

XAAZ-27209 210 August 1964: Note by Murphy & Woot on  
✓ 27 July talks with AWD, Roubin & Stinson re defects  
in handling. On 27 July 1964 there had been a  
discussion on the "Use of Henschel bags in Water  
Control. Report" - AWD, Roubin, Stinson, Holmes  
Murphy, Douglas. Report general agreement for that

✓✓ Add to:

XAAZ-22425 of 22 Aug 68: Sergius a whom  
we had no trace walked in, told a story of  
having been LHO in body 1960, alleged that this  
account was KGB. he told us he. Am Am Int. office  
was present. S. claimed. in which one of two gets  
misunderstood. Told a rambling, disconnected  
story but his extreme and aberrant behavior indicates  
a mental problem, things he claimed to have  
suffered brain damage or injury. I really life  
treatment. Born 24 July 1935, lived near Coaly.  
Failed medical exam. for FBI App. Institute.  
Claims had been present & brain worked by  
KGB. in March 1960 after which he met LHO.  
April & May. Had phosor wet appear in  
own note. Alcohol & refused oxygen. Based  
on by. Int. strengthening after this episode.  
He acknowledges KGB prop. knew he was in  
the Int. & his progress. He walked out giving  
good health and it was in.

?? Mental case - not valid  
Was this info passed to intelligence? Did it not  
wind up on 7 24 Aug?

XAAZ-22425 of 22 July 1964: "Apparent harmlessness  
in material furnished the Community list on the  
Dept of State" Helms & Barker, further & letters by  
Barker & Helms 3 July 1964. Refers to talks between  
✓ Glenn & Wagner 9 July 1964 regarding parties in  
Gov. estates disposition from USIA. Regulate own  
only worked on men 24 cars, including 10 hundreds

XAAZ-27249 contd.: This report  
is being <sup>checked</sup> <sub>over</sub>

non-inclusion of N. info. Review SB concept of  
H from file problem. Draft of a general  
reference to defects info ~~should~~ out and  
attached

② NA: one of these papers refers to a British lab.  
machine who had mentioned LHO. ~~See the lab.~~

XAAZ-22773 of 24 Aug 1964: Request from Warren  
Comm. (Kashin & Helms) for permission to  
publish list 2 docs. as author. in "Proble  
Foreign Conspiracy" section of its report.  
Asks for a letter approval.

XAAZ-22855 of 27 Aug 1964. MRR by Huel & Sharkey  
on Pres. Fr. Com. Section 2 Report / letter gist  
of selected para & wording

XAAZ-22429 of 28 Aug 1964: Comment on Konstantin Petrov  
204. ~~Investigation, Kashin & Helms Embassy, Moscow [29 July 1964].~~  
See additional notes

XAAZ-22800 of 31 Aug 64. Helms & Kashin: Extract  
from memo of source title date 19 Feb 1964  
sent to Comm.

XAAZ-22774 of 1 Sept 1964: Kashin & Helms. Request  
- introduction, description of activities on LHO before  
via application, all from Embassy govt. State  
translations. Also in case.

XAAZ-22775 of 3 Sept 1964: Recommendations, information  
by comm. to Kashin

XAAZ-22939 of 10 Sept 1964: checking out of State  
translations of LHO application May. for info and info  
by Bureau 15 Oct, plus Helms comm. comment

XAAZ-22776 of Sept 11, 1964. Rankin to Helms, re his  
memorandum to public agency memo. 2 July 1964. re  
statement made by an officer in the Forest Guard  
in Mexico City, re a sub. memo containing info.  
by same info.

XAAZ-22874 of 14 Sept 1964. Helms memo on his  
copying in Cuban govt agency on LHC's passport  
no. First color number is he passed through  
house no. D092526. There is later ledger copy  
show it as D092526. [This found to be in error.  
reading. Under stress & recorded as 0]  
See XAAZ-22862 of 18 Sept 1964.

XAAZ-22781 of 17 Sept 1964: Helms to Rankin  
re Rankin A240E, & Cuban coast.  
Loring

[NB: Arthur Darling interviewed by Bernard Fensterwald Jr,  
14 Sept 1971 re Unknown Man in Oswald Case]

XAAZ-22795 of 21 Sept 1964. Rankin to Helms for  
assistance in identifying Oswald's fellow workers in  
Minsk. Attached Census. Ex. 2625

XAAZ-22870 of 20 Oct 1964. Revised version of info  
provided in memorandum 3 Jan 21 June 1964 re  
Oswald. info relative to intell. methods & org. Request  
was of 4 June 1964 missing

XAAZ-17857 of 4 Nov 1964. Report by Arthur Darling on  
results of visit to Commission & various FBI reports  
referring to persons in Cuba. Names were forgettable  
& names of individuals, agreed, should be deleted.

