



Assassination Records Review Board
 600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
 (202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

June 9, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
 RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
 IN THIS DOCUMENT

Stewart F. Aly
 Associate Deputy General Counsel
 Office of General Counsel
 Department of Defense
 1600 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1600

Colonel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.
 Information Management Officer,
 DCSPER (DAPA-ZXI)
 300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
 Washington, DC 20310-0300



Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano's Army Papers under the JFK Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information Agency, and others.

Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the records.¹ *We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.* The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient review of the Califano papers.

¹The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

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Preliminary Review of Califano Papers

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: *first*, the records are very similar in subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; *second*, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and *third*, the Califano papers contain equities of numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.² Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simplify the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the

²Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before the August deadline arrives.

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Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the records while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a plan that will provide all agencies with equities in the Califano papers to have an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

Sincerely,



T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
Richard S. Werksman, USIA
William Leary, NSC
Carol Keeley, FBI

JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)

Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from 1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.

Representative Topics:

- (1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs--the "Cottrell Committee") meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. These documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings, minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at meetings of the ICCCA.
- (2) Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the U.S. military in the event of a Cuban uprising.
- (3) Psychological warfare against Cuba.
- (4) Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba.
- (5) Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.
- (6) Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.
- (7) Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and suggestions for possible future actions.

Apparent Equities:

Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities, usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC, 60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962 and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

- (1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs) meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.
- (2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert paramilitary operations against Cuba.
- (3) Cuban coup planning.
- (4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
- (5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
- (6) U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.



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Stewart F. Aly
 Associate Deputy General Counsel
 Office of General Counsel
 Department of Defense
 1600 Defense Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20301-1600

Mr. Edmund McBride
 Chief, Information Management
 Division
 Joint Secretariat
 Joint Staff
 The Pentagon, Room 2B917
 Washington, DC 20318-0400

Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS
 Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central Files
 under the JFK Act

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to declassify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division, Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of numerous military entities in these papers, as well as equities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.

Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the records.¹ *We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.*

¹The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
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Messrs. Aly and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 2

The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.²

Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has tentatively reached the following conclusions: *first*, the records are very similar in subject matter to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection; *second*, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the information in other contexts; and *third*, these papers contain equities of numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own

be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

²The Joint Staff's Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located—namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.

Messrs. Aly and McBride
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Page 3


equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort greatly simplify the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Joint Staff and the Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

Sincerely,



T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
William Leary, NSC

JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)

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Topics:

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Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—usually State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection; upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.




Assassination Records Review Board
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MEMORANDUM

Via Facsimile

July 2, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM: Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board 
SUBJECT: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS Records

1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: the Joseph Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July 24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A.M. Monday morning, July 21, at the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW (at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street).
2. Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations: Archives/Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiciary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place (Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building, and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARRP building.
3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to expedite declassification of these documents will take more than one session to accomplish.
4. We look forward to working cooperatively with all of our partners in this enterprise.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Morwell

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18 July 1997

Memorandum For: David G Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications

1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following individuals:

Charles A. Briggs
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG


Kathleen Puchnick
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG

Richard D. Kovar
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG

[REDACTED]
S/DO/IMS

[REDACTED]
IC/DO/IMS

William Perkins
IC/DO/IMS.



2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official certification of the individuals' clearances will follow. If you have any questions concerning clearances in my absence, please contact Barbara Standley, 703-613-1806.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. Barry Harrelson", enclosed within a hand-drawn rectangular border.

J. Barry Harrelson
Project Officer,
CIA JFK Review

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-82

*FAX'd by Barbara
AM - 21 July 97*

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
MEMORANDUM

Via Facsimile

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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August 5, 1997

TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG

FROM: Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board 

SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS Records

1. I am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.
2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.
3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions until they are completed.
4. Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point-of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.
5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.

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NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
 NOVEMBER 18, 1997

CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
 (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RELEASES MILITARY RECORDS RELATED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64

The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified military records from 1962-64 that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

"These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power during the early 1960's," said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. "We now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services."

The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical context.

The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being "assassination related." The documents are from the files of [REDACTED] who served as General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army, the files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now available to researchers.

Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202) 724-0088.

-more-

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk

The Assassination Records Review Board was established by the JFK Act, which was signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April 11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.

The Review Board consists of the following members:

Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.

Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.

Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections at Princeton University.

Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American University.



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ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RECORDS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
 NOVEMBER 18, 1997

CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
 (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

**SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM MILITARY RECORDS ON U.S. POLICY
 TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64**

Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents that may be of particular interest to the reader are marked by arrows in the margin on the right side of the relevant pages.

List of Selected Documents

1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020

Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from February 1962.

"Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba"

2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104

February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962
 "Northwoods" documents

3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018

May 1, 1963

"Courses of Action Related to Cuba"

4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011

December 11, 1963

Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua"

5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010

December 19, 1963

"Meeting with President on Cuba"

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 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk

6. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
January 31, 1964
"A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba"

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/01/63
PAGES : 135
SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA

POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

LATIN AMERICA SECURITY

ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES

CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

BLOCKADE OF CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed actions to be used against Cuba, including operations to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro and potential reaction to US involvement.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT

- CUBA -

1. Operation SMASHER:

a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of a "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube, which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.

2. Operation FREE RIDE:

a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst the Cuban people.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American or KLM one-way airline tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas, etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased. The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period.

3. Operation TURN ABOUT:

a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are being made for his "removal".

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the crescendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism or hardware.

UNCLASSIFIED

Special Handling of this paper is requested.
Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office.

Incl 5/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages.
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Operation DEFECTOR:

a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to defect with equipment.

b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished by intelligence means and promise of rewards.

5. Operation BREAK-UP:

a. Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.

b. Concept: This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily toward the Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would degrade confidence in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously affect combat capability.

6. Operation COVER-UP:

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely a cover.

b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.

7. Operation DIRTY TRICK:

a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.

8. Operation FULL-UP:

a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.

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b. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.

9. Operation PHANTOM:

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capabilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches and air drops have been made in other areas.

10. Operation BINGO:

a. Objective: The objective is to create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other areas. It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:

- (1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
- (2) Word flashed to the President.
- (3) President orders counterattack to include:
 - (a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
 - (b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communication in Cuba.
 - (c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected targets/landing areas.
 - (d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to pre-selected targets.
 - (e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and further interdict lines of communication.
 - (f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields, road/rail terminals, etc.

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(g) Resupply and replacement activities.

Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.

11. Operation GOOD TIMES:

a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by distribution of fake photographic material.

b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table brimming over with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as "My ration is different." Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective with the underprivileged masses.

12. Operation HEAT IS ON:

a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a detrimental tightening of security.

b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on routine training activities.

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OPERATION: Invisible Bomb

OBJECTIVE:

1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confusion of the Castro government.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101 or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be exploited is the "sonic-boom."

3. The "sonic-boom" can be employed in several different ways such as an individual boom at selected spots or a continuous boom and performed at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the windows on a street in Havana.

4. The "sonic-boom" effect can be maximized by planning missions for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping. The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial.

5. The directional aspects of the "sonic-boom" also make it feasible for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the Cuban land mass.

6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and expense.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"

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Objective:

1. To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather intercept capability by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose of determining frequency and terminology usage for practice or real GCI operations.
3. By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or solid weather conditions, override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee pilot issue instructions which run MIG out of fuel or towards Florida, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, etc.

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Operation TRUE BLUE

1. Objective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the Cuban people by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba (Florida, Inagua, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.

3. The technique of communications intrusion could be exploited by pre-taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be injected such as:

- a. "Cuba Si, Russia No."
- b. Communism exploits the masses.
- c. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
- d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
- e. Castro and his reign of terror.
- f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
- g. Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
- h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.

4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps under control of USIA.

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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2 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Ideas in Support of Project

The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and possible use in furtherance of the objectives of the Cuba Project. I think some of them have promise and should you desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we will do so.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brigadier General USA
DOD Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

6 encls

1. Operation Smasher (2Pages) (TS)
2. Operation True Blue (1Page) (TS)
3. Operation "Horn Swoggle" (1Page) (TS)
4. Operation "No Love Lost" (1Page) (TS)
5. Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or disrupt (4Pages) (TS)
6. Operation Invisible Bomb (1Page) (TS)

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Operation "NO LOVE LOST"

1. Objective: To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of radio conversations.

2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying for Castro. Refugee pilot would get into argument with Castro pilots over radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you Red son-of-a-gun," and call by name if appropriate.

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I. Operation SMASHER.

1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications facilities in Cuba.

2. Technical Requirements:

a. Detailed information on both commercial and military communications facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.) location and type of repeater stations. This information is required to construct a refined device.

b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short circuit. This is possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes a conductor; when the tube cools the matter returns to a solid non-conductive state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.

3. Targets:

a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone service.

b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunction with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way TV channels.

c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.

d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.

e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to-point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military communications capabilities.

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4. Concept of Operation:

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- a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate equipments.
- b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have access and who would receive proper remuneration.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
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RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)

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CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

UPRISINGS IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

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JCS 1969/303

7 February 1962

Page 2144

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOVIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

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APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

 MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
 Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

Subject: Cuba Project

 Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
 BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:
 "Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62

1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors:

a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during the meeting of 9 May 1961.

b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba.

c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially.

d. Time favors the Castro government.

2. The basic military implications of Castro's Communist government are as follows:

a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in:

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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability.

(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.

3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered:

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba.

b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the Cuban people.

b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS nations.

c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.

d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.

5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases.

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12 March 1962

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F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON *27 May 64*
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L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Enclosure
Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project EXCLUDED FROM GDS

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SPECIAL HANDLINGJCSM-272-62
10 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the United States will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.

2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this communist government increases the probability that one or more other nations in Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United States and the Organization of American States. While considered unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc. They are provided with the opportunity to continue with their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing internal security measures by police state methods decrease

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the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.

5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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9 March 1962

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UNCLASSIFIEDREPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

- a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
- b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.
- c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.
- d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

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(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

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- (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
- (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
- (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

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RETURN

The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will be transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

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ENCLOSURE B

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10018
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/189

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : J-5
TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)
DATE : 05/01/63
PAGES : 36
SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA

REVOLT IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

OPLAN 312

OPLAN 316

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs
and Joint Staff discussing courses of action toward
Cuba.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

REF ID: A67426

CLASS: 100

CLASS: 100-100000

REPORT BY THE 5-5

TO THE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

REPORTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

2. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

3. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE REVIEWED THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
REPORTS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

RECOMMENDATION

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FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

JCS 2301/10

(Page revised by JCS 2301/10 - 15 May 1963)

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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II) (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comment and recommendation concerning the requirements for and the desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba, giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by CM-437-63, dated 25 March 1963*, requested that a study be made of the requirements to plan and incite a revolt in Cuba. He stated, in part therein, "In view of past difficulties in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it will always be extremely difficult to contrive a timed uprising in proper relation to US operations to exploit it." Hence, "consideration should be given to the advantages of engineering an incident as a cause for invasion rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from the inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability."

