

JFK Assassination System
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BUNDY

454-1

TOP SECRET

Box 454

MEMORANDUM

TO: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE: July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961 until 1966. TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961. During 1961 in the Kennedy Administration much of the primary responsibility for following Dominican Republic affairs was delegated by BUNDY to RICHARD GOODWIN.

The following broad issues should be raised in the questioning of Mr. BUNDY in relation to the TRUJILLO assassination:

- What construction was given by the CIA, State Department, and Special Group during the Kennedy Administration to the January 12, 1961 decision by the Special Group in the waning days of the Eisenhower Administration to approve "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents. Did this authorization carry over? Was it stretched to cover supplies of potential assassination weapons?
- Did the reporting to the President and the NSC staff from State and CIA provide adequate notice of the propensities for assassination on the part of Dominican dissident groups with whom the CIA was in contact? (See Rusk memo of 2/15/61, Bissell memo of 2/17/61, and CIA memo of 5/13/61). Specifically, did Bissell's memo of February 17, 1961 adequately respond to your request for information for "higher authority"?

- Did the CIA send a cable to the Dominican station on May 29, 1961 as an authentic statement of a policy to dissociate from political assassination? Or, was this an attempt to create a written record favorable to the U.S. which was contrary to previous policy?

BUNDY's testimony in relation to the TRUJILLO assassination should involve the following questions (see the Tabs indicated, which are contained in the binder of TRUJILLO materials):

1. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 12 January 1961 (Tab J)

Special Group approved the supply of a limited number of small arms and other material to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 14 February 1961 (Tab A, BUNDY binder)

"Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." What precipitated this request?

3. MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM DEAN RUSK - 15 February 1961 (Tab Q)

4. BISSELL MEMORANDUM TO BUNDY: "BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC"- 17 February 1961 (Tab R)

5. CIA MEMORANDUM PREPARED AT REQUEST OF RICHARD GOODWIN: "CIA COVERT ACTIVITIES, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC" - 13 May 1961 (Tab 3C)

6. MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY FROM CHESTER BOWLES ATTACHING DRAFT TELEGRAM - 26 May 1961 (Tab 3-F)

7. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 29 May 1961 (Tab 3-G)

8. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 31 May 1961 (Tab 3-I)

TO: Fritz Schwarz
FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 10, 1975

McGEORGE BUNDY

Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION

1. TAB S (pp. 48-54 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the names of the two people from whom it /the request for such a capability/ is most likely to come from." (53).

2. TAB T (pp. 58-59 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request (58).

3. TAB U (pp. 80-83 -- 6/9/75)

Bissell testified that the "urgings" for an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and representatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82).

Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82). "When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone to BUNDY as well." (82).

4. TAB V (pp. 16-19 -- 6/11/75)

IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba. HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO."

Bissell testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility for Project RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact." (19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact

had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19).

5. TAB W (pp. 42-53 -- 6/11/75)

Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he discussed "all aspects of the creation of the capability." (50). Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (50).

When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he recalled discussing the assassination capability with ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied: "I am not sure about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir." (52)

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Chronology and Issues for Testimony of McGEORGE BUNDY

Biographical Background

1953-61	Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvard University
1961-63	Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs
1963-66	Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs
1966-	
Present	President, Ford Foundation

Chronology of Events

Summary Outline Re Castro

1. January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose (NSAM 100 Plan re Removal of Castro)
2. November-January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose
3. January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One
4. June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two
(August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination)
5. January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy
(Seeming pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death)
6. December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro Assassination Plot.

Issues and Questions1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin

Jan. 9-10, 1961 Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview)

Jan. 20, 1961 Bundy Appointment. Kennedy Administration takes office. McGeorge Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Jan. 27, 1961 Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy Interview) Calendar note.

April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs.

May 16, 1961 New U.S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved actions taken by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish U.S. policy toward Cuba. The NSC "agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below (CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action." Source: Record of Actions by NSC on May 5, 1961. (Tab B).

Oct. 5, 1961 NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba. The memorandum states in full: "In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba." There is no explanation of the nature of the "indicated contingency." Source NSAM No. 100, Oct. 5, 1961. (Tab C).

Was "Executive Action" discussed?
Was Bissell instructed re "Executive Action"?

Was this basic context for later U.S. Policy?

Was "indicated contingency" related to "Executive Action"? Did JFK authorize NSAM 100? What was JFK instruction re NSAM 100? See next entries below.

- Oct. 5, 1961 Taylor Instructions for Castro 'Removal' Contingence -- JFK interest NOT to be Revealed. On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines to Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a "plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene." Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest in the plan.
- Was this the "indicated contingency" in Bundy's NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961?
- Oct. 6, 1961 Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961. (See Lansdale, Tab 2).
- Is this plan the one referred to in Bundy's NSAM 100? Did it relate to a U.S. assassination plan?
- Nov. 30, 1961 President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized "the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation." The memo stated: "(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government." Source: Memorandum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70). (See Lansdale, Tab 4).
- In a staff interview, Bundy recalls he probably wrote this memo. Memo shows JFK approval for Mongoose. What was JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK interest in Mongoose?
- Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection, January-June 1962
- Jan. 19, 1962 RFK Urges Action. RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that solution of Cuban problem carries "the top priority in the U.S. Government--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared." Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, from McManus to McCone. (See Lansdale, Tab 10).
- Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by CIA a Castro assassination plot had tacit authorization of higher authority?

Issues and Questions

- March 5, 1962 Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. General Taylor's memorandum proposes Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target government /Cuba/ "the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive use of U.S. military intervention. Source: Memorandum by General Taylor, March 5, 1962, 00188. (See Lansdale, Tab 22).
- March 5, 1962 Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A) including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004. (See Lansdale, Tab 21).
- March 16, 1962 President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22, 1962: "This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." Source: Memorandum, March 16, 1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Tab E).

If U.S. military intervention ruled out, must assassination be considered as only way to succeed?

Establishes Bundy was familiar with Mongoose guidelines.

Why was it necessary to correct this memorandum? Is there a second level of plausible denial, allowing Special Group to deny a CIA action?

- April 11, 1962 Bundy Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress report. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. "Mr. BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollable action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S." Source: Minutes of Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. (Tab F).
- August 7, 1962 Harvey submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group (Augmented), for a paper on "stepped-up Course B" William K. Harvey submits to General Lansdale a ten page plan of covert activities. (Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (Tab G).
- August 8, 1962 Lansdale Transmits Plan to SG (A). Citing the "major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions in the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area,'" General Lansdale sends the requested papers (from State, Defense, CIA, and USIA) to the SG(A). "The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped-up Course B." (Source: Unsigned memo of August 8, 1962 from Gen. Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lansdale, Tab 38).
- August 10, 1962 Question of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting. At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Mr. Risk's office, at which, inter alia, Mr. McCone presented "an alternate plan (called... the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale," "the question of assassination particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara....It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. /Mr. Harvey/ took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Sources: Memorandum of August 14, 1962, for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott). (See Lansdale, Tab B, Lansdale Tab F).
- Does advantage of having action controlled counsel for consideration of assassination rather than sabotage?
- Why did Special Group (Augmented) request a stepped-up plan? Note Harvey involvement.
- (In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, prepared for the Rockefeller Commission, McGeorge Bundy states: "I don't have any recollection of where or how I heard about the poisoning possibility....Now, as to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of -- and it is a refreshed recollection -- I would not have known about it a month ago -- is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in that meeting.")

Aug. 12, 1962 Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, "Including liquidation of leaders," are excised.
General Lansdale distributes to Harvey (CIA); Hurwitch (State), Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate Course B.

The original memorandum contains the following language:

"Papers required from each of you for me Tuesday meeting:

"Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper."

When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is, and the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of language deleted by General Lansdale. (Source: Lansdale's Memorandum of August 13, 1962, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson, Subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962, supra. (See Lansdale, Tab D, Lansdale Tab F).

Aug. 14, 1962 Harvey memorializes Discussion of Assassination of Castro.
Harvey writes for Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, a memorandum "for your information." The memorandum records how the topic of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's having circulated reference to it in his memo of the preceding day, August 13, 1962. (See Lansdale, Tab F)

Paragraph 3 reads:

"The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

(Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra)

Does Bundy recall this discussion? He has said (at his interview with Committee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has no recollection, refreshed, revived, or independent of any such discussion by McNamara.

Aug. 23, 1962 Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181).
 Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President has directed the following action be undertaken:
 "4. The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor)..."
 "8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense)." (Source: NSAM, No. 181, from McGeorge Bundy, August 23, 1962) (See Lansdale, Tab 41).

What prompted this NSAM? Did NSAM 181 result from the August 10 meeting?

Aug. 27, 1962 CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAM #181.
 Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs Mr. Bundy that 'Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever' will be responsible for the line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSAM #181. (Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director, DCI, to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) (Tab H).

Note Harvey responsibility.

Oct. 17, 1962 Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the Special Group Augmented of October 16, 1962.
 After discussion with President Kennedy, selected aspects of Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONGOOSE sabotage proposals, directed to the Special Group (Augmented) on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved. (Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI to Special Group (Augmented), subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals; Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962). (Tab I, Tab J)

Were other unwritten or unrecorded proposals discussed by Bundy to the President?

The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible. (b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program." Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963, "Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43). (Tab M).

April 11, 1963

President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over to U. S. side. Chase states: "I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem." Source: Memorandum to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file). (Tab N).

What is meant by 'more violent solutions'?

April 11, 1963

Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security Reasons. On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present) requested that comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs dated April 11 on three papers being considered at today's meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. /The meeting discussed the "entire question of sabotage" and thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations./

Why were documents destroyed?

The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage...the group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations...until an overall policy is made clear and steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro."

Note unclear policy toward Cuba.

It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be made to higher authority and a paper would be prepared outlining "a proposed broad program for sabotage" examples of specific operations, the scale of activity and how such activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47). (Tab O).

April 18, 1963

Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command.

"Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether "it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U. S. policy." Source: Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). (Tel P).

April 23, 1963

Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro. Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would be too long, thus/ "Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety." Source: Chase memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (Tel P).

Does such "short and sweet action" refer to assassination?

April 23, 1963

RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro Death. Discussion of Bundy paper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement" and a U. S. program should aim to "create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces..."

Does McNamara's hard view reflect JFK policy?

TOP SECRET

Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months." (Source: Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63...;" JFK Library file.) (Tab Q).

Why interest in Castro death?

April 29, 1963

Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group members, Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are: ... (b) Possible death of Castro....

Why interest in Castro death?

Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file. (Tab S).

April 30, 1963

Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group meeting results in assignment of "examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives," economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.) (Tab T).

Does "disappearance" refer to Castro death?

May 13, 1963

Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U. S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading "The U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes, the U. S. would be widely charged with complicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file.) (Tab U).

Is Kent counseling against assassination?

May 28, 1963

Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency. Bundy informs Standing Group that at meeting on May 28, "We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose.

Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA" /not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source: Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File. (Tab v).

June 6, 1963

Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret...it was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group in advance." Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 (Tab w)

Note interest in talks with Castro while also seeming interest in contingency of his death.

June 19, 1963

JFK Approves External Sabotage Program. A meeting was held with "higher authority" (Bundy present) at which a program for "external sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest." Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba". (Tab x)

Did JFK decide against talks and in favor of harder sabotage approach?

September 20, 1963

Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Bundy's request, Chase summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of Action." Chase's summary states: "...The present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: "Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro...and drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality." Source: (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney, Jr.. of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Affairs. (Tab 2B, Tab 2A)

Issues and Questions

Why is it necessary to exclude assassination if it is not being considered? Was Denney asked to consider assassination?

June 10, 1964

Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In a memo to the DCI, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S. would not condone the

planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for \$150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Ghe Guevera." "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy." Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tab 2G)

June 18, 1964

Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Special Group (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr. Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303 Committee Cuban review." The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the U. S. A. in the next 120 days." The memo asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk." The memorandum continued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform Coup de Main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all impending adventures?" A memorandum attached was described as: "Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Leaders, 10 June 1964."

Note Bundy's view below that U.S. must prevent such plots.

June 18, 1964

Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the island." "...A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he

(McGeorge Bundy)

- 15 -

Issues and Questions

would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964. (Tab I).

June 19, 1964

Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassination Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be construed as condoning. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 Committee meeting of June 18. "In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup. (Tab 2J)

What was RFK's action in response.

July 30, 1964

Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot. The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Memorandum for the record dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30, 1964. (Tab 2K)

August 19, 1964

Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile-Mafia Plot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons interviewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA. Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, 1964. (Tab 2L)

Did Bundy feel compelled to take any action?

(McGeorge Bundy)

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SEPARATE DOCUMENTS

September 23, 1963

Bundy Warns Special Group on Security. Bundy points out to the Special Group that "unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the government who have to know a little or much about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba."
(Source: Memo, Sept 23, 1963, Bundy to Special Group. (Tab 2C))

Oct 29, 1963

Bundy informs JFK of need for White House information on CIA communications. Bundy asks the President to order that the White House received one copy of all important instructions from State and CIA to the field. Bundy states trouble has arisen from "difference of emphasis" in what we have sent to the field.
(Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, Bundy to JFK.) (Tab 2D)

Oct 29, 1963

Bundy on Lodge's movements. Bundy in a checklist discusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb Lodge's movements.
(Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, title Checklist.) (Tab 2E)

Oct 30, 1963

Bundy cables Lodge re Impending Coup. Bundy cables Lodge that "we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or a coup."

Memorandum
To: FAO Schwarz, Smothers
From: Robert Kelley

SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA

McGEORGE BUNDY

McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration. Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that function in mid-1961, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962.

Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion of assassination or Executive Action capability at that meeting. Bundy attended the August 10, 1962 Mongoose meeting where a Castro assassination was reportedly suggested.

In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears from other documents to have called for a plan in the event of Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following questions and areas:

A. In meeting with Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an Executive Action capability or a Castro assassination plan discussed?

B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro assassination plot or capability?

