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3 WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978
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6 U.S. House of Representatives,
7 Subcommittee on Assassination
8 of John F. Kennedy of the
9 Select Committee on Assassina-
10 tions,

11 Washington, D.C.

12 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in
13 room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer
14 (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

15 Present: Representatives Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and
16 Sawyer.

17 Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold-
18 smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey;
19 O. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. Cross.

20 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will come to order.

21 The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read
22 those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee
23 today.

24 The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are
25 regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. Mr. Devine will
26 be substituting for Mr. Dodd.

27 Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion
28 that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held

1 in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained
2 by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or
3 testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people
4 and consequently Section 2(k)(5) of Rule 11 of the Committee
5 rules would apply.

6 Mrs. Burke. I so move.

7 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

8 You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer
9 as the roll is called.

10 The Clerk. Mr. Preyer?

11 Mr. Preyer. Aye.

12 The Clerk. Mr. Devine?

13 Mr. Devine. Aye.

14 The Clerk. Mr. Thone?

15 (No response)

16 The Clerk. Mrs. Burke?

17 Mrs. Burke. Aye.

18 The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer?

19 (No response)

20 The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

21 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

22 The Committee will go into Executive Session at this time
and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee,
all witnesses to please leave the room at this time.

(Pause)

1 Mr. Preyer. We will now proceed in Executive Session.

2 The Chair will ask the witness if he will be sworn at this
3 time.

4 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
5 give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and
6 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

7 Mr. Helms. I do, Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Preyer. You may be seated.

9 As we do to all witnesses, the Chair will give a brief
10 statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

11 House Resolution 222 mandates the Committee to conduct a
12 full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances
13 surrounding the assassination and death of President John F.
14 Kennedy including determining whether the existing laws of the
15 United States concerning the investigation of the President
16 and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies
17 and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforce-
18 ment and there is full disclosure of evidence and information
19 among agencies and departments of the United States government,
20 and whether any evidence or information not in the possession
21 of an agency or department would have been in assistance in
22 investigating the assassination, and why such information was
23 not provided by such agency or department; and to make recom-
24 mendations to the House, if the Select Committee deems it
25 appropriate, for amendment of existing legislation or the

1 enactment of new legislation.

2 Mr. Helms, are you represented by counsel?

3 Mr. Helms. Yes. I have with me, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gregory
4 B. Craig who is my counsel on this occasion.

5 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

6 Mr. Craig. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Preyer. The Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith at this
8 time to begin the questioning.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

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1 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record will you
3 state your name and address?

4 Mr. Helms. My name is Richard McGarrah Helms, and for
5 the benefit of the Reporter, the middle name is spelled
6 M-c G-a-r-r-a-h.

7 I live at 4649 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
8 20007.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you previously served as the Director
10 of the Central Intelligence?

11 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you serve in that
13 capacity?

14 Mr. Helms. I served from 1966 to 1973.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time, how many years have
16 you been associated with the CIA?

17 Mr. Helms. Since the doors opened in 1947.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. As a part of your association with the CIA,
19 were you required to execute a secret^{oath} ~~seal~~?

20 Mr. Helms. I was.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time I would like, Mr. Ambassador,
22 to present what has been marked as JFK Exhibit No. 94.

23 Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me. I have identified
24 it as a document that I read earlier.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, Mr. Chairman, JFK Exhibit

1 No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the
2 Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose
3 of authorizing present and former agency employees to testify
4 fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to
5 questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate.

6 At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a
7 letter, or a copy of a letter, from Mr. Carlucci to the
8 Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this
9 item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK
10 Exhibit 125.

11 (The document referred
12 to was marked JFK Exhibit
13 No. 125 for identification.)

14 Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received
15 in the mail.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this
17 letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No.
18 94?

19 Mr. Helms. I believe I do.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you
21 to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August
22 1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this
23 Committee.

24 Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from Mr. Scott
25 Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to

1 Mr. Blakey sent by Mr. Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of
2 the CIA.

3 I request that ^(this) be introduced into evidence as JFK Exhibit
4 126.

5 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

6 (The document referred to
7 was marked JFK Exhibit No.
8 126 for identification.)

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read this letter before
10 the meeting started this morning.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of that
12 letter

13 Mr. Helms. I do.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to intro-
15 duce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mr. Breckin-
16 ridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge
17 at the request of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador.

18 At this time, I request that that letter be introduced
19 into the record as Exhibit 127.

20 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have seen this letter on another
21 occasion.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter
23 be introduced into the record as JFK No. 127.

24 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

(The document referred
to was marked JKF Exhibit
No. 127 for identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in
1963 when you were with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for
Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
the organization^{al} function of the Deputy Director for Plans was
in 1963?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was
the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simplest
term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received
its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and
the other CID/2 or M-12.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to
conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action out-
side the continental limits of the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you describe generally what your
responsibilities were as head of that unit?

Mr. Helms. I was, in fact, in charge of the unit. In
other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central
Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas
operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the

1 investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

2 Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren
3 Commission was formed, there was every effort made in the
4 Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible
5 to request from the FBI who was conducting the investigation
6 or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the
7 Warren Commission.

8 I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I
9 think, in this country equally struck with the tragic circum-
10 stances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what
11 we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these
12 other entities that had the lead in this investigation.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and under-
14 stand, your testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency
15 at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren
16 Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the
19 CIA's investigation organized?

20 Mr. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took
21 place. I guess it is all of 15 years.

22 I do not recall that, at the outset, that there was any
23 formal organizational change made to accommodate this investi-
24 gation. My recollection is that we figured that most of our
25 contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City --

1 in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination
2 in Mexico City.

3 It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of
4 designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was
5 the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection,
6 his name was Whitten.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Jack Whitten?

8 Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard
10 to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency?

11 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility
12 to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or
13 the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see
14 to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the
15 requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the
16 circumstances.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible
18 for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you
19 and then from you to the Warren Commission?

20 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall, at this late
21 date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry
22 would come over. We would attempt to satisfy it and we would
23 attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual
24 bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection
25 would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of

1 material. Each individual item that came along we took care
2 of as best as we could.

3 As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were
4 looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places,
5 trying to run down individuals, identify bits and pieces
6 that the Warren Commission was trying to clarify, and as a
7 result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area
8 divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans
9 Director, at that time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the
11 CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the
12 investigation?

13 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren
14 Commission was established and it got its work underway that
15 this was put into the counter-intelligence staff.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
17 the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli-
18 gence staff was?

19 Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli-
20 gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special
21 provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence.
22 I say a special provision, because in the area of positive
23 intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa-
24 tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies
25 of government.

1 Whereas, in the counter-intelligence field, it had a
2 mandate to maintain counter-intelligence files and also to do
3 counter-intelligence evaluations.

4 To be more specific about this, if there was an allegation
5 from the FBI that a spy at the United Nations had been trans-
6 ferred to some unit in Paris and it was the Agency's job, then,
7 to try to see what that agent was up to. It was also the
8 Agency's job to make an evaluation of whether he, indeed,
9 was working for the Russians or the French or whatever the
10 case might be.

11 Therefore, the counter-intelligence staff did have an
12 evaluation function which the foreign intelligence staff, or
13 the positive intelligence staff, did not.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that why the CI staff was given primary
15 responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall any longer what
17 considerations went into giving this job to the counter-
18 intelligence staff. I think it is logical to agree with what
19 you say, but I do not recall any longer as it having been
20 or what the controlling reasons were.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Jack Whitten
22 who originally was given responsibility to coordinating aspects
23 of the investigation. Do you recall how long he retained this
24 responsibility?

25 Mr. Helms. It is not only my recollection but in an effort

1 to clear my mind in preparation for this hearing, I did some
2 checking with some former colleagues, and my recollection is
3 that he sort of had the labor for only a couple of months;
4 after that, the job was turned over to the Counter-Intelligence
5 Staff.

6 Do you recall why the transition was made from Whitten to
7 the CI staff?

8 Mr. Helms. I think, if recollection serves, that we could
9 see that this investigation was broadening far beyond Mexico
10 City and it did not make much sense to have it in the hands
11 of a man who was running the Mexico City desk.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Whitten was originally given the
13 responsibility for coordinating the investigation, was he ever
14 told by you that he would have exclusive control of the
15 investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no such recollection. I would see no
17 reason to give him -- in fact, I could not see why it would
18 have occurred to me to want to say that to him.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Whitten ever
20 discussed with you problems that he was having with Mr. Angle-
21 ton's in some way interfering with the investigation?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall this. He might have. Today,
23 I do not recall this.

24 If you could identify what the troubles were, it might
25 refresh my memory.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten has testified before the
2 Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that
3 he was initially given responsibility for the investigation and
4 was told more or less that he would be given free rein as to
5 coordinating the information, and, I guess, sending it to the
6 Warren Commission.

7 He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way inter-
8 fering with his function as coordinator of the investigation
9 and that at some time the investigation was turned over from
10 Whitten to Angleton. Does that refresh your memory at all?

11 Mr. Helms. It does not, and may I say, I do not mean
12 to add to the questions I have not been asked, but I cannot
13 imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. Whit-
14 ten claims that he was given. We did not operate that way.
15 Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Your position would be that the primary
17 reason, as you recall it, for the investigation's being taken
18 from Whitten, in a sense, and given to the CI staff was because
19 the investigation began to undertake broader tones than was
20 initially anticipated?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes. That is not only my recollection, but
22 also it would seem to be in the year 1978, to have been a
23 rather sensible thing to have done under the circumstances.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Whitten also testified before the
25 Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without

1 receiving authorization from anyone. Do you recall whether
2 or not that was a problem at any time?

3 Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsible for the
4 liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he
5 talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day
6 of the week and probably several times a day.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination,
8 instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr. Whitten was coordi-
9 nating the investigation?

10 Mr. Helms. Certainly not. We were doing our best to be
11 as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you serve as a point of contact between
13 the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given
14 to someone else?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was
16 ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the
17 Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing
18 most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation
19 indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by
20 anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a
21 particular point of contact. I do not recall anyone else's
22 having been designated as a point of contact.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what responsibilities, if
24 any, were given to Mr. Raymond Rocca?

25 Mr. Helms. I think in the counter-intelligence staff when

1 they took over this responsibility, if you want to call it
2 that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence
3 staff that was responsible for pulling things together there.

4 In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go
5 to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have
7 in the investigation?

8 Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very
9 important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there
10 was a constant traffic between him and me about what we were
11 doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these
12 various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the
13 Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief
14 him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers
15 and so forth. He had a very real role.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop-
17 ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he
19 was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if
20 necessary.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how many times a week you
22 would meet with Mr. McCone and discuss with ^{him} them the develop-
23 ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination?

24 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure,
25 there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five

1 days a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at
2 those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private
3 meetings, I could not conceivably give you any idea.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCone
5 was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the
6 developments?

7 Mr. Helm. Certainly not. He was actively apprised. He
8 was very much interested, and we were all very much interested.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the division of
10 responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with
11 regard to the investigation. Would you go into somewhat more
12 detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that
13 time?

14 Mr. Helms. This crime was committed on United States soil.
15 Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the
16 primary investigating agency would have been the Federal
17 Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of
18 the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have
19 been supportive in the sense of what material we are able
20 to acquire outside the continental limits of the United States
21 with reference to the investigation.

22 This was the division of labor between the FBI and the CIA.
23 The CIA's mandate started at the ocean front. Or, to put it
24 another way, the FBI's mandate started as soon as you crossed
25 into the continental limits of the United States. For

1 investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role
2 inside the United States at all. So when I used here the
3 word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the
4 term. We are trying to support the FBI and support the
5 Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we
6 were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my
7 recollection, were we ever asked to.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of
9 responsibility satisfactory?

10 Mr. Helms. It was law. It was not a question of whether
11 it was satisfactory or not; it was law.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. One of the purposes
13 of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at
14 that time and the manner in which the Agency has gone about
15 investigating the death of the President. So, at this time,
16 I am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of
17 facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation
18 that was involved?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such
20 short notice I would want to make such a serious judgment as
21 that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one
22 organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have
23 a great deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the
24 FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not
25 recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA

1 by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that
2 is the best answer I can give you on such short notice.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any
4 problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the
5 investigation?

6 Mr. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was
7 the difference in the evaluation of the material of the
8 Soviet defector named Nosenko gave. My recollection is that
9 what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States
10 around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI
11 to the Warren Commission exactly as he said it.

12 The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they
13 came to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides
14 or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been
15 established at this stage of the game, and the Central
16 Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to
17 the Warren Commission.

18 There, indeed, there was a difference between the two
19 agencies.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Aside from that substantive disagreement
21 in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall
22 whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the
23 investigation?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information freely passed between the

1 CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is
2 right now, the CIA is acting in a support function to the FBI.
3 Was the FBI giving information to the CIA?

4 Mr. Helms. My best recollection is that there were not
5 difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said
6 at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We
7 were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative.

8 I do recall when we got into certain sensitive areas a
9 couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could
10 not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for
11 example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try
12 to apprise them orally of what our predicament was.

13 In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole
14 thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could
15 and to go over the edge, if necessary.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. In this case, my question
17 was whether the FBI was also sending information to the Agency?
18 In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your pur-
19 poses?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds.
21 Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit
22 difficult, sometimes, to know whether you are getting something
23 the existence of which you have never heard.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any
25 working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular

1 emphasis to ^{any} the particular areas, geographic areas?

2 Mr. Helms. I think that the entire United States govern-
3 ment, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there
4 would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate
5 President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets
6 were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans
7 were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may
8 have been involved in it.

9 I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly
10 any question there was more discussed during those days as to
11 who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who
12 was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done
13 the things he had done, and so forth.

14 So there was a great deal of conjecturing going on. I
15 think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like
16 to make a comment about the various investigations into the
17 assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I
18 have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the
19 day that the KGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havana
20 is prepared to turn over their files to the U.S. as to what
21 their relationships to these various people were, it is going
22 to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally,
23 and conclusively.

24 A great deal of investigation can be done, and has been
25 done. It has been done conscientiously. I think people have

1 tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of
2 differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made
3 that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated
4 as they might have been. That all may be true.

5 But it really does not make any difference what is done in
6 this connection until you can get those governments to lay
7 before you their records of how they dealt with Lee Harvey
8 Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case.

9 And, based on past experience, I doubt very much whether
10 you are going to get the compliance of the Soviets or the
11 Cuban government.

12 But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely
13 important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It
14 is only in books that they end up with all the little things
15 worked out at the end and tied off neatly.

16 This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the
17 air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so
18 undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there
19 is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never
20 going to be laid to rest.

21 Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the likelihood
22 of that happening is remote?

23 Mr. Helms. Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe my question was --

25 Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith. I did not mean to

1 digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

3 My question was, what areas received primary emphasis. I
4 think your answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy.

5 Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of
6 the foreign conspiracy question were investigated?

7 Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet
8 aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald
9 had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been
10 satisfactorily explained as far as we knew.

11 Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very
12 suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing
13 of his defection. So that there were several areas there
14 that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and
15 analysis and everything else that could be given to it.

16 I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magni-
17 tude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this
18 country, it is at this point that in our international relations
19 we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a
20 foreign government of having been responsible for this act
21 is tearing the veil about as nastily as one can, and this can
22 lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very
23 unpleasant.

24 I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not
25 only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that

1 President Kennedy's whole approach to the Cuban government
2 of Fidel Castro.

3 So that we were treading very lightly, but I am sure that
4 we were very concerned at the time as to what we might end up
5 with. And this was not improved or our mood about this was
6 not improved when Khrushchev runs to Drew Pearson in Egypt when
7 they were visiting there and tells Pearson that the Soviets,
8 that this was a conspiracy of the right to assassinate Presi-
9 dent Kennedy. Why does he make this remark to Drew Pearson?
10 What is his purpose? What was behind this?

11 Is it a smoke screen to cover up his own complicity?

12 The air was full of these things. Therefore, we were
13 very conscious of it and we were doing what we could to make
14 sense out of it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, was all information pertinent
16 to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren
17 Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. As far as I know. If there are indications
19 or evidence that it was not, I do not recall having been aware
20 of any sins of omission at the time.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. On the average, would you be able to tell
22 us how much time passed from the moment that information was
23 received by the Agency until it went to the Commission?

24 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that as soon as we were
25 able to satisfy an inquiry, we sent the reply back. And some

1 of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

2 For example, some might involve checking a file which was
3 in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if
4 we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

5 Obviously, one takes longer to perform, one act takes longer
6 to perform than the other.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive
8 an inquiry from the Commission prior to giving the Commission
9 information?

10 Mr. Helms. Yes, I did, as I recall it.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive
12 an inquiry from the FBI prior to giving the FBI information?

13 Mr. Helms. That is my recollection.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was any member of the
15 Warren Commission or staff informed by the CIA of the CIA's
16 anti-Castro assassination plots?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not know. Let's clear this up right now.
18 There is no sense in your going on asking a whole series of
19 questions on this. I am glad to tell you what I know about
20 it.

21 In the first place, Mr. Allen Dulles who had about -- maybe
22 a few months before, anyway -- ceased being Director of
23 Central Intelligence and was replaced by Mr. McCone, was a
24 member of the Warren Commission. I do not know what he said
25 to the members of the Warren Commission.

1 Mr. McCone testified before the Warren Commission. I
2 believe I was with Mr. McCone the day he testified, although I
3 do not even have a clear recollection of that anymore, and I
4 have not refreshed my memory from the Warren Commission Report.

5 These so-called assassination plots I believe if I may put
6 it this way -- a sloppy term which has come to cover some
7 devices which the Church Committee found evidence that the
8 Agency had on its drawing board, if you want to put it that
9 way -- the only assassination plot that had any even semblance
10 or substance to it was one involving a couple of Mafia chief-
11 tains and which were supposed to have taken place before the
12 Bay of Pigs invasion.

13 I guess you could call that an assassination plot.

14 As far as the AMLASH business was concerned, I had a great
15 deal to do with the AMLASH operation and, as has been publicly
16 stated before and I will publicly state it again, that was not
17 an assassination plot. The effort of working with AMLASH was
18 to see if we could find a political alternative to Castro and
19 a man who was prepared to lead a revolt against Castro in
20 political and military terms, inside Havana.

21 The assassination aspects of this which have been so
22 highly publicized was an issue that Mr. Cubella himself kept
23 raising, which was the simplest way to perform his mission was
24 to try to get rid of Castro physically. But he never attempted
25 it, as far as I know, and President Kennedy had been assassinated

1 before there was any possibility of his having attempted it,
2 at least with the connivance of the Agency.

3 I think if one reads the record carefully of these various
4 facts, you will find what I say is supported by the record.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Cubella given any support by the
6 Agency with regard to his desire to assassinate Fidel Castro?

7 Mr. Helms. In the end he was not, as far as I know.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Before the end, was he at any time given
9 any support?

10 Mr. Helms. No.

11 There is the famous story of the poison pen but he did not
12 take the poison pen. He simply returned it to the case officer
13 who offered it to him. There was no other device given to
14 him, as far as I am aware.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Mr. Dulles'
16 being on the Commission. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles actually
17 knew about the so-called anti-Castro assassination plots?

18 Mr. Helms. He certainly knew about the Mafia one that I
19 mentioned. I think there is abundant evidence that he did know
20 it. I do not have that firsthand, because that particular
21 operation was being handled by Mr. Bissell and Colonel Edwards
22 with Mr. Dulles and General Cabell and I was not brought in on
23 it.

24 At the time I was not a party to it.

25 This is all secondhand information I am giving you, based

1 on what came out of the Church Committee hearings.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. McCone knew of
3 the plots against Castro?

4 Mr. Helms. Yes, I think he did. Well, eventually he did.
5 I do not know exactly at what juncture he was informed about
6 them.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you at any time inform
8 the Warren Commission about these plots?

9 Mr. Helms. I did not talk to the Warren Commission about
10 them.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would your position be that the anti-
12 Castro plots were not relevant to the Warren Commission's
13 investigation?

14 Mr. Helms. I would not put it that way, Mr. Goldsmith.
15 I would not like to agree with that statement.

16 Perhaps they were relevant. I think that is a matter of
17 opinion.

18 What I would like to say, however, is I have noted in the
19 last two or three years that various witnesses have come
20 forward to various Congressional Committees saying if they had
21 known this or known that or known something else their
22 investigation, their attitude, their handling of the matter
23 would have been entirely different. But how it would have
24 been different is not really explained anyplace that I can
25 find.

1 I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make another comment, if
2 I may, please. In 1962, in October, we had the Cuban missile
3 crisis and to recall and refresh your memory, this was the
4 occasion on which Fidel Castro and Khrushchev connived to put
5 intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil which had
6 a range which could fire into the United States at least to
7 the middle of the country, if not all the way through to
8 California.

9 If Khrushchev had been able to pull off this trick, it
10 would have been the military coup of the century. The Russians
11 would, in the military sense, achieve what, up to that time,
12 they had not been able to achieve otherwise -- to hold the
13 United States hostage.

14 At that time, the Soviets did not have intercontinental
15 ballistic missiles with the range or the accuracy to fire
16 from Soviet soil to the United States. They have since
17 achieved this capability but they did not have it in 1963,
18 I believe the military evidence will show.

19 Obviously, President Kennedy through some good intelligence
20 was provided, and by handling the situation with great skill
21 able to get those missiles withdrawn and also the bombers,
22 the IL-28's which came with them. But I do not think that
23 this operation endeared Fidel Castro to John F. Kennedy.

24 That was in October. In December the brigade which had
25 gone ashore at the Bay of Pigs, the brigade of Cuban exiles

1 referred to as No. 2506, was finally gotten out of Cuban jails
2 as a result of an exchange organized by Attorney General
3 Robert Kennedy of payments of medical supplies and pharmaceu-
4 ticals and so forth. And this group came back and they were
5 brought together in the Orange Bowl in Miami and President
6 Kennedy addressed him.

7 On that occasion, he said words to the effect that I will
8 return this flag to this brigade in a free Hananna. I think
9 those words are unambiguous.

10 So in this period of the months prior to his assassination,
11 there certainly was bad blood between President Kennedy and
12 Fidel Castro. This was known to everybody. Whether this blood
13 was made worse, or not made worse, by so-called assassination
14 plots which maybe Castro knew about, or maybe he did not know
15 about, I am unable to say.

16 But I think there has been a gross exaggeration which has
17 taken place about the role that the so-called assassination
18 plots might have played in the Warren Commission investigation.

19 Ladies and gentlemen, what different conclusion would you
20 suggest that the Warren Commission should have come to?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony
22 that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact,
23 were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light
24 of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why
25 the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro

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1 assassination plots.

2 Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the
3 Warren Commission about our operations.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission did not know
5 of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask
6 you about it.

7 Is that not true?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes, but how do you know they did not know
9 about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How
10 was I to know that?

11 And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in
12 the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren
13 Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else
14 without the Director's permission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever discuss with the Director
16 whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-
17 Castro assassination plots?

