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Vol. 3 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R881

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED

ON

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BY

88

Hearing held before

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL  
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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Thursday, August 21, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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410 FIRST STREET, S. E.  
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## EXHIBITS

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Author: Shirley S. Siverter, Ph.D., Washington, D.C. 20003

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STAFF INTERVIEW

Thursday, August 21, 1975

United States Senate

Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to

Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 o'clock  
a.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Burton Wides, Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson,  
Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

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to was marked Hedgman  
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identification.)

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1 like to make the point that I am going on recollection of events  
2 which occurred nearly fifteen years ago, some fifteen years,  
3 some slightly more, some slightly less. So therefore, I will  
4 make every effort, but again, I am stressing this fact that I  
5 have not had an opportunity to refresh my memory by reading old  
6 files or anything of the sort.

7 Mr. Baron. That is completely understandable.

8 Mr. Hedgman. I just want this -- I am making this point  
9 for the Committee members. I have already made it to you  
10 yesterday.

11 Mr. Baron. And it is understandable that we are asking  
12 you to discuss events that took place almost fifteen years ago,  
13 but it is your intention to give us the truth as far as you can  
14 recall it?

14  
15 Mr. Hedgman. It is my full intention to give the truth.

16 Mr. Baron. Thank you.

16 Mr. Wides. Mr. Hedgman, would you please briefly give  
17 us a description of your career with the Agency, and that can  
18 be by basically divisions or type of job in a very brief  
19 summary.  
20

20  
21 Mr. Hedgman. I began, was recruited to serve, as what  
22 is referred to as a non-official cover agent, and I was a  
23 contract as opposed to a staff officer. That was changed  
24 shortly afterwards. I think a few months later I was made a  
25 staff officer but remained on official cover for the first several

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1 years of my time, working abroad. I returned to Washington  
2 where I then became overt in the sense of I worked in the  
3 offices and was no longer ostensibly a private businessman.  
4 I served as what is known as a case officer in the European  
5 area.

6 Mr. Baron. About what time period would you say?

7 Mr. Hedgman. It was '53 to early '57. Early '67 until  
8 the mid-60's I served in Europe working primarily on Soviet  
9 operations.

10 Mr. Dawson. I think you might have misspoken. You said  
11 mid-60's, early '57 to mid-60's. Did you mean 1960?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Mid-1960, yes, I would correct that. From  
13 July 6 on until -- I can't remember whether it was June or  
14 July of 1963 I served as Chief of Station in then Leopoldville,  
15 now Kiershasa, Zaire. I was Chief of Station. I then returned  
16 to Washington in the early fall, the exact dates I don't recall,  
17 of 1963, and I was what is known as a Branch Chief. I was  
18 responsible for the eastern half of Africa from 1963 to June  
19 of 1965.

20 June of '65 till June of '67, I was <sup>27,11</sup> ~~again Chief of Station~~  
21 ~~Congo~~

22 I returned to Washington where I became Branch Chief  
23 again for the Southeast Asian area for a very brief time. In  
24 essence it was to prepare me for my next assignment which was  
25 the Chief of Station, Vientiane, Laos.

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21  
22 Mr. Hedgman. I believe those dates are correct of the  
23 5th or 6th. It could conceivably be the 7th. Certainly long  
24 before that time, those of us interested in the political  
25 situation there; that is, the Ambassador, members of the Political

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1 Section, myself, were greatly concerned about what appeared  
2 to be a Soviet effort to take over the Congo.

3 Mr. Wides. And because of conflict between -- among, I  
4 guess, is the appropriate word -- because of conflict, or  
5 potential conflict, among the central government under  
6 President Kasavubu and others as one faction, Patrice Lumumba  
7 and his followers as a second faction, and Mr. Tshombe and  
8 his followers as a third --

9 Mr. Hedgman. And Gizenga as a fourth.

10 Mr. Wides. Gizenga, I take it he was somewhat within  
11 Lumumba's camp?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I'm sorry. I should not have  
13 interrupted.

14 Mr. Wides. In any event, there was the potential of  
15 imminent fratricidal war?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Tshombe had already declared the Katanga  
17 to be an independent state of Katanga on the 11th of July, if  
18 memory serves me.

19 Mr. Wides. Is it also correct that Mr. Lumumba was the  
20 person of those three leaders, of those three factions, whose  
21 potential activities concerned the United States the most at  
22 that point, particularly with regard to the possibility of  
23 Communist influence in the Congo?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Are we referring to the September period  
25 now, late August, September?

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1 Mr. Wides. Yes, yes.

2 Mr. Hedgman. I would say, but there was another -- there  
3 was also -- there was also great concern about the Tshombe  
4 succession, which we did not recognize.

5 Mr Wides. Right. Right.

6 In early September, did you receive a message from Head-  
7 quarters indicating that you would, on a special restricted  
8 channel indicating it was for your eyes only at the Station, and  
9 telling you that a messenger whom you would recognize would be  
10 arriving with a mission for you?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I believe, yes, I received such a message.

12 Mr. Wides. When, would you please state --

13        Mr. Hedgman. And I believe that was the general thrust  
14 of the wording. I cannot, at this time, affirm with absolute  
15 certainty that that was exactly it, but that is my recollection.

16 Mr. Wides. When would be the best date that you would  
17 best be placing that time that you could give us?

18 Mr. Hedgman. I believe it would have been around the  
19 beginning of September, but I cannot pin it down more than  
20 within a week or ten days.

21 Mr. Wides. About how long before the messenger arrived  
22 would you say the cable came, if you can recall?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot recall definitively. I would guess,  
24 and I would just guess, a few days.

25 Mr. Wides. And is it accurate that the thrust of the

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1 cable, you cannot recall particular words, was that a messenger  
2 whom you would recognize would be coming to give you a mission  
3 to carry out?

4 Mr. Hedgman. As I understood it, he was coming with  
5 instructions. I did not know what type, sort of instructions.

6 Mr. Wides. Yes.

7 Mr. Baron. Can you state in your own words just exactly  
8 what the gist of that cable was?

9 Mr. Hedgman. I am not sure that it will be exact or  
10 even close, but it is my -- I am going again, and I stress this  
11 time now on recollection, and it is not a sure thing, but my  
12 recollection was that the cable advised me that a person whom  
13 I would know to be or recognize as an officer of the Agency,  
14 and I am not sure that it said as an officer of the Agency,  
15 someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instruc-  
16 tions for me.

17 Mr. Wides. Did the cable refer in any way to Lumumba  
18 that you can recall, that would involve the Lumumba problem or --

19 Mr. Hedgman. I think, it is my recollection that it did  
20 not refer to Lumumba in any way.

21 Mr. Wides. And with regard --

22 Mr. Hedgman. Either directly or hint by indirection.

23 Mr. Wides. With regard to the cables for general  
24 procedural aspects, is it correct that it bore a special  
25 reference or slug, I believe is the term?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I think, I am guessing about that. I think  
2 it probably did, because that would have been a normal way to  
3 indicate the special handling. I believe the message also was  
4 marked for my eyes only --

5 Mr. Wides. It would not have been marked --

6 Mr. Hedgman. -- and contained instructions that I was not  
7 to discuss the message with anyone.

8 Mr. Baron. And that you were to destroy the message?

9 Mr. Hedgman. Not at that time.

10 Mr. Wides. Did it indicate that any communications that  
11 you sent thereafter to the Headquarters in connection with the  
12 impending visit were to be given the same slug or --

13 Mr. Hedgman. I am assuming that it probably did, but I  
14 cannot be 100 percent certain. I don't recall sending a message  
15 until after I met the gentleman concerned.

16 Mr. Dawson. Maybe we could approach that a different way.  
17 You do recall whatever message you received was not in the normal  
18 course of communications with the Agency?

19 Mr. Hedgman. Well, it came through Agency communications  
20 channels, but it -- it was marked Eyes Only, for me.

21 Mr. Dawson. That's not unusual, necessarily?

22 Mr. Hedgman. At that time it was more unusual than it is  
23 today, I would say.

24 Mr. Wides. Was it marked RYBAT, do you know?

25 Mr. Hedgman. I'm sorry, I don't recall.

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1 Mr. Wides. But RYBAT usually involved a fairly wide  
2 dissemination, or at least dissemination to others in the  
3 Agency.

4 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

5 Mr. Wides. And when you say, Eyes Only, yourself, this  
6 would, of course, include also the communicator who would have  
7 encrypted it, necessarily?

8 Mr. Hedgman. One communicator in Washington and one in -

9 Mr. Wides. Well, return --

10 Mr. Hedgman. -- in Kienshasa or Leopoldville at that  
11 time.

12 Mr. Wides. We will return in a moment to how you  
13 dispatched communications back.

14 Now, at some point shortly thereafter, someone did  
15 arrive from Washington whom you later determined was the  
16 messenger referred to in the cable, is that correct?

17 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

18 Mr. Wides. And in terms of placing that visit, is it  
19 correct that you, your best belief is it was in the second week  
20 of September or thereabouts?

21 Mr. Hedgman. I would say thereabouts, but again, I have  
22 tried to think, tried to pin down a date on this, and I cannot,  
23 sir.

24 Mr. Wides. But you place it in terms of --

25 Mr. Hedgman. I place it in terms of an apartment which

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1 I rented, and I believe that I rented that apartment in fairly  
2 early September.

3 Mr. Wides. And it was not too long after you had rented  
4 it that this person came?

5 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, yes.

6 Could we hold on?

7 Mr. Wides. Yes.

8 Mr. Hedgman. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. I was remembering another  
9 meeting in that apartment, and I was able to identify, pin down  
10 the time of that meeting, so --

11 Mr. Wides. Who was the messenger who arrived?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Mr. Sidney Gottlieb.

13 Mr. Wides. And at that time, you knew who he was?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I recognized him as an officer of the  
15 Agency.

16 Mr. Wides. By name, or on-site, or both?

17 Mr. Hedgman. On-site.

18 Mr. Wides. And by name or not?

19 Mr. Hedgman. I do not recall whether I knew his name.

20 I suspect I did, but I cannot reaffirm that.

21 Mr. Wides. Did you know what office he worked in, or did  
22 he have to tell you that?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I believe that I knew, but this was not with  
24 great certainty, that he worked in the what was then called  
25 TSD, Technical Services Division. I did not know what part of

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23 Mr. Hadgman. Yes. I would say that was the, that was  
24 my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was  
25 probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing

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25 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. That was my understanding, as a

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non-expert. However, in thinking it over, I believe that I -- there was -- this was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable.

It was also my recollection, let me just try and think for a moment here -- I can't remember where I was going. I had a point I wanted to make.

Well, if it comes back, I will think of it.

Mr. Dawson. Would it help you to have her read back that portion where you were just testifying?

Mr. Hedgman. I don't think so.

Anyway, the biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there were a better way -- certainly, the point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back to the United States, either to an American or the United States government.

Mr. Wides. With regard to the materials, you said it is your best recollection that he brought them with him?

Mr. Hedgman. I believe he did.

Mr. Wides. Yes.

Do you recall having a discussion with him about the materials as to how to use them and what traces they would leave and the like?

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1 visit in order for you and him to have had them essentially  
2 with you while he was discussing them, is that right?

3 Mr. Hadgman. Yes, I believe, as I stated, that he brought  
4 them with him or --

5 Mr. Wides. Or if they, if he did not, that they would  
6 have arrived while he was there? In other words, are you more  
7 certain that they were there at the time you had the discussions  
8 with him?--

9 Mr. Hadgman. Yes.

10 Mr. Wides. -- than you are that he brought them, even  
11 though it is your best belief that he did?

12 Mr. Hadgman. I believe he brought them.

13 Mr. Dawson. Do you recall his giving you any instructions  
14 on their handling, the reason that you had rubber gloves?

