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Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
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R473

The United States Senate

GRAY

Report of Proceedings

INVENTION
BN 3/2/77
NY 8/8

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000051530

Wednesday, July 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

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Att. dated 7/10/75

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COMMITTEE BUSINESS

Wednesday, July 9, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:25 o'clock
p.m., in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman)
presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Mathias,
and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; F.A.O.
Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; and Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
Counsel, Frederick Baron, Michael J. Madigan, Charles Lombard,
Charles Kirbow, and Robert Kelly, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 The Chairman. Mr. Gray, would you like to take the Chair?

3 Before you're seated would you please take the oath.

4 Do you swear that all the testimony that you give in this
5 proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
6 but the truth, so help you God?

7 Mr. Gray. I do.

8 The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gray, I want to apologize
9 for the delay. You've been waiting several hours and I am sorry
10 that it's taken us so long in our interrogation of the previous
11 witness. I appreciate your being here and I understand you have
12 some opening remarks that you would like to read into the record.

13 Mr. Gray. I will, sir, and that may save a little time for
14 the Committee.

15 The Chairman. Very well.

16 Mr. Gray. Let me say, Mr. Chairman and members of the
17 Committee, I've been around this town a long time. You don't
18 have to apologize to me for being behind. I know how it is.
19 So I am happy to wait.

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1 TESTIMONY OF GORDON GRAY

2 Mr. Gray. I have always considered it a privilege to appear
3 before a Senate Committee. As perhaps you know, I had a session
4 on July 5 with four members of the Committee staff. I should
5 like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I found them courteous, intelligent,
6 able and well informed. I hope that our meeting was a construc-
7 tive one.

8 I trust that I need not assure you that I wish to be as
9 helpful as I can, but I must remind you that we shall probably
10 be talking about situations which existed something like 15 to
11 17 years ago and I fear that my recollections are not as sharp
12 as I would like them to be. The staff members did give me
13 some refreshment by showing me memoranda which I believe will
14 form the basis for your questions. I might say that these were
15 memoranda which I had not seen before, and I believe that the
16 reason that they were not distributed to principals of what is
17 now called the Forty Committee was that President Eisenhower
18 wanted only one copy of notes of these meetings in existence
19 and that was to be kept in the files of the Director of the
20 Central Intelligence Agency. An exception was made in the case
21 of Cuba.

22 My own experience with the National Security Council and
23 intelligence matters in general was as follows:

24 As Secretary of the Army from 1949 to 1950, I at one time
25 was a statutory member of the NSC. However, as you will recall

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1 the 1949 amendments to the Act removed the Service Secretaries.
2 I might parenthetically say that Senator Symington and I have
3 a standing joke that we are the only living two people who have
4 ever been kicked off the National Security Council. He was at
5 the time Secretary of the Air Force.

6 In 1951 I established and served as the first Director of
7 the Psychological Strategy Board at the request, and by appoint-
8 ment of, President Truman. In 1953 I was a member of the
9 President's Committee on International Information Activities,
10 popularly known as the Jackson Committee. In 1955 I became
11 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
12 and in that capacity served as back up for the Secretary of
13 Defense for National Security Council matters. I attended all
14 NSC meetings with him. In 1956 I became Director of the Office
15 of Defense Mobilization in which capacity I was again a statutory
16 member of the National Security Council. In July 1958 I became
17 Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security
18 Affairs and the National Security Council and its subsidiary
19 bodies were among my responsibilities. In this capacity I also
20 served as the President's representative to what was first
21 known as the 5412 Committee -- I believe it was 5412-2 Committee --
22 and later "Special Group," I having changed the name because
23 5412 had attained some visibility. My understanding is that
24 subsequently it underwent at least two more name changes, the
25 last being the Forty Committee. I consider this Committee --

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1 the Forty Committee -- a vital one in the interest of the
2 United States and of the President. Indeed, when following
3 instructions from President Eisenhower to leave everything
4 in the best possible shape for his successor, and when I was
5 briefing McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's to be Special
6 Assistant for National Security Affairs, it became apparent
7 to me that it had probably already been decided that virtually
8 all of the so-called machinery developed during Eisenhower's
9 Administration would be disbanded. I sought, and succeeded in
10 obtaining, one commitment from McGeorge Bundy and that was that
11 if he wanted to protect the interests of his President the one
12 thing that should be retained would be what is now known as
13 the Forty Committee. This commitment was kept.

14 Since May 1961 I have been a member of the President's
15 Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

16 I took no documents out of Government with me and have not
17 had occasion to read anything other than those shown me by the
18 Committee staff. As I have already observed, I never even saw
19 notes of the Forty Committee meetings and such memoranda in
20 this field as I made I think entirely related to Cuba. They
21 were produced in original form only and these are all at the
22 Eisenhower Library at Abilene.

23 That concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chairman.

24 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gray.

25 We have a vote on. In the interest of time I think we

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1 No, I don't know entirely that it never did.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Now was your relationship with Mr. Eisenhower
3 such that you would believe that he would discuss with you
4 any important matter that came to his attention that related
5 to the field of covert operations?

6 Mr. Gray. I believe that -- yes, the short answer to that
7 question is yes, that he would discuss with me anything that
8 came to his attention independently of me, yes.

Q Mr. Schwarz. Now if an officer of the Central Intelligence
Agency or if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
had told President Eisenhower that the Agency had made a
contract with the Mafia in order to assassinate Fidel Castro,
do you believe that President Eisenhower would have discussed
that with you?

Mr. Gray. I believe that he would but I don't know that to be the case.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he, President Eisenhower, ever have such discussion with you?

Mr. Gray. About --

Mr. Schwarz. Assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Gray. No.

Mr. Schwarz. About the use of the Mafia in connection with Cubans?

Mr. Gray. No, I have heard about this use of the Mafia only in recent times when it appeared in the press. I never

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1 knew anything about that situation.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn, Mr. Kelly, and put before
3 the Witness, the Special Group minutes of November 3rd, 1960,
4 which, Senators, are Tab V of the red book?

(The document referred to
was marked Gray Exhibit
No. 1 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Gray, this is what purports to be the
2 minutes of a Special Group meeting which you attended?

3 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at the third page, please?

5 The document says that "Mr. Merchant asked whether any
6 real planning has been done for taking direct positive action
7 against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara."

8 Mr. Merchant was a State Department representative on the
9 Special Group?

10 Mr. Gray. He was. Yes, indeed.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Now would you agree that the words "direct
12 positive action" appear to question whether there's been any
13 planning in connection with assassinating those people?

14 Mr. Gray. I think the phrase "positive action" could
15 include assassination, but I should say it is all the intent
16 of the user of the phrase and his meaning of it, and I'm not
17 sure what was in Mr. Merchant's mind. I agree that assassination
18 could be included in that phrase, but I think, having had my
19 recollection refreshed by seeing this paper, which I had not
20 seen before, Mr. Merchant includes, or General Cabell pointed
21 out that this was not a practical option and he said it would
22 have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion was beyond
23 our capabilities.

24 Mr. Schwarz. General Cabell was the Deputy Director of
25 the CIA?

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1 Mr. Gray. He was the Deputy Director of the CIA at the
2 time.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Did he disclose at that meeting or any other
4 time that the CIA had engaged the Mafia in order to assassinate
5 Fidel Castro prior to this meeting?

6 Mr. Gray. No, not to my knowledge.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Turning back to Tab B, -- Senators, I
8 am now going to refer to two earlier documents at which the
9 subject of dealing with these three persons -- Castro, Che
10 Guevara, and Raul Castro -- is discussed, although not decided
11 upon, and I think the earlier meetings should be read in light
12 of the November meeting when the CIA representative said it
13 was not practical.

14 Tab E, if you would mark it as Exhibit 2, Mr. Kelly, is
15 that what it purports to be, minutes of the National Security
16 Council meeting in March of 1960?

17 Mr. Gray. Well, it is a report of the discussion of the
18 Council. I wouldn't consider it as such minutes, Mr. Schwarz,
19 but it purports to be a discussion.

(The document referred to
was marked Gray Exhibit
No. 2 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. The Special Assistant to the President for
2 National Security Affairs is reported as being present, and
3 I take it that is you.

4 Mr. Gray. That is right, sir.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Now there's a lengthy discussion of the
6 subject of Cuba and Mr. Castro, which runs, starts on page 2,
7 and I would like to call your attention to some pieces of it
8 and see if it fits your recollection of attitudes in that
9 period of time.

10 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Dillion -- that's Mr. Douglas Dillon.

12 Mr. Gray. That's right.

13 Mr. Schwarz. He takes the position on page 7, which is
14 the second page of the copy we have: "The result of Castro's
15 disappearance might be a Communist take-over."

16 Was that attitude expressed by people in connection with
17 Mr. Castro?

18 Mr. Gray. I am sure that there was. I don't remember
19 Mr. Dillon saying this but I have no doubt that it was a
20 concern of people at the time if Castro should not be in power
21 that there was a vacuum which might be taken over.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I'm just going to put in some excerpts from
23 the document which set the flavor and then read up to the
24 particular thing I want to question the Witness about.

25 On page 8, which is the third page, the President is said

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1 to have said that "a certain amount of pro-Castro sentiment
2 had been expressed by small groups in the countries he had
3 recently visited."

4 Skipping down: "Latin American Presidents had counselled
5 further forbearance by the United States."

6 Skipping down further: The President is quoted as having
7 said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Americans living
8 in Cuba.

On the top of the next page the statement is made that "we might finally have to use force if U.S. citizens were exposed to mob violence." Then Admiral Burke is quoted as saying we need a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements could rally.

Was that a problem, the lack of a replacement for Castro, who would be preferable to the United States than Castro?

Mr. Gray. Yes, it was a problem. I think it was recognized by many people who thought about it as a very serious problem and I remember very well, Mr. Schwarz, toward the, I guess the end of the Eisenhower Administration that he used to press the DCI, Mr. Dulles, Allen Dulles, very hard about the possibility of a government in exile because he didn't want a vacuum left if something should happen to Castro to take him out of power.

As I recall it, and I have not looked at my notes on Cuba since I left the government--since the Bay of Pigs, I

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1 had a chance to see them then. The Cubans couldn't agree
2 among themselves. The Central Intelligence Agency had not,
3 I think, by the time President Eisenhower went out of office,
4 been able to set up any kind of government in exile. I'm
5 not sure that one was ever set up.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Would the assassination of Mr. Castro prior
7 to there being a preferred replacement be consistent with
8 United States policy as you understood it during the time that
9 you were in office? And I understand you're saying that
10 assassination wasn't approved, but I'm asking you a hypothetical
11 question. Would the assassination of Castro prior to the
12 identification of the preferable leader of Cuba have been
13 consistent with the United States policy?

14 Mr. Gray. Well, I can't answer that yes or no because
15 I must repeat that to my knowledge assassination was not
16 considered a sensible course of action at the highest levels
17 of government.

18 But I think that the other part of the question is that
19 actions should probably not have been taken to relieve Castro
20 of power until there was some way to assure some sort of a
21 viable government ready to move in.

