nacional. El mercado inmediato para nuestros camaroneros son las flotas nacionales. La Booth Fisheries tiene mucho interés en comprar seis naves más de inmediato. Proyecta una posible expansión de veinte naves más en los próximos dos o tres años. También la posibilidad de arrendar o vender a plazos de pago dichas naves a capitales locales, así como también, estimular las inversiones de otros capitales nacionales. Estimamos un mercado nacional de unas veintidós naves camaroneras en los próximos tres años. Las demandas del resto del Caribe, podría estimarse conservadoramente en unas cuarenta naves, haciendo un total de sesenta y cinco embarcaciones, que se comprarán en México y los Estados Unidos. Con nuestra producción de quince naves en ese período de tres años, es evidente que poseemos un mercado suficiente para el Caribe así como con las demandas del Pacífico y otras áreas de intensa pesca.

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En cuanto al varadero, estimamos que con nuestras modernas instalaciones podremos dar servicio a 400 navas anualmente. Comparados con los servicios del varadero de Steamship Co., que está dando servicios parciales a 15 navas anualmente.

En proyección, se estima que las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua llegarán a 40 navas en este año. Añádase unas 40 embarcaciones costeras de todas índoles. Esto constituye un total de 120 embarcaciones que requieren los servicios de un varadero cuatro veces al año (tres varajes al año normales y uno de emergencia), o sea, un total de 480 varajes anuales. Los varaderos locales, podrán satisfacer unos cien varajes en conjunto. Esta situación ha forzado a un gran número de camaroneros tener que irse del país para reparar sus navas (a Honduras, El Salvador, y hasta los Estados Unidos), con la consiguiente pérdida de tiempo de pesca y de divisas para Nicaragua.

Limitaciones de orden técnico. Surgen las siguientes inicialmente: la ausencia de personal técnico local, y el tiempo de importación de la gran diversidad de piezas y material mecánico.

El diseño del astillero - varadero se ha hecho contemplando expansiones futuras al paso que progresan las demandas. Esta planificación se ha hecho también en torno a los dos talleres (carpintería y mecánica). El primer factor, la ausencia de personal adiestrado en construcción de navos de acero se superará inicialmente con la utilización del personal adiestrado de la Compañía. Al asignarle dos o tres asistentes locales, estos podrán aprender prácticamente las especialidades requeridas. El segundo factor, solo podrá resolverse con una eficiente coordinación

con el personal de distribución y suministros de la Compañía en Miami. Será posible tener cualquier pieza o material en el Bluff en un día de tres semanas después de pedido por los oficiales locales (vía aérea). Se contempla además tener un gran surtido de piezas de repuestos en nuestros almacenes del astillero.

Competencia externa o interna. En cuanto al astillero, no existe competencia externa ni interna en el orden centroamericano. La única competencia que encontraremos será la mexicana, y la norteamericana.

El estudio comparativo de esta competencia sigue a continuación:

(a) Precios. Camaronero, (madera, 35 ton., sin acero).

México	US\$ 41,000.00	
Estados Unidos	US\$ 45,000.00	
Nicaragua	US\$ 40,000.00	(Proyectado)

(b) Calidad de materiales..

México: Buena material; malos diseños y construcción general.

Estados Unidos: Buenos materiales; excelentes diseños; construcción varía con la Compañía desde buena hasta excelente.

Nicaragua: Buena material; diseños y construcción excelentes.

(c) Canales y ^{políticas} de distribución: Aunque sin duda será difícil al introducir inicialmente en ventar con los mercados Mexicanos y Norteamericanos, debido a los altos aranceles de estos países, tenemos un mercado ilimitado en el resto del Caribe. Competiremos favorablemente debido a la excelente posición de Nicaragua con respecto a los mercados Centroamericanos, Venezolanos, Colombianos, etc.

En cuanto al varadero, es de notar que comparativamente, los varaderos extranjeros son por mucho, menos costosos que los nacionales, a

votos es un suño. Tras un estudio de los precios típicos de cada varadero, llegamos a la conclusión que se puede dar mucho más servicio por un costo igual o menor. En los ejemplares que eligen, hemos estimado un varaje típico de tres días, limpieza, calentar, desmenuar ajo, cambiar un número de tablas, asegurar el costillaje o cadastros, asegurar timón y alientos, y finalmente la pintura.

(a) Precios

Embarcaciones	US\$ 130.00	(sin embarcar el ajo)
Máximo	US\$ 150.00	
EE. UU.	US\$ 175.00	
Schooner Key	US\$1000.00	
INVERNICA	US\$ 150.00	(Proyectada)

(b) Calidad de la mano de obra.

Embarcaciones	buena	
Máximo	buena	
EE. UU.	excelente	
Schooner Key	regular	
INVERNICA	excelente	(Proyectada)

Intensificación de ventas. En la estimación del potencial de ventas, entre tres vías de utilidad: los del astillero; los del varadero, y los servicios de mecánica y electricidad a la comunidad del área en general.

(a) Precios (asumiendo estabilidad de precios en los próximos tres años). Astillero: US\$ 40,000.00 por cada camarero (sin motor); otras embarcaciones proporcionalmente cotizadas.

Varadero: precio de varaje normal, US\$ 350.00. Cuando se presentan desperfectos mecánicos o piezas de repuesto, el precio será mayor.

(b) Cantidades.

Astillero: Dos camareros el primer año, seis el segundo y diez el

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tercer año; todos para venta nacional.

Varadero: 300 varales de un posible total de 600 el primer año; 300 el segundo y 400 varales el tercer año.

(b) Ingresos brutos. (aproximados).

	<u>1er año</u>	<u>2do año</u>	<u>3er año</u>
Artillero:	US\$ 60,000.00	US\$ 240,000.00	US\$ 240,000.00
Varadero:	US\$105,000.00	US\$122,300.00	US\$ 137,600.00
Misceláneos:	US\$ 5,000.00	US\$ 7,000.00	US\$ 10,000.00

III. VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DEL PROYECTO

Costos de Producción Estimados para el primer año de producción. En el cálculo de costos, se toma en consideración la construcción de 10 embarcaciones, servicios completos de reparación y mantenimiento en 300 varas, y demás servicios misceláneos, con un total de 31,000 horas de trabajo (en unidad de turno diario).

Costos de Producción.

(a) Materias Primas: Los materiales requeridos para la construcción y reparación de embarcaciones, son muy variados y muchas veces, especiales.

A continuación solo enumero los materiales principales con cotizaciones generales y aproximadas.

Maderas.	Laurel o pino amarillo	25,000 pies cuadrados.
	Caoba de leña y Zeda.	20,000 "
	Roble de leña.	5,000 "

Metales. Acero y acer-2 (S.A.R.) 40 toneladas.
Hierro colado y demás metales 10 ton.

Con un valor total de US\$ 30,000.00

(b) Materiales:

Pinturas: Epoxy zinc, Silver, primaco, epoxy bases, latex, copper antifouling, barnices, etc.).
Unos 1800 galones.

Ferretería en general: Tornillos y clavos de zinc, cobre, hierro, acero; arandelas; pasadores; tuberías metálicas, plásticas, etc.; insulación de polystyrene, styrofoam, cemento; láminas de vidrio y bakelite, etc.

Equipos diversos: Hélices (40" x 34"); ejes de acero inoxidable, winches GMC en lino, anclas, baterías, sistemas de iluminación ordinaria y navegacionales, telégrafos accesorios eléctricos, plantas eléctricas, bombas de achique, cisternas de petróleo, unidades de enfriamiento y refrigeración, estetóscopos, equipos de radio-comunicación, etc.

Con un valor total de US\$ 20,000.00

(c) Mano de obra. La empresa empleará, durante su primer año de producción, un jefe de mecánica y timonería, dos mecánicos especializados,

dos asistentes de mecánica, un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de ribera y marcos, y los asistentes de carpintería.

Con un sueldo anual colectivo de US\$ 13,000.00

Gastos de Operación.

(a) **Gastos de Administración:** El Personal de Administración consistirá de, un administrador-contador público, un asistente oficinista y dos encargados de servicios y mantenimiento. En conjunto cobrarán un sueldo anual de US\$ 3,400.00 y demás, se reservará la cantidad anual de US\$ 2,000.00.

Gastos Totales de Administración US\$ 15,400.00

(b) **Gastos de Ventas:** Dada la naturaleza de la empresa, no es necesario incurrir en gastos de ventas, anuncios, etc..., y por tanto asumimos un gasto nulo para esta sección. Costos fijos y variables. Todos los gastos anteriormente estimados, pueden considerarse como gastos fijos, y solo se consideraran gastos variables, el 20% del material consumido por los talleres de mecánica, dada la variabilidad de las reparaciones mecánicas. El resto, está gobernado por un sistema sencillo de producción que predice necesariamente, los costos detallados de la construcción y reparación de las naves en consideración. Proyección de los Gastos de Producción para el Segundo y el Tercer Año de Operación. (Véase el Formato a continuación).

ESTADOS DE PROYECTOS Y GANANCIAS

<u>A. INGRESOS TOTALES:</u>			
	<u>1er año</u>	<u>2do año</u>	<u>3er año</u>
VENTAS ASTILLERO	\$ 40,000.00	\$ 240,000.00	\$ 240,000.00
VENTAS VARIADO	\$ 100,000.00	\$ 120,000.00	\$ 120,000.00
VENTAS MISCEL. REAS	\$ 5,000.00	\$ 7,000.00	\$ 10,000.00
<u>VENTAS NETAS</u>	<u>\$ 145,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 367,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 370,000.00</u>
<u>B. COSTO DE PRODUCCION:</u>			
	<u>1er año</u>	<u>2do año</u>	<u>3er año</u>
MATERIAS PRIMAS	\$ 30,000.00	\$ 80,000.00	\$ 90,000.00
MATERIALES	\$ 50,000.00	\$ 90,000.00	\$ 90,000.00
MANO DE OBRA DIRECTA	\$ 32,000.00	\$ 40,000.00	\$ 40,000.00
DEPRECIACION (MAQ. 20%)	\$ 10,000.00	\$ 10,000.00	\$ 5,000.00
REPARACION Y MANTENIMIENTOS	\$ 2,000.00	\$ 10,000.00	\$ 10,000.00
CONSUMOS (ELECTRICIDAD)	\$ 2,000.00	\$ 2,000.00	\$ 3,000.00
SEGURO DE LA PLANTA	\$ 1,000.00	\$ 1,000.00	\$ 1,000.00
<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>\$ 127,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 233,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 249,000.00</u>
<u>C. GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION:</u>			
	<u>1er año</u>	<u>2do año</u>	<u>3er año</u>
SUELDOS	\$ 6,000.00	\$ 9,000.00	\$ 9,000.00
GASTOS DE OFICINA	\$ 2,000.00	\$ 3,000.00	\$ 3,000.00
<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>\$ 8,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 12,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 12,000.00</u>
<u>D. GASTOS FINANCIEROS</u>			
	<u>1er año</u>	<u>2do año</u>	<u>3er año</u>
DEL CAPITAL	\$ 15,000.00	\$ 15,000.00	\$ 15,000.00
DEL INTERES	\$ 4,000.00	\$ 3,800.00	\$ 3,700.00
<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>\$ 19,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 18,800.00</u>	<u>\$ 18,700.00</u>
<u>E. TOTAL GASTOS</u>	<u>\$ 154,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 263,800.00</u>	<u>\$ 279,700.00</u>
<u>F. UTILIDAD NETA</u>	<u>\$ 32,000.00</u>	<u>\$ 104,200.00</u>	<u>\$ 137,500.00</u>

IV. JUSTIFICACION SOCIO - ECONOMICA

Emples. En el primer año de producción, el personal de la empresa será de diez y seis hombres, distribuidos en la forma siguiente:

Personal de Administración: cuatro empleados (un administrador y contador público) un asistente de oficina, y dos encargados de servicios y mantenimiento).

Personal de Carpintería: siete empleados (un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de rivera y marina, dos asistentes de carpintería).

Personal de Mecánica: cinco empleados (un jefe de mecánica y tornería, dos mecánicos especializados, y dos asistentes de mecánica).

Todos los empleados de la empresa, recibirán inicialmente ^{salarios} sueldos basados en sus conocimientos técnicos, años de experiencia, etc. Dicha escala de pagos será superior a las normales, para atraer a la empresa, el mejor personal posible. Se contempla además un plan de aumentos de sueldos fijos y meritatorios, para estímulo de los esfuerzos de superación de los empleados.

Se espera aumentar el número del personal a veinte para el segundo año de producción, y a veintidós para el tercer año. Respecto a la Balanza de Pagos, las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua han aumentado sus efectivos por unas diez a quince embarcaciones anualmente. Dichas embarcaciones son compradas en su totalidad, en México y los Estados Unidos. Sus valores conjuntos en un periodo, de tres años, oscilando a un mínimo de US\$ 900,000.00 a un máximo de US\$ 2,035,000.00. Nuestra producción durante este periodo, será de catorce camaroneros con un valor de US\$ 900,000.00 que representen divisos que permanezcan en el país.

Dificultades al Comercio y al Desarrollo Económico. Presentemente, la mayoría de los camaroneros en el área, no tienen facilidades para servicios de reparación mecánica, y en la mayoría de los casos, en las facilidades se varaje. Esto es debido en parte, al poco estado de las vías férreas de los verdaderos locales, así como también, lo anticuado que resultan sus equipos. Debido a estas dificultades, muchos camaroneros tienen que remontarse a Honduras, México y a veces hasta los Estados Unidos para efectuar reparaciones de averías normales o accidentales. Es difícil estimar con certeza las pérdidas totales a que incurrían dichas embarcaciones, entre los trámites legales de entrada, y salidas a otros países, los costos de combustible y personal, y de mayor importancia, las pérdidas enormes que representa el tiempo perdido de pesca. Puesto que nuestros verdaderos poseedores mayor capacidad que el requerido normalmente, esto representará una garantía de servicio aquellas embarcaciones con averías de emergencia, etc. En este modo, captaremos aquellas embarcaciones que ordinariamente tienen que abandonar el país para efectuar sus reparaciones, con las consiguientes reparaciones de divisas y tiempo valioso de pesca en aguas nicaragüenses.

Protección y Estímulo: Dada las características de industria fundamental (Ley #135, del 20 de Marzo de 1966), un astillero representará ayuda gubernamental durante sus primeros años de desarrollo, para asegurar las tan necesarias reinversiones requeridas por una empresa de tal complejidad y magnitud. Presentemente, se están haciendo en Managua, las gestiones necesarias para darle a esta empresa el reconocimiento legal de industria fundamental, con todo auxilio gubernamental.

V. ANÁLISIS TÉCNICO

Características técnicas de los productos a elaborar. En este se diseña el primer modelo en camaronero de 30 toneladas (en madera). Igualmente hay otro diseño en acero, de 30 toneladas. Las especificaciones generales para la nave de acero son las siguientes: Tonelaje: 30 toneladas; eslora: 32'; manga: 20'; calado: 8'; quilla: barra/acero-3, 2/3" x 8"; travaseros: plancha/acero; cubierta 2/16" plancha/acero. Pinturas: Rust & Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosivo y antifouling, un total de seis capas. Frigoríficos: capacidad 2.1 ton, en hielo-sinistera., construcción de styrofoam-concreto. Planta motriz Caterpillar 3 343 con supercargador. Hélices 48" x 24" de tres paletas Michigan. Eje de transmisión 3" x 14" de acero inoxidable. Vaseh GMC en línea. Caba interior de ocho voltios con cargador de baterías. Fogón de cocina de petróleo. Lunas de navegación y sistemas de reflectores. Radiotelefono RCA Cruisophone 140. Compás magnético Ritchie modelo B453. Patrómetro Raytheon modelo RM-721. Tanques de petróleo especiales al casco, con capacidad para 5,000 galones de petróleo. Un tanque para agua potable de 750 galones, etc.

Proceso de Producción

Los procesos de construcción de embarcaciones y los servicios requeridos por dichas naves son por necesidad complejos, aunque con tecnología llegan a simplificarse enormemente. A continuación, se da una descripción breve de los procesos a seguir en el astillero, y en el varadero. La construcción de una nave comienza con la colocación de la quilla sobre la plataforma de moldes. Luego se va colocando el costillaje, que ya debe tener su curvatura preformada en las cámaras de

torción a vapor. Se fijan las traviesas y colastes, seguido a lo cual se cortan los maderos del costillaje. Apoyando desde la quilla hacia arriba se van colocando el entablado del casco de modo que cada pieza posea un ajuste perfecto y para, (al echar el casco al agua, la madera sufre una expansión precalculada que sella por completo el casco sin necesidad de calafatear). Se barren el encame del eje y se fijan los soportes del timón y su canal.; se colocan los tanques de combustible, agua potable y la braga de refrigeración. Se tira el entablado de la cubierta y la caseta de la tripulación. Se colocan los refuerzos de acero a la proa, popa y cuarto de máquinas. Ya en esta etapa comienzan las instalaciones secundarias como son, la pintura, tendido eléctrico, plomería, colocar equipos y misiles, plumas con su winch, colocar la planta motriz y echar la nave al agua. Ya en el agua, se llevan a cabo los trabajos finales.

Para una embarcación de acero, el proceso es mucho más sencillo, y por consiguiente de menor costo.

El proceso normal de servicio de varas, a una embarcación es la siguiente: la cuna (ver diagrama No. 1 y No. 3), espere a la embarcación a la entrada de la rampa. Cuando las boyas de maniobra, la nave penetra sobre la cuna y queda presa por las traviesas que la tripulación sabe desde la nave. El winch No. 1 sube la cuna sobre la rampa lateral y de allí la asigna a su suciedad correspondiente. Ya en la caseta, se raspa inmediatamente con cepillos eléctricos portátiles y agua a presión. Mientras el casco se seca, se le inspecciona minuciosamente para advertir alguna señal de penetración por gusanos en la madera.

Se comienzan los trabajos de calafates y al asegurar el casco en general. Le sigue, las primeras capas de pintura de protección. Mientras tanto, los trabajos mecánicos de mecánica se están efectuando en el interior. Al dar la última capa de pintura al fondo, se efectúa la inspección final, y al secar la última capa se echa al agua. La operación completa no dura más de dos o tres días en un dique moderno, y conlleva los trabajos coordinados de dos carpinteros, un mecánico, y dos asistentes de patio, así como también el usual surtido de piezas de reparación y repuesto.

Instalaciones

Como se puede observar en el diagrama No. 1, el terreno ocupado por el astillero es relativamente pequeño: de unos 15,500 metros cuadrados. Consiste en una rampa de concreto-reforzado, con varillas de 4", y posee una extensión de 150 metros de largo por 20 metros de ancho, y en su parte más profunda descendiendo a una profundidad de siete metros. El patio central consiste en: una cumbrera lateral (25 x 17 x 1 m.); que rueda sobre la cumbre de concreto (117 x 25 x 1 m.); tres secciones de cumbrera (42 x 20 m.) la tercera terminando en la nave de trabajos de astillería (25 x 22 x 11 m.). Los edificios idénticos están destinados para los talleres de carpintería, mecánica, oficinas y almacenes, con un área de trabajo de 1200 metros cuadrados. Un edificio para la instalación de las dos plantas eléctricas de 75 kilowatts cada una, piezas de repuesto y equipos de electricidad en general (un tanque de 350 galones de petróleo estará soterrado al lado del edificio para proveer las plantas de combustible). Un tanque de agua dulce (4000 galones) con

su poto y turbina, completan las instalaciones de la primera fase del proyecto. La segunda fase se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de producción.