15 Mr. Hadgman. Yes. I recollect that I told him that I  
16 didn't know anything about the handling of such things.

17 Mr. Dawson. And do you recall what he told you about  
18 that?

19 Mr. Hadgman. No, I don't really.

20 Mr. Dawson. Did he say to you that in order to handle  
21 this substance you had to have the rubber gloves on?

22 Mr. Hadgman. That's an assumption I have made as a result  
23 of my recollection that there were rubber gloves. But I cannot  
24 be sure.

25 Mr. Wides. Let me go back to the statement that you made

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1 that there was more than one agent.

2 Do you recall definitely that there was more than one?

3 Mr. Hedgman. That is my recollection, yes, sir.

4 Mr. Wides. Now, do you mean by that there was more than  
5 one dosage, or more than one vial or pill of the same kind of  
6 lethal agent, or that there were several different kinds?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I believe there were two or more lethal  
8 agents, types of lethal agents.

9 Mr. Wides. Do you recall him mentioning the word  
10 botulism at all? Does that ring a bell?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot be certain of that.

12 Mr. Wides. Do you recall --

13 Mr. Hedgman. I think that it is possible, but I cannot  
14 be certain.

15 Mr. Wides. Does it ring some sort of a bell?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Botulism rings a bell, but I am not -- I  
17 know what it is, therefore it is, there is an Agatha Christo  
18 murder mystery based on it, or something like that.

19 Mr. Wides. Do you recall whether some of them were  
20 poisons in the nature of cyanide and the like, or whether they  
21 were all represented to be biological agents; that is, a virus  
22 or a deadly germ of some sort?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I believe they were biological agents.

24 Mr. Wides. Do you recall whether any were referred to as  
25 a virus?

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1 should use, or whether there was any different among them in  
2 terms of preference from the point of view of effectiveness or  
3 ease of use, or would you have just been left essentially closing  
4 your eyes and picking one? Wouldn't you have had some discus-  
5 sion?

6 Mr. Hedgman. I would think so. But I cannot -- don't  
7 believe I can pin this down.

8 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any discussion with Dr. Gottlieb,  
9 as to differences in the method of administration, preferred  
10 method of administration?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I remember there was a reference to putting  
12 one of them in possibly toothpaste which would be used.

13 Mr. Wides. How would that be accomplished, with a  
14 syringe, or --

15 Mr. Hedgman. I don't remember. I think so.

16 Mr. Wides. Do you recall specifically that there was a  
17 syringe as part of the equipment?

18 Mr. Hedgman. I believe there was, but I sure wouldn't  
19 take my life on it. But if I said I believe there was a  
20 syringe, that's my recollection.

21 Mr. Wides. Now, just to go back for a moment, you said  
22 before that he said that your instructions were if possible to  
23 eliminate Lumumba, and that you thought that one possible way  
24 or the way he was particularly addressing was in the sense of  
25 assassination?

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1 Mr. Hadgman. That's correct.

2 Mr. Wides. I take it that once you started discussing  
3 these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the  
4 kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was  
5 killing Lumumba?

6 Mr. Hadgman. There was no doubt in my mind that this was  
7 one of the way, and probably what they thought was the only way  
8 that would work. But as the Chief of Station, I still, even  
9 though a junior Chief of Station, I had a certain amount of  
10 freedom of choice, I felt, at the time.

11 In other words, particularly since the emphasis was that  
12 it could not be traced back to the U.S. government or the  
13 United States.

14 Mr. Wides. Did you see --

15 I'm sorry.

16 Mr. Baron. The purpose of designing a lethal agent that  
17 left the traces of a normal disease rather than a poison was  
18 exactly that, wasn't it?

19 Mr. Hadgman. Yes, I would assume so.

20 Mr. Baron. To avoid --

21 Mr. Hadgman. It seems to me that was one of the points  
22 that came out.

23 Mr. Baron. To avoid attribution to the United States?

24 Mr. Hadgman. To avoid attribution, really.

25 Mr. Wides. Did you see any of the paraphernalia, do you

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1 Agency?

2 Mr. Hedgman. To my recollection, he did not refer to any  
3 past use or knowledge of such.

4 Mr. Wides. Did he refer to any prospective or possible  
5 use elsewhere in the world?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Not to my recollection. I don't believe he  
7 did. It would not have been normal for him to discuss that with  
8 me.

9 Mr. Wides. Do you recall, by any chance, the name of  
10 Fidel Castro coming up in the course of this?

11 Mr. Hedgman. Almost certainly it did not.

12 Mr. Wides. Now, with regard to the possibility of other  
13 means, first with regard to the possibility of other means of  
14 killing Lumumba, did you discuss with him any other ways of  
15 arranging Lumumba's death other than using these lethal agents,  
16 such as shooting, or --

17 Mr. Hedgman. I think I may well have suggested that as  
18 a possibility, shooting.

19 Mr. Wides. Did you discuss with him specific other ways  
20 of trying to eliminate him as a political threat, or is it  
21 simply your assumption that if you had found some other way,  
22 that might have been an alternative option for you?

23 Mr. Hedgman. Would you rephrase that question, or repeat  
24 it?

25 Mr. Wides. You said that your understanding was that

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1 your instructions were to eliminate Lumumba, and that one way  
2 of doing this, which was discussed in concrete form, and which  
3 you were given the means for, was killing him or arranging his  
4 death, but that that was only one possibility.

5 Did you discuss, in fact, with Dr. Gottlieb any other ways  
6 of eliminating Lumumba, non-lethal ways?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I may well -- non-lethal ways?

8 Mr. Wides. Yes.

9 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot recall with certainty on that. It  
10 is my recollection that he was, either was or was very shortly  
11 thereafter under the protection of the United Nations in the  
12 Prime Minister's combination residence and office. Certainly  
13 he was there after 14 September.

14 Mr. Baron. Just to clarify this, the means of --

15 Mr. Hedgman. 1960.

16 Mr. Wides. Let him finish the answer. I don't know if  
17 that is fully responsive.

18 What is your best recollection as to whether you did or  
19 did not discuss any other way of eliminating Lumumba other than  
20 assassination?

21 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot give you assurance. I have  
22 tried to go back in my mind on that.

23 Mr. Wides. You can't recall one way or the other?

24 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot recall one way or the other for  
25 certainty. I know that it -- somewhere along the line in there,

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1 I thought of shooting as a possibility, but whether I discussed  
2 it with Dr. Gottlieb, I am not sure.

3 Mr. Wides. Well, I understand that is a possibility that  
4 you discussed other means of arranging his death, or you may  
5 have discussed other means of arranging his death --

6 Mr. Hedgman. I may have.

7 Mr. Wides. -- than use of agents, but earlier you said  
8 you considered your instruction to be eliminating him, and that  
9 one possibility was through his death, but there were other  
10 possibilities. And I am asking you now whether you recall  
11 discussing any non-lethal ways to eliminate him as a political  
12 threat with Dr. Gottlieb in connection with your instructions?

13 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot be certain that I did, sir.  
14 There obviously was the possibility that his Congolese political  
15 enemies would gain control of him in some manner, get him in  
16 their, under their control, in which case he would have been  
17 neutralized.

18 Mr. Wides. But in regard to your instructions to do what  
19 you could to eliminate the threat, with regard to action that  
20 you would take as the Station Chief, I take it all you discus-  
21 sed with Dr. Gottlieb were means of arranging his death from the  
22 point of view of what you could do?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot affirm that.

24 Mr. Wides. But you don't recall discussing anything  
25 else?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. No.

2 Mr. Wides. Now, what was your first reaction when [Dr.  
3 Gottlieb] when it first became clear to you what [Dr. Gottlieb]  
4 was discussing with you in regard to --

5 Off the record.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 Mr. Wides. Back on the record.

8 What was that last question?

9 (The Reporter read back the last question.)

10 Mr. Wides. -- efforts to kill Patrice Lumumba?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I would say great surprise. I don't know  
12 whether shock would be the word. It's a little hard to recollect  
13 one's emotions, but it was an emotional, an emotional reaction,  
14 I think.

15 Mr. Wides. Did you raise with him the question of  
16 authorization of such instructions to you?

17 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I did. That's my quite strong recol-  
18 lection, that I did.

19 Mr. Wides. What do you recall in essence was what you  
20 said to him?

21 Mr. Hedgman. In essence, I think I must have, and again  
22 this is, I am guessing as to what my wording was, must have  
23 pointed out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,  
24 and I may have probably said that I never heard of it being  
25 done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in

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1 the Agency had I ever heard any references to such, in my,  
2 recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection  
3 I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued.

4 Mr. Wides. And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?

5 Mr. Hedgman. It is my recollection that he identified  
6 the President, and I cannot -- the President of the United  
7 States -- and I cannot recall whether he said "the President,"  
8 or whether he identified him by name.

9 Mr. Wides. But it is your best recollection that he said  
10 something more specific than highest authority, that is, the  
11 President, or the White House, or President Eisenhower?

12 Mr. Hedgman. I want to get this one right, because I  
13 realize it's important.

14 Mr. Wides. Let's start, excuse me, let's start with the  
15 most basic question.

16 Is it your recollection that he clearly told you it was  
17 an authority higher than the Director of the CIA?

18 Mr. Hedgman. I'm not sure that he put it that way. As  
19 I said, I believe --

20 Mr. Wides. But I don't mean that he used those words,  
21 but is it clear --

22 Mr. Hedgman. That was my understanding, that it --

23 Mr. Wides. That is was higher than the Director?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

25 Mr. Wides. Can you recall whether he said "the President?"

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1 or "President Eisenhower?"

2 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot recall whether he just said, whether  
3 he said "the President" or whether he said "President Eisenhow-  
4 er."

5 Mr. Wides. But it was one of those two, is your best  
6 recollection?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I would say almost certainly, but not -  
8 in other words, I am at about the second level of affirmation  
9 here.

10 Mr. Wides. If not that specific --

11 Mr. Hedgman. It was my understanding it was the  
12 President, yes.

13 Mr. Wides. And did he also, apart from what you would  
14 have inferred would be implied by that, did he also say in any  
15 way something that referred to it being approved by the Director  
16 of the Agency?

17 Mr. Hedgman. I have tried to go back in my mind on that,  
18 and I think, I believe-- but again now, this one, it's pretty  
19 loose in my mind -- it was something to the effect that the  
20 President had instructed the Director.

21 Mr. Wides. Your understanding then was that these  
22 instructions were instructions coming to you from the office  
23 of the President?

24 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

25 Mr. Wides. Or that he had instructed the Agency, and they

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1 were passed on to you?

2 Mr. Hedgman. That's right.

3 Mr. Dawson. You are not the least unclear whether or  
4 not you came aware with a very clear impression that the Presi-  
5 dent's name had been invoked in some fashion?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I came -- certainly that is my  
7 recollection.

8 Mr. Dawson. You have no doubt about that?

9 Mr. Wides. At the time?

10 Mr. Hedgman. At the time I certainly felt that I was  
11 under instructions from the President, yes.

12 Mr. Wides. All right.

13 Mr. Dawson. You were less certain as to whether or not  
14 the Director of Central Intelligence's name was invoked as  
15 authority?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Because the other one seemed higher, and --

17 Mr. Dawson. Okay.

18 Mr. Hedgman. And I think in my own mind I could not  
19 imagine the Agency taking such action without clearing it with  
20 the President.