3. CINCLANT has forwarded a proposed concept for a "Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, executed, and supported overtly by US military forces" and a related letter on the use of Cuban nationals.

DISCUSSION

4. For discussion, see Enclosure B.

* Enclosure to JCS 2304/176
 ** Attachment to JCS 2304/171
 *** Attachment to JCS 2304/168

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JCS 2304/189
 (Rev. 5/13/63)

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CONCLUSIONS

5. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched as its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.

6. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly perpetrated by the Castro regime or (b) foment a revolt in Cuba.

7. Engineered provocations would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

8. The United States should:

a. Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt US military intervention in Cuba.

b. In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.

c. At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

9. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

11. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.*

* Enclosure to JCS 1969/217

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JCS 2304/189
(Rev. 5/13/63)

1104

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MEMORANDUM

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: THE MEMORANDUM IN THE NAME OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 SUBJECT: CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 RECOMMENDATION - Not recommend to Foreign Military Office
 to the Secretary of Defense

1. The memorandum in Enclosure A, together with the
 findings, are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for
 his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart-
 ment of Defense for Policy Review and

2. The memorandum in Enclosure B, together with the
 findings, are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for
 his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart-
 ment of Defense for Policy Review and

3. The memorandum in Enclosure C, together with the
 findings, are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for
 his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart-
 ment of Defense for Policy Review and

4. The memorandum in Enclosure D, together with the
 findings, are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for
 his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart-
 ment of Defense for Policy Review and

5. The memorandum in Enclosure E, together with the
 findings, are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for
 his use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Depart-
 ment of Defense for Policy Review and

108-25647-10

(Rev. 5/15/65)

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ENCLOSURE B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subject: Courses of Action Related to Cuba. (U)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the courses
of action that might be taken by the United States to contrive
a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba. They are of
the opinion that the discussion in the Appendix hereto would
be useful to you in your capacity as Executive Agent of the
Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.

GROUP 1
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UCS 2504/136
(Rev. 5/25/63)

1012 - 1025

Enclosure B

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APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desirability and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series of incidents as a cause for invasion and consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.

2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions that:

- a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt will occur in the near future.
- b. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's increasingly efficient internal security operations.
- c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for US intervention.
- d. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.
- e. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly

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(Rev. 5/13/63)

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perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would call for US military intervention.

f. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.

g. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba.

(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.

h. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization should be given the primary responsibility for developing such a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.

1. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.

j. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba while containing much merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages.

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(Rev. 5/13/63)

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b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as directed.

c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of the Castro communist government and to assist in the establishment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the United States.

20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of action in this study would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that one single governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.

21. Because of the extensive military operations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt, they should be assigned the specific responsibility for developing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.

CINCLANT CONCEPT

22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations. The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18 months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will be required.

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23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and the development of a suitable cover plan.

24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employment of conventional forces.

25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by D-Day OPLAN 316, about 3 August 1964.

26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's excellent counter guerrilla ability. This time requirement appears to be excessive, but it could be shortened. The criteria for United States recognition of a new government could be met in this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:

- a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
- b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the population; and,
- c. Was prepared to honor international obligations.

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27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately:

(1) Headquarters, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA)	-	6 Off	42 EM
(2) UW Operating Base	-	36 Off	482 EM
(3) Support Units	-	15 Off	331 EM
(4) Special Forces	-	1 Group Headquarter (reinf.) 2 Companies (reinf.)	
(5) Submarines	-	2	
(6) APD	-	1	
(7) SEAL Teams	-	1	
(8) Air Commandos	-	150 Personnel 20 Aircraft 4 Air Control Teams	
(9) CIA Forces	-	Internal and External assets as required by CINCLANT.	

28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time, however, a nucleus JUWTF staff is included within the CINCLANT staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond current capabilities.

29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the activation of the JUWTF as a separate organization and the assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of 48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be required. Approval of any concept in principle or for planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the

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activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept recommended, concerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" in anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken. There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.

31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see JCSM-350-63.

32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the presence of Soviet troops on the island.

33. The experience of the JMWTF during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equipment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.

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34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:

- "a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.
- b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.
- c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.
- d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.
- e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.
- f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.
- g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.
- h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964."

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : R. D. ALBRO
TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
DATE : 12/11/63
PAGES : 11
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
ARTIME, MANUEL
CUBAN BRIGADE
KENNEDY, ROBERT
CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding
training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recruitment efforts
of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert
Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~

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20310

ACSI-CX

11 DEC 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

ATTN: MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

1. (U) References:

a. Memorandum 19 Nov 63, above subject, to Office, Secretary of the Army

b. Intelligence Report #2870006563, 9 Aug 63, Subject: Prominent Cuban Exiled Leaders visit Nicaragua (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua

c. Intelligence Report #2870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subject: Puerto Cabezas and Cuban Exiles (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua

d. Summary of Information, 1 Nov 63, 112th INTC Gp, Subject: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)

e. Memorandum for Record, ACSI-CX, 19 Nov 63, Subject: Cuban Brigade Member (U)

2. (S) Reference 1a, prepared at the request of your office, advised that query by USARMA, Managua within the U. S. Embassy there, revealed no indication that Colonel Thomas D. McPhail, O-30613, USA Retired, the former Chief of US Army Mission, was in anyway involved in the training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua.

3. (C) During the above inquiry, the USARMA, Managua called attention to two intelligence reports he had furnished (references 1b. and 1c above) reporting Nicaraguan press comment on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee leaders Dr. Manuel ARTINE Buesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Secarras, Dr. Manuel Antonio DE VARONA, Dr. Francisco FERNANDEZ Pla, Dr. Laureano BATISTA, Dr. Orlando PUENTES, Dr. Miguel DE LEON, and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua during July and August 1963. The USARMA's comment on the newspaper speculation and rumors concerning this visit was that he "does not have any firm information or indicators that anti-Castro forces are being trained in Nicaragua."

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 28738

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11 DEC 1963

ACSI-CX

SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)

4. (C) Reference 1d. from the A. C. of S. G-2, Fourth Army reports alleged efforts by Mr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, to get some of his former associates in the Bay of Pigs invasion to resign their U. S. Army commissions and go with him to a revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. A copy of this reference is inclosed for your information. COMARC, Fourth Army and 3rd Army have been directed to continue to report on the alleged recruiting activity by ARTIME.

5. (C) Reference 1e. reports information received from Ft. Holabird, Md., that a former Cuban Brigade member, 2nd Lt. Jose Raul VARONA Gonzales, O-2312303, had been invited by 2nd Lt. Enaida OLIVA (former second in command at the Bay of Pigs) to visit Washington, D. C. on 18 Nov 63 to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General. VARONA is a student at Ft. Holabird and reportedly was the G-3 of Brigade 2506 in the Cuban invasion. When VARONA returned from Washington he did not mention seeing Mr. Kennedy, but did say that he had met with Lt. OLIVA. The actual purpose of the meeting is not known. A copy of reference 1e. is inclosed for your information. Mr. Robert Kennedy did confer on 17 Nov 63 with Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto Perez SAN ROMAN, Jose SAN ROMAN aka Jose Perez SAN ROMAN, and Enrique Jose RUIZ William Alfert. They were also scheduled to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy on either 21 or 22 November 1963. There is no indication that Ft. Holabird student VARONA was present.

6. (C) This office has no information whether Mr. Kennedy is aware of ARTIME's alleged recruiting activity. The information in paragraphs 3 through 5 above, and the inclosures hereto, are furnished in the event that they may be of some pertinence to your inquiry regarding Colonel McPhail, reference 1a. above.

2 Incl
as

(Sgt) R. D. Albro, Col. GS
R. D. ALBRO
Colonel, GS
Director of Foreign Intelligence

OFF CHIEF OF STAFF

DEC 11 5 55 PM '63

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Cuba Selected Documents

#5

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10010
RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : EARLE G. WHEELER
TO :
TITLE : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963
DATE : 12/19/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATIONS, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with
President on Cuba. 1 Document.

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JUL 23 1997

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19 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 1963

1. The following persons were present at the meeting:

White House: The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Smith
State: Mr. Thompson
Mr. Ball
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Martin
Mr. Crimmins
Defense: Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Vance
General Wheeler
CIA: General Carter
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. Helms
Treasury: Mr. Dillon
USIA: Mr. Wilson

2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations covering the following areas:

- a. Collection of intelligence.
- b. Propaganda activities.
- c. Economic denial actions.
- d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.
- e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.
- f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.

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DOD DIR 5200.10, DOCS NOT APPLY

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3. a. The President was most interested in economic denial actions. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and British governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms are likewise active in this area, as well as a number of essentially fly-by-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No reputable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact, have been helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging in this traffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governments of firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice.

b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not, to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group. However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success.

c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons:

(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various actions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and

(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of the OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of their survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further information regarding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report

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to the OAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort is devoted to ascertaining the maximum that the OAS is prepared to do as a result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the OAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it is too early to expect a complete break in economic and travel relations between OAS countries and Cuba.

5. There was some discussion of further actions we might take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time. Among other items mentioned were the effect of low level reconnaissance flights from time to time and the desirability of executing such flights at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express approval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.

Signed - Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

COPIES TO:

Chairman, JCS #1
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Director Jt Staff (Attn: SACSA) #6
Army General Counsel #7

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copy #9 OAS TSN
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10117
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCSM-77-64

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TITLE : A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA
DATE : 01/31/64
PAGES : 58
SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
COUP IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
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COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, JCS
regarding contingency plans in the event of a coup in
Cuba.

[R] - ~~ITEM IS RESTRICTED~~



~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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SM-161-64
31 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above, which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, if supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the elimination of the communist regime and establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 316. Conditions under which military intervention at a level LESS than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 8970, DTG:070155Z March 1963.

4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the attachment hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

M. J. Ingelido
M. J. INGELIDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary

Attachment

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Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of 1 page, Series A

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BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
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It is the policy of the Department of Defense to ensure that all information is properly classified and that the classification is based on the sensitivity of the information to the national defense. It is the responsibility of all personnel to ensure that information is properly classified and that the classification is based on the sensitivity of the information to the national defense.



IN REPLY REFER TO:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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DEC 30 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)

Reference: JCSM 809-63, * Subject as above, dated October 21, 1963

Enclosed herewith are three copies of the plan on the above subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis for appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has been advised of the foregoing and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested to brief the President on its outline.

In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accomplished.

In accordance with paragraph 8b, page 22 of the plan, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed planning by agencies concerned.

* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1

** Appendix to Enclosure B to
JCS 2304/205-2

Cyrus R. Vance
Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of the Army

Enclosure (3 cys)
As Stated

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No. 7/5 0354

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A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA

1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.