Costo por cada sección: (aproximado):

Muro de retención y relleno del pantano	\$ 1,300.00
Rampa	\$ 4,000.00
Patio central	\$ 10,300.00
Cimula de la cuna lateral	\$ 2,000.00
Biblioteca de talleres/almacenes/oficinas	\$ 12,000.00
Biblioteca del taller de astillería	\$ 3,000.00
Biblioteca de las plantas electricas	\$ 2,000.00
Cuna lateral	\$ 4,000.00
Tres cuinas de varadero	\$ 12,000.00
Tanque de agua con poto	\$ 500.00
Sumido electrico, drenaje, plomería, etc.	\$ 1,000.00

TOTAL----- \$ 38,000.00

Existencia y juicio acerca de la localización de la planta. Fue evidente desde el primer momento, que la localización de un astillero-mercader en la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua, tenia que residir en el que del puerto del Bluff- Bluefields, o en Rio Escondido. Las razones eran las siguientes:

(a) GEOGRAFICA

Es el único puerto con comunicación fluvial y la carretera con el interior del país, con las consiguientes facilidades de movimiento para la compra de piezas de repuesto y materiales de construcción.

(b) Es el único puerto con fondeo guardado (comparado con lo que se encuentra Puerto Cabezas al mar abierto).

(c) Es centro de compra de la pesca (Booth y Pescanías). Entre las dos compañías atraen un gran número de embarcaciones y crean una demanda local para facilidades de varaje.

(d) Es un centro de abastecimientos de combustible, víveres, pieles, y demás artículos.

(e) Pieno reconocimiento de los potenciales del área por la INVERMICA. Sin duda, de aún mayor beneficio, hubiese sido un puerto con "gran calado de fondo y acceso". Presentemente, la barra de arena del Bluff, limita la entrada a dicho puerto a embarcaciones con un calado de 13 pies o menos (un máximo de 800 toneladas). Esto limita enormemente el tráfico comercial en Bluefields. Posiblemente, en un futuro no muy remoto, se drague dicha barra, y para entonces, nosotros estaremos lo suficientemente desarrollados para dar servicios en diques flotantes a naves de gran tonelaje, haciendo así, del Puerto de Bluefields, un puerto de primera magnitud mercantil.

Possibilidades previstas de Expansiones Futuras:

Se prevé, en este estudio preliminar, la construcción de una nave adicional de 30 x 35 x 7 metros, para servir de taller general a tres equipos de astilleros simultáneamente. Igualmente, la construcción de un muelle de concreto para aquellas tareas que no requieran varaje. El muelle irá equipado con una grúa móvil, y servicios de electricidad y agua potable. Tentativamente, este plan (Fase II) se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de operaciones. (Véase el diagrama No. 1).

VI. ANALISIS FINANCIARIO

Monto estimado de la inversión total del proyecto

El estimado del monto total del proyecto es de ochocientos treinta y siete mil dólares (US\$ 237,000.00). Los rubros específicos están presentados en el formato No. 3 al final de este capítulo. El monto del préstamo solicitado al IDROFAC, y su utilización se da a continuación en forma general por rubros.

Equipo de Construcción:

Los camiones de volteo de 2 1/2 toneladas cada uno. Carretillas para concreto, elementos de vibradores de concreto (nosotros poseemos los compresores), cuba de concreto para la grúa, tubería de lameta para echar concreto bajo del agua, trenes y sus tuberías de hierro, etc.

Valor total (aprox.) de US\$ 25,000.00

Materiales de Construcción:

25,000 sacos de cemento Lone-Star.
125 toneladas de calillaje de 1/2" y 3/4" corrugado, con su alambre de acero.
12,000 pies cuadrados de tablado de piso.
2,000 pies cuadrados de madera de construcción.
20 toneladas de vía férrea de 4".
64 carriles de ferrocarril (1 1/2" a 2 1/2" diámetro).
Accesorios de vía, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US\$ 40,000.00

Materiales Taller Carpintería:

Sierra de mano (2' x 10').
Sierras de mano, bisagras de presión, dos taladros eléctricos de 2".
Dos lijadoras eléctricas, lijadora y promedadora de mano, cajas de torsión, dos juegos completos de herramientas y equipos portátiles eléctricos, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US\$ 5,000.00

Equipos y Materiales Mecánicos:

Inversión (adicional) INVERMICA de US\$ 2,000.00, y US\$ 3,000.00 por INVERMAC.

Torno para ejes (cam 24" tambore 24").

Torno de precisión 8" (cam 3" tambore 24").

Trilado Buffal. Pares de 2" con accesorios.

Sistema de Turner modelo B-1 3310

Quatro prensas hidráulicas manuales de 20 tons. cada una.

Reservorios eléctricos.

Presad-re hidráulica.

Prensa de apertura de 12".

Sistemas de diferenciales (1 ton)

Tres juegos de tarrajas completas, juegos de copas, con minerales, extensiones, llaves de torsión, llaves de combinación, yunque de capacidad, etc.

Los lotes completos de herramientas con sus gabinetes, torcímetros, calibradores, cortadoras, palidors, auto. de válvulas, juegos de

troques, una unidad de análisis de motores, etc.

Valor Total (aprox.) de US\$ 34,900.00

Características del Capital Social:

El capital de financiamiento de la INVERMICA tiene dos fuentes: los múltiples equipos y materiales que ya posee dentro de Nicaragua, con un valor total de más de US\$ 130,000.00, y segundo, el capital social de la empresa, suma que asciende a US\$ 50,000.00.

Garantías:

A continuación, se presenta la lista general de los equipos de la INVERMICA que se utilizarán en el proyecto. Muchos equipos son en su mayoría equipos nuevos y en pleno estado operacional, es decir, que la INVERMICA posee el personal técnico necesario para sus operaciones y mantenimiento. A pesar que en su mayoría dichos equipos son nuevos, el monto total de sus valores conlleva la usual depreciación del 30% del precio que pagó la INVERMICA por dichos equipos en los Estados Unidos en maquinarias por sus meses de uso. No se incluye costos

adicionales de flota marítima, adunas, etc. Ya que carecen de
listas de estimación los precios son aproximativos.

Equipo de Construcción.

- 1 Bulldozer CATERPILLAR D-7
 - 1 Autovolanteo CATERPILLAR D-112
 - 1 Grúa Little Giant de cap. 15 ton
 - 2 Plantas eléctricas CATERPILLAR 2033 de 75 Kilowatts cada una
 - 2 Plantas HCHL-2
 - 1 L. C. M. C. 12 ton. con torres y/o equipos
 - 1 Patena de carga de 40 ton
 - 1 Concretera HUIE-WIL modelo 66
 - 1 Camioneta WILLYS 1964
 - 1 Jeep WILLYS 1964
 - 1 Trailer de tres toneladas.
 - 1 Compresor con equipos CATERPILLAR de 60 H. P.
 - 1 Compresor con equipos chicos con motor Wisconsin de 9 H. P.
 - 2 Turbinas GEORGE de 2" y 2 1/2" de diametro con sus motores.
 - 1 Turbina BEARS de 1" con motor
 - 20 Lotes de herramientas de construcción (pico, pala, cavadoras, etc.
- Con un valor total (aprox.) de US\$ 90,000.00 con 8% depreciación.

Equipos con Mecánica:

- Tres lotes completos de herramientas.
 - 1 torno GRANVILLE (cama 7" x 10")
 - 1 soldadora de aluminio eléctrica LINDE tipo V - 3000
 - 1 soldadora eléctrica HOBART modelo APB 360
 - 2 equipos completos de soldaduras de oxi-acetileno.
 - 1 taladro de mesa de 3/4" CRAFTSMAN.
 - 1 Sinfín para aluminio CRAFTSMAN
 - 2 taladros eléctricos de 1 1/2"
 - 2 taladros eléctricos de 3/4"
 - 2 cepilladoras y pulidoras eléctricas.
 - 2 sierras finas eléctricas de mano
- Equipos misceláneos
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US\$ 6,500.00

Materiales Diversos:

- 5,000 pies de tendido eléctrico de alto voltaje.
 - 3,500 pies de tendido eléctrico de 600 voltios.
 - 3,500 planchas de hierro de 1 1/2" x 10"
 - 2 cargadores eléctricos de 12 y 24 voltios.
 - 2 transformadores eléctricos.
 - 16 cajas de piezas de repuesto para nuestros motores CATERPILLAR, G. M. y WILLYS.
 - Tuberías de hierro, cobre, zinc, pintura, lacetas, accesorios de plomería, baterías de 12 voltios, tanques de agua de 1500, 1000, 350, 100 y 50 galones, inyectoras, etc.
- Con un valor total (aprox.) de US\$ 15,000.

-22-

PLAN GENERAL DE INVERSION

<u>REQUISITOS DE INVERSION</u>	<u>INVERSIÓN</u>	<u>IMPORTE</u>	<u>TOTAL ASOCIADO</u>
A. GASTOS DE INSTALACION:			
a. Equipos de Construcción	\$ 80,000	\$ 25,000	\$ 115,000
b. Materiales de Construcción.	\$ 15,000	\$ 40,000	\$ 55,000
c. Equipos Taller Mecánica	\$ 31,500	\$ 5,000	\$ 36,500
d. Equipos Taller Carpintería.	\$ -----	\$ 5,000	\$ 5,000
B. GASTOS DE ORGANIZACIÓN:	\$ 500	\$ -----	\$ 500
C. CAPITAL DE TRABAJO:	\$ 25,000	\$ -----	\$ 25,000
D. IMPREVISTOS:	\$ 20,000	\$ -----	\$ 20,000
TOTAL	\$162,000 (34.6%)	\$ 75,000 (31.6%)	\$ 237,000

Los terrenos serán arrendados a la SOCOMI FINANCIERA por una suma mensual que se acordará una vez colocados los créditos.


FUENTES Y USOS DE FONDOS

A. FUENTES		PERIODO INSTALACION	PERIODO OPERACIONAL		
			1er	2do	3er
1.- Capital Propio	\$ 112,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
2.- Financ. a mediano plazo	75,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
3.- Ventas	-----	\$180,000	\$346,000	\$409,300	-----
4.- Saldo del año anterior	-----	\$140,000	\$172,000	\$221,900	-----
TOTAL FUENTES	\$237,000	\$330,000	\$541,600	\$541,600	\$541,600
B. USOS					
1.- Inversión fija					
a. Edificios etc.	\$ 35,000	\$-----	\$-----	\$-----	\$-----
b. Maquinaria	\$ 41,800	\$-----	\$-----	\$-----	\$-----
2.- Costo de Producción.-	\$-----	\$127,800	\$389,100	\$342,300	-----
3.- Costos de administración.-	\$ 200	\$ 10,400	\$ 12,000	\$ 12,000	-----
TOTAL USOS	\$ 87,000	\$137,500	\$511,100	\$511,100	\$511,100
FONDOS DISPONIBLES (A-B):	\$140,000	\$192,500	\$330,500	\$330,500	\$330,500
1.- Amortización del préstamo	\$-----	\$ 19,800	\$ 12,000	\$ 17,700	-----
2.- Re inversiones	\$-----	\$-----	\$ 50,000	\$-----	-----
3.- Dividendos	\$-----	\$-----	\$-----	\$ 50,000	-----
SALDO PARA EL AÑO SIGUIENTE:	\$140,000	\$172,700	\$221,800	\$221,800	\$221,800


NOTA:

Este capital representa el valor de los equipos de construcción, el capital de trabajo y el capital para imprevistos, y por tanto, es una cifra máxima. No es necesariamente cierto que este capital permanezca intacto, pero si estimamos que no sea menor de los US\$ 112,000.00.-

POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- AJUSTADO



POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- VARIABLE



NOTA DEL APENDICE:

El reestudio de las necesidades del astillero, de las extensas (e intensas) reparaciones que requieren las flotas, y del enorme volumen del mecanizado, revela el enorme peso que tendrá que soportar los talleres de mecánica y carpintería.


Dado el capital que dispone INVEBANICA en estos momentos, solo puede disponer de US\$ 25,000.00 para dichos talleres (más US\$ 6,300 en equipos que ya poseemos) para dichos talleres, ya que en esta etapa, el énfasis está en la construcción y una producción inmediata.



Por consiguiente, que una inversión adicional en los talleres, sea de vital importancia para una producción eficiente y de menor costo.

El astillero, por naturaleza, demanda en una producción en serie, varios equipos sofisticados, un notable volumen de piezas de repuesto y capital auxiliar.




Podemos optar por comprar dichos equipos con las ganancias del primer año. Pero creo conveniente, que esta suma adicional se le incorpore al plan de préstamos iniciales, solicitados por la empresa.

L. J. P. / 11






TALLERES Y OFICINA



ASTILLERO NO. 1

EDIFICIOS PRINCIPALES



ESPECIFICACIONES :

PESO NETO : 18 TONELADAS

CAPACIDAD : 62 TONELADAS

ESLORA : 80 METROS

ANCHO : 10 METROS

TIEMPO DE MOVIEDRA : ~ 15'

ESCALA





DIAGRAMA NO 3
CUNA PARA CAMARONES

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____
D-REF TO FILE NO. _____
FILE NO. ☐ REF. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. _____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED _____

FROM: **JMWAVE**
ACTION: **W42-8**
1970 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	ED	3	CA
2		3	
3	MO	7	D
4		8	

FILE, VR, W42-8, CE, CE/OPS, CE/DA, FE

SECRET 170017Z

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 4049

TYPIC AMWORLD AMTABBY

ACTION

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMTABBY-27 WHO AT 2130 HOURS 14 JULY 65 VISITED MRR OFFICES AND DISCOVERED ARTIME GIVING CLASSES ON "HUMAN RIGHTS," AND ANTONIO IGLESIAS ON STREET FIGHTING TO GROUP ABOUT 20 MEMBERS. INCLUDED IN GROUP WERE FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET, EDGAR SOPO BARRETO. (ARTIME'S AIDE), QUINTANA (MIL SEC) (POSSIBLY RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA) GOILLOT (PROBABLY MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA) (FORMER MEMBER ALPHA JATT); NILO MESA (POSSIBLY NILO MESSER PUJOL).

2. ARTIME NOW DESCRIBED AS QUITE PLUMP, CHAIN SMOKER, VERY NERVOUS AND NEVER STRAYS FAR FROM PERSONAL BODY GUARD "GALLEGO" SAENZ. ARTIME WHO ON FRIENDLY TERMS A-27, GREETED WARMLY, ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO KUBARK ASSIGNMENT WHICH PLANNED FOLLOWING A-27 LEAVING MRR. A-27 INFORMED ARTIME HAD TURNED DOWN KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AS INVOLVED ACTIVITIES NOT DIRECTED AGAINST PERJEMEN. ARTIME STATED HE LEAVING FOR EUROPE ON 16 JULY FOR TWO WEEK TRIP; SIXTO "TITO" MESA ALOMA WHO DESCRIBED AS ARTIME'S "MONEY MAN" IN EUROPE AS OF 14 JULY.

3. ARTIME HAS PURCHASED PICK-UP TRUCK FROM DUMAS MILNER, LOCAL AREA CHEVY DEALER, AND ALLEGED ACTING VERY CLANDESTINELY RE ACTIVITIES,

UNCL IN 13378 102

ARTIME VISITS MRR OFFICES ONLY AT NIGHT, CHANGES RESIDENCES EVERY OTHER DAY OR SO. THESE ACTIONS FREDICATED ARTIME CONCERN THAT "SOMEONE OUT TO KILL HIM" AND FEAR ATTACK FROM SOME EXILES WHO CONSIDER HIM LIABILITY. HAS "RECRUITED" TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO PREVIOUSLY IN MRR CAMPS NICARAGUA, AND RECENTLY PAID EACH 350 DOLLARS REPRESENTING FIRST MONTH'S PAY. ALSO TOOK THESE TWO TO WAREHOUSE WHERE GREAT AMOUNT CPATES WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MILITARY EQUIPMENT; MEN SAW NO WEAPONS. ARTIME CLAIMED EXPECTED ADDITIONAL SHIPMENT MATERIEL SHORTLY AND WANTED THESE TWO PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT TO MONKEY POINT, NICARAGUA, THEN PROCEED TO MONKEY POINT ASSIST REOPENING CAMP. ARTIME TOLD TWO MEN HAS SUPPORT (UNIDENTIFIED) HIGH ODYOKE OFFICIAL WHO TOLD ARTIME CARRY OUT THREE OR FOUR OPERATIONS. IF OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL, ARTIME ALLEGED, HE TOLD HE WOULD RECEIVE FULL SUPPORT AS PREVIOUSLY, BUT ONLY IF "HE PRODUCES." ARTIME INFORMED TWO MEN THAT "WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN SECOND CHANCE; WILL NOT FAIL THIS TIME."

SECRET

CFN 4049 AMTAEBY-27 2130 14 65 MRR ARTIME ANTONIO IGLESIAS 20
FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET EDGAR SOPO BARRETO QUINTANA RAFAEL

RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA GILLOT MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA ALPHASAYY

NILO MESO NILO MESSER PUJOL GALLEGGO SAENZ A-27 A-27 MRR A-27

EUROPE 16 SIXTO TITO MESA ALOMA 14 DUMAS MILNER CHEVY MRR NICARAGUA

SECRET

UNCLAS ID 13378 180

350 DOLLARS NO WEAPONS MONKEY POINT NICARAGUA ODYOKE NOT FAIL

BT

SECRET

SECRET

WE/C 65-303
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, WE/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative
in Frankfurt to contact the bank in [] to cable
transfer the amount of [] to the []

[] for credit to the account of []
[] or []

Carl E. Jenkins
WE/C/CA/EA

cc: WE/BAF

DDP/WE/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WE/C/Exec
1 - WE/C/CA/EA

SECRET

SECRET

WH/C 65-403
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT : Deposit to INVOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of to the INVOVEN account of AMBIRDT-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attached:
Voucher

cc: WH/D&F

EDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Assec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

14-00000
MSG: C.E. JOHNSON/bh
INT: WH/C/CA/DA
EAT: 4550
DATE: 19 July 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL 24

SECRET

1	EA-	3	CA
2		3	C
3	MO	3	P
4		3	X

TO: JMWAVE MINAGUA SAN JOSE PANAMA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WHK 8 INFO: VR . FILE, ☐ RD COPY WH 8, CI/ops, CI/OA

TO: WAVE INFO: WAVE SJOS PACY

CITE: 22330

TYPIC AMBIDY ANTAREY

REF: WAVE 4049 (IN 13378) (NOT SENT SJOS PACY)

1. KINDLY IDENTIFY TWO INDIVIDUALS SOURCE PARA 3 REF. ANY OTHER EVIDENCE CRATES IN WAREHOUSE CONTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT? PLEASE DO NOT INDICATE UNDUE INTEREST THIS MATTER TO AMBIDY-1 PEOPLE.

2. FYI, SO FAR AS HQS KNOWS AMBIDY-1 IS WELL AWARE ANTAREY-27 WORKS FOR WAVE; SIXTO MESA HAS BEEN EUROPE SINCE 16 MAY ON VACATION AND PERSONAL BUSINESS; A-1 LEFT 16 JULY FOR NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA FOR TWO WEEKS VACATION WITH SOME MEETINGS OFFICIALS ALL COUNTRIES; MRR HAS BEEN RUNNING RURAL CIVIC ACTION TRAINING AT NIGHT BECAUSE MEMBERS WORK DAYTIME; PURCHASED TRUCK TO SUPPORT TRAINING BY DEVELOPING SMALL MODEL FARM; A-1 PLANS VISIT MONKEY POINT TO ASSESS FOR POSSIBLE RURAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN RICE COOPERATIVES HE DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT SCHICK, ALSO POSSIBLE FISHING COOPERATIVE AT BLUEFIELDS; A-1 SAID HAD RECEIVED INVITATION VISIT PRESIDENT ORLICH AND FONMIN OUDER; A-1 PLANS VISIT RURAL COOPERATIVE CENTER IN VERAGUAS PROVINCE HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE BY BISHOP MC GRATH AND MR. GEORGE LODGE OF HARVARD, THEN TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT ROBLES.