21 Mr. Wides. Do you recall asking something to the effect  
22 of where did this brilliant idea come from, or who had such a  
23 brilliant idea?

24 Mr. Hedgman. I think I made a comment like that  
25 yesterday, but I am not sure those were my words at all. I think

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1 I was -- I was being a bit facetious in that sense yesterday  
2 when I said that, but, I mean, I think I asked why, who.

3 Mr. Wides. And your best recollection then is he said in  
4 effect, the President, that is, he said either the President or  
5 President Eisenhower has instructed or told the Director that  
6 this is what is wanted?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I think he said told the Director. This is --  
8 I mean, after all, the President would not pick up the phone  
9 and dial Dr. Gottlieb and say, hey, I've got a little job for  
10 you.

11 Mr. Dawson. Though it may be an assumption on your  
12 part --

13 Mr. Hedgman. That's right. I am -- yes.

14 Mr. Dawson. But you are clear as far as the President  
15 has told you to do this?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Gentlemen, after fifteen years I cannot be  
17 100 percent certain, but I have always, since that date, had  
18 the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the  
19 President.

20 Mr. Wides. And your impression, your recollection is at  
21 that time, after your discussion with Dr. Gottlieb, that you then,  
22 at that time, had the very clear impression that these were  
23 instructions from the President?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Baron. In your mind, is it more likely that Gottlieb

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1 used the words "the Prasadant" or "President Eisenhower" than  
2 it is that he used some euphemism?

3 Is that correct?

4 Mr. Hedgman. I believe that is so.

5 Mr. Wides. That is your best recollection?

6 Mr. Hedgman. That is my best recollection.

7 Mr. Wides. With regard to what you understood your  
8 instructions to be, is it a fair summary to say that your  
9 instructions were to determine in what way you could use these  
10 agents, with the possibility that you might think of a better  
11 way in your mind, but that if you could use these agents to  
12 assassinate Lumumba in a way which would not implicate the  
13 United States, that you were under instructions to do so?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I would qualify that slightly. I would  
15 qualify it in that in operations normally you never use greater  
16 force or greater effort than is necessary to accomplish the  
17 purpose. I would think, and I think I thought at the time, that  
18 if there were some way that he could be removed from a position  
19 of power and threat which we, most of us thought was a threat  
20 to the United States by him, that that would have been satis-  
21 factory.

22 However, it was clear that people were thinking in terms  
23 of his physical removal by the equipment I was given, the  
24 agents, the lethal agents which were given to me.

25 Mr. Wides. Well, were you not impressed with the fact

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1 that someone in the Agency had literally arrived at your door-  
2 step with lethal means and indicated that the President had  
3 instructed the Agency to direct Lumumba's removal, and that it  
4 was in that connection that he was arriving with these lethal  
5 means?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Oh, yes.

7 Mr. Wides. Well, I take it --

8 Mr. Hedgman. This was not a common occurrence.

9 Mr. Wides. I take it you thought you had authority to  
10 use them, and that had you done so the next day, or very shortly  
11 thereafter, that that was clearly within the authority  
12 that -- well, off the record.

13 (Discussion off the record.)

14 Mr. Wides. Subsequent to your discussion with Dr.  
15 Gottlieb, did you seek confirmation of the instructions that  
16 he had given you by further communications with the Agency?

17 Mr. Hedgman. In my recollection that I sent a message,  
18 whether I identified Gottlieb by name or not, I do not recall,  
19 but that I asked for some form of confirmation that he was the  
20 proper messenger and that his instructions were --

21 Mr. Wides. Correct?

22 Mr. Hedgman. Were correct.

23 Mr. Wides. Did you receive a response to that message?

24 Mr. Hedgman. I -- before I continue, I would say that  
25 this is the best of my recollection that I sent such a message.

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1 Mr. Wides. Yes. Well, excuse me, did you --

2 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot, I cannot affirm absolutely and  
3 positively, but I have a recollection that I sent such a  
4 message.

5 Mr. Wides. Do you have a fairly strong recollection that  
6 after speaking to [Gottlieb], because it involved such a momentous  
7 issue, that you felt in need of some further guidance or  
8 confirmation?

9 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I was worried about it.

10 Mr. Wides. And the most likely course for you to have  
11 taken would have been to seek confirmation by cable? I take  
12 it you don't recall any request in a face to face exchange with  
13 any Agency person for confirmation?

14 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct. There was no face to face,  
15 other than my discussions with [Dr. Gottlieb].

16 Mr. Wides. And your recollection, although you are not  
17 certain, is you sent a cable seeking confirmation?

18 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

19 Mr. Wides. Do you have a recollection of receiving a  
20 response to that?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Again, a recollection, but I believe I  
22 received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was  
23 the messenger and his instructions were, were legal instructions  
24 in the sense of being -- legal, of course, would not be a  
25 correct --

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1 Mr. Wides. Duly authorized?

2 Mr. Hedgman. Duly authorized.

3 Mr. Wides. Now, after you received them, at least after  
4 you received that confirmation, is it correct that you felt you  
5 had the authority thenceforth to use these lethal agents to  
6 assassinate Lumumba and that had you done so any time thereafter  
7 it would have been within the authority of your instructions?

8 Mr. Hedgman. I think so, but it is possible, and I cannot --  
9 I have thought about this a good deal last night. It is possi-  
10 ble that the instructions may have been that I was to explore  
11 these where available, but I was to get final confirmation  
12 before -- I cannot be 100 percent sure.

13 Mr. Wides. Are you raising that as a possibility without  
14 any recollection of that at all? Is that what you are doing  
15 in regard to this last statement?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I suppose that's it. I don't have a  
17 firm recollection.

18 Mr. Wides. You don't have any?

19 Mr. Hedgman. I have tried to determine in my own mind  
20 whether I had an absolute free hand at that time.

21 Mr. Wides. Well, let's take it one step at a time.

22 Do you have any recollection of any message during  
23 [Gottlieb's] discussion with you or thereafter in effect putting a  
24 hold, having a sort of a go, no-go, hold on your use of the  
25 poisons? Do you have any recollection of that?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I do not, but may I add there, I know that  
2 I sent several messages about potential access.

3 Mr. Wides. Yes.

4 Mr. Hedgman. Which makes me think --

5 Mr. Baron. Potential access to Lumumba?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, which makes me think I was perhaps  
7 supposed to clear it.

8 Mr. Wides. Could those also simply have been progress  
9 reports, even if there was no hold?

10 Mr. Hedgman. That's possible, yes.

11 Mr. Wides. And do you have a recollection, although not  
12 a clear one, that in fact you thought it was up to you at that  
13 point and that you could go, if you thought the situation was  
14 correct?

15 Mr. Hedgman. If I had to decide between those two things,  
16 I think I probably thought I had it, but I cannot absolutely  
17 confirm that, sir.

18 Mr. Wides. I understand that, but you have some recollec-  
19 tion that you thought you had it, and you have no recollection  
20 of thinking there was a hold? You simply cannot be, you are  
21 not absolutely certain that you thought you had a go ahead,  
22 is that a fair summary of your testimony?

23 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I think that would be correct.

24 Mr. Wides. Now, do you recall, and I am coming back to  
25 the messages in a moment, do you recall sometime in the

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1 beginning of October, when a Mr. Justin O'Donnell arrived at  
2 the Station?

3 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall the time, but it was perhaps,  
4 it would have been about that time.

5 Mr. Wides. Was it several weeks after Dr. Gottlieb's  
6 arrival?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot put a timeframe within weeks on it.  
8 I would have guessed yes.

9 Mr. Wides. Was it clearly after Dr. Gottlieb?

10 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

11 Mr. Wides. I believe you indicated to us in preliminary  
12 discussions that you had some intimation or anticipation that  
13 his arrival -- strike that.

14 Am I correct that you had some knowledge he was going to  
15 arrive before he appeared; that is, by name you knew that he  
16 was coming to the Station before he actually physically got  
17 there?

18 Mr. Hedgman. I believe that is correct.

19 Mr. Wides. And I believe you indicated yesterday in  
20 preliminary discussions with us that in anticipating his  
21 arrival, you had some impression that he was to aid in the  
22 removal or the elimination of Lumumba, is that correct?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I don't believe -- I may have misstated  
24 myself if I said that yesterday. I think it was more when he  
25 arrived that I was advised of that.

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1 Mr. Wides. I see.

2 Mr. Hedgman. There may have been a message in that  
3 channel indicating that he was arriving, which would have made  
4 me think that he was related with it. I cannot be certain.

5 Mr. Wides. Do you recall indicating to us yesterday  
6 that when he arrived initially one thought you had was that  
7 perhaps you were going to be replaced as Station Chief, in your  
8 first job as Station Chief, because you had been dragging your  
9 feet, or not acting expeditiously enough on Lumumba?

10 Mr. Hedgman. I recall saying that yesterday.

11 Mr. Wides. What is your recollection today?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Put it -- may I go off the record a moment?

13 Mr. Wides. Yes.

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 Mr. Wides. Let's go back on the record.

16 Let me phrase the question this way, Mr. Hedgman: when  
17 Mr. O'Donnell arrived, I take it as a somewhat junior Station  
18 Chief, and in your first job as a Station Chief, that you  
19 considered whether there was dissatisfaction with your handling  
20 of the job, or the need for more experienced personnel there,  
21 is that correct?

22 Mr. Hedgman. I think that is possibly true.

23 Mr. Wides. Now, do you recall whether one of the  
24 thoughts that went through your mind was that perhaps the  
25 Headquarters was, the Agency was dissatisfied with foot-dragging

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1 or the lack of action on your part in implementing Dr. Gottlieb's  
2 instructions? Was that one of the thoughts that went through  
3 your mind as far as you can recall?

4 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot say that with certainty now. It  
5 is very possible.

6 Mr. Wides. Do you have any recollection that that went  
7 through your mind even if you can't be certain?

8 Mr. Hedgman. To repeat, that he --

9 Mr. Wides. That you thought --

10 Mr. Hedgman. That I thought that they were dissatisfied  
11 with my handling of that?

12 Mr. Wides. Because you had not yet eliminated Lumumba  
13 or taken further steps to do so?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I just can't, I just would like to back off  
15 that one because I cannot be certain. I knew that obviously  
16 they had sent a man who had much more experience than I, and  
17 yet it was clear that he was working for me, because I was  
18 not relieved as Chief of Station. They would never have sent  
19 him there under me and then switched the positions.

20 Mr. Wides. Prior to his coming -- to return now to the  
21 period when you sent the confirmation, request for confirmation  
22 do you recall slugging it back through a particular channel?

23 Mr. Hedgman. There was some special channel, and I --  
24 because it was handled differently than any other normal  
25 message. For example, it was not put on a regular cable form,

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1 which, you know, you have several copies for your various  
2 files. And it was my recollection that I personally carried  
3 the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded  
4 in a double-talk way that even the communicator would not  
5 necessarily know what it was about.

6 Mr. Wides. If your communication to the Headquarters and  
7 their communication back were in somewhat ambiguous terms,  
8 particularly your question, such as is the person, is this  
9 person the messenger, and are his instructions accurate, and  
10 if the reply was essentially yes to both questions, how would  
11 that have assured you that his invocation of Presidential  
12 authority was accurate, or even his invocation of the authority  
13 of the Director was accurate without your indicating in your  
14 cable in some way what the instructions were?