C. Was the emphasis placed by President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose Program such that the CIA may have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro assassination.

D. What accounts for the seeming pattern of interest in the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death?

E. What were the Command and Control procedures for authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration?

F. Was an assassination of Castro ever considered by the Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem of Cuba?

G. If an assassination was not considered or authorized, what explanation is there for the CIA Castro assassination efforts during the Kennedy Administration?

MEMORANDUM

TO : Files

FROM : Bob Kelley

DATE : July 8, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY

SUMMARY

On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was interviewed at his office at the Ford Foundation in New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until 1:30 p.m. The interview was conducted in three parts:

1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached chronology.
2. Mr. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of these matters.
3. Mr. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of that matter.

In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the documents listed on ~~the~~ attached chronology relating to Castro, and it was his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview, that they did not reflect any consideration by the White House or Cabinet level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plan.

Mr. Bundy stated further that those documents relating to the contingency in the event of Castro's death and similar language did not relate to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office unrelated to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFFLE program, Bundy stated that he was "astonished" that this could have been going on without the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no authorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route. Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not know whom) informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but it was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassination methods, and was not targeted against any particular individual or country.

Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three areas outlined above.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY

NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words "indicated contingency in Cuba" involved.* When shown the Parrott memorandum for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's instructions "against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred that "the President's interest in this matter" not be told to Mr. Woodward,

*NSAM 100 clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a NSAM without his approval, Bundy said. However, Bundy emphasized that JFK never asked him to look into or develop a plan for the assassination of Castro.

Mr. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly, when shown the Special Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where Mr. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was also not refreshed. Bundy stated that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was desired was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's removal. Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information as to why the Presidential interest in this plan should have been concealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the interview, after reviewing for Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty days after NSAM 100 was issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15.

President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy had no recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Tayler ran the Special Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy merely attended to represent the Presidential interest.

Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval, March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized that final success will require decisive U. S. military intervention."

It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons, and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the overthrow of the Cuban regime, policy makers might have taken up consideration of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume that there were "two forks": an invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking in the JFK administration was focussed toward an invasion by U. S. forces. At other points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the "two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive of the situation today in those terms.

JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of effort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of the document states that the Special Group augmented was given "tacit authorization to proceed" The footnote corrects that and states no authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions and was a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on a one-to-one basis with President Kennedy and get a "clear signal" from him on a covert action proposal. The understanding was that the paper record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear signal to the members of the Special Group in informal conferences but rarely at a formal group meeting. Bundy said we wanted the President to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'd continue doing it; but his approval would not be recorded.

In response to a question, Bundy said that there was not another level of plausible deniability between the Special Group and the CIA. In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect to assassinations, a paper record might be created that showed no approval by the Special Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassination, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability, "We would be explicit with the CIA either way on covert action approvals, and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record."

August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting

Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meetings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of August, September and October. Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of any discussion or proposal concerning assassinations. More directly, Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or independent, of any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassinations during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recollection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period (Mr. Bundy contested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed. Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two meetings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was

evidently not in attendance at the second, held in the afternoon in the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr. Helms' memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meeting.)

1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro's Death

Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the President, although he did not have a clear recollection of writing this memo, reflected the fact that Mongoose was not producing. Bundy said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would not come down." Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt impelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's opinions to this affect.

Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re "Violent Solutions"

Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical School.) Chase did not have the type of position or responsibility on Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or involvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus, Chase's references to a "short and sweet" approach have to do with actions

like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassination.

Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death

The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss contingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or discussion of a Castro assassination. For example the paper by Sherman Kent was "straight estimating" by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.) In response to a question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death. Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline in Castro's health or some other event that might have prompted these studies. He could not do so.

Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot

Bundy commented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingenuous memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra". However, Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all. He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection refreshed or otherwise. Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when he was asked to have the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter

of law enforcement, or any other outcome with respect to the information received by the Special Group.

After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy was asked if there might have been any connection between these documents and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked for an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents, also seem to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another". As he had done when ^{the} ^{first} documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK "never asked me to look into an assassination of Castro." Nor was his recollection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he simply does not recall issuing NASM 100 or any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else with respect to these documents.

Executive Action

Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10. He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissell had been his teacher in college and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January 27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability. He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability but that no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without authorization. He thought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell related to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch. He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot.

"No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order in a valid way."

Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference to "poison" but as something that would be on a larger scale than an individual assassination. For example, if such poison would be used it would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single individual. Bundy had heard of the ball point syringe but does not recall it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high powered rifles.

Lansdale-RFK-JFK Relationship

Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between "RFK beating up on people and saying 'go get poison'." It was in RFK's character to press the bureaucracy hard and want to "act aggressively" against enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any instructions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho" suggestions that Bobby usually made.

Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams for assassinations. He does know that there was no "witting authorization" of three-man assassination teams. He strongly disagrees with any suggestion (by Helms) that the atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it acceptable to plot Castro's assassination.

Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the Special Group. He is "astonished" if it did so. He said he never knew of

a case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the President around the Special Group. He said he would have to exclude the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was not operating in the Special Group at that time.

Trujillo

Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs. He did recall of being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissidents and thought this was "o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

14 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 February 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy,
Dulles, Gen. Cabell, Bissell

✓ 3. General

Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue.

In the course of the discussion, the following points, among others, were made:

- ✓ a. Dominican Republic - Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

✓4. Congo

Mr. Bissell gave more details of the project designed to provide support for pro-Western forces in the Congo, which had been introduced at last Thursday's meeting. The Group had no objections.

✓6. Vietnam Agent Drop

The proposal for this operation was approved, subject to the stipulation that non-U.S. - preferably Chinese - crews be used.

Mr. Bissell said that if all goes well we would plan to come back to the Group for approval for certain "spoiling actions." The members felt that CIA should proceed on the assumption that a comprehensive program would continue, and should therefore take steps to begin the six-week training cycle for the Vietnamese air crews, which had been mentioned in the formal proposal.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

COPY NO. 38

RECORD OF ACTIONS
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
at its
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING
held on
May 5, 1961

(Approved by the President on May 16, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2420. U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2421. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT



2422.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

- a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.
- b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.
- c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.
- e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.
- f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.
- g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

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ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT



2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

- h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense.
- i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship.
- j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.
- k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

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
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ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT



2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

1. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of \$200-\$400 million.
- m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U. S. groups.
- n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.
- o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.
- p. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

2423. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

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TOP SECRET

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2424. U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over in that country.

2425. U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

- a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.
- b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering inclusion of U. S. troops in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.
- c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the President promptly on U. S. training troops in Viet Nam.

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
NSC ACTIONS NOS. 2420-2425

- 5 -

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5-128

October 5, 1961



NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 100

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Cuba

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Richard Goodwin

cc: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy's Files
Mr. Bromley Smith

TOP SECRET

C-O-P-Y

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on
Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara,
Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale;
Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey

1. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language.

In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval to the Special Group, which involve policy considerations.

2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Institutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase II were deferred.

3. The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made:

a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation.

b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be made to the Group. (This decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in c below.)

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c. Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re-supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping." The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations.

In connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days.

4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should reflect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately.

4. At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba.

6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent.

7. It was agreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines.

Thomas A. Parrott

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16 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE
with the President

In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.]

M.D.T.

22 March 1962

This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines.]

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11 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 11 April 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Martin; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey

Colonel Davies and Mr. Duval, of CIA, were also present.

1. General Lansdale gave a progress report.

2. Mr. McCone stated that there is little evidence from photo reconnaissance of any significant increase in military support facilities, over those that existed during the Batista regime. He therefore questioned whether current estimates of the size of the Cuban military forces may not be somewhat exaggerated. In this connection, attention was called to the sizeable list of bloc materiel which has been provided to Cuba.

Mr. McNamara asked about evidences of underground installations, pointing out that should these exist in any significant numbers it would have a bearing on probable Cuban intentions and also on the difficulties of armed invasion of the island. He added that in any case, the difficulties can be expected to increase in the next one to five years.

Mr. Harvey reported on the interrogation of recent exfiltrates, with emphasis on their statements that some resistance elements exist in seven areas.

Answering Mr. Rusk's question, General Lemnitzer said that the U.S. has the capability of blockading Cuba completely. He added that the chiefs consider Cuba a threat to the U.S. and the Hemisphere now and in the future.

The following requests emerged from this discussion:

a. Defense and CIA analysts should jointly consider all available evidence, particularly photographic; bearing on supporting military facilities, including any underground ones.

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b. A study should be made of the time and resources required to put a complete blockade into effect.

c. CIA should compile the numbers of individuals who are now traveling into Cuba from other countries in the Hemisphere.

d. Defense/JCS should examine the possibility of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean, manned by personnel from one or several countries; particular attention should be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely U.S., in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt of that country from Cuba.

3. Mr. McCone said that the current schedule of covert actions can be met, but he suggested that perhaps it should be speeded up even though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U.S. He added that the present restrictions on attribution present difficulties with respect to training agents and to supply missions. Mr. McCone also questioned whether complete success within the current covert framework would lead to the desired result.

Mr. Rusk urged that efforts be continued to explore the possibilities of defection or subversion of key individuals in the Castro regime, and that efforts be made to induct Cuban exiles into the U.S. armed forces. (Mr. McNamara agreed that the latter could and should be done.)

In answer to the Secretary of State's question as to the adequacy of existing policy approvals, General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than restricting them to intelligence missions. It was agreed that, within the framework of present understandings, the numbers of personnel to be infiltrated could be stepped up. In this connection, it was noted however that it will be difficult if not impossible to maintain motivation and morale indefinitely, without at least the implied promise of eventual action by the U.S.

4. The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified; on the other hand, this should not be taken as an excuse to cease activity against the Castro regime. He, supported by the Secretary of Defense, took the position that the U.S. should "play for the breaks," and should take necessary steps so as to get into a position which would afford the U.S. a maximum number of choices of action. In this connection, he and Mr. McNamara suggested that the current target

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7 August 1962

COVERT

COVERT ACTIVITIES

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action "b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a "time table" basis.

II. MISSION:

"Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment"

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III. TASKS:

A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.
2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.
5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.

B. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.
3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.
4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor acts of sabotage.

C. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.

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2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.
3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.
4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.
5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.
6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.
7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
 - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
 - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
 - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
 - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
 - e. Militia morale.
 - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

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IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in "high noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.

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2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.
5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.
6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either

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as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2. Urban Resistance Cells - Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising). A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals. ✓

3. Rural Resistance Cells - Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors. ✓

4. Guerrilla - Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, ✓
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recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight" under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups. Additional Policy approval is required. ✓
S. H.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:

- a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.
- b. Submarines and other naval craft.
- c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

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V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.

a. Site A - commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. Site C - Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba"

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft

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for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.

B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba.

C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.

D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.

E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against Cuban industry and public utilities, i. e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.

F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.

G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.

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H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.

I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.

J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."

K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

* Fiscal Year 1963 - \$40,000,000

Fiscal Year 1964 - \$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis.)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT : CIA Action in Response to National
Security Action Memorandum No. 181

1. In response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181, the following CIA officers are designated as the responsible officers for items in which action is assigned to CIA.

Item 2. Mr. Seymour R. Bolten

Item 4. Mr. William K. Harvey
or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever

Item 5. Mr. Ray Cline


2. I have directed the following actions to be initiated:

A. The CIA/Cuban Task Force will follow up with Pentagon representatives to determine the Department of Defense attitude or action on the Secretary of State's suggestion made at the 23 August meeting regarding the removal of restrictions on mounting operations out of the Guantanamo Base.

B. The Board of National Estimates will establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and types of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construction, particularly missile sites.

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
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- C. The Board of National Estimates will prepare an assessment of the physical and psychological dangers to the United States and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba.
- D. CIA will institute immediately a daily publication on Cuban developments to include current intelligence reporting, substantiating evidence, estimative assessments, and coverage of domestic and foreign press. This publication will be distributed to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and the Attorney General.
- E. CIA will arrange intelligence collection overflights of Cuba as frequently as the situation demands.
- F. The CIA/Cuban Task Force is now working on a plan of operations which will be supplementary to the course of action already approved by the Special Group (Augmented). This plan of operations will approximate the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE in Plan B Plus.

Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lt. General, USA
Acting Director

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MONGOOSE

16 October 1962

A-1411

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Group (Augmented)

SUBJECT: Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals

1. The Director of Central Intelligence proposes that CIA undertake as soon as possible the following listed sabotage operations:

a. Demolition by an eight-man raider team of the railroad bridge near Calafre, Pinar del Rio Province.

*Blr
a Cuban*
b. An underwater demolition attack by two Cuban frogmen against shipping and port facilities at the port of La Isabelia, Las Villas Province.

c. Grenade attack on the Chinese communist embassy in Havana, to be carried out by a recruited Cuban agent who has access to a roof overlooking the embassy grounds and who has volunteered for this mission.

*not approved
(including
Munroe)*
d. Mine with delayed oil drop plus the approaches to one or more of the following harbors: San Rey, Nicaro, Pinar, Manzanillo, Matamoros, Bahia Honda.

e. A demolition attack by a hit-and-run raider team on the Matanzas power plant.

f. A hit-and-run mortar and gunfire attack on the Soviet SAM site near Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province.

g. The military sabotage by a raider team of the Great Inland, wooden dock, and auxiliary stockpile at the Negro nickel plant. A parallel attempt will be made to destroy the auxiliary stockpile using land mines.

h. Sabotage by an fire or oil tanker off Pinar or Matanzas harbor. This operation will be mounted from a small, fast boat using recoilless rifles and rockets.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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1. Incendiary attack by a hit-and-run raider team on the Tanco oil refineries at Llanos and Santiago

2. Approval of the Special Group (Augmented) is requested for CIA to undertake the above listed sabotage and raider operations.