3. A-1 CASE OFFICER, JAMES D. ZABOTH, PLANS MEET HIM MIAMI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
19-23 SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL CIP 401

CLASSIFICATION TO BE MAINTAINED

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1	5
2	1
3	7
4	6

TO :

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

28980

AREA ABOUT 1 AUG. WILL DEBRIEF AND ADVISE ALL STATIONS CONCERNED
HIS ACTIVITIES. WILL CONTACT WAVE BY PHONE ON ARRIVAL. WILL LOOK
INTO MATTER OF POSSIBLE MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO
WAREHOUSE DURING VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

by Joseph D. Estlin
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

WH/2

WH/C/CA

WH/C/MO

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

COPY NO.

CLASSIFICATION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET

IN 11311 12-2

ACCORDING BORGES, ANYUM HAS ACCESS TO NON-ANYUM PLACES MIAMI AIR-
PORT UNKNOWN TO ODOKE SINCE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (AMANO¹
SAID PILOT OF ONE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) ANYUM GROUP GETTING FUNDS²
FROM NON-PEPRIME SOURCE. (AMANO¹ SAID SOURCE MAY BE JESUITS SINCE
AMBIDY-1 HAS CLOSE CONTACTS CATHOLIC CHURCH AND RECENTLY VISITED
ROME.)

4. AMBIDY-1 ALLEGEDLY SAID ODOKE HAS DEFINITE PLANS WHICH
WILL BE DECISIVE WHEN PLACED IN EFFECT BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN. AMANO¹-1
STATES BORGES CLAIMS KUBARK VERY BUSY INFILTRATING ARMS AND EXILES
INTO PERUMEN SINCE SOME FORMER ANYUM MEMBERS USED BY KUBARK THIS
PURPOSE.

5. WAVE ATTEMPTING OBTAIN MORE INFO PLANS AMBIDY AND ANYUM²
AND WILL FORWARD SOONEST.

6. WAVE PLANS NOT RPT NOT HAVE AMANO¹-1 PASS ABOVE INFO CUIS.

SECRET

CFN 156 28960 AMANO¹-1 ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET ANYUM AMBIDY-1
NICARAGUA 11 JULY MIAMI CENTRAL AMERICA 50 PT SPANISH BRITISH SOVIET
CUBA 25 26 JULY FRANK FIORINI ROME NOT HAVE

CUIS

SECRET

BT CS Comment: *AMBIDY-1 (3) plans to visit Monkey Point to assess for
possible rural civic action program.

SECRET

IN 16327 PAGE 2

TEN HUNDREDS OF \$500,000. SHE SAID THIS MONEY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COPE WITH FUTURE EMERGENCIES.

5. ACEVO SAID HE KNOWS SOME OF AMBIDDY-1'S TRICKY WAYS HANDLING ANYUM FUNDS. AMONG THEM WAS ONE IN WHICH ACEVO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING BEEN PAID \$32 FOR SPECIAL EXPENSES. ACEVO CLAIMED HE NEVER RECEIVED ANYTHING MORE THAN HIS \$400 MONTHLY ALARY. OTHER OF ACEVO'S FRIENDS ALSO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING RECEIVED \$32 DAILY, BUT THIS ALSO UNTRUE.

6. ACCORDING AMOT-120, [] SAID THAT AMBIDDY-1 BLAMES KUBARK FOR HAVING BROKEN INTO HIS HOME RECENTLY. [] HOWEVER, SAID HE KNOWS IT WAS "COJO MORIN" WHO ROBBED AMBIDDY-1.

SECRET

CFN 41574 10 JULY 65 [] AMOT-120

AMBIDDY-1 PORT EVERGLADES FLORIDA NICARAGUA KING (FNU) TEOFALO BABUA ANTILLEAN \$25,000 80 BY 27 FEET NOT AGREE PEDRO ACEVO \$200,000 \$300,000 \$500,000 \$30 \$400 \$30 AMOT-120 VIOLATE "COJO MORIN"

RT

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT 095				CLASSIFICATION SECRET			
ORIG. WH/C/RR/PI		1		ECUTING		22 16 32	
EXT. 5547		2		3			
DATE 22 July 1965		3		6			
CONFIRMATION COPIES WHC 11				TDCS D9-315/02467-65			
INFORMATION COPIES CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO/H, WE 8, WH 15, SR 4							
DATE DISTRIBUTED 22 July 1965				PRECEDENCE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE			
DISSEMINATION				BASED ON (R.D. OPT., PREJ.)			
WHC/RE	3	WHC/S	1	WH/PAC	1	WE/5/R	1
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/2/N	2	WE/MADR	1
WHC/FI	1	WHC/EA	1	WH/MANA	1	WE/3/BC	2
WHC/OS	1	WHC/CA/PP	1	WH/2/CH	2	WE/LOND	1
WHC/MO	1	SE/PR	1	SE/SCS	1	WE/R	1
EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR			
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS A-1 201 NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM C S INTERNAL USE ONLY							
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER				COORDINATING OFFICER(S) WH/CA/Jenkins/Rohlfing (in draft)			
CLASSIFICATION SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)				RELEASING OFFICER G/WH/C/RR			
				COPY NO.			

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/CENTRAL AMERICA

TDCSDB-315/02467-65

DATE OF INFO EARLY JULY 1965

DISR 22 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

ALLEGED PLANS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA TO BLOW UP A SHIP INVOLVED IN TRADE WITH CUBA; PLANNED AIR ATTACK AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY 1965

PLACE:

DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (22 JULY 1965)

REF

IN-16311

SOURCE

FIELD REPORT NO.

AND

APPRAISAL

SELF-EMPLOYED FOREIGN NATIONAL WHO RESIDED IN CUBA FOR MANY YEARS PRIOR TO AND AFTER CASTRO'S ADVENT. HE RETAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN FRIENDS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED. SOURCE CLAIMS HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, AN MRR MEMBER.

1. ACCORDING TO ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, A MEMBER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, MRR LEADER, AND HIS WIFE VISITED NICARAGUA THE WEEK OF 11 JULY 1965 AND ^{HE} WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO CENTRAL AMERICA AGAIN IN ORDER TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-JULY ARTIME INDICATED THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO NICARAGUA IN ORDER TO VISIT THE FORMER MRR TRAINING CAMPS AND TO LOOK INTO THE CURRENT STATUS OF A SMALL INDIAN-EDUCATION TRAINING PROGRAM BEING CONDUCTED BY HIS GROUP OF ABOUT FIVE MEN REMAINING IN NICARAGUA. FROM NICARAGUA, ARTIME

PLANNED TO PROCEED TO COSTA RICA AND PANAMA TO LOOK INTO A NEW

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

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GROUP 1
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STATE/OSI DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA PIC MK USIA OSI ONE OCS ORR XNS DCS FBI
I&NS REPCINCLANT CIA/NMCC FAA COAST GUARD BORDER PATROL
CUSTOMS

SECRETTDCS DE-
315/02467-65

PAGE 2

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM OF INTEREST TO HIM IN THOSE COUNTRIES. HE WAS TO RETURN TO MIAMI, FLORIDA, IN EARLY AUGUST.)

2. BORGES CLAIMS THAT ONLY ONE MRR BASE REMAINS IN NICARAGUA, WHERE THERE IS A GROUP OF ABOUT 50 TRUSTED MEN. THE GROUP HAS ARMS AND EQUIPMENT CACHED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

3. ACCORDING TO BORGES, ARTIME IS PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA, ESPECIALLY THE BLOWING UP OF A SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AIR ATTACK IS BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY. THE MRR HAS ACCESS TO TWO AIRPLANES AT THE MIAMI AIRPORT, WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO THE MRR; THE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (SOURCE

COMMENT: THE PILOT OF ONE PLANE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) THE MRR GROUP IS GETTING FUNDS FROM A NON-AMERICAN SOURCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS MAY BE THE JESUITS, BECAUSE ARTIME HAS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HE RECENTLY VISITED ROME.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO. (ALSO SENT MANAGUA.)

END OF MESSAGE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

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23 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Lodge, Harvard School
of Business

1. On 15 July 1965, with [redacted] of CA Staff, I met Mr. Lodge at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel to discuss what he knew about the relations among AMBIDDY-1, Bishop McGrath of Panama, and a rural development program they are all working on in Panama. Mr. Lodge described Bishop McGrath as a real ball of fire, about 39 or 40 years old, born of U. S. parents in the Canal Zone but he has taken Panama citizenship. He graduated from Notre Dame University, did graduate work in Rome and has taught in several European and Latin American universities, such as in Chile. He is one of the three top Catholic prelates in Latin America and has extremely close ties with the Vatican, e.g., he is on the Ecumenical Council and on the birth control group. He has an official operating budget of \$2,000 per year which he augments from every conceivable source, particularly from the German bishops. He is politically and operationally minded, an American completely in his attitude and behavior, a typical Irish politician, Mr. Lodge submitted somewhat wryly. His parents are retired and live in Miami where he visits often. He recently met AMBIDDY-1 there on two occasions. On this same visit he also met the Papal Nuncio from Santo Domingo (he appears to receive most of the hot potato type assignments in his part of the world).

2. Veraguas Province of Panama is a selected testing ground for community development programs in rural areas. It is the poorest and most hopeless province of Panama, a small armed uprising took place there in 1958 and was put down. The Communists have their best organization in Panama in this province. The program there is based on the village of San Francisco, about 10 miles off the highway, and is an expansion of the efforts of the parish priest Father VASQUEZ

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-2-

Pinto who has been thereabout 10 years. He is a dynamic young man who has lead the villagers to rebuild their village and church to develop their land and organize a cooperative and small credit facilities. The village is only 1,200 people but they raised by themselves \$1,000 to buy materials and then built a training center capable of housing, feeding and training 60 men at a time in rural cooperatives and rural development. One of their ideas is to select bright looking leaders and potential leaders from rural areas, first in Panama and later, hopefully, from other nearby countries for visits of a few days in which they hope to brain-wash them of Communist type propaganda they may have heard and show them what can actually be done so they can take the good word with them to their own communities. This is in addition to the regular formal course of 4 months for selected young potential leaders from rural communities in Panama and all over Latin America.

3. Another leading light in the program is Father Steele who was thrown out of Dominica by Trujillo for organizing cooperatives and is a recognized authority on the subject. Father Steele uses Veraguas as a home base but travels to Chile, Colombia and other countries conducting short training courses on the ground. There are some Dutch priests on the staff whom Bishop McGrath personally recruited. Father Vasquez Pinto has sent about 10 to 15 local boys to the Antigonish School in Nova Scotia and they are back for duty. Mr. Lodge describes the group as a highly motivated and energetic group and Father Vasquez Pinto as a young and effective Panamanian priest who is a good operator. Mr. Lodge has two men from Harvard University there to study the program and assist in any way they can. The Peace Corps has 54 people in the Central Provinces of Panama, about 30 of them in Veraguas Province. They cooperate with the center, in fact the two Harvard men are interviewing each of the Peace Corps volunteers about their work. Mr. Lodge said they are coming up with some good information and ideas which otherwise would be lost as there is a good deal of experience among the Peace Corps kids but they don't know to recognize its significance or how to organize it into useable form.

4. The above group is trying to organize the center as a viable base with an effective staff to continue the training program even if the present leaders should move on. They hope it will become a pilot program for Latin America and that they will be able to seed other similar programs from

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-3-

this one. They hope to be able to spot and develop leaders in remote areas for future operations in those areas. Incidental to these major objectives, they are also helping to develop the economy of Veraguas, to develop production, transport to markets, credit facilities, and in general to help alleviate grievances which the Communists have exploited in the past.

5. Bishop McGrath has arranged with AMBIDDY-1 for about six of AMBIDDY-1's people to attend the January 1966 training course, with 3 or 4 to remain on the staff. Hopefully, one of them will develop into the executive director of the center. It was agreed that the first man will not be too closely associated in the public eye with AMBIDDY-1 in order to try to forestall initial bad publicity from opposition elements. AMBIDDY-1 and Bishop McGrath agreed, therefore, that Nestor IZQUIERDO (who is well known as a long-time adherent of AMBIDDY-1 from 1958-59 Comandos Rurales days in Oriente) would not be assigned to the Panama center at this time. AMBIDDY-1 told Bishop McGrath that he would try to obtain sufficient funds to support the men assigned to the center. He has not yet brought up this matter with his case officer, and as the amounts will be very small, he may try to squeeze it out of his newly authorized budget. However, he may ask the Agency for additional help to sponsor these men while they are working their way into the program. It is intended that the Cubans would continue ~~the~~ cooperation in the program, eventually working them into the field wherever they are needed and acceptable.

6. Mr. Lodge will meet Bishop McGrath next in Panama on 29 or 30 July. As a coincidence AMBIDDY-1 will probably be in or near Panama around the same time, as he left 14 July for Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama for meetings with their presidents and several days visit in each country.


Carl E. Jenkins
WJ/C/CA/EA

File:
AMCIVIC ✓

CC: WN/PO/B
C/WN/2

CA STAFF - Close

SECRET

SECRET

3 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3

ATTENTION : C/WH/3-Bolivia

SUBJECT :

1. On 29 July 1965 I discussed Subject with Major Lupton of Detachment "A" of ACSI Headquarters. In response to my direct questions Major Lupton stated the following:

a. ACSI is not using subject but they have been considering such use.

b. Subject is not working in Bolivia or anywhere else for ACSI or any other Defense Department component that Major Lupton is aware of.

c. ACSI was unaware that subject had been designating himself as a sort of public relations representative and press man in behalf of General BARRIENTOS.

2. I stated to Major Lupton that we held a poor opinion of subject, regarded him as an opportunist, and a possible candidate for "burn" action. Furthermore we were concerned about his alleged press activities in behalf of BARRIENTOS and felt if he were in anyway connected with a United States Intelligence agency and this became known, it could have an adverse affect on the extremely delicate political situation which now exists in that country and very well place the U.S. Government in an embarrassing position with respect to the Bolivian Government. Based on our views regarding subject I told Major Lupton that we would not coordinate any operational proposal ACSI might put forward aimed at using subject's services.

3. Major Lupton took the above in good grace and asked if it were possible for us to provide him with any information concerning subject's background and other details which would give ACSI a clearer picture of his activities. I told Major Lupton that I would look into this and let him know whether we

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- 2 -

could comply.

4. In light of Major Lupton's request in paragraph 3 above, is there any material of such nature that is suitable for passage to his office?

NR/FOA

SECRET

SECRET

5 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba
VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal *for*
SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDY-1 for Month
of August 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of for the month of August 1965 to be given to AMBIDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

John H. ...
DC/HD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET

SECRET

WE/C 65-331
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA: Chief, WE/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT: Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative
in [] to contact the bank in [] to cable transfer
the amount of [] to the []
[] for credit to the account of []
of []

Carl E. Jenkins
WE/C/CA/EA


cc: C/WE/B&F

DDP/WE/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - WE/C/Exec
- 1 - WE/C/CA/EA

SECRET



SECRET

WH/C 65-379
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division
VIA: Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal
SUBJECT: Deposit to INVOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you
deposit the amount of to the INVOVEN account of
AMSIDY-11

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attachment:
Voucher


cc: C/WH/DAF

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CoJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Essec
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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
		SECRET SECRET		
TO	Chief, WH		ACTION	
INFO			X	
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE		X	
SUBJECT	TYPIC, Operational/AMWORLD/ANLILACs Report on AMBIDDY-1		X	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			X	
ACTION REQUIRED - FYI			X	
REFERENCE - None			X	
<p>1. In late July 1965 members of the ANLILAC Group reported the following information as a result of their contacts with various members of AMYUM located in the JMWAVE area.</p> <p>A. AMBIDDY-1 has a warehouse in the WAVE area in which he is storing equipment brought back from his Central American base. The equipment includes UDT gear, boat motors, rafts, uniforms, and bulldozers. There are no weapons in the building.</p> <p>B. AMBIDDY-1 is planning to put the BABUN PC into proper condition for use as a Mother Vessel. The vessel is now in Tampa. AMBIDDY-1 spent over \$10,000. on this ship last year.</p> <p>C. ANLILAC-8, a former ANLILAC who was fired a couple of years ago and who has been with AMBIDDY-1's group since then, was in the local area recently and told ANLILAC-6 that A-8 was the caretaker at one of the Bases in Central America along with 9 other men. He stated that they had all the weapons from the last effort and were preparing the camp for re-activation. AMBIDDY-1 told A-8 that \$500,000. was available for the reactivation.</p> <p>2. The penchant of PBRUMEN exiles for exaggeration, embellishments, and contortion of information (as can be seen from para 1 B, and C) continues to plague the remnants of AMWORLD and as a consequence gives rise to jealous fears on the part of the ANLILAC Group particularly as to the real state of AMWORLD. Such reports as those above and others when</p>				
<p>DESENSITIZED</p> <p>Dist. by CSN 43-43</p> <p>3 - WH/C</p> <p>CS COPY</p> <p>CROSS REFERENCE TO</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p> <p>CLASSIFICATION</p> <p>SECRET SECRET</p> <p>DATE TYPED</p> <p>DATE DISPATCHED</p> <p>4 Aug 1965</p> <p>AUG 10 1965</p> <p>DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</p> <p>UFGA-22867</p> <p>HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</p> <p>201-2674137</p> <p>19-124-27/3-4</p>				

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UFGA-22667

collected by the AMLILACs - tend to affect the latter's morale and confidence in KUBARK because the AMLILACs believe that anything AMBIDDY-1 does is done with KUBARK support and blessing. As Headquarters is aware the great fear of the AMLILACs is that AMBIDDY-1 will get all the action and all the glory. However, in view of the current KUBARK/AMBIDDY-1 relationship the AMLILACs have little to fear and a renewed morale crisis is not expected to arise. On the other hand, if AMBIDDY-1 were to re-activate part of his action force and conduct a raid utilizing non-KUBARK support, that would be another matter. It would then be very difficult to convince the AMLILACs that KUBARK was not involved and their morale and confidence would be badly shaken. This situation is brought to your attention simply to show what effect such AMBIDDY-1 activities would have on this Station's painstaking efforts to retain a superior and experienced commando capability under already difficult psychological conditions.

DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED

DISPATCHCLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

TO	Chief, WH	INDEXED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	ALREADY INDEXED	<input type="checkbox"/>
INFO		SEARCHED FOR INDEXING	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	<input type="checkbox"/>		
FROM	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN ASSIGN INDEXING	<input type="checkbox"/>	ABSTRACT	<input type="checkbox"/>		
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT Possible Arms Purchases from AMWORLD by Bay of Pigs Veterans Association.	MICROFILM	<input type="checkbox"/>				

Action Required: For Your Information.**References:** A. UFGA-31947, 11 June 1965.
B. UFGA-22527, 30 July 1965.