15 Mr. Hedgman. I suppose that -- I doubt that I would have  
16 indicated in the cable the authority cited because of the  
17 nature of the instructions. Perhaps I was much more naive then  
18 than many of us are now, but I assumed when I received instruc-  
19 tions that they came, they were duly authorized instructions.

20 It was clear that the man -- I had received the message  
21 that someone was going to contact me with instructions, which  
22 was most unusual. I mean, why weren't they sent in writing,  
23 in other words, by cable or by dispatch. And it arrived, and  
24 it arrived, a man whom I recognized as an Agency officer, and  
25 he gave me instructions. I went back through this very special

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1 channle and said, you know, I don't remember how I worded it  
2 it was a doubletalk thing, but I came away, I was convinced that  
3 yes, it was right.

4 Now, there is no way I could know or be absolutely certain  
5 if those instructions emanated from the President, but I, I took  
6 this perhaps as an act of faith.

7 Mr. Wides. I understand.

8 When you were discussing with Dr. Gottlieb during his stay  
9 of a day, perhaps one or two days, what else can you recall was  
10 discussed by the two of you?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I don't have a recollection. I probably  
12 wanted to know about where my various friends were and what was  
13 happening and the sort of gossip that goes around.

14 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any discussion as to whether  
15 Mr. Bissell was witting of this particular mission or instruc-  
16 tion?

17 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot be certain of that. I think I  
18 would have assumed.

19 Mr. Wides. Not being certain, what is your best recollection  
20 as to whether his name came up in regard to the instructions?

21 Mr. Hedgman. I have no recollection whether his name  
22 came up. Certainly I would have assumed that he would have  
23 been involved, and it is entirely possible that his name didn't  
24 come up.

25 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any other names coming up besides

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1 the reference to the White House and possibly the express  
2 reference to the Director, possibly?

3 Mr. Hedgman. I don't believe so.

4 Mr. Wides. Do you recall Mr. Tweedy's name coming up?

5 Mr. Hedgman. No, I do not. But it is entirely possible  
6 that it did, in that he was my direct chief.

7 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any other aspects of the  
8 discussion, whether related to the mission or not, in regard to  
9 what his job was, what he was doing at that time, your problems  
10 in the Congo, or Mr. Lumumba's particular threat?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I probably discussed with him what I saw to  
12 be a very severe threat, serious threat, I should say, to  
13 U.S. position in Africa. It was my belief that the Soviets were  
14 making a major effort to secure a bridgehead, to take over one  
15 of the two or three largest, and potentially richest countries  
16 in Africa.

17 Mr. Wides. Do you recall anything regarding any discussion  
18 regarding access that you then had? Now, I am referring to your  
19 discussions with Dr. Gottlieb in the way of agents you might  
20 use who might be able to prevent attribution to American and  
21 so forth?

22 Mr. Hedgman. I have a recollection, I have a recollection  
23 that I cited one agent's name, or perhaps not name, but  
24 described him as a person who would have access.

25 Mr. Wides. To Lumumba directly?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. To probably have access to -- certainly  
2 would have access to Lumumba, and might be able to use such  
3 agents.

4 Mr. Wides. Was there any discussion of instructing this  
5 agent how one would go about instructing the agent to use the  
6 lethal agents between yourself and Dr. Gottlieb?

7 Mr. Hedgman. Probably, but I cannot be sure of that,  
8 because I would -- I know I did not know how to use them, so  
9 I must have asked how to use them.

10 Mr. Wides. Do you recall subsequent to your -- let me  
11 go back.

12 How would you characterize, or if you can remember the  
13 substance of what you said, what was your response to Dr.  
14 Gottlieb having been given these instructions, having been taken  
15 somewhat aback, according to your testimony, having asked about  
16 authority and having been assured that it came from the White  
17 House, what was the essence of the response that you gave [Dr.  
18 Gottlieb] that he would have brought back to Headquarters himself?

19 Mr. Hedgman. I think that it was that I would explore,  
20 and again I am saying I think, that I would explore this.

21 Mr. Wides. Did you give him any indication that you would  
22 not carry out the instructions?

23 Mr. Hedgman. No, I don't believe I said that. But I  
24 believe I pointed out that it was -- it would be extremely  
25 difficult to carry out these instructions, meeting the criteria

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1 that we could no way be traced back to the United States.

2 Mr. Wides. Would it be a fair summary that he left the  
3 meeting -- well, you can't testify for him -- that it would  
4 have been reasonable for him to leave the meeting with the  
5 impression that you would, if possible, carry out those  
6 instructions?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I couldn't speculate as to whether he thought  
8 I would or not.

9 Mr. Wides. But would that have been a fair impression  
10 for him to take away from your comments?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I think it would be a fair impression that  
12 he would take away the thought that I was going to look into  
13 it and try and figure if there was a way, but I do remember --  
14 I shouldn't say remember -- I believe I stressed the difficulty  
15 of trying to carry out such an operation.

16 Mr. Wides. But since he had given you instructions that  
17 the President wanted this, would it have been fair for him to  
18 carry away from your conversation the understanding that if  
19 you thought it could be done, if you found a way, that it would  
20 then go forward, you would then go forward?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

22 As I said earlier, I cannot be certain that I -- that  
23 he would have gone away with the idea that I would immediately  
24 do it, or that I would seek further authorization.

25 Mr. Wides. Now, subsequent to the sending of the request

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1 for confirmation, and the receipt of the cable which you have  
2 a recollection of, both confirming the instructions, what  
3 further steps did you take in the Congo, and what further  
4 communications did you have with Headquarters regarding the  
5 mission?

6 Let's take that one step at a time.

7 What further steps did you take prior to Mr. O'Donnell  
8 coming?

9 Mr. Hedgman. I believe that I queried the agent who had  
10 access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just what  
11 that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speaking  
12 to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom,  
13 did he have access to the kitchen, things of that sort.

14 I have a recollection of having queried him on that without  
15 specifying why I wanted to know this.

16 Mr. Wides. Did you take any other steps to find out the  
17 pattern of Patrice Lumumba's activities as they might relate  
18 to attempting to put these lethal agents into food or toothpaste?

19 Mr. Hedgman. That's what I, in essence, I think what I  
20 was doing there was -- but without specifying why.

21 Mr. Wides. Did you recall any other steps? What did you  
22 do with the materials themselves?

23 Mr. Hedgman. As I recall, I placed them in the bottom  
24 drawer of my safe, to which I had access.

25 Mr. Wides. No one else had the combination, or did anyone

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1 else have the combination to the safe?

2 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I believe my secretary had the  
3 combination.

4 Mr. Baron. Did you discuss this with your secretary?

5 Mr. Hedgman. I most certainly did not.

6 Mr. Wides. Was she in the habit of occasionally opening  
7 the safe rather than yourself?

8 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

9 Mr. Wides. What would have happened, or what did you  
10 anticipate would happen, if she had opened the safe and seen  
11 these packages?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Well, I believe they were probably wrapped  
13 or sealed in an envelope or paper marked probably -- I put that,  
14 and this is again probably -- Eyes Only, so for myself --

15 Mr. Wides. You didn't feel it necessary to indicate to  
16 her that there were some packages here and I don't want you to  
17 open them or to look at them?

18 Mr. Hedgman. If I sealed it and put Eyes Only on it,  
19 she would not have.

20 Mr. Wides. Did you send subsequent cables back or have  
21 further communication with Headquarters after the request for  
22 confirmation?

23 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. It is my recollection I sent several,  
24 two or three, something like that.

25 Mr. Wides. What was the substance of each of those?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot give you the substance, I believe  
2 they were in the nature of progress reports.

3 Mr. Wides. With regard to your finding an access?

4 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

5 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any cables back from Headquarters  
6 after the first one indicating the affirmation?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I believe there was. If I had to bet money  
8 on this one, I would say, I would bet on the fact that there  
9 was at least one or two more back to me.

10 Mr. Wides. What is your best recollection as to the  
11 nature of those?

12 Mr. Hedgman. I don't really have a recollection. I  
13 recall that there was one more, than one cable, more than  
14 two cables, the one saying that there is the man coming, and  
15 there was the one which I recall saying yes, that's right,  
16 and you are to follow out his instructions or his instructions  
17 are duly issued or something to the effect. And I believe there  
18 was one, one or two other cables, but I don't have a recollection  
19 of their contents. Probably querying for further explanation,  
20 but I cannot confirm that.

21 Mr. Wides. Let me ask you the following question: you  
22 have indicated that, I believe you have testified, and correct  
23 me if I am wrong, but I have a recollection that you at the time  
24 thought you had the authority to go ahead with the use of the  
25 lethal agents if you thought it could be done within the guidelines

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1 given you. You have raised the possibility, although you have  
2 no recollection, that there might have been a hold and a need  
3 for further approval.

4 Is it fair to say that you understood that this was well  
5 beyond the exploratory stage as a conceivable option that the U.S.  
6 might take, and that you understood that from the highest  
7 authority, that is the President, there were instructions  
8 to carry out the assassination of Lumumba if it could be done  
9 without attribution, but that Headquarters might have expected  
10 some indication from you of how you were going to do it prior  
11 to the actual implementation? Is that a fair summary of what  
12 you are telling us?

13 Mr. Hedgman. Will you repeat that? Could she --

14 Mr. Wides. That you had received instructions from the  
15 highest authority, that is the President, down through the Agency,  
16 if that is possible, because of their concern about Mr. Lumumba  
17 to use lethal agents to assassinate him, but that you might have  
18 you had received the authority to do that, and there was a  
19 direction to do it if possible, but that you might have sent back  
20 to Headquarters, in guarded language, an indication of how you  
21 were going to go about it, or that you had decided that it could  
22 be done in a feasible way before going ahead with it.

23 Is that a fair summary?

24 Mr. Hedgman. I think probably that I would have gone back  
25 and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final

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1 approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had  
2 there been a way to do it. I did not see it as a practical, as  
3 a matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly.

4 Mr. Baron. As far as you were concerned, the policy  
5 decision had been made at Headquarters and in the White House  
6 to assassinate Lumumba, and the questions that remained were  
7 operational questions, is that correct?

8 Mr. Hedgman. It is now my recollection, some fifteen  
9 years later -- and again I stress fifteen years -- that I  
10 thought the policy decision had been made in the White House,  
11 not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as  
12 the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political  
13 decision.

14 Mr. Baron. And any further communication --

15 Mr. Wides. Excuse me, please.

16 And the political decision was if possible he should be  
17 eliminated?

18 Mr. Hedgman. As a threat.

19 Mr. Wides. As a threat.

20 Mr. Hedgman. Assassination being one means.

21 Mr. Wides. That had been approved?

22 Mr. Hedgman. Of achieving -- I felt at the time --

23 Mr. Wides. As a policy matter?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I thought at the time, yes, that it  
25 had been approved. That is my recollection, yes.

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1 Mr. Baron. So any further communications that you would  
2 have had, as you mentioned a moment ago, to seek approval from  
3 Headquarters would have been approval for the specific operational  
4 modes that you would use to carry out the program?

5 Mr. Hedgman. I think that's probably the case, sir.

6 Mr. Wides. And is it correct you are indicating in that  
7 regard your estimation now of what your likely course of action  
8 would have been in terms of how you would have proceeded, given  
9 your situation there, is that correct?

10 Mr. Hedgman. I don't understand, sir.

11 Mr. Wides. In terms of checking -- well, you indicated  
12 you think now you probably would have checked back before going  
13 ahead?