CSCI-316/02545 of 15 Dec 1964 : re Allegation of unid.  
accident of Cuban involvement in <sup>as Hopper</sup> ~~an~~ airplane  
crashed. ~~held up~~ <sup>at</sup> Cuban plane flight  
afternoon of 22 Nov. Source, since deceased, lived  
and out from a well known Cuban secret  
ag. On 23 Nov. 63 he had forgotten to report.  
Plane remains 1700 hrs. from Dallas via  
Tijuana and Mexico city. This goes to by an airplane.  
[DBI rejected this account because of internal  
inconsistencies; see its reply 31 Dec 1964 - DBA  
9484) of that date]

XAAZ-23580 of 8 Feb 1965: Letter from Katz to  
DBI concerning working of security controls  
on CIA corresp. furnished to Pres. Commission

XAAZ-23581 of 27 Feb 1965: DBI's reply to the  
security controls on CIA corresp. regulate  
background and notes how agreement  
worked on each item. State that in no instance  
was an for. with held from public domain  
if it had a direct bearing on the assassinations  
(Reply prepared by Chasly-)

CSCI-316/01398 of 3 April 1965 : forward copy of  
encl. letter to Sov. Encl. referring to LHO.  
Named: U.S. R. DOBKINS.

↑  
This man was investigated by  
FBI in US & in Mexico -

XOA2 - 27167 of 22 June 1966.

RSA Chron of meeting, with Warren Commission:

14 Jan (Mr. Rankin to Mr. Helms, 64 AWD, Rankin, St.

12 March (Mr. Rankin) '64

27 March 64 - Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Stone at all (from  
briefing on case handling, working records  
A).

26 May 1964 - Mr. Noble (re Mr. Mohrman's call)

28 August 1964 - (Mr. Hanson?)

12 Oct 1964 - (Mr. Stone & Mr. Goldberg)

25 Aug. ? (at Commission's meeting, prop.)

Mr. Helms Chrons: 14 Jan (see above) 28 June  
(at Rankin's office), 12 March (Mr. Rankin's office  
with Murphy, RSA, 27 March 14:30 (see above)

24 June 11:30 (J. Warren, 27 July (AWD, Rankin,  
Hanson, Helms, Murphy, Boyle)

NB: RSA named, p. 13 as one of the liaison officers  
between Commission and anti-communists, in Jay  
Epstein's book Inquest (1966)

BD - 5277 of 4 Jan 1967 (see vol. 54). : CA briefing

On Commission's criticism of Warren Report (whose  
discom is already noted). This brings down  
general line pointing out: (2) no signif. new evidence  
has emerged. (3) critics follow selective criticism  
in details & arguments (4) conspiracy impossible in  
this case by nature of circumstances. (5) Comrad as a  
house (6) Report not a work job. (7) The deaths  
subsequent to the report are not statistically signif.  
Commission's gained 448 witnesses, the FBI gained  
25,000.)

14-00000  
DDB-79914 of 28 Apr. 67: case of Enrique Guedes  
Gonzalez. Mentions patient NYC, arrested by FBI  
19 Nov 1963 confessed to be member of team 2  
associated with the Kennedy. FBI says he has  
never arrested nor interviewed. (See further  
notes of 7 Feb 1967 in El Paso (NY) which claims  
Carter had sent 1 team to US & back to the.

X A42-27214 of 2 NOV 1967. Comparison of  
 Oswald case with other American defections  
to USSR and mentions relating to re-defections  
and their work (144 56)

HMMT-10150 27 Feb 1970. Mexico City file on case

DST-18668 of 28 Aug 1969. Found State Department  
of letter and document. doc. by ex State employee  
Charles William Thomas in connection of Cuban  
reps. in conspiracy. (See Warren Commission Report  
pp. 299-310, 65-59, 730-86). Copies sent by letter  
also to FBI & Sec. State. Thomas still orig. means  
of comm. with Mrs. Pary (nee Gans) on 10 Dec  
1965. Ellen Gans m. to Arthur Pary. She documents  
as Mercant.