1. On 21 July 1965, AMOT-237 furnished the following in AMOT Report DD-1531, which information he had received from ESIRE-1:

a. Juan Jose PERUYERO Rodriguez (201-294249), President of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, Alberto MARTINEZ Echevarria (201-390790) and Ruben GONZALEZ de la Heria, are making overtures to buy arms from AMBIDDY-1. The Association's Directorate, and the membership-at-large, have not yet been told officially of this contemplated deal.

b. ESIRE-1 felt this information was partially confirmed by the following comment made to him by Luis Humberto VIDANA Quasch (201-274645) in a conversation: "What do you think that AMBIDDY-1 has been reduced to doing? He now wants to sell the arms he has left over from all that business he was mixed up in ... and to think that a person like him is receiving aid."

c. ESIRE-1 thinks it possible that the BABUN brothers may be the persons financing PERUYERO in the purchase of the AMWORLD arms. ESIRE-1 commented that PERUYERO would not dare tell him about buying any AMWORLD arms as he knows that ESIRE-1 would be opposed to such negotiations on the grounds that this would be immoral.

2. Previous reporting on AMWORLD/AMBIDDY-1 activities has indicated, as in Reference A, that AMBIDDY-1 was interested in buying for arms and ammunition.

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<div>COPIES DESTROYED BY 201-267437 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</div>	DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
	9 August 65	12 AUG 1965
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
	UFGA-22709	
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
	49-132-5-96	
CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		

3. ESIRE-1's comment, about a possibility that the FABUN brothers may be the persons interested in purchasing the AMWORLD arms, ties in with the AMCRAG-1 information reported in Reference B that Teofilo BABUN, Luis Humberto VIDANA Guasch, and EMHARB-1 were acting as go-betweens for General INBERT's Junta in the Dominican Republic and the recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami.

4. On 30 July 1965 AMOT-14 reported in DD-1532 that AMLINT-1 had been in a local restaurant where he overheard a conversation between Alfredo BORGES Caignet (201-347593), now Immigration Secretary for AMWORLD, and Jose Luis SOSA Sancio (201-746587). BORGES told SOSA: "Be ready to go back to the place where you were before, because you will have to leave for there in the first four or five days of August. AMWORLD will function in the same manner as previously, but with more independence." BORGES also commented to SOSA that AMBIDY-1 is the current owner of the Vizcaya Restaurant at 142 S.W. 37th Avenue."

Philip G. ELMARD

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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 R-REF TO FILE NO. _____
 FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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FROM SAN JOSE

ACTION OWN 8 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, NR, WNK, C, C/D, RS, FI

201

John - to you
 12 AUG 55 131282
file

SECRET 122229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJCS 7870

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED IN COSTA RICA 10 AUGUST ON TACA 773 FROM MANAGUA.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATION IF HEADQUARTERS STILL DESIRES TRAVEL OF SUBJECT.

SECRET

REF 7870 MANUEL ARTIME BUESA COSTA RICA 10 TACA 773 MANAGUA

BT

SECRET

*WH/2/CR-NIC
 will answer -
 & made Tele con.
 CEE*

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/C/CA - Attn: Don R. Hitting		<i>[Signature]</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
6	WH/3/Bolivia		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: See 4307 which is attached to you. How much, if any, of the UENTOCILLA contact with AMBIDDY-1 do you think we might give to ACIS? Nothing now - Wait till guy goes up again + if we need more ammo to turn him we may use the 3/1 contact by him to 5 Aug 57.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
WH/3/Bolivia		9-10-57	
UNCLASSIFIED		SECRET	

FORM NO. 237

Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O-507565 (40)

Chief of Station, La Paz

Chief of Station, La Paz

Chief of Station, La Paz

Chief, LHM

Reading, VERACRUZ, Mexico (201-51300)

201-001-1-1

- REMARKS: A. HHS-401, 25 June 1963 (not sent LHM)
B. HHS-401, 3 June 1963 (not sent LHM and La Paz)

1. The long-delayed meeting with CHENE took place on 29 July 1963 to discuss whether CHENE has a concrete operational interest in the VERACRUZ, Mexico. Headquarters was informed that CHENE is not using Subject operationally but that they had been considering so. CHENE was not aware that Subject has been representing himself as a private relations representative for General Jose PASADILLA, Co-President of the Bolivian Junta. CHENE was informed that KIRBY had a poor opinion of Subject, regarding him as an opportunist whose actions and activities, especially on behalf of the Bolivian Junta and specifically PASADILLA, combined with any covert relationship with CHENE could, if discovered and exploited by leftists in Bolivia, have an adverse effect on the extremely delicate political situation in Bolivia. As a result, CHENE was informed that KIRBY would not at this time be in favor of coordinating any operational use of Subject which CHENE might propose.

2. For LHM: CHENE said that the initial notification to KIRBY that Subject had been located by an CHENE detachment in La Paz was in error.

3. For JMW: CHENE evidently has some sort of contact with Subject in the JMW area since his file had to be requested from their JMW representatives before the 29 July meeting could be held. Also, the information in reference B obtained from Subject was most probably gathered by him for transmission to CHENE. (The information about the Communist situation in Bolivia is completely erroneous.)

2 - La Paz, with (201-51300)
2 - JMW, with (201-51300)
2 - LHM, with (201-51300)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	201-4307	23 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	REF FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-51300
Distribution 1 - RI 1 - G-2	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE	OFFICER - LHM
	C/201/2/201414	1st
	COORDINATING	OFFICER'S NAME
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
	201/2/201414	

201-267437

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REF - 437

b. For Info: Has the Station checked on VICTORIA with the
Jama contacts as requested in [] 11/5? Depending on the results
of such checks, Headquarters would have no objection if the Station
were to provide Liaison with sufficient information extracted from
the source on subject forwarded with reference A to discontinue communications
from having any further contact with subject. Please advise Headquarters
of the action you take in this matter.

Edward A. BARK

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT (AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA)

DATE: 17 AUGUST 1965

SUBJECT: FOREIGN PUBLICATION: PROCUREMENT
FOR INR/CS/FP

UNCLASSIFIED

NO FILE # GIVEN

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMOT/AMWORLD

Charges Against KUBARK in the Death of Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. On 11 August 1965, ANTAUP-2, accompanied by Dr. Luis CASAS Martinez, former provincial commissioner of Camaguey, held a conversation with ANTAUP-1 in which he learned the information given below. This information was reported in AMOT Report DD-1562, 13 August 1965.

2. According to ANTAUP-1, Alicia TUDELA Sanchez is planning to bring up again the case of the death of her husband, Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez, who died in the AMWORLD training camps which were under the direction of AMBIDDY-1. According to ANTAUP-1, TUDELA plans to blame KUBARK for the death of her husband. TUDELA claims details of her husband's death which she has in her possession will substantiate this accusation.

3. ANTAUP-1 also says that TUDELA is preparing to make an attempt on the life of AMBIDDY-1. She is receiving information from persons close to AMBIDDY-1 on all AMBIDDY-1's movements and is looking for a silencer to put on the gun she will use in this attack. ANTAUP-1 reports that he has attempted to calm TUDELA down and is trying to persuade her to give up the idea of attacking AMBIDDY-1.

4. ANTAUP-2 commented that ANTAUP-1 boasts that he is the one who obtained the information and proof against AMWORLD and KUBARK in the death of TRUJILLO and that he has this proof in his possession. ANTAUP-2 believes that it was ANTAUP-1 who steered TUDELA's accusations from AMWORLD towards KUBARK.

cs cy filed 201-743522

Philip G. ELWARD

201-267437

Distribution:
3 - WH/C

GROUP 4
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DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

19 August 65 AUG 25 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-22868

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-124-27/3

☒ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

RID/TIP

GE 66

EXTENSION

NO.

UPCW-5472

DATE

26Aug65

TO: (C or designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

RID/AE

GA 50

RL

201-267437

Subject: Manuel ARTIDE

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

RID/TIP

GE 66

for

10.

11.

12.

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6 to 1: Herewith document classified to [redacted] subject of which is [redacted]

Please review for reclassification to subject's [redacted]

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for immediate destruction by the custodians should an attempt be made to seize them. AMBIDDY-1 said ahead neither plans nor money to reactivate any bases, except as they might be used for local civic action type programs.

4. AMBIDDY-1 was advised by his case officer in strongest terms to sell or throw away everything from the Central American camps, to concentrate on trying to project a new image of himself as a constructive and progressive leader involved in community development and civic action type programs in Latin America by invitation of the local governments, and to stop talking or acting as a paramilitary operator. He was advised in even stronger terms to get out of the WAVE area as soon as possible to remove himself as a target of constant personal attacks against which he could not defend himself. He agreed in principle, subject to waiting three months for his wife to deliver their first child.

5. WAVE may assure the ANILAC leader that, to the best knowledge of KUBARK, the ANWORLD program is dead, that AMBIDDY-1 has no real intention and only limited capability of mounting raids, and that anything he might do along the lines of paramilitary action would certainly be without ODYOKE support or blessing given the present political climate in HQS area.

6. FYI, HQS continues to try to influence AMBIDDY-1 to stay out of paramilitary matters entirely. To this end, we shall try to keep his top operational personnel otherwise occupied in KUBARK or other employment, to keep him as fully and usefully occupied as possible away from the WAVE and PRAUMEN area, and to convince him to sell or lease his two Swift boats to commercial enterprises or to another KUBARK program outside the WAVE area.

7. HQS will welcome continued reporting on AMBIDDY-1's activities from WAVE sources, which serves a useful purpose as a check and monitor for the case officer to compare and contrast with AMBIDDY-1's reports to him. In addition, we are recruiting the former ANWORLD Deputy for Support and Administration, who also serves as legal and political advisor to AMBIDDY-1. He is now residing in the HQS area, is back on the staff of a large university and has agreed to assist in keeping AMBIDDY-1 on the straight and narrow path following the lines of paragraphs 4 and 6 above.

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26 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDY/1 - 23 August 1965

SUBJECT: AMBIDY/1 discussions with General Anastasio SOMOZA, President SCHICK and other Nicaraguan officials, 24 Jul-20 Aug 1965.

1. A/1 first met with General SOMOZA 27/28 July. The following points were made in these discussions:

a. General SOMOZA said the State Department is making an investigation of how much money he is using to control the government and win the next presidential elections. SOMOZA told A/1 that he intended to run and fully expected to win the election, but would not need to buy any votes. He asked A/1 to please tell "Washington" that State is very clumsy and if they really want to know anything they should call on the Agency, or the FBI, either of which is much more effective. SOMOZA said everybody in Managua knows about State's efforts to block his candidacy and are laughing at them.

b. SOMOZA said he was meeting Daniel ODUBER of Costa Rica at the border shortly, and they would make a "non-aggression pact" agreeing that neither will make trouble for the other's campaign for election to Presidency. ODUBER had asked for the interview. SOMOZA told A/1 that he thought ODUBER had made a "live and let live" agreement with the Communists, and that at their meeting, he would demand from ODUBER a public denunciation of the Communists to be followed by effective control measures against them.

c. The MRR will be allowed to build and operate a small boatyard for construction, maintenance and repair of shrimp boats at Bluefields without SOMOZA or the Nicaraguan Government to be cut into the proceeds. This is part of A/1's community development program, aimed at developing a large fishing cooperative based on Bluefields which will be self-sustaining and profitable for the members and the local economy. SOMOZA also approved continuation of the basic education program being conducted by A/1's five man contingent at the old Monkey Point base and eventual development of that area as a rice-growing cooperative for the benefit of the local Indians.

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d. General SOMOZA, at A/1's strong recommendation, agreed to start pushing Civic Action programs through the National Guard in an effort to enhance his personal image preparatory to the next Presidential campaign. SOMOZA asked A/1 to assist and advise in this effort.

2. The next meeting with General SOMOZA by A/1 was on 4 August, with following points:

a. SOMOZA said that the latest program of Fidel CASTRO is targetted against Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Part of the plan includes assassination of the presidents of the three countries as part of a terror campaign to soften them up. He said that in Panama, particularly, President Marcos ROBLES is a prime target but the Communists are exploiting a recent turn against him by the National Guard because he has cut down on their costs, pensions, and other privileges. If ROBLES is eliminated from power, the Communists feel the chief of the National Guard will take over and they think they can handle him more easily than they can ROBLES.

b. Source for above, according to SOMOZA, was a close associate of Marcial AGUILUZ, whom he described as the top Communist in Costa Rica and one who had recruited (fnu) FONSECA, a Nicaraguan now living in Mexico. FONSECA is a bastard son of one of SOMOZA's foremen, a Communist, and an agent working directly under order of Fidel CASTRO.

c. A/1 and SOMOZA talked again about a Civic Action program in Nicaragua and SOMOZA said again that he would support it. He will assign Father LUGO, a Cuban priest who served with the Bay of Pigs forces, to a position similar to a chaplain in the National Guard in order to assist in the program. SOMOZA will support MRR community development programs with whatever authorizations are required and with whatever official or personal prestige he may offer.

3. A/1 next returned to Managua on 17 August and met with Major PEREZ of the Nicaraguan Customs Service, a personal aide to the General. PEREZ said SOMOZA was very angry (not at A/1 or his people) and difficult to see. He said 3 Colonels were under arrest for 3 days each for disobeying orders. PEREZ was afraid to see SOMOZA for fear he might be arrested also. However, A/1 called SOMOZA by phone and was invited to visit him next day at Tipitapa. A/1 met him the next day (18 Aug) and had lunch with SOMOZA and (fnu) BENITEZ, a Puerto Rican, former politician there who is now in business but remains in contact with and working for the U. S. Government. After lunch, BENITEZ left

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and A/1 went with SOMOZA in his car. While they were riding, SOMOZA told A/1 why he was so angry.

d. A message had recently come to General SOMOZA from the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Panama saying that he had it from authoritative sources that the U. S. not only would not support his candidacy for the Presidency, but would strongly oppose it. In addition, SOMOZA had word that Sydney ROSS, Director of El Tiempo (Spanish language newspaper in New York), after a recent interview with Asst. Secretary Jack Vaughn of the State Department, had an off-the-record talk with VAUGHN after the interview. VAUGHN had said that, so far as he was concerned, SOMOZA was no different from the other Latin American dictators such as TRUJILLO, PERON, DUVALIER, STROESSNER, Col. LOPEZ, or Gen. CASTELL Branco, and that he could certainly not support installing another military dictator in Nicaragua. The two reports were confirmatory in SOMOZA's mind and made him feel extremely bad as he said he has always talked favorably about the U.S. and tried to cooperate with them at every chance.

e. SOMOZA checked with the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua (whether in person or by sending Pres. SCHICK was not made clear) about the matter, and received a typical State Department reply that the U.S. was neutral in Nicaraguan internal affairs and would take no action about the elections. The Ambassador said he could not believe VAUGHN could have made such statements because of the U.S. position of neutrality in Nicaraguan affairs.

f. SOMOZA also said he had sent a message to Washington suggesting that if some of the other countries heard about themselves being lumped with TRUJILLO, PERON, etc. they might well call back their troops from Santo Domingo and tell Washington to go to hell.

g. He said he was going ahead with his plans regardless of what the U.S. does about it and reminded A/1 of Mr. J. C. KING's talk with him (SOMOZA) at the airport in Washington to let him know after the mistaken attack on the SIERRA ARANZAZU that Washington would understand if SOMOZA decided to kick A/1 and his camps out of Nicaragua. He used this as an example of an attempt from Washington to dictate to him which he had ignored, telling A/1 that he was a friend, would continue to be, and would continue to make his own decisions regardless of what Washington might want from him. A/1 made another strong suggestion that SOMOZA take off his uniform and start making public his civic action ideas. In addition, he again advised him to go personally to Washington

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to talk directly with VAUGHN and other U. S. officials to get the picture cleared up. A/1 said, "Let's try to get along with the Norteamericans, it's better to have them with us than against us." SOMOZA agreed, but said he had sent his brother, Luis SOMOZA, ahead.

h. The following day, 19 Aug, General SOMOZA called A/1 and said Luis had called him, reporting he had talked to Vaughn in Miami. Said Vaughn had denied talking to Sydney ROSS or of passing such information to the Ambassador in Panama. Luis said he dropped the subject at that point and talked about other things. (A/1 believes Luis could be fabricating as usual or could have botched up the interview if it did take place.) A/1 again strongly recommended that General SOMOZA make his own visit to Washington and talk to Vaughn and others in person.

4. On 19 August, A/1 interviewed President SCHICK for the Tridente (MRR news magazine). He had previously interviewed General SOMOZA. The interview reports will be relatively innocuous coverage of some of the major events of the day. The agenda of points for each interview is attached. A/1 intends to dedicate an issue of Tridente to each country which has helped the MRR, e.g. Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia.


Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Atts.

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INTERVIEW WITH HIS EXCELENCY THE CHIEF
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE
ANASTACIO SOWOZA DERAYLE DIVISION, FOR
THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE

1. GENERAL, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD?
2. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD IS DULY PREPARED TO FIGHT ANY COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE PLANS IN YOUR COUNTRY.
3. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE COMMUNIST DANGER IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
4. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE ROLE THAT THE ARMY SHOULD PLAY IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATES IN LATINAMERICA.
5. ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE ROLE THAT YOUR TROOPS HAVE PLAYED AS INTEGRANT PART OF THE INTERAMERICAN PEACE FORCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.
6. GENERAL, WE WOULD LIKE FROM YOU A FEW WORDS FOR THE CUBANS VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST TYRANY.

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INTERVIEW WITH THE EXCELENCY, THE PRESIDENT OF
NICARAGUA, DR. RENE SCHICK FOR THE TRIDENTE
MAGAZINE.

1. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WHO HAVE BEEN AN EXAMPLE AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, EVEN FOR YOUR PARTY'S OPPOSITION, YOU SHOULD HAVE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT WORK SOMETHING ELSE WHICH YOU CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE AND WHICH IS THE MOST LOVED ONE. WHICH IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT WORK AND YOUR MOST LOVED ONE?
2. DO YOU HAVE FAITH IN THE CENTROAMERICAN COMMON MARKET? WHAT FUTURE DO YOU SEE IN IT?
3. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE DOMINICAN PROBLEM?
4. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE VIET NAM PROBLEM?
5. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH, AS FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE IT AMONG THEIR PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATIONS?
6. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE WAYS OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM?
7. TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE PREPONDERANCE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF NICARAGUA? IN THESE LAST YEARS?
8. WE WOULD LIKE A MESSAGE FROM YOU FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

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27 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect

1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Bon Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Managua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOZA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.

2. About late May or early June, ESPINAL was drinking in a Managua bar and engaged one of A/1's delegation in conversation, not knowing who he was. He claimed to have been in Guatemala recently where he had worked with some "good people of the lower classes" in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government. He quoted at length, and accurately, from Che GUEVARA and used examples, also accurately, for some Fidel CASTRO operations on how to overthrow a government. A/1's man played the part of a leftist sympathizer to elicit from subject. Through the Nicaraguan security service, the MRR people found out that Col. RUIZ H. claimed subject had come to him and presented himself as a CW expert saying he was willing to work for him in an attempt to make a coup against the government in Costa Rica. In early July, subject told Col. RUIZ H. that the Costa Rican operation was taking too long and nothing much was going on, so he was going to Panama from where he could be called back immediately when they were ready to go in Costa Rica. Subject had also been overheard to say in Managua that he had a special mission to assassinate a Central American president.

3. A/1 said the Nicaraguan service believes that Angelini's Restaurant in Panama City is a source of false passports for Communists. A/1 looked at the place on his visit in Panama and found it to be in a poor section inhabited by Communists not far from the International Hotel.

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4. A/1 said he reported the above information to Major ARAUE, Chief of the Presidential Guard in Panama City. He was unable to see President ROBLEZ, who was away in the interior.

Carl E. Jenkins
VN/C/CA/EA

SECRET

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1. On 24 July 1965, A/1 met with the son of Col. PERALTA, at his request, at the Lido Palace Hotel in Nicaragua. The meeting was arranged by General MONTIEL, chief of the Nicaraguan security service.