14 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

15 Mr. Wides. Is it correct to say that that is your  
16 estimation now of how you would have decided to proceed, but  
17 that is not necessarily your instruction that you had to check  
18 that, because I think you indicated before you had no recol-  
19 lection that you felt your instructions were to check back before  
20 going ahead?

21 Mr. Hedgman. I am not sure that I said that. I don't  
22 know for sure that I had an absolute freedom.

23 Mr. Wides. I understand. But you said before, if I am  
24 correct, that you had no recollection of a requirement to go  
25 back?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. There is a difference between not having a  
2 recollection and being sure.

3 Mr. Wides. I understand. And you said that you did have  
4 a recollection, although you aren't certain, that you felt  
5 free to go ahead, whatever you might have done in terms of  
6 your personal decision of how to proceed?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I think I said that I thought the policy  
8 decision had been made at the political level and that the Agency  
9 had been instructed to neutralize, to remove from position of  
10 power or whatever position of threat, Lumumba -- I am not  
11 fencing with you.

12 Mr. Wides. No, I understand.

13 With regard to Mr. O'Donnell's arrival, what did he  
14 indicate to you was his mission when he arrived?

15 Mr. Hedgman. I understood it to be that -- similar to  
16 mine, that is the removal or neutralization of Lumumba. I am  
17 not sure what wording he would have used.

18 Mr. Wides. Did he discuss with you the possibility of  
19 assassinating Lumumba?

20 Mr. Hedgman. I can -- I have no clear recollection of  
21 his discussing the assassination. I know that -- I have a  
22 fairly good recollection that he was there for the removal of  
23 Lumumba. Whether the word assassination, whether the word --

24 Mr. Wides. Do you have any recollection of discussing  
25 with Justin O'Donnell the practicality and the morality generally

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1 of assassination as an Agency activity?

2 Mr. Hedgman. As an Agency activity, I am not sure.  
3 Certainly, and in that specific case I believe that I did  
4 discuss with him the practical problems involved in carrying  
5 out such an operation.

6 Mr. Wides. Such an operation being the assassination of  
7 a political figure?

8 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, assassination or any other removal  
9 from power, because we did not have the --

10 Mr. Wides. I am not sure if your testimony is you do  
11 recall discussing, among other things, assassination with  
12 Justin O'Donnell or that you don't recall discussing it with  
13 him?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot affirm that I discussed this, but  
15 I assume I must have discussed it. I discussed, for example,  
16 the question of access.

17 Mr. Wides. I take it then that you have no recollection  
18 of his indicating to you one way or the other whether assassina-  
19 tion was an option that he was considering?

20 Mr. Hedgman. No, I don't.

21 Mr. Wides. As a way of eliminating Lumumba?

22 Mr. Hedgman. I think I, since, in view of my instructions  
23 I may have assumed that he was doing this.

24 Mr. Wides. Did he indicate to you anything about a  
25 conversation that he had had with Mr. Bissell regarding

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1 assassination of Mr. Lumumba?

2 Mr. Hedgman. I do not recall his discussing that with  
3 me.

4 Mr. Wides. And do you recall ever indicating to him that  
5 there was a virus or other deadly biological agent in the  
6 safe?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I do not recall that, no, but I gather that  
8 I must have from what you told me yesterday.

9 Mr. Dawson. You stated yesterday, I believe --

10 Mr. Wides. Excuse me.

11 Let me just on the record clarify that.

12 Do you mean by that if Mr. O'Donnell testified you did  
13 tell him you would not dispute that, you just have no recollec-  
14 tion?

15 Mr. Hedgman. I have no recollection.

16 Mr. Dawson. You said yesterday you not only were  
17 unenthusiastic about it, I believe were the terms you used,  
18 about the prospect of seeking to assassinate Lumumba, but I  
19 thought you also said that O'Donnell was not particularly  
20 enthusiastic about his work there either?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

22 I would put it yes, his work there. I cannot pin it  
23 down to assassination as such, although certainly in my own  
24 mind I think I must have thought that at the time. I didn't,  
25 was not enthusiastic about these instructions, and I had

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1 no -- had the impression he was not that happy even to be  
2 there.

3 Mr. Wides. You said yesterday, I believe you said you  
4 felt under no pressure to carry out the assignment, is that  
5 a correct statement?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Yeah. I don't recall getting messages to  
7 the effect, which quite often one gets when you have been given  
8 instructions to carry out a specific operation, you know, let's  
9 have the information, what are you doing, why aren't you doing  
10 more? I do not recall pressure on me to get moving on this  
11 thing and do it and carry it out.

12 Mr. Wides. You indicated a moment ago, I think, in  
13 connection with Mr. O'Donnell coming and your general wondering  
14 at the time of his approval, whether there was dissatisfaction  
15 with your performance that the Congo had become a central area  
16 of focus for the government and their concern over its future  
17 and Soviet intervention and so forth, is that right?

18 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I knew -- well, of course by the  
19 time that Mr. O'Donnell arrived, the Soviet intervention was,  
20 shall we say, limited, if I recall correctly, only to the north  
21 and northeastern part of the country, because the Soviets had  
22 been expelled.

23 Mr. Wides. I meant in the larger sense of Soviet influence  
24 or Communist influence eventually in the country?

25 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

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1 Now, let's see. Would you repeat that?

2 Mr. Wides. Well, the essence of the question is simply  
3 that at this time, by late September, early October, the Congo  
4 was an area of great concern to the United States government?

5 Mr. Hedgman. Correct.

6 Mr. Wides. There was a general sense of urgency about  
7 the problems?

8 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

9 Mr. Wides. The potential problems, and you had gotten  
10 the unusual communication, a direct personal messenger, that  
11 the President of the United States had instructed the Agency  
12 to eliminate Lumumba?

13 Mr. Hedgman. Right.

14 Mr. Wides. Now, I find it a little hard to understand  
15 in that context how you would have regarded, how you could have  
16 regarded it as not a high-priority item with some urgency  
17 involved.

18 Mr. Hedgman. Well, certainly it was a priority, but  
19 there were many priorities, and that was one of my problems  
20 at the time, that I was swamped with work, a little bit like  
21 you with four people calling you here.

22 Mr. Wides. Well, would you have rated this on a comparable  
23 level with various intelligence requirements that you would have  
24 got in the normal course?

25 Mr. Hedgman. No, I would have -- but there were a number

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1 of other requirements which were levied on me which we are not  
2 discussing and is not in the purview of this discussion today.  
3 I think there was one major thing probably which took some of  
4 the heat off, that is, that Lumumba had been essentially  
5 neutralized within his office complex, home and office complex  
6 where he was under guard by the United Nations.

7 He was able to send messages out, but the -- there had  
8 been a coup d'etat, at least there was a coup d'eta on the  
9 night of the 14th of September, 1960. A government which was,  
10 although nationalistically oriented seemed relatively friendly  
11 toward the United States, was in power. There was a great deal  
12 of discussion as to its legality at the time, but that was  
13 resolved by the United States and most of the Western powers  
14 who decided that it was legal since the government, since once  
15 President Kasavubu appointed the members of that government,  
16 his government, he was the legal Chief of State.

17 So I would -- do you follow what I am trying to say?

18 Mr. Wides. Yes, I do.

19 Mr. Hadgman. I think there was a lessening in my own  
20 feeling, of urgency.

21 Mr. Wides. Each time that you sent a cable back -- you  
22 said you thought you had sent several after the request for  
23 confirmation --

24 Mr. Hadgman. I think I did.

25 Mr. Wides. Was that simply something you made up, or did

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1 that reflect additional action that you had taken?

2 Mr. Hedgman. No, it was not a fabricated message. In  
3 other words, I didn't fabricate things.

4 Mr. Wides. Did it just reflect further thoughts, or  
5 did it reflect a report on some further steps you had taken?

6 Mr. Hedgman. I think probably, and I cannot be sure of  
7 this, sir, I think it probably reflected further steps which  
8 I had taken; that is, exploratory steps.

9 Mr. Wides. How many times did you speak to the agent about  
10 what kinds of access he had, and what Lumumba's patterns were?  
11 Was it on more than one occasion?

12 Mr. Hedgman. I believe so. I believe it would have been  
13 on two, possibly three.

14 Mr. Wides. What other steps or activities had you  
15 undertaken which were reported in your cable?

16 Mr. Hedgman. I think that was it. Querying him, and  
17 then personal observations of the area.

18 Mr. Wides. Did you indicate to Mr. O'Donnell what you  
19 had done in that regard when he came?

20 Mr. Hedgman. I assume I did, but I cannot be sure.

21 Mr. Wides. And do you recall --

22 Mr. Hedgman. I mean, it would have been normal for me  
23 to have done so.

24 Mr. Wides. Do you recall discussing with him [Dr. Gottlieb] <sup>7</sup>  
25 trip?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall it, but I assume I must  
2 have.

3 Mr. Wides. Why do you assume you must have?

4 Mr. Hedgman. Because you told me yesterday that he  
5 testified that I had told him I had biological agents in my  
6 safe.

7 Mr. Wides. And you think you would have told him the  
8 additional background of receipt of those? Is that it?

9 Mr. Hedgman. I believe so.

10 Mr. Wides. Did you take any steps in the way of discus-  
11 sions with the agent you mentioned, or any other steps, to  
12 further explore the possibility of implementing these instruc-  
13 tions once Mr. O'Donnell arrived?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I do not recall. I tend to doubt it, because  
15 I believe he left, left town and went to Stanleyville, the  
16 agent I am speaking about, sometime in October. But that's --

17 Mr. Wides. Did you feel some sense of relief of not  
18 having to pursue the question of eliminating Lumumba after  
19 Mr. O'Donnell arrived because you sort of felt that this was  
20 his special assignment?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Probably. But on the other hand, I was  
22 the senior -- I was not the senior officer, but I was the  
23 commanding officer, if you will, and anything that took place  
24 was also my responsibility.

25 Mr. Wides. What did you know of what he tried to do with

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1 regard to eliminating, he being O'Donnell, in regard to  
2 eliminating Lumumba?

3 Mr. Hedgman. It is hard to recall now. I know we met.  
4 He probably reported verbally to me what steps he was taking,  
5 and that may have been those, his reports may have been those  
6 messages also which I sent. I said I thought I sent several  
7 messages via that special channel, and in retrospect, I may  
8 have been reporting one of those messages, they may have been  
9 reports which he gave me to send back to Washington.

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10 Mr. Wides. Well, let me ask you this: I have reviewed,  
11 and I can represent to you that I have reviewed several files  
12 regarding his activities in the Congo, and they include in the  
13 normal message traffic, between Leopoldville and the Congolese  
14 desk at the Agency, references to him in his crypt, and his  
15 activities there. Did that suggest that --

16 Mr. Hedgman. He's --

17 Mr. Wides. There might be other, there might be, are  
18 you saying there might also be messages regarding his activities  
19 in the special channel, or would that suggest to you that his  
20 activities were not communicated in the special channel?

21 Mr. Hedgman. It doesn't suggest either one, really. I  
22 am again not trying to fence with you or anything. I don't  
23 know. I would guess that I would have sent in a special  
24 channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would  
25 touch upon his removal in one way or another.

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1 Mr. Wides. Does the crypt JMOGRE mean anything to you?

