

09/29/93

Date: 08/15/92

Page: 1

## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

## IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10014

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM :  
TO :

[R]  
[R]

INDEX CARDS  
TITLE :

DATE : 06/00/75  
PAGES : 483

SUBJECTS :  
OPERATION MONGOOSE  
CASTRO

[R]  
[R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
✓ CLASSIFICATION : T  
✓ RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
✓ CURRENT STATUS : P *full*  
✓ DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 *Open*

OPENING CRITERIA : *Δ*

COMMENTS :  
Box 141, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards dated June/July 1975

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NO OBJECTION *as excised*  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*4/5/94*

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
JFK Maxwell Taylor ✓	27 Sept 62	Special Group Aug- MOONGOOSE <sup>mented</sup> Diem/

OCCURRENCE:

Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sepcial Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense. ✓

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. ~~Angelint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of battle, so as to permit planning overflight routes was authorized. This will be flown out of Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese Air Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalist pilots documented South Vietnamese citizens.~~

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (00050)

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29/75

UNCLASSIFIED

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29-3-94 *lu*  
(1)(A)

CARD 2 of 2

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

DATES:

Feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used ~~SILVER~~ in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).  
*RUES states that*  
Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

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AS SANITIZED

24 Mar 94  
(1)(b)  
(1)(c)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
Maheu Edwards Rosselli ✓ Giancana	Trafficante <i>Breckinridge</i> 3 or 4-61	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

*that was*  
Breckinridge testified Maheu on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and "on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader." (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Roselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ... was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)

TOP SECRET

<u>SOURCE:</u>	<u>STAFF:</u>
Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75	John Bayly
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 7/2/75

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24 Mar 94  
(1) (A) (3/12)

<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> (See list of names below.)</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u> Apr 17, '61 -</p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET CASTRO CUBA - SYNDICATE/PHASE II -- KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II CARD 1 of 3</p>		
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <p>1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P 2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W 3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.) 4. SHEPPARD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)</p> </td> <td style="vertical-align: top;"> <p>5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.) 6. <del>BRUCE CHELVER</del> HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (<del>CHELVER</del> knows that HARVEY was meeting with gamblers in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.) 7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.))</p> </td> </tr> </table>			<p>1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P 2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W 3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.) 4. SHEPPARD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)</p>	<p>5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.) 6. <del>BRUCE CHELVER</del> HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (<del>CHELVER</del> knows that HARVEY was meeting with gamblers in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.) 7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.))</p>
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<p><u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. REPORT 1967 8-55 - 56</p> <p><u>FILE:</u></p>	<p><u>STAFF:</u> Baron</p> <p><u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75</p>			

**TOP SECRET**

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17 '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

3. [ ] TSD [ ] participation was limited to furnishing the bills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962..)

7. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

8. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:FILE:STAFF:DATE:

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AS SANITIZED  
24-Mar-94  
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

O'CONNELL, [REDACTED]

ROSSELLI, John

DATES:

14 Apr 11 1962  
June 1962

CASTRO

~~CUBA~~

CATEGORIES:

SYNDICATE/PHASE II

OCCURRENCE:

(46)

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSSELLI meet in Washington. / O'CONNELL and HARVEY agreed that O'CONNELL continue in the operation for two or three weeks after HARVEY's takeover (46).

The I.G. REPORT does not set with certainty the date O'CONNELL was finally eliminated from the operation, although it says he definitely had to be out of the operation by June 1962, when he was assigned to [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 46

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> HARVEY, William ROSSELLI, John ✓ VARONA, Tony O'CONNELL [REDACTED] CASTRO, Fidel	<u>DATES:</u> 21 April 1962	<u>CATEGORIES:</u> <u>TOP SECRET</u> <del>CASTRO</del> <del>CUBA</del> --- SYNDICATE/PHASE II
--	--------------------------------	---

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY arrives in Miami to find ROSSELLI already in touch with TONY VARONA, the Cuban exile leader who had participated in PHASE I. (47)

According to HARVEY and O'CONNELL, who agreed that this was an on-going operation, the poison pills were to be placed into CASTRO's food, by an asset of VARONA's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by CASTRO.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 47

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75



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*24 Mar 94*  
*(C) (A)*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

O'CONNELL [REDACTED]

ROSSELLI, John

DATES:

14 April 1962

June 1962

CASTRO

CATEGORIES:

~~CUBA~~

SYNDICATE/PHASE II

OCCURRENCE:

(46)

HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSSELLI meet in Washington./ O'CONNELL and HARVEY agreed that O'CONNELL continue in the operation for two or three weeks after HARVEY's takeover (46).