22 I'm not sure I'm responding to your question.

23 Mr. Schwarz. No, I think you did. Now I want to pick up
24 near the bottom of page 9 and read two sentences to you.

25 "Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation

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1 in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any
2 plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal,
3 since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than
4 Castro."

5 Now does the plan for the removal of Cuban leaders contem-
6 plate the assassination of Cuban leaders?

7 Mr. Gray. The plan that Mr. Dulles reported on that
8 was being worked on on March 14 was a four-point program, and
9 I am not sure, Mr. Schwarz, whether this meeting took place
10 before the President approved of the four-point program or
11 immediately afterwards, but Mr. Dulles was certainly referring
12 to what I call the four-point program which was approved
13 by the President and which formed the basis of various
14 activities which ultimately resulted in what we know as the
15 Bay of Pigs.

16 I have not had a chance to see that four-point paper,
17 I guess since I went out of office in the Eisenhower Admini-
18 stration. As I recall it, however, it included sabotage,
19 increased or enhanced economic sanctions, propaganda activities,
20 and the training of Cuban exiles.

21 Now this program was approved by the President. Subsequently,
22 in about March -- I don't know the date of it -- there were
23 many meetings with the President about Cuba and this four-point
24 program and I recorded these meetings, I must say in violation
25 of his instructions because he had told me, as I think I said

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now some related language is used in
2 Paragraph 6 on page 2, which says:

3 "There was a general discussion as to what would be the
4 effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che
5 Guevara should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said
6 that the only organized group in Cuba today were the Communists
7 and there was therefore the danger that they might move into
8 control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous
9 because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS.
10 Colonel King" -- and he's with the CIA -- "said there were
11 few leaders capable of taking over so far identified."

12 Now the November 3 memo, which we marked as Exhibit 1,
13 which suggested no such authority to assassinate the three
14 men was ever granted, and indeed, that the CIA said it was
15 not a practical solution.

16 But do you not agree, Mr. Gray, that the language used in
17 here suggests that the subject of assassination was being
18 discussed?

19 Mr. Gray. At the level of the Forty Committee or the
20 National Security Council?

21 Mr. Schwarz. Yes. These words should disappear simul-
22 taneously or any plan for removal should be a package deal,
23 which is the Security Council.

24 Mr. Gray. I do not, no, sir. I again repeat that, "should
25 disappear" is like removal or eliminate. It is the intent of the

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1 user of the expression or the phrase that is controlling and
2 there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency
3 plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but I am repeating
4 that at the level of the Forty Committee or a higher level
5 than that, the National Security Council, there was no active
6 discussion in any way planning assassination.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Well, we agreed, remember, that there had
8 been one where it was turned down but it was discussed. That
9 is the November 3, 1960 meeting.

10 Mr. Gray. That's true.

11 Mr. Schwarz. And there the words used were "direct
12 positive action."

13 Mr. Gray. That's right.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And we agreed that that included assassinations
15 and there from the context you thought it probably meant
16 assassination.

17 Mr. Gray. Mr. Schwarz, I will say I agree that assassination
18 could have been on the minds of some people when they used
19 these words eliminate or get rid of.

20 I cannot say that Admiral Burke, for example, wasn't
21 himself thinking of assassination. I am just trying to say that
22 it was not serious considered as a program of action by the
23 President or even the Forty group.

24 Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible that persons
25 at the level of the Forty Group or the 5412 or such high

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1 authority might use words like "get rid of" or "eliminate" to
2 mean overthrow the government, as opposed to murder the leader
3 and other persons, perhaps in the Central Intelligence Agency,
4 would interpret or misunderstand those words to mean murder
5 the leader, kill the leader?

6 Mr. Gray. I think this is possible. However, the people
7 who might have given it that interpretation in the Central
8 Intelligence Agency had no authority to carry out such a plan.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Your testimony is that it would be beyond
10 their authority to act to assassinate unless they had been
11 given a specific order.

12 Mr. Gray. Or unless it had been included in a specific
13 program.

14 Mr. Schwarz. In other words, it would be beyond the
15 authority of the Agency, as you understood the Agency, to
16 rely upon general instructions such as we should take action
17 in order to overthrow the Castro government to constitute
18 authority for taking specific action to assassinate Mr. Castro
19 personally?

20 Mr. Gray. I agree with what you say and if I may just
21 speak further to the point. The fact that there were many,
22 many meetings about Cuba with the President with sort of a
23 shifting group of top government leaders throughout three
24 quarters, at least, of 1960, and that is into January of '61
25 when the word "assassination" or that kind of activity within

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1 his approved program was never mentioned, is an indication
 2 to me that it was never in the President's mind or anybody
 3 who were these important people in government that assassination
 4 was considered a wise, sensible or practical thing to undertake.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as Exhibit 4 the April 14th,
 6 1960, discussion of the National Security Council on April 14th,
 7 1960, which is Tab H, and the part that I'm going to call your
 8 attention to is on the fourth page, which is numbered page 5.

9 (The document referred
 10 to was marked Gray
 11 Exhibit No. 4 for
 12 identification.)
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1 Mr. Schwarz. Actually, I'm going to start at the bottom
2 of page 4 and start with the comments made on Trujillo and
3 then go to comments made on Castro and call your attention to
4 the different language that is used.

5 With respect to Trujillo the following is stated:

6 "Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect to the
7 situation in the Caribbean. If Trujillo could be removed from
8 power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were
9 prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro
10 campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost.
11 The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would
12 be a favorable development for us."

17 Do you understand the words "getting rid of Trujillo"
18 to mean assassinating Trujillo?

18 Mr. Gray. I did not understand that to mean that. I
19 did not understand then and understand now it to mean assassina-
20 tion.

1 Mr. Schwarz. All right. Would you look at the next
2 paragraph where it demonstrates that if people wish to talk
3 about assassination, they were quite willing to use the precise
4 word assassination, and what I would like to ask you after you
5 have read that, well, I may read it into the record:

22 "Turning to Cuba Mr. Dulles reported that a Senor Betancourt
23 (no relation to Venezuela's Bentancourt) had recently defected
24 in Cuba and had told U.S. officials that he sees three possible

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1 outcomes of the Cuban situation: (1) the assassination of
2 Castro, which would make him a martyr (2) Castro's suicide,
3 which is a possibility in the event of failure and (3) a
4 continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in
5 a socialist dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba."

6 I guess the only question I had coming out of that is
7 was the point that the assassination of Castro would make him
8 a martyr one which you heard discussed on more than one occasion,
9 or was that the only time you heard about it?

10 Mr. Gray. I think that this is the only time I heard it,
11 Mr. Schwarz. Here, of course, Mr. Dulles is quoting a Senor
12 Betancourt, who is talking about the assassination of Castro.
13 Actually, I would now have to say that it's not unlikely that
14 it would have made him a martyr had he been assassinated.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now has your recollection been refreshed
16 sufficiently for you to remember without my showing you a
17 document that during your service the special group authorized
18 the passage of weapons to dissidents in the Dominican Republic?

19 Mr. Gray. Yes, I think they were referred to as small
20 arms. That was in late December of '60 or early January of '61.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's put in the record as Exhibit 5
22 the January 12, 1961 minutes of the Special Group, Tab X.

(The document referred to
was marked Gray Exhibit
No. 5 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. In which it is stated that the Special Group
2 approved the project then limited supplies of small arms and
3 materials would be made available to dissidents inside the
4 Dominican Republic so long as -- that isn't there.

5 Was there any condition put on that, as you recall?

6 Mr. Gray. I do not recall. As a matter of fact, Mr.
7 Schwarz, I have difficulty remembering these two meetings or
8 this meeting, which was in January and the next earlier meeting
9 was in December.

10 I was asked by a council of the Rockefeller Commission
11 about arms for the Dominican Republic, and to be perfectly
12 honest I had forgotten any discussion of arms for the Dominican
13 Republic and it is only because your able staff has shown me
14 this memorandum that I am able to say to you that it must have
15 been discussed because I can't deny that it appears in these
16 minutes.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Now prior to that meeting, didn't Mr. Bissell
18 say on December 29th, 1960 and let us put before us Exhibit 6
19 of the minutes of that meeting which is Tab W.

(The document referred to
was marked Gray Exhibit
No. 6 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. That the plan, current as of December 29, would
2 not bring about the desired result "lacking some decisive
3 stroke against Trujillo himself."

4 Wouldn't you read that to mean the stroke against Trujillo
5 himself is killing him?

6 Mr. Gray. I wouldn't so construe it.

7 Mr. Schwarz. How do you construe it?

8 Mr. Gray. Well, other memoranda here I think reflect
9 other notes, reflect that various courses of action which
10 might take place in Cuba or Trujillo resigning, and I think
11 there was some negotiation to that effect.

12 Now you haven't mentioned in some of these minutes --
13 these memoranda have refreshed my recollection that somehow
14 there was much more concern about Trujillo in many quarters
15 than there was about Castro, and it seemed important to some,
16 I now recall, that something should be done about Trujillo
17 and before anything was done about Castro.

End Tape 6A

Begin Tape 6B

18 Senator Mondale. Could I ask you about why are we so
19 concerned about Trujillo? He was presumably friendly to us, anti-
20 Castro, anti-Communist. What was the concern?

21 Mr. Gray. I believe the concern was more in Latin America
22 than in the United States of America. I think they were
23 concerned about perhaps the way he governed his country, for
24 example. But I think it is reflected that the President or
25 high officials of our government were receiving some Latin

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1 American pressure to do something about Trujillo.

2 Senator Morgan. Wasn't part of it, Mr. Gray, at that time
3 the fact that he had previously arrested a large number of
4 prominent people in his country and while doing so maybe he
5 had alleviated some of this opposition but he lost general
6 support and the country was in bad financial condition and
7 it was thought that he was going to either fall or abandon
8 the country and that Castro people would take over?

9 That seems to be reflected as I read the minutes of the
10 Security Council.

Mr. Gray. Senator, I just don't recall the situation in those terms, I'm sorry.

Senator Morgan. Fritz, if I remember, is that not reflected in the minutes?

15 Mr. Schwarz. Yes, it is and there's also the thesis that
16 we needed to demonstrate that we wanted to move against both
17 right wing and left wing to establish credibility in Latin
18 America for the movement against Castro.

Senator Mondale. That proves that nobody is safe.

Senator Morgan. I really think it might be well somewhere for you to put that in the record because when we come to writing the report on Trujillo that we will want to know why.

1 The Chairman. My memory of the period and the concern about
2 Trujillo was the fear that Castro, a Communist take-over would
3 occur in the Dominican Republic by virtue of the repressive

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1 action that Trujillo had taken and the shakey condition of
2 his government and the belief at the time that Castro was
3 aggressively engaged in efforts to extend his revolution to other
4 Latin American countries.

Isn't that the case, or do you recall, Mr. Gray?

6 Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I just don't recall. I said to
7 Mr. Schwarz earlier, if I may repeat something I said earlier,
8 that it's a strange thing to me that my recollection about the
9 Dominican Republic is much dimmer than about many other things,
10 and he told me this is true of some of the other witnesses. I
11 don't know why this is so. But my recollection is very dim
12 about the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz. Senator Morgan, some of the exhibits we put in do put forward both the reasons that have been put forward here.