2 Mr. Hedgman. No, sir.

3 Mr. Wides. Do you recall a time when Mr. O'Donnell had  
4 an agent come into the Congo to assist him in his efforts?

5 Mr. Hedgman. I had not remembered that until yesterday  
6 when you raised it.

7 Mr. Wides. Do you now have a recollection, refreshed, of  
8 his having someone come in?

9 Mr. Hedgman. A vague recollection, very vague.

10 Mr. Wides. Do you recall where the person came from, or  
11 whether he was a CIA officer, or just a contract agent?

12 Mr. Hedgman. From the name you used for him yesterday,  
13 I would know that he would be an agent as opposed to an  
14 intelligence officer.

15 Mr. Wides. But you have no independent recollection of  
16 who he was or where he was from or his background?

17 Mr. Hedgman. No. I had forgotten that entirely.

18 Mr. Wides. Do you recall a time when you learned that  
19 Patrice Lumumba had escaped from his house detention or arrest  
20 in the Presidential Palace?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. It was not the Palace, the Prime  
22 Minister's residence.

23 Mr. Wides. The Prime Minister's residence.

24 And do you recall whether you had any foreknowledge that  
25 that was imminent, or a likely possibility?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. No, I did not recall that. He did not --  
2 it did not seem likely, since the entire area was surrounded  
3 by Congolese troops.

4 Mr. Wides. Do you know of any assistance or involvement  
5 of Mr. O'Donnell or his agent or anyone else connected with the  
6 Station in Mr. Lumumba's escape from the detention?

7 Mr. Hedgman. I am quite certain that there was no Agency  
8 involvement in any way, because I think I would -- I am convinced  
9 I would have known it as Chief of Station.

10 O'Donnell could not have taken such action under normal  
11 Agency procedures without consulting me.

12 Mr. Wides. Now, is it correct that when he escaped, Mr.  
13 Lumumba tried to journey to the Stanleyville region where his  
14 following was the strongest, and that along the way, en route,  
15 he was apprehended by the Central Congolese government authori-  
16 ties and brought back under arrest, first to Leopoldville,  
17 is that correct?

18 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

19 Mr. Wides. And this happened some time in the period of  
20 November?

21 Mr. Hedgman. Late November.

22 Mr. Wides. And to your knowledge or information that you  
23 might have, was there any CIA assistance provided in any  
24 significant way for tracking him down and the efforts to  
25 recapture him?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. No.

2 I believe as we said yesterday, you asked me if I had a  
3 plane and did spotting or anything of that sort. No, we did not.

4 Mr. Wides. Or providing any other resources or intelli-  
5 gence information or guidance of any sort?

6 Mr. Hedgman. We had no intelligence information.  
7 Guidance, as I said, I recall being with, I believe, Congolese  
8 officers to the effect that they were trying to figure out how  
9 to head him off, a discussion about there were only a certain  
10 number of ferries and river crossings where the roads -- you  
11 know, there were a limited number of roads, and he had to go  
12 through deep rain forests and major rivers were crossed.

13 I may have commented. I don't know for sure.

14 Mr. Wides. But you would not characterize your activities  
15 as providing any assistance to the Congolese to locate him, or  
16 would you?

17 Mr. Hedgman. I honestly, I don't think it -- if it was  
18 any assistance, certainly not a major assistance.

19 Mr. Wides. Do you recall any communication with the  
20 Agency while Mr. Lumumba was at large prior to your trip to  
21 Rome, which I will get to in a moment, about his escape or, I'm  
22 sorry, about your provision of any assistance or cooperating  
23 with --

24 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall.

25 Mr. Wides. -- the Congolese government?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I am certain I sent cables about what I knew  
2 about it, about what I would gather from things. I may have  
3 commented about what might have been done to head him off.

4 Mr. Wides. Would those have been in the normal channels,  
5 those communications?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I would assume they would have been.  
7 Remember, we are at that time -- I should stress this, this makes  
8 quite a difference -- our communications facilities were marginal,  
9 to say the least, and we did not have the modern equipment which  
10 is now used in most Stations, embassies, where you just sit  
11 down and poke it out. And I won't go into the technical aspects,  
12 but it took much longer to code, encode and decode messages.

13 As a result, I kept my messages much shorter than what  
14 I would nowadays. So, I presume and assume that I sent whatever  
15 intelligence I could gather on what was happening.

16 Mr. Wides. Was there a time in November when you went  
17 to Rome for a meeting with Mr. Bissell and Mr. Tweedy?

18 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

19 Mr. Wides. And Bronson Tweedy and Richard Bissell?

20 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

21 Mr. Wides. And this took place at <sup>10</sup> ~~the~~ Station in Rome?

22 Mr. Hedgman. That's correct.

23 Mr. Wides. The meeting?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

25 Mr. Wides. And Mr. Karamessinus, Thomas Karamessines, was

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1 then <sup>27</sup> ~~the Station~~ Chief in Rome?

2 Mr. Hedgman. He was.

3 Mr. Wides. Was he present for some of the discussions, or  
4 only for the general, the social --

5 Mr. Hedgman. I believe he was present at the general  
6 discussions that we had.

7 Mr. Wides. Do you recall --

8 Mr. Hedgman. I know he was there part of the evening.  
9 This took place at his home as opposed to the office.

10 Mr. Wides. And part of the discussion and the main focus  
11 was with regard to the Congo, was on the fact that Lumumba was  
12 on the loose, and it wasn't clear whether he would incite an  
13 uprising?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I would say it was more clearly a complete  
15 overview of what was going on, including the threat of the  
16 Tshombe secession. Of certainty, Lumumba's escape would have  
17 been a major point of discussion, as was the fact that Gizenga  
18 had set up a government which he claimed to be the only true and  
19 legitimate government in Stanleyville.

20 Mr. Wides. Was Mr. Lumumba one of the topics that you  
21 recall discussing?

22 Mr. Hedgman. I'm quite certain that we did, but I mean --

23 Mr. Wides. This would have been because he was on the  
24 loose at that point?

25 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

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1 Mr. Wides. And had not been captured and was a potential  
2 threat?

3 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

4 I had asked not to leave to attend the meeting. My  
5 recollection is I sent a message saying that in my opinion I  
6 should not leave the Congo at that time.

7 Mr. Wides. I know that we have had a little more chance  
8 to think about it. Can you recall now any discussion at that  
9 meeting regarding Lumumba's possible assassination, either  
10 prospectively or with reference back to your earlier cables to  
11 Headquarters and your meeting with [Dr. Gottlieb?]

12 Mr. Hedgman. No, I cannot.

13 Mr. Dawson. This meeting was a meeting of the African  
14 Station Chiefs, was it not?

15 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I don't know whether all were there,  
16 or the majority, but certainly a number of them were there.  
17 But, they were not present at the evening meeting.

18 Mr. Dawson. No. I understand that.

19 Mr. Hedgman. I was given sort of a special treatment,  
20 into see him, and then I could leave.

21 Mr. Wides. Did you ever have any discussions with  
22 Bronson Twnedy regarding the assassination of Lumumba where both  
23 the assassination, the question of assassination, the question  
24 of assassination in relation to Lumumba came up, either in the  
25 fall of '60 or later 1960 or later on?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I must assume that we did, but I cannot be  
2 certain of that.

3 Mr. Wides. I think you indicated to us yesterday you  
4 recalled talking with Bronson Tweedy in regard to Lumumba and  
5 saying in effect that, thank God nothing was ever done. And I  
6 thought the implication was --

7 Mr. Hedgman. I think I probably, I said I probably said  
8 that sort of thing, but to recall a specific meeting and  
9 conversation on this subject, I am not sure that I said that.

10 Mr. Wides. Would you say you have no recollection of  
11 discussing assassination of Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy?

12 Mr. Hedgman. I have a vague recollection of saying, you  
13 know, something to the effect that it was a good thing we  
14 didn't, but I can't be --

15 Mr. Wides. You can't place it, but you have some recol-  
16 lection that you had such a discussion?

17 Mr. Hedgman. I think so, sir. But this is a pretty  
18 vague thing in my mind.

19 Mr. Wides. And can you recall when you think that  
20 happened? I don't mean by specific date, but that is the period  
21 in question or much later on?

22 Mr. Hedgman. Probably later on, but I don't know. That's  
23 a guess.

24 Mr. Wides. Do you recall ever having a discussion with  
25 Mr. Bissell regarding it?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. To what?

2 Mr. Wides. With regard to the assassination of Lumumba?  
3 Did that particular question ever come up in discussions that  
4 you had with Mr. Bissell either during the events which we have  
5 been discussing or after the events?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Of course, I didn't see Mr. Bissell very  
7 often. I saw him in Rome, and I next saw him when I returned  
8 in late January of 1961, when I returned to the States. I cannot  
9 recall such a conversation, but I think it is possible, perhaps  
10 even likely.

11 Mr. Wides. But you have no recollection?

12 Mr. Hedgman. No, sir.

13 Mr. Wides. Would the same be true with regards to Mr.  
14 Dulles, that you have no recollection, although it is possible?

15 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

16 Mr. Wides. Do you recall --

17 Mr. Hedgman. I saw Mr. Dulles even less often.

18 Mr. Wides. Do you recall discussing the fact that you  
19 had received instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba with  
20 Director Schlesinger in 1973?

21 Mr. Hedgman. I believe it was at that time that I spoke  
22 to him, because when he took over, either he or Mr. Colby issued  
23 a request for any information which would, activities conducted  
24 or considered, what have you, by the Agency, which would appear  
25 illegal.

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1 Mr. Wides. Do you think that was the time, but you have  
2 a definite recollection that in any event you did at some point  
3 relate this, relate the fact of these instructions to Director  
4 Schlesinger?

5 Mr. Hedgman. I think it was Schlesinger. It could have  
6 been Colby, but I believe it was Schlesinger, or I may have  
7 told both of them.

8 Mr. Wides. Other than those two gentlemen and the people  
9 we have discussed already --

10 Mr. Baron. What exactly did you tell Schlesinger as far  
11 as you can recall that now?

12 Mr. Hedgman. That, to the effect that I felt that I had  
13 received instructions to assassinate Lumumba.

14 Mr. Baron. You didn't mention the means by which this  
15 was to be carried out?

16 Mr. Hedgman. I doubt it, but I don't know.

17 Mr. Wides. Do you recall mentioning the Presidential  
18 authority?

19 Mr. Hedgman. I think that I did.

20 Mr. Baron. You say you may have discussed it with both  
21 Schlesinger and Colby, that would have been a discussion that  
22 would have taken place subsequently with Colby when he became  
23 DCI?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Well, of course Colby was Executive Director  
25 under Mr. Schlesinger. Colby could have been in the room when

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1 I reported to Schlesinger. It is silly that I don't remember  
2 specifically this, but I did make, I did report this verbally.  
3 I preferred not to --

4 Mr. Wides. And your best recollection is you reported it  
5 to Schlesinger, and you may have also reported it to Mr. Colby,  
6 is that your best recollection?

7 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. And you were going to say that you preferred  
9 not to put it in writing?

10 Mr. Hedgman. It was the sort of thing I did not wish to  
11 dictate to a secretary, and being one, if not one of the world's  
12 best typists, and thirdly it seemed to me it was a matter not  
13 to circulate on paper, frankly. It was a mistake that it --

14 Mr. Wides. Can you recall ever discussing this with  
15 Richard Helms?

16 Mr. Hedgman. No, I don't recall.

17 Mr. Wides. -- the instruction to assassinate?

18 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall.

19 Mr. Wides. Is there anyone else in the Agency you can  
20 ever recall discussing this assigned mission with?

21 Mr. Hedgman. No. It's possible that I talked with some-  
22 one like Tom Karamessines when he was DDP. But --

23 Mr. Dawson. Did you talk to [Dr. Gottlieb] subsequent to  
24 his arrival in the Congo?

25 Mr. Wides. You mean after his departure, after that trip?

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1 Mr. Dawson. Yes, subsequent to.

