

CONFIDENTIAL

file
(DO guidelines
names
Cuba)

7 January 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA**FROM:** Bryant Rogers**SUBJECT:** MEETING WITH [REDACTED]**REFERENCE:**

On 6 Jan we met with [REDACTED] from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.

The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release the names of those major players with whom CIA worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then discussed our relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that as a funding vehicle for the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark figures for annual budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could claim that one was paid more than another. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to Latin America. The DO reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and assets and any specifics on tradecraft.

When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that they have been mentioned in open literature.

With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.

CC: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Richard D. Kovar-Y. @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA

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JFK

1/15/82

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.

Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.

Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

CL BY 0695930
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82


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SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we will release names of employees who have retired in an overt status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a document. We will continue to protect the true names of employees cited as serving in a field position. References to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between Headquarters and the field.



for Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

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
8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
ARRB Staff

FROM: Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and
Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)



Attachment

Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.

SECRET

**Assassination Records Review Board**

600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530

(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

December 11, 1995

**CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT**BY FACSIMILE

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear John:

As Mary and I discussed with Barry late last Friday, CIA's long-awaited response to ARRB's request for evidence about the true names to be considered at tomorrow's Board meeting was disappointing and inadequate. For several months, the Board has been encouraged by the CIA to expect a comprehensive presentation of specific evidence relating to its desire to protect the true names of CIA employees. The Board has delayed action on hundreds of assassination records in anticipation of this evidence. We are frankly concerned not only by the impact the CIA's action will have on our work, but also by the fact that we feel we have been misled by the Agency in this instance.

We urge your full compliance with our request in time for tomorrow's meeting.

Sincerely yours,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

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11 December 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

1. On 1 December, Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board staff members. Also participating from CIA were [redacted] and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; [redacted] OGC; and Barry Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect the names of former Agency employees that appeared in the JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people who retired under cover if they were identified in the public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3. The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Board in its review of names when it meets on 12-13 December. The Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing, evidence of risk for each of the names that will be discussed at the Board's meeting.

[redacted]
John F. Pereira

CL BY: [redacted]
CL REASON: COV 2-87 1-5C
DECL ON: XI
DRV FROM: AHB 70-9

SECRET

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From the Desk of

NOTE FOR:

Barry R. Gibson @ DO

FROM:

 @ DO

DATE:

03/04/96 09:26:53 AM

SUBJECT:

JFK - Central Cover appeal

The General Counsel and I met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to deal with the potential public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel they are not getting enough information to make that decision.

Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which I will pass on to you (including how to deal with Whitten). I would at the very least like to be able suggest that we attempt contact again (either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course, any suggestions you have at this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. [Until we work out an agreement with the Board, you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]

In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:

1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if available: ,

- # living abroad
- # of those retired under cover vs. those whose cover has been rolled back or lifted
- # of those who still work for us in covert/overt capacity

2. The # of responses we received to date.

3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don't release.

4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.

I realize you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.

CC:

J. Barry Harrelson

Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO

Frederick Wickham @ DO

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8 March 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harellson
John Pereira

FROM: [REDACTED]
DCI/OGC/LD

SUBJECT: JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

REFERENCE:

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From the Desk of [REDACTED]

NOTE FOR:**FROM:****DATE:****SUBJECT:**

[REDACTED] @ DCI
DCI
@ DCI

03/08/96 02:50:39 PM

JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

I have been informed that [REDACTED] will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should go as well.

Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

1. Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a "window" in which all stations would be opened [REDACTED] Of course, if there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive evidence.

- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month [REDACTED] needs to be signed onto this idea.

- Jeff, last month, presented additional information on [REDACTED] Jeff and Dave should be prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.

2. The Board recently released the names of 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or so I am told). The thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the last meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable way to deal with cover employees. I understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just the principal. If this is true, the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable alternative (using pseudos or generic descriptions like "case officer")

3. I will be out all next week but Barry Harellson/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI (30373) will be happy to fill you in on the details. Barry will be contacting [REDACTED] next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.

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
MEMORANDUM

March 20, 1996

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

To: Review Board

cc: David Marwell
CIA Team

From: T. Jeremy Gunn 

Subject: Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names

The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines on the release of true names of CIA officers:

When the true name of a CIA officer (*i.e.* past or present employee of CIA) appears in a document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part II (below).

Part I. Categories of Officers.

1. **Living officers.** For living (present or former) officers, CIA must prove that (a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer is either working or is retired under cover; *and* (c) the officer objects to the release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the officer's true name until the year 2010.

2. **Where current status of former officer is unknown.** Where CIA has been unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has made a good faith showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may postpone the true

name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997, additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or category 3 (below).

3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CIA believes that the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of the true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living person (including family members), or (d) the release of the true name would cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could be made without causing harm.

Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

The Board presumptively will postpone the release of names consistent with categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear in a context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

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29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a common last name appears by itself or in conjunction with a common first name such that it does not tend to specifically identify the individual.

b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it remains unidentified after a reasonable search is conducted.

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired overtly:

In most cases, overt employees' names will be released, but in some cases overt employees may have a portion of their employment remain under cover. Such cases will require the same review as that of an employee who remained under cover into retirement.