16 Senator Morgan. I haven't been here all the time.

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now I want to talk about
Patrice Lumumba.

Do you remember who Lumumba was?

Mr. Gray. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now we didn't like Lumumba very much, did we?

Mr. Gray. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Why was that?

Mr. Gray. It's my recollection we thought Lumumba would

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1 be amenable to Soviet influence and control. But your
2 associates refreshed my recollection. Most of what I remembered
3 about Lumumba was the terrible jokes we used to tell about,
4 "you've got the wrong telephone Lumumba."

5 The situation in the Congo was fluid, it was chaotic, and
6 now I remember it was the subject of very much discussion in
7 this government and in the National Security Council. But I
8 do remember the name Lumumba and I of course have seen some
9 of the papers which contain references to him.

10 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now were these minutes referred
11 to your associates or your associate; we have shown you
12 papers that convince you that that is the name used
13 for President Eisenhower.

14 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Marked as Exhibit 7, Tab P of the Senators'
16 books Special Group Meeting, 25 August, 1960.

(The document referred to
was marked Gray Exhibit
No. 1 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Now you're talking about Lumumba in that
2 second paragraph, aren't you?

3 Mr. Gray. Yes.

4 Mr. Schwarz. At first Mr. Parrott and Mr. Dulles described
5 some operational lines involving the use of unions, the ²⁴ [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] and the labor groups. The group agreed that
7 that kind of action against Lumumba was very much in order.

8 Now you went on then to call on behalf of your associate,
9 and that is President Eisenhower.

10 Is that right?

11 Mr. Gray. It must have been, yes.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Saying that he had expressed extremely strong
13 feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action,
14 and then there is discussion about that. And it is "agreed
15 that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out
16 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity that might
17 contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

18 Now do you agree that you contemplated and approved, at
19 least, the planning of the assassination of Lumumba in that
20 meeting?

21 Mr. Gray. No, sir.

22 Mr. Schwarz. Didn't you agree that no activity would be
23 ruled out?

24 Mr. Gray. Well, again, I repeat, Mr. Schwarz, that when
25 you talk about an activity like some of these other phrases or

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1 Mr. Gray. Are you asking me if I can establish his
2 credibility. I impune his credibility.

3 Mr. Schwarz. Or make any comment, if you can. If you
4 can't --

5 Mr. Gray. All right, sir.

6 Well, Robert Johnson, as I recall, was an able member of
7 the very small NSC staff which we had in those days. It was a
8 lean staff and I recall, I think, that I regarded him highly
9 as an individual and as a staff man.

10 The thing that puzzles me is where he ever would have
11 heard Eisenhower make that kind of a statement because I don't
12 think, I can't swear to this, that he ever attended a National
13 Security Council meeting, and I would wager that he never saw
14 Eisenhower in any other kind of capacity.

15 May I ask a question? Well, is this a sworn testimony?

16 Mr. Schwarz. Yes, it was and he describes it as being
17 in the summer at a meeting with a number of people with the
18 normal secretary away and that he was present at the meeting
19 to take notes.

20 Mr. Gray. This is possible. I said that I would have
21 gathered that he attended a National Security Council meeting,
22 but of course the notes of the meeting would indicate that.

23 Mr. Schwarz. We have not found notes of the meeting taken
24 by him.

25 Mr. Gray. I question the credibility of this statement.

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1 Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be proper
2 to fill in the full circumstances.

3 In his testimony this Mr. Johnson, he said it was not
4 his normal course to be at the Full meetings of the National
5 Security Council. What he did was to fill in because it was
6 the summer and people were away on vacations. He took the
7 place of the regular note-taker and he was startled by a
8 remark made by the President following a briefing on the situation
9 in the Congo with particular regard to Lumumba when the
10 President said something to the effect of -- he was not clear in
11 his mind about the exact words but the meaning remained in
12 his memory, mainly get rid of Lumumba.

13 Then he said that the question that arose, he wrote this
14 up in notes and he referred it to, I've forgotten who the normal
15 note-taker was, what to do with the notes. He said he could
16 not recall the exact words of the President and that it was
17 a long time ago and that what stuck in his memory was the
18 startling remark by the President and the stunned silence of
19 the people in the room.

20 Senator Tower. Why don't we have the minutes of that
21 NSC meeting?

22 Mr. Schwarz. Well, we have not found the minutes of the
23 meeting, unless it is this meeting, and this meeting is not
24 shown as having been transcribed by Mr. Johnson but rather
25 by Mr. Parrott.

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1 Mr. Gray. Well, excuse me. You see I don't know which
2 meeting we're talking about now. The anti-Lumumba campaign
3 that we're talking about is a Special Group meeting.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And it doesn't show President Eisenhower
5 attending it.

6 Mr. Gray. He never attended a Special Group meeting
7 except the meetings in his office on Cuba, which weren't
8 technically Special Group meetings themselves, But the President
9 never attended a Special Group meeting.

10 So the President couldn't have made it in this meeting
11 and I would feel more comfortable having challenged the
12 credibility of Mr. Johnson for whom I stated I have a high
13 regard.

14 If you can't find the minutes of the meeting that he
15 said he took notes on -- now to me it seems the Committee would
16 be interested if you would take his testimony seriously in
17 trying to find out.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And that, Mr. Gray, is why we are looking;
19 we have not succeeded.

20 Mr. Gray. And my second point again, and forgive me for
21 being repetitive, that he apparently said that, he didn't
22 remember the exact word, but here again, get rid of or get
23 rid of Lumumba.

24 Well, it's no secret now. I've testified here that my
25 associate wanted to get rid of Lumumba.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. In his testimony he said that whatever the
2 words were he construed them as meaning killing. He, Johnson,
3 construed them as meaning killing and the meeting was stunned.

4 Mr. Gray. Well, I would like to say I disagree.

5 The Chairman. What did you understand the Eisenhower
6 policy toward Lumumba to be -- take such action, such covert
7 action as might be necessary to depose Lumumba?

8 Mr. Gray. That's right. This meeting moved to spend,
9 the last exhibit speaks of various types of covert action that
10 might be taken and this minute reflects the fact that I said
11 that certainly the President had very strong feelings on the
12 necessity for straightforward action.

13 I do not consider that to include any thought in his
14 mind of assassination.

15 Now this was a Special Group meeting in August. I don't
16 know when the National Security Council meeting at which Mr.
17 Johnson said he was present.

18 Mr. Schwarz. All we have is the summer.

19 Mr. Gray. All you have is what?

20 Mr. Schwarz. He said that it was in the summer.

21 Senator Schweiker. The summer of when, Fritz?

22 Mr. Schwarz. The summer of 1960.

23 I think we'll wait until the Senators come back up.

(A brief recess was taken.)

d Tape 6B

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The Chairman. All right, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Gray, we had a chat over the recess and you said you wanted to make some further comment about the questions we asked you concerning Mr. Robert Johnson.

Mr. Gray. Yes, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am troubled by this. Earlier I expressed my high regard for him as an individual and as a member of my staff. I find myself now challenging his credibility. This troubles me quite deeply. I just wanted that on the record.

Also, I guess it is reasonable to point out that in any event if he were to take notes of the meeting and if the President did use the word "get rid of," it is the same kind of language we've been talking about ever since I have been sitting before the Committee.

Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Given your close connection to President Eisenhower on all covert action matters, do you believe that it is possible that you might not have understood exactly what President Eisenhower had in mind when such terms were used? Are you confident that it was not the President's intention and it was not the policy of his Administration to pursue any means, including assassination for the purpose of getting rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Gray. Mr. Chairman, I would say that any administration

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1 should probably give consideration to any means, but in answer
2 to the question about my relationships with General Eisenhower,
3 I would be convinced, if I may use that word, that I understood
4 him very clearly in any conversations we had about anything.
5 And in further answer to your question I would think and believe
6 that it was not his policy for the United States to pursue a
7 policy of assassinations.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Why not, Mr. Gray?

9 Mr. Gray. I don't think that this is the kind of thing
10 he would have believed in. Proving a negative is very difficult,
11 but I will repeat one illustration that I gave.

12 In many months of meetings about Cuba if there were any
13 thought of assassinating in Cuba, certainly there would have
14 been some conversation about it in these meetings.

15 There was to my recollection no mention of assassination
16 at all. This is just not the way he would go about things.

17 Mr. Schwarz. All right. I want to ask you a broad question
18 about Cuba that will start with your testimony and then ask
19 ask you to assume certain facts as true and then ask you to
20 explain those facts to the best you can acting as an expert.

21 First, you have testified that the assassination of Castro
22 was not, as far as you know, authorized by the Eisenhower
23 Administration.

24 Mr. Gray. Not so far as I know.

25 Mr. Schwarz. And second, you have testified that you

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1 believe that President Eisenhower would have communicated to
2 you personally if a CIA official, Mr. Dulles, had come to see
3 him to say that the CIA was seeking to assassinate Mr. Castro.

4 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

5 I believe that the President would have communicated any
6 such action or agreement or order or approval to me, although
7 I must point out that I was not with President Eisenhower
8 24 hours a day. It was a few minutes every day, practically
9 every day.

10 I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe,
11 that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with
12 such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it
13 from Mr. Dulles.

14 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now third. You have testified
15 when we have examined Exhibit 1, which is the November 3, 1960
16 Special Group minutes, the Senators' Tab V, that you did
17 recall that meeting at which the subject of assassination was
18 brought up and it was rejected by the Special Group after hearing
19 from Mr. Cabell of the CIA as being impractical. All right?

20 Mr. Gray. All right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, assume, if you will, that
22 in fact prior to November 3, 1960, and at or about the end of
23 September, 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency made a
24 contract with the Mafia to offer \$150,000 if Mr. Castro were
25 killed.

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1 Assume that to be a fact, as the record indicates. It is
2 a fact. Now, as a person with experience in the field of
3 national security matters, can you explain that fact in light
4 of your testimony?

5 Mr. Gray. I find it very difficult to explain, Mr.
6 Schwarz. May I just speak about procedures for a moment, which
7 will help me answer your question, I think?

8 In the case of covert action, at least at that period of
9 time, although it may have been approved by the Agency itself --
10 I am now speaking about the Central Intelligence Agency -- the
11 normal procedure then would have been for it to be staffed in
12 the State Department. I have already, I think, testified that
13 I complained that I was not given a chance to staff out some
14 of these matters, but that is perhaps aside from the point --
15 at which time both the State Department and the Agency had
16 agreed it would have gone to the Forty Committee and if the
17 Forty Committee approved it, it would be approved, considered
18 approved by the government, unless, as in some cases, the
19 President's representative to the Forty Committee had a
20 question about the action and he wished to have a Presidential
21 decision, and that happened on a few occasions.

22 So now getting back to your specific question, how could
23 this thing have happened, one way it could have happened would
24 have been that it was well known in the Agency that there was
25 a program directed against Castro and that the people in the

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1 Agency assumed that that meant anything goes against Castro.