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**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 46

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

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29-3-94

(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZ

de Cunha, Virginia

DATES:

July 10, 1962  
~~June 11, 1962~~  
~~July 1, 1962~~  
~~May 1962~~

MONGOOSE

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Ruz, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginia Leitao de Cunha, she contacted Ruz and obtained Ruz agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re:

Juana Castro Ruz, 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: di Genova  
July 1, 1975

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29-3-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD  
AMLASH  
~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~  
Robert KENNEDY  
HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

Nov. 13, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using ~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

"FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

TOP SECRET

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29-3-94 *ee*

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
<del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro  <i>Card 2 of 2</i>

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination-weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F. Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

**TOP SECRET**

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29-3-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Desmond FITZGERALD

AMLASH

~~Nestor SANCHEZ~~

Robert KENNEDY

HELMS

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

Nov. 13, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Castro

Card 1 of 2

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SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

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29-3-98 *enc*

(1)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
<del>SANCHEZ</del> FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro  <i>Card 2 of 2</i>

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 2)

In a memorandum by ~~SANCHEZ~~ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that ~~SANCHEZ~~ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the ~~SANCHEZ~~ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." (90)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F. Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

TOP SECRET

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AS SANITIZED  
29-3-94  
(1)(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SANCHEZ  
AMLASH  
(MANUEL) ARTIME

DATES:

Dec. 6-7, 1964

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

SANCHEZ met with AMLASH in Paris. AMLASH indicated that although he was unable to carry out his plans during the past year, he "continued to feel that his solution to the Cuban problem was the only one feasible and that he had to continue trying."  
(100) AMLASH "was told that the U.S. Government could not and would not in any way become involved or provide assistance in the task he had planned for himself."  
(100)

However, the IG REPORT explains that SAS "contrived to put (MANUEL) ARTIME and (AMLASH) together in such a way that neither knew that the contact had been engineered by the CIA. The thought was that ARTIME needed a man inside and (AMLASH) wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, ARTIME might get his man inside and (AMLASH) might get his silenced weapon--from ARTIME. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for ARTIME to give to (AMLASH), and did not intend to furnish a silenced weapon for ARTIME to use.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

TOP SECRET

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AS SANITIZED  
29-3-94  
(1X2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARTIME

AMLASH

~~SANCHEZ~~DATES:

Dec. 30, 1964

Jan. 3, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with ~~SANCHEZ~~ in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.

# TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:DATE:

7/1/75



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29-3-94 *l*  
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ARTIME

AMLASH

~~SANCHEZ~~

DATES:

Dec. 30, 1964

Jan. 3, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

ARTIME and AMLASH met in Madrid, where AMLASH told ARTIME that "he had requested a silencer for a FAL rifle from the Americans, which they had not been able to provide. ARTIME agreed to furnish either a silencer for a FAL or a comparable rifle with silencer." (102) ARTIME reported the results of this conversation in a meeting with ~~SANCHEZ~~ in Florida on Jan. 3, 1965.

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IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

F Baron

FILE:

DATE:

7/1/75

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29-3-94 *em*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
RFK	Mr. McCone <del>Col. Jackson (CIA)</del>	Oct 9, 1962	Special Group (Augmented)  <i>Mongoose</i>
McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Wilson Mr. Parrot		
Mr. Johnson	Dr. Charyk		
Mr. Gilpatric	Dr. Scoville ✓		
Gen. Taylor	Col. Steakley		

#### OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of ✓ the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

#### SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of  
FILE: Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

#### STAFF:

DATE: PGV

(02221)

6/22/75

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29-3-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See list of names below.)

DATES:

Apr 17, '61 -

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

CASTRO

~~CHIEF~~ - SYNDICATE/PHASE II --  
KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)

5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)

6. ~~BRUCE CHEEVER~~ HARVEY's deputy in 1962  
(CHEEVER knows that HARVEY was meeting with gangsters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)

7. ✓ TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.))