2. Young PERALTA said that his father had no faith in the Agency, and neither did he. They still think the Agency put Luis SIERRA to work with Roberto ALEJOS to overthrow Col. PERALTA. They are [redacted]

[redacted] and not at all clear on what U.S. policy or wishes are in connection with Guatemala. Col. PERALTA is willing to do whatever he is able to do, within reason, to meet U.S. expectations, if he only knows what they are, but he is tired of hearing how bad things are without concrete and constructive suggestions about how to improve them.

3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people [redacted] and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/1 also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.

4. A/1 said young PERALTA was in Managua to attend a meeting concerning tourism in Central America.

Carl. E. Jenkins
VN/C/CA/EA

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1. In late July, A/1 went to Costa Rica and met with President ORLICH, telling him the MRR was out of business so far as operations directly against Cuba are concerned, and no longer needs bases, money, or other support for such paramilitary activities. A/1 described the latest MRR program to combat CASTRO/Communist efforts in Latin America by engaging in community development and counter-insurgency activities. He asked only for help in projecting a progressive and constructive image and some basic prestige for the MRR and for himself. To that end, he reminded President ORLICH that both of them knew full well that in the whiskey smuggling scandals and coup attempts for which A/1 had taken the rap, not only was he not guilty, but had been, in fact, the first one to give the warning in both cases. In return for those past favors, he now wants Pres. ORLICH to put him together with Daniel ODUBER (the PLN candidate for president who will almost certainly be elected) in order to counteract the bad-mouth put on A/1 to ODUBER by Manolo RAY, Colonel FIGULS, and Theodore "Yo-yo" QUIROZ. A/1 proposed to meet ODUBER personally, and let him make up his own mind. Pres. ORLICH called ODUBER's office, but he was off politicking on the coast. ORLICH then sent A/1 with Colonel LIPPA (a good friend of A/1) to talk with ODUBER's secretary, who also is a good friend of Col. LIPPA. The secretary (actually a male assistant) said everybody talks about A/1 but nobody really knows him or very much about him. Some good liberal revolutionaries say he is a good man, others say he is a S. O. B. A/1 replied that was the reason he had taken the trouble to come to see ODUBER, that he would make his position clear himself and would be glad to confront any accusers if ODUBER so desired. The secretary said they were concerned about the campaign because the opposition was uniting and was getting plenty of money from big businessmen. A/1 offered to help by printing posters, leaflets, and other campaign material if they needed it, free of charge at his "Quality Off-Set Printing Shop" in

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Miami. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary, Roberto MADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can be convinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to make political speeches.

2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto MADRIZ. ODUBER admitted that he knew the Cubans were not guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against them. He also appreciated A/1's previous refusals to assist coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1 said he told ODUBER, "I know you have been told I am a S. O. B. and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your mind. I know the people who have so described me and would like to meet you together with them so you can make your own judgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.

A/1 said he gave ODUBER a quick history of the MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He told ODUBER he realized they had not been close before, but he felt ODUBER and the PLN were the best choice for Costa Rica and therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any way they can, including training, men and equipment. ODUBER asked for a specialist to do some training of his personal security group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios for them if possible. A/1 assigned Luis ARRIEURITA Sardinias (301-398890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica, who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty as a security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donate one issue of Tridente, the MRR news magazine, to Costa Rica with favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies to Costa Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer to print posters, etc. A/1 told him that the MRR people had heard of a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategic moment and making a widely publicized declaration that they are supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and might lose the election for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactionary group whom the Communists could control or overthrow. ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on them by saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists. A/1 offered to help him with this through Tridente.

ODUBER said he would be a different president that was "Chico" ORLICH and will be more independent of the

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U. S., dealing directly with other countries on Costa Rican interests instead of falling in line always with the U.S. and the OAS. A/1 mentioned Pres. ORLICH's offer to recognize a Government of Free Cuba if A/1 could manage to seize and hold a piece of Cuba and declare such a government. ODUBER agreed to honor the agreement, without committing troops, but through his good offices in foreign affairs. He agreed to exert moral pressure on the U.S. in behalf of such an undertaking, if necessary, by exploiting the favorable press and public attitude toward him in the U.S.

3. In A/1's opinion, ODUBER is not a Communist by any stretch of the imagination, nor will he be a later edition of "Pepe" FIGUEROA. If he does take over, there will be many problems for the U.S. in contrast to the easy-going relationship with "Chico" ORLICH. ODUBER's personal circle includes a strong group of violently anti-U.S. people. One of them, according to A/1's delegation in San Jose, is (fnu) SUNIGA, a government official who is the Costa Rican in charge of Alliance for Progress matters. He has been heard to say that if ODUBER were president, no Costa Rican troops would be sent to Santo Domingo nor would Costa Rica support OAS decisions forced by the U.S.

Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION ON TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
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3	DCWH/C		
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6	WH/C/CA/EA		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: 1 - I talked to WH/2 people and got follow-up requirements - CEA 2 to 6: I believe copies of these memos should go to appropriate stations for their info. <i>[initials]</i>			
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C. E. JENKINS 1908 - Ph. 6567			27 Aug
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FORM NO. 237

Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O-657100

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Miami. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary, Roberto MADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can be convinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to make political speeches.

2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto MADRIZ. ODUBER admitted that he knew the Cubans were not guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against them. He also appreciated A/1's previous refusals to assist coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1 said he told ODUBER, "I know you have been told I am a S. O. B. and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your mind. I know the people who have so described me and would like to meet you together with them so you can make your own judgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.

A/1 said he gave ODUBER a quick history of the MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He told ODUBER he realized they had not been close before, but he felt ODUBER and the PLN were the best choice for Costa Rica and therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any way they can, including training, men and equipment. ODUBER asked for a specialist to do some training of his personal security group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios for them if possible. A/1 assigned Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinias (201-298890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica, who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty as a security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donate one issue of Tridente, the MRR news magazine, to Costa Rica with favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies to Costa Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer to print posters, etc. A/1 told him that the MRR people had heard of a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategic moment and making a widely publicised declaration that they are supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and might lose the election for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactionary group whom the Communists could control or overthrow. ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on them by saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists. A/1 offered to help him with this through Tridente.

ODUBER said he would be a different president that was "Chico" ORLICH and will be more independent of the

SECRET

U. S., dealing directly with other countries on Costa Rican interests instead of falling in line always with the U.S. and the OAS. A/1 mentioned Pres. ORLICH's offer to recognize a Government of Free Cuba if A/1 could manage to seize and hold a piece of Cuba and declare such a government. ODUBER agreed to honor the agreement, without committing troops, but through his good offices in foreign affairs. He agreed to exert moral pressure on the U.S. in behalf of such an undertaking, if necessary, by exploiting the favorable press and public attitude toward him in the U.S.

3. In A/1's opinion, ODUBER is not a Communist by any stretch of the imagination, nor will he be a later edition of "Pepe" FIGUERES. If he does take over, there will be many problems for the U.S. in contrast to the easy-going relationship with "Chico" ORLICH. ODUBER's personal circle includes a strong group of violently anti-U.S. people. One of them, according to A/1's delegation in San Jose, is (fnu) ZUNIGA, a government official who is the Costa Rican in charge of Alliance for Progress matters. He has been heard to say that if ODUBER were president, no Costa Rican troops would be sent to Santo Domingo nor would Costa Rica support OAS decisions forced by the U.S.

Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MADRID

ACTION: WH/SA 8 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1500, 2 JUL 64)

INFO : DOP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH 7, VR

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MOB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SB
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YOS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FERS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	EPTS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LOG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SEC
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

12 JUL 64 IN 20035

SECRET 221523Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE MONT CITE MADR 1194 (MONT ACTING)

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM RECEIVED CABLE FROM HABANA 2 JULY SAYING PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IN SERIOUS DANGER. IF FATHER ARRESTED, PROBABLY WOULD BE SHOT.

2. QUANTUM SOURCE SAID ONLY WAY SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR GOVT URUGUAY TO ORDER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HABANA GRANT ASYLUM.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/URUGUAY

TDCS -314/00124-64

DATE OF INFO. 2 JULY 1964

DISTR. 2 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

SERIOUS SITUATION OF PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SPAIN, MADRID (2 JULY 1964)

REF

IN -20035

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ACCORDING TO A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HAVANA, CUBA, ON 2 JULY 1964, THE PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, LEADER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER, AND IF THE FATHER IS ARRESTED, HE WILL PROBABLY BE SHOT.

COMMENT: THE INFORMANT SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY TO ORDER ITS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN HAVANA TO GRANT THEM ASYLUM.)


2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM



STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NIA NIC XNS USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI INS
TREASURY

SECRET

3 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDBY-1 and
Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 June 1964 at 2130

1. I was called at home by the security officer and informed that AMBIDBY-1 wished to speak to me. When I returned A-1's call he mentioned that he would be leaving for Costa Rica on 1 July. AMJAVA-4 would be remaining in Miami for four or five days to get the new reorganization under way. A-1 asked if we could intercede with INS in facilitating the departure of four or five of his men who wish to leave for the camps. A-1 was informed that we would be unable to take any action until the names have been submitted to us.

2. A-1 asked that we assist in obtaining a visa for Innocencio ALONSO Ramirez who will be sent to Mexico. Alonso will replace Pineda in the job that he was originally going to do. A-1 would prefer that Alonso have no contacts with any other Cuban exile organization while in Mexico.

3. A-1 stated that some of the MRR secretariats would need at least one or two weeks to wind up their affairs in Miami. A-1 was advised that we realize the dismantling of MRR in Miami could not be done over night. However, any procrastination would be viewed as an act of bad faith.

4. I informed A-1 that the ADELAIDA is being insured for \$14,000 per annum. A letter of confirmation from the Consejo would be sent shortly.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency
and privacy code

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-2-

5. In concluding our telephone conversation A-1 stressed that he would like to meet Mr. [] in August to report on the reorganization and improvements of his movement.

6. A-1 asked when he could meet with Carl in Latin America. I again reminded him that any time he wishes to meet with any of the Headquarters personnel he needs only to send us a message.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Inocencio ALONSO Ramirez - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)
SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Proposed Meeting between
Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1 in August 64

1. AMBIDDY-1 has expressed a desire to meet with Chief, Western Hemisphere Division after the raids in August 64.

2. We have replied via AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH will be glad to meet with AMBIDDY-1 at that time.

3. We intend to hold on to the [] safehouse until after the meeting has taken place. Preferably AMBIDDY-1 should be routed via San, Puerto Rico, to [] whence he would be picked up at a nearby motel and taken to the safehouse.


Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/ME

HDE/gt (6 July 64)

Distribution:
Orig - C/WHD

File:

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


6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)
SUBJECT : ANWORLD--AMBIDDY-1, Personality and Handling Problems

1. Has AMBIDDY-1, who is the linchpin of ANWORLD, acquitted himself well so far and by and large lived up to our expectations? The answer to this question is a qualified "yes."
2. Not having been selected by CIA as the man most likely to rally the best elements of the Cuban exile community round his cause, AMBIDDY-1's disappointing showing as a political figure should come as no shock to anyone.
3. AMBIDDY-1 never claimed that remnants of his movement inside Cuba were active or could be directed from abroad.
4. AMBIDDY-1's ability to enlist and organize some good activists has been successfully put to the test. Given the extent of American help (and our methodical harassment of competing action groups), to have accomplished less would have been difficult to excuse.
5. AMBIDDY-1's personality was formed in the crucible of student conspiracy against Batista, American exile, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, two years imprisonment under sentence of death and, since July 1963, headship of an unconventional warfare mechanism supported by the United States. He is a man of many engaging traits: Sincerity of demeanor, seeming ability to place events in a broader context of history, ready wit and self-depreciation, empathy based on shrewd evaluation of his interlocutors, to mention a few. Subjected

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to stress or suffering misfortune, some of the obverse traits begin to show: Uncontrollable outbursts of fury, impulsive reactions, peevish vindictiveness and self-pity (none of which have been observed by us firsthand).

6. Imbued with a somewhat shallow philosophy, AMBIDEX-1 is prone to tailor ideas to what he strives to accomplish at any given moment and to the impression he desires to leave with his opposites. Since he rightly views his relationship with the Americans as crucial toward the achievement of main goal, viz., to overthrow and succeed Castro, his pronouncements usually how close to what he conceives to represent the main lines of American thought.

7. AMBIDEX-1's personality feeds on adulation and surface manifestations of loyalty, despite the fact that he claims to view loyalty to his person as ephemeral and as under continuing threat of subversion, especially by his American allies. To the extent possible, we have attempted to assuage his preoccupations on that score.

8. In the final analysis, AMBIDEX-1 trusts only himself and views even his closest associates as mere pawns whose relative value fluctuates as the chess game progresses.


9. Endowed with an inquisitive and retentive mind, AMBIDEX-1 has a remarkable knowledge of facts which in any discussion he ably marshals and articulates.

10. AMBIDEX-1's views of things American is conditioned by his quest for a key position in the struggle to overthrow Castro. Hence, any advice is selectively accepted or (usually tacitly) rejected, depending on whether it serves to strengthen that position. There is, of course, nothing reprehensible about this.

11. AMBIDEX-1 relates to his environment in essentially conspiratorial terms. His world is peopled with demons and saints, the latter frequently epitomized by CIA, the former by the Department of State. All American moves toward himself and his organization are interpreted by him in those terms.

12. AMBIDEX-1 probably fancies himself as an adept student of human behavior. Applying as a gauge his choice of intimates and bedmates, he appears to be capable of committing appalling blunders in his judgements of human nature.

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-3-

13. AMBIDDY-1 has permitted himself to get snared in a web finely spun by a squad of hardened veterans of Havana's halfworld. This can be analyzed as manifestation of rank immaturity. More difficult to explain is that AMBIDDY-1 has relinquished control over this affair to an extent where it now threatens his life's work. In AMBIDDY-1's PRQ II we predicted, more boldly than wisely, that he would not get caught up in female entanglements. While we did not underestimate the power of sex, we probably overrated AMBIDDY-1's character and motivation.


14. In a project which may have vast consequence as regards the security of the United States (transcending by far its intrinsic value as an unconventional warfare instrument) we, of course, have to take into consideration the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 could be working for the other side—either now or later. We view this possibility as most unlikely, yet feel somewhat remiss in not having paid much attention to what transpired between the landing at Playa Giron and the Rose Bowl ceremony. There has been some talk about his having undergone marked personality changes during that period in his life, but we actually do not know whether and, if so, to what extent his psyche suffered damage.

15. AMBIDDY-1's aged parents live in Cuba. He professes intense filial devotion toward his mother. Thus, Castro has in his power two valuable hostages. We have had some frank talks with AMBIDDY-1 about this subject and he knows that we are not unmindful of the purpose to which such hostages can be put. We have received no indications that pressures have as yet been brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1, nor do we have any concrete reason for believing that such pressures would be of much avail.

16. AMBIDDY-1's intense love of country strikes me as unfeigned. In the light of his resistance record and feats of personal sacrifice, we doubt whether he could consciously bring himself to harming Cuba. His hatred of Castro stems in the main from the latter's betrayal of the revolution. AMBIDDY-1 frequently mentions Cuba's subservience to the USSR as the darkest betrayal of all, but also voices exception to other aspects of Castro's tyranny.

17. Can we take AMBIDDY-1's professions of faith in democratic principles and the Constitution of 1940 at face value? I submit that we not do so as long as we are unable

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-4-

to fathom the bedrock of his political convictions. I am reluctant to accept his writings and the program of the NRR as a valid base for judgement in this regard. In the final analysis, it may turn out that what animates AMBIDDY-1 in his unwavering opposition to Castro is the fact that as long as Castro is "in" AMBIDDY-1 is likely to remain "out." That, for purposes of justifying our support to him, may suffice.

18. Our methods of handling AMBIDDY-1 will have to remain circumscribed by the imperatives of autonomy. He cannot be treated as a controlled agent without making a mockery of autonomy.


19. One of the benefits we have reaped from autonomy is that the American position vis-a-vis AMWORLD and particularly the elements of self-interest which animate us in supporting this project can be clearly spelled out without necessarily jeopardizing the project.

20. AMBIDDY-1's manifest dependency upon American goodwill, while an element of latent control and as such recognized by AMBIDDY-1, ought not be kept in the forefront of our dealings with him inasmuch as it injects another element of instability which forces AMBIDDY-1 to worry about his rear whereas he ought be concentrating on his front. Too frequent harping on the consequences of American displeasure cannot serve to forward our project.

21. AMBIDDY-1 has been known to make quite a fewish of his resentment at deceptive promises and broken commitments. Our record in this respect, while not unblemished, is fairly good. We can see no merit in practicing deception and much to commend candor in dealings with him. AMBIDDY-1's own record of living up to commitments is somewhat marred by his shortcomings as an organizer and administrator. There have been no instances of demonstrable bad faith. However, seeming indications of assent on his part are frequently meant to denote no more than that he comprehends what has been said.

22. In providing AMBIDDY-1 with political guidance, we should strive to relieve him of all preoccupation with the vagaries of United States foreign policy and to discourage sterile demonological speculation.

23. Hopefully, recent realignments within AMWORLD will serve to usher in a period of political tranquility



SECRET

-6-

is CIA's relations with AMBIDDY-1. For purposes of AMBOLD, the task is hard in the realm of paramilitary and not political warfare.

Henry D. Hecksher
VM/BA/GO/HH

cc: DC/VM/BA

NDH/bh

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - AMBIDDY-1 201

1 - Policy File

1 - Counterintelligence File

cc: COS, JMWAVE

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	WAS	INT	4 SS SB
2			5
3	ICS	6	PEPS AR
EOB	RPTS	ICG	CA
CI	SI	BF	EE
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: DC/MH/SA 3

INFO: *DDP, C/MH, VR

201
18

SECRET 061835Z

DIR INFO MANA WAVE CITE SJOS 6865

16 JUL 64 21930

RYPIC ANWORLD

ON 3 JULY TACA CARRIED FOL CUBANS TO MANA: MANUEL FRANCISCO ARTIME
BUESA; JACINTO LUZARRAGA GARCIA.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YOBITE CABLES.

SECRET

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declassification

Copy No.

SECRET

ANTHOLD Meeting in Panama, 10 July 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of Adelaida Padron y Cruz

The subject of photographs of AMBIDT-1's mistress was not raised by him at this meeting. He made no reference to Adelaida, and I did not bring up the subject. I did get the impression on no basis in particular that he was not concerned about the problem of Adelaida and apparently she is settled in Managua and not causing any problems at the moment. As the subject was not discussed, however, I would like to state that as a nebulous personal opinion, not as a reporting of fact.


Carl E. Jenkins
WM/BA/SC/HR

File:

Padron - 201

AMBIDT-1 - 201

SECRET



DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : UFGW-3963, 29 June 1964

1. WAVE has determined that IDEN presently resides at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Miami. The house she lives in has a "For Sale" sign on it by a real estate broker named Henry Chamberlain whose office is located at 7768 Biscayne Blvd.

2. WAVE has checked the public records pertaining to the above property and the following information was obtained:

A. "The property is reported being located at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Lot 124, Washington Place, Plot Book 20, Page 54. The house was built in 1940 and purchased on 4 May 1951 by Miriam C. Humes for \$19,000. Miss Humes married John C. McCarthy on 4 October 1961. The couple got a mortgage from First Federal Bank, Miami, for \$12,400, at which time the house was appraised for \$18,475. McCarthy died on 15 August 1962, and the title is now in the name of Miriam C. McCarthy. She has approximately \$6,000-\$7,000 in equity. Present mortgage is \$11,495.57, and she pays \$87.00 per month."