2 This could have been a possibility.

3 I rather guess that that is the probable answer to the
4 question. A possibility of course is that the responsible
5 people in the Agency simply felt they had the power to act on
6 their own, which I would have denied had it come to my attention.
7 I am unable to, really to explain it. But if it happened, it
8 is my judgment that it shouldn't have happened without the
9 appropriate procedures being followed.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And your testimony is that those procedures
11 were not followed.

12 Mr. Gray. I believe this to be the case. If I ever
13 heard of this Mafia thing before it recently appeared in the
14 press, I certainly have completely forgotten about it.

15 Mr. Schwarz. It is the kind of thing you would remember
16 if you had ever heard it.

17 Mr. Gray. I would think so. I would think so, yes.

18 Mr. Schwarz. So just to pin down what you said, well,
19 you are obviously not sure. Your opinion is that the most
20 likely explanation is that the Agency personnel assumed
21 erroneously and mistakenly that the program with respect to
22 Cuba included the assassination of Castro, even though the
23 program in fact did not include the assassination of Castro.

24 Mr. Gray. I have to make that kind of assumption.

25 As a further observation about this we were referring to

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1 a November 3 meeting of the Special Group in which it was
2 agreed when General Cabell said assassination is not a
3 practical alternative. I just can't understand how -- what
4 date did you say, Mr. Schwarz?

5 Mr. Schwarz. The record indicates the contract with the
6 Mafia was made the end of September, 1960.

7 Mr. Gray. Now here is General Cabell on the 3rd of
8 November saying that this is not a viable alternative. I
9 find it difficult because he's the Deputy Director of the
10 Agency, and I don't think myself that he might have approved
11 an assassination attempt and would have come to the Special
12 Group saying that this is not the way to go about things.

13 General Cabell was an honorable man, I think an able
14 Deputy Director. He would not, I think, have approved such
15 an action and then a few days later say this is not the kind
16 of thing that we should do.

17 Mr. Schwarz. So from your knowledge of his character
18 you would assume he, in fact, did not know of the contract with
19 the Mafia.

20 Mr. Gray. This would be my assumption.

21 The Chairman. Have you completed?

22 Mr. Schwarz. I do have one thing, I forget. Did you
23 and I discuss whether or not Vice President Nixon had a major
24 role in the Bay of Pigs?

25 Mr. Gray. Yes, we didn't finish our discussion.

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1 Mr. Schwarz. I think you have something that might add
2 to the record on that.

3 Mr. Gray. I was saying to Mr. Schwarz that I am reasonably
4 sure -- this is not by way of suggesting you shouldn't call
5 former President Nixon for any purpose you want to talk to
6 him, but I am not talking about the Bay of Pigs. I am reasonably
7 sure he never attended those meetings of the Special Group.
8 It wasn't really the Special Group. How can I refer to it --
9 the Ad Hoc Committee that sort of was set up by the President
10 to deal with the Cuba program.

11 It is my strong recollection he never attended any of
12 those meetings. I think that what he would have known about
13 the Bay of Pigs would have been known to him -- well, I say
14 the Bay of Pigs. What ultimately culminated in the Bay of
15 Pigs, the program against Castro, would have been known by
16 him only as it was discussed in the National Security Council,
17 and I cannot remember with what detail that program was
18 discussed in the National Security Council. I would have to
19 see the notes to refresh my recollection.

20 So that if he had an active role in what led to the Bay
21 of Pigs, I have forgotten what it was. I'm just saying that
22 I don't think he's going to be too helpful on that particular
23 point.

24 Now let me say, please, if I may volunteer one other thing,
25 at the time that President Eisenhower went out of office on

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1 January 21, I think it is fair to say that there was no plan
2 or no action committed, there was no military planning. As
3 a matter of fact, I never heard -- I'm geographically ignorant
4 perhaps, but I don't think I ever heard of the Bay of Pigs
5 until this thing came out. So certainly there was no military
6 planning to land at the Bay of Pigs.

In fact, General Eisenhower objected very strongly to
the fact that there was any military planning whatsoever when
he left office. And I expressed to Mr. Schwarz the personal
opinion this morning that this was a bad three-months period
in American history when, after President Kennedy was elected,
he apparently felt he was not in a position to trust many of
the people around him. And my own judgment is had this thing
come a year later, either the Bay of Pigs operation would not
have been started or it would have been a successful operation.
And I think it is unfortunate for him and it was unfortunate
for him and for the country that this thing sort of came to
a head so quickly in his Administration.

That is gratuitous, I know.

The Chairman. Senator Schweiker -- Senator Tower had
a question.

Senator Tower. Referring to Tab E, page number 9, which
is Exhibit 2, toward the end of the page there. These are
the minutes of the Security Council meeting of 10 March, 1960:

"Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation

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1 in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any
2 plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal
3 since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than
4 Castro."

5 Now did Mr. Dulles -- now the minutes are not detailed in
6 this instance, but can you recall whether or not Mr. Dulles
7 went into any detail on the plan to affect the Cuba situation
8 was being worked on?

9 Mr. Gray. May I take a minute to answer that question,
10 Mr. Chairman?

11 The Chairman. Surely.

12 Mr. Gray. I am not so sure how much I told you, Mr.
13 Schwarz and members of the staff and members of the Committee.
14 It's hard to remember.

15 I have been shown the minutes of the Special Group which
16 are dated, I think, February 27 -- anyway, in February of 1960,
17 which dealt with the sabotage of sugar refineries, and I remember
18 the meeting. It was in the President's office in the Oval
19 Room and I remember it very clearly because there were schematic
20 drawings of sugar mills and Mr. Dulles and his technical
21 associates were demonstrating how this kind of sabotage could
22 take place, etcetera.

23 And I remember the President, and it is my recollection that
24 the President said, well, perhaps it's time to make a move
25 against Castro, but don't just fool around with sabotaging

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1 sugar mills. If you want to move against the Castro government,
2 bring me a program which is going to be effective. They can
3 always repair the sugar mills, etcetera.

4 And as a result of that direction Allen Dulles came back
5 to the President in my presence and in the presence of others,
6 I have forgotten who now, with a four-point program which
7 responded to the President's request to come up with something
8 more than just sabotaging sugar refineries.

9 I have not seen that four-point program since I left
10 government. It is in the library at Abilene and those four
11 points were sabotage, enhance the economic sanctions, propoganda,
12 which resulted, among other things, in the establishment of
13 that Swann's Island radio, and the training of Cuban exiles.

14 Now, Senator Tower, I would have to know the date of that
15 four-point program which was the beginning of all of this
16 to know, for example, to answer your question as to how deeply
17 he went into detail at this meeting because he was either
18 preparing the four-point program or had just prepared it. It
19 was my recollection it was sometime in March that he presented
20 it to the President. The records would show this certainly
21 at Abilene, and I remember very well that Mr. Dulles read from
22 this word for word without any deviation whatsoever to make
23 sure he was proposing a program that the President understood.

24 So that is sort of a convoluted answer to your question.
25 I don't know at this time whether the program was in preparation

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1 or had just been adopted. But he certainly, according to this
2 note, didn't go into any real detail about it.

3 Senator Tower. Well, here again, I'll read this to you.

4 "Admiral Burke suggested" -- now this was in response
5 to Mr. Dulles's report that the plan to effect the situation
6 in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke's follow-on comment
7 was "the suggestion that any plan for the removal of Cuban
8 leaders should be a package deal because many of the leaders
9 around Castro were even worse than Castro."

10 I would assume that that refers to Raul and Che Guevara.

11 Mr. Gray. Yes.

12 Senator Tower. So it would appear to me from that that
13 Mr. Dulles, if he went into any detail or at least it was
14 understood by Admiral Burke that the kind of plan being worked
15 on to effect the situation in Cuba had something to do with
16 the removal of Castro, perhaps not necessarily by assassination
17 but perhaps by other means.

18 Then again, over P in numbered page 2, Exhibit 3, in the
19 Special Group -- this is a memorandum for the record --
20 a Memorandum for the Record, numbered page 2, Item 6:

21 "There was a general discussion as to what would be the
22 effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che
23 Guevara should disappear simultaneously."

24 So this says to me that at least there was an awareness
25 and at least some contingency planning going on, I suppose

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1 under Dulles's direction to effect the removal of Castro by
2 some means and those around him.

3 Mr. Gray. Well, in the first reference, which is the
4 National Security Council meeting, he actually said that there
5 was a plan being developed and Admiral Burke apparently said
6 well any plan should be a package deal. Later on Admiral
7 Burke again is expressing his opinion that the removal of
8 Castro by whatever means might result in a Communist takeover.
9 But let me remind you, please, Senator, that these meetings
10 were either the same day or one day apart, and I have already
11 said that I don't know whether that four-point program was
12 in existence under preparation or had been adopted. I just
13 would have to see the date of it. But I don't think you'll
14 find it.

Excuse me, sir.

Senator Tower. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. Gray. I don't think that Admiral Burke knew what
was in any four-point program at that time and I think he
was just expressing his own observation. Well, if you're
making plans these are the considerations that I have in mind.

Senator Tower. Well, a four-point plan, as I remember
you reconstructed it, included economic sanctions, propoganda
broadcasts, the training of Cuban exiles as guerrillas, I
suppose, and what was the fourth?

Mr. Gray. I think it was sabotage.

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1 Senator Tower. Sabotage.

2 Mr. Gray. I think these are the four points.

3 Senator Tower. But none of those contemplate political
4 activity of the type that would result in the actual surgical
5 removal of Castro.

6 Mr. Gray. I understand that.

7 Senator Tower. These are less precise instruments of
8 adversely impacting on the Castro regime.

9 Mr. Gray. I simply have to repeat that I am reasonably
10 certain on March the 14th Admiral Burke was not privy to the
11 plan that Mr. Dulles was referring to and that he was simply
12 expressing his opinion that if you have any plan at all, it
13 ought to take these factors into consideration that you might
14 end up with a Communist government if you don't watch out.

15 And I think, well, I know I've already said thereafter
16 there was a lot of discussion about a government in exile to
17 avoid this kind of situation. My guess -- I have to guess that
18 Arleigh Burke was just expressing an opinion when he was told
19 there was a plan being formulated. I don't know whether that
20 responds or not.

21 Senator Tower. All right, thank you.

22 Senator Schweiker?

23 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Mr. Gray, in the Special Group records that we are
25 referring to here --

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1 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

2 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Merchant is whom? He represented
3 whom for this Special Group?

4 Mr. Gray. He was a State Department representative.

5 Senator Schweiker. And Mr. Irwin represented --

6 Mr. Gray. He was Defense Department. He was Assistant
7 Secretary of Defense and for Security Affairs.

8 Senator Schweiker. Now in your structure set-up at
9 the Administration here General Goodpasture played a role.
10 What was his role?

11 Mr. Gray. General Goodpasture's title was Staff Secretary.

12 Senator Schweiker. For the National Security Council?

13 Mr. Gray. No, for the President, for the Office of the
14 President, and that is a role which he performed. Now this wasn't
15 a cover name. If you wanted a secretary you had to
16 get Goodpasture to hire him, this sort of thing. He was
17 secretary to the whole White House staff. He was also a
18 trusted confidant of the President, a distinguished military man,
19 as then, and subsequently, he was an unusual sort of man
20 and I think this is not irrelevant to your question, he
21 for example, though it's not generally know, has a PhD. from
22 Princeton, as well as being a four star general, and that is
23 not a common thing. The President used him, if I may over-
24 simplify, for spot matters. If he wanted to get a message to
25 the Pentagon or to the Joint Chiefs or perhaps even to Allen

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1 Dulles on some immediate issue or some immediate problem. My
2 responsibility was more in the longer range planning. I had
3 the National Security Council and its related machinery, which
4 was a planning board in the OCB.