2. Assumptions.

a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.

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Re 2304/205-3

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c. US intervention would be based on:

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would not await formal OAS approval), or

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or

(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.

d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:

(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.

(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation

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which could be used as a pretext for such action.

(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage unorganized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316.

3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time. (In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering information made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)

b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:

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(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained/^{American} observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Government if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)

(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,

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the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.

(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.

(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.s. below).

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
(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.

d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support. At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.

4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 MARCH 1962 DEJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

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5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

William H. Craig
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure
Pretexts to Justify
Military Intervention
in Cuba

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Enclosure
Pretexts to Justify Military Intervention
in Cuba

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ENCLOSURE

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.

(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).

(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.

(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.

(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.

(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

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9 March 1962

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SPECIAL DISTRIBUTIONREPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

CUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.

4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION

5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.

6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.

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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

- a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
- b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.
- c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.
- d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. MC

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. D

42 { 3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A

* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in Gen Craig's office

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. X w/ D

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.

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4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

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- (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
- (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
- (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations.

- (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
- (9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
- (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.
- (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will be transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

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ENCLOSURE B

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303

** JCS 1969/313

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12 March 1962Page 2165

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NORTHWOODS (S)

A report* on the above subject is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

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Helem -
Put these all
under one tab as
draft material used
in preparation of DDD
Comments in connection
w/ Thurston report
prepared 20-24 Feb 63
Thurston
Col p

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Helen -
I have over
a lot of
undated drafts
here - They
are all about
20 - 25 Feb.

Please do
the best you
can with them

~~TOP SECRET~~**COMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA****1. Introduction**

While there is not total agreement on the magnitude of the Communist effort to export subversion to Latin America, from and through Cuba, there is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential hazards for the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in Montevideo and Mexico City have been sources of infection to much of Latin America for two decades or more. Finally, there is evidence that the U. S. appreciates these realities, as exhibited in the depth of on-going U. S. programs in all of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.

The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate -- as to scope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of the Committee that they are not. Further, it is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at impeding the flow of students and subversives to and from Cuba will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.

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First, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.

Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view -- therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.

II. Measures to Impede the Export of Communist Subversion By and Through Cuba

1. Programs Now in Motion.

The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:

a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which units to provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive movement:

(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.

This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.

(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.

These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.

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(3) U. S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.

This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Cuban revolutionaries to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U. S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.

(4) Overflight.

Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities, these flights serve as a reminder of U. S. vigilance and determination.

(5) Communications Intelligence.

All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Communications Intelligence system.

b. Propaganda - Radio and Television.

(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.

(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts from the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.

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(3) *Et seq.* (additions on this subject should be provided by USIA).

c. **Intelligence Collection.**

(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.

(2) *Et seq.* (should be supplied by CIA).

d. **The Forum of World Opinion.**

(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibits the penalty for conducting subversive activity in her neighboring states.

(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.

e. **Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.**

(This is to be provided by State)

2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.

It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba.

While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in

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their entirety, in order that the President may have all the available options.

a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.

(1) Intensively monitor, observe and report upon air and sea transportation -- both scheduled and non-scheduled, both Free World and Communist -- in the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba. Develop and execute a multi-national politico-military program providing for inspection by each cooperative Latin American state of suspected carrier vessels in their respective territorial waters.

(2) Exploit fully the intelligence opportunities afforded by the communications system passing through Havana, while reviewing periodically the advisability of interrupting the system for security reasons.

b. Intensify Psychological Actions.

(1) Create problems for the Castro regime and its propaganda programs by an intensified psychological effort employing a variety of radio and airborne TV emphasizing the hardships and suffering being endured by the Campesinos while subversive traitors are given favored treatment.

(2) Publicize the contrast between living conditions of U.S. instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.

(3) Increase greatly the amount of propaganda directed against the U.S. to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the degradation and suffering inflicted on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive efforts.

(4) Conduct airborne television broadcasts directed at the Cuban people and Latin American students in Cuba, revealing the extent and nature of Castro-subversive efforts are designed to destroy the Western Hemisphere.

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c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.

(1) By non-attributable means -- Cubans and third country nationals -- endeavor to acquire much more hard intelligence on the nature and scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba and methods of exportation.

d. Movement of Personnel.

Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements with Latin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into and out of Cuba. (This is to be expanded by State).

e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capability of Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversives.

It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other costly factors -- arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specific actions aimed at reducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a direct effect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause them to turn to their own internal problems and will give the Russians pause as to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginally productive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest, apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions will contribute to this end:

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~~TOP SECRET~~**(1) Attain Cuban resources**

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of quarters and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

(2) Diminish Cuban financial resources.

(a) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.

(3) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.

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1. Programs now in being:

In appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.

a. US Military Efforts.

United States military forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal are:

(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and psychological operations training through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.

(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.

(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and riot control.

(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency education for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.

(5) Provision of civic action training and assistance.

(6) Auxiliary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversion.

(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.

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- (b) Officer exchange programs.
- (c) Language training for Latin American military students.
- (d) International Army, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.
- (e) Comparative mapping operations.

(7) Troop information:

The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at making the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includes:

- (a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism."
- (b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One Hundred and eighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.
- (c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Tacticas y Directivas Contra La Farsa Comunista" are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.

- b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).
 - c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).
 - d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CIA).
- 2. Programs Which May Be Initiated:**

As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practical capabilities. However, as they cross the

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complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds:

a. Surveillance

(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting system; each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.

(2) Require a US intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide selective exchange of intelligence between subscriber nations.

(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.

b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.

Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for employment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U. S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.

c. Training and Orientation.

Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:

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(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.

(2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United States.

(3) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.

(4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.

(5) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.

d. Troop Information Program

Expand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicemen (and their civilian contemporaries) to the subversive danger they face.

e. News and Propaganda

(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.

(b) Objectives of the Communists within each country.

(c) Communist methods of operation.

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(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.

(e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads.

(3) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

f. Travel Controls (to be furnished by State).

g. Improve Our Counterinsurgency Programs

We should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counterinsurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces. Beyond this we should place specific emphasis upon developing civic action programs in the areas of greatest need.

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j. Non-attributable actions

(1) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Castro.

(2) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.

IV. Conclusion.

It is the belief of the Committee that the actions outlined in the preceding sections comprise a series of steps which in some areas will stem and in others attack the program of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in itself, and any combination of actions may generate correspondingly favorable results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of any specific set of actions.

It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those actions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligations and dedications in other areas and which are within U.S. capabilities, and that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their ultimate elimination.

And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activities involved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Government be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the total program.

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While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.

Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:

(1) Measures to attrit Cuban resources:

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

(d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.

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(2) The designation of a single point in the Government to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total program.

(3) An intensified and broadened news and propaganda program, including the following:

(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

1. An exposition of acts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.
2. Objectives of the Communists within each country.
3. Communist methods of operation.
4. Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth

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to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:

(c) **Distribute Anti-Communist Literature**

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

(4) **Greatly expanded training and orientation in the United States for key segments of each Latin American country's population, such as:**

(a) **Enlisted as well as officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.**

(b) **Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or in the United States.**

(c) **Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.**

(d) **Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.**

(e) **Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.**

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by

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close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their
resolve to combat subversion in any form.

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AN ACTION PROGRAM

COMBATING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. Introduction

While there is not total agreement on the magnitude of the Communist effort to export subversion to Latin America, from and through Cuba, there is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential hazards for the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in Montevideo and Mexico City have been sources of infection to much of Latin America for two decades or more. Finally, there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates these realities, as exhibited in the depth of on-going U.S. programs in all of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.

The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate - as to scope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of this Committee that they are not. Further, it is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at impeding the flow of students and subversives to and from Cuba will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.

First, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.

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Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view - therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.

II. Measures to Impede the Export of Communist Subversion By and Through Cuba

1. Programs Now in Motion.

The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:

a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive movement:

(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.

This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.

(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.

These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.

(3) U.S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.

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This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Cuban revolutionaries to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U.S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.

(4) Overflight.

Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities, these flights serve as a reminder of U.S. vigilance and determination.

(5) Communications Intelligence.

All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Communications Intelligence system.

b. Propaganda - Radio and Television.

(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short-wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.

(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts from the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.

(3) Et seq., (additions on this subject should be provided by USIA).

c. Intelligence Collection.

(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.

(2) Et seq., (should be supplied by CIA.)

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d. The Forum of World Opinion.

(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive activity in her neighboring states.

(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.

e. Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.

(This to be provided by State)

2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.

It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a full spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba. While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in their entirety, in order that the President may contemplate the full array of options.

a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.

Substantively
(1) Monitor, observe and report upon all air and sea transportation - both scheduled and non-scheduled, both Free World and Communist - in the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba. Develop an agreed multinational police-military program providing for inspection by each cooperative Latin American state of suspected carriers within its territory or its territorial waters.

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(2) Consider, at a time when the criticality of the situation dictates, re-instituting the quarantine of Cuba giving as a reason evidence of the export of agents and materials of subversion by and through Cuba.

b. Intensify Psychological Actions.

how? (1) Create problems for the Castro regime and its subversive programs by an intensified psychological effort emphasizing the hardships and sufferings being endured by the campesinos while subversive trainees are given favored treatment.

(2) Publicize the contrast between living conditions of USSR instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.

(3) Increase greatly the amount of VOA broadcast time tailored to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the degradation and suffering brought on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive effort.

(4) Conduct airborne television broadcasts aimed at the Cuban people and Latin American students in Cuba, dwelling on the theme that Castro's subversive efforts are designed to destroy the tranquility of the Hemisphere.

c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.

(1) By non-attributable means - Cubans and third country nationals *endeavor to* acquire much more hard intelligence on the nature and scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba and methods of exportation.

d. Movement of Personnel.

Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements with Latin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into and out of Cuba. (This to be expanded by State.)

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e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capability of Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversives.

It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other costly factors - arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specific actions aimed at reducing the Cubans' resources will thus have a direct effect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause them to turn to their own internal problems and will give the Russians pause as to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginally productive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest, apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions will contribute to this end:

(1) Cause unrest, fear and suspicion in the Castro regime.

(a) Introduce many small inexpensive sabotage kits into the country. Even if utilized by only a small number of malcontents, in the aggregate they would waste valuable resources, take Communist lives and divert the attention of the regime from its dynamic program.

(b) Introduce very large numbers of small inexpensive fire arms and ammunition into the country. Such action would cause grave unrest in the Castro regime and among the Russians, and would result, inevitably, in costly search operations.

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(2) Attrit Cuban resources.

(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.

(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storages.

(c) By means of intelligence indications cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at a high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.

(3) Diminish Cuban financial resources.

(a) ^{Consider timing} Introduce counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial picture, and to undermine confidence.

~~(b) Create rumors of bank failures.~~

(4) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.