18 Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, in 1963, what consideration
20 if any the Warren Commission was giving to the theory that
21 the Kennedy assassination was part of a Cuban conspiracy, a
22 Castro conspiracy?

23 Mr. Helms. I do not know what consideration was given to
24 it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the issuance of the Warren

1 Commission's report, did the CIA at any time have any documents
2 or other information which indicated that Castro may have known
3 about the CIA anti-Castro's assassination plots?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any, Mr. Goldstein^{with}. Maybe
5 there were, maybe there were newspaper articles. I do not have
6 any recollection of that anymore. I believe this allegation
7 has been made. I do not have any firsthand recollection.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever conduct an investiga-
9 tion into this issue?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. During the time that you were DCI, do you
12 know whether the Agency ever conducted an investigation into
13 this issue?

14 Mr. Helms. If it did --

15 Mr. Craig. Could I clarify what issue you are talking
16 about here?

17 ^{Goldsmith} Mr. Helms. The issue I am concerned about now is whether
18 the Agency had any information that Castro may have known about
19 the assassination plots against him.

20 Mr. Craig. Whether the Agency conducted an investigation of
21 that issue?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

23 Mr. Helms. I would have thought, Mr. Goldsmith, that since
24 the Agency was operating against Cuba not only in 1962, '63,
25 '64, probably '65, that if those allegations were made by

1 agents of the FBI or the Secret Service or the Coast Guard
2 or the Agency itself that the Agency would have, in the
3 interests of protecting its operations, would have done its
4 best to find out if this were true. It is just maybe they
5 were not able to find out. I would have thought that there
6 would have been an ongoing series of operations in this regard.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall specifically one way or
8 another?

9 Mr. Helms. No.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the fact that the Warren Commission was
11 not told about the anti-Castro assassination plots, at least
12 by you, did that reflect a desire on your part to avoid
13 having embarrassed the Agency?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having any thoughts of
15 that kind in regard to the investigation of the Warren Commis-
16 sion. One of the difficulties I had with this question is
17 ever since Senator Schweiker's report was made, which made a
18 great deal out of this, I have never had an opportunity to
19 talk to the people who were associated with me at the time to
20 find out just exactly who knew what about what in those days.

21 The United States, after all, is a nation of Monday morning
22 quarterbacks and it seems to me this is one of the outstanding
23 examples of Monday morning quarterbacking.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was there any desire on your
25 part to avoid an international crisis by not telling the Warren

1 Commission about the anti-Castro assassination plots?

2 Mr. Helms. The thought never occurred to me, Mr. Goldsmith.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. In summary then, is it your position that
4 the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in
5 response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

6 Mr. Helms. That is correct.

7 I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible.
8 There may have been times or circumstances under which something
9 different might have occurred, but my recollection of those
10 days is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive
11 of the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for
12 something, we gave it to them.

13 As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have
14 no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, do you think that was a
16 workable arrangement?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought so.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, other than the anti-Castro
19 assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining
20 to a possible ^{motive,} mode of means or opportunity to kill the
21 President that the Warren Commission was not told about?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever inform President Johnson about
24 the anti-Castro assassination plots?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not like the term. You use it over and

1 over again. I do not like it.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, if you would give me
3 a term, I will make an effort to accommodate you.

4 Mr. Helms. That would be kind of you. I think what I
5 would like to say is that was President Johnson informed
6 of our efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you answer that question?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes, he was informed.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. At what time?

10 Mr. Helms. At various times after he became President.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was he told specifically about your efforts
12 to get rid of Castro prior to the assassination of President
13 Kennedy?

14 Mr. Helms. Yes, he was.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether he was specifically
16 told about the AMLASH plot?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I ever discussed the
18 AMLASH plot, or the AMLASH operation, as such. I do not have
19 any recollection of it.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether President Johnson
21 was apprised of the involvement of some of the Mafia figures
22 in this operation?

23 Mr. Helms. He was.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he was so apprised?

25 Mr. Helms. I do.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you so inform the Committee?

2 Mr. Helms. Yes. I have not testified to this before
3 because I have no written documentation to support this, but
4 I reported these various matters to President Johnson on May
5 10th, I believe, 1967.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. How are you able to remember the date so
7 well at this time, Mr. Ambassador?

8 Mr. Helms. I do not like the implication of the question,
9 at this time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am not in a position to
11 quarrel with you over the way my questions are phrased. I
12 would like to know --

13 Mr. Helms. The implication is that I declined to identify
14 it on some previous occasion.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. That is not the inference I
16 was intending to suggest. My question is a very simple one: how
17 are you able to remember today the specific date?

18 Mr. Helms. After I returned from Tehran and had some time
19 available to me, I had an opportunity to dig back and get
20 ahold of some colleagues and talk to various people to try to
21 range in on what time period it was that these matters came up
22 and how they were dealt with, the so-called IG Report that I
23 asked to have done at the Agency.

24 Therefore I wanted to try to specify the date on which I
25 reported to President Johnson about this IG Report. I was able

1 to relate it to another matter I discussed with him on that
2 occasion, and therefore I was able to specify the date.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what effect, if any, did
4 the CIA's concern with protecting sources and methods as
5 provided by law have on the information that was provided to
6 the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Preyer. This is the second bell on the vote. Before
8 we go into that answer, the Committee will stand in recess for
9 about ten minutes.

10 (A brief recess was taken.)

11 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its hearing.

12 I understand that it is agreeable with you to proceed at
13 this time, even in the absence of a quorum.

14 Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I repeat the question that
16 I asked you prior to the brief recess. What effect, if any,
17 did the agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and
18 methods have on the information that it provided to the Warren
19 Commission?

20 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I cannot recall any specific
21 circumstances if there were any where this question of protec-
22 ting sensitive sources and methods caused us difficulty.

23 As I said earlier this morning, somewhere in the back of
24 my mind there may have been an instance or two where we did not
25 particularly want to put something in writing to the Warren

1 Commission so that it would come to reside in our files,
2 become a part of the permanent record.

3 But in a couple of those cases -- and I believe there were --
4 someone went down and talked to a member, a couple of members
5 of the Warren Commission staff so that they would be privy to
6 the information without necessarily having it in writing.

7 I do want to repeat what I said earlier, that we were
8 doing our level best to be responsive and we were bending over
9 backward or frontward, any way you like, to be as responsive
10 as we could, even when sensitive sources and methods were
11 involved.

12 I think that you will find, if I just might add this, that
13 we turned over to the FBI, for example, material from a mail-
14 ordering operation which the Agency was conducting in those
15 days which was considered about as sensitive as anything that
16 we were doing.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. When the Warren Commission staff or members
18 were informed about information that either reflected a sensi-
19 tive agency method or information that came from a sensitive
20 agency source, was the source of that information actually
21 given to the Warren Commission?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I am sorry, I do not know.

23 We very seldom gave the names of sources to anybody, under
24 any circumstances. We usually tried to describe the source in
25 some fashion which would be helpful in evaluating the material.

1 But we practically never gave the names of individuals who
2 were informants or agents or anything of that kind.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling the Committee, then, while
4 the Warren Commission might be told about the substance of
5 the information generated from a sensitive source or method
6 of operation that the specific source and method would not
7 necessarily be disclosed?

8 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily, but I do not know what happened
9 in every instance. I am really trying to give you what was
10 the normal operating procedure.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Ambassador, I would like
12 you to refer to what has been marked as CIA Document No. 1907.
13 For your reference purposes, I would like to indicate that you
14 have been given a series of volumes of materials, materials
15 containing CIA documents.

16 The Agency has numbered those documents for the Committee.

17 You will note if you open up, in this case, volume number
18 two, on the lower right-hand corner of each page, it states
19 page 1 of -- in this case, 212.

20 There are 212 pages in this volume. That is not the
21 document number I am referring to. Immediately above that on
22 each page there is another number of four digits -- for example,
23 1874 appears on page 1.

24 When I say CIA Document No. 1907, that would refer to
25 what appears on page 1034 of 212. For the future, I will be

1 referring only to the CIA identification number.

2 Mr. Helms. All right.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the practice we have been utilizing
4 throughout ⁱⁿ the hearing ^{and} in depositions.

5 CIA 1907 is a brief for presentation to the President's
6 Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I would
7 ask you to look at CIA No. 1910 and read to yourself paragraph
8 E.

9 Mr. Helms. Paragraph E.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Helms. All right.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, does this paragraph
14 accurately reflect the Agency's attitude towards sensitive
15 sources and methods and the way in which information touching
16 upon sensitive sources and methods was handled with the Warren
17 Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. I believe so. I do not believe any reason to
19 quarrel with what is in that paragraph.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In the last sentence of this paragraph, there
21 is a reference to channels and procedures that have functioned
22 very well between the Commission and the Agency. Would you
23 apprise the Committee as to specifically which channels and
24 procedures were established in communicating this information
25 to the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I would assume, Mr. Goldsmith, that what they
2 are attempting to say here is certain individuals who are
3 familiar with the question at issue were authorized to sit
4 down and talk with the Warren Commission staff members about
5 the operation or about the information.

6 I do not recall there was any structured way that this was
7 taken care of. I think it was.

8 If you were the individual most conversant with the problem,
9 you might be authorized to go down, or maybe your Chief would
10 be authorized to go down and explain it and sit down with them
11 and go over it.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone from the Warren Commission or
13 its staff express its concern to you that sources and methods
14 by virtue of not being provided to the Warren Commission
15 specifically were causing a problem to the Commission or its
16 staff?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall this, Mr. Goldsmith.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, are you able
19 to state whether Mr. Dulles played any special role in the
20 Warren Commission in so far as the Agency was concerned.

21 Mr. Helms. I am not able to make any comment about it
22 at all.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state, for example, whether
24 Mr. Dulles represented the interests of the CIA while on the
25 Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know
2 what interests he represented. Having known Mr. Dulles for
3 many, many years, I would have thought that he would have
4 acted very responsively as a member of the Commission and
5 tried to represent the United States' interests.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles ever pass on to you Warren
7 Commission-related information?

8 Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. In fact, I do not remember
9 having seen Mr. Dulles at all during this period. If I did,
10 it must have been on very rare occasions.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, Mr. Dulles, never briefed you
12 or any Agency personnel on Warren Commission matters?

13 Mr. Helms. I did not say that he did not talk to anyone
14 else in the Agency. I do not recall his ever briefing me.
15 He was a very responsible individual, Mr. Dulles. I cannot
16 imagine his doing anything that he would have felt was
17 improper.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going
19 to move on to another line of inquiry unless you or any other
20 members have any questions.

21 Mr. Preyer. Mrs. Burke?

22 Mrs. Burke. No.

23 Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Gold-
24 smith. You may proceed.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what role, if any, did the

1 Mexico City Station have in the Agency's investigation of
2 the assassination?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I believe that the Mexico City
4 station had a rather key role at the outset because it was
5 the Mexico City station that produced the information prior to
6 President Kennedy's assassination that a fellow named Oswald
7 had indeed visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico
8 City and this had been made a matter of record in the United
9 States government.

10 So I think it was in this context that the Mexico City
11 station obviously after the assassination was being asked
12 about the circumstances surrounding this report and what
13 additional information they had and was it indeed Lee Harvey
14 Oswald.

15 And then I believe there was a great to-do about the fact
16 that his name was slightly wrong in the telegram, or the
17 dissemination that was made.

18 All of these things I have heard in recent times. But
19 his having been to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico
20 City, obviously was a very important part of the initial
21 impressions one had that it was Oswald that had committed the
22 assassination.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it appropriate to say, relative to the
24 roles played by other overseas stations, the Mexico City
25 Station played a greater role in the Agency's mission?

Investigation

1 Mr. Helms. I think that is a fair statement.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who the Chief of Station was
3 in Mexico City? To refresh your memory, was it Mr. Winn Scott?

4 Mr. Helms. Yes, that is correct.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to give the Committee an
6 assessment of Mr. Scott's competence as the Chief of Station?

7 Mr. Helms. Well, in the first place, Mr. Scott came to
8 the CIA after having been an agent for some years of the FBI.
9 He was a man of experience. He served a long time in Mexico
10 City, or -a comparative long time if you look at these overseas
11 assignments in terms of a tour of duty of two or three years.

12 He spoke Spanish, and he was regarded as one of our more
13 competent station chiefs.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether or not Mr. Scott
15 maintained an adequate system of records and files in the
16 Mexico City station?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection of this. In
18 fact, I do not recollect this having been an issue.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott had a
20 personal safe?

21 Mr. Helms. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for agency chiefs of station
23 to maintain a personal safe?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that that
25 was entirely up to them, if they wanted a personal safe or if

1 they did not want a personal safe. I see nothing about it
2 one way or the other.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Scott's death in '70 or '71, do
4 you know why Mr. James Angleton went to Mexico City and removed
5 documents from Mr. Scott's personal safe?

6 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever get materials from
8 Mr. Scott's safe to you?

9 Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having seen them. This
10 was in 1971, you say?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

12 Mr. Helms. I do not recall having seen them, Mr. Goldsmith.
13 In fact, I do not recall the trip. I am not for a moment
14 implying it did not take place, I just do not recall it at
15 all. I just knew that Mr. Scott died suddenly, I believe of
16 a heart attack. But he had left the Agency at that time, I
17 believe. Is that correct?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. He had retired.

19 Mr. Helms. Retired and living in Mexico City?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. That is also correct.

21 Mr. Helms. Right. I do not know what Mr. Angleton took.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. You never sent Mr. Angleton to Mexico City
23 to remove materials from his safe?

24 Mr. Helms. I may have authorized the trip on the basis of
25 what I was told at the time. In 1978, I do not remember the

1 trip.

2 Let me just say here that this is not solid information
3 I am giving you, but there may have been some concern that
4 maybe Scott had something in his safe that might affect the
5 Agency's work and the Agency just wanted to double check and
6 be sure there was not anything of that kind there. I think
7 that would be a normal practice, particularly if a fellow
8 died so suddenly and there we were.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Ann Goodpasture?

10 Mr. Helms. Ann Goodpasture, yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity did you know her?

12 -- Mr. Helms. She was a staffer of the Agency and I believe
13 she served in Mexico City for a time.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether during her stay in
15 Mexico City she was commonly known as Winn Scott's righthand
16 person?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall in that connection, but I
18 believe she was there quite some time.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, Mr. Ambassador,
20 did you review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed
21 between the Mexico City station and headquarters?

22 Mr. Helms. After the assassination?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Helms. I certainly saw some of the cables. I am simply
25 incapable of saying today of what I saw, how many of them I saw,

1 because I think, in some circumstances, I would have been
2 briefed, I would have been told here are the circumstances,
3 what should we do?

4 But I do not know whether I reviewed individual cables
5 or whether I did not.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was primarily responsible for reviewing
7 the cable traffic and dispatch traffic between the Mexico
8 City station and headquarters, specifically with regard to the
9 assassination?

10 Mr. Helms. I think in regard to the assassination the
11 branch that ran or had the control or support of the Mexico
12 City station, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere division,
13 the staff chiefs who are responsible for various aspects of
14 the operation like positive intelligence and counter-intelli-
15 gence, I undoubtedly read a number of them myself. I just
16 do not know which ones anymore.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we made reference to Mr. Whitten
18 being responsible for reviewing cable traffic pertaining to
19 the assassination. After the responsibility for the investiga-
20 tion was given to the CI staff, do you know whether anyone
21 on the CI staff was given the responsibility for reviewing
22 the cable traffic that flowed from the Mexico City station and
23 headquarters?

24 Mr. Helms. No, I do not know that this responsibility was
25 given specifically, but I would have thought that if Mr. Rocca,

1 whom you mentioned earlier this morning, were handling Mexico
2 City matters, he would have wanted to review the traffic.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any
4 surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban
5 and Soviet embassy and consulates?

6 Mr. Helms. My recollection was during that period they not
7 only had photographic surveillance of both of the embassies,
8 but they also had telephonic or wiretaps on both of the
9 embassies.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information related to Oswald obtained
11 as a result of these operations?

12 Mr. Helms. Yes, it was.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information was obtained?

14 Mr. Helms. My impression is that when he called one or
15 the other of the embassies that this was picked up and trans-
16 cribed and it was in that way that they found out that there
17 was a fellow named Oswald who had called.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there was any other
19 information obtained regarding Oswald as a result of these
20 surveillance operations?

21 Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore. It seems to me that
22 there was a great controversy back at that time over the
23 photograph of an individual.

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I will repeat my question.

1 Other than the information that was obtained concerning
2 Oswald as a result of the telephonic surveillance operation,
3 was any other information obtained about him as a result of
4 the surveillance operations that you had in Mexico City?

5 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not remember. I remember,
6 obviously, the telephone thing because that became such a key
7 issue later on. I do not remember whether they had other
8 information on them or not.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission given information
10 on Oswald's contact with the embassies?

11 Mr. Helms. As far as I know, it was.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall at that time whether the
13 Commission was specifically told about the source of the
14 information?

15 Mr. Helms. I believe this is what this must refer to here.
16 When you are asking me to read paragraph E, that I would have
17 assumed that the technical questions involved here was those
18 surveillance devices.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the Warren Commission
20 was told about the specific surveillance operations?

21 Mr. Helms. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to refer
23 to CIA document number 2144 which also appears in Volume 2.

24 Mr. Helms. My volume 2 only goes up to 2071.-

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I stand corrected. It is in

961

1 Volume 3.

2 Mr. Helms. Fine.

3 2144?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Helms. Right. I have got it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the first paragraph.

7 (Pause)

8 For the record, this is a cable dated 20 December 1963 to
9 Mexico City from the Director.

10 Mr. Helms. All right.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph 1 makes reference to the Agency's
12 intention to eliminate mention of the telephone taps in dealing
13 with the Warren Commission. Do you recall how long the Agency's
14 plan to eliminate mention of these taps in communicating
15 with the Warren Commission remained in effect?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

17 I am sorry. I have no information whatever.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain, however, that the Warren
19 Commission was told specifically about the telephone operations?

20 Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I just assumed that it was at
21 some point.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, to what extent, if any, did the
23 Agency's concern for protecting under the law sensitive sources
24 and methods interfere with the information that was being given
25 to the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I cannot answer the question.

2 I have been doing the best I can. It was my impression at
3 the time that one way or another staff members of the Commis-
4 sion were informed of the fact of the way the information had
5 been acquired because it was rather central to the investiga-
6 tion.

7 If this is not correct, then I am wrong. It was my
8 impression that at some time or other this was made clear
9 to them, I assume off the record.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify, for
11 purposes of this record, that I have shown you just one cable
12 dated December 20th. Subsequently, the Warren Commission was
13 given information.

14 I do not want to suggest to you that the information was
15 not given and the specific sources were not made available
16 to the Warren Commission.

17 The Committee, at this point, is concerned with what
18 appears to be an early plan not to make reference of these
19 sources and methods, but I do not want you to think that you
20 are being shown exhibits out of context.

21 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether it has been made, the
22 Committee has been made aware of the fact that the reason for
23 the sensitivity of these telephone taps and the surveillance
24 was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's stand-
25 point, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with

1 the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become
2 public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings
3 between Mexico and the United States, and that was the
4 reason.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that you refer
6 to CIA No. 177 which appears in Volume 1. For the record,
7 that is a cable dated October 9, 1963 to the Director from the
8 Mexico City station.

9 Mr. Helms. Do you want me to read the cable?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read it to yourself, sir.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. In the first paragraph of this cable,
14 it refers to LIENVOY. Is that a reference to the telephonic
15 surveillance operation?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore anything about these
17 cryptonyms. My assumption in reading this would be that
18 probably it did. I do not know for sure.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. From the context of the second paragraph
20 which makes reference to the source being LIANPY^{EMPTY}, would you
21 say that that, in all likelihood, refers to the photo operation?

22 Mr. Helms. LIANPY^{EMPTY}?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 Mr. Helms. I assume so. I do not recall any more.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does paragraph 2 contain a description of

1 someone that the Mexico City Station thought was Oswald?

2 Mr. Helms. I guess it was. That is the only assumption
3 I can make based on the context of the telegram.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The description of the individual involved
5 is not an accurate description of Oswald, is it?

6 Mr. Helms. Not based on what I have learned about Oswald
7 since.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how this individual mistakenly
9 was linked to Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City Station ever asked
12 to explain why it thought that the individual referred to in
13 paragraph 2 was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald?

14 Mr. Helms. I have a general impression that there was a
15 great effort made to clarify who this man was. Is this the
16 fellow they have never identified? This photograph has been
17 kicking around for years.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let me show you that photograph now
19 to refresh your memory.

20 For the record, this corresponds with Exhibit No. 1 of
21 the Warren Commission.

22 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. That is the
23 photograph I recollect as being the one that every effort was
24 being made to find out who that man was. Has he ever been
25 identified?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, that was my next question.
2 Was the Agency ever able to identify this individual?

3 Mr. Helms. Not to the best of my knowledge.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City Station ever explain
5 to Headquarters how this individual was linked to Oswald?

6 Mr. Helms. If they did, I was never made privy to it. I
7 think it was obviously a mistake of some sort.

8 All I recall is that a valiant effort was made to find
9 out who this fellow was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was consideration ever given to the
11 possibility that this person may have been an Oswald imposter?

12 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not recall the circum-
13 stances anymore. I am sorry.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that the
15 question of whether this individual was an Oswald imposter
16 presents a significant issue. By virtue of you not being able
17 to recall whether or not this was examined, is it fair to say
18 that it probably was not considered?

19 In other words, I am suggesting that, because the issue
20 is a significant one, had it been considered, you would remember
21 it.

22 Mr. Helms. You see, Mr. Goldsmith, I can see the signi-
23 ficance of the issue, but if we do not know who the man was,
24 we do not know where he was. How were we going to investigate
25 this? If I may submit, in fairness, we did not have access to

1 the Cuban authorities to go to their embassy and say, who is
2 this fellow seen coming out of your embassy. We did not have
3 it with the Russians either. Where were we to go to investi-
4 gate this matter?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you do not recall whether
6 this issue was investigated?

7 Mr. Helms. No, I do not, but I do not know how it would
8 have been investigated.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission told about
10 the picture to which reference is made in paragraph 3 of this
11 cable?

12 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about
14 the specific connection between the picture and the cable
15 reporting Oswald's contact with the Embassy?

16 Mr. Helms. I would have imagined that the Agency did
17 everything that it could to work with the Warren Commission
18 staff in trying to find out who this man was, what his signi-
19 ficance might be. I cannot imagine that this was not thoroughly
20 gone into.

21 If there were any evidence not thoroughly gone into, I
22 would not understand it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where
24 I felt the Warren Commission, by virtue of not having known of
25 this picture or of the cable perhaps did not ask the Agency

1 about it and therefore may not have been apprised of this
2 photograph.

3 Mr. Helms. Is my recollection not accurate that we had
4 the FBI working with us to try to locate this man? It seems
5 to me that everybody we might find who might have conceivably
6 had some means of identifying him was asked about it. I do not
7 think we were making any secret of it, that we could not iden-
8 tify him. We were trying to get some help to do it.