↑  
This aspect of the case persisted

14-00000  
DCB - 18035 - 31 July 1965. 3 vols. Review vols of  
materials prepared for national circulation re  
release for U.S. Archives. + Vol. of correspondence



(201-334252)

@ Marcos

Mamell Eugenia VEGA Perez. b. 1919 Havana.

Print sent by Ent. Ent.  
Ent. Identifies 5061. <sup>My</sup> <sup>as</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>above</sup> <sup>at</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>ent.</sup>  
Sent 22 and 1983.

2nd 3<sup>rd</sup> Inst. August 64. Presumably i/c of seminary in London. App. for new "Committee in response of the labor revolution". Ex in school instructor

Reportedly worked under supervision of Bonnor  
 Cesar CROMB Montoto, Comm.-Councillor

NB: who is defector (1964) AMSTOKE/1?

OSTET-1 reported on 8 Nov 62 that Ensign  
+2008 in presence had told VSBG Perry that  
on instructions of Capt. Cook. Hildebrand to  
Advise that VSBG was to handle such  
cases as prompt problems & difficulties  
(He had received & had been handled  
by someone else.)

Already reported Jan 1963 on handling subv.  
contracts. (AMSPend/2, from SYNOPSIS).

6 Jan - 13 Feb 1963 on leave in Hawaii

N13: as of 14 Nov 63 "fullest possible coverage" had been reg. by Hqs. on ship in kindred. In Nov 63 Hqs. expressed being in Max Joint Exercise.

See Dennis Spinal 2 Sept 63, Mex. network contains

05 of Cuban installations of 14 in all.

[Query: was it normal for a case like LHO's application to be handled by a local employee not an officer

Described 21 Nov 1962 (UW 12559) as in flux  
in change of contour lines. Return first  
to the Cuba.

Rodriguez

On 14 Feb 1964 Vega (and his subordinate, Regalis) were in contact with the <sup>Mexican</sup> agents of group led by Arcadio Aguilar <sup>friend</sup> which was plotting to kill General Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua). One of the two agents sent to Cuba for try. This confirmed by two sources.

Another Dis. Officer: Miguel P. de 1st Lt Nuez  
Palmer 54-60. Friend of Vega.

Vega acted as June 1964 as Intell. chief of DBI in Mexico City, releasing Alfredo MIRABEL in that capacity. He acted as chief of DBI then in August, 22 June 63.

Alfredo Mirabel Diaz, Consul, arrived Mexico 2 Sept 63 held in contact. From Johnson Sec. Oct 63. Vega ref. Mexi 16 April 64 to release Regalis Rodriguez for inspection. Regalis left PC 25 April.

Random on Vega:

- Am. Mex < Mar 2 Apr 62
- Dep. Mex > Mar 6 Jan 63
- Am. Mex < Mar. 13 Feb.
- Dep. Mex > Mar. 13 Apr 63
- Am. Mex < Mar 21 Apr 63
- Dep. Mex > Mar 3 Nov 63
- Am. Mex < Mar 16 Apr 64 — as chief. Regi

NB: This would make him about 45 as of 23 Nov 63. That he was there during LIT 63 stay 27 Sept - 2 Oct

NB: only with lets turned to Co

All people going to Cuba legal or alleged must first contact Subject. He to then being. Date and pending it to Cuba for name checking. This name checking procedure normally takes 15 days.


Went back to Mex. from May. Nov 63 and was concerned to the Dep. of Natl. Int. of DBI as Nicaragua. He left Mex. City 16 April 1964. He left

Vega meñi de Nov 21 + 21. ... returned ...  
1966. ...  
L. ... 14 April 1966. ...  
27 June 1966. ...  
de ...  
de cultura en Cuba.

Vega meñi ... 29 May - 14 June 1967

Reprinted by ...


...  
...  
...






1


(1)












2



*Duplicate*



2. Bold/Criticism can be sustained against Mexico's flag and by covering handling notices 27 Sept and 22 Nov:

- d. s. found on a individual  
the USSR Coast. State people identifying him as  
was identified by the person identifying,  
by voice and appearance and one of the  
tra than was seen to be

(2) Hgs. designated the *Blarina* imp of the 8<sup>th</sup> on the 10<sup>th</sup> within  
during the analysis, <sup>done</sup> maps based on the phenotypes of  
unidentified individual.