Since the Russians are doubtless a major factor in training programs conducted in Cuba, any action which will interfere with their inter-relationships will diminish directly the subversive training capability:

(a) Initiate a Russian language program beamed to Cuba and designed to attract Russian listeners. Once an audience is established, undertake to cause the Russians to question the purpose of, wisdom in, and personnel risk involved by their presence in Cuba.

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(b) Exploit the presence of the Red Army in Cuba by driving a wedge between the Soviet soldier instructors and the Cuban population. Efforts to attain this objective would include the use of live double agents, planted rumors, incidents created by guerrilla insurgents, and propaganda designed to identify the hardship of the peasant with the Soviet intrusion.

(c) Develop action plans for Cubans to kidnap, harass and destroy Russian technicians. Offer bounty, through clandestine sources, for destruction of Russian personnel.

(Additional actions, aimed directly at the subversive training and distribution potential in Cuba, should be added by other agencies, in their areas of competence).

III. Measures Designed to Enhance the Capabilities of the Latin American States to Resist Communist Subversion

1. Programs now in being:

In appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.

a. US Military Efforts.

United States military forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal are:

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(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and psychological operations training, through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.

(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.

(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and riot control.

(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency education for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.

(5) Provision of civic action training and assistance.

(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversion:

(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.

(b) Officer exchange programs.

(c) Language training for Latin American military students.

(d) International Army, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.

(e) Cooperative mapping operations.

(7) Troop information:

The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at making the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includes:

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(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism".

(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism" pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One-hundred and eighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.

(c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Técnicas y Directrices Contra La Farsa Comunista" are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.

b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).

c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).

d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CIA).

2. Programs Which May Be Initiated.

As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practical competence. However, as they cover the complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds:

a. Surveillance:

(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting system; each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.

(2) Require a US intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide for exchanging intelligence between subscriber nations.

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(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.

b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.

Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for employment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U.S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.

c. Training and Orientation.

Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:

- (1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.
- (2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United States.
- (3) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.
- (4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.
- (5) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.

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~~TOP SECRET~~**d. Troop Information Program**

Expand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicemen (and their civilian contemporaries) to the subversive danger they face.

e. News and Propaganda

(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:

- (a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives, and general subversive programs.
- (b) Objectives of the Communists within each country.
- (c) Communist methods of operation.
- (d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
- (e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

Many Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads.

(3) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

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To be furnished by state

f. Travel controls

*Handled
specific*

(1) We should strive for an OAS embargo on travel to and from Cuba. If unable to achieve a majority decision in the OAS we should pursue the matter on a bilateral basis, outside of the framework of the OAS, and inject these Cuban isolationist criteria into acceptance requirements of the "Alliance for Progress".

(2) We should initiate measures against Cuba directed at preventing Latin Americans from entering Cuba or returning to their own countries and prevent the travel of Cuban personnel and goods to other Latin American countries. The "Alliance for Progress" should be used as a lever, adding these requirements to the acceptability criteria.

(3) We should promote arrangements which permit extradition of individuals who are charged with subversive activities.

g. Improve Our Counterinsurgency Programs

We should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counterinsurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces.

h. Sponsor Land and Political Reform

Handled

Intensify action through OAS channels to bring about land and political reform in Latin America in order to reduce the susceptibility of the "have-nots" to communist subversion.

i. Support Labor and Youth Reforms

Encourage reforms to ameliorate the frustrations of labor and youth. With labor, it is a matter of economics; with youth, it is a matter of orientation.

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Unless sufficient reform is made to satisfy the aspirations of the laborer; and unless sufficient evidence is presented to embryonic intellectuals that Castroism is the greater of the political/economic evils facing them, Castro will continue to find a fertile bed for his seeds.

J. Non-attributable actions

(1) Through third parties, seek and destroy the communist agents, fund resources, and subversive capability wherever it exists.

(2) Penetrate communist party labor and youth groups in the Latin American target countries.

Objectives would include:

(a) Publicized exposure of the apparatus.

(b) Frustration of subversive plans and apprehension of leaders by government authority.

(c) Counterspying against future subversive planning.

(3) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Castro.

(4) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.

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*In some cases will stem
~~substant~~ and in other
 attack the program*

IV. Conclusion *Celina*

It is the conviction of the Committee that the actions outlined in the preceding sections comprise a ^{series of actions} program which offers promise of meeting and ultimately reversing the process of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in itself, and any combination of actions ^{may} generate correspondingly favorable results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of any specific set of actions.

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 possible*

It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those actions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligations and dedications in other areas, and that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their ultimate elimination.

And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activities involved, it is recommended that a single point in the Government be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the total program.

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Originating Agency: DoD

Subject: Crisis/Contingency Planning

Date: 3/11/63

Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)

DIA ☐

Navy ☒

ONI ☐

OSD ☒

Joint Staff ☐

USAF ☐

NSC ☐

State Dept. ☒

CIA ☐

CIA ☐

Other ☐

(Please specify below)

The Department of State has no objection to the
release or declassification of this document in full
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Record
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7/24/97 Boyle

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REASON: 1.5.2.2
DATE: 10-07-2012Captain Zumwalt/DRAFT # 2
March 11, 1963OSD/
ISAIX.A.3.d. General Pressures to Create a Contingency

In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban regime without harming the United States image and with minimum distortion of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures should be designed to create opportunities and contingency situations for further exploitation, along the way.

The optimum orchestration of such a Cuban program must obviously be developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required. This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final phase with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the respective phase in either category would be coordinated as part of an overall governmental orchestration.

A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.

US Posture - - Initially the US image should be that of willingness to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil and his subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level. It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been

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extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs of more favorable change in Cuba.

Later the US image should change to one in which the US is being "led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponsored pressures against Cuba. These would consist of measures less than those certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro or provide an occasion for decisive action. Pressures would be applied in such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the OAS majority in seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet irrevocably committing US prestige to decisive action.

Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have brought the US position to such a point that decisive action is possible, and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise of eliminating ^{him} some decisive action might be considered. This need not be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.

OAS Action - - The USG will need to devote major attention to the strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly along several lines, quite apart from the covert effort to organize the majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve solidarity should consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforts to set up an OAS military organization with occasional commitment of troops

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for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the region. It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.

Initial OAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the invocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the continued presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicate that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the Special Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and the US should press for implementation of its recommendations.

The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against promotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formally state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified) level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme. Bilateral approaches and economic quid pro quos should be used to win Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS.

Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an official finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or

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White Paper should be promulgated through the OAS. Later a "new condition" should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end. Following the above, an OAS vote should call for the remaining LA nations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance for Progress.

The OAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and land area around the entire LA continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships carrying arms, subversive agents, propaganda materials, etc. could be authorized.

Free World Activity
Still later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the form of a resolution for all members to take such action including the use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.

The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that the situation may get worse. Later, as a result of "OAS insistence" the Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade embargos to all items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited; free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba

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crucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.

Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks, through briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an appropriate point in the orchestration, food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.

The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application of a blockade to Cuba. This could be a phased weapon consisting of a blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.

Surveillance over Cuba -- Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel, aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly suspicious indications.

Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; while avoiding AA defenses.

Still later, suitably timed, the United States/OAS should initiate very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in intensity to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.

In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should be at saturation levels.

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Regional Surveillance -- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrangement, a surface ship and aerial surveillance of the coastal and offshore waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cuba. There should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries. There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive activity.

Propaganda -- There should be established immediately a radio station (Radio Free Cuba), probably in Florida, using covert funds, with regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political groups. Its content should be the middle course between VOA and Radio Swan.

Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the theme of the U.S. "watchful waiting" for change in the Castro regime. Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beamed to Cuba. Highlight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. Still later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.

Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations. Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat

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of Castro to the regimes of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to power on a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform. Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal was accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has left to offer. Conclude that only the mutual fear of retribution among his elite remains to hold them in power. Use slogans such as "L 64" (Liberty in '64), etc.

Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the rudiments of seditious activity.

Still later urge the many small revolutionary cells to make contact with neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime through all media; exhort the people to organize to join enlarged resistance groups; seek to build up resistance heroes. Endeavor to deflate Castro through these broadcasts. Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to choose their own political and social structure.

Subversion -- There should be an initial period of no increase in subversive efforts by the U.S., until the bilateral phase of the Cuban affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union will remove no additional military personnel.

After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of defiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups

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of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to paint L'64, etc., on walls or to commit isolated acts of sabotage. The purpose would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership. This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should continue. The number of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating the cells, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and outside Cuba. This would be a transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identified in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and Cuban fighters training outside Cuba, should be introduced in the same way into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent leaks of planned US invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be scheduled off Cuba. At the same time it should be made clear to rebel leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until a revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.

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It should be emphasized to the rebel leaders that the U.S. does not expect the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions.

Still later a complete orchestration should be woven together, coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the main-streams discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of all available externally trained resistance fighters, provision of maximum logistic support, etc. At the appropriate time, if this resistance movement needs the assistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured air strike, related to an appropriate Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban offensive and defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. This attack should be coordinated with all-out sabotage.

An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if required to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistance efforts has been initiated.

Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories above should be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence, lasting for a period of two to three months, until some episode of escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistence should lead to escalation of pressures. After another short period, again preferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by a majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.

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If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act, such as firing on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum immediately rather than gradually.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-613C/sg
Ser 000950P61
MAR 1 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban
Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U)

Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 of 28 FEB 1963

Encl: (1) through (8) Proposed actions (TS)

1. As requested by reference (a), specific and direct actions designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are submitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).

W.F.A. Wendt

W.F.A. WENDT
Director, Strategic Plans Division

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**PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT
BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US,
BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO
IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE
TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA**

- A. Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S. citizens do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- B. Continue U.S. restriction against U.S. airline service to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other airlines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral U.S. action).
- C. Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws to determine the legal capability or impediment to control of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- D. Arrange for adverse publicity on individuals who are known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- E. Spread rumors of epidemics in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- F. Sabotage aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- G. Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin Americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- H. Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation, or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- I. Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry to their country of persons suspected to have been trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
- J. Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action). Supply equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See enclosure (6).
- K. Cubana's Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5 are operational). Under existing agreements, Cuba must

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ENCLOSURE (1) to CNO Ser/Memo 000 950 P6)

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seek Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18) on the Havana-Mexico City route. We should persuade Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety, facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts (unilateral U.S. action).

- L. Encourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled traffic stops to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).
- M. Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with administrative delays (minute examination of air worthiness certificates, customs, documents, etc.) (unilateral U.S. action).
- N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin American countries would cooperate with Mexican efforts to deny travel their nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City Tel 2221) (bilateral U.S. action).

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Lt. Col. J. K. Patchell - X75727
18 April 1963

**U. S. POLICY CONCERNING CLANDESTINE AND
COVERT ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST CUBA**

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide, within security limitations, a useful guide for the consideration of clandestine and covert actions as a part of a future projection of U. S. actions toward Cuba.