2 Mr. Hedgman. I saw him numerous times.

3 Mr. Dawson. And your reaction to him was thank God we  
4 didn't have to carry that mission out, or thank God it didn't  
5 happen?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Well, I talked to him about so many things,  
7 and I probably said that.

8 Mr. Wides. Do you have a recollection of discussing with  
9 him at a subsequent time to his trip to Leopoldville, ever  
10 raising the instructions he gave you for his trip?

11 Mr. Hedgman. Not specifically as such.

12 Mr. Wides. You don't have a recollection, or you don't  
13 recall discussing it specifically, but you recall some general  
14 illusion to it?

15 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I recall general illusion to it.

16 Mr. Dawson. Do you recall talking to anybody within the  
17 last six months about this, or more recently?

18 Mr. Wides. Since the first of the year?

19 Mr. Hedgman. Yeah. I am just trying to go through in my  
20 own mind.

21 (Pause)

22 Yes, Mr. Colby. I saw him the other day when I returned.

23 Mr. Wides. What was your discussion with him in that  
24 regard?

25 Mr. Hedgman. I told him I assumed this subject would come

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1 up.

2 Mr. Dawson. This subject? Did you expect him to be  
3 fully cognizant with all the particulars?

4 Mr. Hedgman. I am not sure that I did.

5 Mr. Dawson. At least the Presidential authorization and  
6 the passage of the vials of poison, the person that was used  
7 to pass these?

8 Mr. Hedgman. I mentioned Dr. Gottlieb's name. I am not  
9 sure that I mentioned vials of poison or --

10 Mr. Wides. Did you indicate to him Dr. Gottlieb had come  
11 to the Congo?

12 Mr. Hedgman. I believe I did.

13 Mr. Dawson. Well, let me just follow that.

14 And the Presidential authorization, was that also  
15 mentioned?

16 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I am quite sure I mentioned that.

17 Mr. Dawson. What was his reaction?

18 Mr. Hedgman. His reaction was that it was a great shame  
19 that this ever happened. I'm putting words in his mouth.

20 Mr. Dawson. Go right ahead.

21 Mr. Hedgman. And certainly that I must obviously report  
22 fully and honestly to the Committee.

23 Mr. Wides. Did he discuss, say anything about his prior  
24 knowledge of what you had just told him?

25 Did he seemed surprised by any of what you told him?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. No, I don't think so. I think that I had  
2 given him this, or as I said earlier, probably at the same time  
3 or parallel with when I did Dr. Schlesinger.

4 Mr. Wides. When you saw him recently and mentioned this,  
5 did you refer to your telling this to Director Schlesinger, or  
6 did you say, as you recall?

7 Mr. Hedgman. Something like that.

8 Mr. Wides. And did he acknowledge that he had learned  
9 of it earlier?

10 Mr. Hedgman. Acknowledge? I think he indicated -- I  
11 would, have, would have assumed from his conversation that he  
12 recalled something about it, yes.

13 Mr. Wides. Did the fact that Dr. Gottlieb had made a  
14 trip to the Congo seem to surprise him, or did he acknowledge  
15 that he was aware of that as well?

16 Mr. Hedgman. I don't know. I don't know that I said at  
17 this time that I referred to [Dr. Gottlieb's] travel to the  
18 Congo when I saw him.

19 Mr. Wides. Recently?

20 Mr. Hedgman. Just the other day when I came back I paid  
21 a courtesy call on him.

22 Mr. Dawson. This was like this week then?

23 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. It was Monday, I believe.

24 Mr. Dawson. Do you recall anybody else that was a party  
25 to that conversation, or whom you had similar conversations with

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1 recently, similar and separate?

2 Mr. Wides. Was there anyone there when you spoke to Mr.  
3 Colby?

4 Mr. Hedgman. For part of it, part of the meeting, and  
5 then we were alone for part of the meeting.

6 Mr. Wides. Was there anyone there when you mentioned what  
7 you thought he wanted to talk to you about?

8 Mr. Hedgman. No, there was no one else present.

9 Mr. Wides. And have you spoken to anyone else?

10 Mr. Hedgman. I didn't wish to raise this in front of  
11 other Agency employees, because it seemed to me that I didn't  
12 know who was aware of this. I had no desire to discuss it in  
13 front of others.

14 Mr. Wides. Did he indicate anything as to what he thought  
15 anyone else had told the Committee or would tell the Committee,  
16 including Mr. Bissell, Mr. O'Connell or Mr. Gottlieb, Dr.  
17 Gottlieb?

18 Mr. Hedgman. No. He just indicated that it was very  
19 difficult -- I am really putting words in his mouth and I  
20 shouldn't do this. I had the impression that he regretted this  
21 very much, that this had ever happened, and the truth had to  
22 come out, and that was the only way for the Agency to ever  
23 regain its status and usefulness. But I am putting -- I am  
24 elaborating probably. He may not have thought all of those  
25 things.

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1 Mr. Wides. Have you had any conversations directly or  
2 through intermediary communications with either Mr. Bissell or  
3 Mr. Tweedy since you returned?

4 Mr. Hedgman. No. I tried to call Mr. Tweedy as an old  
5 personal friend on his phone twice and there was no answer. So  
6 I assume he is away on vacation or something, either that or  
7 maybe he's in town and I just missed him.

8 Mr. Dawson. So to summarize, the only person you really  
9 recall having all of the facts of the Presidential authorization  
10 passing of the virus, with whom you really have a firm recollec-  
11 tion, I should say, is [Dr. Gottlieb?]

12 Mr. Hedgman. Yes. I would have guessed that.

13 Mr. Wides. Excuse me.

14 You mean he ever discussed it with?

15 Mr. Dawson. The whole picture, or the panorama of things  
16 that might have taken place.

17 Mr. Hedgman. I don't think that I -- I mean, he discussed  
18 it with me.

19 Mr. Dawson. I agree, sir.

20 Mr. Wides. Let me ask you two more questions if I can,  
21 and then I will have to leave.

22 Mr. Baron. Just to follow this up, have you spoken to  
23 [Dr. Gottlieb about coming to the Committee?

24 Mr. Hedgman. I have not. I have not seen him.

25 Mr. Wides. With regard to the events subsequent to

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1 Mr. Lumumba's recapture and his detention in Thaysville --

2 Mr. Hadgman. Thaysville.

3 Mr. Wides. Thaysville.

4 And his subsequent, Mr. Lumumba's subsequent transportation  
5 to Katanga, what discussions did you have with the Congolese  
6 officials and what kind of guidance or input did you or anyone  
7 from the U.S. Embassy or Station make into those decisions to  
8 transport him to Katanga?

9 Mr. Hedgman. To the best of my knowledge, neither the  
10 Station or the Embassy had any input in the decision to send  
11 him to Katanga.

12 Mr. Wides. What discussions were there with the Congolese  
13 officials as to whether he might be executed either by the  
14 Central Government while he was under their control or by  
15 Mr. Tshombe when he was sent to Katanga?

16 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall any such conversations. I  
17 think there was a general assumption, once we learned he had  
18 been sent to Katanga, that his goose was cooked, because Tshombe  
19 hated him and looked on him as a danger and a rival.

20 Mr. Wides. But you had no discussions with anyone in the  
21 Central Congolese government regarding whether he should or  
22 should not be sent there?

23 Mr. Hedgman. I had absolutely none, no sir.

24 Mr. Wides. And once he was there, what information did  
25 you have as to whether they were considering his death prior to

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1 learning of his death?

2 Mr. Hedgman. I had no, no information because it was not  
3 the sort of thing I suppose that the Congolese officials really  
4 wanted to discuss with a representative of a foreign government.

5 Mr. Wides. Was there any contact between our acting  
6 Base Chief in the Katanga Province and the officials in Katanga?  
7 Was there any discussion between them or communication that you  
8 know of regarding what would be done with Patrice Lumumba?

9 Mr. Hedgman. No. The only thing that I would imagine  
10 would have happened is they would have tried to advise both  
11 Washington and Leopoldville of any information they had on what  
12 happened to him.

13 Mr. Wides. Excuse me. Off the record.

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 Mr. Baron. I would like to move very quickly through a  
16 few loose ends that pop up as we went along relating to your  
17 conversation with [Gottlieb] and then, O'Donnell and then  
18 Schlesinger, and it is really just about one question on every  
19 loose end, and I want to then turn to WIROGUE, and I don't  
20 think that will take very long, and then the possibility of  
21 conversations with the Embassy. And I would like your help  
22 on that part since I was not there yesterday. But I will  
23 leave that for the last, and you can pick up with any loose  
24 ends.

25 Is that all right with you?

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1 Mr. Dawson. Fine.

2 Mr. Baron. Mr. Hedgman, I would like to pick up here  
3 for a moment with a series of short, loose ends from the  
4 examination that we have done so far.

5 Mr. Hedgman. I will try to do my best.

6 Mr. Baron. That is, first of all, when you discussed  
7 your conversation with the then-DCI, Schlesinger, you said that  
8 you indicated to him verbally that you had been asked to  
9 participate in an assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Did he  
10 respond when you made that indication to him?

11 Mr. Hedgman. May I go back? I think I made it to him.  
12 It is conceivable that I could have made it to Bill Colby as  
13 his Executive Director, or that the two could have been present  
14 together. It is ridiculous, but I can't pin this one down in  
15 detail.

16 Mr. Baron. Did you receive a response from Schlesinger?  
17 You mentioned yesterday that he was able to be quite Sphinxlike  
18 when he wanted to, and you thought that this might have been  
19 one of those situations.

20 Mr. Hedgman. I had the impression he took it all on board  
21 and did not necessarily wish to advise me of what action he  
22 planned to take.

23 Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Either he or Colby, whichever it was.

25 Mr. Baron. Was there any follow-up from either Schlesinger

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1 or Colby after you had given them this information?

2 Mr. Hedgman. I do not recall.

3 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the assassination mission  
4 with anyone in the Inspector General's Office at the CIA?

5 Mr. Hedgman. Not to my recollection. But it is conceiv-  
6 able they could have sent -- during that period, there were a  
7 number of discussions with Inspector Generals on various aspects  
8 of work and so on. Whether there was a discussion of this  
9 subject, I don't recall it. So I doubt it, but I don't know.

10 Mr. Baron. On a number of discussions that you had with  
11 the Inspector General's Office?

12 Mr. Hedgman. On many other subjects, totally unrelated  
13 to this, personnel matters.

14 As you recall, Dr. Schlesinger committed a very sharp  
15 reduction in force, which resulted in personnel problems and  
16 Inspector Generals' investigations, and so forth.

17 Mr. Baron. Were you interviewed by anyone from the  
18 Inspector General's office in the preparation of their Report  
19 in 1967 on assassination efforts within the CIA?

20 Mr. Hedgman. 1967?

21 Mr. Baron. Yes.

22 Let me represent to you that at the request of the DCI,  
23 the Inspector General's Office prepared a Report in 1967 on  
24 any involvement that CIA had or could be conceived to have had  
25 with assassination efforts. Were you interviewed in connection

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1 with that Report?

2 Mr. Hedgman. When -- you don't remember the date of the  
3 Report?

4 Mr. Baron. I believe the date was in May of 1967, and it  
5 was prepared by Scott Brackinridge and Mr. Earman and Mr.  
6 Greer.

7 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I know them all. I don't believe so,  
8 but I was abroad at that time.