9 I do not think this is one of these closely-guarded
10 secrets, nor did the Agency have any motive for passing that
11 along to anyone who was interested.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of attempting to refresh
13 your memory on this issue, the way that the Warren Commission,
14 at least in the record, was apprised of this photograph was
15 as follows: in February, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified
16 before the Commission and made reference to a photograph that
17 she had seen that purported to show Jack Ruby.

18 The photograph she was referring to was one of the
19 individuals who appears in the picture we just told you, *Odum*
20 Exhibit No. 1. That, at least in the record, is the first
21 time that the Warren Commission was told about this particular
22 photograph.

23 Is that consistent with your recollection?

24 Mr. Helms. How did Marguerite Oswald find out about the
25 photograph? Had she been shown the photograph?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. She was shown the photograph shortly
2 after the assassination.

3 Mr. Helms. By the FBI?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Helms. Begging your pardon, what was the question?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. The question is, according to the record,
7 the first time the Warren Commission was told about this photo-
8 graph in mid-February of 1964, at that time, the person who
9 informed the Commission about the photograph was Marguerite
10 Oswald, not the Agency.

11 Mr. Helms. I have no idea why the Agency had not raised
12 the question of the photograph. The only supposition I can
13 make, not knowing who it was, they did not know what to do
14 about it, and they did not know its relevance or its signifi-
15 cance.

16 Mr. Preyer. Excuse me. We have another vote on.

17 The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

18 (A brief recess was taken.)

19 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its sitting.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you recall whether the
21 Warren Commission was dissatisfied with the explanation that
22 had been given to it concerning the photograph of the individual
23 in Mexico City that initially was linked to Oswald?

24 ^{Helms} Mr. Preyer. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. That would be
25 a very difficult question for me to answer. I do not recall

1 any official criticism. They may have said something to
2 members of the staff, or a member of the staff may have said
3 something to a member of the Agency about it. I do not have
4 any personal recollection of it.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ^{refer to} CIA document No. 2221, which appears
6 in Volume 3.

7 Mr. Helms. Volume 3, 2221?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

9 For the record, that is a memorandum prepared by William
10 Coleman on March 26, 1964.

11 Mr. Helms. I am having trouble finding it. I am sorry.
12 I am moving as fast as I can here. 2221?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. I have it. Do you want me to read that?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Please.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Helms. All right. I have read it now.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Focusing your attention on the second to
19 last paragraph in CIA 2222, that seems to suggest, does it
20 not, that at least Mr. Coleman, who was ^a the senior staff
21 counsel with the Warren Commission, was not satisfied with the
22 explanation that had been given to him by the Agency concern-
23 ing that photograph?

24 Mr. Helms. That does seem to be what he is implying.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that refresh your memory as to whether

1 this photograph created any controversy between the Commission
2 and the Agency?

3 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. It does not.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any reason why the Commission
5 would not have been told about this photograph as early as
6 December when it was initially formed?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not have any idea why. It was later
8 than that. The photograph was brought to the Commission's
9 attention. I have no recollection of this whatsoever. My
10 recollection is confined almost entirely to the efforts made
11 at some point. I do not even know exactly what period this
12 was to try to find out who the man was.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. At this point, would you please refer to
14 CIA 2139.

15 Mr. Craig. Is that also Volume 3?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

17 Mr. Helms. I am zeroing in on it. I have got it, 2139.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is an internal note
19 dated 5 March 1964 from Raymond Rocca to Dick -- I assume that
20 is Richard Helms.

21 Mr. Helms. You assume it is who?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Richard Helms, yourself. If my assump-
23 tion is incorrect, please clarify the record.

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. The reason I assumed the memo was
2 addressed to you was that someone wrote in in parentheses
3 DDP immediately above the name Dick.

4 Mr. Helms. I see that.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever receiving this memo?

6 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the second
8 paragraph of the memo, does it make reference to the famous
9 six photographs that were not of Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. It does. It says, for example, the famous
11 six photographs that were not of Oswald. I did not realize
12 there were six photographs.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I should indicate they
14 eventually located as many as twelve photographs of this
15 individual.

16 Drawing your attention to the second paragraph, why
17 was there a preference on the part of at least some of your
18 staff to wait out the Warren Commission with respect to,
19 among other things, these photographs?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I assume it has to do with
21 the way they were taken. Is that not a reasonable inference,
22 that it was a question about wanting to put on the public
23 record the fact that we were photographing people going in and
24 out of these embassies.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. The issue here is not putting anything in

1 the public record. The issue is explaining what happened to
2 the Warren Commission.

3 Mr. Helms. I do not know if it was something else. I do
4 not have any idea what it is any longer, but I assume you have
5 had an opportunity to speak to Mr. Rocca or Mr. Angleton or
6 somebody. Maybe they have a better recollection than I. I
7 do not recall if I got this memorandum what I did about it.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. If this case involving the photograph
9 an example of a situation where the Agency's concern for
10 protecting sources and methods under the law prevented it from
11 giving the Warren Commission all of the information that the
12 Commission was asking for?

13 Mr. Helms. It may be they were not getting it promptly
14 in the form in which they wanted it. It seems to me that the
15 entire thrust of this memorandum was that they were getting
16 the information, in any event, in some form or another, by
17 some means or other.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy,
19 turning to another issue not dealing with this document, that
20 contact was reported to Headquarters by cable, I believe the
21 cable recited earlier. Why would a cable be used to report
22 this contact as opposed to some other way of communicating
23 the information?

24 Mr. Helms. I think that since this was an American, since
25 they thought it was an American who had gone to a Soviet

1 Embassy, that they would report it by cable. That was a
2 reasonably routine way of doing it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest that the contact at
4 the time you would consider to be important?

5 Mr. Helms. It does not suggest to me anything like that.
6 The pouch usually took a long time. They would have thought
7 since this was an American they ought to report on it promptly.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with
9 the Soviet Embassy, was any importance attached to that
10 contact?

11 Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of. I would have thought
12 that the evidence would have indicated to the contrary.
13 The FBI apparently paid no attention to the report.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask you to refer
15 to CIA No. 179 that appears in Volume 1; for the record, that
16 is a cable dated 10-10-63 consisting of Headquarters' response
17 to the earlier Mexico City station cable.

18 I would ask you to read through CIA 179 to 181.

19 (Pause)

20 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. This cable contains information reporting
22 that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union. Once this fact
23 had been realized did this in any way escalate the significance
24 of his contact with the Soviet Embassy?

25 Mr. Helms. This information? Yes. I would have thought

1 it would have escalated it quite considerably.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Would some sort of response have been
3 expected on the part of the Mexico City station, had they
4 additional information on Oswald?

5 Mr. Helms. Yes. I would have thought that the Chief
6 of the Mexico City Station, having received this telegram,
7 if he did get additional information on Oswald he would desire
8 to pass it very quickly back to Headquarters.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, if the Mexico City Station
10 had information in its possession and that information had
11 already been processed to the effect that Oswald had also
12 contacted the Cuban Embassy, should that have been communicated
13 to Headquarters?

14 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I do not know
15 whether it was or not, but I would have thought it should have
16 been.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of this cable contains
18 a correct description of Oswald, at least a description that
19 is more accurate than the one that is contained in the Mexico
20 City Station cable.

21 Upon receiving this description, did the Mexico City
22 station ever respond with respect to the discrepancy in the
23 two descriptions?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. This cable also refers to Oswald as Lee

1 Henry Oswald. I believe earlier you made reference to the
2 fact that there had been some confusion over the middle name.

3 Do you know how the name Lee Henry Oswald got into the
4 Agency's records instead of Lee Harvey Oswald?

5 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that ever a source of concern to you?

7 Mr. Helms. I believe there was an effort to ascertain
8 what had caused the mistake, but I do not know whether any
9 satisfactory explanation was ever found.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether any report was
11 written reflecting that effort?

12 Mr. Helms. I would have assumed that someone would have
13 written up the work they had done in an effort to clear up
14 the discrepancy, but I do not recall the report, and I cannot
15 say from firsthand knowledge that one existed.

16 I would have assumed that a form would have required the
17 writing of such a report.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to CIA No. 181, the lower left-
19 hand corner of the page, it indicates that Thomas Karamessinas
20 was the releasing officer of this cable.

21 Mr. Helms. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the
23 Agency as Mr. Karamessinas have been the releasing officer for
24 a cable like this?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not think -- if I may suggest it, with

1 due deference, that is not really the way I would have
2 described what was happening here.

3 You see, this cable originates in the Western Hemisphere
4 Division because, not only through the Western Hemisphere
5 Division, but it also goes to various elements of the CI staff.
6 Frequently in the procedures that we used in the Agency when
7 you had both staff and various parts of the staff and the
8 division and so forth, these frequently went to the so-called
9 front office for relief, either to Karamessinas or myself.

10 Since I notice in the cable here questions of policy as
11 to where this information was going to be disseminated and
12 things of that kind, I would have found this quite a normal
13 procedure.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you, at this time, refer to CIA
15 No. 2140, Volume No. 3.

tape 2a 16 Mr. Preyer. We have another vote on. It is final
17 passage on the defense bill. We will recess for ten minutes.

18 (A brief recess was taken.)

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, would you refer to 2140?

20 Mr. Helms. Yes. Do you want me to read it?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, please.

22 (Pause)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is a 10-10-63
24 dissemination cable sent by Headquarters to various Federal
25 agencies.

1 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have read it.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, this cable in particular
3 has sparked some controversy because it also contains an
4 indirect description of Oswald. The question I have for you
5 is why, especially in light of the earlier cable which you
6 just examined which contained a correct description, this
7 incorrect description went out in this particular cable.

8 Mr. Helms. I do not have a clue, Mr. Goldsmith^{with}.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that issue ever raised by the Warren
10 Commission?

11 Mr. Helms. I have no recollection any longer. I assume
12 it must have been raised. I would assume this would have been
13 gone over and picked at and repicked at and every effort made
14 to find out what had happened and what had gone wrong. But
15 that is 15 years ago and I do not have any recollection of the
16 chain of events.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever shown these
18 specific cables?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they
20 might have been shown this dissemination. I do not think
21 there would have been any reluctance to show them that.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever
23 obtain a tape-recording of Oswald's voice?

24 Mr. Helms. I would have assumed when this telephone
25 call -- is that what you are referring to by tape recording?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

2 Mr. Helms. Those telephone calls were taped.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings of
4 Oswald's voice the station managed to obtain?

5 Mr. Helms. No.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Were these tape recordings in existence at
7 the time of the assassination?

8 Mr. Helms. I can only assume that they were. How
9 frequently they were cleaned up after they were transcribed, I
10 do not know. I do not know anything about those procedures
11 anymore, if I ever did.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the tapes were made
13 available to the Warren Commission?

14 Mr. Helms. Whether they were made available?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

16 Mr. Helms. I do not.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings there
18 were?

19 Mr. Helms. Of Oswald's voice?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been unusual for the
23 Agency not to have had tape recordings in existence in November
24 of '63, at the President's assassination?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not know how long they kept those tapes,

1 whether they simply transcribed what was on them and cleaned
2 them up and used them again, or whether they held them. I do
3 not know what they did with them.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that the
5 Ambassador be given JFK Exhibit 128, and I would like to have
6 Exhibit 128 introduced in the record. It is a letter from
7 Mr. Hoover to Mr. Reilly of the Secret Service dated November
8 23, 1963.

9 Mr. Chairman, I request that this item be admitted as
10 an Exhibit.

11 Mrs. Burke. So ordered, without objection.

12 (The document referred to was
13 marked JFK Exhibit No. 128 for
14 identification.)

15 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read starting on page
16 4 of the last paragraph on the page.

17 Mrs. Helms. Yes, I have read that document or that
18 paragraph of the document.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Hoover is referring to a tape record-
20 ing that his agent listened to. Do you know which tape
21 recording he is referring to?

22 Mr. Helms. I have no idea. I am sorry.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was any issue ever raised in 1963 concern-
24 ing a tape recording that had been made available which purpor-
25 ted to contain Oswald's voice, which in the end did not?

1 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I cannot help you.

2 May I ask, not out of curiosity, but simply by way of
3 attempting to be helpful, is it possible that what Mr. Hoover
4 is referring to, that some FBI agent assigned to the Embassy,
5 the American Embassy in Mexico City, might have been who
6 listened to this tape recording?

7 The FBI had a large station in Mexico City. I just
8 thought that might be what he is referring to.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the question of the
10 existence of Oswald's tapes was important in 1963?

11 For example, I raised this with you because the question
12 has arisen as to whether the person who showed up at the
13 Embassies in Mexico City was not Oswald. If you had a tape
14 recording of his voice, that could obviously be tested to
15 corroborate whether that was Oswald.

16 Do you recall whether this was an issue in 1963?

17 Mr. Helms. If it was, I do not know how it was handled.
18 I do not recall it as an issue.

19 As I say here today, I do not ever recall anybody ever
20 having said to me that it was not Lee Harvey Oswald who called
21 the Embassy.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever
23 obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photo surveil-
24 lance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and
25 consulates?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know. My impression is that they
2 did not, but I am not sure.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this time to refer to
4 CIA No. 248, which would appear in Volume No. 1.

5 Mr. Helms. All right.

6 Would you give me the number again?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. 248.

8 Mr. Helms. I have 248.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

10 (Pause)

11 For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Papich of the FBI
12 concerning the photo-coverage of the embassies dated 27
13 November 1963.

14 Mr. Helms. Who is this memorandum signed by, or who did
15 it originally come from? Where did it originate, so I can tell
16 what I am reading?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to answer
18 your inquiry. However, the Agency has made available to us at
19 this time just the first page of this memo so that the author
20 cannot be identified at this time.

21 Mr. Helms. Thank you.

22 I have read the page.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that according to this
24 memo the CIA and the Mexico City Station at least attempted to
25 keep the Cuban and Soviet embassies and consulates under constant

1 surveillance, photographically?

2 Mr. Helms. That was certainly the object of the exercise.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. If the record -- by the record, I refer
4 to the Agency's record of Oswald's contacts with the embassies,
5 and also the Warren Commission's contacts with the embassies,
6 established that Oswald visited the Cuban and Russian embassies
7 and consulates at least five times, possibly more than six.

8 Would you regard it as unusual for the surveillance sta-
9 tion not to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought it was unusual if he has
11 been there five or six times.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, there were, in the record, no
13 photographs of Oswald that ^{were} ~~was~~ obtained.

14 Was the Mexico City Station ever questioned as to why
15 no photograph of Oswald had been obtained?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know firsthand if they were questioned,
17 but I would assume they were questioned in spades. I would
18 assume everyone would want to know why.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you specifically involved?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not remember any more.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym
22 AMMUR?

23 Mr. Helms. No.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether in 1963 or '64 the
25 Agency obtained information concerning Oswald from a Cuban

1 defector who defected from the DGI?

2 Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-
4 tion, please refer to CIA 1879 that appears in Volume 2.

5 Mr. Helms. 1879?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

7 Incidentally, I have been informed that the memo you were
8 just referring to, CIA 248, appears to be a blind memo, just
9 one page in length.

10 Mr. Helms. I see. Thank you.

11 (Pause)

12 All right. I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Before going into this memo in further
14 detail, I would like to know whether you think it should be a
15 source of concern for this Committee specifically, the fact
16 that, according to the Agency's record, no photograph of
17 Oswald during his visit to Mexico City was ever taken or
18 obtained.

19 Mr. Helms. I think it would be useful if I were to say
20 that using photographic surveillance of those embassies in a
21 foreign country was a very tricky matter, not only as to rela-
22 tions between the countries, but tricky as far as the public
23 is concerned, and that expecting clandestine technical devices
24 of that kind to work perfectly is quite beyond the state of the
25 art, or was in the year 1963, and there is nothing the Congress

1 can do to improve that kind of thing. Either the thing works
2 or it does not work. But there is very little point in trying
3 to follow a line of inquiry that is critical of the way the
4 Agency conducted those operations, because they were done under
5 the most difficult circumstances, not under laboratory
6 circumstances. Therefore, if they worked or did not work, it
7 was a great deal of matter of luck, often, than good technical
8 work or good judgment.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. That line of inquiry is not directed
10 specifically at any criticism of the Agency. The mode of
11 analysis goes to style.

12 Oswald makes five or six visits to the Embassy. We have
13 a situation where the record suggests that there was an attempt
14 to have continuous photographic coverage. Even if the photo-
15 graphic coverage was not 100 percent effective, one would think
16 if he visited five or six times he would be picked up at
17 least once.

18 From that, the next step would be, if there was a picture,
19 why was it not made available? And that is specifically the
20 issue with which the Committee is concerned.

21 Mr. Helms. I can understand the Committee's concern, and
22 I wish it luck solving the problem.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this particular document, 1879,
24 is your memory now refreshed about a Cuban defector offering
25 information to the Agency concerning Oswald, concerning the

1 assassination in general?

2 Mr. Helms. My xerox is so poor here. Is this the one
3 you are referring to as AMMUD?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Helms. I had forgotten about this defector report
6 or, if I knew about it, I imagine it was brought to my atten-
7 tion at the time, certainly, I do not recall anymore.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the middle of the page, the
9 part of the paragraph labelled as "Comment," would you tell the
10 Committee what the term WH/SA/CI?

11 Mr. Helms. SA, I am not sure anymore what that would have
12 been. I do not know if that was Special Activities or just
13 what. I am sorry. Wait a minute.

14 No, I cannot help you.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether SA referred to the
16 Cuban Task Force?

17 Mr. Helms. If it referred to the Cuban Task Force, I
18 would have thought it would have been SAS. I thought that
19 what was normally referred to, the Special Activities Staff,
20 and it was therefore referred to, or would have been referred
21 to, as WH/SAS/CI, if that is what it was.

22 Maybe this is correct. I do not want to say you are not
23 correct. Obviously, you know a great deal more about this these
24 days than I do.

25 I can only say I thought it was usually referred to as

1 SAS.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information concerning
3 the assassination AMMUD provided?

4 Mr. Helms. No.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information he provided
6 concerning Oswald's contacts with DGI?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not. I just know what I have read on
8 the sheet.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of the sheet indicates
10 that Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy on two or three occa-
11 sions. Then it says, before, during and after these visits,
12 Oswald was in contact with DGI, Cuban intelligence.

13 What follow-up, if any, do you recall being done with
14 this particular issue?

15 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not understand.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Having received this information, what
17 was done with it?

18 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what could have
19 been done with it. So he was in touch with Cuban Intelligence.
20 What would we do about that.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about it?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they
23 would have been.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where
25 the Warren Commission maybe did not have knowledge of this

1 incident, would not have specifically asked you about it.

2 So this would be an example of the CIA's initiating information
3 to the Warren Commission.

4 Mr. Helms. It seems to me, having interrogated a defec-
5 tor and developed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and his
6 contacts with the Cubans, that the Agency would have volun-
7 teered this information to the Warren Commission if, indeed,
8 the Warren Commission was still sitting on 5 May 1964, which
9 I assume that it was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, would you please read CIA
11 No. 1906, which is a memo dated 12 May 1964, directed to Mr.
12 Rocca from Mr. Angleton.

13 Mr. Helms. This is from Angleton to Rocca, right.

14 (Pause)

15 I have read it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. It says, "I raised with Mr. Helms the
17 nature of the recent information you are processing that
18 originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source" That
19 would be AMMUD.

20 "I informed him that this would raise a number of new
21 factors with the Commission," et cetera.

22 What new factors, if any, would the AMMUD case have
23 raised with the Warren Commission?

24 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. In 1978, I haven't the foggiest
25 idea.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any reluctance on the part of
2 the Agency to disclose this information to the Warren Commis-
3 sion because of the sensitivity of the source?

4 Mr. Helms. Did you not just tell me he was a defector?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, he was a defector.

6 Mr. Helms. And was a defector at this time?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

8 Mr. Helms. I am not entirely sure why this great question
9 of sensitivity, unless he was a secret defector and the
10 Cubans did not know he had defected. That might make it
11 sensitive.

12 I cannot figure out what else would have been sensitive
13 about it. I simply take the word of Angleton who wrote the
14 memorandum that there was something sensitive about it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever tasked
16 to pursue the leads generated by the source?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the
19 case of the Soviet defector Nosenko?

20 Mr. Helms. Yes, I am.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did you play with
22 regard to the handling of this case?

23 Mr. Helms. I assume -- and I have to use the word
24 assume, because my memory does not carry me this far. I assume
25 that I was, in one way or another, involved with the Nosenko

1 case from the time that contact was made with him in Geneva
2 through his defection and then through the period after he
3 defected and was held by the Agency and I was probably in and
4 out of the case -- and by in and out, I simply mean that at
5 periodic intervals I would hear some aspects of the case, or
6 about the case -- until the time that he was eventually
7 resettled.

8 In other words, by "resettled," I simply mean he was led
9 out of the Agency's custody, found a place to live. I thought
10 he was given a new identity and assumed a life in American
11 society in the public domain. But I was in and out of it all
12 the time. How many decisions I was involved in during this
13 period I do not recall anymore.

14 I do not want to duck any of them. It was an ongoing
15 case of great sensitivity, great legal complications, and that
16 is the best way I can answer your question.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I take it that, as DDP and then DCI, you
18 were involved in the decision-making process concerning Nosenko?

19 Mr. Helms. That is right.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read the three major agency
21 reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case?
22 Specifically, there was a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet
23 Russia Division; another report later in '68 called the ^{Sole} Soley
24 Report; another, a third report, in 1976 referred to as the
25 Hart Report.

1 Have you had occasion to read any of those reports?

2 Mr. Helms. It is a cinch I have not read the Hart Report
3 because I had left the Agency long before 1976. As to the
4 other two reports, I do not recall anymore whether I read them.
5 I cannot imagine that I would not have been told what was in
6 them.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. During his defection in 1964 and at his
8 arrival in the United States, was he in the custody of the CIA?

9 Mr. Helms. Yes.

10 The procedure was that Soviet defectors, or defectors
11 who were accepted by act of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee,
12 were handled by the Agency and the United States, and Nosenko
13 was no exception.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. By what legal authority do you recall was
15 Nosenko in CIA custody? You made reference to normal procedure.

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether the NSC directive have
17 the power of law or not. I am not a lawyer.

18 I simply know that it was an agreed-upon device in the
19 United States government for handling defectors.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. How long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA
21 custody?

22 Mr. Helms. Two or three years, I imagine.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. If the record would indicate that he was
24 in custody until October '69, at which point he was admitted
25 as a resident alien to the United States, would you dispute

1 that in any way?

2 Mr. Helms. I would have thought -- I see what you mean.
3 Excuse me. I do not think I understood your question properly.
4 Let me go back.

5 I have no reason to question the fact that he was in CIA
6 custody until 1969. I was referring to the fact that he was
7 under interrogation for, I think, two or three years and then
8 he was in the Agency's custody under different surroundings
9 and under different circumstances I believe.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We understand each other.