The paper is designed to be as objective as possible without compromising many details of highly sensitive information. For this reason, the paper focusses on general principles. The study is not intended to be critical. It is not designed to justify the past nor to predict the future.

The discussion of the factors conditioning U. S. policy in the realm of the clandestine and covert may seem elementary and somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular conditioner would be speculative.

2. MAJOR CONDITIONING FACTORS

Following are listed a number of the major conditioning factors which probably have influenced past U. S. policy in the clandestine and covert areas. This is not an exhaustive list, but it describes briefly a few of the elements which must be considered in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:

a. Objective.

It is most desirable to determine the U. S. objective in precise terms. When the objective is clarified and

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understood, actions can be developed to achieve that objective. The extent of the U. S. commitment, as reflected by the determination of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the commitment of U. S. resources and has great significance in the motivation of recruited Cuban participants.

It must be understood that the creation of a resistance under the situation currently obtaining in Cuba probably envisages an ultimate U. S. commitment to direct military action. There can be no advanced guarantee of the success or the security of such an operation, nor is there any realistic brake upon the ultimate outcome which may be susceptible to rapid escalation. Current intelligence estimates indicate little likelihood of the success of a Cuban inspired revolt without significant external support.

While U. S. clandestine or covert actions can be taken in support of (or as a prelude to) overt U. S. or multilateral actions, there are general misconceptions and certain grave risks inherent in (a) seeking a solution to the Cuba dilemma wholly by clandestine or covert means, (b) placing disproportionate reliance on clandestine and covert activity, (c) developing clandestine or covert actions in isolation of or significantly in advance of U. S. policy, and (d) developing actions for the sake of action alone or in order to capitalize on some intriguing gimmickery.

Obviously, the determination of U. S. objectives is beyond the realm of the clandestine and covert and cannot be considered in the context of Cuba alone. Serious judgments must be made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against Cuba may be detrimental to U. S. aims by causing intensified security measures in Cuba, counteractions elsewhere, or the unnecessary exposure and compromise of pro-U. S. suspects, potential agents or trained U. S. assets.

b. Risks.

A good "rule of thumb" with respect to clandestine or covert actions is that the risks entailed are in direct proportion to the usefulness of the operations.

c. Attribution and Deniability.

U. S. leadership will always be concerned with clandestine or covert actions which may be attributed to the U. S.

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It is reasonable to assume that Cuba will attribute to the U. S. (at the time of Cuba's choosing) any actions, real or manufactured, which they desire. Assuming that the U. S. will receive the blame (regardless of the nationalities of those involved), attribution, per se, is not a relevant measure except as it may limit the overall flexibility for action.

Deniability, while quite relevant, is a relative factor. Every effort can be made to disassociate participants, to utilize sanitized material, and to operate from covert bases. Such efforts, when carried to an extreme, tend to jeopardize the security of the operation. Generally, an attempt is made to strike a reasonable balance to achieve "plausible deniability," a term obviously subject to widely varying judgments.

In summary, the determination of deniability is subjected to judgments at all levels of those who have access, including the curious and those who develop personal emotional involvements. Theoretically, the solution appears to be to seek a reasonable balance between almost complete deniability (an example in which few actions can be taken and the associated administrative or security precautions outweigh or jeopardize the operation itself) and reasonable safeguards to insure that the proof of U. S. implication cannot be developed.

In this connection there is a mandatory requirement for unanimity of denial on the part of U. S. officials. This unanimity must obtain despite the magnitude, persistence, or accuracy of the Castro/Communist propaganda machine. The stated denials of U. S. officials generally are not contested. Official statements which indicate or hint at U. S. implication or internal U. S. governmental dissension may be all that is required to compromise an otherwise secure operation.

It should be pointed out that as a result of U. S. accepted complicity in U-2 flights and the Bay of Pigs operation, the U. S. is in a significantly more sensitive position with respect to clandestine and covert actions. U. S. admissions tend to give

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greater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. S. may undertake actions of a less conventional nature.

d. Visibility.

It may be desirable to undertake actions which achieve little press coverage (visibility or noise level). It is difficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent of the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can control the timing and magnitude of public release. The world press for the most part is not subject to U. S. control except as the U. S. may achieve success through counter-propaganda.

It is reasonable to conclude that a progressively increasing or static noise level is the most acceptable. A dramatically increased noise level may be acceptable when accompanied by significant (headline) overt items which serve to distract the attention of the public.

e. Morality and Selectivity.

There is a natural reluctance to undertake clandestine or covert actions which result in the death or serious injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainly cause harm to certain elements, but some of the destructive actions which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they strike at the wrong targets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve the desired degree of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, implemented in secrecy.

The creation of food, clothing and medical shortages and the sabotage of storage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may hurt the economy but those committed to the Castro Regime may suffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken an inactive or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security mechanism.

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There are obvious moral judgments attached to many of the proposals for actions directed against Cuba. When the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. S. position probably reflects the least common denominator. Many proposals may be unacceptable because the deniability factor is too low or the proposals may be of a nature that premature commitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since the weapon may be worthy of a more far reaching impact. There is an understandable frustration in the U. S. resorting to the application of sophisticated clandestine weapons against a small state which theoretically could be brought to its knees in a relatively short period of time through the application of conventional weapons.

There is an imposing array of intriguing or amusing "tricks" which are of no real or lasting consequence. These could subject the U. S. to adverse criticism on moral grounds or extend the parameters of warfare to new dimensions.

4. Recruitment and Exile Politics.

The recruiting problem deserves consideration in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously, the recruitment of a sole individual involves a system of screening which theoretically must not be compromised either in the process of sorting or during the subsequent utilization and post-utilization periods. There is a marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag, or to infer participation in secret operations. Individuals personally and scores of exile organizations are quick to capitalize on the real or imaginary activities of their members. These Cuban exile organizations compete for recognition, prestige and material support which they hope will stem from their participation in clandestine or covert activities. There is a constant flow of proposals for action and requests for assistance or official recognition. Some individuals and organizations merely desire to publicize their affiliations with some member of the U. S. Government.

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It is not feasible to investigate in details all of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groups. Experience has indicated that generally the exile claims are without foundation and the preponderance of their proposals are not feasible. As a matter of practice such individuals or groups are not satisfied with a single rebuff, but make their offers to individuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice or with members of Congress, the press, and other non-governmental individuals or agencies. A specific action or proposal may have had merit at one point, but from a security standpoint, the persistence of the proposer may have negated the potential of his proposal and could have compromised an otherwise workable scheme.

In order to minimize affiliation with exile groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequently envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affiliations. While this may be possible, experience has indicated that it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. S. who have associated with U. S. personnel and those who speak English are generally marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature combine to limit their social mobility are more likely to turn to, accept and become involved in the social, political or cultural cloisters of Cubans in the U. S.

There are additional political and psychological problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled and generally desire to remain united with families and friends. Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro generally can be measured in terms of their assimilation and economic success in the U. S. Experience has shown that internal oppositionists may resent external Cuban leadership. As the exile groups compete for political prestige and material support, so do the representatives of the internal resistance groups.

The problems of exiles attempting to determine the extent of U. S. commitment and associated security implications are discussed elsewhere in this paper.

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g. Timing.

Obviously, the successful execution of well-planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming. Recruitment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of days. There is no standby reservoir of multi-purpose agents. The operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both to nature's elements (weather, tides, moon, season) and other unanticipated and unpredictable circumstances (Cuban alerts, contact with patrols, compromise of internal contacts, actions of anti-Castro groups, or other world events).

Timing problems are compounded by the increased security requirements and the requirements for synchronized actions.

More effective operations can be undertaken when there is some general continuity in the program and there is an opportunity to plan in greatest detail. From a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult to maintain individual or group motivation and aggressiveness when operations are delayed, aborted, cancelled or subjected to continual modification.

3. ASSETS

In considering U. S. assets for covert and clandestine operations against Cuba, it is well to review briefly in an historical context, the situation which faces the U. S.

Prior to Castro's assumption of power, U. S. efforts in the field of intelligence and clandestine operations in Latin America lagged behind efforts in other more immediate problem areas of the world. At the time Castro assumed control in Cuba, there was much open controversy on the question of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was assumed that the change of government in Cuba was in the well-known Latin tradition. Later, it was realized that the change of government was not just a change in personalities, but a revolutionary change in governmental system. At this point, early in 1960, plans were developed to assist the people of Cuba in overthrowing their government. This plan

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culminated in the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in late April 1961. It has been conceded that the Bay of Pigs Operation caused many dissidents and potential resistance groups to expose themselves and be "rolled up" in the Cuban security operations which came in the wake of this fateful operation.

During the six month period which followed the events of April 1961, the U. S. was not in a position to expose itself further to any suggestion of clandestine actions against Cuba. The experts involved in that operation were reassigned and little or no effort was made to further endanger any residual assets in Cuba which may have survived the Cuban security operations of the spring and summer of 1961.

By late 1961, another effort was organized to determine what assets were available for operations in Cuba. It suffices to state that an inventory revealed that the few reliable assets in the target area were essentially intelligence agents and could not be spared for conversion to clandestine operations. Castro had consolidated his security mechanism to the point that by early 1962 it was quite clear that insertions of agents in useful areas would be most precarious. The large reservoir of motivated Cubans who had participated in the Bay of Pigs Operation were either imprisoned or had lost their cover. They were no longer an available source for clandestine operations. During the first nine months of 1962, the emphasis was placed on intelligence gathering rather than clandestine operations or political action in the target area.

Because of certain operational difficulties most of the operational missions undertaken during the spring and summer of 1962 were aborted or compromised. Castro's accusation, coupled with the public appearance and "confessions" of "U. S. agents" caused the operational program to be periodically discontinued. No attempt was made during or immediately after the missile crisis to continue the program.

4. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The role of the Department of Defense in clandestine and covert areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Department of Defense and within the Central Intelligence Agency.

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By charter the Department of Defense does not play the principle role in the fields of clandestine or covert operations. The Department of Defense is not specifically precluded from assuming a principle role and, in fact, there is specific authority for the Department of Defense to assume such a role when the scope of a particular operation exceeds the capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency. From U. S. lessons learned in Laos and Cuba (during the Bay of Pigs Operation) the size of these operations were considered beyond the capabilities of the CIA. (At least the resources of men, money and materiel available to CIA were strained severely). In such circumstances when DoD assets far exceed those of CIA, it may be preferable to give DoD the primary role and responsibility and have CIA render required support. Again security becomes a major factor when an operation reaches such a magnitude that DoD is forced to assume the responsibility. Many argue, with some justification, that when the operation is of a magnitude that the DoD must assume the responsibility, it is at the point of losing its cover or clandestine wrappings and DoD may suffer the consequences.