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967 p. 55 - 56

FILE:

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

28.6.75

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29-3-94

(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17 '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. [REDACTED] TSD [REDACTED] participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

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29-3-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, William <del>SILVER, Arnold</del> BISSELL, Richard	26 Jan. 1961	EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ~~ARNOLD SILVER~~ about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52). HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ~~ARNOLD SILVER~~ (52)

**TOP SECRET**

<u>SOURCE:</u> HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52	<u>STAFF:</u> Rhea
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 30.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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29-3-94 (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~Silver, Arnold~~  
Harvey, William  
Bissell, Richard

DATES:

1/26/61

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with ~~Arnold Silver~~ about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with ~~Arnold Silver~~ (52)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/30/75

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED  
29-3-94  
(1)(A)

<u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>	<u>DATES:</u>	<u>CATEGORIES:</u>
HARVEY, WILLIAM <del>SEVER, ARNOLD</del> KUBARK	<del>Spring, 1961</del> <del>1961</del> Jan. 26, 1961	EXECUTIVE ACTION
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u> Harvey was asked about notes written by him and <del>Sever</del> from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time the Executive Action Project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific personnel for that purpose. (59)</p>		
<u>FILE:</u>	SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 1, 1961, pp. 9-10 STAFF: Rhea DATE: 6/30/75	

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<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u></p> <p>ZRRIFLE QJWIN SILVER, Arnold LUMUMBA, Patrice</p> <p>O'DONNELL, Justin BISSELL, Richard</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u></p> <p>May 1961 February 19, 1962 <u>Feb., 1961</u></p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET</p> <p>EXECUTIVE ACTION ZRRIFLE</p>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u></p>		

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~program~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the [redacted] to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

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SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
BISSELL, Richard HARVEY WHITE HOUSE <del>SILVER, Arnold</del>	February 1961 (HARVEY's rough estimate)	EXECUTIVE ACTION / ZRRIFLE CASTRO <del>LEAVEL</del> CONGO

OCCURRENCE: the  
BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability,  
a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37) i.e.,  
"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such  
a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability  
with HARVEY." (37)  
"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ~~CARNOLD~~  
~~SILVER~~ and with ~~SIDNEY GOTTSLIEB~~ (37-38).

(continued)

end of 2

<u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38	<u>STAFF:</u> Baron
<u>FILE:</u>	<u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75

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<p><u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u></p> <p>BISSELL, Richard HARVEY, William <del>ARNOLD</del> SILVER, Arnold ✓ LUMUMBA, Patrice</p>	<p><u>DATES:</u></p> <p>FEB 1961</p>	<p><u>CATEGORIES:</u> TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE CONGO</p> <p><b>TOP SECRET</b></p>
<p><u>OCCURRENCE:</u></p>		

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in [redacted] to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELLE. O'DONNELLE made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph [redacted] was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ZRRIFLE

QJWIN

SILVER, Arnold

LUMUMBA, Patrice

O'DONNELL, Justin

BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

May 1961

February 19, 1962

Feb., 1961

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~the~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the [redacted] to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL.

(O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

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DATE: 28.6.75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
ZRRIFLE QJWIN SILVER, Arnold ✓ LUMUMBA, Patrice	May 1961 February 19, 1962 Feb., 1961	EXECUTIVE ACTION ZRRIFLE

#### OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~the~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the [redacted] to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL."

(O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

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SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

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DATE: 28.6.75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

~~Win, K. J.~~

QJWIN

~~SILVER, Arnold~~

DATES:

6/25/75

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that Q.J.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through ~~ARNOLD SILVER~~ for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by Q.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the [REDACTED] (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

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(1)(A)  
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMLASH

DATES:

March 9, 1961

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] an officer assigned to the Mexico City Station met in Mexico City with a high officer in the Cuban armed forces who was subsequently to become a CIA asset known as A.M. LASH-1.\* [redacted] met with A.M. LASH to sound out his views on the Cuban situation. A.M. LASH was in Mexico City to attend a "leftist-sponsored" conference. (78).

The March 1961 meeting was inconclusive, but it led to other meetings out of which Project A.M.LASH was created. A.M. LASH-1 "repeatedly insisted that the essential first step in overthrowing the regime was the elimination of CASTRO himself, which /A.M. LASH-1/ claimed he was prepared to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that we /CIA/ furnish him the special equipment or material needed to do the job." (79).

The IG REPORT concludes that: "The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for /A.M. LASH's/ plot(s)." (80) (Continued on next card)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE: 7/10/77

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(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
RFK	Mr. McCone	Oct 9, 1962	Special Group (Augmented)  <i>Mongoose</i>
McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Wilson		
Mr. Johnson	Dr. Charyk		
Mr. Gilpatric	Dr. Scoville		
Gen. Taylor	Col. Steakley		
	Col. Laddford (CIA)		
	Mr. Parrot		

OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Over-flights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of  
FILE: Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

STAFF:

DATE: PGW

(02821)

6/29/75