Maxwell S. Carter
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

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
1 - Mr. Bundy
2 - Mr. Johnson
3 - Mr. Gilpatrick
4 - Mr. McCone

5 - Mr. Kennedy
6 - General Taylor
7 - Chief of Operations - *Destroy 4/9/63*

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Operation MONGOOSE

17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from
General Carter, dated 16 October 1962

As agreed at yesterday's meeting, Mr. Bundy discussed the
above-mentioned memorandum with higher authority today.

The decisions are as follows:

1. Paragraph d. of the subject memorandum is dis-
approved. This disapproval extends to any activity intended to
capitalize on even the notional existence of materiel of the kind
described.
2. Paragraph b. is approved with the addition of the
words "Bloc or Cuban" inserted before "shipping and port facilities."
3. Paragraph h. is approved with the addition of "Bloc"
before the words "oil tanker."
4. All other proposals are approved as listed.

Thomas A. Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Copies:

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|---|--|
| 1 - Mr. Bundy | 5 - Mr. Kennedy |
| 2 - Mr. Johnson | 6 - General Taylor |
| 3 - Mr. Gilpatrick <i>by destroyed 4/9/63 - RLM</i> | 7 - Chief of Operations - <i>by destroyed 4/9/63 - RLM</i> |
| 4 - Mr. McCone | |

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
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WASHINGTON

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January 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba

On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, I have met with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963. The time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be winding up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there is well nigh universal agreement that MongOOSE is at a dead end. The people with whom I have been working are: Vance, Yarmolinsky and General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric; Nick Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CIA; and Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department.

The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we have worked out together, and while there may be some small differences of point of view or need for revision, I think they are ripe for your consideration.

1. The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when necessary. There is no point pretending that major Cuban policy decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and your own executive role, supplemented by the Executive Committee when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties, is indispensable.
2. The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinating responsibility. After considerable discussion, the unanimous consensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group on Cuba. The Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and Ed Martin for departmental business, and, under their guidance, to



you and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination. Nothing in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks, or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed; but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circumstances, the necessary coordination will be carried out effectively by good will and good sense on all sides. When there is an honest difference that cannot be resolved it will, of course, have to come upstairs one way or another.

The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the individual appointed as coordinator. The recommendation of the State Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has been doing a very solid and constructive job as head of the Vietnamese Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs, which turn out to be his preferred professional field, both by experience and by interest. He has the necessary professional seniority in the Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance. He has worked well with the White House staff.

If this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Department would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination. At the same time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy coordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with Cuban refugees and with interested agencies of Government on the spot. Bill Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepartmental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator and the Miami office.

3. If a Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert operations should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to the Special Group (5412) in the normal way. The Special Group



would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through the Executive Committee. The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered in a visible office of Cuban Affairs. Such a change would liberate General Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely valuable.

4. The problem of organization is of course less than half the battle: what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There are a number of loose ends, large and small, of which the following are samples:

a. The shipping orders and the broader question of economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled. Executive Orders have been prepared along the lines of your press conference statement, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies. The State Department will take any public rap for this delay.

b. The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy. We need a much more open and continuous communication with refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the brigade. If we can manage it, we need to get a stronger process of representation of free Cubans.

c. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself. Donovan, for example, has an invitation to be Castro's guest at the beach of Veradero, and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like Manolo Ray.

d. The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined. The very large commitment of the CIA to MongOOSE activities should be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Government in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further --





although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been trying to do what it was told to do.

e. The political, psychological, and personal aspects of the effort to isolate Castro's Cuba should be pursued intensively in the OAS. We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons here.

f. We need to keep up a continuous and high-level barrage of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance. You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector and this position should be energetically sustained.

g. The question of Pan American flights should be reviewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan American. Over the long run this franchise is of the highest importance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their marginal losses is very impressive.


5. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by Monday. If you approve, we could put the organization into effect at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues by Cottrell's people with the Executive Committee before the end of next week.

h.f.B.

McG. B.

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Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council
Meeting of January 22, 1963

The President began his discussion of national security problems by calling attention to the worldwide responsibilities of the United States. While we fully recognize our responsibilities, other states are not carrying their fair share of the burden.

Cuba

The major lesson of the Cuban crisis, the President said, was the paramount importance of timing. Both sides, the United States and the USSR, need sufficient time to consider alternative courses of action. Our objective was and is to protect our national interests while trying to avoid a nuclear exchange which, if it happened, would be a defeat for both sides. In handling crises, it is important that the Russians have enough time to debate their action. If they are forced to react in an hour or two, they may react in a spasm and resort to nuclear war. We, too, looking back on the quarantine vs. air strike decision, took several days to discuss and understand the advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. The reason for building up NATO conventional forces is to gain greater control over the timing of a showdown in Europe provoked by the Russians.

The President pointed out that we must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russian pressure against us in Berlin. We must always be ready to move immediately against Cuba in the event we decide such action would be a more effective response to a Soviet initiative than a nuclear response. We can use Cuba to limit Soviet actions in the way the Russians use Berlin to limit our actions.

Western Europe

Turning to Europe, the President recalled that de Gaulle's current policy is no different than that he has been advocating since 1958 when he first proposed to President Eisenhower a U.S. - U.K. - France directorate giving France, in effect, a veto on our use of nuclear weapons. The suggestion was turned down because it would have broken up NATO. This Administration agrees it was a correct



decision. The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the reason why he is behaving as he now is. Even if we had given France nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France to a predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his memoirs, de Gaulle has expressed his view that France must be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on no one.

In analyzing de Gaulle's present actions, the President said de Gaulle did not question our support of Europe. The proof that he does not fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of French troops opposite the Russians in Germany. He relies on our power to protect him while he launches his policies based solely on the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle turned to Germany. This helps to keep Germany from looking to the Russians. It does threaten NATO which de Gaulle strongly opposes.

As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S. considerable trade. If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more severe setback for the U.K.

Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle. One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six. We should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin America are.

U.S. Trade Negotiations

The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade negotiations. In the present situation, we must be very careful to protect U.S. interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious, it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar and Congress will be demanding reductions in our foreign programs.

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One effort we must make, the President continued, is to seek to prevent European states from taking actions which make our balance of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain large forces in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if it increases its agricultural production to our detriment. We have not yet reached the point of wheat against troops but we cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off the "fat of the land." We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for ourselves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them. No longer dependent on the U.S. for economic assistance, the European states are less subject to our influence. If the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in. We must exploit our military and political position to ensure that our economic interests are protected.

Attitude Toward Neutrals

Referring to criticism by those who say we are treating neutrals as favorably as allies, the President said he did not believe such criticism was sound but we shouldn't be over-confident ourselves. For example, the Pakistanis oppose our giving military assistance to the Indians. Despite the fact that the Pakistanis are our allies, we must recognize the importance of India. If the Indians joined the Chinese, we would have no free South Asia. Our aim is to make the sub-continent of Asia strong. Even under present Indian leadership, we can work with India just as we must use our ally Pakistan to achieve our aim of keeping the sub-continent out of the Communist camp. We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc. Therefore, we must keep our ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not like many things they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing against us.

Assistance to Foreign Countries

The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United States -- not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving

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our national security. Recalling that the military could always get Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the President asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on economic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real danger. A major effort is required to prevent this. We must make every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc. Once a country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to get it out. We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest.

Domestic Issues

In introducing his remarks on domestic issues, the President emphasized the major effort which has been made to hold down the budget deficit now estimated at about \$12 billion. The current budget shows increases only for defense, space and the fixed charge of interest on the national debt.

Our economic growth rate over the past ten years, he continued, has been too slow, particularly in view of the great increase in our population.

We must avoid another recession which would endanger our gold position and have a bad psychological effect on the American people. In comparison with the Russians who are making a major effort to improve their domestic economy, we must not give the impression of just drifting lest other states draw the conclusion that we cannot deal with our domestic economic problems.

An unbalanced budget as such is not worrisome especially when we realize that our present deficit is a reflection of the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. The new tax bill is very important in this respect because if it is passed by the Congress we will be in much better shape.

It is unnecessary to point out that all these matters, AID, defense, economic growth and the tax program are all related. If we become

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weaker economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. If this happens, the entire Free World position weakens. It is basic to our national security to have a strong domestic economy.

Defense Problems

Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military programs, e.g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike-Zeus, the President said we are going forward with large defense and space programs. If the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a limit to how much we can do.

One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to increase their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the European forces around our troops have only enough supplies to fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further forward than the troops of de Gaulle who, instead of committing his divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the military interests of the Free World, we should consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States.

Test Ban Negotiations

The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations with the USSR on a test ban treaty. Our primary purpose in trying to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists. We will have a difficult time protecting the free areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons. A test ban including only the USSR, the British, and the U.S. would not be very meaningful except in regard to the Chinese problem which the Russians are believed to be as concerned about as we are. If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition which undoubtedly will develop.

Concluding his remarks, the President thanked the assembled officers for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which exist among the Departments and Agencies, and expressed the hope that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation which now exists.

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3 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Cuba

PRESENT: The President, the Attorney General, Secretary Vance,
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Martin, Mr. Hurwitch,
Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Calefano

1. The President asked Mr. FitzGerald whether the exile raids accomplish anything worthwhile. The latter replied that he thought they do not accomplish anything except perhaps to bolster morale of the exiles; on the other hand the effect on people still in Cuba can be counterproductive to some degree. The President said that he does not object to these raids if they really strike worthwhile targets rather than the "froth" which their acts to date have represented. He added that he had no objection to raids from the sea unless they were directed at Soviet ships. He also said we cannot condone the holding of press conferences by the exiles after such raids.

2. Mr. FitzGerald gave a summary of the results of agent operations to date. He noted that failures in black operations have been due to weather, lack of reception, hostile activities in the area, and mechanical failures; only three failures have been due to refusal of the agents to continue. He emphasized the fact that the Cubans are very good at counterinsurgency--that is putting down resistance groups--but not very good at sophisticated counterintelligence operations. He noted that there has been no particular trouble in recruiting agents, but that it is not always possible to match the qualifications and experience of these operatives with desired targets. Mr. FitzGerald added that the classic Communist "block system" is particularly effective in uncovering illegal residents.

3. The President asked whether sabotage operations are now underway. Mr. Bundy pointed out that they are not, because the Special Group had decided--based to a considerable extent on the difficulties encountered in mounting the mine operation--that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it, in relation to the results that could be obtained in the intelligence field. The latter has been considered to have priority and to be more practicable. Mr. Martin added that it had also been felt that sabotage by itself was not particularly productive and that it should be done primarily in conjunction with other activities.

In answer to the President's question, a number of people said that acts of sabotage might have some beneficial results from the U. S. point of view, both from the standpoint of the intrinsic economic damage that might be done, and also for the psychological effect of making it evident that internal resistance to Castro exists. (In the latter connection, Mr. FitzGerald made the point that recent exfiltrates have said that there is now no organized resistance inside Cuba.)

4. In answer to the Attorney General's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that immediate plans are primarily based on obtaining fuller intelligence coverage of the island, with emphasis on filling in existing geographic gaps. He said that perhaps the most important question in this context is whether time is on our side or on Castro's, and added that the Board of National Estimates is currently investigating this question. Mr. FitzGerald added that in his opinion there is no chance of a successful civilian uprising against Castro because of the strength of Castro's security measures, but that we are hopeful of accomplishing penetrations of the military establishment; on the other hand, it is doubtful whether any such contacts would be willing to communicate among themselves, for fear of provocation.

5. The Attorney General asked whether it might not be useful to consider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time. Mr. Bundy added that under these circumstances we would then have to face the problem of whether the U. S. would actually back up these men. The Attorney General urged, in any case, that CIA survey all possibilities for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed.

6. The President summed up the meeting by directing the following:

a. The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible.

b. CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months.

c. A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program.

(Signed) Thomas A. Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

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11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley
were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April, on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light

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of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.

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April 11, 1963



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT: Cuba -- Policy

1. We are all concerned about solving our Cuba problem, but so far, we have been looking seriously at only one side of the coin -- ways to hurt Castro by varying degrees of overt and covert nastiness. We have not yet looked seriously at the other side of the coin -- quietly enticing Castro over to us.]
2. If the sweet approach turned out to be feasible and, in turn, successful, the benefits would be substantial. In the short run, we would probably be able to neutralize at least 2 of our main worries about Castro -- the reintroduction of offensive missiles and Cuban subversion. In the long run, we would be able to work on eliminating Castro at our leisure and from a good vantage point.
3. While the practical obstacles to this sort of approach may be immense, they may not be insuperable. Two such obstacles are the domestic political situation and Castro's reluctance to be enticed.
 - (a) Domestic Problem -- If the American people can be shown that the offensive missile threat and the subversive threat are under control, that the Russian presence in Cuba is reduced and that Castro is much more a nationalist than a Communist, the selling job necessary for a careful, quiet policy turn-around may not be impossible.
 - (b) Castro's Reluctance to be Enticed -- This may be an easier nut to crack now than it once would have been. Castro may have received, from our point of view, some very valuable education over the past couple years. Hopefully, he has learned that the Russians are not as tough and reliable as he thought they were and that we are a lot tougher and nastier than he thought we were; also hopefully, he is scared.

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Our present nasty policy is probably a necessary prelude to a sweet approach. The more we can (1) scare Castro and (2) demonstrate to him that the Bloc is either unwilling or unable to fill his security and economic requirements, the more amenable Castro probably will be to a new approach. In this regard, perhaps the worst thing we can do is to let our nasty policy ease off without a particular objective in sight.

4. I understand that, in the near future, the President will be looking at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem. It might be interesting if, at roughly the same time, he could have a look at a feasibility study on a policy turn-around.]

// Do you think this timing for such a study is right? Or do you think it is still premature?

GC

Gordon Chase



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EYES ONLY

18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

1. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability, which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be useful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully. In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr. Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various types, and then recommendations.

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Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date, and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this. He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent, it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not generate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become active, it will be obvious that they have U.S. support because it is well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr. Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American governments might be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives.