- 9) Ripped letters through asked by Hqs. did not press or secure an identification or follow-up on LHO before the arrest of Hqs. (i.e. locate where he had stayed, what he had done, when he had arrived or when he had left. NB: meeting dis

App. can be  
given for next  
action to be  
taken to be  
revised for  
24-10-1944.

the legal attaché or the Mex. representation or the Embassy (which was informed by the 10<sup>th</sup> Oct).

(4) Though requested by Mexico Station Hqs. asked the Navy for a photo of H.O., but did not permit and secure a photo before the event.

(6) Mexico Station did not match the 1st radio intercept with its earlier intercept (of 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Sept) until after the 22<sup>nd</sup> Nov. event, when it did so with alacrity.

(7) Mexico Station did not match its 1st coverage of the unidentified individual with its coverage of the same individual on 4 Oct in front of the Soviet Embassy, nor on 15 Oct. in front of the Cuban Embassy until after 22 Nov.

(8) Despite the discrepancies in description Mex Station put the 1st photos into the chain of evidence on 22 Nov. 2200 hours. Ultimately the decision having been made by the <sup>(naughty)</sup> Ambassador and the Division Chief <sup>(in effect, not)</sup> being faced with a fait accompli. (It was notified)

(9) No photo coverage was obtained at any time of H.O. in Mexico city. The intro. of the unidentified individual - in good faith by COS - was inevitable and compromised the operations in the long run, though every effort was made to satisfy the requirements of the Commission and the security of the operations.

(10) Two members of Cuban emb. known to have dealt with COS: Silvia Giron and Conrado Aguirre. Both left & replaced on 21 Nov 1951. named.

3. The thrust of Hqs. instruction after the 22 Nov event was against the USSR report, rather than the Cuban coverage which was only because, turned up at least one significant intercept:

(a) The basic Calderon conversation - afternoon 22 Nov. which seems not to have gone to the Commission. Possibly? - this must be checked

- and (b) the <sup>two</sup> Brothers - Princes Hermenegildo telephone calls on the — and — ,
- and (c) ambiguous reference by Jugoslav ambassador Vlahovic -

4. Major. coming after exam based on technical coverage and size utilization of liaison. The two signif. challenges are:

(a) Were the Soviet & Cuban aware of the coverage visual & audio before 20<sup>th</sup>?

(b) Did Sovs and/or Cubans have penetration in the brotherhood which would have permitted them to blunt the thrust of the ~~top~~ succession of major leads which were investigated tending to show a known degree of contact between UFD <sup>at various points</sup> and the substantive details of the intercepts?  
Viz:

(1) Case of Gileberto Alvarado Ugarte - Nicaragua within 24 hr. investigation prosecuted through Dec.

(2) Restrictions of the amount of detail given by Silva Bureau. (Can hear later in May 1967) → statements to confid. source he trusted? If so there is also reason to review the Cuban Case details. ) Silva Bureau was not subjected to a thorough checking examination based on what we knew or could surmise from the intercepts.

(3) Gilberto Rojas Villanueva case (in broadcastings & lognormal). This appears to have been admitted.

(18) Ence of Elena Garro de Paz. See the successive reports of this sheet office, Thomas. This case suggests the possibility that Cuban sources in Cienfuegos were in a position to manipulate and circumscribe the Alvaro Alvarado and other heads appearing themselves, including the Alvarado matter: note the extraordinary point these two always have in common - the presence of a red headed negro. (According to Alvarado in the Cuban compound, according to Elena Garro, in attendance at Cuban Bureau's party)

(5) Observations by Elig. Catlett to Stacy (belly down)  
into lead accompanied <sup>moment</sup> Theodore Lee on his  
Carbon trip for F&FC org. Boise - 21 June 1942  
LPT's relationship to F&FC activity is totally unclar-  
ified and unbelievable on its face unless it  
can be assumed that F&FC and Carbon them-  
selves were more aware of what he was doing  
than they have acknowledged.

⑥ Case of Excess Contribution. In June, 1950, Tempio  
inquired in May 1949, relation to 449 alleged  
contact with pro-Communist student groups at U.C.  
David & Co. attempted to secure this, request  
for more connections.

Olaf, Urban

5. Acknowledging fundamental aspects of life, which  
man is little interested in.

(2) He denied the ~~statement~~ <sup>statement</sup> that he was  
susp. to know what was going on.