Except for participation during World War II, few individuals in the Department of Defense were concerned with clandestine operations prior to 1960. Experiences of the military in Germany, Laos, Cuba and Vietnam served to underline many of the capabilities and limitations of the military in these fields. There are many emotional organizational conflict of interest aspects involved in a consideration of the role the military should assume. One view is that the military can and should assume a greater role immediately. Supporters of this view base their arguments on some demonstrated inefficiencies committed under CIA management in the past, the planning experience of DoD, and the breadth and depth of resources in men, money and materiel available to the Department of Defense. Some of the more emotional support of this view stems from the military's frustration of CIA's apparent inability to take bold actions (probably combined with some inborn jingoism).

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The proponents in DoD of a more cautious approach are sensitive to the commitment of U. S. military resources in the unconventional field at the expense of implicit responsibilities in the conventional area. There is some opposition on moralistic grounds and there is concern that the inability to maintain security in any sizeable covert or clandestine operation could subsequently reflect adversely on the military establishment or the professional military as a group. Other objections include a reluctance to assume the responsibilities and risks entailed in operations of this nature and a preference to play a supporting role to the "professionalism" of CIA. Some bureaucratic or organizational lethargy may also influence military views.

In the past, the military has played an essential role in three major categories -- money, men and material. From the fiscal standpoint, the Department of Defense can provide vast expenditures with relatively great flexibility.

The vast resources in manpower of the DoD (with military technical and linguistic skills, overseas experience, physical conditioning and personal dedication and aggressiveness) provides a very lucrative potential for DoD participation in clandestine and covert actions. The major problem in this connection is the separation of the individual from the military Service. The mechanics of individual cover, dummy records, and the administrative processing is essentially no great problem. The difficulties appear in the consideration of family and military associations. It is relatively easy to quickly isolate and "sheep dip" an air crew or a small boat crew for one short mission; however, this process is not easily extended for any protracted period. There is usually a requirement to consider carefully the pay and allowances of military personnel operating independently or in conjunction with CIA personnel on clandestine and covert operations.

The material assets of the Department of Defense can play a major role in CIA's overall operation. DoD can provide cover for many of CIA's training, supply and storage installations. DoD is involved in surveillance activities. The DoD inventory of aircraft

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and ships with trained crews are adaptable to infiltration and exfiltration missions. DoD stocks of arms, foodstuffs and equipment along with DoD's ability to assemble, package and ship for aerial or surface delivery quantities of supplies is a significant asset.

There is a general misunderstanding concerning the use of Army Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Air Force Jungle Jim organizations or Marine Corps special units in covert and clandestine operations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convert individuals or units for clandestine or covert operations, the basic mission of Special Forces originally was oriented toward the organization of resistance forces in support of overt military operations. Subsequently, the charter of Special Forces was expanded to incorporate counter-insurgency operations in friendly territory. Both of these missions are essentially overt in nature and there is a lack of experience and doctrine for the commitment of Special Forces in clandestine or covert operations. This generally applies to units of the other military Services. Any major reorientation of the mission of these units will detract from their current requirements and could jeopardize, for example, the ability of our Special Forces to assist in the organization of a resistance in Cuba in support of a conventional military operation there.

5. INTELLIGENCE

It is essential to an understanding of the problem to realize that since late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indicated that there is little likelihood of an internally sparked Cuban resistance to be of any significance. According to CIA there is little possibility of getting advance information of any uprising without this information also reaching officials of the Castro Regime. It is also estimated that there is little likelihood that any resistance groups would be able to "hold out" in any organized form for more than a week or two. Castro personally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance and moves ruthlessly, committing disproportionate forces to ensure that the spark does not mature.

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There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This has caused the U. S. to place primary importance on clandestine intelligence operations with a corresponding lack of emphasis on other clandestine operations. In order to undertake operations, vast amounts of current operational intelligence are needed. The priority for this operational type intelligence has been relegated to a relatively unimportant station in the spectrum of our intelligence requirements for Cuba. This is particularly true when there are limited assets and so much pressure to obtain reliable information or confirmation on sophisticated conventional weapons or Soviet activities. Normally, different methods of operation are employed in a different physical environment for those seeking operational intelligence.

It should be pointed out that the lack of intelligence has been used as a crutch in not pressing for more clandestine operations actions. This view can be justified, but no commander who commits forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know about his enemy. Somewhere in between lies the answer. There must be an acceptance of certain gaps in operational intelligence and consequently some additional operational risks; otherwise, no meaningful actions will ever be taken.

6. PARAMETERS OF FUTURE ACTION

This portion of the paper is designed to indicate in general terms the latitude of clandestine and covert actions based upon past experience and those pertinent factors which might serve to limit or modify U. S. action in these areas. This should not be interpreted to indicate the limits of future actions.

Clandestine and covert activities prior to and during the Bay of Pigs operation can be characterized as bold and far reaching. The future orientation of U. S. activity in this field is conditioned largely by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since April 1961 can be summarized as being cautious, intermittent, and low level. The current attention directed towards "things Cuban" places even more stringent requirements on U. S. activities in the clandestine and covert environment.

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Following are examples of the types of activities which could be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, but is presented to illustrate the types of activity which might be considered.

a. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

- (1) Interrogation of refugees.
- (2) Counterintelligence in U. S.
- (3) Legal travellers.
- (4) Glandastine intelligence agents.
- (5) Air and naval surveillance.
- (6) Communications surveillance.
- (7) External sources (where Cuba is represented officially or quasi-officially or where refugees and travellers can be reached).
- (8) Intelligence provided by third countries.
- (9) Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). It is important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders suspected potential defectors relatively inaccessible. The development of a defector program requires vast amounts of operational intelligence which has not been available. There are additional problems in seeking defections from among those who have families. The Cuban security apparatus combines with geography to further restrict attempts on the part of many who might defect if there was any reason to believe they could leave Cuba. Those who have sought asylum in other embassies in Havana have been refused exit visas for such prolonged periods that their information, when finally released, is practically useless.
- (10) Penetrations (inside or outside Cuba). Extreme caution must be used to prevent the compromise of any penetrations which can be made. Penetrations in the communist apparatus outside of Cuba may be of little utility or Cuban requirements of such low priority as to limit the scope of such attempts.

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~~SECRET~~**b. Propaganda and Psychological Operations**

(1) Radio and television directed at Cuba (black, white or grey).

(2) Printed material (mail, airdrop, or packed with other material destined for Cuba). Airdrop is severely limited by Cuba's air defense capability.

(3) Radio and television and printed material to Latin America.

(4) Counterpropaganda.

(5) Rumor, threat, or other campaigns using all available communication assets, to include telephone. Propaganda should reach the proper target, should be consistent (Cuba versus other parts of Latin America). Psychological actions could include air dropping of foodstuffs and medicine, Russian language broadcasts, large scale military actions near Cuba of a deception nature, rumors and "plants" of information, etc.

c. Political Actions

(1) Inside Cuba to instigate demonstrations, establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.

(2) External to instigate demonstrations against Cubans.

(3) Tours of Cuban exiles to Latin America and elsewhere (educators, jurists, labor leaders, women, youth, entertainers, religious and cultural groups, etc.). NOTE: Many of the above actions can be accomplished overtly.

d. Economic Actions

(1) Sabotage of agriculture, power, industry, internal or external transport, communications, administration, or storage facilities.

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(2) Covert operations to prevent sale of purchase of items destined for Cuba or coming from Cuba. (Sugar, tropicals, etc.) NOTE: Since the Sino-Soviet commitment to Cuba is preponderant, a large portion is not susceptible to U. S. action; however, the remaining trade with the Free World, although relatively minor, is critical to Cuba and provides the U. S. with a lucrative target.

(3) Counterfeiting. Because Cuba has essentially a barter market and mass distribution is difficult, this may not represent a useful activity. There are other very far reaching implications which must be considered against a relatively meager and short lived gain.

c. Sabotage and Harrassing Actions

(1) Sabotage of leaders homes, offices and military installations. (Economic sabotage included in paragraph d above).

(2) Actions designed to withdraw people from harvest or to overwork military elements. (To include actions from rumors to major military exercises).

(3) Radio or television intrusion or jamming.

(4) Bribing, embarrassing, blackmailing, assassinating, coercing and kidnapping leaders.

(5) Attack, seizure, search or harassment and sabotage of air and naval traffic.

(6) Attack, intimidation and harassment of Cuban representatives abroad.

f. Paramilitary Operations

(1) Raids.

(2) Prison breaks.

(3) Weapons caches.

(4) Reconnaissance in force.

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g. Provocations or auto provocations. Contrived operations can be undertaken; however, it appears preferable to capitalize on real provocations which occur almost daily in some form. Through political and psychological handling many of these real provocations can be developed into provocative acts.

7. FUTURE OPTIONS

A discussion of future options should be related specifically to the overall objective and should consider the factors indicated in paragraph 2 above.

There may be advantages to taking clandestine actions for actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and publicize continued Cuban resistance, (b) keep the resistance potential alive, (c) accede to demands for a spectacular action, (d) indicate a reprisal for actions by the Cuban Regime, (e) test, probe, deceive or harass the internal security mechanism in Cuba and (f) establish a psychological climate for other overt actions.

So long as Castro remains the "David" and the U. S. remains the "Goliath," the U. S. will have a major problem of image making in Cuba, Latin America and the world. Since April 1962, there are indications that the fascination for "Fidelismo" has waned significantly but to the Cubans, the Latin Americans and many other new-born states, Castro is still the "David" and the only Latin who has successfully challenged the North American giant. The recognition and support of a resistance leader (real or imaginary) in Cuba would only provide a partial solution to this problem.

As the economic situation in Cuba becomes more intolerable, the U. S. may expect greater dissension and more manifestations of unrest, to include outbreaks of violence. At some point, the U. S. could be called upon to support openly such an effort. Obviously, it would be extremely embarrassing to the U. S. to be unable to respond before the resistance is crushed completely. In any event, it would be extremely difficult for the U. S. to support such a resistance in a clandestine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such support could serve to alert Cuba to U. S. intentions.

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Theoretically, the most desirable event which could take place would envisage a major split of Cuban leadership involving relatively proportionate military and internal security forces. It is difficult under present circumstances to visualize a Cuban leader of such stature even considering such a move, since he has no real assurance of immediate U. S. military, economic and political support so vital to his tenure and so necessary to prevent a counter coup from those deriving strength from the heavy Sino-Soviet economic orientation of the present regime.

The U. S. continues to be extremely vulnerable to acts of subversion and provocation by the Cuban Regime. It is not beyond the realm of possibility to have Cuban directed attacks of Cuban military elements (disguised as exiles or U. S. personnel) on soft and emotional targets in Cuba. Such an action could serve to help Castro consolidate internally and to seriously embarrass the U. S. internationally.

8. SUMMARY

The U. S. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting for the breaks in Cuba and not knowing precisely when or how the breaks will occur. As time goes on the chances for an internally inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major political schism in which major elements of the security forces are split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of sufficient magnitude to permit the U. S. to muster multilateral representation or support and intervene on behalf of this resistance.