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that time is running in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that some of these activities are designed to slow down or possible stop the trend of events in his favor.

It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has already been approved, is in process of possible implementation. It was agreed that this process should not be interrupted.

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Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63,
April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives."

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i. e. he did not

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stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies:

- a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2.
- b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months.
- c. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer run by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

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Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows:

- a. Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing.
- b. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane.
- c. Develop a program to get rid of Castro.
- d. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba.
- e. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal.
- f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow.
- g. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley Smith

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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April 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba -- Policy

I refer to your request that I look over the papers for the Standing Group meeting and give you my comments.

1. The covering memorandum is very stimulating, hits the gut issues and should provoke some much-needed thought and discussion on Cuba policy.

2. Re "Possible New Initiatives" on page 3 -- The implication of the three courses of action is that only Course a is likely to gain our maximum objectives. While this is probably true, I'm not sure we can rule out all possibilities quite yet. For example, Course c could conceivably lead to the attainment of all possible U.S. objectives, including the eventual overthrow of Castro.

I think the first order of business is to figure out exactly what we want U.S. - Cuba relations to look like in X number of years. Assuming we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way of getting rid of him -- a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or a combination of both (e.g. a two-stage plan)? If, on the other hand, there is a Castro we can live with, what are our terms of accommodation? Are we more likely to get these terms by a tough or a sweet approach?

3. Re POL Blockade on page 3 -- Even assuming it would not escalate into a shooting war, a POL blockade may not be a realistic pressuring device. It is my understanding that we would have to blockade for three to six months before Castro would really hurt. This means we would be under terrific world (and probably domestic) pressure for an awfully long time (e.g. newspapers depicting dying babies because the power was cut off at the hospital). Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate should be of the "short and sweet" variety.

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4. The Standing Group may also wish to focus hard on some of the policy approaches which we are now using and which we may want to continue using in the future. For example, is economic isolation of Cuba from the Free World likely to make Castro submit to our will? Or is a rupture in the Bloc/Cuba tie more promising? Is it possible to use both approaches at the same time? Or are we more likely to break the Bloc/Cuba tie if we back off from our policy of isolating Cuba economically from the Free World?

GC

Gordon Chase

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 29, 1963

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF THE STANDING GROUP
TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 10:30 AM

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful discussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to make preliminary decisions as to ways and means of getting forward with the necessary spade work.

1. The possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are:

a. Interference with overflights.

b. Possible death of Castro.

c. The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary. - *Cuban vs Cubans.*

d. Attributable interference by { Castro in other countries.
or USSR *take from d.c.* } *8 p.*

e. Reintroduction of offensive weapons.

2. Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government with both immediate and long-run objectives. Examples which come to mind are:

President { a. Greater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt all military traffic to Cuba. *talk to him*

Seymour
Bob
Murray { b. Expanded economic action, possibly including encouragement of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it is hoped that some may be offered.

SENSITIVE - TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

c. Oppression of small-scale sabotage over a long period.

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0 { 3. The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it could be pursued on a separate track while some or all of the things proposed above were going on.

→ 4. An information program for post-Castro Cuba. There was general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories.

Documents which members may want to look at before the meeting are attached:

Tab A: Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a year from now.

Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority.

It is recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more meeting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more detailed work.

McGeorge Bundy

Level of attention

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May 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

MEMBERS OF THE STANDING GROUP

The following assignments have been made as a result of the discussion in the Standing Group on Tuesday, April 30th:

1. There will be an examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro were to disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent and will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th.
2. There will be an analysis of the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. This analysis will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Paul Nitze, and its first results will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. This first analysis will provide: a. A detailed examination of possible action in the event of interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment of possible use of other contingencies in Cuba or in the waters around Cuba.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a general paper on the possible forms of effective interference with the economic life of Cuba by sabotage or other means. In particular, CIA will report on the oil problem in relation to Cuba. It is hoped that a first report on this study may be available next week for distribution.
4. The Department of State will examine the possible use of the sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro regime. It is hoped that this study will be available next week.

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TOP SECRET EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE



5. The principal topic of discussion for the meeting of the Standing Group on May 7th will be the development of a U. S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and the initial lead in the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USIA. Appropriate papers will be circulated before noon on Monday, May 6th.

RECAPITULATION OF THE STANDING GROUP

The following subjects were discussed at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 6th, 1961, presided over by Mr. McGeorge Bundy:

1. The first item on the agenda was the report of the Secretary of the Standing Group, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, on the meeting of the Standing Group on May 4th, 1961.

2. The second item on the agenda was the report of the Secretary of the Standing Group, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, on the meeting of the Standing Group on May 4th, 1961.

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TS #185620

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

13 May 1963

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in
the Event of Castro's Death*

SUMMARY

We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case

* This memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sought to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very generally the problem of Soviet reactions.

GROUP 1

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downgrading and
declassification

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the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention.

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I. CUBA WITHOUT CASTRO

Factors in the Situation


1. The course of events in Cuba after Castro's death would depend upon a wide range of variables and unknowns, which are unlikely to be made manifest until after the event. Yet we can make some advance assessment of the importance of certain factors.

a. The Leadership. Castro's personal predominance has overshadowed the rest of the leadership. The two most prominent and powerful political leaders under Fidel are his brother Raul and Che Guevara. Raul is Deputy Premier and the designated successor. Furthermore he is Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander in Chief. He has by far the best chance of taking over after his brother's death, but he has a cold and unattractive personality with little of Fidel's appeal to the public. On the other hand, Che Guevara is a more colorful figure, a man of ability and drive, and therefore a likely contender for power. If these two were to cooperate, together with President Dorticos they would have a good chance of consolidating control. Among the old line Communists the position and attitude of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez would be the most important, since he enjoys

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some respect among the Fidelistas and has authority among the Moscow-oriented Communists.

b. Differences within the Regime. The top leadership of the regime seems to live in more harmony than after the Escalante affair in the spring of 1962 or after the October 1962 crisis. However, we believe that there is still a basic cleavage between the Fidelistas and the Moscow-oriented Communists and that it might widen in situations of stress.

c. The Army and Security Forces. The armed forces and security services have been molded into instruments highly responsive to Fidel himself. After his departure, both the army and the security forces are likely to become more important and more active in politics. Their allegiance in a power struggle would depend to a major extent on the circumstances then current. We have little trustworthy information on the majority of the individual military commanders, but we do know that popular leaders have been moved from post to post, presumably to prevent their attaining too great power. A sizeable minority of the top military commanders are persuasively reported to be opposed to the present close ties with the USSR; they have been restrained so far by their personal loyalty to Fidel and by the regime's

- 3 -

4-68



informant system. A few commanders would probably lend themselves readily to support of another Moscow-oriented leader; most have demonstrated no political loyalty except to Castro. Thus we would expect dissension within the armed forces in the event of a struggle for power. The loyalty of the commanders rather than the attitude of the troops would probably govern the behavior of the military forces in such a struggle.

d. The Cuban Public. The enthusiasm of a substantial portion of the population for the changes wrought by the Castro revolution, the departure or imprisonment of many potential

- 3a -

4-67

leaders of opposition, the general passivity of the remainder of the population, the weakness of the resistance, and the strength of the security organizations all argue against the likelihood of a popular uprising after Castro's death.

e. The Soviet Role. Castro's death would deprive the Soviets of the only Communist leader with Charisma in Latin America and at the same time relieve them of the difficulties of doing business with a spiny independent character. Castro's successor might be far easier for the Soviets to deal with, but is sure to lack Castro's wide emotional appeal. Upon Castro's death the Soviets would move rapidly to the support of Raul Castro or whatever other friendly contender for power seemed likely to win out. They would be able to offer significant help to their chosen instrument, and such support might be decisive in any struggle for power among the top leadership.

f. The US Role. If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the US would be widely charged with complicity, even though it is widely known that Castro has many enemies. US intervention would be anticipated by many supporters and by many opponents of the regime. In this state of affairs, not only the nature but also the timing of US actions would have great importance, and US

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silence or inaction would also have far-reaching consequences.

These will be dealt with in more detail in the following paragraphs.

Stages of the Cuban Reaction to Castro's Death


4. If the US did not intervene immediately, Raul Castro or one of the top echelon of Castro's followers would probably be able to consolidate a working regime acceptable to the Soviets. However, we believe that there would be a substantial, though less than even chance, of a struggle for power among the top leaders. Such a struggle for power might be resolved by the emergence of a single leader, but there is a chance that the conflict would ultimately take on the characteristics of a civil war.

a. Initial Period of Solidarity. We believe that the most probable development after Castro's death would be a rallying of a regime around the designated successor, Raul Castro. The opposition would take heart, but would wait for a move from the US and the Latin American opponents of the Castro regime before committing itself to more than token efforts. After an initial period of consolidation and solidarity the new leaders might go on to shore up their position and establish their permanent authority and control. On the other hand, it is equally likely that a

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struggle for power will develop. During this early phase we believe that pressure from the US would be more likely to increase the solidarity of the regime than promote a power struggle.

b. Struggle for Power. If some individual or group decided to contest Raul's leadership, the outcome would depend upon a number of factors, the most important of which would probably be whether Raul had gained or alienated the loyalty of the armed forces. It is possible that, as in the USSR, the struggle for power could be confined to the inner circles and that a single figure would eventually gain control. In Cuba, however, such a struggle would be likely to break into the open, throwing up several ambitious contenders for place and power.

c. Widened Conflict. It is also possible that a struggle for power would not end after the strongest of the individual leaders had asserted himself but that alliances would be formed and lines be drawn between the Fidelistas on the one hand and the Moscow-oriented Communists on the other. Such a split could extend into the Army and security forces and develop into something like a civil war. Perhaps even more likely than a two sided civil war would be a conflict in which many groups

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emerged, all striving for dominance, forming alliances and breaking off into new splinter groups and factions. In such a situation the emergence of a non-Communist Fidelista group, claiming to be the rightful heirs of the original revolution, would be a possibility, but unlikely without US support.

d. Ultimate Resolution. Whatever the outcome of an upheaval like that described above, certain elements in the present situation seem certain to survive. The social and economic changes brought about by Castro's revolution are unlikely to be reversed, whether or not Castro's ultimate successor be a Communist. Cuba is likely to be a socialist state and probably to require for some time an authoritarian government. Whoever the leader of Cuba is, he will probably be critically dependent upon the support of armed forces.

II. US COURSES OF ACTION

5. No Special US Initiatives. The posture of the US in the immediate aftermath of Castro's death will be of critical importance. If the US took no position and no action after Castro's death the new regime would move rapidly to consolidate

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its hold and the likelihood of an anti-Communist force emerging would be greatly reduced. If such an anti-Communist group did emerge without the encouragement or intervention of the US its position might be less vulnerable to charges of being the creature of the US. We think it much more likely, however, that any anti-Communist group that emerged in Cuba would need and might openly seek assurances and help from the US. The most likely circumstances for such an appeal would be those in which a nationalist group was openly in conflict with a Communist-directed and supported group.

6. US Support for the "True Heirs" of the 26th of July Movement.

The emergence of an effective anti-Communist force in Cuba will depend primarily on Cuban initiative and would probably require the defection of important elements of the existing regime. With proper timing, however, US encouragement might stimulate such a development. Once the internal political forces in Cuba have produced a split between the nationalists and the Moscow-oriented Communists US initiatives would be of utmost importance. At the right moment they might produce a merging of nationalists within the regime and those in opposition. This seems to us the combination most likely to upset the forces seeking a Communist succession.

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If US offers are to have an appeal to such a coalition they must make clear the willingness of the US to cooperate with former members and supporters of the Castro regime whose aim is to achieve Cuba's independence of the Soviets and the Communist Bloc. It will also be necessary for the US to make a convincing assertion of its readiness to accept most of the social and economic changes instituted by the Castro regime.

7. The problem of timing will, of course, be one of great importance. It seems likely that there would be a period during which a public announcement of US willingness to support a nationalist group would be disadvantageous. A too rapid announcement might serve to consolidate resistance to these people; a too long delay could cause them to despair. Meanwhile, it would be essential to transmit an offer of support clandestinely to the right people at the earliest possible moment. One problem will be the relative timing of a US announcement and of activities designed to preposition forces in anticipation of fulfilling promises. It will be extremely difficult to move any US forces without publicity by the US press, but such prepositioning as can be carried out inconspicuously probably ought to take place as soon as a general course of action has been decided upon. A public statement of

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US intentions should probably be made before military preparations directed toward Cuba become widely known.


8. Once a nationalist group had emerged and entered into conflict with the Moscow-oriented Communists, the assistance which it would require from the US would depend largely on circumstances. It might be that arms and ammunition delivered rapidly and in such a way as to ensure its victory would be the only aid called for. It is possible that such a group would ask for US air support and perhaps for US ground forces as well in the early stages of conflict; sooner or later it would almost certainly require such support. In a later stage if a US supported nationalist group had won dominance, the US would face a new set of problems. Almost any such group would be likely to insist that no political or social changes made under Castro be reversed except at its own initiative. Compensation for expropriated US property might be agreed to, but not at a realistic figure. The US would almost certainly be obliged to undertake an aid program at least the rough equal of the present Soviet program.

9. Action Through a Government in Exile. It is highly unlikely that any Cuban exile group could effectively influence the course of events in Cuba after Castro's death, with or without US support. Furthermore, the association of exiles with US

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initiatives would probably reduce their chances of success. It is possible that certain groups in Cuba would prefer to deal with the US through a Cuban government in exile, but we think it unlikely.

10. Quarantine and Blockade. If in consonance with various policy pronouncements the US were to quarantine Soviet attempts to reinforce its military and technical personnel in Cuba and to introduce additional armaments, the US-oriented revolutionaries would probably be enspirited. If on the other hand the US declared a blockade the reactions in Cuba would be mixed: our friends would be greatly heartened to realize that the US had indicated its willingness to bring down the Communist regime in Cuba, even at the risk of war with the Soviet Union. The regime would be apprehensive. Unless the blockade were swiftly challenged by the Soviets and the focus of the confrontation drastically shifted, the chances of the fall of the successor Cuban regime would rise.