5 Senator Schweiker. Was there a staff to direct over?
6 Were you a staff director?

7 Mr. Gray. My title was Special Assistant to the President
8 for National Security Affairs and by statute there is an
9 Executive Secretary, and his name was James Lay, James S. Lay.

10 Now the cause of the potential difficulties in having
11 two men dealing in somewhat the same field, it was the
12 practice between General Goodpasture and me to keep each other
13 fully informed when any of our activities impinged on the
14 activities and responsibilities of the other.

15 I thought this was a good way to operate the White House
16 myself, but it did require two men of goodwill and mutual
17 respect or it wouldn't have worked too well, as you can guess.

18 So if I can oversimplify -- he was the spot man and I
19 was the long range planning man.

20 Mr. Schwarz. So you must have had a good working
21 relationship.

22 Mr. Gray. Well, sir, I'll say publicly, because you might
23 have him in as a witness, if somehow he could get nominated
24 for President, I would vote for him. I don't know whether
25 he'd say the same about me.

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Senator Schweiker. Well, I understand that John Eisenhower, in the last couple of years of his father's administration, also worked either with, maybe with General Goodpasture in some context.

Is that correct or not?

Mr. Gray. Over in the White House? Oh, yes. He worked for General Goodpasture in the White House.

Senator Schweiker. Would he come into areas -- well, would either General Goodpasture or John Eisenhower come into that kind of Special Group situation?

Mr. Gray. Thank you, because I should have explained this. First, with respect to General Goodpasture, he was always invited to sit with the National Security Council as an observer, not as a participant, and generally did.

So he knew what was going on in my field in that way. John Eisenhower, never.

When some, usually when some covert action was approved by the Forty Committee, I would inform General Goodpasture that if it was of sufficient importance for him to know about it. Never John.

What General Goodpasture informed John of I don't know, but Goodpasture was not a representative of the Special Group and neither was John. He never attended the Special Group meetings.

Senator Schweiker. Goodpasture did not attend the

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John did good staff work. I will have to say he was not at the NSC or Special Group level in terms of his activities. I am not sure, Senator, precisely what he is.

He says in the letter he wrote to you, Senator, recently,
I think, offering --

Senator Schweiker. Yeah, he wrote a letter to me.

Mr. Gray. Well, it was in that letter I think he said that Goodpasture and I were both -- well, I'm not sure about that.

Senator Schweiker. I think he did.

Mr. Gray. I've got the letter up here. I have it here if it's important. But he wanted Goodpasture and me to offer our services up to this Committee and before I had a chance to do so, which I would have, I had a call from the Chief Counsel of the Committee asking me if I would come. So I was able to write John that I was asked. I didn't have to offer.

Senator Schweiker. That's all I have. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Gray. I was perfectly willing to come before the Committee, eager to come if I could be helpful, and you would need not have issued a subpoena to get me here.

The Chairman. Senator Morgan.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question.

Mr. Gray, we were talking about Robert Johnson, and as I was thumbing through the book I noticed that under Tab U there

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1 is a memorandum contained in the discussion of the National
2 Security Council and it lists as being present a Mr. Robert H.
3 Johnson, the Director, National Security Council, Secretary,
4 and he signed the minutes.

5 So I just wonder if that does indicate that maybe at times
6 he did take the minutes?

7 Mr. Gray. Well, it certainly does indicate that he was
8 there at this meeting, Senator Morgan. But again, and I may be
9 mistaken in how many meetings he attended, and I'm already
10 on record about my trouble with having challenged him, but I
11 would remind you also that this meeting was in October and not
12 in the summer. And as far as I can understand from what has
13 been reported, he only referred to attending a meeting in the
14 summer of 1960.

15 Senator Morgan. I just mentioned it to indicate that
16 he may have from time to time.

17 Mr. Gray. I would have to agree with you.

18 Senator Morgan. When you were the Director of the Office
19 of Defense Mobilization, did you resign the position when you
20 became Special Assistant?

21 Mr. Gray. Yes, sir.

22 Senator Morgan. So that position later was filled by
23 whom, do you know?

24 Mr. Gray. Well, at the time I left the Office of Defense
25 Mobilization its responsibilities and those of the Civil

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WANDA A. PAUL

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1 Defense Administration were moved into one organization, and I
2 believe that my successor was Leo Roig, a former governor of
3 a western state, and I've forgotten which state. He had been
4 Director of the Civil Defense organization. Later Civil
5 Defense was transferred to the Defense Department, I believe,
6 and that office became known as ERP. I believe it's still
7 known as ERP. You gentlemen would know better than I would.
8 It's the Emergency -- well, anyway, it does emergency planning
9 for relocation and so forth.

10 So that started out by reason of being the old National
11 Security Resources Board which was created by the act that
12 created the Defense Department.

13 The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

14 Mr. Schwarz. All right, the memo I told you that Senator
15 Morgan referred to, that is a meeting of the National Security
16 Council and there's a lot of attendees listed. It doesn't
17 list the President.

18 Does that mean the President wasn't there or was it a
19 practice not to list the President?

20 Mr. Gray. Actually, Mr. Schwarz, I take the position, and
21 maybe I said this to you, really I am puzzled by this one to
22 which my attention has just been called because my view always
23 was that there is no National Security Council meeting without
24 the President. It is the President and Council. And I don't
25 understand, it says here is the Secretary of State, of course.

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1 He would have been the ranking member of the Council presiding.
2 I'm sorry, you've got me on this one. I cannot understand
3 because I always have taken the position when I read in the
4 press today that the National Security Council says, or the
5 National Security Council does I take some umbrage because
6 there isn't any such thing as the National Security Council
7 without the President, if the National Security Council is
8 saying something.

9 This is why I don't think that we have the best organization
10 possible to run our affairs today. But that is not the
11 subject of this discussion.

12 The Chairman. Well, I'll tell you one thing about it,
13 Mr. Gray. It is no longer lean.

14 Mr. Gray. No, sir, I know that and I know very well
15 about that. But this is not the subject.

16 May I go off the record?

17 The Chairman. Certainly.

18 (Discussion off the record.)

19 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Gray, I have a couple of things that
20 came up in your meeting with the staff I neglected to ask you.
21 Was there at some point during your government experience a
22 discussion of killing Nasser, and if so did it lead to anything?

23 I mean obviously he didn't die from assassination.

24 Mr. Gray. Yes, I'm glad to bring that up because I think
25 I got the impression I never heard the word "assassination"

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1 used and that is not quite correct. I cannot remember which
2 year this was but probably '58 or '59, at the time when Colonel
3 Nasser was riding high. We were in the Planning Board of
4 which I was Chairman, reviewing an NSC paper which would go
5 naturally to the President and members of his Council on the
6 Near and Middle East.

7 And as we began discussions of this paper and views about
8 what our relationships with and posture toward Colonel Nasser,
9 what should be this posture. And the original comments ranged
10 all the way from one side, let's bump him off, to the other
11 extreme, let's get in bed with him. And I mean there was a
12 whole gamut of expressions.

13 Well, when we sat down to write the paper the word
14 "assassination" or "bump off" or anything of that sort never
15 appeared, nor did "get in bed with him," although it's interesting
16 that the CIA position at that time was that Nasser was the
17 wave of the future, that he would sweep across Africa and
18 we ought to get rid of him.

19 The President's decision finally was somewhere between
20 the extreme of getting in bed with him and of trying to limit
21 his capabilities somehow. Having left the impression perhaps
22 I never heard "assassination" mentioned, I'll guarantee it
23 never found its way into print in that paper and it was never
24 offered to the President as an option in that Middle East paper.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Well, is the point it didn't get into print,

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1 is that the only point you can say about Nasser?

2 Mr. Gray. Well, nobody seriously after the first discussion,
3 nobody was putting forth that as an alternative.

4 I am not sure that answers your question.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Well, it's better, I think, than saying it
6 didn't get into print.

7 Mr. Gray. All right, it was not pressed.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Did you hear of any other discussions of
9 assassinations?

10 Mr. Gray. Yes, there's one other I mentioned to the staff
11 and I have forgotten. Can you refresh my recollection?

12 Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Was it a discussion when you were
13 with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board?

14 Mr. Gray. Oh, yes. A former member of that Board, whom
15 I would just as soon not identify because I don't think it's
16 important to this Committee, when the DCI would appear before
17 the Board and we would be brief on Vietnam, on various occasions
18 this member of the Board would say, have you given any

19 consideration to trying to bump off the leadership in Hanoi?

20 And I was never sure whether he was being facetious or not.

21 But in any event this was his question and the DCI would

22 just shrug.

23 So we'd come back to another meeting a couple of months
24 later and he'd say, have you yet given any consideration to
25 bumping off the leadership in Hanoi? And the DCI would just shrug.

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1 Mr. Kelly. Yes, all National Security Council meeting
2 minutes come from Abilene.

3 They give us only the portions relating to --

4 Mr. Schwarz. It is relevant.

5 Mr. Kelly. Well, I told them to give me the first
6 page, whether relevant or not, and now we'll get the signature
7 page, whether relevant or not.

8 Senator Schweiker. I was wondering whether General
9 Johnson kept the minutes of that meeting.

10 Mr. Schwarz. General Johnson was the one we had with
11 General Taylor, and this is Mr. Johnson.

12 The Chairman. It is very difficult to read that sentence,
13 the one that Senator Schweiker has pointed out: "Mobutu
14 appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment,
15 but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave
16 danger as long as he was not disposed of."

17 It is hard to read that sentence without at least construing
18 it to mean that Lumumba was still alive and until he was no
19 longer alive, he was a danger.

20 Senator Schweiker. What was the time sequence, if I
21 might ask the counsel, of the meeting that Bissell had about
22 disposing of Lumumba? When did that occur?

23 Mr. Schwarz. The fall or the summer.

24 Mr. Baron. October-November.

25 Senator Schweiker. Of that year?

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1 an assassination.

2 Mr. Schwarz. No, it had never been suggested. But does
3 that help you interpret the language about Lumumba, disposing
4 of Lumumba?

5 Mr. Gray. Would you ask the question again?

6 Mr. Schwarz. You referred to the reference to assassinating
7 Lumumba, the failure of that up above and you commented we had
8 nothing to do with it, and I said there was no allegation we did.
9 But I asked you whether those words about Mobutu help you
10 interpret the "disposed of" language about Lumumba, or are
11 they irrelevant to the interpretation of "dispose of"?

12 Mr. Gray. Well, I will simply repeat that. It was not
13 my impression that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba.