11 What unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility
12 for handling Nosenko in 1964?

13 Mr. Helms. My recollection was that he was turned over
14 to the Director of Security as far as his handling and housing
15 and so forth was concerned; that his interrogation was handled
16 by people provided by the Soviet Russian Division, or whatever
17 the division was known as at that time.

18 The title of that division, Mr. Chairman, changed through
19 the years, and I am not sure what it was called in 1964.
20 Anyway, it was the division that was attempting to run opera-
21 tions against the Soviet Union.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying initially the responsibil-
23 ity for questioning Mr. Nosenko was given to personnel from
24 the Soviet Russia Division?

25 Mr. Helms. The interrogating responsibility, yes.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Did they continue to have responsibility
2 for him until he was released from CIA custody in 1969?
3 Custody in the sense that you referred to earlier?

4 Mr. Helms. We switched terminology here. The Soviet
5 Russian fellow were the interrogators. The housekeepers,
6 administrators and handlers I believe, if I am not mistaken,
7 came from the Director of Security. I believe that they con-
8 tinued this on through during the time that he was in Agency
9 custody.

10 Am I wrong about that?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I am afraid I cannot respond to you at this
12 time concerning that. You are certainly correct in terms of
13 personnel who handled him with regard to interrogation.

14 Mr. Helms. All right. Let me just rest on what I have
15 said.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. So initially, the personnel that handled
17 the interrogations came from the S~~R~~ Branch or Division. Did
18 they continue to have this responsibility until Mr. Nosenko
19 was released from custody in 1969?

20 Mr. Helms. I thought the interrogation period was sort
21 of over when he was turned over to Bruce ^{Soley}Soley and ^{Soley}Soley
22 was the fellow who was supposed to take care of him and talk
23 to him and so forth.

24 My recollection may be wrong. It may be fuzzy. I thought
25 that there was a change there.

1 At the time that he was released from the active or hostile
2 interrogation, an effort was being made to get him adjusted so
3 he could assume some kind of life in American society.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Why was responsibility for handling
5 Nosenko in terms of questioning him transferred from the SR
6 people to Bruce ^{Soley} Soley?

7 Mr. Helms. My recollection of the circumstances was
8 I had a problem as Director and it was a serious problem --
9 that was what to do with Mr. Nosenko. After all, we held him
10 against the laws of the United States for a period of two or
11 three years. Even though we had consulted with the Deputy
12 Attorney General as to what to do about the case we got no
13 particular help from him because there was no legal precedent
14 for these things.

15 In fact, as far as I know today, there has been no effort
16 made to set up a legal context in which a case like this could
17 be held.

18 I was not interested in continuing this any longer than
19 it was felt necessary to get as best we could to the bottom of
20 the Nosenko case.

21 So after considering all the factors, the decision was
22 made to get him out of what I can only refer to as Durance
23 file and get him into different circumstances and make an
24 effort not only to resettle him, but find out whether pleasant
25 and cordial treatment he had any different things to say than

1 he had under hostile interrogation.

2 I want to emphasize the point. I am not trying to anti-
3 cipate your questions, Mr. Goldsmith; it just seems to run
4 right along here -- that my motivation as Director of the
5 Agency was to get that man into a status where he could handle
6 it in some way that was proper and legal and all of the rest
7 of it and get him out of a status where we were obviously in
8 violation of the law in holding him.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long a period Mr. Nosenko
10 was held in custody or confinement under violation of the law?

11 Mr. Helms. I think it was two or three years anyway.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which individual specifically
13 had primary responsibility for interrogating him in '64? To
14 refresh your memory in part, would David Murphy have been one
15 of those individuals?

16 Mr. Helms. That sounds good.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anyone else besides Mr.
18 Murphy?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I recall this name
20 from my recollections as to 1964. It seems to me that Bagley
21 was another fellow involved in the interrogation of Nosenko.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Helms. I do not compre-
23 hend fully your response. Another individual may have been
24 involved in the interrogation?

25 Mr. Helms. An individual knowned as Tennant Bagley.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I understood that. The record is clear
2 on that.

3 My question now is was another individual who interroga-
4 ted Mr. Nosenko known as Thomas Ryan?

5 Mr. Helms. That name, I am sorry, does not ring any
6 bells with me.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did Mr. Bagley hold with
8 the Agency?

9 Mr. Helms. I think at that time he was in the SR Division
10 somewhere.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. How were these individuals selected for
12 handling, Mr. Nosenko? Why, in particular, were these
13 individuals chosen?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that
15 the Chief of the SR Division would pick individuals who knew
16 the most about Soviet intelligence, Soviet intelligence
17 methodology, how things were done in the Soviet Union. In
18 other words, would have provided the most expert interrogators
19 we could have.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. How much expertise, if any, did the
21 individuals have ^{on} to the Oswald case?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. When Nosenko was questioned about Oswald,
24 was any effort made to have the interrogator have sufficient
25 expertise concerning Oswald and the JFK assassination?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I cannot imagine he would
2 not have briefed himself on these things. In other words,
3 what would be the purpose on the part of the interrogation?
4 What we were trying to do was find out whether Nosenko was
5 telling the truth or not. This would have been an important
6 part of finding that out.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you also think that the individuals
8 involved with the questioning of Nosenko were, in fact,
9 experienced interrogators?

10 Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know what experienced interro-
11 gators are, really. In the American vernacular, a man who
12 has been doing anything for two weeks has become experienced,
13 so I do not know how you evaluate that term.

14 But people like Murphy and Bagley and so forth were
15 certainly experienced in Soviet Russian matters. Whether they
16 were experienced interrogators or not, I do not remember. The
17 word interrogator is something from World War II. If you were
18 an interrogator in a prisoner of war camp, you kind of got that
19 rubric hung around your neck and that gave you a certain status.
20 I have never quite understood why, but nevertheless it did.

21 Whether these fellows ever had that kind of interrogation
22 instruction or experience, I do not remember.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The Nosenko case was an important one,
24 was it not?

25 Mr. Helms. Very important.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, would it be expected
2 that the people questioning him would have had a lot of
3 experience?

4 Mr. Helms. I would have thought the agency would have
5 put the best people in it that they could find. Certainly that
6 was my intention.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Who made decisions concerning which areas
8 of inquiry were going to be addressed to Nosenko?

9 Mr. Helms. I think there was a great deal of cooperation
10 done within the DDP trying to work out the interrogation of
11 Nosenko. It was so important to us and we had him for so long-
12 I am certain there there was a lot of consultation and effort
13 made to figure out ways to arrive at the truth here.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the SR branch, which units would
15 have been involved?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know who was involved. That is all
17 on the record. I think it is fine to ask me these things, but
18 fifteen years later I do not remember a whole list of names.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Part of the Committee's problem is that
20 the record is not all that clear and does contain errors.

21 Mr. Helms. The record contains errors? How does the record
22 contain errors? I am not clear.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I am talking in a general sense. Part of
24 the problem that the Committee faces is ^(that) the record, in fact,
25 does not speak for itself and that records do contain errors.

1 Mr. Helms. I see.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I make no comment one way or the other
3 whether the record contains errors in this particular case.

4 How frequently were you briefed concerning the results
5 of Nosenko's interrogation sessions?

6 Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection whatever.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you ever recall being briefed?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes. I am sure I was asking from time to
9 time as to how we were finding out. After all, I felt I had
10 to go see Chief Justice Warren and tell him that we were not
11 able to establish Nosenko's bona fides. I obviously satisfied
12 myself before I went that we were not able to.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Did questions concerning Oswald constitute
14 a major facet of the overall inquiry that was being made of
15 Nosenko?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes. No question about it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. In January, 1968 when the SR Division
18 Report concerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency's
19 position concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not think the Agency has ever had a
21 position. The only position I know of that could be called an
22 Agency position was we did not know whether he is bona fide
23 or not. I never made a determination as to whether he was
24 bona fide or not. But I believe unless something has happened
25 that I never heard of, that it still must be an open question.

1 Or, let us put it this way, a matter of opinion.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not so that the SR Report of 1968
3 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not remember firsthand what the thrust
5 of the report was, but obviously this is a very difficult line
6 of inquiry for me because I read the magazines and newspapers
7 and books and so forth which have appeared since, and I do not
8 know what I have read there and what I knew from that time.

9 I just judge from reading the New York magazine, for
10 example, that this is still an open question. If the New
11 York magazine is a bad source, I have nothing to add.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In January, '68, when the --

13 Mr. Sawyer. If counsel would yield for just a moment,
14 may I ask the Ambassador, this is kind of intriguing to me,
15 we having had a rather long session with Mr. Nosenko. Do you
16 have an opinion yourself on that question?

17 Mr. Helms. No, sir, I do not, because a lot of time has
18 passed since I have been out of the Agency and a lot of the
19 factors that went into this argument and debate, I have now
20 forgotten about.

21 I have been under constant appearances in Grand Juries,
22 Congressional Committees and various investigations on all
23 kinds of subjects, so my memory is even more wonky than it
24 would be under normal conditions.

25 I do not know about Mr. Nosenko. I do know that there

1 are differing opinions, however, about him, but I do not have
2 any personal feeling myself about him.

3 I am sorry, I cannot help you. I do not know.

4 Mrs. Burke. Since Mr. Sawyer has interjected a question
5 at this time, I have a couple of questions I would like to raise
6 at this point.

7 There were many defectors from the Soviet Union and Cuba
8 during that period of time. What was the usual procedure for
9 the housing of those defectors and what was the procedure in
10 terms of their places of detention?

11 Mr. Helms. Usually, Mrs. Burke, when these men were
12 brought to the United States they are put in what is called a
13 safe house which was usually a relatively isolated residence
14 where we could control the environment around it, and they
15 were lodged there -- normally very comfortably and well-fed and
16 well-taken care of and interrogated. And the normal procedures
17 did not take terribly long, maybe a month or two or something
18 of this kind, and then they would be resettled, a new identity
19 would be given to them, or something would occur.

20 But the Nosenko case was so central to the whole problem
21 of trying to establish this relationship of the Soviet Union
22 to the assassination of President Kennedy, and since we were
23 unable to resolve the case satisfactorily to ourselves, this
24 went on far longer than any other case I have ever remembered.

25 And I must say also, because I do not want to mislead you

1 in any way, that whether or not the handling of defectors, the
2 way it was done in those days, was in compliance with all the
3 laws of the United States, I do not know. All I know was
4 inside the Executive Branch there was an Inter-Agency Committee
5 on which the FBI and the Army, Navy and State Department and
6 all these agencies sat, and they were the ones who decided what
7 was going to happen to these defectors.

8 I believe -- I am no lawyer, as I said, but I believe
9 that there is kind of a grey area in our laws as to exactly
10 what their rights are when they defect because they do sign
11 papers saying that they want asylum and all the rest of it, so
12 they do, in a sense, give up certain rights by making this
13 request.

14 Mrs. Burke. Were not some of the defectors tried in the
15 civilian courts?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know any case of that.

17 Mrs. Burke. Not Soviet defectors? It has to be in time
18 of war?

19 Mr. Helms. I think that is right.

20 Mrs. Burke. May I inquire about how much longer does
21 counsel intend to go?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. This might be an appropriate time for the
23 luncheon break.

24 Mrs. Burke. All right.

25 Mr. Preyer had to leave. If there is no objection, his

1 suggestion was that we recess until 1:30.

2 Mr. Helms. I am at the Committee's disposal. I will be
3 back anytime you tell me.

4 Mrs. Burke. Is that convenient for everybody else?
5 Is there any particular reason why 1:30 would be inconvenient
6 for you?

7 Mr. Helms. Not for me.

8 Mrs. Burke. If there is no objection, then the Committee
9 will stand in recess until 1:30.

10 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to
11 reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:30 p.m.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith is recognized.

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1 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS -- Resumed

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the Committee will proceed
3 at this point and I take it, based upon our discussion a few
4 moments ago, you are willing to proceed this afternoon without
5 a quorum?

6 Mr. Helms. Certainly.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

8 When we broke for lunch, you were into the area of Nosenko
9 and specifically I want to ask you whether or not in January
10 of '68 when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was
11 issued, I asked you what the Agency's position regarding
12 Nosenko's bona fides was.

13 I believe that your answer was that the Agency, in fact,
14 had no position. Is that correct?

15 Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not
16 recall there having been any necessity at that time for having
17 to establish an agency position.

18 As the Director, my pre-occupation, as I mentioned earlier,
19 was to attempt to regularize Nosenko in such a fashion that
20 he could assume some kind of a life on the American scene.
21 And I was most anxious, particularly, to change his method of
22 living which, for a protracted period, as I said this morning,
23 he was being held without the blessing of a court and I was
24 entrusted to get him regularized in such a fashion that we
25 could, in effect, over time, get rid of our responsibility for

1 housing him, feeding him and handling him.

2 In other words, what was known in the intelligence
3 community as getting him ready to be resettled.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The SR Division Report, which initially
5 was issued, was approximately 900 pages in length. That report
6 did make a statement regarding Nosenko's bona fides, did it
7 not?

8 Mr. Helms. I do not know if that were the 900 page
9 report. I do recall that I did not read all of that. I was
10 just told what the general thrust of it was.

11 I believe that there was a disagreement between the SR
12 Division and the CI Staff over Nosenko's bona fides. It did
13 not seem to me at the time that it was essential that that
14 had to be 100 percent composed.

15 My problem was, as I say, was to get him resettled.

16 I believe there was a disagreement. I would not be
17 surprised -- I do not know for a fact, but I would not be
18 surprised -- if that disagreement exists to this day.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, the CI staff had not issued
20 any type of a formal report?

21 Mr. Helms. No, but they had mouths, and they could tell
22 the Director what they thought about the case.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. In January of '68 --

24 Mr. Helms. I am not even sure -- excuse me for just a
25 second -- as to exactly at that time, in 1968, because I do not

1 want to mislead the Committee or you, I do not know whether
2 SR and CI saw this eye to eye and the Security Division felt
3 differently, or just who took exactly what position. I am
4 not that clear in my mind anymore.

5 I just know that there were disagreements inside the
6 Agency itself.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Agency's position in January
8 1968 with regard to the veracity of the information Nosenko had
9 provided concerning Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. I believe that really this was a matter that
11 was at fundamental issue because if the information that
12 Nosenko had provided about Oswald was true, then it led to a
13 certain conclusion about Oswald and his relationship to the
14 Soviet authorities.

15 If it was incorrect, if he was feeding this to the United
16 States government under instructions from the Soviet service,
17 then it would have led one to an entirely different conclusion
18 about Oswald's role and the Soviet identification with it.

19 It rather strikes me that, as far as I know, to this day
20 it has never been satisfactorily resolved. What did Lee Harvey
21 Oswald represent as far as the Russians were concerned? I
22 promise you that I do not know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. In your view of the analysis, then, is
24 the veracity of what Nosenko told the Agency about Oswald a
25 critical factor in evaluating his overall credibility, his

1 overall bona fides?

2 Mr. Helms. It is not only that, Mr. Goldsmith, but the
3 fact remains that the issue of why Oswald assassinated
4 President Kennedy has not been resolved for the satisfaction
5 of a lot of citizens of this country. I assume that that is
6 one of the reasons that you are having these hearings.

7 If one could accept at face value what exactly Nosenko has
8 said, it would lead you to one interpretation. If you cannot
9 accept it, it may lead you to another interpretation. I do
10 not know how you are going to compose the difference.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My question, though,
12 is, from the Agency's perspective, was the information that
13 Nosenko provided concerning Oswald a major factor in determining
14 the larger issue ~~in determining the larger issue~~ of whether
15 Nosenko was a bona fide defector?

16 Mr. Helms. It obviously played a role in it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. A major role?

18 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether you could say it was a
19 major role or not, but it was certainly an important role, let's
20 put it that way.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. I might state at this point in the
22 record earlier you had asked me whether I knew how Nosenko was
23 handled in terms of the distribution between the Office of
24 Security and the SR Division. I wanted to clarify that.

25 In fact, according to the Committee's sources, Mr. Nosenko

1 was handled by the SR Division, at the time they had the
2 responsibility of questioning him and dealing with him on an
3 everyday level. The Security Office personnel were in charge
4 of overseeing him essentially watching for Security and making
5 sure he did not go where he was supposed to go.

6 Congressman Sawyer asked you this morning about whether
7 you have any opinion about the bona fides of Nosenko. Are
8 you able to give any more specific response to the Committee
9 at this time concerning that issue?

10 Mr. Helms. No, I am sorry, Mr. Goldsmith, I am not.
11 I realize that this is a terribly important question and,
12 recognizing its importance, I am not attempting to duck or to
13 show a lack of forthrightness. I just do not know the answer
14 to the question.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You have no opinion on it?

16 Mr. Helms. No, I do not have an opinion.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. After the SR Division issued its report
18 in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by Bruce ^{Soley} Soley?

19 Mr. Helms. My recollection was that Bruce ^{Soley} Soley, whether
20 he did an investigation or whether he engaged in long dialogues
21 with Nosenko or just what, but I believe, at some point, ^{Soley} Soley
22 came up with his opinions about Nosenko.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not also true that late in 1967
24 ^{Soley} Soley was actually given responsibility for handling Nosenko?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not remember the date unfortunately. You

1 will have to tell me what those dates were. All I know is
2 that there was a transition between the time that he was being
3 held in one situation. ^{Soley} Soley entered the picture. He was put
4 into different housing arrangements and so forth. I do not
5 know the exact date of that change.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will put aside for the moment
7 the question of the date, but at one point ^{Soley} Soley took over
8 the everyday handling of Nosenko -- ^{Soley} Soley was in and the SR
9 people were out. Is that correct?

10 Mr. Helms. I think by that time the SR people had had
11 their opportunities to talk to Nosenko. This had been going
12 on for months.

13 I believe at that time that ^{Soley} Soley -- the job was given
14 to Soley to handle this man, and to try to find some means of
15 resettling him.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. The SR people did not have any further
17 responsibility?

18 Mr. Helms. I think they had access if they wanted to, but
19 I do not think there was any responsibility they had.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether ^{Soley} Soley had any particu-
21 lar expertise in regards to the Oswald case?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I do not think so.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was ^{Soley} Soley considered to be an expert in
24 interrogations?

25 Mr. Helms. No, I do not think he was. I think that he was

1 a good security officer. He was interested in the case. He
2 had become acquainted with it when the Office of Security was
3 responsible for it, and I think that he was chosen because he
4 was game to try to work with this man.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. To whom, if anyone, was ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ directly
6 responsible during this period?

7 Mr. Helms. I think he was responsible to the Director
8 of Security and, in turn, the Director of Security would have
9 been responsible to me. ~~and responsible~~

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, again, the 1968
11 investigation conducted by ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~, whether Nosenko was
12 questioned about Oswald?

13 Mr. Helms. I do not specifically, no.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable in 1968
15 if ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ had been unable to resolve the question of Nosenko's
16 bona fides?

17 Let me rephrase that. If he had been unable to come
18 forward with a viewpoint concerning Nosenko's bona fides.

19 Mr. Helms. What was your question?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable to the
21 Agency if ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ had been unable to come forward with a
22 position one way or the other concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

23 Mr. Helms. I do not think by that time there was any
24 feeling that there was going to be suddenly a ray of truth
25 come through and we were going to be able to resolve the case

1 of Nosenko. The problem in those days was to deal with this
2 man. The effort was to accomplish that, and ^{Sole} Soley was given
3 that job.

4 Whatever Soley had come up with, if he were reasonably
5 successful in keeping the fellow contented, getting him squared
6 away, getting his English straightened out and all the rest of
7 these things, I would have thought he was doing a good job.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of what appeared to be the
9 enormous consequences of the situation where Nosenko, in fact,
10 were not a bona fide defector, the consequences of that as
11 far as the American intelligence community was concerned, it
12 would appear, were quite great.

13 Mr. Helms. For the intelligence community, it would have
14 had no consequence, for the intelligence community. It would
15 have had consequences for the country.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will take it step by step.
17 Certainly the American intelligence community would have been
18 concerned. The entire issue of Nosenko's being a planted
19 defector, possibly, planted for the purpose of protecting other
20 Soviet agencies working within the American intelligence
21 community.

22 Mr. Helms. That is what I was trying to warn the Warren
23 Commission against, that possibility, that contingency, and
24 the implications of it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the consequence of such a

1 contingency, it would appear that the Agency would very much
2 want to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides and would
3 not be satisfied with the situation where you are in limbo.

4 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, may I ask you a question?
5 How would you suggest that that be done?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, is it not true that the
7 Agency would feel compelled to try to resolve that issue?

8 Mr. Helms. We did the best we could.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. By 1968, you are saying the Agency
10 did not have a position one way or the other.

11 Mr. Helms. That is right.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What about at the conclusion of Soley's
13 work when he issued his report? At that time, did the Agency
14 have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not believe so. At least during my time
16 there, I do not recall us ever taking a position as an Agency.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Has the Agency ever taken a formal posi-
18 tion regarding the truthfulness of Nosenko's story on Oswald's
19 contacts or lack of contacts with the KGB?

20 Mr. Helms. That is the heart of the issue. That is why
21 I believe on that particular question, the question has never
22 been resolved, never been satisfactorily answered.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this. If it were clearly
24 proven that Nosenko's statements concerning Oswald were untrue
25 what significance could you attach to such a finding in so far

1 as the broader question of his overall bona fides is concerned?

2 Mr. Helms. I think that, if it were established beyond
3 any doubt that he had been lying and, by implication therefore,
4 Oswald was an agent of the KGB, I would have thought that the
5 implications of that -- not for the CIA or for the FBI, but
6 for the President of the United States and the Congress of the
7 United States would have been cataclysmic.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you be more specific?

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, I can be specific. In other words,
10 the Soviet government ordered President Kennedy assassinated.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Does it necessarily follow that ^(if) Nosenko
12 was lying about Oswald, and that Oswald was, in fact, an agent
13 of the KGB?

14 Mr. Helms. It does not necessarily follow. We can do
15 all kinds of syllogisms here.

16 The issue before the House is, was he or was he not an
17 employee of the KGB? It is on that that this whole thing tends
18 to turn.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. The initial issue here is the truthfulness
20 of Nosenko's statements about Oswald and essentially those
21 statements are ^{that the} KGB had no contact with Oswald.

22 If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statement on
23 Oswald were untrue -- proven in the sense that it could not be
24 believed that Oswald did not have contacts with the KGB, but
25 not proven in the sense that Oswald was, in fact, a KGB agent,

1 if just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved,
2 without our taking the next step and saying that Oswald is
3 a KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall
4 assessment of Nosenko's bona fides?

5 Mr. Helms. Well, if the man had been demonstrated to have
6 lied, it would have had a good deal of an effect on the estab-
7 lishment of his bona fides, I would think. . What was his
8 motive for lying? Why did he lie?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you take the analysis so far as to
10 say if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, if it were clearly
11 proven that he were lying about Oswald, that in fact he was
12 not a bona fide defector?

13 Mr. Helms. That is one of the problems exactly; you put
14 it very well.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Is your answer to my question yes?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes.