11. Invasion. If the US declared its readiness to support the Cuban nationalists and true heirs of the Castro revolution and if such a group emerged, the chances are at least even that it would require the intervention of US forces before it could

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gain control of the island. Of the various guises under which invasion might be undertaken the least palatable and probably the least effective would be that of a Cuban exile force. An undisguised US invasion would cause political problems inside and outside Cuba, but we do not believe that they would be unacceptable to the Cuban anti-Communist movement. Much would depend, of course, on the authenticity of the Cuban movement.



12. Joint Action by Hemisphere States. Joint OAS action would be unlikely to have any great appeal to Cubans, even the Cuban nationalists. However, steps to bring the OAS in some way or another into any action contemplated by the US might help avoid many diplomatic problems in Latin America and elsewhere.

13. Soviet Reaction. Castro's departure from the scene would not lessen the Soviet concern to preserve the Communist base in Cuba. They would certainly try to influence the situation, particularly if a power struggle developed. For a time they could operate behind the scenes and publicly would not have to go beyond reaffirmation of their vague commitments to protect a Communist Cuba. Once the struggle reached open

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conflict, or if the US took strong action against the new regime, the USSR would have no choice. They would have to decide how far to go in support of a Communist faction. What they would do outside Cuba is beyond the scope of this paper, but within Cuba we believe the Soviets would be cautious about engaging in open conflict.



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19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Sabotage Program, Cuba

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority, on the above subject. Present were Mr. McNamara and General McKee; Mr. Harriman; Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald; and Mr. Bundy.

Mr. Harriman said that the Standing Group had approved the proposed external sabotage program for Cuba and that the Secretary of State had approved it in general terms, although not in detail. He said it was State's understanding that the Special Group would review the program regularly but that all concerned had agreed that once operations had begun, they should continue for a reasonable length of time and not be subject to periodic stop-and-go orders. A period of perhaps eighteen months was mentioned.

Mr. FitzGerald then gave the outlines of the proposed program. It will be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (a) electric power; (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (c) railroad and highway transportation; and (d) production and manufacturing. (He pointed out that many targets in the last category could be put out of operation by successful sabotage of power facilities.) The first operation is planned for mid-July. Raids will be conducted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents under CIA control. Missions will be staged from a U.S. key.

The point was raised that if any agents are captured they can reveal their point of departure, and the question was asked whether a British key could not be used instead. Mr. FitzGerald responded that this would not help the situation because in any case the agents would be in a position to tell a full story about U.S. involvement.

A question was asked as to whether the Cubans could retaliate in kind. The answer was that they would certainly have this capability but that they have not retaliated to date, in spite of a number of publicized exile raids.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that these operations will raise the noise level considerably, in the same manner as the Alpha 66 raids did. (A comment was made that this is certainly true, and that it

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will increase our domestic political problems, because the increased publicity will inevitably lead to complaints that the U.S. course of action is inadequate.) Mr. Bundy added that the proposed sabotage program interlocks with two other efforts along the same lines. One of these involves an autonomous operation which will be based in Central America and which will not be operative until October or November, and the other consists of continuing efforts to develop internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage. The purpose of all of this is to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest. Mr. McCone said that the military forces are a particularly important target in this connection.

Mr. McCone also emphasized the fact that no single act of sabotage, as proposed in this program, can be expected to have a very significant effect on the Cuban economy, but what we are trying for is the cumulative effect of a continuing series of operations.

The program was approved, with the understanding that operations would not begin until mid-July.

Thomas A. Parrott
Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

July 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO : CCA - Mr. Crimmins
FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.*
SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action

This paper, prepared solely by a member of the INR Special Studies Group who, among others from INR, has represented INR on the Cuba Coordinating Committee, presents a concept and offers some possible courses of action towards Cuba. It is submitted for your possible interest.

Summary and Recommendations

Rationale of Proposals

Revolutionary Nationalism Versus Communism

- A. Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Alternative
- B. Revolutionary Objectives
- C. Revolutionary Program
- D. Exile Radio Activities

Discrediting Castro in Latin America

Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule

Psychological Guidelines

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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Summary and Recommendations

US policy seeks to achieve an independent, democratic, and socially progressive Cuba and to erase the communist presence in Cuba which constitutes a foreign imposition on the Cuban people and a threat to hemispheric security. The problem discussed in this paper is how to gain these objectives without resort to invasion or attributable acts of violence and violations of international law. To this end the paper offers specific proposals and guidelines for: 1) discrediting Fidel Castro and his communist regime in Latin America, 2) destroying his image in Cuba, and 3) creating the necessary preconditions for nationalist upheaval inside Cuba within two years.

Public expression of US policy should parallel the useful distinction made during the missile crisis when action was directed not against Castro but against the communist military threat emanating from Cuba. It should now be aimed publicly not at getting rid of Castro -- since this only increases his popularity with the nationalistic Cuban people -- but at removing the threat posed by the communist presence in Cuba. The public position should be: Castro is not a threat to us, but a mere puppet who has violated Cuban liberty, dignity and well-being; the communist presence in Cuba, however, constitutes a totalitarian and subversive force in this hemisphere and therefore remains unacceptable.

In short, we suggest that the US government publicly disengage from Castro while continuing indirect action against him in order to overthrow his communist regime. Accordingly, the following action is recommended:

a. Indirectly guide nationalist revolutionary exile groups with reputations that remain untarnished (through non-identification with Batista, the Brigade, or US interests) in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime from within, under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement." We propose that reputable exile leaders such as Manolo Ray, Ernesto Betancourt and Javier Pazos: 1) be informed by Romulo Betancourt that the US expects them to assume the main leadership role in this endeavor without involving the US; 2) be offered for their consideration the strategy, Revolutionary Objectives and Revolutionary Program set forth herein; 3) be encouraged to initiate a several-month campaign of radio harassment as a prelude to fomenting organized sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare against the Castro regime; and 4) announce their Revolutionary Program on July 26, 1963, seemingly, if not actually from the Cuban mainland.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1963

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MEMORANDUM TO: Members of The Standing Group

The meeting this afternoon will be devoted to a number of special problems on Cuba, but I hope we may have a few minutes at the end to take a reading on the general position as it appears to be developing.

1. First, we will turn to the problem of sugar as presented in the papers of the Department of Agriculture. For this part of the discussion, Under Secretary Sundquist will be present for Secretary Freeman.

2. We should briefly discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death. For this part of the discussion Mr. Sherman Kent will be present.

3. There are two highly sensitive CIA papers which Mr. McCone has requested that we hold for distribution at the meeting. They deal with a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA and with the specific problem of Cuba's oil supplies.

4. I propose at the end to make a brief oral comment on the results of our discussions thus far, as I understand them. My own preliminary conclusions are not optimistic, but that is not an excuse for avoiding the issue.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

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b. Reverse the present David-Goliath relationship with Cuba by having a smaller and militarily helpless Central American state, with a highly respected leader, engage Castro in a propaganda struggle in order to distract Castro and provoke him into threatening and unwise countermeasures. If successful this will serve several purposes: 1) make an ordinary bully out of a heroically posturing Castro, cause him to lose self-esteem, and possibly involve him in a chain reaction of mistakes, 2) increase Latin American concern over Cuban subversion and promote OAS cooperation in defense of a small nation (the US should be the last to interfere overtly), 3) provide the US with an excuse to take further action against Cuba, should such escalation become desirable, and 4) present Cuba-obsessed American public opinion with a new outlook on a Castro cut down to smaller dimensions.

c. Coincidental with this baiting of Castro, and without attribution to the US, mount a campaign to destroy Castro's image through ridicule.

US strategy should be directed toward achieving the eventual downfall of the Castro/Communist regime as a result of internal stresses and in response to forces largely, if not wholly, unattributable to the US. Without fanfare and through the employment of overtly legal measures, and without displaying undue concern about Cuban diplomatic relations and marginal trade with such countries as Uruguay and Chile, the US should continue to seek the economic and political isolation of Cuba from the free world.

The Cuban regime contains the seeds of its own destruction. We believe that progress in promoting its destruction can be made in such a way as to increase US prestige in Latin America and give immediate impetus to the Alliance for Progress program.

Rationale of Proposals

The strategy proposed here is intended to supplement present measures against Cuba, and to offer operational and psychological guidelines, at the same time that it dovetails with recent policy on exile groups. It seeks to place the Cuban problem in perspective, subordinating it to more vital national and hemispheric issues. If this strategy is based on realistic assumptions and accurate analysis, it will serve as a public relations guide for the emotionally charged Cuban problem both in the

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US and abroad. Although we cannot assume that the Castro regime can be toppled by the proposed measures within twenty-four months, these proposals involve no US military commitment or financial cost, and we recommend that they be implemented without delay.

The fact that the nationalist symbol personified by Castro is now essential to communist success places the vulnerability of the Castro/Communist regime in one person and makes him the logical operational target. However, the indoctrination of Cuban youth is proceeding apace, and the loyalty of this group is being strengthened by the regime's assignment of responsible roles to relatively young cadres. Furthermore, as communist indoctrination and totalitarian organizational techniques become more effective, the communist apparatus will be able to function perhaps even more efficiently without Castro. His symbolic value in Latin America, however, would continue to be a communist asset.

Although Castro is an unreliable ally who is actually neither puppet nor neutralist, the Soviet Union is committed to supplying massive aid to him. Given the scope of this investment, there is small chance of negotiating the communist presence (foreign and local) out of Cuba. Activist Cubans inside the island, who are capable of fomenting an upheaval, view as the alternative to Communism not a democratic state but either a repetition of Batista or an American occupation. Consequently, many Cubans actually prefer Castro to foreseeable governments. They should be afforded a Cuban nationalist alternative. Moreover, a purely Cuban solution to the Cuban problem has a great advantage -- it avoids direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union.

If the Castro/Communist experiment will appear to have failed not on its own merits but as a result of obvious or inadequately disguised US intervention, or as a consequence of the fraudulent invocation (in Latin American eyes) of a unilateral and lopsided Monroe Doctrine, the validity of Castro's revolutionary course might remain unquestioned. This Castro/Communist experiment constitutes a genuine social revolution, albeit a perverted one. If it is interrupted by the force of the world's foremost "imperialist" and "capitalist" power in the absence of major provocation, such action will discredit the US and tend to validate the uncompleted experiment. Further Castro-type revolutions will then be stimulated rather than discouraged, since it will appear to many that social revolution (peaceful or otherwise) -- and not just communism -- has been outlawed by the US in this area. It is not the winning of this kind of battle but the manner in which it is won that will determine the success or failure of US policy in the hemisphere.

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Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro, destroy his self-esteem, sabotage his revolution, force him to conclude that his situation is hopeless and, as in the case of his political idol Eduardo Chibas, in 1951, drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality. While suicide is not expected, it is reasonable to anticipate that sustained harassment and denigration of Castro plus frustration of communist plans within Cuba will provoke turmoil and set the stage for the regime's collapse.

The targets of pressure, influence, and support in Cuba are the military, urban labor (in particular pre-Castro trade union members), student, bureaucratic, and other groups that are susceptible to disenchantment with Castro. The Cuban masses are at least passively loyal to Castro and not a major target. Action against Cuban and bloc ships even within the Cuban three mile limit should be avoided, in order to deny the Soviet Union an excuse for claiming attack in international waters, which would allow them to use this issue to obscure Castro's reversals by confusing Cuban and world opinion.

The greatest weapon against Communist subversion and recurrent disorder in Latin America would be convincing evidence that the Alliance for Progress is in forward motion and that the internal social reforms upon which it is dependent are being carried out. US strategy must recognize that such reforms are initiated in response to political pressure, which can only be applied by an articulate electorate, literate and instructed in democratic practices. Perhaps the greatest stumbling block to effective implementation of the Alliance program is the Latin American feeling that it is essentially a negative anti-Cuba policy. Unless the Alliance for Progress is dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist programs and policy, Castro can successfully exploit this association to destroy the hopes of Cuban and other Latin American idealists.

US pressure tactics to obtain collective OAS measures against Castro's regime often result in creating resentment against the US and sympathy for Cuba. Legal victories of tactical value, unsupported by Latin American public opinion, or supported by disreputable and transient regimes, should not obscure continuing problems which may become a source of later political defeats. Other OAS members should continue to be encouraged to accept more responsibility for the Cuban problem, even to the extent of putting forth solutions we may not favor.

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Possible OAS attempts, promoted by such countries as Mexico and Brazil, to reach an understanding with Castro can always be used to publicize conditions within Cuba by posing such terms as: holding of elections (a nudge to Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and Guatemala), releasing political prisoners, university autonomy, reintegration of exiles, and Cuban cooperation against foreign subversion.

Revolutionary Nationalism versus Communism

A. Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Alternative

Reputable exile groups, such as are led by Manolo Ray, embody a nationalist alternative to a Castro/Communist dominated Cuba, but they must appear to operate without US support from Latin American bases. Only by appealing to Cuban nationalism and by supporting the original aims of the Cuban revolution can the exiles stimulate and promote action which will retain the passivity of the masses, dampen the enthusiasm of Cuban youth, gain the support of urban labor, weaken the loyalty of cadre elements -- who in vast majority are not now Communists -- and turn them against the communist regime.

At a carefully determined appropriate time, Soviet installations on the Cuban mainland should be attacked by exile and local guerrillas on a large scale. Severe reprisals against these Cuban action elements might provide a lever for creating antagonism between the Soviets and the Cuban people. If properly exploited and publicized by non-US media, a quiet rage could accumulate in the minds of at least some of the 300,000 Cubans under arms. Since the US will appear dissociated from this activity and unable to control it, it will be justified in publicly ignoring any Soviet or Castro complaints. Although there would be some risk of escalation, we should be prepared to meet it in order to permit Cuban patriots to evict the Communists from Cuba.