According to authoritative sources, the U. S. will receive little or not advance notice of such an uprising and according to intelligence estimates there is little likelihood of such an uprising surviving for more than a few days. Also, it has been indicated that there is little likelihood of such a resistance could gain control of a radio station to request outside assistance. (It is recognized, however, that this probably would be one of the principle aims of any such action group.)

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So long as the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to subsidize Cuba, the internal economic situation will probably not become intolerable for those committed to the Castro Regime. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would stand to suffer severely if they undertook any major reduction in their support of Cuba.

Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient magnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U. S. or to provide a juridical basis for overt intervention. To Castro's liking, U. S. options have been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressures or to a time-consuming and frustrating multilateral approach utilizing the OAS mechanism.

The U. S. may again be afforded the opportunity to take increased overt actions (such as blockade or other stringent measures). Unless preplanning on this or other actions is accomplished beforehand, covert actions in support of these overt measures will be limited to only those opportunities upon which the U. S. can capitalize with the means at its disposal at the time.

From the standpoint of the Cuban Regime, there appears to be little likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directly against the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warnings against U. S. boats indicates the possibility of uncontrolled action on the part of individuals of the Castro Regime.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of _____, February __, 1963, 4 P.M.)

FROM: Coordinator of Cuba Affairs

SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba

Objectives

The basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January 25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba. It also commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created."

This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the psychological requirements of our overall policy.

Role of Psychological Operations

A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover action and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psychological effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in the fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.

One of the tasks of psychological operations is to exploit other activities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any negative aspects of such activities. In designing and carrying out action programs directed at Cuba, it shall be the task of the Coordinator and his Group

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to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any given circumstance, shall have priority.

Strategy and Tactics

We must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists. We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way that will:

- a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;
- b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that communism is not a solution for the problems of a developing country;
- c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of operation throughout the Americas;
- d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and excessively costly.

Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of this, we can move toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of major importance to our overall strategic purposes.

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We have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is one which the Communists have tried to use against us.

Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept. It calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our arsenal and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all levels.

Our initial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, confidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspondingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake everything on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final showdown.

Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro elements and failures on the part of the regime itself. Our aim should be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.

A factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a

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resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an unexplained fire, creation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance of antiregime slogans on walls, a defection from the armed forces--these and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact. In the long run, they can be equivalent to a major victory.

The important thing is to keep the pressure on, to never give the regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks is unbroken and unending. Our purpose is to create a situation in which the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which they come to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.

Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist world. Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a "rat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium.

In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule out the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to insure final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effective is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure that overt force requirements will be minimal.

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Specific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the Cuban problem are submitted in Annexes A and B.

Audiences and Targets

The psychological program should be directed at the following primary audiences or target groups:

- 1) the Cuba people. Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is eliminated. It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's history must be written by the Cubans. But they should know that they will have friendly support from others.
- 2) the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubt and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.
- 3) Latin America. In programs directed at the peoples and governments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influence of the Cuban regime and its propaganda, to encourage solidarity within the OAS family, to counter Cuban influence in key groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.
- 4) the Soviet Union and other Communist states. To picture Cuba as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that it is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventually eliminate their involvement in Cuba.

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- 5) Other countries. To insure understanding of what is involved in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that communism provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries, to expose the continuing danger of communist efforts to export revolution.
- 6) the Home Base. To provide the American people and the Congress with the full facts of the Cuban situation within the limits of legitimate security considerations.

Assets

The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range of the Government's capabilities for action and information. These include, among others:

- a) public statements by the President and other officials;
- b) informational assets such as the public affairs and Congressional relations agencies of State, Defense and other agencies;
- c) the Government's research and analysis facilities;
- d) overseas information programs in all media, especially the facilities of the U.S. Information Agency;
- e) the diplomatic mechanism for both formal and informal contacts;
- f) capabilities for unattributed programs of action and information.

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Coordination and Guidance

In carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein, it will be necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We must be sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere. It will be necessary to provide careful and regular policy guidance to those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an inter-departmental basis.

U.S. Posture toward Cuba

The picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and decisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other friends, dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion. We should take note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must be geared to permit answers to Castro and his henchmen immediately and effectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should be on the airwaves tomorrow at the latest.

Our approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselves to answering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive. We should insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining, the disagreeing as much as possible.

Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs
Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs FEB 11 1963

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Guidelines for Attributable Programs

Current Requirements

1. There should be a statement, preferably by the President, explaining overall U.S. policy toward the Cuban question. It would provide clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future develop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public, for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we regard their future; tell Latin Americans how we see the problem and our view of their role; underline to the Soviet bloc our determination to oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own people the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means.

The Coordinator should arrange for preparation of such a statement and submit a draft to the White House.

2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material reduction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be prepared to move forward along other lines. The Coordinator should develop a program to meet this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence of Soviet forces should be described as an exacerbating influence in East-West relations and a symbol of foreign domination and control in Cuba.

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3. Clarification of our position on "non-invasion" would be desirable. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be clear that we do not regard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful course. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cannot be eliminated. The door should be left open for any action that we and our allies in the hemisphere may regard as necessary in the future to counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime.

4. We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possible internal revolt. This, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should avoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to encourage an open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that could be read as a firm pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves against Castro. We should make clear, however, that we are prepared to support and cooperate with any elements who succeed in ending communist dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free and democratic government responsive to the desires of its own people.

5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are met.

6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the following:

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- a) programs now underway in the psychological field;
- b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a significant psychological effort against Cuba;
- c) Castro's propaganda machine--how does it work? how much effort goes into it? how can we weaken it?
- d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes, techniques, principal targets, etc.;
- e) current position of Castro and his regime in Latin America--main areas of influence, by country and by groups.
- f) the past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages of plane vs. balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means, possibilities of such a program being used to attack us in the UN or among the Cuban people.

Themes for Information Programs

Information media should exploit the following themes to the maximum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be spotted on a day-to-day basis and used. Commentaries and discussions should be tailored to take full advantage of these attitudes.

(To Cuban audiences)

1. Castroism is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.

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2. Cuba is an unwilling instrument of Soviet policy, subject to the whims and moods of a foreign power.
3. Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes, giving help and withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's desires.
4. Castro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture, religion, and well-being are sunk.
5. Communism has failed to solve the problems of Cuba--has lowered rather than raised its standard of living.
6. The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betrayed.
7. Freedom, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future."

(To Latin American audiences)

1. Use the above as appropriate.
2. Castro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion, espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.
3. Castroism promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation.
4. The Hemisphere's most promising course is vigorous efforts to achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

(To Soviet and Bloc audiences)

1. The above as appropriate.

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2. Cuba represents a steady drain on already limited Soviet and bloc resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear on Soviet shelves.
3. Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.

The above lists do not pretend to be exhaustive. They are but the beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and propaganda offensive.

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It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A.

See Par. 4
Page 2
above A

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CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES**

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13 May 1963

SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership**INTRODUCTION**

Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that this proposal can be utilized in conjunction with current programs as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in the event no pressing requirement exists, it is suggested that this proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study and handled on a closely held basis.

REASON FOR PROPOSAL

Following are listed a number of indications that the leadership question will be addressed in the near future:

- a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition and support in an attempt to fill this void.
- b. There has been constant pressure on the U.S. and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much of this political and psychological pressure.
- c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems of Cuban exile unification.

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d. The proposal could emphasize the development of a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant."

e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S. from making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group and could be used as a device to test exile response.

f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political ideologies).

g. This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progressive basis to influence the ideologies of the resistance and thus to influence the platform of a future Cuban Government.

h. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the de facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.

OBJECTIVE

To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba. This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.

DEVELOPMENT

An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with resistance in Cuba or a newly devised name. The name selected should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order

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to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm," "The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant," or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish could suffice. Over a period of several months the name could be "dropped" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels, in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or members of his group. Communications could be arranged between this individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's censors or by radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S.

After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in time it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may, without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.

During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pursued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy" would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be circulated.

At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little his political platform in very general terms -- realizing that the mystique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,

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arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet with his appointed representative. His instructions and words could be relayed to the public by many means.

As his political platform becomes more apparent within the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms) or those who are unwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of controversy among exiles can be drawn more clearly. Undesirable leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition through his disavowals.

Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti-Castro image.

While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, its implementation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time. Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability; however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created over a long period of time or developed rapidly without a political or economic commitment on the part of the U. S. There may be a point at which the U. S. could no longer disavow collaboration with this imaginary person. This point, however, is so distant that during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for the U. S. to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or loss of prestige.

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~~TOP SECRET~~CONCLUSION

Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.

James K. Patchell
James K. Patchell
Lt Colonel, USA

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22 May 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is a brief "run-down" of meeting on psychological operations at State, 21 May 1962. The meetings are normally held each Monday at 1430. Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown (USIA); Seymour Belton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); Harvey Summ (Cuba Desk Officer - State); Bob Hurwitch, Dick Phillips (Public Affairs Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs - State) and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research - State).

Subjects discussed included:

- (1) Priorities of work - Cuba, Western Hemisphere, U.S. in that order.
- (2) Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Universities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA to check authenticity and whether document is outdated.
- (3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposed changes.
- (4) USIA reported three commentaries put out on Cuban Independence Day.
- (5) On the Armstrong Circle Theater, USIA states this "hung up" for \$15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's speech into wide circulation.
- (6) State suggested that speeches in Cuba (Rodriguez, Castro, and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it.

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(7) CIA to declassify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba which exposes Soviet colonialism - for wide distribution in Latin America through Embassies and USIA and for use by CIA in Cuba.

(8) CIA wants more stuff in the vein of ridicule, satire, humor - to get away from invective and hit the regime and individuals - low key stuff to develop ridicule.

(9) CIA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what they read, what they listen to, etc.

(10) USIA and CIA to play up the March USIA survey which shows Castro's popularity in Latin America on the decline.

(11) On 26th of July, State suggested cave be used to avoid discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate between original 26th of July movement and its principles - and the betrayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State's help on providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use is within policy (I have noted some particularly hard hitting stuff - if used properly).

(12) A number of important events and dates in June and July were discussed to include Caribbean Games, Peace Festival, Khrushchev Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes" statement. USIA and CIA to prepare information on these.

(13) State asked CIA to prepare a catalogue of admission of failures of the Castro Regime, a list of production promises, and a report of bloc people in key positions. All were asked to bring ideas into next week's meeting to be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.

(14) This office will be placed on distribution of minutes of the meetings.

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~~TOP SECRET~~OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 June 1962

SENSITIVE**MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE****From: Lt. Col. Patchell****Subject: Psychological Operations Group**

Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself attending. Following is a summary of subjects discussed:

(1) CIA asked State to provide a clarification of personalities and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a discussion of CRC and newspaper stories on its change in leadership.