14 The Chairman. If there are no further questions, Mr.
15 Gray, we appreciate your testimony.

16 Mr. Gray. May I make some concluding remarks. They are
17 rather brief.

18 The Chairman. Yes, certainly.

19 Mr. Gray. First of all, let me say, sir, that I have
20 been treated with the utmost courtesy by counsel, staff, and
21 by you and your Committee, and for this I am grateful. I
22 have appeared before a lot of committees and this has not
23 always been the case. And I appreciate the opportunity to
24 appear.

25 And I hope you will permit me some personal, but not

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1 unimportant observations.

2 I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously
3 as possible as I feel very strongly the need for a viable
4 Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its
5 charter. I believe that the present furor about CIA is
6 impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it
7 is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the
8 better our country will be served. I believe that we will
9 continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis
10 for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when
11 covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of
12 our national security.

13 Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that
14 there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that
15 it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence
16 Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally
17 concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country,
18 especially through its very many KGB agents who are here.

19 I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be
20 interested enough to investigate this most serious matter.

21 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray.

22 Mr. Gray. Thank you for the courtesy.

23 The Chairman. Thank you.

24 The hearing will recess until 10:00 tomorrow morning.

25 (Whereupon, at 5:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned,

SECRET - EYES ONLY

3 November 1960

E-5

Gray, Ex # 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

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Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

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✓4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

✓5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

✓6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this.

✓7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

SECRET - EVER GRAY
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on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group
on 20 October 1960.

Tom Parrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

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Gray Ex # 1

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Tom Parrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

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3 November 1960

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Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically, the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

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Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

✓4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

✓5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

✓6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this.

✓7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group
on 20 October 1960.

Tom Parrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

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March 14, 1960

Gray Ex # 2

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 435th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, March 10, 1960

Present at the 436th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the Secretary of State; Mr. James H. Douglas for the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (John S. Patterson). Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Admiral Arleigh Burke for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Science and Technology; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John W. Irwin, II; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would cover certain situations which had developed during the absence of the President in South America. Growing strains had appeared in relations between Iran and the USSR. [REDACTED] indicated that the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, seeing no further hope of the re-establishment of normal relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, was suggesting that Khrushchev and the Shah should hold a meeting somewhere in Europe. The USSR continues to insist that Iran must ban all military bases, while the Shah is willing to go no further than giving assurances that he will not permit long or medium-range missile bases to be established on Iranian territory. The campaign of Soviet pressure against Iran is being intensified, with Russian radio propaganda being designed to play on the nerves of the Shah by emphasizing plots against his life. Mr. Dulles felt there might be some grounds for believing plots against the Shah did in fact exist. Balchtar

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NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WMS 3-17-98

The Department of State has no objection to the
release or declassification of this document in full
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 April 98 WJ

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Iran; Khrushchev's trip to Asia; Guinea's relations with the Soviet Bloc; the Italian political situation; Japanese-Korean relations; and the Cuban situation.

2. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Action No. 2177)

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Planning Board discussion of U.S. Policy toward Cuba. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum)

Mr. Dillon remarked that any threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Cuba would probably develop overnight. The Country Team report that there was no hope of satisfactory relations with Cuba, while new, was merely a confirmation of our basic current policy toward Cuba. Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba. This objective is not being realized at the present time because there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed, the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist take-over. If Castro were successful in his effort to provoke us into intervention, the result would help the USSR, since American intervention in Cuba would be considered in many parts of the world as a counterpart of Soviet intervention in Hungary. It was becoming more and more likely that the law we originally planned to recommend to Congress on sugar would not be passed; and indeed we may not now want it passed. It had been planned to recommend an extension of the sugar subsidy without change except for the provision that the President would have authority to make changes at his discretion. Congress will probably now want to go further than this recommendation. Mr. Dillon reported that up to the present time he had felt we should be careful not to take actions which would have a serious effect on the Cuban people, but now he believed we need not be so careful about actions of this kind, since the Cuban people were responsible for the regime. If Castro continued his present activities, the results would be catastrophic throughout the hemisphere, whereas a set-back to the Cuban economy as a result of Castro's actions might be a desirable development, since it would show that Communist-type activity does not pay. Our legal position with respect to the Guantanamo Naval Base was firm. The only basis for attack on our position would be the argument that the treaty was imposed on Cuba and that it was a very old treaty. However, if the matter were

brought to the UN, we would be in a difficult position because our posture is that we do not wish to keep a military base if the indigenous country does not want our base. There was a certain similarity between Guantanamo and Bizerte, where the French case is based on legalities and our position is that the problem is a political one. However, we are standing on legal grounds with respect to Guantanamo, even though our position is a difficult one.

Admiral Burke believed we had a legal right to stay in Guantanamo, which was a very useful training base. Guantanamo differed from Bizerte in that we had been established in Guantanamo for a long time and there were no Cubans living inside the base area. Cutting off the water supply would be the only means of Cuban attack against the Guantanamo Base. If the water supply were cut off, we could continue to support the base by means of Navy tankers, perhaps even by installing plants which manufacture fresh water from sea water. Admiral Burke reported incidentally that we had attempted to obtain water by drilling on the base, but had been unsuccessful. In fact, we had feared for a time we might strike oil. The 230 marines on the base would be able to hold it against a Cuban armed attack. In Admiral Burke's view, Castro may want to provoke our intervention in order to lower U.S. prestige in Latin America so that other Latin American revolutions could be created. The Latin American military men to whom he had talked favored a strong U.S. stand, felt that the U.S. had exercised a great deal of restraint so far, and insisted that we should not allow ourselves to be pushed further.

The President said a certain amount of pro-Castro sentiment had been expressed by small groups in the countries he had recently visited. His host Presidents had labelled this sentiment as Communist-inspired. On the trip he saw displayed some signs favorable to Castro, but was aware of no demonstrations. The Latin American Presidents had counselled further forbearance by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization of American States would finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action. The Latin American Presidents, however, had no idea as to how the situation in Cuba should be handled. The President had suggested to them that they should not condone a situation which might result in frightening U. S. business away from Latin America. To some extent each country is restrained from action against Castro by a vociferous Communist element.

Mr. Gray asked whether the Council should keep the situation in Cuba under constant surveillance and whether it was the consensus of the Council that, for the time being at least, our present policy toward Cuba should continue to be pursued. The President said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Americans living in Cuba. We would be forced to take action other than diplomatic action if U.S. citizens were in danger, and we ought to

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Know what action we would take in such a contingency. We might finally have to use force if U.S. citizens were exposed to mob violence. Admiral Burke thought we needed a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements could rally. Mr. Dulles said some anti-Castro leaders existed, but they are not in Cuba at present. The President said we might have another Black Hole of Calcutta in Cuba; and he wondered what we do about such a situation. Mr. Dillon felt it would be necessary to face that situation when it arrived. Admiral Burke noted that we had plans for immediate evacuation of the 10,000 Americans in Cuba, as well as military forces to put these plans into execution. Secretary Douglas was somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of evacuation, saying that someone was bound to get hurt during such an operation. The President remarked that we could blockade the island and say it is quarantined. Mr. Gray asked whether State and Defense should be directed to review contingency plans regarding Cuba. Mr. Dillon said plans were being reviewed constantly, but the difficulty was that all the contingencies could not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke believed Cuba could be blockaded within two to three hours after the order was given. Mr. Patterson asked whether economic measures as such had hurt Castro. Mr. Dillon believed that economic measures against Castro would not have much effect in a short time. Moreover, Castro would probably be able to counteract economic sanctions by receiving what he needed from the Soviets. The President said he could not do this if we blockaded the island. Admiral Burke suggested that we should intensify our propaganda to persuade the OAS and the Cuban people to support our policy. The President agreed, adding that we could do almost anything if we had the support of the OAS. Mr. Dillon pointed out that the State Department was constantly endeavoring to secure the support of the OAS. The President agreed with the suggestion of Secretary Anderson that the Inter-American Bank should be used as a method of gaining the support of OAS countries. He added that we should endeavor to think of all possible ways of influencing Latin American countries to favor our policies in Cuba. Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro. The President said the Argentinians had been very bitter about Guevara. Secretary Anderson said the following story was going the rounds: When Castro wanted to take over the Cuban Bank, he had asked at a meeting of his supporters whether there was an economist present. Guevara had raised his hand and Castro had appointed him head of the Bank. On the way out of the meeting Castro had said to Guevara "I didn't know you were an economist", and Guevara had replied, "Oh, I thought you said a Communist."

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March 14, 1960

Gray Ex # 2

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of the National Security Council,
Thursday, March 10, 1960

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EYES ONLY

7/9/75 TESTIMONY

15 March 1960

E-2

Gray Ex. # 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

✓ SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting 14 March 1960.
Present: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles.
Also Present: Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Robertson, Col. King.

1. Cuba was the exclusive subject for discussion. Mr. Dulles asked all present to read paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba". After reading was completed, it was agreed by all members that propaganda action should be greatly increased both covertly and through U.S.A. Mr. Robertson said that for the past ten years U.S.A.'s Voice of America program to Latin America has been virtually non-existent through lack of funds. U.S.A.'s propaganda capabilities were mainly through local assets. Mr. Gray was requested by the Committee to approach U.S.A. Director, Mr. Allen, and ask for a report on U.S.A. proposed program on Cuba. Mr. Dulles mentioned that Mr. MacArthur had recently been in Cuba studying this problem and had met with Colonel King upon his return.

2. It was agreed that further preparations should be made for CIG action. If the Cuban situation should deteriorate to the point where troops were needed to protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners, even taken forces from some Latin American countries would be well welcome. Admiral Burke mentioned the good shooting of Brazilians and Venezuelans at recent maneuvers in Puerto Rico.

3. Mr. Robertson said that if overt intervention were essential, criticism of our action would be lessened if it could be made under the cover of a request from a Cuban junta or rapidly formed provisional government of moderate elements. The early formation of such a group was encouraged.

4. During a discussion of radio sites, the use of WFL by a Cuban group was mentioned and not objected to. Mr. Bissell emphasized the advantages and disadvantages of a radio station in the Florida Keys. Mr. Dulles said that Havana was under consideration as a site for a short wave transmitter and wondered if Mexico might not eventually permit such an installation. Admiral Burke suggested the possibility of Haiti, Puerto Rico, some of the American islands, and possibly the Bahamas. He also recommended that consideration be given to broadcasting from ships. Admiral Burke asked for suitable tapes to be broadcast at the Guantanamo station in English, certainly for American personnel. These broadcasts would of course be heard by many Cubans understanding English. U.S.A. would be asked to furnish tapes.

5. Mr. Gray expressed concern over the time stipulated in the paper before trained Cubans would be ready for action, and asked what were capabilities for a crash program. Mr. Merchant asked Admiral Burke what were the immediate capabilities if overt action were required. Admiral Burke replied that the Navy was quickly strengthening Cienfuegos and soon would be

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moving in additional tanks. A battalion would be on the alert for Guantanamo and two battle groups for Havana. The Marine division and two Army divisions were ready if needed. Total American forces would approximate 50,000 men. The Admiral said first forces could be in the air within four hours after receipt of orders.

6. There was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Paul Castro and the Guevarra should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Ruller felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One possibility was Juan Jimenez, the head of the Agricultural Reform program. No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned.