No public encouragement should be given the Cuban exiles beyond the universally accepted acknowledgement that patriots have the right to fight for the independence and freedom of their own countries. Reputable exile elements should obtain their moral and material support from such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica. Direct US assistance should be avoided or channeled through the governments of the above-mentioned countries. Excessive US or even foreign assistance or involvement will become known and thus tend to sap Cuban nationalist initiative, lessen revolutionary motivation and appeal, and allow Castro convincingly to blame the US.

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Although exiles can be instrumental in establishing the preconditions of successful revolt, the main effort must come from within Cuba. With proper guidance (from Betancourt, Orlich or Americans they trust) reputable exiles can present an appealing program, create a mystique and a provisional leadership symbol in imprisoned revolutionary hero Major Huber Matos, and initiate the psychological and operational program to discredit Castro and provoke internal revolt.

The uprisings in Poland and East Germany and the successful revolt in Hungary were crushed by the use or threat of use of massive military force: large Soviet armies were stationed on their territories. In contrast, the absence of an occupation army permitted Yugoslavia to exert its independence. For the same reason, and also because of geographical separation, little Albania not only maintains its independence from, but also brazenly thumbs its nose at, Moscow. And, with a few hundred men Castro overthrew a regime whose forces were equipped and trained by the US. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if the well-armed Cubans should decide to revolt, the small number of Soviet troops there would almost certainly act wisely by remaining in their barracks.

Except for specific actions, outside inducements and pressures for exile political unity only internationalize and thus neutralize their most cohesive element -- nationalism. For example, an exile government would only be discredited as a US puppet and have no appeal within Cuba at this time. Similarly, whenever an exile group is closely identified with the US or its interests, Castro is able to rally Cuban nationalism to his support. Center and left-of-center groups need not be alienated, but it is only the revolutionary exiles who can convey nationalist conviction to potential upheavalists in Cuba; this nationalist focus is a tactical communications device.

Some exile action groups are cooperating among themselves. In exchange for supplies and by demonstrating more effective leadership, the more reputable ones could perform a coordinating function. For action purposes these units should add to their own emblems that of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement." The latter might infuriate Castro and confuse his supporters. Formal political unity is largely irrelevant and should not be pressed.

Mutuality of interest and proven trust remain the most effective means of influencing exile groups toward cooperative action. Any attempt by a foreign power to control exile activities will corrupt and discredit them or reveal that their integrity can be purchased. In Castro's own words: "Revolutions are carried out on a basis of morality."


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As a reputable exile, Castro trained with his men in Mexico and solicited funds in New York City. After he landed in Cuba and commenced organized guerrilla activity, he expressed this view of the function of non-combatant exiles:

Exiles should cooperate in the struggle, but it is absurd for them to try to tell us from abroad what peak we should take, what sugar field we should burn, what sabotage we should perform, or at what moment and in what circumstances and form we should unleash the general strike. In addition to being absurd, it is ridiculous. Help us from abroad by collecting money among the exiles and the Cuban emigrants, by campaigning for the cause of Cuba in the press and in public opinion. Denounce the crimes we are suffering here, but do not pretend to direct from Miami the revolution that is being waged in all of the cities and country places of the island through fighting, agitating, sabotaging and striking and thousands of other forms of revolutionary action, which have been the war strategy of the 26th of July Movement.

Although Castro fought very few battles in the Sierra Maestra, he was able to broadcast fairly regularly to the Cuban people (reportedly by tapes via Radio Caracas). His kind treatment of the local peasantry, and their consequent passive adherence to his cause, plus the relative indifference of the Cuban military forces sent against him (mostly interested in plunder) were special circumstances which no guerrilla unit can hope to duplicate within the present totalitarian security arrangement. While guerrilla activity in Cuba now usually has tragic results, this action perhaps cannot and probably should not be discouraged. However, such action units require guidance and coordination of their losses are to be reduced and their effectiveness increased. This need could be filled by revolutionary exile radio, which should promote not revolt, but relatively less risky sabotage (spiking highways accommodating Soviet trucks) and passive resistance. Discouraging revolt at this time would give this radio an aura of wisdom and authority and also suggest its certainty about the coming revolt and its timing: "Do not revolt now!", has an ominous ring.

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B. Revolutionary Objectives

Only by drawing to themselves the very powerful force of Cuban nationalism can the reputable exiles undermine the present Cuban regime and provoke a revolt or palace revolution against Castro. Towards this end they must be able to:

- 1) convince the Cuban people that they are against any foreign interference, US or Soviet;
- 2) convince the Cuban people that they are engaged in an internal struggle, indifferent to whether or not this is part of a global Cold War;
- 3) convey certainty of ultimate victory and demonstrate willingness to sacrifice;
- 4) identify themselves with the original aims of the Cuban revolution, the Constitution of 1940 as amended in the light of history since 1958, and the ideas of Marti;
- 5) separate patriots from ambitious politicians, reduce dissension among reputable exiles, encourage internal leadership for an uprising and discourage future caudillos like Castro, by publicly excluding themselves from public office for two years after liberation;
- 6) announce the objectives of the revolution from the Cuban mainland, make clear that a detailed program will not be imposed but must be worked out with the democratic participation of the Cuban people, have it understood that no one person nor any exile group can claim the right to speak for all the Cuban people;
- 7) establish Free University of Havana facilities in a Central American Republic to train exile students, excluding partisan politics (as guests of a friendly country) and political undesirables, partly as a lure to defect Cuban youth through a superior educational program, with Radio Education to be beamed at Cuba;

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- 8) make the Cuban hero Major Huber Matos an effective revolutionary symbol and provisional leader (the mystique of an unseen man leading a revolution from a dungeon cell); initiate a student sponsored "Save the Rosenbergs"-type campaign (complete with riots and demonstrations), not in the US but in Latin America, to "Free Matos!" and free the estimated forty to seventy-five thousand political prisoners in Cuba (about whom there has been astonishingly little concern) and collect money to assist their families;
- 9) halt haphazard raids and attacks which might harm innocent people (allowing Castro to speak of dead women and children), concentrate on key military (particularly foreign), industrial and communications installations, avoiding bloodshed if possible; gain the cooperation of other exiles and insurgents by offering arms and equipment in return for coordination and cooperation;

C. Revolutionary Program


The following are suggestions for a public program which the exiles should announce on the Cuban mainland through radio and leaflets under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement" and with Matos as their provisional leader. The feasibility and the details of this program would of course have to be determined by the reputable exiles themselves; whatever are its contents, its primary purpose is to appeal to the people within Cuba. The principles to be enunciated would include:

- 1) Political freedom, civil liberties, rule of law and respect for individual privacy; and social justice along the lines of the 1940 Constitution. Implementation of the original aims of the 26th of July Movement. All political, social and economic programs to be voted on freely by all the Cuban people.
- 2) Exile leaders exclude themselves from accepting political office (a Castro tactic). All office-holders will be elected and for specific periods of time. No more Caudillos like Batista or Castro. The OAS will be asked to help provisional leaders to administer until national and local elections are held twelve months after liberation.

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- 3) Restore university autonomy and the free exchange of ideas and scholars. Espousal of all political ideas permitted, but Communist and Fascist political parties forbidden for a period of five years. Children will be taught the true Cuban ideals of Marti.
- 4) No labor without pay. Workers can form their own trade unions and elect their own leaders without government interference. Sick leave and other benefits to be restored. Peasants will be given the choice of: a) owning their own land; b) finding employment on cooperatives; c) obtaining training and work in urban areas.
- 5) Elimination of capital punishment, exclusion of reprisals against cadres of the present regime; those guilty of atrocities to be judged by an impartial jury under OAS supervision; prevention of unnecessary killing of Cubans by Cubans; transformation of the Isles of Pines into a national park, and the prison into a technical school for the young.
- 6) Recommend a mixed type of economy: state, local, cooperative and private enterprise. Decisions will be made on the basis of experiment with ultimate decisions determined by referendum of the Cuban people.
- 7) Property will not be restored to Batistianos and Communists. Foreign owned properties will be compensated on the basis of 1958 tax assessed evaluation over a period of fifteen years. Foreign owned companies have the choice of this compensation or restoration of 49% ownership plus 51% compensated provided they are willing to assist modernization and share management on all levels with Cuban nationals.
- 8) Foreign investment will be carefully regulated along the lines of the Mexican Revolution, with 51% ownerships rule applicable to all enterprises. For a period of at least two years Cuba will not accept unilateral economic assistance from the West or from the Communist bloc, but will seek

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aid and technical assistance from the international organizations such as the UN or the OAS and from such countries as Sweden and Israel. (This might not be practical, but should have public appeal.)

(An outcry against revolutionary exile proposals for the handling of foreign property and investment by short-sighted American business interests with assets in Cuba will have the beneficial effect of increasing the appeal and legitimacy of the exiles putting forth this program.)

Anything less than a program of this kind will confirm Castro's frequent and effective warning to the Cubans: "They will take it away from you." This program should be acceptable to the 26th of July leaders who refused to accept Castro's dictatorship and a Communist society. It should also appeal to ranking Cuban nationalists who remained in Cuba. The importance of this leadership element was confirmed recently by the British Ambassador to Cuba: "He (Castro) desperately needs his new friends, the 'old Communists'. He needs thier political theory as a basis for his society...But he cannot afford to lose his old strongly nationalistic 26th of July Movement comrades."

D. Exile Radio Activities

Exile broadcasts from Latin American countries or from international waters should attempt to transmit occasionally from the Cuban mainland or give the appearance of so doing, since it may be difficult to convey revolutionary inspiration from abroad. Exile broadcasts can be justified by recalling the totalitarian logic by which Castro demands non-intervention in his affairs while he intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations. Operational difficulties should be admitted to the Cuban people with the explanation that mainland broadcasts will become more regular and frequent when the Soviets leave with all their weapons.

Exile radio activity is essential for the following reasons and purposes:

- 1) It can harass and ridicule Castro directly by interrupting the transmission of his speeches: "Fidel has no chin"; "Why did you kill Cienfuegos?"

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- 2) Keep alive hope and the original aims of the 26th of July Movement, play its anthem (now forbidden), and remind Cubans that they and the revolution have been betrayed. Therefore, it can portray Castro as the Counter-revolutionary.
- 3) Incite and teach no revolt but riskless sabotage and passive resistance as the first stage of rebel planning. "Cuban food yes, Soviet sugar cane no!" Guevara's guerrilla handbook can be used against Guevara.
- 4) If Castro retaliates in a brutal manner against insurgents who have attacked Soviet installations, it can help direct Cuban nationalism against the "Soviet occupation force."
- 5) After engaging democratic Latin American students in a "Free Matos!" campaign, it can raise this cry within Cuba and create a rallying symbol in the person of an authentic revolutionary hero, lodged in a prison once occupied by Castro.
- 6) The Revolutionary Program should be announced from the Sierra Maestra (from the source of the struggle) partly to infuriate Castro and in sentimental appeal to the non-Communist revolutionaries still in Cuba; "Unions for the workers, land for the peasants, Cuba for the Cubans!" The main appeal would be directed at the urban classes.
- 7) It can repeat Castro's broken promises regarding civil liberties, free press, elections, land reform: "Marti si, Comunismo no."
- 8) By broadcasting accurate information about the outside world, it can remind Cubans of their isolation and help cope with a problem described by Jaime Benitez: "...for want of adequate information from the outside, divergences of opinion within the country grow undernourished and eventually stifled..."

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- 9) Radio Free Havana University can keep alive the ideals of freedom and democracy through political education programs: "The autonomous university is the cradle of liberty." "this is the democratic creed that Marti preached," etc.
- 10) It can emphasize that the Revolution is purely Cuban and not exportable to other countries such as Brazil, Chile or Mexico (for an interesting reaction).


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Discrediting Castro in Latin America

Fidel Castro regards himself as a transformer of history--a Bolshevik Bolivar--and he sustains himself psychologically by the exaggerated role he has been able to play in the Cold War and within the communist bloc. His ability to manipulate mass emotions and to maintain political momentum stems in large measure from the heroic role he plays in a David-Goliath political setting. Thus as long as Goliath (the US) continues to appear to be his main threat, the longer he will be able to feed his own ego and maintain his heroic reputation with Cubans and with important anti-Yankee elements in Latin America who already have deep-seated prejudices against the US.

We propose that the president of a small Central American republic be induced to assume a David role in which he employs ridicule and invective to make of Castro an enraged and impotent Goliath, thereby substantially reducing Castro's prestige and conspiratorial effectiveness throughout Latin America. For the sake of illustration it will be assumed that the republic is Costa Rica, a country dedicated to freedom and democracy. Costa Rica is half the size of Cuba, has a population of only 1.2 million, and a per capita annual GNP of over \$400. (comparable to pre-Castro Cuba). Moreover, Costa Rica possesses the unique advantage of a population which is 88% literate, and no army save a civil security force of some 2,700 men.

Costa Rican president Francisco Orlich is an educated and forceful man who actively participated in fighting during the 1948 Costa Rican revolution and later helped repel an insurrectionary raid from Nicaragua. He belongs to the Figueres-led political group in Costa Rica which has promoted democracy with such fervor abroad that it has been accused internally of "international adventurism."

As a consequence, if Orlich were to accept this proposed role, he might be obliged to strengthen his political position within Costa Rica. By placing his own house in the best possible order, he would increase his effectiveness in this proposed role. If Castro can be provoked into a public polemic with Orlich, Orlich would be obliged to prove his consistency by expressing some criticism of other authoritarian states. US effectiveness might be equal to its ability to remain publicly aloof.

Orlich's opening maneuver would follow along these lines. He would present Costa Rica as a functioning democracy which is achieving its social revolution in freedom--in contrast to Cuba. That its aims are peaceful is attested by the fact that it has no army. It is justifiably proud of having more teachers than policemen. These and other real achievements should be made known to the

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Cuban people by radio broadcast. It should be easy to find other excuses to provoke Castro and outside radio penetration, according to the Canadian Ambassador to Cuba, provokes Castro's total rage.