3. WAVE was unable to obtain any information regarding AMBIDDY-1's interest, if any, in the property. It is possible that he intends to purchase some other property. WAVE will continue to check all leads regarding houses in Miami of interest to AMBIDDY-1 and will inform Headquarters of the results.

Attachment - USC
IDEN Sheet

Distribution:
3 - Addressee
Att. - USC

ANAL	FI
DE	DE
ABSTRACT	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Jul 64	JUL 27 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFGA-17035	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19-124-27/3	

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

RESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-17035

IDENTITY

- Adelaida PADRON y Cruz

illegible

✓ 3-WH/SA

~~SECRET~~

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slc att. 1 UFGA-17035

CS COPY

201-267437

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

NEW

7157

27 JUL 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
DETAILS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. RID/AN

2. RID/MIS

3.

4.

5. RID/Files

6.

7.

8.

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11.

12.

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14.

15.

RE

CT

Please
reclassify
into

201-267437

Subj.
~~This~~ is
Mrs. AMBIDDY-1FORM
9-60

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS☐ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : (Artimo) Buena, Manuel Francisco
201-210838

1. It is requested that the sterile telephone answering service on Washington, D. C. telephone number 638-4640 be extended until 25 September 1964.
2. It would be appreciated if your office handle the necessary arrangements to extend the answering service.

WH/SA/SC/RH

R.J. Hernandez/gt (29 July 1964)

File:

Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

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29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Reported Marriage of AMBIDDY-1

SANBORA has received conflicting reports concerning the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 has married Adelaida PADRON. One of the reports stated that AMBIDDY-1 married Adleaida in Miami during the first part of July. Another report originating from Sixto Mesa reported that AMBIDDY-1 was married in Costa Rica during the latter part of July.

Raul J. Hernandez
WM/SA/BO/HR

File:
SANBORA - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET



AMWORLD Meeting in Houston, 31 July


SUBJECT: Status of AMBIDDY-1's Parents

AMJAVA-4 stated that he had received in Miami a letter from the Spanish Consul in Cuba that AMBIDDY-1's parents had planned to come out of Cuba before the Pilon raid. Afterwards they felt that it would be too dangerous and had stayed in place. Now orders are out to find them and to pick them up. The Spanish want them to take refuge in the Mexican Embassy at the earliest moment. The Spanish say that they can arrange to deliver the aged couple to the Mexican Embassy. The question is, can we at HQS check with the Mexican Government to try to arrange that they guarantee to receive and afford safe travel to Mexico for AMBIDDY-1's parents. I agreed to investigate but gave no commitment or real hope of any success.

Carl E. Jenkins
WM/SA/SC/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓

SECRET



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31 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMJAVA-4
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 31 July 1964, 1300 hours

1. AMJAVA-4 complained that the regular budget funds for August had not arrived at their bank and inquired as to the reason for the delay. Martin stated he would check into the matter and Carl would have the explanation at their meeting tonight. In the meantime, A-4 will ask AMWORLD-2 for a loan. A-4 also asked for an itemized account of the deposits still remaining in Bank Account II.

2. A-4 claimed he spoke to [] recently concerning the exit of AMWORLD personnel from Miami. According to A-4 it is presently impossible for their people to leave.

3. A-4 asked that we obtain [] since their supply is running short.

4. A-4 stated that ADELIAIDA is being repaired at their base and, in his opinion, the ship will be able to carry out operations in the early part of August. A-4 suggested that [] go to the base and talk to Francisco NIE Morales who is handling the repairs on the ADELIAIDA. A-4 felt that these are only temporary repairs and the ADELIAIDA will have to go into drydock. A-4 believes that a meeting of the minds between [] and NIE would be beneficial on how to best keep the ADELIAIDA operational. The undersigned stated he did not know if this would be possible for security reasons and the results would be passed through Carl.

5. A-4 stated he had received the spare parts for the 30 caliber machine guns and the 20 mm. cannons.

AMJava conversation recorded
in prearranged frequency
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

-2

6. According to AMJAVA-4 Carrillo has paid all the bills of Talaris.

7. A-4 reported that AMBIDY-1 was married in Nicaragua on 13 July. A-4 was asked to convey our best wishes.


8. Carl stated he would meet A-4's flight into Houston. In the event they did not meet at the airport, A-4 was to proceed to the usual place.

Raul J. Hernandez
WM/BA/DO/HM

File:
AMJAVA-201
Conversations
ADELAIDA
AMBIDY-1 201

Above conversation conducted
in plaintext to avoid
changed privacy code

SECRET



MESSAGE FORM

ROUTING

VE/SA/SO/HH

6 AUGUST 64

84477

☐ NOEX☐ NO INCL☐ FILE IN CI FILE NO

SECRET

19-124-27/2

1	✓	2	✓	3	✓
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199	✓	200	✓	201	✓

CI

SP

SP

SEC

KS

PANAMA CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: A-1 201

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

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NO

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NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO PRIORITY/PACY

NO

CITE OR

HYPER TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD

REF: DIR 40165

40248

FOR JENKINS:

1. MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMBIDY-1, ETA PANAMA 7 AUGUST.
2. ALSO RAISES SUBJECT PARENTS DIFFICULTIES IN PERUMEN AND ASKS IF WE CAN ARRANGE ASYLUM THRU MEXICANS. WHILE MOST SYMPATHETIC AMBIDY-1 PERSONAL PROBLEM, SEE NO WAY SECURELY INTERCEDE HIS BEHALF WITHOUT COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP AND INDICATING ODOYKE INTEREST TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

W. Hood
 DIAMOND FITZGERALD
 C/WH

Samuel Halpern
 SAMUEL HALPERN
 ADC/WH (SA)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

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 downgrading and
 declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Conv No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	WCE	DET	415
2			5-1-66
3			6
ECB			
WHBA CI 0300 6 Aug 66			
SEC			

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

Temp for MR

ACTION: DCI W/ISA 2

INFO : DDP, VR

SECRET 860545Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE 1304

RYBAT TYPE

AMWORLD LASBAR TYPIC

FOLLOWING RECEIVED AT 06/0540Z

GROUPS 33

FOLLOWING RECEIVED ON THE AMBIDY PRIVACY LINK (TMO NOT SLUGGED AMBIDY)

[Redacted Content]

END OF AGENT MESSAGE

SECRET

TRANSLATION

Informed by Omar that my parents are having difficult situation in Cuba. I request you see if arrangements can be made with Mexican embassy in Cuba for their asylum. I will go to Panama 7 Aug. to meet Carl. Thank you. Ignacio

DECLASSIFIED 11/20/03

SECRET

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in Panama City, 8 August 1964


SUBJECT: Parents of AMBIDDY-1

In connection with his parents I told AMBIDDY-1 that my HQS had investigated the possibility of intercession with Mexico in their behalf. Our considered opinion was that this would not serve a useful purpose and might be counter-productive. The relations with Mexico are strained at present because of their adverse vote in the OAS meeting and my people could see no way in which they could intercede without directly indicating an official U. S. Government interest in AMBIDDY-1 himself. He agreed that this was probably the situation. He asked only if in my opinion we might be able to assist in expediting their entry into the United States as refugees seeking asylum in case they were able to make their way to Mexico. I stated that in my opinion we would be able to assist in such a situation.

Carl E. Jenkins
WM/SA/SC/RE

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

SECRET



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY
ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, CLWH, VR

ROUTING	
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SECRET 072130Z

DIR CITE PACY 4244

RYB TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: A. DIR 40165

B. DIR 40248 - A-1 301

C. DIR 40297

D. DIR 40466

E. DIR 40534

11 AUG 64 IN 45982

1. REFS DISCUSSED WITH ZABOTH 6-7 AUG. HE WILL TAKE UP WITH AMBIDDY-1 8 AUG.

2. [] ADVISED STA 7 AUG THAT 60-DAY TOURIST VISAS OF AMWORLD DC-3 CREW EXPIRED THAT DATE. COULD EXTEND VISAS LOCALLY BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL APPLICATION AND SUBJECT CREW TO TAX DECLARATIONS AND OTHER RED TAPE TO SECURE EXIT PERMITS LATER. ZABOTH AND STA AGREED PREFERABLE CREW RETURN [] AND SECURE NEW VISAS THERE. [] SO ADVISED. ZABOTH WILL BRIEF AMBIDDY-1 THIS ASPECT AND A-1 WILL DIRECT CREW RETURN [] AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM IN []

3. ZABOTH ETD [] 9 AUG. WILL CALL FROM []

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CIS COMMENT: AMBIDDY-1 DELAYED UNTIL 8 AUG DUE VISA PROBLEMS.

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

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DESENSITIZED

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-14759, 21 August 1964

SUBJECT: Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa

DATE : 15 July 1964

FROM :

A few days ago I was able to read a report on the activities in large scale of Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, and the beginning of his intimate relations with his present mistress.

Of this report I can mention the most outstanding passages as I had to memorize them.

"Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa takes his first steps in the public life as Political Sargent of the 'Partido del Pueblo Libre' (Party of the Free People) whose leader at that time was Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling.

Later he directed his activities in the fight against General BATISTA, going in the Sierra Maestra where he was appointed Lieutenant by Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.


He was appointed Lieutenant because of his friendship with Major SORI-MARIN, because he was catholic, and because of the lack of trained persons in the Sierra Maestra.

There are more news on Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa when he published the open letter in the newspaper "Avance" denouncing the Castro Regime. The letter was published after he left Cuba, while in Exile in Mexico.

In answering, the CASTRO Regime accuses him of having stolen funds from the Cooperative of which he had charge. This was certified by his friend Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.

When he arrives in the USA, that is in Miami, Florida, he is a guest of Mr. Ricardo LORIE and Mr. Michael YABOR.

An argument begins within the MRR, in which there are two sides, one includes Ricardo LORIE and Michael YABOR, and the



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-2-

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other Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Miss Pepita Riera.

This argument becomes stronger because of the appointment of the MRR Delegate to the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa aspires with all his strength and intrigues to this position.

He seeks the help of Mr. "Macho" BAQUER, who is said to belong to the CIA and who at the same time supports the FRD (DRF).

He holds a meeting with Mr. SANJENIS in the Cafeteria Dough-Nuts, at 8 and 33 Ave., SW.

Later, at a luncheon at the home of Mr. SANJENIS, in Fort Lauderdale, he obtains the support of Manuel VILLAFANA, Pepita RIERA, SANJENIS, and Mr. PAULA, who agree to help him in his plans.

Nevertheless, he continues to look for support and tries with the BATISTA sector, maintaining reunions with MUJAL, Chile MENDOZA and Engineer BADIA.

The plans of the Council are being completed as far as the camps in Guatemala, etc., and in order to get the control on the civil and military sections, due to his excessive ambitions, he tries and obtains the support of the following persons: Col. BASCO, Dr. SARDINAS, Col. Orlando PIEDRA, Miguel SUAREZ Fernandez, Caho HERMIDA, Laureano BATISTA Falla and Mr. Juan MESA, who is said to be a CIA representative. It is common understanding that this gentleman has helped him quite a bit.

He also receives the help of the Catholic Front through Father GONZALEZ Posada and Father LLORENTE, who refused it at a beginning.

With all this in his hands, he obtains the control of the military phase and appoints officers of his trust to the commanding posts in Guatemala, such as the brothers San Roman, SUEIRAS, Eneido OLIVA, Andrew Jr., Manuel VILLAFANA and Carol.

After the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the return to Miami, he continues with his activities, taking active part in the Orange Bowl act, where President John F. KENNEDY is presented with the "false" banner of the Brigade 2506.

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That banner was never, at any time, in front of the Bay of Pigs, but came from Guatemala, brought by MORO-MOLINET and which bears his signature on one corner.

The Government of the USA was advised that they would make a political play with this banner, so it is returned to Fort Bernnet, and is later destroyed by true revolutionaries.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa has had contact with the BIRCH Society, group of crazy Nazi who is an infiltree of the Communists.

There are reports that his father has been a communist for years in a department of Las Villas Province.

Beginning of his relations with his present mistress and date on several figures forming his group.

A certain morning Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa visits the Restaurant Rancho Luna, at 8 and 9 Ave., SW, accompanied by his chauffeur, BASULTO.

Casually or prearranged, he meets Mr. Edgar SOPO Granda, friend of Dr. ARTIME and member of the Brigade 2506. (This young man is the son of a Navy officer under BATISTA, who committed suicide in La Cabana at the beginning of the Revolution.)

SOPA Granda was in the company of his close friend Aida PEREZ Pozo, who in turn was in the company of her "intimate" friends Juana MANUELA and Adelaida PADRON.

At this meeting Dr. ARTIME and Adelaida PADRON liked each other, and the great idyl is born.

Dr. ARTIME set up a house for Mrs. Adelaida PADRON on 71 NE 6 Ave., where she lives with her two smaller children by her first marriage to Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia. It is rumored in the circles close to this couple that Dr. ARTIME will soon marry this woman.

These three women: Adelaida PADRON, Juana MANUELA, Aida PEREZ Pozo, are known for their sexual deviations, that is, they are three famous lesbians.

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DESENSITIZED

They began to visit the MRR offices, and several of its members complained because of their lack of morals.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Aida PEREZ Pozo was assigned in the Intelligence department of the MRR with a salary of \$100.00 per month. It is rumored this was because of her close friendship with Adelaida PADRON and ARTIME.

Adelaida PADRON:

Of humble family, she is known as servant of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, famous lesbian of the high society of Cuba.

She is her favorite servant and takes her along in her trips to Europe, having great regards for her.

At the time that Adelaida PADRON was working for Mrs. Ma. Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, the chauffeur of the latter was a brother of the well known lesbian, Mrs. Lucia CANO, better known by the nickname of "La Campeona" (The Champion).

This is the reason for the great friendship between Adelaida PADRON and Lucia CANO - "La Campeona".

Adelaida PADRON is also a close friend of Flor de Lotto LARRUA and Toni LAVERNIA, famous artists in Cuba.

Adelaide PADRON has arrived to her corruption. She boasts of having had intimate contacts with leading women of the Cuban society.

While she was still married to Major Roger ROJAS, she gave a party at her house at 445 NE & 30 Ave., Miami, where among the approximately thirty persons who assisted, there were about fifteen lesbians and about five homosexuals. There is a picture of this party in the "Revista Farandula", published about one and a half years ago.

General Fulgencio BATISTA was the witness at the wedding of then Lieutenant Roger ROJAS Lavernia and "Miss" Adelaida PADRON.

This wedding took place with great roar in the Night-Club Tropicana, of Havana, Cuba.

It is said that Adelaida PADRON maintained intimate relations

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DESENSITIZED

with General BATISTA, and that it is even certain that one of her sons is of the General.

Later Adelaida PADRON gets the divorce and maintains intimate relations with Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ.

Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ was a candidate for Mayor of Marianao and is a close friend of Dr. Rolando MASFERRER.

At present Mr. SUAREZ has intimate relations with a woman named YOLANDA.

Mr. SUAREZ requested that Adelaida PADRON return a Chevrolet Belair, 1953, to him, since he bought it, but she does not return it because she says that "it is in her name and it is hers".

Mr. SUAREZ at this time has a business of fruit seeds in Homestead, Florida.

Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia:

Of rich family, son of Mr. Pedro ROJAS Bermudez, Chamber representative for the Liberal Party in the Oriente Province, Cuba, for several terms. Owner of sugar cane farms and live stock ranches. Roger ROJAS Lavernia entered the Cadet School, graduating a sub-officer. He served in several squadrons of the Rural Guard and because of his close friendship with General BATISTA, in 1957 he was sent to the USA (Washington) to take an intelligence course, in order to create the BRAC (Buro de Repression de Actividade Comunistos - Bureau of Repression of Communist Activities)- "Cuerpo de Investigaciones Anticomunistas" (Anti-Communist Investigation Corps).

After working for a while in the BRAC, he was promoted to Major, Chief of this corps,

It is said that this promotion was due to the relations of Adelaida PADRON with General BATISTA.

At the present time Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia resides at 445 NW 30 Ave., is owner of a boarding house, but he is going to dispose of it this month.

Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia faced problems at the beginning of the Revolution, but through his friendship with the rebel Major,

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-6-

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William GALVEZ, he was able to take care of them.

It is to be noted that Major William GALVEZ is the lover of Adelaida PADRON's sister.

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA:

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA entered the USA through the Mexican border, crossing the Rio Bravo.

They are lesbians and it is said that Juana Manuela is the "husband" in this couple.

Juana MANUELA is the daughter of a District Attorney of Las Villas, who has lately run into trouble with the Miami Police.

Because of their obscure positions here, it is believed that they are infiltrates of the G-2.

At the present time Aida PEREZ Pozo resides with her sister, Migdalia PEREZ Pozo, at 1432 NW 16 St., Apt. 1, Miami, Florida.

Migdalia PEREZ Pozo is married to Mr. Santiago SANCHEZ, who is a revolutionary, working at this time for the MRR.

Lucia CANO "La Campeona":

Lucia CANO, known by the nickname of "La Campeona", is a lesbian, famous in this milieu.

The brother of this "lady" is the chauffeur of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA; he is known to be a communist; he even made trips to Russia and Czechoslovakia.

The sisters of Lucia CANO are also communist and are still in Cuba.

The husband of Lucia CANO is Jose SEBLED, known as "El Gallego", and is almost always around the restaurant owned by TURQUITO, on 8 St. SW. This TURQUITO is the one of the ORFILA trouble. Mrs. Lucia CANO has a lover, a married man with two children. His name is unknown.

Mrs. Lucia CANO, "La Campeona", is "intimate" friend of Adelaida PADRON.

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SECRET/RYBAT

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Although Adelaida PADRON maintains "intimate" relations with several of her girl friends in Miami, she has confessed that the one she likes completely is her "intimate girl friend", the wife of Dr. Pedro RAMOS, well known doctor who resides in Miami, Florida.

Dr. Pedro RAMOS resides at 213 NW 50 St., Miami, Florida.

Victoria PADRON:

She is the sister of Adelaida PADRON. She is tied in this matter because she introduced and directs all of her sister's activities.

Victoria PADRON is married to an Italian-American whose name is unknown.

Victoria PADRON lives in common-law with Mr. Raul GRANDA, married, ex-chief of the Military G-1 in the era of General BATISTA.

According to what Aida PEREZ Pozo informed to Mr. Manolin GARCIA, when the counter-revolution will succeed, Mr. Raul GRANDA will occupy his post because it is a family affair through ARTIME, Adelaida, etc.

NOTE: In all this love intrigue around Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, there could be the influence of two factors: either the infiltration of BATISTA elements, as almost all the components of the groups have some link with him; or else infiltrates of Castroites who work in the USA, since there are involved the relatives of Lucia CANO, who are communists and still in Cuba. There is also the link of Adelaida PADRON's sister with Major William GALVEZ.

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DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING

Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD

Reports on AMBIDY/1 Activities

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : None.

1. The Station continues to receive numerous reports on AMBIDY/1 activities. Most are fragmentary and based on stories which someone has heard about town but invariably cannot be traced to exact sources. Some of these reports are as follows:

a. AMRAZZ/1. The departure of AMBIDY/1 and his group from the WAVE area was due to pressure from ODACID. This action was the result of the publicity generated by AMWORLD after their successful operation. The departure did not signify a loss of aid to AMWORLD from ODYOKE. The exit of AMYUM/19 from AMWORLD was due to his dissatisfaction with AMBIDY/1's immoralities. It is supposed that AMYUM/19 is a spokesman in this regard for the AGRUPACION CATOLICA. AMBIDY/1 is accused of leading a licentious life for some time; having a mistress who was formerly a mistress of Batista; and buying a house and presenting it to this woman. It is also reported that he will marry this woman soon.

b. AMRAZZ/1. Carlos MONTANER advised that AMBIDY/1 has almost run out of funds and that his group will soon be liquidated.

c. AMSHADY/1. The talk around town is that AMBIDY/1 is now married to his girl friend. However, he is still living with a male friend and she is still living with a girl friend.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
1 cy, Rpt by

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Addressed to U/S/C

DATE TYPED

21 Aug 64

DATE DISPATCHED

AUG 24 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-17459

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

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AND
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d. AMCHEER/25. (This information is from Pedro LEYVA Ugarizza, sub director of the paper, REPLICA, through Carlos RIVERA.) Report attached under separate cover.