7. The cut off of oil shipments by Russia, France and Spain was mentioned. Mr. Gray said that action by the oil companies will not be raised until his associate decides on the covert program.

8. Mr. Robertson mentioned the possibility of harassment suits being brought against the Cuban Government. Mr. Ruller questioned whether suits could be brought against the Cuban Government. Mr. Ruller mentioned the possibility of American banks to limit credits. Mr. Robertson said he had learned that the Havana Power Company that the Cubans were purchasing \$5,000,000 worth of equipment, and wondered what such a large amount could be for.

9. Mr. Ruller said he wanted to emphasize how Cuban activities were extending far beyond their own borders, and that this should be given as much publicity as possible in order to influence the position of other Latin American countries. It was agreed that each member at European ports might be requested not to local units on missions ships to Cuba. It was suggested that action be explored through local through the FBI. The FBI might succeed at Antwerp and there.

10. Admiral Burke had a derogatory report on Lt. Col. Harguin from a former Cuban Naval Attaché to Washington, Commander Polio. The Navy has considerable confidence in Commander Polio who is now believed to be in exile and living in Florida. Admiral Burke said the report was old and there might be nothing to it. Mr. Ruller promised that he would carefully check this out. Colonel King described at some length our relationship with Harguin and the favorable impression he had made. Admiral Burke said that the Spanish were reportedly working with Harguin, and Mr. Ruller commented that Harguin's ideology was probably communist too far to the left to please the present Spanish regime.

11. Mr. Ruller requested approval by the Committee of the financial costs and their permission that he speak to Harry Smith of the Bureau of the

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Subject. He thought it would be prudent and wise to do so. There were no objections.

12. Mr. Gray said he would like to submit later this week to his associate the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba", but modified on the basis of this morning's discussion. Mr. Dallas promised a revised paper this week.

/s/ J. C. King
Chief/WH

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

15 March 1960

E-2

Gray Ex # 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting 14 March 1960.

Present: Messrs. Harcourt, Gray, Levin, Dulles.

Also Present: Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Robertson, Col. King.

1. Cuba was the exclusive subject for discussion. Mr. Dulles asked all present to read paper entitled "General Concept/Action Plan for Cuba". After reading was completed, it was agreed by all members that propaganda action should be greatly increased both covertly and through U.S.A. Mr. Robertson said that for the past ten years U.S.A.'s Voice of America program to Latin America had been virtually non-existent through lack of funds. U.S.A.'s propaganda capabilities were mainly through local assets. Mr. Gray was requested by the Committee to approach U.S.A. Director, Mr. Allen, and ask for a report on U.S.A. proposed program on Cuba. Mr. Dulles mentioned that Mr. Wickham had recently been in Cuba studying this problem and had met with Colonel King upon his return.

2. It was agreed that further preparations should be made for CIG action. If the Cuban situation should deteriorate to the point where troops were needed to protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners, even token forces from some Latin American countries would be most welcome. Admiral Burke mentioned the good sharing of Brazilians and Venezuelans at recent maneuvers in Puerto Rico.

3. Mr. Robertson said that if overt intervention were essential, criticism of our action would be lessened if it could be made under the cover of a request from a Cuban junta or rapidly formed provisional government of moderate elements. The early formation of such a group was encouraged.

4. During a discussion of radio sites, the use of WRL by a Cuban group was mentioned and not objected to. Mr. Bissell emphasized the advantages and disadvantages of a radio station in the Florida Keys. Mr. Dulles said that Puerto was under consideration as a site for a short wave transmitter and wondered if Mexico might not eventually permit such an installation. Admiral Burke suggested the possibility of Haiti, Puerto Rico, some of the American islands, and possibly the Bahamas. He also recommended that consideration be given to broadcasting from ships. Admiral Burke asked for suitable tapes to be broadcast on the Guantanamo station in English, ostensibly for American personnel. These broadcasts would of course be heard by many Cubans understanding English. U.S.A. would be asked to furnish tapes.

5. Mr. Gray expressed concern over the time stipulated in the paper before trained Cubans would be ready for action, and asked what were opportunities for a crash program. Mr. Harcourt asked Admiral Burke what were the immediate capabilities of overt action were required. Admiral Burke replied that the Navy was quietly strengthening Guantanamo and soon would be

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moving in additional tanks. A battalion would be on the alert for Guantanamo and two battle groups for Havana. One Marine division and two Army divisions were ready if needed. Total American forces would approximate 50,000 men. The Admiral said first forces could be in the air within four hours after receipt of orders.

6. There was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Paul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously. Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One possibility was Juan Marinello, the head of the Agricultural Reform program. No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned.

7. The cut off of oil shipments by Reed, Tanco and Shell was mentioned. Mr. Gray said that action by the oil companies will not be raised until his associate decides on the covert program.

8. Mr. Robertson mentioned the possibility of harassment suits trying to Cuban dollars on sugar shipments. Mr. Dulles questioned whether suits could be brought against the Cuban Government. Mr. Kissell mentioned the possibility of American banks to limit credits. Mr. Harbois said he had learned that the Havana Power Company that the Cubans were purchasing 50,000 tons of dynamite, and wondered what such a large amount could be for.

9. Mr. Dulles said he wanted to emphasize that Cuban activities were extending far beyond their own borders, and that this should be given as much publicity as possible in order to influence the position of other Latin American countries. It was agreed that each member of European powers might be persuaded not to load arms on missions ships to Cuba. It was suggested that action be explored through Latin through the EEC. The EEC might succeed at Antwerp and Rome.

10. Admiral Burke had a derogatory report on Lt. Col. Farguin from a former Cuban Naval Attaché to Washington, Commander Velasco. The Navy has considerable confidence in Commander Velasco who is now believed to be in Cuba and living in Florida. Admiral Burke said the report was old and there might be nothing to it. Mr. Dulles promised that he would carefully check this out. Colonel King described at some length our relationship with Farguin and the favorable impression he had made. Admiral Burke said that the Spanish were reportedly uneasy with Farguin, and Mr. Dulles commented that Farguin's ideology was probably somewhat too far to the left to please the present Spanish regime.

11. Mr. Dulles requested approval by the Committee of the financial annex and their permission that he speak to Henry Stans of the Bureau of the

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12. Mr. Gray said he would like to submit later this week to his associate the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba", but modified on the basis of this morning's discussion. Mr. Dulles promised a revised paper this week.

J. C. King
Chief/WH

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DATE: 11/11/11

April 14, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 441st Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, April 14, 1960

Gray Ex # 4

Present at the 441st NSC Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs (Items 3 & 4), for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, CIA; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

Mr. Lay said he regretted that Mr. Gray would be unable to attend the beginning of the Meeting but might be able to attend before it ended.

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2. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206 and 2213)
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Mr. Dulles said that Chou en-Lai's forthcoming visit to New Delhi represented a Chinese Communist effort to restore cordiality in the relations between India and Communist China, a cordiality which had been shattered by the events of the last year, including the border dispute, and the suppression of the revolt in Tibet. Chou en-Lai would be accompanied by a high-powered negotiating team and his expectations of arriving at a settlement were apparently high. By contrast, Nehru was skeptical about the possibilities of settlement. Nehru was also under parliamentary and public pressure to make no concessions in the border dispute since he had committed himself not

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NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 Apr 98 W

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Mr. Dulles reported that in the Dominican Republic, Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious. The wholesale arrests ordered by Trujillo last winter had affected almost every prominent family in the Dominican Republic. Although these arrests had broken up the plotting against Trujillo, they had at the same time, weakened the dictator's position. Mr. Dulles thought that further attempts would be made to kill or oust Trujillo. Relations between the government and the church were rapidly deteriorating. Mr. Dulles pointed out incidentally that the attitude of the church in the Dominican Republic was quite different from the attitude of the church in Cuba. The economic situation in the Dominican Republic was worsening. Business is stagnant and international financial sources are drying up. The government has resorted to various subterfuges in an attempt to improve its precarious financial position. Secretary Gates asked whether it was true that Trujillo was one of the richest men in the world, with more money than the Dominican government. Mr. Dulles said this statement was true; Trujillo was reported to have milked the Dominican Republic of \$400 million, an estimate which was probably exaggerated and should be scaled down by one-half or two-thirds. Secretary Anderson said he understood that \$44 million in gold had been recently removed from New York banks by the Dominican Republic and had been placed in the Bank of Nova Scotia. Mr. Dulles said he had a detailed report on the financial situation of the Dominican Republic, all the details of which he would not read. However, it appeared that the Dominican Republic now held \$15 million in gold and that it had incurred a variety of obligations; for example, a \$16.5 million loan from the Bank of Nova Scotia secured by the sugar crop. The Dominican Republic had also drawn \$7 million out of a \$11.5 million credit with the International Monetary Fund. Secretary Anderson said the International Monetary Fund's dealings with the Dominican Republic might present a problem to the U.S. The Dominican Republic now had drawn so much from the Fund that it could only draw in the future \$2 million every 90 days without consulting the Directors of the Fund. If the Dominicans should want to draw more than \$2 million every 90 days, the question would arise as to how the U.S. Director should vote when the Dominican Republic undertakes the necessary consultation with the Fund.

Mr. Dulles, continuing his briefing, reported that Trujillo, apparently not realizing his position, is not anticipating an early fall from power and is apparently not planning flight. The Dominican military forces have apparently been repelled by the excesses in Cuba and may believe they will be compelled to act against Trujillo before the radical pro-Castro elements, which

The Vice President wondered whether the worst outcome of the situation in the Dominican Republic would not be a takeover by the pro-Castro elements. He also wondered whether we were doing everything possible to support other elements. Mr. Dulles said the difficult question was that of leadership of moderate elements in the Dominican Republic. The vice president of the Republic might be able to assume power or the principal military officers might govern through a military junta. Many prominent anti-Trujillo Dominicans were in exile. Mr. Dillon said this government was following the situation in the Dominican Republic closely and intended to try to prevent seizure of power by any pro-Castro group. This would involve working closely with the OAS. The Vice President believed that we could not let Castro or a pro-Castro group take over the Dominican Republic even if we had to intervene in order to prevent such a takeover. Mr. Dillon felt that in order to intervene we would need an invitation. The Vice President feared that the old story was being repeated in the Dominican Republic; that is, the pro-Castro element was the only minority group with strong leadership and definite objectives. Mr. Dulles said there was a group in Venezuela which would like to move into the Dominican Republic and take over the government. Mr. Dillon believed the Castro element in the Dominican Republic was not strong enough to assume control of the government without support from Cuba. It was, accordingly, very important that the U.S. be prepared for rapid action. The Vice President agreed that it was very important that the U.S., if necessary, take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power in the Dominican Republic.

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Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us.

Turning to Cuba Mr. Dulles reported that a Senor Betancourt (no relation to Venezuela's Betancourt) had recently defected in Cuba and had told U.S. officials that he sees three possible outcomes of the Cuban situation: (1) the assassination of Castro, which would make him a martyr (2) Castro's suicide, which is a possibility in the event of failure and (3) a continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in a socialist dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba. Senor Betancourt had said that Castro was a warped personality and he had accordingly suggested that the U.S. appoint a committee of three to deal with him - a committee consisting of a psychologist, a diplomat and an actor of the Orson Welles type.