Once Castro is provoked into responding to these measures, Orlich would step up the power of his transmitter so that all Cubans will come into range for clear reception. Although Orlich would probably need little or no coaching in this role, the following are examples of lines he might adopt:

- 1) Politely request that "brother" Fidel refrain from interfering in the affairs of democratic sovereign states. Invite the Cuban people to visit a land of freedom and social justice--when they are again free to travel.
- 2) Deny vehemently that he believes that Fidel is mad--as is alleged by some medical authorities, admit the possibility that he might, however, be a little sick mentally and for this reason deserving of kindness and understanding.
- 3) Express frequent praise for the Cuban people and its noble traditions, make clear that disdain is only directed at Castro and his fellow-puppet entourage.
- 4) Take advantage of Castro's vanity, accuse him of sporting a beard simply because he has no chin. His proprietor Khrushchev needs no beard, dare his vassal to be man enough to shave.
- 5) Describe the free and happy people of Costa Rica, a land without concentration camps, without political prisoners, where citizens are not required to spy on each other, where the dignity of privacy is respected. Explain that he has come to office via a free election, other political parties are allowed and dissenting views are, in fact, encouraged.
- 6) Invite unarmed Cuban observers to learn about democracy. Remind Castro of his dealings with Trujillo.
- 7) Make no mention of the US or the Alliance for Progress.

If Castro responds to this baiting, Orlich can defy him, emphasize the absence of a military establishment and declare that a free people--even without any armaments--has nothing to fear from a deranged and silly dictator. This should be sufficient to rally other Latin American countries to Costa Rica's defense, and the



anticipated excesses of Castro's fury would do much to discredit him in Latin America.

It is imperative that the "Colossus of the North" remove itself from direct confrontation with a "small, defenseless country." Castro needs to be pitted against a competitor on his own level, one not vulnerable to charges of "imperialism," "dollar-diplomacy" and other shibboleths to which Latin Americans instinctively respond. Costa Rica or a similar country is invulnerable to these charges.

When the American public observes Castro responding to the hounding of little Costa Rica, it will come to view the Cuban problem with perspective and without hysteria or obsession. In turn, when Castro finds himself cut to size, his new perspective might impel him into obsessive and hysterical behavior. Assuming a sympathetic attitude for a sick man on the part of the Cuban people, they might decide to dispense with his services, without violence.

This proposal is a further effort to discredit Castro, which in conjunction with other efforts, might create internal stresses leading to Castro's removal by Cubans. At the least, it should help to discredit him in Latin America, it might provoke him into surfacing his aggressive intentions, and it might provide an excuse for additional OAS measures against him.

Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule

The Cuban sense of humor is ideally suited to poking fun at even the Maximum Leader. With a population of only six and a half million, Cuba has 1,300,000 radio and 370,000 television receivers. The media of television and radio are therefore essential in connecting Castro's psychological needs, his charismatic popularity, and revolutionary control over the Cuban population with his defiance of the US. This arrangement is vulnerable to broadcast interference from outside Cuba, and it offers opportunities to subject Castro to ridicule. Castro's extreme sense of dignidad, however, will not permit him to find this amusing and the Cuban reaction might have considerable impact on the less stable elements of his personality.

As Latin America's most accomplished orator, Castro's broadcast exhibitions of sympathy for and identification with the underdog and the masses are so accomplished that they may be partly genuine. They are the source of his strength and appeal. Paranoia, however, is his most salient personality trait and to him this affliction is a boon.

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It fits ideally the role he seeks to play. He would create enemies if they did not already exist and his defiance of these enemies, which is frequently headlined in the press ("Castro Still Defiant," "Castro Shouts Defiance of OAS") impelled him to an effort to defy Khrushchev. This stance of apparent heroism has been linked with Cuban nationalism. Javier Pazos offers this analysis: "Fidel Castro...knows very well that the regime he has established can only maintain itself in power by confronting the Cuban people with an external menace. Both the Communists and Castro need to be in constant strife with the US in order to survive." The Canadian Ambassador to Cuba recently observed:

Castro keeps his revolution going, however, by playing on and building up anti-US sentiment and the Messianic cause of Latin American revolution. These themes are essential to his program. He always seems to have to attack something....What he really enjoys is playing the role of a world figure...Invasion scares...seem to strengthen rather than weaken him.

(On the other hand, when it is tactically to Castro's advantage, he could stress his role as a world leader by emphasizing coexistence. Castro may decide that he has achieved eminence on a par with Khrushchev and Mao, and he might temporarily confine his activities to maintaining his position).

Cubans and other Latin Americans enjoy observing Castro pluck the American Eagle's tail feathers. In turn, his audiences satisfy his need for adulation. Reporter Donald Grant states that, "In Castro's complex personality, vanity looms so large that some who have known him intimately think it verges on pathological narcissism." In reality, Castro rules by television and public appearance, simultaneously feeding his ego and retaining his popularity. His own description of this therapy is: "My medicine is the people...I thrive on seeing and talking to the people."

Radio and television transmission could be carried out by exiles using a well-known Cuban broadcaster, or someone with a quick and acid wit, either by adding to Castro's dialogue by mimicking his voice (as the "Minimum Leader") or by speaking to and commenting on his dialogue during a live transmission.

Radio interference will pose no problems. Line of sight sound transmission to television receivers would be complicated since it would involve some risks to those operating nearby but outside the three mile limit. A transmitting balloon antenna, for example, would permit greater range but also be easier to locate

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and subject to weather conditions. The US would not, of course, be directly involved in this operation.

The minimal arrangement requires that the anti-Castro wit be able to receive at least the sound of Castro's voice while transmitting his own voice to Castro's radio listeners with some clarity and range. An example of how this might sound is contained in an imaginary interference with a real speech delivered by Castro at the Rene Fraga Moreno sports field in Mantanzas, broadcast over Havana National Radio and Television Network 0224 GMT, 31 March 1963 (FBIS text).

/mimicking Castro/

...This is something fundamental and of special importance to the revolution. /which I have betrayed/ Human intelligence and human work is what creates and produces. /not beards and cigars/ For that reason, in the Oriente mountains, in the pre-vocational school, /in Siberia/ there are at present nearly 4,000 students, in the schools /and prisons/ of Las Minas del Frio (applause) who will be meeting gradually our /Khrushchev's/ future needs, the plans for improving our present teachers, who year by year are bettering themselves to fulfill their sacred duty/ to Russia/ For that reason we should glance to the future, because the future belongs completely to us. /Blas Roca/ (at this point a monitoring technician hands Castro a note explaining this interference. Castro shakes his fist in defiance as a voice says) / I am the Gusano Maximo and I hate all Cubans!/

/dialogue with and comments on Castro/

The imperialists have tried to copy these tactics of revolutionaries, /Fidel, you are lying!/ but the mentality of a counterrevolutionary/ like brother Raul/ will never be the mentality of a revolutionary/ come on, Fidel, shave/ the mentality of the counterrevolutionary will be crime, terror, and one of awaiting for the foreigner to come and invade. /what nonsense/

And here in this province, /where is your chin, Fidel?/ at the end of January, and at the beginning of February/ March too?/ two workers of La Co were murdered./ you did it, Fidel, you butcher!/ A family, with two children, was shot to death;/ you communist murderer/ and thus several crimes were committed/ you're lying again, you ape....

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
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 20, 1963



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action

As you requested, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's "Cuba: Possible Courses of Action" (attached). Essentially, the paper purports to show how we can achieve a solution to the Cuban problem without resorting to invasion or attributable acts of violence or violation of international law. To this end the paper offers specific guidelines for (1) discrediting Castro and his regime in Latin America, (2) destroying Castro's image in Cuba, and (3) creating the necessary pre-conditions for a Cuban upheaval within two years.

At the outset, the author gives the "rationale of proposals" which he describes later in the paper. First, the proposals will dovetail with present policies, put the Cuban problem in a properly subordinate perspective and involve no U.S. military or financial cost. U.S. public posture should be that Castro is not a threat to us and that we are concerned not with him but with the Communist presence in Cuba. Second, the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom. Third, there is little chance of negotiating the Soviet presence out of Cuba. Fourth, a purely Cuban solution is most desirable. It avoids a US-USSR confrontation. Also, it is important for our hemispheric policy that the Cuban/Communist experiment appear to fail on its own merits; thus, we should disguise any U.S. intervention. Fifth, our targets should be the military, urban labor, students, and bureaucracy; the masses are not a good target. We should leave Cuban and Soviet shipping alone since such attacks will obscure Cuban reverses by confusing Cuban and world opinion. Sixth, the Alliance for Progress must show forward motion and should be dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist policies. Seventh, we should encourage OAS members to accept more responsibility for the Cuban problem. The author then goes on to describe his proposals under four main headings.

1. Revolutionary Nationalism vs. Communism -- Reputable exile groups (e.g. Manolo Ray) can be instrumental in establishing pre-conditions for a successful revolt, which must come from within. The U.S. should help only indirectly. Apparent U.S. involvement will sap internal Cuban initiative, tend to discredit the integrity and appeal (to Cubans) of the revolution and allow Castro to convincingly blame the U.S. Help should be channelled through such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica; the exiles, who should strenuously appeal to the powerful sources of Cuban nationalism, should operate from Latin American bases.

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Some specific exile objectives are (1) to convince Cuban people that they are against any foreign interference, and that, indifferent to the Cold War, they are engaged in an internal struggle; (2) to convey certainty of victory and demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice; (3) to attack and provoke attacks on Soviet installations in the hope that reprisals will create Soviet/Cuban antagonisms. (The U. S. should be dissociated from this but should be prepared to risk possible escalation.); (4) to separate patriots from ambitious politicians and to encourage internal leadership for uprising; (5) to establish a Free University of Havana in Latin America which will offer a better program (to be beamed at Cuba) and which will draw defecting students.

The exiles, under the banner of "The Authentic 26 of July Movement", with Major Huber Matos as provisional leader (the mystic of the imprisoned leader), should announce its program to Cuba. The program's principles would include (1) political freedom, the rule of law, a return to the original aims of the revolution; (2) free elections after 12 months, with exile leaders excluding selves from accepting political office (a Castro tactic); (3) restoration of university autonomy; (4) trade unions, no labor without pay and a better deal for the peasants; (5) no reprisals and an end to capital punishment; (6) a mixed economy; (7) compensation for, but regulation of foreign companies; (8) aid from UN or OAS but not from U.S. or Soviets for two years; (9) no property or political office for Communists or Fascists.

The exiles should broadcast to Cuba from Latin American countries, international waters, and occasionally from the Cuban mainland. Such broadcasts are essential for the following reasons and purposes: (1) harass and ridicule Castro; (2) keep hope alive and emphasize the original aims of the revolution; (3) play the July 26 anthem (now forbidden); (4) incite and teach no revolution, but riskless sabotage and passive resistance; (5) direct the broadcasts against "Soviet occupation forces"; (6) stress "Free Matos" campaigns; (7) announce a revolutionary program from Sierra Maestra; (8) repeat Castro's broken promises; (9) bring information from the outside to remind Cubans of their isolation.

2. Discrediting Castro in Latin America -- The author notes that in his role of David against Goliath, Castro prospers in the eyes of Cubans and many Latin Americans who enjoy seeing Goliath's tail twisted. We should encourage a small Central American country -- e. g. Costa Rica -- to take up the cudgels with Castro and shower him with invective and ridicule. Hopefully, Castro will respond to the bait. This will (1) provoke Castro into surfacing his aggressive intentions and make an ordinary bully out of the heroically-posturing "Maximum Leader"; (2) increase Latin American concern over Cuban subversion and promote OAS cooperation in defense of a small nation; (3) provide the U. S. with an excuse to take further

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action against Cuba should escalation be desirable; and (4) present American public opinion with a new outlook on a Castro cut down to size.

Costa Rica deserves serious consideration for the purpose described above. It is much smaller than Cuba (1.2 million people), has the same per capita income as pre-Castro Cuba, is 88% literate, has no army but a small security force of 2700 ("more teachers than police") and is a democracy achieving social revolution in freedom. Orlich might be very willing to play the role.

3. Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule -- The author suggests that we take advantage of Cuba's good radio and T.V. facilities, the Cuban sense of humor and Castro's paranoia and sense of dignity. We should arrange interference in his broadcasts -- e.g. mimicry, or biting comments (a little sick mentally, beard covering weak chin) while he is speaking. Such tactics might amuse the Cuban people, enrage Castro and help destroy his charismatic image. He should be susceptible to this sort of thing.

4. Psychological Guidelines -- The author notes that Latin American support of U.S. policy is often impeded by Yankee-phobia and offers these guidelines -- (1) we should not appear to be opposed to economic and social revolution; (2) we should to ignore Castro taunts; (3) we should erase the Bay of Pigs image, a loser; (4) to maintain flexibility we should keep U.S. policy statements to a minimum; (5) we should encourage OAS initiative; (6) we should avoid direct attributable involvement in Cuban situation.

5. Comment -- The author has been hampered by the fact that a lot is going on in U.S./Cuban affairs that he doesn't know about. However, I agree with Bromley that there are some interesting ideas in the paper which are worth exploring. We will do this at the next Psychological Subcommittee meeting on Wednesday.

GC
Gordon Chase

I expanded the theme

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Without speculating on the long and short term repercussions of such tactics, this affront to Castro's personal dignity might, as a start, amuse the Cuban people, enrage Castro and help to destroy his charismatic image. Personal dignity is the touchstone of the Latin American personality. Affronts to Castro's personal vanity might make him wilder and more open to terror than existing economic and political pressures.