(2) It was then I felt very, spiritual & I began  
my little journey, I was at last, then on the  
border of my little life, at present, but

lets: 87 hours.

Can it be concluded that if he had contact with either Soviets or Cubans or both, that must be beyond the transit-vision aspect one into that he was told to assassinate Pres. Kennedy? or anything of that kind? (Consider in this context his subsequent letters to USSR Ent. Washington after return from Mexico.). Operationally it makes more sense to conclude that his relations were in an electric, developmental stage and that his support to a defeat was bona fide. (Note the symbolic identity between his suicide attempt in Moscow in 1959, which tipped the balance in his favor of remaining in the USSR, and the assassinations as his ultimate self-proving [and self-determined] "devotion".)

NB: This allows for LHO having said nothing that was self-compromising in his dealings with Soviets and Cubans, including threats against the lives of prominent anti-Soviet and anti-Castro individuals which he uttered the Soviets nor Cuban ever admitted after the events of 22 Nov, they knew.

6. What is the probative value - without factual collateral relating to Mexico and Dallas event - of Castro's statements as reported by AP, on 7 Sept 1963 as Brazilian Embassy receipts? Note that UPI news could reject element of the AP statements without factual collateral its probative value is only as a conditioning factor, which could have operated principally on a homicidal individual's self-love. Therefore Castro must mean a significant collateral weight for what he said about the nature and degree of his proven explanation against

Lincoln, his alive and JFK is dead, was more evidence  
an act of terrorism where it may have been a  
conditioned response by a psychotic victim, as  
"justifiable homicide". As worse, he gave no conduct  
an investigation, <sup>or could have seen</sup> ~~over a year~~ to suggest that  
the assassination was indeed, a political assassination again,  
in the absence of factual collateral that goes beyond  
what we do know, namely that it was the will  
of JFK and Officer Tippett and that he did it alone.

Ask the same question of the Factor's observations \* to  
his   F.O. interlocutor: what signif. (causally)  
can be attached to what he said? (Excluded the  
remarks (of a emotional & psych. insight).)

In question of lack of supporting evidential isolated  
also requiring that these were two distinct sources  
unless come out immediately after the accident, one  
Soviet (Korabel) and the other Cuban (Isabel) in  
terms of saying corroborative <sup>partial</sup> testimony. Both  
both Soviets and Cuban intelligence traces of sources  
off the book

FNB: by 5 Jan. for a brief interview and reported the cold weather  
Mexico, female, Zulu as name. Said to the fact that  
JTC would be within the present year, 1962.

7. There is every reason to be satisfied with the work of those upon the foreign exchange market, but it is not desirable to shift blame on <sup>any</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>for the balance</sup> for allegedly not considering what the anti-trusts are now doing, assuming they intend. I do know I know the policy was the ideal result the bringing out but not the encouragement of the income directly, intended as this note is that plating of by not recognizing that the there is the Commission. Headquartering a 1000 in 1901 was already against such a theory in the absence of suitable evidence to the contrary, which were to be done down the Commission the spirit of the above-mentioned.

(Note that Spurr specifically complimented our efforts for  
forming by his reporting. Doubtless it, itself, suggests  
a foreign involvement.)

In fact at the working level in CIO — about the FBI's  
 position was or is not known to me — it may well be that  
 the <sup>we</sup> report did ~~not~~ <sup>never give explicit and</sup> could have left a larger opening  
 for further accumulation of evidence relative to  
 the foreign conspiracy aspect. ~~There~~ The Miller was  
 so advised by CIO Staff at the time. In any  
 case they did a number of measures of shielding and  
 since we are talking here of degrees of enclosing,  
 because the Report properly read does leave  
 the question of ultimate responsibility of CIO or  
 a single Miller open.

What did the Commission Staff find as to formation  
the actions necessary to cover all aspects of the case and  
to get them investigated - in this instance by the FBI

8. James Q. Smith had closed doors of the Association  
 & possibly lost the hearing on account of the  
 political conspiracy there.

- (2) Inst. in Defector 1944 - inf. passed  
(3) Bonds early 1944 - inf. passed in London  
(4) Citizenship - within 10 and 15 days  
1st Aug. 1944. Dissolved under P. 1 inf.  
at Berlin 1948. Must be.

... of the ... ..  
... ..  
... ..

Long, winding, - 7.