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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(24)

47 SECRET

ROUTING

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE 701

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CIOPS, FI, WHISA 8, NR

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SEP 64 68301

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 6927 ✓

TRAVEL RECORDS^D INDICATE MANUEL ARTINE BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE FROM
PACY 3 SEPT TACA FLT 738.

SECRET

CS COPY

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RI/MIS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
201-267437	
RI/Files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE		TOTAL COPIES	8	SI	<input type="checkbox"/> COPY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DRAFT
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INFO	DDP C/LH VR		1	2	3	4

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DIR INFO MANA PACY VAVE CITE SJOS 7013

22 SEP 64 IN 78499

RYAN/ANVORL/TYPIC/YOBITE

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 16 SEPTENSER FROM PACY IN PRIVATE PLANE. TRAVEL RECORDS INDIVATE FOLLOWING CUBANS ON PLANE WITH ARTIME: ANTONIO GONZALEZ TORRECILLA, JORGE MINERVINO NAVARRO RODRIGUEZ, PABLO ANTONIO ASTUDILLO OJEDA, CARLOS ORLANDO PILOTO Y VALLES. A JESUS ANTONIO SANZ DE ACEDO Y OLEA, LISTED AS SPANISH CITIZEN, ALSO IN THE GROUP.

2. ARTIME LEFT SAN JOSE FOR PACY 19 SEPT ON LACSA 629 AND RETURNED SAN JOSE 20 SEPL LACSA 628.

3. ARTIME AGAIN LEFT SAN JOSE 20 SEPT FOR MANA IN PRIVATE PLANE. RECORDS INDIVATE GONZALEZ, NAVARRO, ASTUDELLIO, SANZ, AND A ADELAIDA PADRON CRUZ ON SAME PLANE.

SECRET

SECRET

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SECRET

IN 80092 PAGE 2

ABOVE MESSAGE RECEIVED ON FREQUENCY 14355 KCS. FIELD
ENDED SCHEDULE WITH "VA VA" VICE LONG DASH, WHICH INCORRECT
PROCEDURE.

VASH S/C NOTE: NO AMBIDY/I SLUG USED.

SECRET

14. MR PRESIDENT OF THE "CONSEJO DE LIBERACION": 1) I ASSUME FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ERROR THAT WAS COMMITTED. 2) I GUARANTEE THAT IT
WAS AN HONEST MISTAKE. 3) FORTUNATELY WE DISCOVERED A CLANDESTINE CARGO
GOING TO BENEFIT MANY CUBAN COMMUNISTS. THE ERROR HAS PARALYZED 12 SUGAR
MILLS. FORTUNATELY MARITIME INSURANCE RATES GOING TO CUBA HAVE INCREASED
30%. 4) FORTUNATELY THE COUNTRY THAT OWNS THE SUNKEN SHIP HAS NEVER BEEN
A LOYAL FRIEND OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IS REFUSED BY ITS FORMER
COLONIES WHICH TODAY ARE FREE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. 5) NEVERTHELESS,
I AM AWARE OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS ERROR AND
BECAUSE OF IT, IF NECESSARY, I OFFER MY RESIGNATION OF MY DUTIES AND MY
SEPARATION FROM THE CUBAN PROBLEM BUT I REQUEST OF THE CONSEJO THAT NONE
OF MY FIGHTING MEN OR ORGANIZATION BE DENIED THE AID THEY ARE RECEIVING
WHICH SIGNIFIED THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO LIBERATE MY ENSLAVED HOMELAND
YESTERDAY BY SPAIN AND TODAY BY COMMUNISM. RESPECTFULLY, ARTIME.

SECRET

10-1
20

AMWORLD Meeting in New York, 6 October 1964


SUBJECT: AMWORLD Contingency Plans

1. AMJAVA-4 said that AMBIDDY-1 was very enthusiastic about the AMEIJERAS operation and felt this was the real key to success of our program to overthrow the Castro regime. He is prepared to concentrate on this operation completely for the immediate future.

2. I asked A-4 if they had done any planning on the basis that the AMEIJERAS operation might not pan out. He asked me directly whether a decision had been made to continue or to cut off support to AMWORLD. I told him that a decision had not been made but that my Headquarters was very interested in the outcome of the AMEIJERAS operation on which he was working. He recognized the importance of this operation and stated that he and A-1 had conjectured that future support to AMWORLD might be contingent on success or failure of their handling of that case. I did not confirm or deny this point but told him that the organization would surely be happy if they were able to handle it with success.

3. A-4 then explained that he and A-1 had spent considerable time discussing the future of their program and their prospects vis a vis the Agency. He said that in their opinion one of two things would happen; either the AMEIJERAS operation would pay off in which case they would be able to continue to operate with Agency support but with a diversion of major objectives or the operation would peter out, in which case they would have to consider what to do without Agency support. He said that A-1 was not only prepared to accept a diversion of primary objective but felt that present circumstances dictated the wisdom of such a move. However, both of them feel that their present paramilitary program must be continued, not because it is crucial to the outcome of the Cuban situation, but because the strength which they exhibit through these operations is the only attraction to AMWORLD that has caused the AMEIJERAS group to contact them.

SECRET



4. In case the AMEIJERAS operation fails to develop, and the Agency should decide to cut off support to AMWORLD, A-4 says they will continue to try to operate as long as they can. He said that instead of 200 people they might be operating with 20, but they could do something. So long as they have the hardware with which to operate they can "sell" operations each time. For example, he said, they would go to Cuban exiles, to Venezuela, to American businessmen, etc. and would tell them, "The October operation will cost \$25,000. If you will underwrite it we will dedicate it to you and run it in your name." He feels this would carry them for a few months provided they can run a few successful operations.

5. A-4 said that when the support ran out the hardware was all gone, and there was nothing left with which to operate, A-1 would take 12 or 15 of his hard core followers and go into the Escambray in Las Villas to make one last ditch effort. I asked him if A-1 felt he would have any chance of a success and A-4 stated that should such a state come to pass, A-1 would definitely go in with the expectation of being run down eventually and shot but that he would do this in order to go out in a blaze of glory and to continue to serve as a martyr. A-4 said there was absolutely no doubt in his mind that A-1 would follow this course, that he had a hero compulsion and a martyr complex and was completely without fear of death. A-4 again mentioned an idea held by A-1 that he will not live past 29 January 1965 (his birthday) because he is convinced that he is destined to reach the peak moment of his life during his 33rd year (as did Jesus Christ) and does not expect to live beyond that time.

6. I asked A-4 where he, personally, stood in such a future undertaking. He said that he was no hero, but he had dedicated seven years of his life as a schoolboy and young man to Cuban independence, and he could not stop now. He would not go in deliberately to die as a martyr, but he would continue with his work doing the best he could with whatever means he could come by. He stated, "A-1 is not such a leader as Tony VARONA who can separate himself completely from the struggle and go out to sell used cars. A-1 cannot exist in a life which is routine and without personal power. He will die first even in a suicidal mission." A-4 stated that

SECRET

he, himself, was of a different nature but that it would be just as impossible for him to go to a routine type of work and leave the work of liberation of his country.

7. I asked A-4 what AMWORLD would do if they were able to commence operations again. He said they had two targets on the north coast that they would like to hit when they have another chance. One is Puerto Vita, the other is Manati. They have target studies on Puerto Vita and have just recruited a refugee from Manati who knows the area thoroughly and brought out a large number of photographs of the target with him from Cuba. Unfortunately some of them were confiscated by U. S. Customs when he came through Miami, but there were still enough remaining to plan an operation. He asked if we might be able to help recover the confiscated photos. I told him that if approval to recommence operations was given, I was sure we could do so. In the meantime, I was, of course, not authorized to discuss possible future operations but was interested in what AMWORLD was thinking along these lines. A-4 understood our position with the current suspension of operations.

Carl E. Jenkins
VE/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Internal ops
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Policy

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		1. FILE NO.			
		2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		3. DATE	
		4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		5. DATE OF INFO.	
		6. EVALUATION			
7. ANALYST		8. DATE PROCESSED		9. DISSEMINATED TO	
				10. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION					
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13. PERTINENT / NO COMMENT ()					
14.					
<p>ARTIME RUFSA, MANUEL 201-267437 SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>CIT CUBA OCC ? RE SANTIAGO ALVAREZ SR. AND JR. EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS AT CONDITIONS AT A BASE OPERATED BY MANUEL ARTIME BUESA</p> <p>200-300-024 UFG -06030 14 OCT 64</p> <p>R 6410232076</p>					
15.					
16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.				➡	

FORM 8-67 807 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-66)

SECRET

19 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer


DATE : 16 October 1964 at 1045 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 said he had met yesterday with a newspaperman named Robert Stark of the London Times. A-1 first knew Stark during his imprisonment after the Bay of Pigs and claims Stark was one of the few correspondents who was allowed to interview the prisoners. According to A-1 Stark and the governor of the Bahamas are involved in smuggling to and from Cuba. Stark smuggles salt pork into Oriente Province and brings out rum and cigars. Stark is the owner of an LCM (Andros Engineer) and an LCU (Charles-town). While A-1 was jotting down the names of the vessels Stark said, "Now don't go sinking my ships." A-1 replied, "We don't sink anyone's ships." Stark is leaving today for Canada to purchase fire bricks for sugar centrals in Cuba. Stark advised A-1 that Ramon Castro, Fidel's brother, would like to defect. Stark is willing to assist Ramon exfiltrate clandestinely provided that A-1 supply a boat to meet the exfiltrating party somewhere in the open seas. Before A-1 commits his organization to such a plan he would like to have Headquarters investigate Stark. A-1 expects to meet Stark within a week and give him an answer at that time.

2. A-1 has received a report from his base that ALBUERNE is involved in a narcotics and numbers racket based in Miami. A-1 is requesting that the complete report be forwarded to Miami in order to turn it over to us.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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-2-

3. A-1 is leaving today for Puerto Rico to solicit funds from several wealthy businessmen. He then expects to leave for Santo Domingo to meet with President Reid. He will then return to New York where he will talk to some New York businessmen and attempt to collect financial support for his organization.

4. AMWORLD has been notified by the Justice Department that they have to register as agents of a foreign government. Manolin Hernandez drafted a letter in reply objecting to being called "agents of a foreign government." A-1 maintains that his organization does not report to nor is responsible to any other government, etc. A-1 was asked to send us a copy of their reply for our records.

5. A-1 commented he has hired Luis PRIETO Portar to head the AMWORLD "Brain Trust."

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SQ/HH

File:
Robert Stark - 201
Luis PRIETO Portar - 201
AMBIDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations

cc De/WN/S 17

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

19 OCT 1964


REPUBLICA
DE
NICARAGUA



PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
PASAPORTE

32 Páginas (PASSPORT) 32 Pages



Acompañado de su Esposa
Accompanied by his wife

y de
and

niño
child

Válido hasta | 19 DE OCTUBRE DE 1964
Valid until

PARA REVALIDACIONES VEASE PAGINA 6
(For Revalidations See Page 6)


FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH



Nacido en REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA -
 el 20 de ENERO de 1932
 the of LA CONCEPCION -
 Profesión COMERCiante
 Estado civil SOLTERO
 Civil status SOLTERO
 Domicilio LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA
 Residence LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA

Firma del Portador
Bearer's Signature

FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH



Nacido en REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA -
 el 20 de ENERO de 1932
 the of LA CONCEPCION -
 Profesión COMERCiante
 Estado civil SOLTERO
 Civil status SOLTERO
 Domicilio LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA
 Residence LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA

Firma
Signature

6
REVALIDACIONES
REVALIDATIONS

Revalidado este pasaporte de
This passport is revalidated from

Válido hasta
Valid until

Revalidado el
Revalidated on

Válido hasta
Valid until

Revalidado el
Revalidated on

Válido hasta
Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

7
OBSERVACIONES
OBSERVATIONS



8

VISAS

OFICINA DE EMISIÓN
Departamento de Asuntos Exteriores

Nombre: _____
Pasaporte: _____
Fecha: _____
Lugar: _____

REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA
GOBIERNO DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA
MINISTERIO DE LA DEFENSA
OFICINA DE EMISIÓN DE VISAS
CALLE 10-10, ZONA 10, GUATEMALA
TEL. 2-22-1111
FAX 2-22-1111
E-MAIL: VISAS@GOB.GU
WWW.GOB.GU

La visa se otorga por un periodo de 90 días.
hasta el 31 de mayo de 1964.

9

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA
GOBIERNO DE LA REPUBLICA DE GUATEMALA
MINISTERIO DE LA DEFENSA
OFICINA DE EMISIÓN DE VISAS
CALLE 10-10, ZONA 10, GUATEMALA
TEL. 2-22-1111
FAX 2-22-1111
E-MAIL: VISAS@GOB.GU
WWW.GOB.GU

La visa se otorga por un periodo de 90 días.
hasta el 31 de mayo de 1964.

10

VISAS



11

VISAS



26 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 25 October 1964 at 1330 hours

1. The Office of Security called the undersigned to advise that AMBIDDY-1 had telephoned.


2. Upon returning A-1's call, he stated he telephoned merely to inform us that he would be going into retreat on 26 or 27 October. He will be staying at the Diplomat Hotel in Hollywood, Miami as a guest of the management since the manager is one of the "100 men." A-1's rooms are 2255 and 2257. The telephone number is WAS-8111. A-1 can be reached at that number for the next week.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SC/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201-

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

30 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 October 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 inquired as to when the organizational charts he requested from Carl would be ready. A-1 explained these charts are urgently needed to prepare future plans concerning the "dissident group." At present Nilo Messer is being groomed to go to Madrid to be the liaison after "Cuco" de Leon is replaced. "Cuco" de Leon is leaving shortly for Nicaragua to commence infiltration training.


2. As to A-1's future plans he intends to leave for Central America on Tuesday or Wednesday, 3 or 4 November. AMJAVA-4 is leaving for Nicaragua on 2 November.

3. AMBIDDY-1 is sending Rafael Garcia, Luis Grillo, and Amado Cantillo to the Dominican Republic to survey the new location which President Reid has offered AMWORLD. According to A-1 Reid has offered them an operations base much closer to Cuba than Isla de Beata. At present A-1 is getting cost estimates on the 12 Swifts which President Reid wishes to buy in the U. S. The different estimates will be sent to President Reid with the three aforementioned AMWORLDers. According to A-1 President Reid suggested that AMWORLD could paint their Swifts the same colors as the ones which the Dominicans will have.

4. A-1, Sixto Mesa, and John Monahan intend to meet a group of wealthy American and Cuban businessmen on Sunday to solicit funds for AMWORLD. A-1 was advised to take a hard look as to the motives of Mr. Monahan before getting

Above conversation conducted
in a changed frequently
changed privacy code

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-2-

too involved with this gentleman. A-1 feels that Monahan is perhaps looking into the future to the day when Cuba will be liberated.

5. A-1 was asked to check if they had purchased the extra commo equipment and spare parts.

6. A-1 was asked to investigate if the steel planking has been paid.

7. A-1 expects a telephone call from Robert Starkie tomorrow, 31 October, concerning the fire bricks. This matter is now being handled by Manuel Hernandez.

8. A-1 was advised that Carl would have the charts by Tuesday night. A-1 will be called on Monday to make arrangements for the meeting between himself and Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SQ/HH

File:

Conversations
AMBIDY-1 - 201✓
Dissident group
Dominican Republic
Business Support
Sabotage Equipment

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency,
changed privacy code

SECRET

701 ✓
SECRET

3 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 2 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he, AMWORLD-2 and John Monahan met some wealthy, American businessmen on 1 November. One of the Americans was the President of the American Medical Association in Miami who promised AMWORLD medical supplies. A-1 mentioned that John Monahan spoke eloquently before the group on behalf of AMWORLD. The undersigned mentioned to A-1 that unlike Cuban businessmen, one has to take a more direct approach with American businessmen as far as money is concerned. A-1 said the reason he has not made a direct pitch for money is because he does not want to take the same approach other exile organizations do. A-1 felt he would have better success in getting a little from alot of people instead of alot from a few.

2. According to A-1, AMJAVA-4 will be leaving Thursday for Nicaragua.


3. A-1 advised that Nilo Messer and Antonio Sanz are now in Spain. Antonio Sanz will return after placing Nilo in contact with appropriate people in Spain. A-1 expects to meet with a representative of the dissident group within the next two weeks. A-1 did not elaborate as to the reason for his expectation. A-1 again asked if the charts he requested would be turned over to him when he meets Carl. A-1 was assured that Carl would bring the charts to the meeting.

4. "Cucc" de Leon is leaving on 3 November for Nicaragua.

5. The three man group scheduled to go to the Dominican Republic to survey the new AMWORLD site has been temporarily

Above conversation conducted
in rearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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-2-

delayed due to expired visas. A-1 has obtained the necessary information for President Reid concerning the purchase of twelve Swifts. This information will be sent with the three man group. When asked why President Reid has not negotiated the purchase of the Swifts himself, A-1 stated Reid tried to but found embezzeling within his group. President Reid wants to show the naval group he can purchase the Swifts on his own.

6. A-1 expects the Philco training school to begin on 3 November. Approximately 25 AMWORLDERS will attend the school. A-1 said he had submitted a list of needed spare parts to Philco but he has not received a reply. A-1 is checking other radio corporations to obtain the lowest possible prices.

7. The MV SANTA MARIA is anchored off Monkey Point and according to A-1 is in top notch condition.

8. A-1 said he terminated his contract with station WRUL in New York. A-1 intends to use the Dominican Republic to beam long-wave programs to Cuba.

9. As of this month the "Tridente" will be reduced in size and will be published monthly.

10. A-1 was informed that Carl will arrive in West Palm Beach at 2130 on 3 November. A-1 will be expecting a call from Carl at the Diplomat Hotel.


Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDY-1 201
Conversations
Financial Aid
Internal Ops
DR

Also a conversation conducted
in prearranged frequency,
changed privacy code

SECRET

SECRET

4 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and
Martin Ferrer

DATE : 3 November 1964 at 2130

1. After several unsuccessful attempts I was finally able to contact AMBIDDY-1 and advise him that Carl would be unable to meet him at the agreed time. I informed A-1 that Carl would contact him at 0900 on 4 November and make arrangements for their meeting.


2. A-1 said he had received confirmation that the Philco school had started on 2 November.

3. During this non-operational period A-1 is having all his vessels checked out to see that they will be in good operational condition. A-1 specifically alluded to the LCM's that are presently being overhauled. The Swift GITANA is also undergoing maintenance repairs.

4. Besides setting up Nilo Messer as AMWORLD's liaison to the dissident group, Antonio Sanz is inquiring as to the departure date of the RIO CAONAO. A-1 intends to broach the topic of attacking the CAONAO with Carl. A-1 stated that he hopes that Carl will have a final decision for him on the CAONAO.