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SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

C. Identifiable names for employees that retired covertly:

a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a current address and contact the person. If the person objects to the release of his or her name for reasons associated with current life style issues, we will object to the release of the name. If the person does not have objections based upon personal circumstances we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the current address, but it can be determined that the individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to continue to protect the name since source of income or benefits can not be altered without prior notification to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or other active benefit, we will review the name for organizational issues. (See para C. c.)

c. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the name to look for identifiable harm to the person's safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of the previous concerns are identified, we will review the potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover provider by the specific occurrence of the name if released.

2. Because families of deceased employees could be the beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the employee. We also have second and third generation officers following in the footsteps of their parents that could be negatively impacted by the revelation.

3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches


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SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of the name.

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.



Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

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SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OCC
1 - IMS/ESG/ALB
1 - IMS/ESG/IRB
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP
1 - ESG Chrono

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

5 March, 1997

Memorandum For: Chief/HRG

From: Barry Harrelson

Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review

Reference: Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)
4 March 1997Name Issue

I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you. Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a person worked for the CIA it should be known.

Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is planning to propose to the Board that they change the process from the focus on individual postponements to documents. Under the new approach his staff would have the authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that even with an additional year they will not finish the project with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the names as an example of how the process would work.

Marwell recommends that we include examples of documents containing names of little or no connection to the story. Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell) said that there were a number of names that appeared in only one document and that the number of names had reached 590. Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint list of important/releasable individuals.

Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to [] and Fred for background use.

HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO should focus on any person on the list that needs protection and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue to be resolved).

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

New ARRB Review Process

Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new process would work. He would like to test the process for the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my comments:

1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted). [no change in our procedures]

2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted document.

a) If they agree, they would stamp the document "ARRB approved" and return it to HRG to process for NARA.

b) If they disagree they would highlight in yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document would go before the Board.

[Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the "grid" to determine what happen.]

3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff would prepare a simplified final determination notice and letter to the Agencies.

[No action would be required; HRG would file the final determination notice with the document].

4) "Green" highlighted documents that go to the Board would be handled the same as today.

[The expectation is that a lot less documents would require Board action.]

Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998. Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the "non-related" material and the "addition records" are reviewed by the ARRB staff.

SECRET - WORKING PAPER

Pending Issues

As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:

1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members. Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell thinks they would react favorably.

2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and that those documents are in the released material.

3) [] FBI file issue; we need to present case to the Board

4) LI 9. Continuing to protect will be a hard sell given that [] identity; we need to present case to the Board.

5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review

Annual Report and Extension

Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual Report and the request for an extension. He would still like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him) along these lines: "reviewed Annual Report"

"note that the Board has ask for extension"

"support the request/feel it is in interest of Agency and public /or something along these lines"

Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

[] (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his notes, and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from the CI histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes that some of the pages should be released and might be considered assassination records. We are going to run into similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the "pages issue" with the goal of having him drop the request to release. As to the question of designating the pages as assassination records, she will inform him that CI will oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.


C O V E R**FAX****S H E E T**

To: J. Barry Harrelson
Fax #: 703-613-3063
Subject: Segregated Collections
Date: April 23, 1997
Pages: 7, including this cover sheet.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.

From the desk of...

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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**Assassination Records Review Board
Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
Adopted: April 23, 1997**

Background

In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete its task of reviewing all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First, on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated Collections" with regard to information that is "not believed relevant" (NBR) to the assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional information and records. Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.¹ (These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first, continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second, establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guidelines that will enable the

¹The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" as including *first*, FBI records that were requested by: (a) the House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") in conjunction with its investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies (e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy assassination; and *second*, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64), and (b) several boxes of CIA staff "working files."

- 2 -

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the Segregated Collections.²

CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI Informants and CIA sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case, although not always, that FBI informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a criminal prosecution and that they may need to testify in court. Foreign CIA sources and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore, unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security assets.

Despite these differences -- differences which would generally suggest a greater degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

²The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections contain records that shed some light on issues that the HSCA explored as potentially relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply to all records in the Segregated Collections, including records containing some NBR redactions.

- 3 -

CIA Sources

The Review Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting. These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or is peripheral to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm if their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.³ In cases where the identity of the source is peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

FBI National Security Assets

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.

FBI Informants

Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for researching individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board.⁴ They retrieve and review the informants' files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and other database searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support redacting the informant's name, *regardless* of whether the informant provided information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-identifying information,

³An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, "Scelso" documents would continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

⁴Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to informant evidence.

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without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants, "PSIs," "PCIs," "established sources," "panel sources," and the like -- designations that indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local and state law enforcement officers.

The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would include the customary (*i.e.*, informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers, informant names, and -- at least potentially -- descriptions of, and information received from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.⁵

The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the informant provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this presumption of release for informants with "positive" information, the FBI would need to make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released. To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.

CIA Employee Name Postponements

Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little, if any, important information.

⁵In HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.

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CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First, since many employees are "under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover provider and jeopardize operations. Second, although the majority of names are of retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already been presented to the Board. Their merit can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their identities are important to the assassination story *unless* the CIA is able to provide specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee name.)

FBI "Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the HSCA subjects reflect "FCI" activities against other nations that have not been addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, *unless* the information in the proposed redaction meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies, although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign government is the source of particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these guidelines.

CIA Stations and Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period 1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations, except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report, (i.e., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. All "LI" crypts, except those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as are "AM" crypts and U.S. government crypts. In other areas, only the digraph is protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts, except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material bearing on information related to the assassination *unless* CIA provides evidence demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will be released in 2017.

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