17 Mr. Preyer. If I may ask one question on that score, of
18 key concern, of course, to the intelligence agency, was the
19 broad question of whether Nosenio was a bona fide defector or
20 a disinformation agent.

21 Is it not conceivable that he might have been a bona fide
22 agent and been basically telling the truth about that, and this
23 other information concerning other security matters would be
24 accurate? Then, on Oswald, maybe to ingratiate himself, perhaps,
25 or to convince the intelligence agencies that he was more

1 important than he really was, trying to put a little extra
2 spin on the ball, that he perhaps overspoke himself on Oswald,
3 maybe lied on that.

4 That would still not necessarily determine whether he was
5 bona fides or not?

6 Mr. Helms. I think that any of these explanations or
7 possible or conceivable or may even be the accurate one. But
8 let us not overlook, Mr. Chairman, the fact that if I were
9 down here trying to defend that thesis in front of you, I
10 think I would have a pretty rough time.

11 Mr. Preyer. Yes. I think you put it very well. Why
12 would you lie?

13 As you have made very clear, this might be a question on
14 his bona fides that we do not know how to resolve right now
15 and may never resolve unless there is a flash of truth from
16 some area.

17 Excuse me, Mr. Goldstein^{with}.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The question that arises, Mr. Ambassador,
19 in light of your statement that the Agency did not have a
20 position regarding Nosenko's bona fides in 1968 is why, in light
21 of the absence of any position one way or another, the Agency
22 never the less paid Mr. Nosenko approximately \$80,000 after
23 taxes in 1968 and then put him on its payroll as a consultant.

24 Mr. Helms. These figures are yours, sir. I do not
25 recall any business about his being put on the Agency payroll.

1 as a consultant. I thought that any monies that were paid to
2 him were in an effort to sweeten him up a little bit and get
3 him prepared to be resettled. I do not recall anybody's ever
4 telling me that he had been hired as a consultant to the
5 Agency.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. If, in fact, it were established by the
7 record that Mr. Nosenko was made a consultant and is, in fact,
8 a consultant today, would that indicate that the Agency has
9 apparently resolve the issue of his bona fides?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know, sir. I did not know that he
11 was considered a consultant at the time that I was Director.
12 I do not recall ever signing off on any piece of paper that
13 made him a consultant.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. In order to have made Mr. Nosenko a
15 consultant, would you have had to sign off?

16 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I think I would have been
17 informed that this fellow is now considered to be a consultant
18 to the Agency and we are sending people down to talk to him.
19 I never agreed to any such thing.

20 I do not care what the record shows.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know to what extent, if any,
22 Nosenko's story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the
23 one he had given previously when he was first confined?

24 Mr. Helms. No. I do not remember those details at all.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether an independent

1 investigation ever confirmed any aspect of Nosenko's story
2 about Oswald?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not know that, either.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko was given
5 polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968?

6 Mr. Helms. That does not surprise me. I would have
7 thought he should have been.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Mr. Nosenko have been given
9 three tests?

10 Mr. Helms. To find out if he was telling the truth.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko failed
12 the first two tests and passed the third?

13 Mr. Helms. I did not remember those figures, no.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Nosenko was given the
15 final polygraph test, the one that he passed, approximately
16 one month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report issued
17 by Mr. Soley which concluded that he was a bona fide defector?

18 Mr. Helms. Maybe that was a part of what Soley was going
19 on when he made that determination, the way he came through on
20 the polygraph test.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. It is also possible, however, that Mr.
22 Soley had completed his report, realized that Nosenko had
23 failed two polygraphs and decided that, prior to the issuance
24 of his report, another polygraph test would be administered.

25 Mr. Helms. I think that he would have, in those days, been

1 in a position to make those judgments or decisions. He was
2 conducting an examination of this case.

3 I would have thought that he would have liked to have had
4 another polygraph test to see if it would, in any way, support
5 the findings that he was maybe establishing in his own mind.

6 Anyway, my recollection of those days is Soley believed in
7 Nosenko.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Nosenko was asked numerous
9 questions about Oswald on the second test, the test that he
10 failed, and was asked only two questions about Oswald on the
11 final polygraph test?

12 Mr. Helms. No, I do not know.

13 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another
14 vote on. We can recess for ten minutes. I will get back just
15 as fast as I can.

16 The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

17 (A brief recess was taken.)

18 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, prior to taking this last
20 recess again, we were discussing, in general, the question
21 whether the Agency had a position concerning Nosenko's bona
22 fides. Perhaps you or I are defining the concept of position
23 very narrowly. By "position," I do not necessarily mean that
24 the Agency had, in writing, a specific position regarding,
25 specific posture regarding, Nosenko. By "position," I am saying

1 was there a prevailing opinion one way or the other in the
2 Agency concerning Mr. Nosenko?

3 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know the answer to that
4 question. When you say a prevailing opinion, I see what you
5 are trying to get at. Obviously, I do not know what opinion
6 prevailed.

7 Some people hued to one line, some to the other. It
8 was my impression that he hued to it with equal fervor.
9 And I do not know that this question has ever been satisfactor-
10 ily resolved. As I say, I have been away from the Agency for
11 five years and maybe some other things have happened in the
12 interim. But at least as of the time I left, I do not think
13 that the issue had ever been resolved between these conflicting
14 forces.

15 May I say when I indicate that these views are strongly
16 held, I mean it. It is like Catholics and Protestants; they
17 simply are not to be swayed.

18 I think, in order to answer your question properly, I
19 would have to say, since there was a division, it was not
20 possible to get a prevailing view, as such. Some people might
21 have said, well, I think this and I think that, without having
22 read the 900-page report, without having been thoroughly
23 conversant with the details. In other words there were not
24 many other people in a position to have a calculated, informed
25 opinion.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying there was no prevailing
2 opinion?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not think so. I do not know what the
4 prevailing opinion would have been.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that the responsibility for
6 handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR Branch or SR
7 Division, did the SR Division enter into the situation as
8 ~~to~~ a neutral party, or did the SR division pretty much think
9 from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a bona fide
10 defector?

11 Mr. Helms. I would have thought, at the beginning,
12 everybody would have entered into this with some objectivity
13 in an effort to establish the truth. As events unwound,
14 I think that this became clear to everyone involved that this
15 was a terribly important case.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. How early in this process did the SR
17 Division form its opinion that Nosenko was not a bona fide
18 defector?

19 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Soley began his investigation,
21 did he enter the situation as a neutral, outside party, or
22 someone who represented one of the factions within the Agency
23 concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

24 Mr. Helms. I really do not know the correct answer to
25 that. It was my impression -- and I can only give it as my

1 impression -- that he had agreed to take on this case, and
2 I thought he came to it without any particular prejudice one
3 way or the other, and that he was going to attempt to form his
4 own opinion.

5 If other testimony on the record does not confirm that,
6 I do not insist on what I say. I simply give you my impression.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, you made reference to Mr. Soley
8 having a positive viewpoint on Nosenko.

9 Mr. Helms. I think he developed a positive viewpoint.
10 It was my impression.

11 I do not know how early he had it. I think he had a
12 positive viewpoing.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. How was Mr. Soley chosen for this parti-
14 cular assignment?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not remember anymore what details went
16 into this. It seemed to me Howard Osborne, Director of
17 Security, recommended that he be given charge of this case and
18 to take it over because we were trying to find a way to
19 resolve it, to resettle this man, and we were looking for a
20 way to do this.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the President ever ask you whether
22 this issue had been resolved?

23 Mr. Helms. Who?

24 Mr. Goldsmith. The President.

25 Mr. Helms. Which President?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. President Johnson.

2 Mr. Helms. Let-me answer it, no President ever asked me.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency, did the Agency ever receive
4 any pressure from above to resolve this issue?

5 Mr. Helms. Not that I recall.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Warren Commission told about
7 Mr. Nosenko?

8 Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know all the things that the
9 Commission was told about Mr. Nosenko. I know that the FBI
10 told them certain things. I believe the Agency told them
11 things. I know that I, personally, met with Chief Justice
12 Warren privately in one of the conference rooms over in the
13 building where they had their Headquarters. I do not remember
14 the date of this meeting with him, but I know I cleared it
15 with Director McCone before I went down there.

16 I believe that it was not terribly long before the
17 Warren Commission was going to conclude its hearings because
18 my point that I felt had to be made to the Warren Commission
19 was that we had not been able to establish, to our satisfac-
20 tion, the bona fides of Nosenko and that the Warren Commission
21 must take this into consideration in compiling their report.

22 And the means chosen of my going to see Chief Justice
23 Warren seemed to be the proper way to do it under the circum-
24 stances so that he could make a determination as to whether
25 he wanted the matter handled differently or whether that was

1 satisfactory to him, or what the case was.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told anything
3 about the substance of Nosenko's story about Oswald?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what details
5 wound up in the hands of the Warren Commission about Oswald.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What other information, besides this issue
7 of the bona fides, did you convey?

8 Mr. Helms. That is what I personally talked to the Chief
9 Justice about.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. When you met with Chief Justice Warren,
11 for purpose of clarification now, did you tell him that the
12 Agency had been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona
13 fides, or did you tell him that the Agency did not think that
14 Nosenko was bona fide?

15 Mr. Helms. I told him we were not able to resolve this,
16 my point being that, since we had not been able to resolve
17 it, that they should keep in mind the contingency that maybe
18 the statements that he had made about Oswald's having no
19 identification with the KGB were not accurate. Therefore, they
20 could not lean on them in the report and therefore they had
21 to face the implication that, if he was not bona fide and
22 come for the purpose of covering up the tracks of Soviet intel-
23 ligence, that this had implications which should be weighed
24 in the scales.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you met with the Chief

1 Justice, I take it, in some way, you must have been apprised
2 of the basic Nosenko story concerning Oswald?

3 Mr. Helms. I believe that the basic Nosenko story con-
4 cerning Oswald was given to the Warren Commission very early
5 in its deliberations by the FBI.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What was Chief Justice Warren's response
7 to your analysis?

8 Mr. Helms. Well, he was obviously -- he was not pleased
9 to hear it, and by that I do not mean that he expostulated,
10 or anything of that kind, but he was not pleased to hear it
11 in terms of the difficulties that it made in completing their
12 report, but that he was perfectly fair and reasonable about
13 it and accepted what I had to say and said he would report
14 it to the Commission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Chief Justice Warren or any Warren
16 Commission member or staffer ever request to interview Mr.
17 Nosenko?

18 Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission informed in
20 April, 1964, that Nosenko was being placed into solitary
21 confinement?

22 Mr. Helms. The Warren Commission?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 MR. Helms. I do not know what the Warren Commission knew
25 about the circumstances under which Nosenko was being

1 interrogated. I did not say anything to them about it.

2 Whether anybody else did, I do not know. But the CIA had
3 custody of Nosenko; they certainly were aware of that.

4 This was part of my statement to the Chief Justice. I
5 could not tell him that I could not resolve the bona fides
6 without explaining to him that this our responsibility.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than yourself, were any of the
8 other individuals responsible for handling Nosenko in contact
9 with the Warren Commission?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know, but I would not have thought
11 so.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission had been informed
13 by the Agency that Nosenko have been placed into solitary
14 confinement, I take it that you would have been the person
15 who would have so informed them.

16 Mr. Helms. Mr. McCone might have informed them.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Or Mr. McCone.

18 Whose decision was it to place Nosenko in solitary
19 confinement?

20 Mr. Helms. I think this was a decision taken by various
21 people. We had to find a place to interrogate him. We had
22 to try and resolve the case, if we possibly could. WE spent
23 months trying to do this. And putting him into solitary
24 circumstances was just part of the effort to see if we could
25 get at the truth.

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1 Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals were involved in that
2 decision-making process?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not remember who all was involved anymore.
4 I certainly was involved in it, but there were others who were
5 involved. I do not know the extent to which Mr. McCone was
6 involved. I do not recall anymore.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What input, specifically, did you have
8 at that time?

9 Mr. Helms. By input, I assume you mean what influence
10 did I have on the decision?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

12 Mr. Helms. I certainly agreed to the fact that this should
13 be tried. This would have been proposed to me; not something
14 that I would have proposed, because at this time someone would
15 have had to have made up their mind that the method of inter-
16 rogation that they were using was not getting anyplace.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Please describe, to the best of your
18 knowledge, the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when
19 he was put in solitary confinement.

20 Mr. Helms. He was put into a small house in the country-
21 side where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory
22 living condition. They were just not particularly spacious
23 or padded, let us say. His bed was perfectly adequate, his
24 chair was perfectly adequate, the lighting was perfectly
25 adequate, but it was not particularly comfortable in the

1 normal, American sense of the terms.

2 You will recall that this question of what to do about
3 him was taken up with the Deputy Attorney General at the time,
4 Nicholas Katzenbach, at a long meeting as to how we were going
5 to continue to handle this case, and the problem before the
6 house was clear to everyone but nobody was able to come up
7 with a very satisfactory solution except that we just had to
8 go ahead and do what we were doing and see if we could even-
9 tually come up with a satisfactory resolution, and that satis-
10 factory resolution never emerged.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the CIA ever able to establish that
12 it had legal authority for placing Nosenko in solitary confine-
13 ment?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not know how you answer that question.
15 As you know, I am not a lawyer. I would say that he was there
16 without the blessing of a court. I would have thought that
17 having held him that length of time that it would have been
18 preferable if we did have a court order to hang on to him.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. YOU indicate that you consulted with Mr.
20 Katzenbach?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other government officials
23 consulted prior to taking this action?

24 Mr. Katzenbach. There were other people sitting in the
25 room with Mr. Katzenbach from the Department of Justice. I do

1 not think this was brought up with the State Department.

2 The Inter-Agency Defector Committee was aware of what was
3 going on.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone senior to Mr. Katzenbach in the
5 government apprised of this action?

6 Mr. Helms. I assume that he told the Attorney General.
7 I do not know. We went to see him in the absence of the
8 Attorney General; I think he was Acting Attorney General at
9 the time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like
11 to have offered as an exhibit a notarized statement given by
12 Mr. Nosenko to this Committee on August 7, 1978.

13 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

14 (The document referred to
15 was marked JFK Exhibit No.
16 129 for identification.)

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to read Mr.
18 Nosenko's statement to you for the purpose of asking you
19 whether you agree with his characterization of the conditions
20 under which he was held in solitary confinement. This is a
21 statement by Mr. Nosenko given to the Committee August 7,
22 1978.

23 "In accordance with the request of the staff of the
24 Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make
25 the following statement describing the condition of my

1 imprisonment from April of 1964 until the end of 1967.

2 "On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up and
3 a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had
4 given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken into
5 another room for the test on a lie detector. After finishing
6 the test, an officer of the CIA, John, has come in the room and
7 talked with the technician.

8 "John started to shout that I was a phony and immediately
9 several guards entered into the room. The guards ordered me
10 to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I
11 was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal
12 bed attached to the floor in the center of this room.

13 "Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or
14 what would happen to me.

15 "After several days, two officers of CIA, John and Frank,
16 started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and in the
17 evening hours was writing forth on whatever I could recollect
18 about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about
19 a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile.
20 Then they stopped to come and see me until the end of 1964.

21 "I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and the
22 beginning of '65. The conditions were very poor and difficult.
23 I could have a shower once a week and once in a week I could
24 shave. I was not given a toothbrush and toothpaste and food
25 given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and

1 was hungry all the time. I had not contact with anybody to
2 talk. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not
3 have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only
4 window was screened and boarded. The only door in the room had
5 a metal screen, and outside in the corridor two guards were
6 watching me day and night.

7 "The only furniture in the room was a single bed and
8 lightbulb. The room was very, very hot in the summertime.

9 "At the end of 1964, there were started again interroga-
10 tions by several different officers. The first day, they kept
11 me under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done
12 in a hostile manner.

13 "AT the end of those interrogations, when I was told it
14 was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to
15 higher ups, I said I was a true defector and being under
16 arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was
17 found guilty, or released.

18 "I also asked how long I would continue. I was told that
19 I would be there 3,860 days and even more.

20 "This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and
21 handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put into
22 a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into
23 a concrete room with bars on the door. In the room was a
24 single steel bed with a mattress. No pillow, no sheet, no
25 blanket. During winter it was very cold, and I asked them to

1 give me a blanket, which I received after some time.

2 "Except for one day of interrogation, and one day for a
3 test on a lie detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards
4 and a doctor. Guards were not allowed to talk to me.

5 "After my constant complaint that I needed fresh air at
6 the end of 1966, I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes
7 exercise to a small area attached to the cell. The area was
8 surrounded by a chain-link fence and a fence I could not see
9 through. The only thing I could see was the sky.

10 "Being in the cell, I was watched day and night through
11 the TV camera. Trying to pass the time, a couple of times,
12 I was making for friends a chess set and every time, when I
13 finished those sets, immediately guards would enter into my
14 cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to
15 read and once, when I was given toothpaste, I found in the
16 toothpaste box a piece of paper with a description of compound
17 of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under my blanket,
18 but guards noticed it and again it was taken from me.

19 "Conditions in both first and second locations were
20 analogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I
21 again was transferred, blindfolded and handcuffed, to another
22 location. In this new place, I had a room with much better
23 conditions and Mr. Bruce Soley, CIA officer, started to question
24 me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions
25 concerning my biography, career in the KGB, and all cases of

1 the KGB known to me.

2 "I was in prison for the whole five years, and I started
3 my life in the USA in April of 1969."

4 Mr. Helms. There was a word you used there, "analogical."
5 What is that? What does that mean.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I am only reading to you what the text
7 says. I am afraid I cannot give you a clear definition of that
8 term as it is used here.

9 Mr. Craig. Could you reread the sentence that that term
10 appears in?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. "Conditions in both (first and second
12 locations) were analogical." If you would like to examine
13 the statement --

14 Mr. Helms. No. I just do not understand what he meant
15 by analogical.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree with Mr. Nosenko's
17 characterization of the conditions in which he was placed or
18 held in solitary confinement?

19 Mr. Helms. I have no means for agreeing or disagreeing.
20 I did not visit him during the time that he was being held.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Is the statement consistent with reports
22 that you received concerning Mr. Nosenko's treatment?

23 Mr. Helms. I would think so, yes. I remember that
24 I had two matters of particular interest in connection of this
25 whole business. One that he should not be physically molested.

1 I wanted to be absolutely certain that that was clear to
2 everybody, and I believe that was complied with throughout.

3 Secondly, I did not want any drugs or any medicines or
4 any tricks of that kind used on him.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. Was Nosenko
6 ever given any drugs for the purpose of either harrassing him
7 psychologically or to compel him to tell the truth?

8 Mr. Helms. I believe not. I believe that, at one time,
9 I was asked whether this could be done and so forth, and I
10 forbade it.

11 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another
12 vote. I think this may be the last one for some time.

13 The Committee will stand in recess.

14 (A brief recess was taken.)

15 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume.

16 Mr. Goldsmith?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

18 Mr. Ambassador, I believe earlier you testified the
19 Agency did not establish or have any position one way or
20 another regarding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

21 Mr. Helms: Despite these efforts we have made.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. That was precisely the point I was about
23 to make, or the impression I was going to raise to you. It
24 would seem then that, the Agency, without having any position
25 one way or the other, went to the trouble to keep Mr. Nosenko

1 under the conditions that he just described.

2 Mr. Helms. We did our very best to resolve this problem
3 and we certainly would not have taken these steps of putting
4 him, if you recall, in Spartan circumstances, if we had not
5 thought there was a possibility it might get us to a goal that
6 we were trying to reach. I do not think that we were trying
7 to reach.

8 I do not think that we ever under-estimated the impor-
9 tance of this case, and we did everything we could do to try
10 to resolve that, including later on giving him sweet, nice
11 treatment with money and pleasant living circumstances and all
12 of the rest of it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Does not the fact that Mr. Nosenko was
14 kept under these conditions reflect that the Agency, in fact,
15 did have a position regarding his bona fides, and at least
16 until such time that he was released from these conditions,
17 the Agency felt that he was not a bona fide defector?

18 Mr. Helms. I think the Agency was trying to establish
19 whether or not he was a bona fide defector and it was decided
20 to use these means of interrogation. The supposition has to
21 be that the matter had not been resolved by other interroga-
22 tion means and this was going to be trying an effort, to see
23 if this would help.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. So that, for the three years Mr. Nosenko
25 was kept under these conditions, the Agency did not have a

1 position regarding his bona fides?

2 Mr. Helms. They were trying to establish his bona fides.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is, then, during those three
4 years, the Agency did not have a position regarding his bona
5 fides.

6 Mr. Helms. There may have been differing views, depending
7 on whether this view obtained or that view obtained. Different
8 people may have altered their position, but the Agency did not
9 have any position during this period. As I was saying, we were
10 trying to resolve the issue.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. You would say that this was a technique
12 in attempting to resolve the overall issue of bona fides?

13 Mr. Helms. That is exactly what I am saying.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Later, when Mr. Nosenko was given -- and
15 I think the record would demonstrate that, or corroborate that --
16 was given approximately \$80,000 after taxes and was allowed
17 to work for the Agency on a contract basis or as a consultant
18 do those factors reflect on the part of the Agency the position
19 that, by this time, Nosenko was considered to be a bona fide
20 defector?

21 Mr. Helms. I do not want to take any position or voice
22 any opinion about anything that happened in the Agency after
23 February, 1973 when I left.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, if the Committee is able
25 to demonstrate to you from the record that these actions

1 concerning Nosenko were taken prior to your departure as
2 DCI, would you then be willing to respond to the question?

3 Mr. Helms. No.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Even --

5 Mr. Helms. I did not know that he was a consultant at the
6 Agency or considered a consultant of the Agency. If, indeed
7 he was, I would like the word defined as to what that entails
8 and what that was supposed to signify.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You did not know that Mr. Nosenko was
10 given approximately \$80,000?

11 Mr. Helms. You said \$8,000 and \$80,000 on another. Which
12 is the correct figure?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry if I gave you an incorrect
14 figure. It is \$80,000.

15 Would the fact that he had been given \$80,000 after taxes
16 suggest to you that the Agency did have a position regarding
17 his bona fides?

18 Mr. Helms. I think that we were trying to resettle him.
19 I think that we recognized that he had been given a pretty
20 rough time, and I think that we were trying, through good
21 treatment and handling him properly and so forth, to not only
22 resettle him, but find out if these means would help resolve
23 the case.

24 If it has been resolved in the last five years, I am glad
25 to hear it. I know nothing about that.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. How would giving him \$80,000 and
2 resettling him further resolve the case? It would seem by that
3 point that the case has been resolved, to the best of the
4 Agency's capabilities. Certainly after you have given him
5 \$80,000 you are not providing him with any incentive to change
6 his story.

7 Mr. Helms. What would you have done with him?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to answer my questions.

9 Mr. Helms. I think this line as inquiry has been taken
10 as far as I can take it.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. You are unable to comment, then, on the
12 significance --

13 Mr. Helms. I am unable to comment. I am trying to say
14 we were trying to resettle him.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, I asked you whether Nosenko
16 had ever been given any drugs for the purpose of harrassing
17 him psychologically or for the purpose of compelling him to
18 tell the truth.