5. Feeling that A-1 was probing for a sign as to what decision has been made on the CAONAO, I changed the subject and asked A-1 if he was watching the election returns. A-1

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed subject matter



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-2-

stated that he was, and the election was progressing nicely. Judging from the tone of A-1's voice, he apparently feels that the re-election of President Johnson and the election of Robert Kennedy would guarantee the continuation of AMWORLD.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH


File:
AMRIDEV-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
RIO CAONAO
Commo

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		1. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>14.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; margin: 10px;"> <p>ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL 201-267437 SEX M DOB ?</p> <p>CIT ? OCC ? RE PLANS TO ESTABLISH A CUBAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IN BRAZIL</p> <p style="text-align: right;">019-006-041/04 UFG -06142 04 NOV 64 WAVE-04258 P2</p> <p style="text-align: right;">R 6412100287</p> </div>				
15.				
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.				

FORM 8-67 807 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-68)

SECRET

9 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1 and
Martin Ferrer

DATE: 7 November at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America on 11 November. He is waiting for the return of Antonio Sanz from Madrid. Sanz is bringing "some information" with him (A-1 did not elaborate) which A-1 wants to evaluate before he (A-1) returns to the bases.

2. A-1 reiterated his promise of obtaining a new roster for Headquarters. A-1 mentioned he is having all his materiel inventoried and expects to have the results for his meeting with Mr. Archer.

3. A-1 was notified that perhaps it would be better if he proceeded to the camps and we would contact him as to the time and place of the meeting with Mr. Archer.

4. A-1 was reminded to submit his request for the December budget.


5. A-1 said he would telephone prior to his departure for Central America.


Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SC/HH

File: Telephone Conversations
Antonio SANZ 201
A-1 201 ✓
Finance

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

A-1

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1
And Martin Ferrer

DATE : 12 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 reported that Antonio Sanz returned from Spain last night (11 Nov) and according to Sanz a representative of the dissident group will be leaving for Spain on 15 Nov. Sanz does not have the name of the representative, however, all indications point to Dr. Faustino Perez. A-1 has only talked to Sanz briefly by phone and therefore did not have all the details of Sanz trip.

2. According to A-1 Sanz talked to the captain of the Caonao and the captain is more willing than ever to deliver the ship to AMWORLD. The Caonao will leave Spain on 16 Nov. A-1 said he would like a reading from Carl on the status of the Caonao operation.


3. A-1 stated that some of his men who were formerly in the U. S. Army are being recalled. A-1 requested that we do whatever possible to remedy this situation. A-1 was advised to submit a list of names of the individuals involved and we would review the problem.

4. Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez is encountering difficulties with I&NS in leaving the U. S. A-1 did not elaborate as to the difficulty, however, it appears to be a matter of not having the proper papers.

5. A-1 said he is very pleased by the intelligence section in Miami, particularly the debriefing of Cuban exiles. A-1 promised to give Headquarters copies of all intelligence reports.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

6. A-1 commented that there is a possibility that AMWORLD may get a free ship from Babun. A-1 feels that by acting as an intermediary for the JOANNE, Babun will give AMWORLD another ship after obtaining possession of the JOANNE.

7. A-1 expects to leave within the next few days for Central America. He will see AMJAVA-4 and get up-to-date reading on the situation at the camps and obtain the inventory from A-4. A-1 would like to see Carl in the U. S. rather than in Panama.

8. A-1 claimed that the \$18,000 balance due on the JOANNE repairs had been sent to Ramsey Scarlett.

9. A-1 was advised that Carl would meet him tonight (12 Nov) in West Palm Beach. A-1 should make reservations at a motel in that city and call Headquarters at 1600 hours today with the name of the motel.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Internal Op
Rio Caonao

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

SECRET

16 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 16 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 expects to leave on 17 November for Costa Rica. He has received an urgent message that Cornelio Orlich would like to talk to him. A-1 hopes to return to Miami as soon as possible to be on call for the meeting with representative of the dissident group.
2. AMJAVA-4 is leaving on the same flight as A-1 but will go directly to Managua. A-4 would prefer to meet with Carl on 19 November in Panama. A-1 was requested to tell A-4 to bring the plans for Jucaro, Casilda, Santa Cruz del Sur and Guayabal to the Panama meeting. A-1 will tell A-4 the address of the [redacted].
3. A-1 said he received word from Managua that several shots were fired at his private automobile yesterday (15 November) in Managua. Fortunately the bullets went astray and the driver was unharmed. The assailant or assailants escaped.
4. According to A-1 approximately a week or so ago the Guardia Fiscal in Parismina, which is near Tortuguero, saw a light out at sea. When they went to see what it was they saw a submarine. A-1 also claims that the U.S. Army is in that area building a tower of some sort.
5. A-1 believes the weapons ordered by Costa Rica from the U.S. were requested by Pepe Figueres under the pretext that of turning them over to Manolo Ray. A-1 opined that some may be given to Ray but a great bulk of the arms would be kept by Figueres.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

6. A-1 said he is mailing the plan for the RIO CAONAO defection and the silencer developed by AMWORLD to Headquarters this very day.

7. A-1 was asked to call Headquarters upon his return from Costa Rica. A-1 agreed to do so.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: AMBIDY-1 201 ✓
Telephone Conversations
AMJAVA-4 201
Costa Rica
RIO CAONAO
Operations

Above conversation conducted
in arranged frequently
changed privacy code

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17 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1,
Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 17 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated William King will advise Philco today that AMWORLD no longer wished to employ Jim Lee. A-1 sent a message to the base for Lee to return to the U. S.
2. A-1 reported he received a call from Nilo Messer who said that Robreno wished to see AMJAVA-4 to make arrangements for the "summit" meeting. It appeared to A-1 that the representative of the dissident group in Spain wants to deal with a higher ranking person than Nilo Messer. Nilo has received indications that the representative has already left Cuba and is somewhere in Europe on a shopping spree. Mr. Santell suggested perhaps it would be best for AMJAVA-4 to arrange the meeting in Paris rather than in Spain. A-1 agreed. AMJAVA-4 will probably leave for Spain on 21 November after his meeting with Carl.
3. A-1 was advised that HQS had received a report stating Guayo is in possession of photographs presumed to be on the ARANZAZU affair that were not turned over to AMWORLD for censorship. A-1 stated that Guayo was searched thoroughly after the ARANZAZU affair and doubts he has photographs in his possession unbeknownst to AMWORLD, however, A-1 will investigate. He advised A-1 he had no way of checking the veracity of the report, however, wanted to alert him of the possibility. A-1 said Guayo is now in Caracas working for "Ebhemia Libre."
4. A-1 plans to leave for Costa Rica on 19 November. We informed him that one of the topics which Cornelio Orlich may discuss is the increasing publicity being generated by the training of Cuban exiles in that country.
5. A-1 was asked to call HQS on his return from Costa Rica.

After conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/BO/HH

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File:
A-1 201, Conv
Int Ops, ARAN, C.R.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1,
Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 20 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say he had just returned from Costa Rica where he spoke to President Orlich and his brother. The Orlichs made no mention of expelling A-1, but, to the contrary, are willing to continue to support AMWORLD. The only request made by President Orlich was that the arms barge be taken out of Costa Rica for fear the Communists would learn of its existence. A-1 said he will comply.


2. The topic of conversation quickly changed to the newspaper article by Hal Hendrix which greeted A-1 upon his arrival from Costa Rica about A-1 involvement in smuggling activities in Costa Rica. We informed A-1 that Al Burt had intended to publish a similar story but was scooped by Hendrix. We asked A-1 what he thought of the idea of having President Orlich issue a complete denial as soon as possible of A-1's smuggling activities in Costa Rica. A-1 felt a presidential denial was essential in counteracting this damaging publicity. A-1 stated he would call President Orlich the first thing in the morning on this matter. Another suggestion to neutralize Hendrix's story was for A-1 to see Al Burt as soon as possible and categorically deny the story. If need be A-1 might want to invite Burt to Costa Rica to speak to President Orlich and confirm A-1's side of the story.

Above conversation conducted
in presence of frequently
assigned security code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/RH

File:
A-1 201
Conv
C. R.
Press

SECRET



SECRET

21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDY-1,
Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 21 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDY-1 to see if he had an opportunity to speak with President Orlich. A-1 stated he was unable to reach the President but did speak to the President's secretary. The secretary advised A-1 that he was unaware of the Hendrix story but he assured A-1 the entire story would be denied. A-1 informed Headquarters that he has sent Manolin Hernandez with a copy of the story to see President Orlich. A-1 commented that the initial reaction in Miami to the story was one of indignation toward Hendrix.

2. When we called A-1, he was on his way to see Al Burt. A-1 had already talked to Burt by phone and they had made an appointment to discuss the entire matter this morning. Burt told A-1 on the phone that rumors concerning A-1's activity had reached him. A-1 said he would tell Burt that President Orlich would issue a complete denial of the Hendrix allegations. A-1 was cautioned not to forget that Burt is primarily a newspaperman and therefore to be on guard as to what he tells Burt.

3. A-1 was advised to take a firm stand against Philco concerning Jim Lee. Lee should be sent back to the U. S. as soon as possible. A-1 was requested to reject any proposals by Philco for consultations in Miami or Central America concerning Lee. A-1 should tell King to telephone Philco on Monday (23 Nov) and make it quite clear AMWORLD cannot afford to pay needless travelling expenses of Philco representatives. King should also ask for a price list for the spare parts. If Philco cannot comply, A-1 was advised to them he will buy his spare parts elsewhere.

SECRET

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed primary code

SECRET

-2-

4. According to A-1 Babun has loaned a PC to A-1.
He promised to send us data on the boat.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SQ/HH

File:
a-1 201 ✓
Conversations
CR
Press
Commo
Maritime

Above conversation conducted
in prolonged herewith
changed activity code

SECRET

23 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Dick

DATE: 21 November 1964, 1600 hours

1. At 1600 hours, 21 November 1964, I complied with AMBIDDY-1's request relayed through the Security Office that he be called on FRanklin 3-1568 in Miami.


2. AMBIDDY-1 described reports reaching him of mysterious phone calls being received by various Cubans in Miami, mostly MRR personnel or wives of MRR members. These calls started during the morning of 21 November. The caller was a North American who spoke Spanish and gave his name as "Bill Jones." The caller sought in each case to solicit derogatory information about AMBIDDY-1, with particular emphasis on A-1's alleged participation in smuggling activities. The caller offered money (A-1 did not know how much) for derogatory information.

3. A-1 mentioned two persons who received calls: ANYUM-19 and the wife of Manolin Hernandez. In addition to smuggling, A-19 was also asked if the reason he broke with A-1 was because of the marriages of AMJAVA-4 or A-1. A-19 denied these allegations to the caller.

4. A-1 said that the story spreading through Miami as a result of these calls is that the U.S. Government -- and probably CIA specifically -- was attempting to discredit A-1 as a basis for denouncing him. A-1 was obviously distressed by these speculations, and in reporting them he was in reality asking the question. I gave him my unequivocal assurance that the U.S. Government was not responsible for the calls.

5. I asked A-1 who he thought was responsible and he said "maybe the Miami Herald." A-1 said that he had seen Al Burt earlier in the day (Saturday, 21 November) and that Burt was angry because he felt that the recent

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TV coverage of the AMWORLD camps and activities in Central America was a scoop to which he was rightfully entitled because of a prior agreement with AMBIDDY-1. A-1 gave Burt his side of the stories being circulated about AMWORLD's contraband activities. A-1 felt that he made an impression. Burt was particularly interested in a denial of these charges which A-1 told Burt would be issued very soon by the President of Costa Rica (see following paragraph). A-1 said he thought that he may have mollified Burt somewhat by having the meeting and by promising him scoops in the future, but that Burt still holds a grudge against him.

6. AMBIDDY-1 said he was expecting momentarily a call from Manolin Hernandez in San Jose. Hopefully, Hernandez' call would be to read a public letter from President Orlich officially denying the presence of AMWORLD training camps in Costa Rica and disavowing charges that A-1 or his people were involved in smuggling. Orlich promised A-1 to issue such a letter. When he gets a copy of this letter A-1 intends to hold a press conference and use it as the heart of his effort to set the record straight about charges that AMWORLD is involved in running contraband.

7. I told A-1 that we would look into his report on the mysterious phone calls and that we would let him know what we find out.

Richard B. Beal
Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: MOB

File: Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Publicity
Rumors

SECRET

DISPATCH**SECRET**

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA
Chief, WHD
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC
AMBIDDY-1's Involvement in Haitian Affairs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. On 18 October 1964 AMCARBON-1 accidentally met AMBIDDY-1 in the lobby of the hotel El Amajador in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. AMBIDDY-1 was obviously embarrassed by the fact that he had the chance meeting with AMCARBON-1 and he asked that AMCARBON-1 not tell anyone in Miami that he had seen AMBIDDY-1 in Santo Domingo. As an aftermath of this chance meeting, AMCARBON-1 arranged for AMBIDDY-1 to talk with Mr. Bernard DIEDERICH, a freelance newspaperman residing in Santo Domingo. The purpose of this conversation was to enable Diederich to give AMBIDDY-1 a briefing on the Haitian scene and, as a follow-up, arrange a meeting between AMBIDDY-1 and certain Haitian exile leaders. The meeting with the Haitians took place at Diederich's house on 18 October 1964. The meeting was attended by AMCARBON-1, AMBIDDY-1, a Cuban known as Nilo Jesus KRSEK Pujol (245-294655), Father BAJEUX and Sylvia WADESTRANDT. After a preliminary series of discussions, AMBIDDY-1 adjourned to another room of the Diederich house to talk privately with Father Bajeux and Sylvia Wadestrandt. At the end of this private meeting, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk with AMBIDDY-1. As a result, AMCARBON-1 learned that, as of 18 October 1964, it was AMBIDDY-1's intention to help the Haitians in their fight against Duvalier. AMBIDDY-1 believed that he could furnish the arms and the transportation for the invasion of Haiti by Haitian exiles. AMBIDDY-1 was also talking about committing some of his troops to such an invasion as he felt that, if he were successful in this venture, he could obtain significant base rights for his organization in Haiti. These bases would in turn be used by AMBIDDY-1's operations against PHRUMEN.

2. On the morning of 19 October 1964, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk in Santo Domingo with a Cuban called Rafael Garcia who is AMBIDDY-1's representative in the Dominican Republic. Garcia indicated that he doubted that AMBIDDY-1 would participate in a Haitian invasion. In this connection, Garcia made the point

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that AMBIDUT-1 had a tendency to get excited about various projects, but he very rarely followed through on any project. As a result, Garcia felt that the Haitians could not count on AMBIDUT-1.

Andrew K. REYNOLDS

SECRET

24 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDY-1 and
Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 November 1964, 0630 hours

1. AMBIDY-1 said he is leaving this morning at 0800 for Nicaragua. He expects to return to Miami within three to four days. A-1 requested that the information Carl had promised be ready upon his return. Although A-1 would not say specifically what the information was, he apparently was referring to detailed maps of the coming operation.

2. A-1 reported the 100-man squad has been increased to 120 men.

3. A-1 asked if it would be possible to obtain Esso road maps of Havana pinpointing strategic locations such as G-2 headquarters, communications centers, police precincts, etc. A-1 also requested a list of all prisons in Cuba and other pertinent data on the prisons.

4. A-1 has compiled a breakdown on how he would like to arm the 120 men. He is sending this information directly to the Lastra address before he departs for Nicaragua today.

5. A-1 commented he had received a cable from President Orlich branding the Hendrix story a complete falsehood. A-1 is circulating this cable around Miami in order to clear himself of the smuggling charges.


6. A-1 said he would call HQS upon his return.

File: ✓
A-1 201
Conversations
"Palace Guard"
CR
Press

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changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

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1

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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDOY-1

DATE: 7 December 1964

1. I telephoned Subject in Miami and introduced myself as "Andres" and indicated that I was calling for "Carlos" who wished to know what Subject wanted as per his telephone call to "Martin" on the previous Friday.

2. Subject indicated that he had three messages he wished to deliver and they were as follows:

a. The President of Panama had given his whole-hearted consent to "Manolin" (Hernandez) in helping them establish their operations in Panama. This message was then relayed to "Carlos" (Jenkins) who was listening in on the conversation.


b. Subject then stated that he had promised to pay the passage of the individuals who were supposed to take part in the meeting set for 10 December. He indicated that he was worried since he had not heard from the "Flechero." This was related to Carlos who indicated that the money had been approved but as yet had not been forwarded to the bank. This information was relayed to A-1 and he seemed satisfied.

c. Subject stated that he was leaving for Nicaragua tomorrow. He also asked if we had read his message to the base. I said that we had not and he then gave me the gist of his message to the effect that the "foreign power" had as yet not vetoed their plans but that in the event they did, he (A-1) would have to drastically revise his policy of adherence to their views. Subject stressed that the message was only to bolster the morale of the men.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/SA/SC/HR

File:
A-1 201
Conversations
Panama
Finances
Op VICTORIA

SECRET



Above conversation conducted
in presence frequently
changed privacy code

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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversations with AMBIDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 6 December 1964, 1630 and 1645 hours


1. After being notified by the Office of Security that AMBIDY-1 had called on the emergency number, the undersigned returned A-1's call. A-1 stated he had just received a message from AMJAVA-4 saying the SANTA MARIA was located at Cerrania Bank due to bad weather and would remain six hours at that position. In the message A-4 said he would comply with the order given him to return, however, requested Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. A-1 requested that the following portion of A-4's message be passed to appropriate persons: "I (A-4) request the suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered for the good of future operations because a person who loses faith in operations, believing himself subject to foreign decisions, is a demoralized person." In light of A-4's message, A-1 urged that suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. I assured A-1 that his message would be delivered.

2. DC/WH/SA was notified of the above message. On the instructions of DC/WH/SA the undersigned called A-1 and advised him that the contents of his conversations with Mr. Santell on 5 December were still valid and our position regarding Operation VICTORIA remained the same.

File:
A-1 201
Conversations
Op VICTORIA


Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

SECRET



Above conversation conducted
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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 3 December 1964


1. AMBIDDY-1 called from Houston, Texas to say that he had just arrived from Central America. A-1 was advised to proceed to New York to meet with Mr. Santall and Carl. A-1 agreed to get on the first plane to JFK airport.

2. A-1 stated that VICTORIA was the operation against Casilda. A-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 had gone on the operation. A-1 contended that he could no longer hold his troops back. A-1 asked if approval had been given to the CAONAO operation and to the Casilda operation. The undersigned stated that Mr. Santall would discuss the entire matter with him at their meeting. A-1 expects to return to Miami for a few days and then go to the Dominican Republic for the CAONAO operation. After the CAONAO operation, A-1 will go to Paris to meet with the representative of the dissident group.


Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SQ/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 2C1 ✓
Conversations
Operations

SECRET



Above conversation conducted
in presence frequently
changed privacy code

8 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Juan Antonio CANCELA Gomez (201-758689)
Possible Connection with Cuban G-2

1. On 7 December 1964 during the course of a telephone conversation with AMBIDDY-1, he indicated that it was possible that Subject was connected with the Cuban G-2. AMBIDDY-1 suspects that CANCELA was sent by the G-2 to penetrate the ANYUM training camps.

2. Subject spent one month at the training camps and then asked to return to Miami. Upon his return to Miami he then made plans to travel to Nassau alleging that he had to go to Nassau in order to obtain a permanent visa to enter the U.S. AMBIDDY-1 had this story checked out with the U.S. I&NS and discovered that this was not necessary to enter the country on a permanent basis. AMBIDDY-1 therefore concluded that Subject was attempting to go to Nassau and eventually work his way back to Cuba.

3. No further information was obtained on this matter.

Andrew D. Kehlring
WM/BA/EO/HR

cc: WM/BA/CS
WM/Security

File: CANCELA 201
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
CI & Sec

SECRET