(2) As evidence that paper has been purchased <sup>exhaustively</sup> with State deposits, indicating State control and disburse.

10. In general the forward ion file shows a minimum input from Wave and no concern with the implications of Statement, leaving the Statement as

books in Sept 1963. They, what was needed,  
within all at highest levels to that platform?  
This should be revealed by July 1964,  
not now, please, and Apr. 7

11. The Bureau is not to be held responsible for the fact that we are unable to get a single copy of the report to the Bureau in order to be examined and put into the files.

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information about the situation and determining the scope of the investigation.

[illegible]

2. The presumption is that there would have been no further correspondence regarding the Little family shortly after 1959 when James Little Jr. died.

⑦ See also FLTD Section 10, Vol. 10, 120, 130, 139  
only a Section 10 in Vol. 10, 120, 130

Die Patrouille schied am 11. März

On the basis of the above information, the following  
recommendations are made:

100



controlled him, requested a bag, offered to turn  
into the court for night, and delivered to  
him money. This occurred on 3 Aug when  
Bouvier found the jewelry case, wearing a  
sign, showing name of Sidell as holder of F.P.C.  
On 12<sup>th</sup> there was a municipal court action  
for which L.H. pleaded guilty, a fine of \$100. On 14<sup>th</sup>  
he was going out and his car was found. Bouvier  
was a friend of L.H. house on 16<sup>th</sup>. On 21 Aug there  
was a radio debate. He also agreed with  
L.H. but is of little interest to the American.  
(see also Bouvier to Charles testimony)

F.P.C. It is remarkable that no one apparently present  
on the F.P.C. promotion tried to attempt

(1) What does one people of the audience testimony,  
with their testimony, and the Bouvier, testimony  
mean?

(2) What was the investigation of O's alleged activities  
activities in H.O. on behalf of the F.P.C.? There  
are except the idea he had own guidance or  
contacts. After he had begun to write to L.H.  
from Los Angeles from El Toro camp?  
What does a chronic account of his known  
int. movements look like starting with the  
filled printed pseudonym dates?

(3) Report does not note the AP report by Harker, on  
9 Sept 1963, nor was testimony taken on this  
point of change the decision that occurred in  
Tamir Picayune must have been seen by him.  
21 reflects main lines however: p. 412 ff.

- ② There was every reasonable argument and some facts to conclude awareness, agreement and handling of LHO ("Red Lion") in the Sov. Union and this Cuban interest included an unresolved contact (Belgrade testimony) which went back to El Toro. And if there was any doubt, Novotny's testimony on KGB file is conclusive.
- ③ The material furnished by the USSR and Cuba (via Sweden) fell far short of anything that fact and reasonable inference suggested.

(This is not to say LHO was under instruction on 22/10/77.

10. In relation to the highest scientific & professional  
achievements suggested by the House (Caldwell)  
intercept - she is interrupted by a somewhat great  
defect as having been associated with the  
Def. during her illness or sickness - there are

② the Cincinnati wife - Kentucky - reports  
after the court - end 1902

① <sup>Ward 6</sup> Santa's <sup>place</sup> near Highland near

7 Nov 1963 - Hunt reported after the  
assassination (Hunt was known at  
one time as "J. Lee" and eventually was  
removed from the League by his government  
who gave a soldierly burial to the man).

Harvard,  
unrec. type  
get it with  
high school -

0-let - 289248 - was opened on 9 Dec 1960 under  
the rubric: OSWALD, Lee Henry. Reported to  
USSR in October 1959.

From all the evidence on hand we deduce that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in the afternoon of 27 Sept 1963 and again sometime on 28 September 1963. It is our opinion that he visited more often than once on the days mentioned, but we cannot exclude the possibility. Two words in John's report, on pages four and five, a house on the "balcon" of which Oswald had been, that Oswald was at the Consulate at least once after his initial visit, and the later visit was on the afternoon of a day on which the Cuban Consul telephoned the Soviet Consulate about Oswald's mind problems. This day will have been 28 Sept., but we cannot be certain of this conclusion."