19 Are you able to state categorically that he was not given
20 drugs for this purpose?

21 Mr. Helms. I would never state anything in this life
22 categorically, including that.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the best statement you can give
24 us on that?

25 Mr. Helms. The best statement I can give you on that is

1 that I believe on one occasion some people wanted to try and
2 use aids to interrogation in the form of drugs and I said I
3 wanted none of this done. I believe my wishes were carried
4 out. I have never heard anything to the contrary, but I cannot
5 swear to it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. When did this incident take place?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the individuals involved?

9 Mr. Helms. It seems to me that some of the interrogators
10 who were involved in talking to him wanted to try truth serums
11 or something of that kind, sodium penathol or whatever those
12 drugs are which are considered to be aids to interrogation.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. Bagley or Mr. Murphy? Were
14 they of the feeling that drugs should be administered?

15 Mr. Helms. I would assume it was someone like that. I
16 am not sure who brought the question to me anymore. I do have
17 in the back of my head the fact that this did come up.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency did administer drugs to
19 Nosenko, would there have been a record of this fact?

20 Mr. Helms. I certainly would have thought so.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you dispute testimony to this
22 Committee by Mr. Nosenko that he was drugged by the CIA and
23 then interrogated?

24 Mr. Helms. He would have to demonstrate that this was
25 the case.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would any decision concerning the use
2 of drugs necessarily involve Dave Murphy at some point?

3 Mr. Helms. It might have. You see, I do not remember
4 whether, all during this period, Murphy was in charge of the
5 SR Division or whether he was in charge for a time when someone
6 else took over. I do not have the agency --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe for this entire period Mr.
8 Murphy was in charge of the SR Division.

9 Mr. Helms. He would have been involved in it. He is in
10 charge of these people in his division. He was obviously
11 attempting to counsel with them how it was to be conducted,
12 so I would have thought he would have been a party of any
13 inquiry at that time, or reference to me for permission at
14 that time.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my line of
16 inquiry with regard to this area. Do you have any questions?

17 I would defer to you.

18 Mr. Preyer. I have no questions on that area, but before
19 you recess to go on your deposition hearing, I have a couple
20 of questions in another area which I would like to ask.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

22 Mr. Craig. Before leaving that area, I might inquire,
23 you mentioned, you asked a question whether Ambassador Helms
24 would dispute any evidence to the effect that Mr. Nosenko
25 was drugged. If such evidence does exist, you might be able

1 to bring that to Mr. Helms' attention and he might be able to
2 comment on it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. As I said, the Committee has received
4 testimony by Mr. Nosenko in which he specifically stated that
5 he was drugged and then, after being drugged, he was interro-
6 gated. That is why this is an issue before the Committee at
7 this time.

8 Mr. Craig. Thank you.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, turning to another area,
10 specifically back to Mexico City, ~~is~~ the name Luisa Calderon
11 familiar to you?

12 Mr. Helms. I just read it in one of the documents you
13 gave me here this morning.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-
15 tion a bit further, I would ask you to look at CIA No. 1936,
16 which appears in Volume No. 2 and specifically on pages 1950
17 through 1954.

18 Mr. Helms. You want me to go -- I have 1936.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to look at 1936, only so that
20 you would see the document that you are going to be reading
21 from, but the relevant pages are 1950 thorough 1954.

22 Mr. Helms. Just a second.

23 (Pause)

24 I see. What is the date of this document, Mr. Goldsmith?
25 Was this back at the time of the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Goldsmith.. No.. This document is a 1975 document
2 prepared by Raymond Rocca in response to a 15 April 1975
3 letter by David Belin of the Rockefeller Commission.

4 Mr. Helms. I see. That is the same David Belin that
5 was on the Warren Commission and later ghost-wrote the book
6 for President Ford about the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know about the book on President
8 Ford, but it is the David Belin who was the Warren Commission
9 staffer.

10 Mr. Helms. That is the same one, then.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you specifically to read
12 through pages 150 through 1954.

13 Mr. Helms. 1950 through 1954, all right.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Starting with paragraph number 18.

15 Mr. Helms. All right.

16 (Pause)

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TOP SECRET

1-131

Mr. Helms. Where did you want me to stop reading?

Mr. Goldsmith. 1954.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I have a couple of pages to go.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please stop once you have gotten to the end of paragraph number 23.

Mr. Helms. Fine.

All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. After having read this document, which describes the conversation involving a woman named Luisa Calderon, or someone whom it appears as Luisa Calderon, is the name familiar to you at all?

Mr. Helms. It doesn't bring back any memories. Just as I said, I identified it from that document you showed me this morning but I don't remember anything about her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the pages that you read pertain to a conversation involving Luisa in which there is some suggestion of foreknowledge on her part, foreknowledge of the assassination, and, of course, the significance of that foreknowledge, the significance of her statement standing alone really is not very great. However, in light of the fact Luisa Calderon had connections or may have had connections with Cuban intelligence, the significance of her statement suggests the foreknowledge has escalated.

Do you recall ever having had the statement brought to your attention, this conversation brought to your attention?

TOP SECRET

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1 Mr. Helms. I do not remember it ever having been brought
2 to my attention.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if that conversation was
4 brought to the attention of the Warren Commission.

5 I know nothing about it. To the vest of my recollection
6 this is the first time I have seen reference to it.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you now refer to CIA 1843?

8 Mr. Helms. 1843?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. That is in volume 1.

10 Mr. Helms. Yes sir. It is in volume 1, is it? This one
11 stops at 1874. There we are.

12 Yes sir, I have that in front of me.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read the handwritten
14 notation on this page.

15 Mr. Helms. Is this ICC or just CC for copy? I guess it
16 is copy. CC for copy. Original and translation sent to Galbon
17 via Kingman, nothing to Bureau yet.

18 (2), one copy original and trans to Luisa Calderon and a
19 a big P.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whose handwriting that was?

21 Mr. Helms. No, I don't.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I indicate for the record that the
23 reference to Luisa Calderon P would probably refer to her P
24 file, which is the local file in the Mexico City station.

25 Mr. Helms. I see. I don't know whose handwriting that is.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know who Galbon or Kingman --

2 Mr. Helms. I know who Galbon is. This is Cononel J. C.
3 King. Who Kingman was I have forgotten.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why anyone would have wanted
5 this transcript from the Bureau?

6 Mr. Helms. It just says nothing to Bureau yet. I don't
7 interpret that to mean it was withheld, it just hadn't got to
8 them yet.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Your reading of that is correct, it says
10 nothing to Bureau yet. I will rephrase the question. In light
11 of that do you know why there would have been a desire to with-
12 hold this transcript even temporarily from the Bureau?

13 Mr. Helms. No, I don't. No, I don't. Over in the column
14 here it says 22 November LIN, which I assume from what we were
15 saying this morning is the cryptonym for the telephone taps,
16 Luisa Calderon and the man outside. Those would be simply
17 descriptive?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA number
19 1929?

20 Mr. Helms. That is in volume 2, then, isn't it?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

22 For the record, that is a blind memo dated 10 April 1964,
23 labeled material from P 8593, shown to Warren Commission.
24 Station House --

25 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have looked at that page now.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any indication from that page
2 that the Calderon conversation was shown to the Warren Commis-
3 sion staffers when they went to Mexico City?

4 Mr. Helms. English translations of calls made by Oswald to
5 the Russian Embassy; English translation of conversations
6 between Dorticos Armas. It doesn't look that way. Is there
7 something I ahve missed?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. No. At this time would you refer to CIA
9 number 2205 and 2206. That would appear in volume 3. When
10 you get to 2205 --

11 Mr. Helms. I have got 2220. I am closing in on it. That
12 goes back up again.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would indicate that
14 2205 is a memo for the record dated 11 April 1964, the subject
15 of which is a visit by three staff represenatives of the Warren
16 Commission. I would ask you to read paragraph 7 on page 2206.

17 Mr. Helms. All right. Somebody has slapped a reproduc-
18 tion of a prohibited stamp all over this and it makes it a
19 little hard going. If you will forgive me, I am going as fast
20 as I can.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

22 Mr. Helms. All right, I have read paragraph 7.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Having read that paragraph, is there any
24 reference in that paragraph to the Luisa Calderon conversation
25 being shown to the Warren Commission staff?

1 Mr. Helms. All it says, reviewed the tape from the tele-
2 phone taps. I assume that means for the days 27th, 28th, 1
3 Cotober, Oswald, at both Cuban and Soviet Embassies. I assume
4 those are only on Oswald's conversations since the Calderon
5 conversation you were talking about was with some unidentified
6 man. I don't know they regard that as Oswald or include it.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. It was also dated 22 November, 1963.

8 Mr. Helms. Right. Then I guess that was not included
9 here. At least I don't see any evidence in this statement.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was this transcript
11 ever given to the Warren Commission?

12 Mr. Helms. Of Calderon?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it should have been given to
16 the Warren Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. I can't see any particular rsason not to have
18 given it to the Warren Commission. I can think of no reason.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Especially in the light of the fact the
20 Agency had information that Luisa Calderon was DGI or possibly
21 connected with DGI?

22 If this material had been given to the Warrent Commission
23 -- by this term I am referring to the Calderon transcript,
24 would a record of such transmission be available anywhere?

25 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I thought they were

TOP SECRET

1-136

1 trying to keep reasonably careful records as to what was sent to
2 the Warren Commission. After all, the intelligence agencies
3 usually are and should be careful about what kind of documenta-
4 tion goes out of their building to anyone, and there is usually
5 a record of it, particularly if it is highly classified and
6 sensitive. So I would have thought there would be a record.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Luisa Calderon connected in any way with
8 the CIA?

9 Mr. Helms. I nver heard of any connection she had with the
10 CIA. If she did it was unknown to me.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer at this time to
12 CIA number 2950. It appears in volume 3.

13 Mr. Helms. 2950, right.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. This is not a very good quality reproduc-
15 tion, so take your time reading it.

16 Mr. Helms. 2950?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

18 Mr. Helms. All right, I am there now. Let me read this
19 out loud to see if I am reading the same thing that you are.
20 In paragraph 4, of the Litawil 9 contact report for 17 July,
21 "attached to reference L-9 reported that Luisa Calderon has a
22 sister residing in someplace in Texas, married to an American
23 of Mexican descent. L-8 can further identify the sister."
24 I can't read that next word.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Domestic.

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Helms. "Domestic Exploitation Section might be in a
2 position to follow up on this lead. Please levy this requirement
3 on L-9 at the next opportunity.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what is the Domestic
5 Exploitation Section?

6 Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know that I recall exactly what
7 it is, unless it was an interrogation unit that the Miami
8 station used to interrogate refugees and other people coming
9 over from Cuba. If it is not that, I don't remember what the
10 Domestic Exploitation Section was.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the Domestic Exploita-
12 tion Section could have been a component within SAS?

13 Mr. Helms. Possibly. But then SAS had control over the
14 Miami station and I would have thought it was somewhere in that
15 complex.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the use of the Domestic Exploitation
17 Section in any way violate the Agency's charter?

18 Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. I think the
19 Domestic Exploitation Section was there, FBI knew about it,
20 the intelligence community knew about it, it had a specific
21 purpose, I don't think there is anything about it that violated
22 the Agency charter. As far as I know I never considered it
23 in that category.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. What again was the specific purpose of this
25 section?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know. If it is what I thought it was,
2 it was a group that interrogated refugees that came from Cuba.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Might this section have been used as a means
4 by which an effort could be made to contact Luisa Calderon
5 and take advantage of her possibilities as a CIA agent ^{OC} as a
6 source of information?

7 Mr. Helms. I don't understand your question. I am sorry.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, could this Domestic Exploitation
9 Section have been used for the purpose of establishing a contact
10 between the Agency and Luisa Calderon so that her assistance
11 or services could be solicited for the Agency?

12 Mr. Helms. My recollection is I don't recall any Domestic
13 Exploitation SEction that was recruiting agents.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than A. M. Mug, the Cuban defector
15 to hwom you made reference earlier today, did the AGENCY obtain
16 additional information pertaining to Oswald and the assassina-
17 tion from sources or agents connected in some way with DGI?

18 Mr. Helms. I don't honestly know. I would have hoped
19 there would have been more than just one defector, but I may be
20 wrong. We were having a very difficult time getting intelli-
21 gence inside Cuba and maybe we didn't get anything from anybody
22 else. I would have hoped we would have gotten something more
23 from refugees or agents or somebody like that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 and 1964, did the Agency have any
25 agents or sources of information within the Cuban Embassy or

1 Consulate in Mexico City?

2 Mr. Helms. I don't know.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this point to CIA
4 number 2977. That would appear in volume 3, I believe.

5 Mr. Helms. 2977?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

7 Mr. Helms. That would be volume 2.

8 All right. Memoranda from Mr. J. Lee Rankin.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Please skim through the memorandum and
10 then read the next page.

11 Mr. Helms. And then read the next page.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. To yourself, sir.

13 Mr. Helms. Right.

14 I have read it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, Silvia Duran, who is
16 someone of important concern to this Committee, and my question
17 here is not directed towards the substance of the memo but
18 rather to the source of the information, apparently here the
19 Agency received information concerning Duran from someone who
20 had direct personal knowledge. Do you know who the source of
21 this information was?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I don't know who the source was, Mr.
23 Goldsmith, but if you are asking my opinion in reading this,
24 I would assume this just is our way of covering up the fact
25 this came from a telephone tap.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Do you know whether or not Silvia
2 Duran at any time had any connections with ^(u) CIA was she an agent
3 or source of information for the Agency?

4 Mr. Helms. Not that I have heard.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to refer specifically to
6 language in this memo that would indicate that the source of
7 the information was a telephone operation?

8 Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I simply was voicing the
9 opinion that when it says a reliable and sensitive source, well
10 informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban
11 Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, I am simply assuming that
12 in order to cover up the fact this information came from various
13 telephone conversations they simply are using this descriptive
14 rubric to cover that fact. I am not sure of this; that is
15 just my assumption.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the
17 name Teresa Proenza?

18 Mr. Helms. Whom?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Teresa Proenza. PROENZA, the Cultural
20 Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City?

21 Mr. Helms. I don't recall her name, no. I think I would
22 -- Proenza Proenza.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency in 1963 in Mexico City have
24 any penetration agents and sources of information within the
25 Soviet Embassy or Consulate?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar generally
3 with th- allegations that were made after the assassination
4 by a Nicaraguan named ^{Alvarado} Alarada to the effect he had witnessed
5 Oswald receive \$6500 in cash from a redheaded negro at the Cuban
6 Embassy?

7 Mr. Helms. I do recall vaguely this Alvarada^a allegation
8 and it was my impression that that all fell to pieces, that this
9 fellow was just trying to ^usake somebody down for some money,
10 or it was self-importance, but never had been able to prove
11 that this was the case.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer now to 2101,
13 which appears in volume 4, which is a polygraph result summary
14 and rather than reading the entire document, please refer to
15 paragraph number 7.

16 Mr. Helms. I see.

17 I have read it.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, paragraph number 7 indicates that this
19 allegation apparently was resolved when Alvarada admitted he
20 had made a mistake and he essentially admitted that he had
21 with respect to the polygraph devices a means of testing one's
22 truthfulness.

23 The issue which the Committee is concerned with at this
24 time, however, appears on page 2100, the top of the page, where
25 Alarada is quoted, where it is indicated to have stated, and I

1 reading now, that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and
2 the fact he was given money since he does not believe in
3 negotiating over death.

4 Perhaps it would be good if you did read paragraph 1, so
5 we are not talking out of context here.

6 Mr. Helms. Is this Al^Varada we are talking --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon?

8 Mr. Helms. It says subject here. Is that Al^Varada?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir. This is the Nicaraguan who made
10 the allegations concerning Oswald receiving money.

11 Mr. Helms. I see.

12 I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, do you know whether Alarada was given
14 money in reference to the allegations that he was making about
15 Oswald?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no recollection of this at all. The
17 only thing that twiggged a memory cell in my head was the
18 redheaderd negro. That always seemed to be a silly story that
19 stuck in my head over all these years. The other details I
20 don't recall.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The statement in here that is of concern
22 to the Committee is the one that suggests that either for
23 making the story for ^{or} ~~at~~tracting the story Al^Varada^V was given
24 money. I am wondering if this issue was ever investigated by
25 the Agency?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know. He was apparently dealing with
2 the State Department people down there, is that correct?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I believe ^{at} OSS refers to
4 the FBI. ODACID

5 Mr. Helms. State Department.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I won't argue with you over that one, sir.
7 In any event, the record indicates that.

8 Mr. Helms. I will show you in another one of your docu-
9 ments that the FBI had a different cryptonym. If you look at
10 the document with dissemination of original Lee Harvey Oswald
11 report to local authorities, you remember the one that goes
12 back --

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. -- you will find the thing broken out and
15 you will find that, I think, in those days the FBI was known
16 as ODNV. And the State Department was ODACID.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that you are correct in that
18 score, Mr. Ambassador.

19 Mr. Helms. I don't know but that is my recollection.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. My source in this room tells me you are
21 correct.

22 In any event, do you know anything about Alarado^v receiving
23 money?

24 Mr. Helms. No sir, I do not, nothing whatever.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about

1 his moreorless cryptic reference to being offered money and
2 negotiating over death?

3 Mr. Helms. I don't know what they knew about the Alarado^u
4 case except from what you showed me earlier. They apparently
5 were briefed about it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission
7 would have been given a copy of this polygraph summary?

8 Mr. Helms. I don't know. If they asked for it I suppose,
9 other wise I wouldn't have thought so. Polygraph^u summaries are
10 usually pretty closely held. That is not a very scientific
11 instrument.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, if they had been given this
13 summary, would there be a record of that somewhere at the
14 Agency?

15 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that record would be?

17 Mr. Helms. I have no idea. Probably in the Security
18 Office somewhere.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am finished
20 with another line of inquiry. I note that it is 3:25 and
21 that we have to leave this room at 4. If you have questions
22 I would certainly defer to you at this point.

23 Mr. Preyer.

24 There is one question I wanted to ask, which isn't
25 directly related to our inquiry here, although it is indirectly

1 related to the Mexican aspects of it.

2 Recently Premier Castro made a very harsh speech attacking
3 the United States, as we have read in the paper, and over the
4 course of this Youth Festival that was held there several others
5 were brought forward. (1), the Consul in the Mexican Embassy
6 there, Mr. Azcue, apparently made a speech to the Youth Festival
7 which in effect said the man who came to the Cuban Embassy
8 in Mexico, was not Oswald, or he had questions about whether
9 it was Oswald. So for some reason, perhaps on his own or his
10 government, he has floated the idea of two Oswalds.

11 Now, whether to confuse the issue or not, I don't know.

12 I think this Committee can probably demonstrate that
13 conclusively by good hard evidence that there was only one
14 Oswald and that Mr. Azcue is wrong on that score.

15 The other point which gives me more concern is the attack
16 Mr. Castro made in his allegations that CIA in this country had
17 foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy and that
18 they deliberately tried to pin the blame on the Cuban Government.
19 That apparently is the new line and he has made that charge in
20 a public forum, for all the world to hear. How much the world
21 would believe that, knowing the source it comes from, I suppose
22 is debatable, but I imagine many Marxist countries of the
23 world are taking that as gospel now.

24 So the question I wanted to ask is on the second point,
25 and it is as to his charge that the CIA had foreknowledge of

1 the assassination to pin it on the Cuban Government.

2 Do you have any comments that you would like to make on
3 that, sir?

4 Mr. Helms. Sir, the only comment I would like to make
5 on that was, or is, not was, that I never knew of anyone in
6 the CIA that alleged that he knew about President Kennedy's
7 assassination beforehand. I never heard that asserted by a
8 single soul, ever. I don't believe there was anyone in the
9 CIA who had any foreknowledge.

10 I recall personally that I was sitting having lunch with
11 Director McCone and two or three other CIA officials when his
12 Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, walked into the room and
13 said President Kennedy had been shot, and if I have ever seen
14 surprise and horror on the group of faces around me it was
15 on that occasion. So I can't conceive that either Director
16 McCone or I had ever heard of this thing and I have never heard
17 it alleged that anybody else had, and I would like to make one
18 further comment about Mr. Azcue, and that is that in a Communist
19 state individuals of the local government do not appear at
20 international conferences and make speeches (a), without speci-
21 fic authorization, and, (b), specific instructions as to what
22 they are to say and what they are to cover.

23 I found it equally interesting that Mr. Cubela, the famous
24 Mr. AMLASH, who has dotted the transcripts of lord knows how
25 many Congressional hearings, also appeared, having been released

1 from jail, as stated in the Washington Post, to assert that he
2 had never been a double agent, that he had only worked for a
3 certain period of time for the CIA. Why he was asked to make
4 the statement, why he was released from jail for the purpose
5 of doing it, I don't know. I could hazard an opinion. But I
6 can only say that these conferences are orchestrated and they
7 are orchestrated very skillfully and orchestrated for a purpose.

8 Mr. Preyer. Do you know anything of any 23 page document
9 that I understand Mr. Castro says he has outlining or substan-
10 tiating his charges?

11 Mr. Helms. No sir, I don't know anything about it.
12 Didn't he give Senator McGovern a document one time that
13 Senator brought back with him, or was it Senator Church? I saw
14 something in the newspapers about this. I have no firsthand
15 knowledge.

16 Mr. Preyer. I got the impression this was a recent com-
17 pilation.

18 Mr. Helms. I see.

19 Mr. Preyer. Probably on the order of Mr. Cubela and Mr.
20 Azcue's appearances. It always seemed to me a little surpris-
21 ing Mr. Cubela, if he was guilty of all the things alleged,
22 that he wasn't preemporily shot, rather than being in prison.

23 Well, I appreciate your comments on that. That is very
24 helpful.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. This would be an appropriate time,

1 for us to break, rather than continue getting into a new area
2 and break for the deposition, so I would recommend that at this
3 time.

4 Mr. Preyer. Very well.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that if
6 we do break at this time, that under the Committee Rules, the
7 Ambassador would be entitled to make a statement at this time.
8 I would also be prepared to have the Ambassador make a state-
9 ment at the deposition.

10 Mr. Preyer. Yes. Under our rules each person who testi-
11 fies, at the conclusion of the Committee portion of the hearing
12 is entitled to make a statement of five minutes, if he cares
13 to, explaining any aspect of the testimony further, or any
14 statement he may care to make.

15 Mr. Helms. You mean if he has anything left to say?

16 Mr. Preyer. Yes.

17 Mr. Helms. Thank you very much, sir.

18 Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Ambassador Helms. We appreciate
19 very much your cooperation in this. Sorry we have interrupted
20 you a number of times today, but I hope we will be able to
21 complete the testimony.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to clarify
23 that I don't believe that the Committee will have a Notary
24 available for the deposition that is about to begin in about a
25 half an hour or so, so I would like to indicate for the record,

1 Mr. Helms, you understand you will still be under oath for the
2 deposition?

3 Mr. Helms. I understand that, certainly.

4 Mr. Preyer. The Committee stands in recess until 10:00
5 tomorrow.

6 (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,
7 to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock Thursday, August 10, 1978.)
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TOP SECRET

HEARINGS

Before The
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee
of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

Washington, D.C.