Psychological Guidelines

Latin American support of US policy towards Cuba is impeded by Yankeeophobia, historically justified or imagined fears of the Colossus of the North, and the spectacle of direct US confrontation with a small Caribbean country. To many Latin Americans, the Cuban regime is linked with a social and economic revolution. Therefore, the US seems to oppose a social revolutionary trend and is portrayed as a "reactionary" country by the left. Within the US, there is a grave danger that public, press, and partisan obsession with the Cuban problem will tend to force counter-productive policy actions such as immediate responses to Castro's charges or the issuance of overly precise and unnecessary policy statements. Such public attention only serves to nourish Castro's ego, arouse Cuban nationalism to his support, and enhance his stature elsewhere.

There is no reason for US officials and media to reply to charges and taunts emanating from Castro's verbosity, and it does not become a great nation to hasten to honor such provocation with a reply. Propaganda cannot be refuted immediately by truth, nor can one debate with someone uninterested in facts. The only remedy is the steady flow of the truth, which in time builds up the credibility of the medium employed and allows truth to be identified as such.

We must erase the Bay of Pigs image by not playing up the Brigade or the individuals connected with it. If nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like failure itself.

Except for special circumstances, additional statements of US policy towards Cuba will tend to inhibit US freedom of action by limiting alternatives, confining policy rigidly to a single course, arousing more questions than are answered, or alerting Castro to a possible policy change. Moreover, Castro will use the opportunity to claim that the US is again threatening the Cuban people. Both in the matter of pronouncements and with respect to overt policies it is usually preferable to have the initiative taken by one or more members of the OAS. To do otherwise confirms the Latin American conviction that the US is overly

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obsessed with Cuba, to the detriment of the Alliance for Progress.

Direct US involvement in anti-Castro information propaganda campaigns creates, rather than destroys, sympathy for Castro in Latin America. Therefore, as much as possible, unattributable material and sources should be used. For the US publicly to ignore Castro would be to deprive him of his largest audience, and it might provoke him into attention-seeking behavior, which in turn might have a sobering effect on Latin American oligarchs who are resisting reforms. It is really by his own actions (shooting of political prisoners, admission of Marxist ideological motivation, and allowing the Soviet missile buildup) that Castro has lost face in Cuba and elsewhere. Rather than engage in a continuing public polemic with Castro, thereby elevating him to our level, the US and its media should keep public commentary on Cuba to a minimum.

Should it become desirable or necessary for the US to comment on the proposed Exile Revolutionary Program, if it is announced, the following guidelines are recommended:

- 1) The US is pleased to note that the formulators defer to the Cuban people for ultimate approval of their program. The future of Cuba can only be decided by the Cubans. We applaud this democratic procedure.
- 2) Every free man awaits the day when Cuba is no longer a Soviet satellite. The Cuban Revolution, although betrayed by a "puppet," still lives. Our sympathies lie with the brave men who risk and give their lives to free their homeland.
- 3) It is understood that the Free World would come to the assistance of a free Cuba. It is for the Cuban people to make a determination on economic assistance after they have reviewed the economic mess left by the Communists.

Since it is known that the US is always prepared to assist noncommunist countries in difficulty, it might appear patronizing and seem like bribery for the US to over-emphasize its capacity to grant economic aid to a free Cuba. Mention of the Alliance for Progress in this context will only exalt its negative (anti-Castro) aspects.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1963

SECRET EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within
the Government

As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two "exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. S. participation in these operations, was excellent.

While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation, and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U. S. -directed raid against Cuba. For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were generally acquainted with the U. S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere; and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told, for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware of the raids.

I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids -- one, that it is in the nature of the problem that many people probably have to know something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently

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Archives

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(page 1 of 2 pages)

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September 23, 1963

can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

SECRET - EYES ONLY

(page 2 of 2 pages)

FROM

JUL 10 1975

Archives

October 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Item for your 4 o'clock meeting this afternoon

I think it would be a wise precaution at the end of this meeting to ask that one copy of all important separate instructions and reports made on any channel -- State, CIA, DOD, USIA, and JCS -- be sent over here during this next period for your personal information.

My object here is to provide a check on the tone of voice of policy-level messages in these tense periods. There is just no doubt at all that a good deal of our trouble in the last three months has come from differences of emphasis, at least, in what we have said to the field. It is pointlessly cumbersome to inhibit the dispatch of business by requiring interdepartmental clearance on everything, but the existence of a single information copy of everything important for you over here will allow Mike and me to call to your attention any serious divergencies.

In requesting such a single information copy, you would be safe in saying that in no case would any such copy be given any additional circulation without direct notice from you to the agency concerned.

I do not underestimate the sensitivity of this order. JCS, DOD, and CIA particularly feel that they have a right to communication downward that is not monitored from above. But your interest is not served by the uncritical acceptance of that right.

McG. B.

FROM

JUL 10 1975

Archives

October 29, 1963

CHECK LIST FOR 4 PM MEETING

(Not intended to be exhaustive)

1. Intelligence

- A. Estimate of prospective balance of forces;
- B. Estimate of quality and quantity of military leadership committed;
- C. Summary of intelligence questions on which it would be profitable to ask further field assessment, e.g.,
 - 1. Can we insist on independent process of confirmation or cross-check?
 - 2. Should we ask for a separate evaluation on these questions by Harkins?

2. Lodge's Movements

- A. If we keep him in place, what are consequences for
 - 1. Plausible denial;
 - 2. Possible indefinite delay in return while nothing happens;
 - 3. Possible bad signal to Nhu or to coup group.
- B. If he returns on schedule, who is in charge in Saigon, and under what instructions. (There should be a draft instruction to Truehart and Harkins on this point for the 4 o'clock meeting.)

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 9 1975

Archives

Contingency Planning

A. CINCPAC - Presumably Defense will draft instructions for Felt which will preserve cover but move substantial forces to within easy range of Saigon.

B. Response to coup. Presumably Harkins should be asked for detailed plans on use and withholding of U. S. forces so as not to choose up sides.

C. There should be a political scenario of U. S. posture;

1. while in a possibly prolonged struggle;

2. if coup succeeds;

3. if coup fails.

ROM

JUL 9 1975

Archives

VIA CAS CHANNEL

10/30/63

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR: AMBASSADOR LODGE

Dec
FROM: BUNDY, WHITE HOUSE

1. Your 2063 shows important difference in our views and we must repeat that we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not give a better-than-even prospect of quick success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we do not share conclusion implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.

2. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not a better-than-even chance of quick success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

JUL 9 1975

Archives

10/30/63

any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong advice given as a friend and choice of sides by USG.

3. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

4. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team, and our only modification

of existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

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10/30/63

all instruction and debriefing of Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein and what he reports at all stages.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires final local U. S. authority to be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this internal switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 5. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

5. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U.S. -controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

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Archives

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10/30/63

such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.

In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may offer asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.

d. But once a coup has begun, and within these restrictions, it is not in the interest of the U. S. Government that it should fail.

6. We have your message about return to Washington and if announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

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JUL 1975

Archives

10 June 1964


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate
Selected Cuban Government Leaders

1. The following report was compiled from information obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions. Presumably the sources of the report, in submitting this information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan.

2. A Cuban exile was approached on 2 March 1964 by an acquaintance who wished to discuss a plan, which was still in the embryonic state, to assassinate Fidel Castro. The acquaintance was described as a businessman and a shipowner who owns at least one ship which sails under the British flag, and who also has a legally sanctioned interest in distributing and placing slot machines in gambling houses. The involvement of the acquaintance in the slot-machine business brings the man in contact with elements in the underworld, primarily through his partner who is a former police officer from St. Louis and through whom there is a tie-in with elements of "Cosa Nostra." The "Cosa Nostra" elements are alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba, and they have offered to assassinate Castro for \$150,000; no advance funds were requested. If the mission cannot be accomplished, or if the plan is unsuccessful, an amount not to exceed \$10,000 would be paid for the travel and living expenses of five men involved in the mission. The Cuban exile commented that he believed he had been approached with this plan because of his family's wealth; he told

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his acquaintance that he was not interested and suggested that an approach might be made to someone who has much more money.

3. Another Cuban exile reported that Byron Cameron, owner and operator of the M/V CAYMAN HOPE, whose address is Caribe Trading Co., Ltd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met with several Cuban exiles on 3 March 1964. Among the persons attending the meeting were Teofilo Babun Franco, co-owner of the Antillean Marine Shipping Corporation, Miami, and two of Babun's employees, Oscar Fernandez Viego and Eliseo Gomez Fernandez. Babun and Cameron are friendly shipping-business competitors in the Caribbean area. During the course of conversation at this meeting, Cameron mentioned that he was in contact with an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash; specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.

4. After a preliminary discussion at the 3 March meeting, it was thought that the amount of \$150,000 for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus \$5,000 expense money, payable in advance, was too high, and Babun felt that this situation was just another attempt to swindle patriotic Cuban exiles. Another meeting was then held on 5 March and a counter-offer of \$100,000 was made for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus \$2,500 for expenses, payable in advance. Cameron promised to check with his contacts after returning from a trip to the Caribbean.

5. During a meeting on 15 March attended by Cameron and Babun and his associates, the following terms were agreed upon for the assassination of the Cuban officials: Fidel Castro, \$100,000; Raul Castro, \$20,000; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, \$20,000; and \$2,500 for expenses, payable in advance. The time-limit for the proposed mission would be 90 days from the date when Babun could verify, to the satisfaction of Cameron, that he had \$100,000 at his disposal for the payment. The contract for payment

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would be honored only upon the presentation of evidence that the three Cuban officials died at the hands of the assassins connected with Cameron's contacts.

6. In early April 1964 Eliseo Gomez Fernandez met with Jose "Pepin" Bosch. Bosch agreed to advance \$100,000 and Babun and his associates would advance \$2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Clavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York, subsequently agreed to the terms, provided that his name was not involved. Accordingly, Babun gave Cameron \$2,500 on 25 April. Cameron then advised his group, and on 25 April he reported that his group had already called its man in Cuba and told him to proceed as planned and that "their other man" would be heading for Cuba shortly. The final comment was "we hope to have some good news for you between 20 and 25 May." Lobo planned to fly to Miami on 19 May to arrange for the transfer of \$100,000 to a safety deposit box, the keys to which are to be held jointly by Cameron and a confidant of Lobo.

7. The identities of the persons in the Cameron group and how they plan to proceed with this mission are not known. Babun's associates are reluctant to make any unnecessary queries because they have invested \$2,500 and because Cameron made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved. Cameron revealed during the negotiations that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis, Missouri, Vice Squad who was about to retire and who has numerous connections in the Mafia. Cameron implied that "the other man" in question is in Spain. Cameron knows that he could be indicted for conspiracy and that if there is any treachery on his part, Babun and his associates would not hesitate to sink his ship, the M/V CAYMAN HOPE.

8. In late May 1964 a prominent Cuban exile who spoke with Jose "Pepin" Bosch reported that Teofilo Babun and Eliseo Gomez had a plan under way to assassinate Fidel Castro for the payment of \$150,000. Bosch claimed that he had committed himself to furnish \$50,000 and that he was hoping he could get the balance

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of the money from the United States Government or from other sources. Bosch indicated that he believes that a quick change for the better in the Cuban situation can be brought about only by the physical elimination of Fidel Castro and that his elimination is well worth \$150,000. In pursuing his attempts to raise an additional \$100,000, Bosch is planning to ask Julio Lobo to contribute at least \$50,000.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

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CSDB-3/661,653

Orig: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Assistant Secretary--Inter-American Affairs
Department of State

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Attorney General
The Department of Justice

The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

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17
A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement.

Peter Jessup

Distribution:

Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

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EYES ONLY

31 July 1964

31
E-12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 30 July 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Item 1.
Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 3.

1. Cuba

The proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August 1964 were approved. Mr. FitzGerald then addressed himself once more to the ever present problem of operations by autonomous groups. While under our cognizance, they are not controlled, he said.

It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement.

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19 August 1964

E-13

Cy - Enigma
Re: ...

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Status of FBI Investigation re Plans
by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban
Government Leaders]

The following information was obtained from the
August 1964 report of the FBI investigation.

1. This memorandum is for your information in response to a 303 Committee query of 30 July 1964 regarding the status of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate Cuban government leaders.

2. The following is a summary of the investigation to date.

3. Subsequent to CIA's dissemination of information regarding "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders" (report disseminated by CIA to the 303 Committee and selected key officials as CSDB-3/661,653 dated 10 June 1964), the Federal Bureau of Investigation has interviewed all of the people involved in the plot except Byron Cameron. Cameron is now in Mexico on a business trip; he may possibly return to Miami on 7 August at which time the FBI plans to interview him regarding the plan. The FBI has not decided if it will interview CIA's other source or if it will re-interview all of the people involved in the plan.

4. The FBI, as a result of its investigation, has disseminated a total of seven (7) reports regarding this matter. A summary of these reports follow:

a. Teofilo Dabun Selman specifically denied to the FBI that he had any involvement in, or knowledge of, any plan to assassinate selected Cuban government officials. He admitted contact with Julio Lobo Olavarria, but denied discussing the plan with him and stated that Eduardo Garcia Molina was present during the meeting with Lobo and that Garcia could verify his statements.

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b. Eduardo Garcia Molina advised the FBI that he knew of the plan and that he was present when Babun discussed it with Lobo.

c. Julio Lobo Olavarria advised the FBI that Babun had told him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to contribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds, but later declined. Lobo also told the FBI that he had discussed the plan with CIA.

d. Jose M. "Pepin" Bosch informed the FBI that he had heard of the plan in general terms and that he had reported it to the CIA. He denied that he had agreed to furnish funds for the plan.

e. Eliseo Gomez Fernandez informed the FBI that he had no knowledge of the plan.

f. Ceferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga informed the FBI that he had no knowledge of the plan.

g. Major John Doherty of the St. Louis, Missouri, City Police Department advised the FBI that he is now in charge of the Field Operations Division of the St. Louis Police Department and formerly was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated that he had no idea as to who would be involved with the Mafia and who would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of Cuban government officials.

h. All other people interviewed by the FBI denied knowledge of the plan.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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