Wave Miami reported by SS 8048 of 22 Nov, 2242 Z, that  
A.M.T. 53 reported #415496 illegals and radio dets  
sent to in Aug. 63 on 11.6. Station 40153. Summary diff  
#415496 plus initials to name from column 100 on  
22.11.63

Valeriy Vlad. KOSTIKOV is identified KGB agent, allegedly believing  
to be a 13<sup>th</sup> dept operator. Being known to have worked  
in matter of missing saboteurs. Allegations of open instigation  
on potentially non-clandestine matters known to be at the  
time an accepted doctrinal point at least among GML.  
NB: we passed to FBI memos. (23 Nov) dated re Kotelov and  
3 finished papers bearing on topic - 2 of these two were  
concerned with Sov use of Kotelov. Ex. 1st. (Aug 61)  
2<sup>nd</sup> other, Sov St. of Spec. Act. (Oct 61)

Det 84915 of 25 Nov 63 2206Z distrib. to FBI only  
the gist of intelligence info reported by Mexico "North  
American" on 23<sup>rd</sup> after full file review

Report from Santiago Club re Nov 63 re Cuba. Last reactions  
indicated unimpaired reaction that answer was "yes, he is  
CIA", Extreme right re segregationist to Kotelov. This  
was change, Pedro Martinez, 1962. Same time he denied  
that answer was involved in 712C laboratory that this  
version only, suspect re Kotelov right re segregationist  
in to blame. (From Santiago 6153 IN 6714),  
23 Nov-63)

NB: There was no listening recorder on Sov. int. on 4 Oct.  
See Mexi 7023 - IN 6714. This cable relates the North Amer.  
82 the 28<sup>th</sup> calls to Oswald identified in case of 1 Oct, but  
indicated no voice comparison could be done "because  
last time would prior receipt of second call"

It is clear from context that FBI sent agent to  
Kotelov. Afternoon 22<sup>nd</sup> carried 2 sets of six  
photos each reference, to Kotelov. but. on 7/27  
at 11:00 AM. at 11:00 AM.

Merri provided full numbers of all probable calls beginning  
this 7<sup>th</sup> in Adena & including the 3 October call by # 7035  
of 23 Nov 1963 (in 67252).

Merri  
Adena

Adena

23/4

According to C/Lt. 23 April 1975, the camera was down on '27 foot for some mechanical malfunctions. He stated he and Shaw worked personally in various & subsequent photo trays. Also certain that was-considered explicable or indicated. Not a matter of human malfunctions & loading & unloading, either. Would attempt to bring elements of recall & consult them on this point. We would get in touch.

Query: Granted above, why did we not get C at its current installation on 18<sup>th</sup> 20<sup>th</sup>?

- 

1

From Notes for a...

3 Apr. 2 hour lesson  
2. In p. 1. For the first time  
at home. my 1st son, 1st daughter

Report that Mexico City station <sup>writing its</sup> ~~was in~~

~~nothing to be said~~

~~Limitations and capabilities had done  
that  
all it could, while in compliance with  
Headquarters instructions: there were no~~

Further contacts by Oswald to report. <sup>It was ultimately decided,</sup>  
he had left Dallas city ~~premises~~ on 2 October

and ~~some~~ <sup>more</sup> photographs. It is not  
 taken any special efforts  
 to ~~obtain~~ <sup>obtain</sup> a position

Identification of various of the birds listed  
registration under class.

Tell me to Mr. and Mrs.



1. Mexi 6453 (IN 36917, ? Set, Cass 2 hrs)  
Actions to web.

2. Dir 74676 to Stat, 3-51-44. 20122

3. Mex 74830 to Mexi, ref. Mex 6453  
22092.

4. Mexi 6534, 15 Oct 1953 Twp 6357  
17302. (arg. for photo)

W. H. S.

Edward J. Butler - Ex-c. Director of the  
Intelligence Council of the Americas, New Orleans.  
His was testimony not taken from this source -

Get (Sons) passed info by / for Ted to look at.

✓ Get copy of Assoc. Inst report for  
the Belin & Howard via channels or  
otherwise.

✓ Coll. done in non-family. of *Labrus*  
*viridis*

✓ Call Gordie & tell him about 12<sup>3</sup>

Get transcripts copy of report & with -

[illegible]

London 16. 11. 1891.

discussions with H. Phillips 28 April = it was  
Cushman camera this was done. He does  
not object to the use of the photo in any way  
but would prefer freezing the background  
containing plain features of the East. Concerned to  
put in C.

- Get the ...
- Get further ... for end  
1963 ...
- We must ... of discussion with  
the Commission ...
- And then ... or unnecessary  
policy ...

28/7

Mike ... of ... since ...  
was ... ..  
since ... (also white) ... ..  
... ..