August 9, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Official Reporter

300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

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Richard McGarrah Helms

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A ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

Wednesday, August 9, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,
pursuant to notice, in Room 304, Cannon House Office Building,
beginning at 4:00 p.m., when present on behalf of the respec-
tive parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ., Staff Counsel

FOR THE DEPONENT:

GREGORY B. CRAIG, ESQ., Attorney At Law,
Washington, D. C.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. It should be noted that this is a continu-
2 ation of a hearing that was conducted today, which started at
3 approximately 9:30 and ended at 3:30. Mr. Helms has consented
4 to allow the Committee to take his statement under oath in the
5 form of a deposition rather than at a hearing. This arrange-
6 ment is acceptable to the Committee.

7 There are a few preliminary matters that I need to dispose
8 of. Essentially, they are as follows. Mr. Helms, do you under-
9 stand that your statement to me at this deposition is completely
10 voluntary.

11 Whereupon,

12 RICHARD MCGARRAH HELMS

13 having previously been sworn by the Honorable Richardson
14 Preyer, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the assassination of
15 John F. Kenney, was examined and testified as follows:

16 Mr. Helms. I do.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. And you also understand that you have a
18 right to counsel?

19 Mr. Helms. Thank you.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. And you have counsel here today?

21 Mr. Helms. I do.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, normally, a witness has a right to
23 receive a copy of his deposition statement. By that, I mean he
24 has the right actually to receive the transcript itself. That
25 is not the case with executive session testimony. In the case

of

1 of executive session testimony you have a right to review the
2 transcript but not to receive it. The Agency has asked us to
3 request of present and former Agency employees and associates
4 to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript
5 because the transcript will contain a lot of classified infor-
6 mation. So what I am asking you now is whether you are willing
7 to waive your right actually to receive a copy of the tran-
8 script, with the understanding that you would of course be
9 given an opportunity to review it for accuracy?

10 Mr. Helms. I understand.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. And you are willing to waive that right?

12 Mr. Helms. I guess so.

13 Mr. Craig. Could I inquire as to whether or not the rules
14 governing the executive sessions as to the release of informa-
15 tion only by vote of the full Committee will apply to this
16 testimony? The Prior testimony today could only be released
17 by vote of the full Committee or used in public session because
18 it was held in executive session.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. That is right.

20 Mr. Craig. We would request that for this, too, if it is
21 at all possible.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. That is a reasonable request and we will
23 act on this deposition as though the rules of executive session
24 govern.

25 Mr. Helms. Thank you. I am glad to waive my right to

1 receive the documents.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

3 Finally, I should note for the record the court reporter
4 will be asked to certify this as a true and accurate transcrip-
5 tion of the testimony that is going to be given here today.

6 Mr. Ambassador, what is a 201 file. We are getting back
7 to the basics now.

8 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that a 201 file is a file
9 opened in the registry of the Clandestine Services on an
10 individual. In other words, the Michael Goldsmith file would
11 be a 201 file.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the criteria for the opening
13 of such a file, generally?

14 Mr. Helms. That there was information available on
15 Michael Goldsmith and it was determined to keep it and, there-
16 fore, a file would be opened.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. And that information would be relevant
18 to some legitimate purpose of the Agency, I take it?

19 Mr. Helms. That is the assumption.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file normally be opened on
21 someone who was perceived to be a counterintelligence threat?

22 Mr. Helms. I am awfully rusty on this stuff, it has been
23 a long, long time since I was involved in these details, but
24 I thought that counterintelligence cases -- well, maybe they
25 would involve a 201 file, too, even though they would have been

1 included in the counterintelligence file. A card, at least,
2 would be there referring to the file. I think 201 just applies
3 to the fact there is a file on an individual in the Agency
4 regardless of what category of individual it is. Is that
5 correct? I have forgotten all this.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I am in the posture here where I have to
7 ask the question, so I am afraid I can't --

8 Mr. Helms. I am doing the best I can and that is my
9 recollection.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Is a 201 file a personality file?

11 Mr. Helms. I thought so. As I say, it has been long
12 years since I have really dealt with these details.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. And if the file were opened on Oswald,
14 for example, would that reflect the fact that Oswald was per-
15 ceived at the time to be a potential counterintelligence threat?

16 Mr. Helms. I would have thought that if a 201 file was
17 opened on Oswald it was because Oswald has come to the Agency's
18 attention and they wanted to maintain the papers on him, so
19 they would have opened a file.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. And would it have been in the context of
21 Oswald posing a counterintelligence threat?

22 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give another example of how a
24 file might have come to be opened on Oswald?

25 Mr. Helms. We might have, I don't know, if we got

1 information, as you have pointed out, that we did from those
2 telephone taps on a man named Lee Oswald they would have imme-
3 diately opened a file on him.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in those telephone taps, if the
5 individual was simply expressing an interest in going to the
6 Soviet Union, that would have been sufficient to have opened a
7 201 file?

8 Mr. Helms. An American citizen, yes, I would have thought
9 so.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA number 796. This is
11 a State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, and I would
12 ask you to read it, please.

13 Mr. Helms. Lee Harvey Oswald.

14 All right, I have read it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would the information contained in this
16 telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

17 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so, an American who was
18 defecting to the Soviet Union would be of counterintelligence
19 interest and that would have been quite sufficient to have
20 caused the Agency to open a file.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if someone is an agent or operational
22 source for the Agency, would operational information concerning
23 him be located in this 201 file?

24 Mr. Helms. I would have thought not.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Where would that information be?

1 Mr. Helms. Operational information was usually kept in
2 the individual divisions or branches where the agent was being
3 handled.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would that be kept in a projects file or
5 operational file?

6 Mr. Helms. Probably.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. If a person were connected with the
8 Agency either as an agent or as a source of information, would
9 he always have a 201 file.?

10 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I am not sure how that was
11 done. If you will forgive me, my recollection is that when an
12 individual was an agent of the Agency that all the papers on
13 him were taken over by the division that was handling him, and
14 there was nothing available in the central records to identify
15 him as an agent. Now, there obviously would be exceptions to
16 that but in the case where there were exceptions, I think all
17 that would be in the file, the central file, would be a card
18 saying to the FE Division or something.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, wouldn't that then be a dead give-
20 away, if all you had in a file were a card, which referred to
21 the researcher to a particular division, that would automatically
22 indicate that the person was an agent. It seems to me that
23 would be contrary --

24 Mr. Helms. It was my impression this was not the case in
25 most cases, but I said in a case where there was a file, that

1 might be the way they would try to handle it. My impression
2 was, the original impression, all the papers were kept in the
3 Division that was handling the agent.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone was an agent he would have
5 his papers kept with the division, but you don't know whether
6 or not those papers would simulteneously be kept in the 201
7 file?

8 Mr. Helms. They would not be. In fact, I am sure they
9 would not be simultaneously kept in the 201 file except under
10 certain maybe unusual circumstances.

11 I am just leaving room for an exception.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. YOU have been very
13 clear on the fact operational information would not.

14 Mr. Helms. For the reason you yourself have cited, this
15 would be kind of a giveaway.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Now, if someone were an agent,
17 would he in most cases have a 201 file?

18 Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know whether you would call it
19 a 201 file. He certainly would have a file. It would be in
20 the possession of the division. Whether you call them 201 files
21 I don't know anymore.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ordinatry name trace always
23 refer to an agent's or source's 201 file?

24 Mr. Helms. I don't remember anymore how this dilemma was
25 resolved about running traces, and on a fellow who was already

1 an agent and how we dealt with the problem of protecting that
2 fact, I don't remember, I don't recall anymore.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the fact of a relation-
4 ship with the Agency would always be noted in the 201 file?

5 Mr. Helms. I don't know. It isn't only 15 years, it is
6 I don't know how many years since I actually was in a division
7 handling these matters and that is why I am so rusty on that.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. When, if ever, is it permissible to remove
9 a document from a 201 file?

10 Mr. Helms. I am just trying to think. I don't believe
11 that documents are removed from the 201 files except under a
12 destruction mechanism for dead files, in other words, files
13 where clearly the individual has died or something of that
14 kind. So I don't think that papers were removed from files, at
15 least legally removed from files, or properly removed from
16 files. I don't think that was permitted.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a recess to check on that noise
18 next door.

19 (A short recess was taken)

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When a document is removed from a 201
21 file is any record required to be kept noting that fact?

22 Mr. Helms. Yes sir, my recollection is that if you have
23 to remove a document from a basic file of the Agency then you
24 leave a notation in there as to where the document is.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Agency maintain a dual system of

1 of 201 files?

2 Mr. Helms. A dual sytem?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. By that I mean are there situations where
4 an individual might have one 201 file which contains primarily
5 biographical information and another 201 file containing either
6 more sensitive biographical information or information of an
7 operational significance?

8 Mr. Craig. You asked whether the Agency presently does?
9 Do you mean to ask during the period of time or --

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you, I appreciate that. Let's go
11 back to the period between 1959 and 1964.

12 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that there was one 201
13 file. That is basically, I believe, a biographical file.
14 There were also operational files but they weren't called 201
15 files, as I recall.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. So while the files would contain different
17 types of information, they would also go by different names?

18 Mr. Helms. Yes, I think so.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you know whether during
20 the period 1960 through 1964 there were categories of opera-
21 tional files, in other words, is there a difference between a
22 projects file and an operations file or production file?

23 Mr. Helms. You see, we did different kinds of operations.
24 There were positive intelligence operations, there were counter-
25 intelligence operations, there were covert action operations ,

1 there were paramilitary operations; and my recollection is that
2 the files were somewhat different in these various categories
3 because of the requirements of the case. In other words, they
4 contain different kinds of things.

5 But, as I say, I am so long away from all of that I am
6 not very helpful to you, I am sorry to say.

7 The whole point of this operation here was to maintain a
8 maximum of security and, therefore, a file might contain all
9 of Michael Goldsmith's biographical information, and all of
10 the operational cables about the use of Michael Goldsmith might
11 be in different files, they might be in the same safe or they
12 might be in different safes.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Are operations or project files ever
14 maintained on a covert basis, in other words, there might be
15 one official file, and then one file that contains other more
16 sensitive information?

17 Mr. Helms. I would not say that had never happened. I
18 wouldn't be surprised if there were occasional cases where the
19 thing was so sensitive that somebody made a separate file
20 in order to protect a certain category of information. But,
21 that would always be known to somebody, it would be known to the
22 case officer, the branch chief, the division chief, this was
23 the case because the system was designed to be as secure as
24 possible but also nobody was interested in encouraging people
25 to be so secretive you could never get hold of the information.

1 So, if a man maintained a file in his office or a private safe
2 or something because he was handling something so sensitive that
3 the didn't want it played around with by any of his associates,
4 at least one would know he was responsible for that.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you cite an example of where that might
6 have taken place?

7 Mr. Helms. Well, there were a couple of Soviet cases that
8 at various times were terribly sensitive and I think that the
9 material was very closely restricted and handled. Whether it
10 was just by one man or two men I just honestly don't recall and
11 I can't come up with actual names of the cases. But I think that,
12 if I understand the thrust of the discussion, there was no
13 leniency about any officer who hid information from his superiors
14 about these things, in other words, in the case of an agent,
15 unidentified, who was extremely sensitive, there would never be
16 any question that anybody checked around to find out who that
17 agent was, if the Director wanted to know if that agent was on
18 the payroll, which he seldom ever did, Directors liked to distance
19 themselves from the identify of agents -- if some person in
20 authority wanted to know about this, that fellow had absolutely
21 no right to say that he didn't know anything about it. He would
22 get fired for that.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. So under the way the system operated, some
24 individual with authority would have to have known about a file
25 being maintained on a covert type basis?

1 Mr. Helms. That is right.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym Z. R.
3 Rifle?

4 Mr. Helms. I became familiar with it during the Church
5 Committee hearings and I didn't become too familiar with it.
6 In other words, I never got back into all of the details about
7 it, but my recollection is that it applied to a project that
8 was set up by Bissell, in his time, whereby some individual whose
9 nationality I have now forgotten, was hired as a professional
10 killer or assassin or something, and I believe he was maintained
11 on the payroll for a time.

12 The Z.R. Rifle project as such, when I became Deputy
13 Director, in other words, the killing or assassin aspect of that
14 was just put on the shelf. I said we weren't going to have any
15 of that stuff, and since we had the fellow on our hands, the
16 case officer, as best I recall, found something more useful for
17 him to do.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the program itself continued, other
19 than the assassination aspect?

20 Mr. Helms. I don't know whether the name Z. R. Rifle was
21 continued but I believe the individual was continued for sometime
22 after that in an effort to find some gainful way of employing
23 him. I believe he was released later on because the project
24 never worked out in any respect. He apparently didn't have any
25 use, as I recall -- I am trying to think about him. He was an

1 Austrian.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Belgian.

3 According to two memos that we have here, CIA number 3319
4 and 3320, one of them dated 19 February 1962, and the other is
5 6 March, 1963, indicates that you gave authorization for this
6 project to continue.

7 Mr. Helms. The project so it could be funded, but my
8 distinct recollection is that I told the case officer who was
9 involved with this that this was to be changed in its concept,
10 in other words, there was absolutely no point in having a
11 professional killer on the payroll as such, and that he was to
12 try and find something else for him to do.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about this
14 project?

15 Mr. Helms. I don't know.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever tell the Warren Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. I nver did.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the case officer who handled this
19 project named William Harvey?

20 Mr. Helms. I thought it was Justin O'Connell. Maybe
21 Harvey started it and O'Donnell took it over later. Maybe that
22 is what happened.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know William Harvey?

24 Mr. Helms. Yes, sure. How could I have missed him?

25 Mr. Goldsmith. What is your assessment of his capability?

1 Mr. Helms. Well, that is a hat full. Harvey came to the
2 Agency back in I guess the late forties or early fifties, after
3 many years with the FBI, in which he handled the Elizabeth
4 Bentley case, among others. He was considered to be a very
5 capable FBI agent and he had a lot of important jobs in the
6 Agency, but toward the end of his career he became an alcoholic,
7 or very close to it, and had to be put on the bench; then he had
8 to be let go.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. So in the end Harvy was let go?

10 Mr. Helms. Yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. How much control was exercised over Harvey
12 when he was running the Z.R. Rifle program?

13 Mr. Helms. I don't know. He was working for Bissell in
14 those days and I didn't have anything to do with it. In fact,
15 I didn't even know about it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Z.R. Rifle project
17 used fake or cover 201 files?

18 Mr. Helms. No, I don't. I don't know what was done.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's review some documents. At this point
20 I would like to refer to CIA number 3307, which I am about to
21 hand you.

22 CIA number 3307 consists of handwritten notes that run
23 several pages. My impression is that these notes were attributed
24 to Mr. Harvey and I would ask you to refer specifically to CIA
25 number 3311, paragraph number 9.

1 Mr. Helms. "Should have phoney 201 in RI. To backstop
2 this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look
3 like a CE file."

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, would you examine CIA number 3314 and
5 3314?

6 Mr. Helms. Okay. I have 3314.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. And does that make reference to the use of
8 RIS cover caution?

9 Mr. Helms. Which part of that page am I to read here?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Look at the top of the page.

11 Mr. Helms. Magic button, Narcotics Bureau, RIS 201 cover
12 caution bankruptcy, no star, eyes, Jim A, Contradestruck,
13 not ATSD problem, Doodle, from you to -- arrow down, apply
14 brakes.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Maybe we can expedite this by my pointing
16 out the sepcific part.

17 Mr. Helms. Please do.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The upper right hand corner of the page,
19 does it refer to RIS 201 cover?

20 Mr. Helms. Yes sir.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. In the next line caution.

22 Mr. Helms. Yes sir. If I were to make a guess, inciden-
23 tally -- I am contributing something here -- if I were to
24 guess I would say this was Harvey's writing and this was not.

25 Mr. Craig. Referring to 3311?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. So the writing in 3311 you would say is not
2 Harvey's?

3 Mr. Helms. Yes.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. And the writing in 3314?

5 Mr. Helms. Are part of what I would say was.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, at the bottom of 3314 there is a
7 reference to the term never mentioned the word assassination.

8 Mr. Helms. Never mention word assassination, yes.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at 3315, paragraph 7.

10 Mr. Helms. Right. No project or papers except for --

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Cover?

12 Mr. Helms. I guess that is cover. I can't read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. And paragraph number 12?

14 Mr. Helms. Cover file from RIS or what is that -- I don't
15 know.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, --

17 Mr. Helms. Or did it, it looks like.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, whoudl you agree that here is
19 a case where, at the very least, agency personnel were contem-
20 plating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake opera-
21 tional file.

22 Mr. Helms. YEs, it looks like that. But then his boss
23 would have known about this. He would have had to get permis-
24 sion to do that. Somebody would have known about it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Again for the purposes of clarification,

1 when a file is faked in the manner suggested by the author
2 of these particular papers, how many people would know about it?

3 Mr. Helms. Well, the person who instructed it be done,
4 I assume his boss, the person who would do it, and whether
5 anybody in the RI or the Registry would know about it is a
6 problematic, they probably would not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the cryptonym S. R.
8 Taffy refers to? Let me show you CIA 3577 which contains no
9 substantial information in it but may refresh your memory.

10 Mr. Helms. Z. R. Taffy?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. That is a dispatch which I believe was
12 sent to you?

13 Mr. Helms. I must confess it is very familiar to me, the
14 name Z. R. Taffy, but what it referred to, I don't know.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have necessarily related to Z.R.
16 Rifle?

17 Mr. Helms. I would have thought not.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the same diagraph --

19 Mr. Helms. I don't know what category of diagraph that
20 came from. But Z. R., no, I associate Z. R. Taffy with nothing
21 of Z. R. Rifle type at all.

22 Let me see if I can possibly come up with what Z. R. Taffy
23 referred to. I don't know.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you know what a black
25 tape 201 file is?

1 Mr. Helms. Black tape 201? No, never heard the expression
2 before today, to my knowledge.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible this kind of file is a 201
4 file which has been designated to be extremely sensitive?

5 Mr. Helms. I don't know. I honestly don't know. I have
6 never heard the expression, to the best of my recollection, and
7 most of those trade expressions I have heard at one time.
8 I never remember hearing that. Z. R. Taffy certainly I heard
9 and am sorry I can't remember that because that has kicked
10 around for a long time, it seems to me.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall an incident where the Mexico
12 City station sent headquarters information pertaining to an
13 individual, an American, who had provided the Soviets with
14 military secrets, military handbooks?

15 Mr. Helms. An American?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. That may in some way be related to the
17 Z.R. Taffy project.

18 Mr. Helms. Yes. Was this an FBI case which we were try-
19 ing to do some work on for them?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Mr. Helms. Yes, I do vaguely recall this. I do vaguely
22 recall this.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. These handbooks were passed in October of
24 1963 in Mexico.

25 Mr. Helms. To the Russian Embassy?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Right.

2 Mr. Helms. I am wondering whether Z. R. Taffy was simply
3 an indicator that permitted material to be sent directly to me
4 bypassing the division. Is that possible?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, I would say that is a possibility.

6 Mr. Helms. That maybe, which is why it is so familiar to
7 me, because it would keep showing up in various places, some-
8 body was trying to send me something.

9 Mr. Helms. Where would such a procedure be used, Mr.
10 Ambassador?

11 Mr. Helms. It would be used, because the way we operated
12 in the Clandestine Services, there were certain things which
13 I wanted to maintain control over myself from time to time.
14 There were disciplinary matters, there were a variety of things
15 where a station chief ought to have a right to deal directly
16 with the fellow in charge of the operation rather than through
17 the division or through a subordinate, and there were indicators
18 set up for that purpose, just like things in the military.

19 Theoretically, when a field commander reports back to
20 headquarters his report goes through various staff echelons,
21 but he should have a direct appeal to the commanding general.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. What does the term CI/SIG refer to within
23 the CI staff?

24 Mr. Helms. Let me see. Was that back in the same era of
25 --

1 Mr. Goldsmith. We are talking about in the period from
2 1959 through 1964.

3 Mr. Helms. SIG?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it refer to Counterintelligence
5 Special Investigations Group or Special Investigatory Group?

6 Mr. Helms. What I am trying to wrack my brain about was
7 that inside the staffs there was a group that was known by
8 various names at various times and various indicators, which
9 was a group the purpose of which was to attempt to get codes
10 and ciphers in foreign countries and there was a special unit
11 whose sole focus in life was to try and accomplish this objec-
12 tive, and this had a team of breakin artists and all kinds of
13 things.

14 I am just trying to remember whether SIG was that unit or
15 whether it was one that dealt more specifically with NSA or just
16 what it was.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe SIG was a unit that was headed
18 by Burch O'Neill. Does that refresh your memory?

19 Let me give you more background and tell me if this agrees
20 with your impression of the purpose of that unit. CI/SIG I am
21 told, refers to Counter Intelligence/ Special Investigative
22 Group, and the purpose of that unit was to determine whether
23 any agency employees had been penetrated by a foreign intelli-
24 gence service. The unit work-d closely with the Office of
25 Security.

1 Does that sound familiar to you?

2 Mr. Helms. It doesn't sound right. It doesn't sound right.
3 It sounds to me like a unit that had another purpose. That
4 may have been one of its purposes. But it seems to me that was
5 the unit that was a highly secret, highly sensitive one.

6 Do you all have clearances for communications intelligence?
7 Does the reporter have all those clearances?

8 This is one of those problems I think we have gotten
9 into here.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify the problem, Mr.
11 Ambassador, and we will see how we can possibly resolve it --
12 not today.

13 Mr. Helms. In order to identify the problem I have to
14 tell you what the problem is and, therefore, I have to breach
15 security.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. No, I understand the problem and I am
17 just asking --

18 Mr. Helms. This has to do with codes and ciphers. In
19 other words, that category of material is largely dealt with
20 by NSA.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. By this now you are referring to --

22 Mr. Helms. SIG, I think, if I am correct about it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's refer at this time to CIA number 788.

24 Can you indentify this form?

25 Mr. Helms. I have looked at the page here.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. What is that form?

2 Mr. Helms. It says it is a file request for information
3 coming from a 201 file itself to headquarters RI from CI/SIG
4 and Egerter.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that the basic form that is used to
6 request the opening of a 201 file?

7 Mr. Helms. I guess it is. It looks like it to me.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. What does the term RI stand for?

9 Mr. Helms. Records Integration. In other words, that was
10 a name given to what in normal parlance would be called an
11 intelligence registry.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. The second line of this document says from
13 CI/SIG Egerter, and then down here, where it says source docu-
14 ment, the term CI/SIG is used again. Does that help you in
15 any way towards resolving the question what the term CI/SIG
16 refers to? I guess.