9 Mr. Dawson. Was the significance of the date in 1967 of  
10 any great moment?

11 Mr. Hedgman. I was abroad at the time. I didn't return  
12 to the States until July, I believe, of 1967.

13 Mr. Baron. Returning now to your discussions with Dr.  
14 [Sidney Gottlieb] when he came to the Congo, to give you lethal  
15 biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it  
16 clear at that time that the means for administering those  
17 biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was  
18 to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or  
19 toothpaste, or any other substance that was to be ingested?

20 Mr. Hedgman. That's my recollection, yes.

21 Mr. Baron. You mentioned that it was your best recollection  
22 that Dr. Gottlieb brought the lethal biological agents with him.  
23 Is that correct?

24 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

25 Mr. Baron. And you mentioned yesterday that you believe he

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1 brought them with him in his bag.

2 Is that right?

3 Mr. Hedgman. I have a recollection that they were in a,  
4 what do you call these small carry-on bags like your Pan Am bag  
5 or Sabina bag or something like that.

6 Mr. Baron. It would not have been difficult for [Dr.  
7 Gottlieb] to have gotten such equipment into the Congo at that  
8 time, would it?

9 Mr. Hedgman. No.

10 Mr. Baron. Were there extensive Customs checks in the  
11 Congo at that time?

12 Mr. Hedgman. There were not.

13 Mr. Baron. Were there any Customs checks at that point?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I can't recall, but if so, they were very  
15 limited.

16 Mr. Baron. When you spoke with [Dr. Gottlieb] did you  
17 ask him how long the lethal biological agents would retain their  
18 potency?

19 Mr. Hedgman. I believe there was a conversation to that  
20 effect.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you recall what he said?

22 Mr. Hedgman. I think it was fairly short, some months.

23 Mr. Baron. They would be lethal only for a fairly short  
24 period of time?

25 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

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1 Mr. Bron. A period of some months?

2 Mr. Hedgman. I think it was less than that, but I cannot  
3 be certain. That is, I remember being surprised, thinking that  
4 limits certain possibilities right there.

5 Mr. Bron. And you said earlier that you took the  
6 poisons into a safe at the Station. When did you take the  
7 poisons out of the safe?

8 Mr. Hedgman. I cannot really recall that.

9 Mr. Bron. Did you take them out on more than one  
10 occasion?

11 Mr. Hedgman. No.

12 Mr. Bron. And that occasion was --

13 Mr. Hedgman. No. I say no. Not to the best of my  
14 recollection. I want to stress that because it is so long ago  
15 that I am almost certain I did not.

16 Mr. Bron. And the occasion when you did take the  
17 poisons out of the safe was when you disposed of them?

18 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

19 Mr. Bron. And can you describe the circumstances?

20 Mr. Hedgman. I think that I took them out probably in  
21 a briefcase or an air bag of some sort, and I believe that  
22 the things like the rubber gloves and the mask were thrown away  
23 in a bushy area or something where, you know, if they were  
24 found it didn't matter that much. I believe I buried the  
25 other matters.

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1 Mr. Baron. The biological agents?

2 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, although they, by that time they would,  
3 the potency would have expired. But, they didn't seem the sort  
4 of thing -- I didn't know enough about it, and I will be damned  
5 if I wanted to leave them lying around.

6 Mr. Baron. Was this out by the Congo River that you  
7 buried these things?

8 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, yes, I think. You know, it is my  
9 recollection.

10 Mr. Baron. Was this after the arrest of Lumumba, after  
11 Lumumba had already been placed in protective custody so to  
12 speak?

13 Mr. Hedgman. By the Congolese, you mean?

14 Mr. Baron. Yes.

15 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, I would think so.

16 Mr. Baron. And was it possible that you waited until  
17 after Lumumba's death to dispose of those poisons?

18 Mr. Hedgman. That's possible. I don't remember.

19 Mr. Baron. But you --

20 Mr. Hedgman. They were long overdue, whatever it was,  
21 I think, because I believe --

22 Mr. Baron. Yesterday you stated that it was your recol-  
23 lection that you had not disposed of the poisons until Lumumba  
24 was successfully neutralized, either by arrest or by death,  
25 and you could tell which. Is that your recollection?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. I think that probably would be a fair  
2 statement.

3 Mr. Baron. Did you discuss the assassination mission  
4 with Dr. Lester Houk?

5 Mr. Hedgman. Never. I am quite sure now.

6 Mr. Baron. He was your Branch Chief at that point?

7 Mr. Hedgman. He was.

8 Mr. Baron. Did you discuss it with Glenn Fields?

9 Mr. Hedgman. I don't recall. He was Acting Chief and  
10 Deputy Chief.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you recall discussing the assassination  
12 mission with anyone else at the Station or in the Congo other  
13 than the one asset?

14 Mr. Hedgman. No. I remember hearing Mr. O'Donnell  
15 commenting on this to --

16 Mr. Baron. <sup>03</sup> ~~Mr. DeLoach~~

17 Mr. Hedgman. I believe it was <sup>03</sup> [redacted] and I was  
18 shocked and surprised, because I thought this was not the  
19 sort of thing that he should discuss with officers who were not  
20 involved in this.

21 Mr. Baron. What was <sup>03</sup> [redacted] job at that time?

22 Mr. Hedgman. He was under non-official cover and an  
23 agent handler, or not necessarily just the agents, but  
24 developing contacts.

25 Mr. Baron. And what's his full name?

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1 Mr. Hedgman. [redacted] <sup>02</sup>

2 Mr. Baron. What did you hear [redacted] O'Donnell say to [redacted] <sup>02</sup>

3 Mr. Hedgman. I don't remember exactly, but in any case  
4 it referred to something about removing Lumumba from -- I'm not  
5 sure whether it was assassination or neutralization, but whatever  
6 it was, it seemed to me he had gone too far.

7 Mr. Baron. And had gone too far because it conveyed the  
8 idea of assassination?

9 Mr. Hedgman. Probably, but I cannot be sure.

10 Mr. Baron. You indicated earlier that in mid-September  
11 there was a coup which effectively limited Lumumba's powers in  
12 the Congo?

13 Mr. Hedgman. That is correct.

14 Mr. Baron. And this would have been very shortly after  
15 Dr. Gottlieb visited you in the Congo and gave you the instruc-  
16 tion about assassinating Lumumba?

17 Mr. Hedgman. I can't be sure whether it was before or  
18 after. That was the 14th of September, that coup took place;  
19 but as you will recall, I cannot be absolutely certain of when  
20 I saw Dr. Gottlieb. I think it was before that, but I cannot  
21 be sure.

22 Mr. Baron. But it is quite possible, isn't it, that the  
23 coup could have been a major reason why there wasn't any more  
24 vigorous action on the assassination front?

25 Mr. Hedgman. That's possible, yes.

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Mr. Hedgman. And I have speculated on that earlier.

Mr. Baron. Is that a strong possibility to you?

Mr. Hedgman. I just couldn't put it, because I don't know what the policy makers, the political leaders, the President, the Director, what the Director's policy, the senior executive, anyway, were thinking at that time.

Mr. Baron. And you mentioned that Justin O'Donnell was not particularly active during his period of service in the Congo?

Mr. Hedgman. He did not seem as active as many of the other people that I had working for me at that time.

Mr. Baron. You didn't rely upon him for major operations or activities at that point, did you?

Mr. Hedgman. No. Well, this -- he was sent out more or less on a special mission, as I understood it, and I left him free for that.

Mr. Baron. You indicated yesterday, and I would like to know if this is still your impression, that the fact that Justin O'Donnell might not have been active on the assassination mission may not have been due to any lack of priority for that mission, but due more to his personal habits of inactivity?

Mr. Hedgman. Perhaps I don't want to malign Justin. I don't mean that -- shouldn't have commented on his character or his personal habits, really. I just have the impression he was

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1 not putting his whole heart and soul into the effort. He was  
2 an officer with a reputation for being gung ho and a very hard  
3 worker when I had known him previously, some years previously,  
4 and he seemed quite, certainly did not seem that way to me out  
5 there.

6 Mr. Dawson. Did you comment on that to the Agency?

Mr. Hodgman. I doubt it, but I cannot be sure.

Q Mr. Dawson. Were you writing his efficiency report at  
the time?

10 Mr. Hedgman. He didn't stay long enough for me to write  
11 an efficiency report. I could have written one if he stayed  
12 the 90 days or more, and as the COS I could have written one  
13 if I'd wished.

14 Mr. Dawson. But you chose not to do so?

15 Mr. Hedgman. I chose not to, to the best of my recollec-  
16 tion, I did not.

17 Mr. Baron. Did much of the cable traffic which you  
18 received from Headquarters in relation to the assassination  
19 mission subsequently become destroyed?

19 Mr. Hedgman. It is my recollection that before leaving  
20 the Station and turning over to my successor that I destroyed  
21 that. Perhaps well before. I just can't put a timeframe on  
22 it, but it seemed to me it was not the type of correspondence  
23 to leave lying about a Station.  
24

Mr. Baron. You indicated yesterday that you had received

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1 some kind of instructions to destroy that cable traffic.

2 Mr. Hedgman. I think I -- I cannot recall exactly what  
3 I said yesterday. Now, when I am trying to be as precise as I  
4 can on the record here --

5 Mr. Baron. Please do.

6 Mr. Hedgman. I think I did, but I cannot be certain. I  
7 cannot be absolutely. I don't know whether I did.

8 Mr. Baron. Would you have received those instructions  
9 verbally from Dr. Gottlieb, or as part of one of the cables?

10 Mr. Hedgman. I don't know.

11 Mr. Baron. Would it be standard procedure for a Chief of  
12 Station to destroy cable traffic relating to an extremely  
13 sensitive operation like that one?

14 Mr. Hedgman. Well, it is standard procedure to keep your  
15 cable files and all other files as small as possible, because  
16 copies of those are retained, of all messages are normally  
17 retained in Washington. You try and keep as small a number as  
18 possible on hand so as to permit you to continue working so that  
19 you have ready reference, because you may have to, in an  
20 emergency you may have to burn all of your communications.

21 And believe me, when you have to go through a burn  
22 session, it is very difficult, and it takes time.

23 Mr. Baron. Had you ever in your experience as Chief of  
24 Station in the Congo destroyed other cable traffic because of  
25 its extremely sensitive nature?

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1 you indicated yesterday QJWIN came from, and <sup>8</sup>McNold had been  
2 there with --

3 Mr. Baron. This is a country in Europe?

4 Mr. Hedgman. Yes, therefore it's logical.

5 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of Project ZRRIFLE?

6 Mr. Hedgman. Yesterday.

7 Mr. Baron. Yesterday was the first time you heard that  
8 name?

9 Mr. Hedgman. I think so. And yesterday, I might  
10 specify, was here.

11 Mr. Baron. Being informed by the Committee staff?

12 Mr. Hedgman. Yes.

13 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of Executive Action?

14 Mr. Hedgman. I have heard those, that term used, and I  
15 don't quite -- I think more in newspapers or more recently than  
16 in the past, but it is possible that I heard it.

17 Mr. Baron. Is Executive Action used at the CIA as a  
18 euphemism for assassination of foreign leaders?

19 Mr. Hedgman. It has been so alleged. I never heard anyone  
20 to my knowledge use it.

21 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a Project at the CIA to  
22 develop means -- strike that.

23 To develop the capability of carrying out assassinations  
24 of foreign leaders?

25 Mr. Hedgman. Not until I talked with the Committee staff

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