(2) The Armstrong Circle Theater movie has been okayed for Spanish language publication and distribution.

(3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 - because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carefully and determine whether useful for replay (I will be invited to attend).

(4) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce - okayed.

(5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement - CIA has been unable to obtain, but should produce soon.

(6) CIA guidance now being prepared for psych war to list priorities as follows: (a) Cuba, (b) Latin America, (c) rest of world. Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.

(7) On the DRE publication "White Book on University Problems in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed in Chile in English, French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary form for Latin newspapers and student publications.

(8) On the CRC publication "Cuba Nueva" - presently going only to exile community. CIA to look into getting it into Latin America and Cuba - money appears to be no problem.

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(9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of items appearing in the FBIS daily summary. (Housing and labor -- made arrangements to put us on distribution.)

(10) CIA brought up the unhappy impact of Moscoso's speech inferring that Cuba should be forgotten and that we should get on with the Alliance For Progress. State indicated that a correction was being made to show that Moscoso was misquoted.

(11) State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was not released until May) had many exploitable points -- corruption - failure to suggest unity - labor -- State sent to CIA for research people to work on.

(12) Item appearing in Cuban paper concerning people who "transgress the norm" being sent to training camps - USIA to take action.

(13) CIA after looking at symbols etc. has about decided that the "worm" is preferable to the "fish" and that it has been popularized by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will develop further the worm idea. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating it to such expressions as "the worm will turn" - if applicable in Cuba and associating it with biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched" -- Isa 66:24 or "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart" - Prov. 25:20. USIA to take action.

COMMENT:

In the two previous meetings I have developed sufficient rapport so that I can now get actions taken without too much question. This next meeting I propose to introduce a system of suspense dates so that the "we are looking into" or "we are considering" are replaced by "we will meet the suspense" -- this may be difficult at first, but feel it can be managed.

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~~TOP SECRET~~OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Curtis (State), Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Smith (USIA), and myself. Following is a summary of discussion items:

- (1) USIA will provide advance notice of TV programs scheduled re Cuba.
- (2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong representation at African International Student Meeting in Canada 27-28 June. They will surface copies of report on student conditions in Cuba. They asked for no advance publicity - then big "follow up" - - State and CIA coordinating to include preparation of releases to U. S. press.
- (3) CIA has looked at CRC's mailing lists for various types of info, to include the publication "Cuba Nueva." They find lists most elaborate, complete and well organized for each purpose.
- (4) USIA reports they are on top of stories pointing out loss of rights by workers in Cuba. USIA provided sample copies of their daily wire output and of weekly mail output for me to look at in greater detail. (I will report separately on this.)
- (5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing -- corruption, unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit.
- (6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time Magazine was in English -- that Time Magazine in spanish was a Latin publication (Bogota) using same format, but not useful for purpose of exploiting Blas Roca story.

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(7) Reports of hunger strikes etc. at Isle of Pines prison to be played up by USIA. (Berne's cable 527).

(8) Copies of cartoon books and other publications were requested by Lt. Col. Patchell.

(9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion poll conducted and schedules for future polls.

Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Although it might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he believed that we should reserve flexibility by organizing the "pipelines" and then putting stuff in from CRC, or other Cuban organizations, as well as stuff created by the U.S., with or without signatures or attribution. He feels that such control would best insure that we sent in just what was needed and no more or no less.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

12 June 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE *SL*

From: Lt. Col. Patchell *VP*
Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. Attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis from R&I-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.

(1) CIA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and use.

(2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival "for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being taken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done on Helsinki. I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki -- not just Helsinki.

(3) USIA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col. Patchell.

(4) CIA will present a document next week on guidance with respect to Cuba.

and when do we see?

(5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible exploitation.

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(6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between Hitler's speech after the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch and Castro's "History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt. CIA will look into this -- both for research and whether suitable for propaganda purposes.

(7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's name -- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. *← not according to I.A. specialists*

a name of more respect!

(8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report, "Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355, dated 6 June 1962.)

(9) CIA reported additional people had been placed in their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.

(10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and recently revisited Cuba. These reports are good for the "before" and "after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime -- who might be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.

*Is Craig aware?
Does Navy have complaints what are they?*

(11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though Cuba was building up a case against the U.S. for future use in the U.N. or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar information for use by State and will present information to the group for possible exploitation.

Craig made aware 12 June 62

(12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona's speech in Costa Rica. CIA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami Spanish language stations.

Any mention of keeping alive by quoting others than Miro?

(13) State suggested the next meeting be held at USIA for the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in handling a select number of items.

Gen L answered on this 12 June 62

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

18 June 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

The meeting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was attended by Mr. Hurwitch, Mr. Bart Wells, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Phillips (State), Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Bob Smith (USIA), and Lt. Col Patchell. Following are items of interest.

(1.) CIA distributed copies of a student booklet (English and French versions attached). Thirty-thousand copies were printed in Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese in Chile -- sponsored by a Latin American student organization, and primarily for Latin audiences. The booklets will be used on tour of Latin America and were distributed throughout Latin America and at international youth and student meetings in Quebec and Helsinki. Some copies will be mailed into Cuba.

(2.) CIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re Cuba. The group made some minor changes. The guidelines are *PRIMARILY FOR USE* 26 July.

(3.) State will put out a similar circular to its posts, and USIA will consider doing the same.

(4.) Roundup reports of overseas stations on actions are due within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant actions immediately.

(5.) Hurwitch distributed copies of a draft cable intended to exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached).

(6.) Lt. Col. Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexican defector -- suggesting appearance before OAS Committee, trip through Latin America, etc.

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(7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louis Post-Dispatch), Tad Szulc, and a number of other newsmen were attempting to get into Havana for the 26 July celebration. Depending on the individual situation, these people will be briefed and debriefed by State and, in some cases, by CIA.

(8.) State will obtain copies of reports from the British, Italian, West German and other Allied Embassies in Havana for distribution to members of this group.

(9.) CIA asked to have Cuban Embassy representatives in other Latin American states confronted with Castro promises and asked for comment for publication -- refusals and "no comments" to be publicized.

(10.) USIA reported that Cardenas incident played two times Saturday evening and four times Sunday over VOA.

(11.) USIA provided film on Carpenter flight for use on TV at Guantanamo.

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

26 June 1962

~~SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch (State), Mr. Robert Follestad (substituting for Harvey Summ-State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (substituting for Seymour Bolten-CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following items discussed:

- a. State to seek anti-Castro press clippings from other Latin American countries for replay.
- b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, "The Impact of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although dated Feb 62, is just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico.
- c. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.
- d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemisphere. Also to direct propaganda designed to stress that Cuba is being "used" by the USSR.
- e. State pointed out the value of President's trip to Mexico this week end to point up US-Mexico solidarity. (Noted that Hurwitch withdrew considerably from his initial position - Cuba not mentioned as a point of solidarity).
- f. CIA is translating Theodore Draper's book into Spanish for dissemination as a paper-back in Latin America.
- g. Decided to play back into Cuba administrative "goofs" by Cubans on transportation arrangements for youths of other Latin countries to celebrations. (Some left penniless and stranded in Caribbean).

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h. The Cultural people in State are seized with problem of Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other personalities. -- That we should at least make an inventory to see what we have available. It is noted that Cubans are "out to win" -- What is now being accomplished is not good enough.

i. CIA working with Navy on declassification of USSR-Cuba Trade Agreement.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 July 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE *(has seen)*

From: Lt. Col. Patchell *gub*

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held from 1100 to 1300 on 3 July 1962 with the following in attendance: Bob Smith (USIA), Seymour Bolten (CIA), Bob Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al Carter, and Bart Wells (State) and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following are highlights of discussion.

- a. State is providing copies of report from British Ambassador to Cuba MARCHAND. Report made after absence of 3 months from his post in Cuba. *Copy attached - see redlined portions*
- b. State has received letters explaining details of Cardenas incident. - passed to CIA and USIA for action.
- c. CIA to obtain more information on outbreak in ALCANO which is being suppressed by Cuba.
- d. CIA provided copies of study on promises and failures of Castro regime. - it has been distributed to CIA stations overseas. State and USIA to look at with view to providing copies to international organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas. *Copy attached*
- e. In view of uncertainty expressed in messages from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and UAR about stability of Cuban economy and attempts to collect funds to assist Cuba. - CIA to play on theme of Cuba as poor investment etc. behind iron curtain.
- f. Defector who was formerly Cuban economic attache in Moscow being debriefed - he was held for 16 months in Argentine Embassy in Havana and for this reason much of his information is dated. CIA to expedite his assessment.
- g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico - still being interrogated and assessed with view to looking at his ability to stand

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up to cross-examination under OAS. State stressed need to expedite in order to gain impact. CIA can provide no estimate of time when assessment will be completed. In Miami, his press conference indicated Castro control of the Mexican provincial police.

h. On question of intervention - Mexican papers stating this is Mexican victory on Cuban issue - this is being replayed by U.S. papers - leaves a poor impression. State said this is being discussed with President and will be covered by Lincoln White at press conference today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be done. State could not answer on Cuban talks - unknown how deeply Cuba was covered and whether the question of diversion of U.S. good or movement of people were discussed. Any hint of Mexican victory will be demoralizing to people in Cuba - exile community - and Latin America in general.

i. Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that State and CIA representatives would meet with CAB officials concerning PAA flights to Havana.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Mr Hand 2111
Lt Col Patchell
SL

11 July 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Col. Patchell *JRP*
Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Following is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on 9 July 62 with the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ, Juan Gurrell, and Al Carter (State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell.

Swiss article. A Swiss publication has a very fine article in detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in Cuba - USIA to replay.

Clipping service. Good immediate reaction to clipping service being provided.

26th of July. Group agreed to "jack up" machinery for information on activities and L. A. reaction to 26th of July.

CRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies of a CRC political platform (attached). Little publicity has been attached to document. CIA will check to see if it is a document for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting, I asked Mr. Hurwitch to consider this in connection with his guidelines paper, depending upon its validity and usefulness. He stated he believed the two were in consonance, but would check.)

Cuban Protests. Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that the publication of protests may be leading up to justification for receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits in with Mr. Bill Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject.) State is responding to protests and queries in low key.

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British Newsmen. Will meet with State representatives at 1430 on 11 July. Others invited. This individual was formerly a Communist.

Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese technicians to assist Cubans in opium growing. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested CIA get declassified and publicized as quickly as possible.

Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group - its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what changes are required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after new NIE is published.

Note: From the time that I joined the group on 21 May, the group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American psychological operations group to one focused on Cuba. My own personal objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latin America - into NATO, the uncommitted areas, eastern Europe, Japan, etc.

Visit of James B. Donovan.^x Following the meeting, Mr. Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with Mr. Donovan.

x Copy sent to W Harvey 16 July 62

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