17 Mr. Helms. I think I know what it refers to.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. This is the topic we were unable to
19 discuss?

20 Mr. Helms. If I am wrong about it, which I apologize for,
21 you have asked me to do the best I can and I am doing the best
22 I can.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I might indicate for the record what we
24 will attempt to do is find someone in our staff with the
25 appropriate clearance -- I believe the Chief Counsel has it --

1 to pursue this issue.

2 Mr. Helms. I think you ought to go out to the Agency and
3 go into this matter out there because I don't think it is going
4 to help your investigation, particularly if I may suggest it,
5 to come back to me on that. He ought to make up his own mind
6 whether it is important to the investigation or not, and if it
7 is, then he has got a real hell of a problem about the tran-
8 script and so forth.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. I agree with you. What we intend to do is
10 contact the Agency and have someone with an appropriate
11 clearance take care of that, and if there is need to get back
12 to you on it we will. I understand the problem you are refer-
13 ring to.

14 Mr. Helms. Right.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. According to this document, a action was
16 taken on Oswald's 201 file on 9 December, 1960. Was that
17 correct?

18 Mr. Helms. That is what I would think, yes.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we saw a document that was a
20 cable which had been received on 10/31/50, a State Department
21 cable. The one you showed me a few minutes ago?

22 Mr. Helms. The one you showed me a few minutes ago?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Which made reference to Oswald intending
24 to defect and give military information to the Soviets. Why
25 did it take more than one year to open a 201 file on Oswald?

1 I might add, this is an issue which is somewhat controversial
2 in this case.

3 Mr. Helms. I can't imagine why it would have taken an
4 entire year. I am amazed. Defect to the USSR October 1959.
5 This is December 1960. There wasn't a 201 file already in
6 existence, I am amazed. Are you sure there wasn't?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. The opening of the file, according to the
8 record, is 9 December 1960.

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, I understand that by Miss Egerter, but
10 the SI Division, had they not opened a file alot earlier?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. According to the record that the Committee
12 has seen the first opening of any file on Oswald was 9
13 December '60.

14 Mr. Helms. I can't explain that.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why the Oswald file was opened
16 up in the name Lee Henry Oswald?

17 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone ever questioned about this?

19 Mr. Helms. There was controversy at the time, it seems
20 to me, as to why it was wrong. It was wrong in the dissemina-
21 tion that went out?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, we looked at this morning.

23 Mr. Helms. I am sure that there was an intense preoocupa-
24 tion at the time as to how this mistake had been made but I
25 recall no longer whether it was resolved or whether it wasn't.

1 wasn't resolved or whose fault it was. I notice, interestingly
2 enough, that this notation was made in 1975.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Right; the notation you are referring to is
4 one that was made by Mr. Raymond Rocca and it refers to --
5 there is an arrow drawn to the middle name Henry, a circle is
6 drawn around the name Henry, and Mr. Rocca wrote down NB:Harvey
7 so at the time the correction was made. I might add, Mr.
8 Rocca has given testimony to that effect.

9 Would a routine file check or name trace for Lee Harvey
10 Oswald have resulted in a reference to this file which was
11 opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald?

12 Mr. Helms. I think I can safely say yes. When traces
13 were run they would run Lee Oswald and every other modification
14 of Oswald they could think of. That is one of the reasons that
15 keeping files at the Agency was so difficult. It was particu-
16 larly difficult with the word Johnson, which is spelled so
17 many different ways.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, in the middle of the page there is a
19 box marked for identification by the number 1, and within that
20 box the letters AG have been inserted. Do you know what the
21 letters AG are referring to?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I don't. I have no idea. No idea. That
23 must run along here. Here is his birth date and country of
24 birth and then the city or town, then there is radio operator
25 and all that stuff. But I have never seen the initials AG and

1 they obviously refer to some identification of Oswald, but I have
2 no idea what that would refer to.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. According to this document, at the bottom
4 of the page, it indicates that the file was a restricted file.
5 Do you know why this file would have been restricted?

6 Mr. Helms. At that time?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

8 Mr. Helms. Only because of this identification SIG, I
9 would assume. With SIG I would assume.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

11 At this time I would like to refer to CIA number 943.

12 CIA number 943 is a xerox copy of three file cards. I
13 would ask you to refer to the top file card on that page.

14 Mr. Helms. The one that says recent defector USSR, former
15 Marine?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Looking at the upper right hand
17 corner of that card, what is the CI project/RI referring to?

18 Mr. Helms. I don't know. I guess I did once but I don't
19 know now.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, was Oswald involved in any CI staff
21 project?

22 Mr. Helms. Not that I heard of.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was he the subject of any CI project?

24 Mr. Helms. No, I don't know of any. I didn't know he had
25 any identification with the Agency at all. I have testified

1 it seems to me to the Warren Commission that the Agency never
2 used Lee Harvey Oswald. That is what I believe to be true to
3 this day. I don't know what the RE refers to. Down here it
4 has see SIG Egerter. I don't know. Has anybody been able to
5 identify what RE stands for?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. We have had people give some explanations.

7 Mr. Helms. You obviously have talked to the right people.
8 I don't know what it means.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA 784 and
10 read that document. It should be in the same volume.

11 Mr. Helms. 784?

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

13 Mr. Helms. Yes. Here, I see that.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read that docu-
15 ment?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. This document makes reference to some, I
18 believe, 37 items that were missing from Oswald's 201 file.

19 Mr. Helms. Right.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Was this documeent ever brought to your
21 attention previously?

22 Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. I have never seen
23 the document before, to the best of my knowledge. If it was
24 brought to my attention I don't recall it today.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever informed that at least

1 sometime there were 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file?

2 Mr. Helms. No, I have no recollection of this. What is
3 the significance of it? Carelessness or where were the
4 documents?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. We are trying to determine the significance
6 of it.

7 Is there anything unusual or improper about documents,
8 in particular, 37 documents missing from Oswald's 201 file?

9 Mr. Helms. I noticed 25 of those are cables. Maybe they
10 were cables considered to be sensitive and were being held in
11 the W. H. Division rather than sent to the 201 file and the
12 registry, because they had to do with telephone taps and so
13 forth. That would be a good reason for not putting them in
14 the 201 file.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, today those cables, at least the
16 cables pertaining to the surveillance operations, are in the
17 201 file, so it is not clear whether those cables refer to the
18 Mexico City ones or some other ones, but this document,
19 at least from the face of it, gives rise to the possibility that
20 there were documents missing from Oswald's 201 file.

21 Mr. Helms. Well, I have given you the best explanation
22 I can or likely assumption as to why the cables might have been
23 missing.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, a minute ago when we examined the card
25 that made reference to the CI/ER, or CI/project RE, does that
 in your mind give rise to the possibility that Oswald in some

1 way was connected with the Agency?

2 Mr. Helms. No, I don't. I don't know what RE stands for.
3 But, you know, this is 1978. If there was a confusion on the
4 part of anybody that Oswald had ever worked for CIA, except for
5 some newspapermen who are always asking these questions, it
6 should have been resolved long before now.

7 As I say, I have testified to the fact he didn't work for
8 the CIA. I don't know anybody that alleges in the CI that he
9 did work for them. Even Epstein in his book of 40 questions for
10 Admiral Turner doesn't raise that allegation.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Is the information contained in the document
12 particularly sensitive?

13 Mr. Helms. This document here?

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, the one you have just been examining,
15 number 784?

16 Mr. Helms. The exact words here are not sensitive, no.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Then why would the document be marked
18 secret for eyes only?

19 Mr. Helms. There was a lot of overclassifying inside the
20 agency. Whoever wrote this document obviously didn't want it
21 to go all over the place, he wanted it to go the the chief CIRA.
22 There were lots of documents marked eyes only I think in
23 retrospect that really didn't need to be eyes only and it
24 wouldn't have been.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Should that document be of concern to the
Committee because of the fact it suggests there were materials

1 missing from Oswald's 201 file?

2 I might add this is a document that was not released under
3 FOIA for some reason.

4 Mr. Helms. Having no explanation except the one I gave
5 you for why they are not in the 201 file, you know this file
6 was opened in 1960, wasn't it? Along come these results of a
7 very sensitive operation in Mexico City. I can understand the
8 Division not sending those down to the 201 file. I see nothing
9 sinister about that at all.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, I should say for the record at
11 the time of the assassination the 201 file was in the possession
12 of the Western Hemisphere Branch. I can't say for sure whether
13 or not the cables were in the file at that time. But it would
14 appear that cable was in the 201 file, as I say, mainly because
15 the file was in the possession of the Western Hemisphere
16 Branch.

17 You have been shown what has been marked as CIA 3572,
18 paragraph (b) of which makes reference to the cable of October
19 10 from the Mexico City station, and a Warren Commission
20 staffer named A. Stern, who wrote this memo, indicates that the
21 October 10 cable was one of the documents that he examined.

22 This document was, according to Stern's memo, located in
23 Oswald's 201 file, so apparently these materials were in the
24 file.

25 I would like to ask you to examine Warren's October 10

1 I would like to ask you to examine Warren Commission
2 Exhibit number 870, which was the affidavit that was prepared
3 by Mr. McCone.

4 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know at whose request, if anyone,
6 this affidavit was prepared?

7 Mr. Helms. I have a vague recollection it was prepared
8 for the Warren Commission.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was it prepared because the Warren
10 Commission requested it or because Mr. McCone thought it would
11 be a good idea?

12 Mr. Helms. I thought the Warren Commission requested it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Does the affidavit also represent the
14 Agency's position at that time that you were DCI?

15 Mr. Helms. Yes, as far as I know.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the allegation was first
17 made that Oswald was connected in some way with the CIA?

18 Mr. Helms. I thought that there were these allegations
19 kicking around right at the time, right after the President's
20 assassination. I don't know where they started but it seemed
21 to me they were kicking around. FBI was charged with having
22 used him too, I believe.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read CIA number 1912
24 through 1913. Let me indicate for the record that this is part
25

1 of the brief that had been prepared for Mr. McCone's presenta-
2 tion to the Warren Commission.

3 Mr. Helms. Do you want me to read the next page?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. 1912 and 1913, please.

5 Mr. Helms. All right.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. You may hold on to that.

7 Mr. Helms. All right.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. On page number 1913, the first full para-
9 graph, it indicates we have traced the sponsorship of that
10 campaign, meaning the campaign to link Oswald to the Agency,
11 directly to individuals and components within the Soviet Police
12 State apparatus.

13 Are you able to state which individuals and components
14 within the Soviet Police State apparatus were responsible for
15 initiating the campaign that Oswald was a CIA agent?

16 Mr. Helms. I am not.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was any report ever done specifically
18 focusing on this issue?

19 Mr. Helms. I don't recall. I don't recall. I would have
20 thought that a statement like this would be based on FBI inter-
21 cepts and things of that kind showing that this had been a
22 propaganda broadcast from the Soviet Union, Black radio broad-
23 casts, things of that kind. I think when the man says indivi-
24 duals and components it just follows like night the day if a
25 Soviet broadcast says something then the Soviet Government is

1 behind it.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you ever see any written
3 reports dealing with this issue?

4 Mr. Helms. Not that I remember, no.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever conduct an investiga-
6 tion to determine whether Oswald in fact had ever been connected
7 with the CIA?

8 Mr. Helms. Oh, certainly.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. And would you indicate for the record
10 when that investigation was conducted and by whom?

11 Mr. Helms. I think right after the assassination every-
12 body checked around to find out if there had been any contact
13 with him. This could have happened very quickly and I think it
14 would have been very easy to ascertain there had been no
15 contacts.

16 The Agency would not have put its Director in the position
17 McCone was put in the affidavit had been morally certain after
18 careful examination that this was the fact.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who was involved in this
20 investigative effort, specifically who was charged with it?

21 Mr. Helms. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Was any investigative report generated
23 in 1963 or '64 pertaining to this issue?

24 Mr. Helms. I don't remember. Certainly we were all
25 interested to find out the truth of this matter and we all came

1 down with the sensation that this was an accurate statement
2 that Mr. McCone was being asked to make. After all, it would
3 have been our jobs if this had been wrong.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what the Agency's investiga-
5 tion involved? Was it simply checking files, talking to
6 individuals?

7 Mr. Helms. We would have checked with files, checked with
8 individuals, checked with various parts of the Agency to find
9 out if they had any contacts. They would have consulted their
10 records.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would a mere file check definitely resolve
12 the question of whether Oswald was connected in any way with
13 the Agency?

14 Mr. Helms. No, I think this went further than a file
15 check. People were physically asked, I think the Domestic
16 Contact Division was asked if they had any record of this man.
17 I am certain that people would have been gone to and said have
18 you ever heard of this fellow, has everybody identified with
19 us? We checked the file, we checked people's memory, we would
20 have been careful about this.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that your investigation
22 would have been hampered in some way by the problems of fake
23 files?

24 Mr. Helms. I can't imagine that it would have.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain why not?

1 Mr. Helms. Simply because I can't imagine why you would
2 have wanted to have a fake file on a man like Lee Harvy Oswald.
3 What would have been the purpose of it?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, my point is if Oswald was an agent
5 that it is possible for someone to have a fake file and con-
6 cealed the fact of that Agency relationship.

7 Mr. Helms. I suppose anything is possible in the world
8 but it didn't happen anyway.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever have an operational
10 interest in Oswald?

11 Mr. Helms. Not that I know of. But that is not to say
12 that somebody might not have thought why don't we double that
13 fellow Oswald, why don't we see this, that or the other about
14 him, but no record was ever established that contact was in fact
15 made with him for these purposes, and if there is anybody who
16 made such a contact my statement is wrong, I have never heard
17 about it.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you a document that
19 suggests at the very least a contact with Oswald was contem-
20 plated.

21 Mr. Helms. I think Epstein says this in his book, doesn't
22 he?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I will show you CIA document number 3367.
24 Make that CIA number 3369. Please read this.

25 Mr. Helms. It looks plausible enough.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, incidentally, that document makes
2 reference to a Harvey story. Do you know which Harvey story
3 that would be referring to, which Harvey that would be referring
4 to? For example, is it possible that it is referring to
5 William Harvey?

6 Mr. Helms. I have no idea. No idea what it refers to.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Mr. Ambassador, at the very least,
8 wouldn't the Agency have had an interest in debriefing Oswald
9 upon his return from the USSR, in order to attempt to obtain
10 information on his experience there?

11 Mr. Helms. I would have thought that that were so but I
12 also would have thought that we would have relied on the Marine
13 Corps or Navy Intelligence to do that job, since he was a
14 Marine.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any working relationship between
16 the Agency and DOD which would have ensured that either DOD or
17 CIA would have debriefed Oswald?

18 Mr. Helms. Certainly I don't think there is any question
19 but it would have been fully expected that the Navy would have
20 interrogated him, if not also the FBI. But normally the Agency
21 didn't interrogate other agencies of the government personnel
22 when they came back. We interrogated other people who didn't
23 have any government affiliations but not usually other govern-
24 ment agencies, unless there was some particular reason for it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald may have positive

1 information by virtue of his employment in the radio factory
2 in Minsk, you don't think that the Agency would have had an
3 interest in him?

4 Mr. Helms. I think they might have had. This fellow
5 indicates that he had an interest for quite a different reason,
6 but I would have thought that it would have been left to the
7 Navy to debrief him and if he had anything of particular
8 interest it would have been passed to us and we might want to
9 follow up at some point. There is no evidence any follow up
10 was ever made even though there might have been interest there.
11 It is the facts we are dealing with, not the supposition that
12 you might have done it or not done it. It is the facts we
13 are dealing with.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the following factors have
15 been cited by the Warren Commission critics as circumstantial
16 evidence indicative of Oswald having had connection with the
17 American intelligence community. I would like to read to you
18 briefly the list and have you comment upon it.

19 The First one, the absence of any commercially available
20 aircraft transportation for Oswald to have traveled from England
21 to Helsinki at the time that he did.

22 Secondly, the ease with which Oswald received his discharge
23 from the military.

24 Third, the ease and speed with which Oswald received his
25 visa into the USSR.

1 Fourth, the ease and speed with which Oswald was reissued
2 a passport in 1963, despite his earlier attempt to defect to
3 the USSR.

4 And fifth, the relative ease with which Oswald was permitted
5 to return to the United States by US officials after his stay
6 in the USSR.

7 These factors taken in conjunction with questions that
8 have been raised by the Oswald file, for example, the delayed
9 opening of the file, the CI/SIG unit initiating the opening of
10 the file, the absence of any record indicating that Oswald had
11 been debriefed by the Agency, have been advanced, as I said, as
12 circumstantial evidence that Oswald did have connections with
13 the intelligence community.

14 What weight, if any, should be given to these factors in
15 evaluating whether Oswald was an agent, source or employee of
16 any American intelligence agency?

17 Mr. Helms. My understanding is that he was not an employee
18 of any American intelligence agency, therefore, the weight that
19 one gives these conjectures should be determined by the
20 individual who is doing the weighing.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Talking hypothetically now, if you
22 approached these factors without the advance knowledge as to
23 what the result is in this case, what weight would you give
24 these factors?

25 Mr. Helms. I wouldn't give very much weight to them.

1 They are just casual comments -- the speed with which, the ease
2 with which. What the hell does that mean?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I would be glad to go into detail for you,
4 if you would like me to.

5 Mr. Helms. In other words, it was six days instead of
6 six weeks, or it was this, that or the other thing. What have
7 you found out? The more interesting things, why were these
8 things done, why did he get his passport back so quickly from
9 the State Department, what do the State Department people say?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry that I am not able to respond
11 to your questions. The Committee Rules prohibit me from
12 responding.

13 Would you care to make any comment upon these factors that,
14 as I say, have been advanced by Warren Commission critics as
15 circumstantial evidence of intelligence association by Oswald?

16 Mr. Helms. My only comment is the United States is a
17 nation of Monday morning quarterbacks.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. What factors, Mr. Ambassador, would you
19 emphasize in attempting to resolve this issue?

20 Mr. Helms. Resolve which issue?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The issue of whether Oswald was an agent
22 or source of information for the CIA.

23 Mr. Helms. I just told you that he wasn't and I am morally
24 certain that he was not and I don't want to get into any more
25 hypothetical discussion of this because I have never seen any

1 evidence that he was. I have never talked to anybody that
2 talked to him. I have never discussed this matter in any
3 context which indicated to me that he had worked for CIA and,
4 therefore, these conjectures are conjectures.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. You wouldn't consider these factors as
6 circumstantial evidence then?

7 Mr. Helms. They don't bother me any.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, during the time that you
9 were both DCI and earlier DDP, in any event, during that time
10 period, were your telephone conversations either tape recorded
11 or transcribed by a stenographer as a matter of routine?

12 Mr. Helms. When I was DDP from time to time a note or
13 two may have been taken by my secretary depending on whether
14 I asked her to or not. It was not routine. There was usually
15 a record kept of who had called or who I had called. When
16 I was Director, I had the capacity to tape the telephone con-
17 versations I had if I wanted to, but 99 percent of the time
18 I didn't do it.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. What type of information goes into the
20 executive registry?

21 Mr. Helms. The mail that comes to the director's office
22 and the deputy director's office. That was simply a device
23 for routing and holding and disseminating the director's mail,
24 or the mail of the director and the deputy director's office.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Were these personal files or would the

1 executive registry contain personal letters, for example?

2 Mr. Helms. Yes.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier today LBJ was told
4 in 1967 about the effort to get rid of Castro?

5 Mr. Helms. Yes.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. Johnson was
7 given a copy of the 1967 IGR or whether anyone from his staff
8 was given a copy of this '67 IGR?

9 Mr. Helms. Whose staff?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. I will rephrase the question.

11 Do you recall whether either President Johnson or any
12 member of his staff was permitted to read the 1967 Inspector
13 General's Report?

14 Mr. Helms. Certainly no member of the staff. I took the
15 report with me when I went to see President Johnson and he asked
16 me to tell him what was in it and I did.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the
18 case of a defector named Minktenbaugh, who defected from the
19 US to the Soviet Union in 1959, and came back to the United
20 States in 1963, approximately, with a Soviet woman?

21 Mr. Helms. It is an unusual name and it certainly is
22 familiar to me, but these facts that you are citing here about
23 when he defected and coming back, I didn't know anything about
24 this woman and I am not even sure that I focused particularly
25 on when he came back.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. The next point I was about to make was
2 Minktenbaugh and his woman companion were KGB. Once Minktenbaugh
3 had gone to the Soviet Union the KGB contacted him and attempted
4 to solicit his assistance. When he came back to the United
5 States his effort to assist the KGB was discovered and he was
6 convicted, I imagine, of espionage.

7 Now, the facts of this case are somewhat similar to
8 Oswald's case. Oswald defected to the Soviet Union and came
9 back with a Soviet wife. There is a question as to whether
10 Marina may have had KGB connections, but we will leave that
11 for another day.

12 Do the parallels in that case that I have just described
13 have any significance, in your opinion, with regard to Oswald's
14 case?

15 Mr. Helms. The intelligence parallels are useful but they
16 don't prove anything. There is so many circumstantial things
17 that go on in intelligence work that you have to have some
18 independent way of checking whether it is the same or just seems
19 to be the same. Obviously the great hole in this whole case is
20 what the Soviets had to say to Lee Harvey Oswald when he was
21 in the Soviet Union during all those months, and we don't really
22 know that.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I just have one final question. There have
24 been allegations made through the years that former agency
25 employee Howard Hunt was involved in the assassination of the

1 of the President. Do you have any information that would shed
2 light upon that allegation?

3 Mr. Helms. No, I can't shed any light upon it except that
4 I don't believe it.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Hunt was in Dallas
6 on November 22, 1963?

7 Mr. Helms. I believe it has been ascertained he was not.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge one way
9 or the other?

10 Mr. Helms. I don't have any personal knowledge one way or
11 the other. I remember this coming up in some connection, maybe
12 it was in connection with the Church Committee hearings.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Or Rockefeller Commission?

14 Mr. Helms. Yes, or Rockefeller Commission. I have
15 testified so many times it is now all a blur, I mean before so
16 many different groups.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to thank you
18 for testifying here today. As Chairman Preyer indicated to
19 you this morning, under the Committee Rules you do have an
20 opportunity to make a statement on the record. If you would
21 like to make some statement at this time, please feel free to
22 do so.

23 Mr. Helms. Thank you very much. I don't think I have
24 anything to add to what I have said. I appreciate the courtesy
25 with which you have dealt with me and I appreciate very much

1 your making an extra effort to finish the hearings today. I
2 don't have any substantive comments to make in addition to what
3 I have testified to here, except to say that I think that you
4 are in charge of a very difficult investigation, particularly
5 one taking place so much later than the events themselves,
6 and that it seems to me you have gone at it with great thorough-
7 ness and care. I think that does it.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much.

9 (Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE OF STENOTYPE REPORTER

I, Robert B. Thomas, stenotype reporter, do hereby certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in the foregoing deposition was taken by me in stenotype and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or financially or other wise interested in the outcome of the action.

Robert B Thomas
Stenotype Reporter