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Mr. Dillon thought the President's letter to the Chilean students was very effective throughout Latin America, especially in Chile. We had recently called the attention of Argentina, Chile and Colombia to the fact that a Cuban radio station had been calling the presidents of these countries "lackeys and slaves of the U.S." On Tuesday we are planning to send a ship to the Nicaro facility in Cuba to load nickel. This will be a test case because the 90 day moratorium on application of the Cuban export tax to Nicaro expired on April 1. It will be interesting to see whether Cuba will apply the tax and compel Nicaro to shut down. Mr. Dillon said it was his impression that the Cuban censorship was becoming more and more effective, so that it was increasingly difficult to get the truth to the Cuban people. He asked whether Mr. Allen would like to comment on this point.

Mr. Allen said USIA had been discussing means of presenting factual information to the Cuban people. His agency had been under some pressure from U.S. newspapers and Members of Congress on this point. The Senate had recently passed a resolution allocating \$100,000 to be used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio stations for programs aimed at Cuba. However, a conference committee had refused the allocation of additional money, suggesting that funds already appropriated be used for the purpose. Studies in USIA had developed two possibilities for getting the factual information to the Cuban people. One project would be a 500 kilowatt mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida transmitting programs beamed to Cuba. It would take at least nine months and possibly up to twenty months to put this project into operation. A second project was the proposal to fly an aircraft over Key West for the purpose of beaming television programs into Cuba, probably on Channel 8. This project could be put into operation in about eight weeks if the Navy would provide USIA with a Super-Constellation aircraft now being used on weather patrol duties. However, this project was fraught with certain difficulties. The Federal Communications Commission, although it would of course cooperate if directed to do so by the NSC or the President, was strongly opposed to the operation because it feared that the result would be a radio war in the Western Hemisphere. In any case, FCC would like to be heard before being directed by the NSC to proceed. Mr. Allen pointed out that if Mexico or Canada beamed programs to one of our cities from an aircraft, we would be furious. A similar reaction might be expected from Castro. Moreover, if it became known that we were broadcasting on a particular channel, Castro could shift his television stations to this channel and jam our programs. In fact, jamming is so easy that Castro might retaliate by jamming other U.S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of this problem. There were other difficulties also. Beaming television programs to Cuba from an aircraft would give Castro a platform from which to denounce the U.S. for television aggression. He could pose as a martyr, saying he was a victim of the powerful U.S., and ask other Latin American countries to rally to his defense. In the light of all these difficulties, USIA was searching for alternate means of getting factual information to the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts to Cuba have been augmented. The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts is that there are only about 150,000 short-wave sets in Cuba, most of which were imported by Castro during his days as a guerrilla. It might be possible for USIA to buy time on local stations in Florida for broadcasting Cuban programs. The most useful station for this purpose is one owned by Mr. Storer, who is most cooperative and whose station has broadcast to Cuba on an experimental basis. Most radio stations do not wish to rent two or three hours of good listening time to the USIA for Spanish-language programs because they are fearful of losing their regular listeners. Mr. Allen concluded by saying he would welcome guidance on the USIA problem.

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Mr. Dillon was inclined to think that any contrived solution such as broadcasting television programs from an aircraft would be less than productive in our relations with Latin American countries unless the operation produced a very definite dividend. Mr. Allen said it had been suggested that we broadcast Big League baseball games to Cuba since the Cubans appeared to be baseball fans. Mr. Dillon doubted that broadcasting baseball games to Cuba would advance our policy very far. Mr. Allen said of course we would mention other news in the pause between innings of the baseball game. On balance, Mr. Allen agreed that while baseball broadcasting to Cuba had some attractions, it was not sufficiently dignified for a U.S. program. The Vice President agreed that broadcasting from an airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce enough benefits to compensate for its disadvantages. The Vice President had no objection to taking action which would be bitterly protested by Castro provided such action would really damage the Castro regime but he saw no point in taking action which would merely irritate Castro without producing tangible benefits for the U.S. No doubt Castro would charge the U.S. with aggression if a U.S. broadcast prevented Cubans from listening to his speeches. Overt action of this kind should not be undertaken by the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result in great benefits to us. The Vice President wondered about the possibility of buying time on Miami stations. Mr. Allen said most of these stations were low-powered stations although there was a Spanish-language station in Miami. The Vice President thought the power of the low-powered stations might be increased. Mr. Allen felt we should expand our short-wave broadcasts, investigate the possibility of buying more time on local stations, etc. He also pointed out that the International Telecommunications Conventions contained the principle that nations wishing to broadcast internationally should do so by short-wave and that standard wave or television broadcasts should use only enough power to cover the territory of the broadcasting state. The Conventions also contain the principle that nations should not broadcast on standard-wave or television from the high seas.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether it would not be more useful to expend available funds for the purpose of introducing more short-wave sets into Cuba rather than to buy time on local radio stations. Mr. Allen felt the introduction of more short-wave radio sets would be feasible. Mr. Dulles said distribution of these sets might present a problem but he would look into the matter. The Vice President said he understood the number of people in Cuba disenchanted with Castro was constantly increasing. He wondered whether twenty per cent of the population was disillusioned with Castro by now. Mr. Dulles said disillusionment with Castro

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had occurred principally among the educated classes of the population; there was not much evidence of any change in the feeling of other classes for Castro. A change in the sentiment of the lower classes would only occur over a long period of time, probably as a result of economic difficulties. Mr. Dulles reported that some Cuban intellectuals would soon be broadcasting to Cuba from Boston at night. It was hoped that a second radio station over which Cuban refugees might broadcast would be installed in five or six weeks. Mr. Dulles then read from a report of the Secretary General of the Popular Socialists (communist) Party in Cuba. This report indicated that the Communist Party recognizes that Castro, as the leader of the revolution, can do more to promote communist aims in Cuba than anyone else. The report indicates that the communists are keeping in the background in order not to make difficulties for Castro in his international relations. The report declares that the major aims of communism are being accomplished in Cuba. It declares that Castro knows that he has the strong support of the communists, that he has said that anti-communists are imperialist agents, that he has given the communists credit for creating during the last thirty years the anti-imperialist sentiment which made the revolution possible and that he has admitted that the revolution could not have succeeded without communism. The report declares that Castro and the leaders of his government consult the communists regularly, that communists are in key positions in the army and in the government, and that a communist-controlled Cuban government could not make as much progress towards the aims of communism as the present government is making.

The Vice President said this report appeared to indicate that the communists feel they have the Castro government well in hand. Mr. Gates asked to whom the report was made. Mr. Dulles said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The Vice President wondered whether the report could not be publicized. He felt publicity would be very effective in this case. Mr. Dulles said he would investigate to determine how widely the report had been circulated already. He would not want to publicize it in such a way as to uncover his sources of information. The Vice President agreed but thought that if the report had been widely disseminated, it would be impossible for the Cubans to tell which recipient had passed it on.

Mr. Allen wished to turn to the situation in India for a moment. He said he had just returned from New Delhi and it was his impression that one of Nehru's great difficulties was his promise to parliament that he would not negotiate on the border dispute until the Chinese Communists had evacuated the territory

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are daily increasing in strength, take over the government. If there is a gap between the departure of Trujillo and the establishment of the new regime, the radical pro-Castro elements might have an opportunity to seize power. If the army does not hold off these radical elements, a period of chaos might ensue. Mr. Dulles believed that Trujillo's downfall might not occur for weeks or even months but, on the other hand, the situation might become critical at any moment.

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A recent invitation by Cuba to Honduran students and legislators to attend the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations indicates that Cuba is abandoning the concept of making this conference an official governmental one. Cuba appears to be preparing to establish diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. Pavlicek, a career diplomat in Latin American affairs who as Minister to Mexico had arranged for the shipment of Czech arms to the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954, would probably be the Czech Ambassador to Cuba. The Cuban communists were increasing their efforts to control the Cuban Labor Federation. The President's letter to the Chilean students had received wide notice in Cuba and elicited a favorable reaction among many people who are becoming disillusioned with Castro.

Mr. Dillon thought the President's letter to the Chilean students was very effective throughout Latin America, especially in Chile. We had recently called the attention of Argentina, Chile and Colombia to the fact that a Cuban radio station had been calling the presidents of these countries "lackeys and slaves of the U.S." On Tuesday we are planning to send a ship to the Nicaro facility in Cuba to load nickel. This will be a test case because the 90 day moratorium on application of the Cuban export tax to Nicaro expired on April 1. It will be interesting to see whether Cuba will apply the tax and compel Nicaro to shut down. Mr. Dillon said it was his impression that the Cuban censorship was becoming more and more effective, so that it was increasingly difficult to get the truth to the Cuban people. He asked whether Mr. Allen would like to comment on this point.

Mr. Allen said USIA had been discussing means of presenting factual information to the Cuban people. His agency had been under some pressure from U.S. newspapers and Members of Congress on this point. The Senate had recently passed a resolution allocating \$100,000 to be used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio stations for programs aimed at Cuba. However, a conference committee had refused the allocation of additional money, suggesting that funds already appropriated be used for the purpose. Studies in USIA had developed two possibilities for getting the factual information to the Cuban people. One project would be a 500 kilowatt mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida transmitting programs beamed to Cuba. It would take at least nine months and possibly up to twenty months to put this project into operation. A second project was the proposal to fly an aircraft over Key West for the purpose of beaming television programs into Cuba, probably on Channel 8. This project could be put into operation in about eight weeks if the Navy would provide USIA with a Super-Constellation aircraft now being used on weather patrol duties. However, this project was fraught with certain difficulties. The Federal Communications Commission, although it would of course cooperate if directed to do so by the NSC or the President, was strongly opposed to the operation because it feared that the result would be a radio war in the Western Hemisphere. In any case, FCC would like to be heard before being directed by the NSC to proceed. Mr. Allen pointed out that if Mexico or Canada beamed programs to one of our cities from an aircraft, we would be furious. A similar reaction might be expected from Castro. Moreover, if it became known that we were broadcasting on a particular channel, Castro could shift his television stations to this channel and jam our programs. In fact, jamming is so easy that Castro might retaliate by jamming other U.S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of this problem. There were other difficulties also. Beaming television programs to Cuba from an aircraft would give Castro a platform from which to denounce the U.S. for television aggression. He could pose as a martyr, saying he was a victim of the powerful U.S., and ask other Latin American countries to rally to his defense. In the light of all these difficulties, USIA was searching for alternate means of getting factual information to the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts to Cuba have been augmented. The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts is that there are only about 150,000 short-wave sets in Cuba, most of which were imported by Castro during his days as a guerrilla. It might be possible for USIA to buy time on local stations in Florida for broadcasting Cuban programs. The most useful station for this purpose is one owned by Mr. Storer, who is most cooperative and whose station has broadcast to Cuba on an experimental basis. Most radio stations do not wish to rent two or three hours of good listening time to the USIA for Spanish-language programs because they are fearful of losing their regular listeners. Mr. Allen concluded by saying he would welcome guidance on the USIA problem.

Mr. Dillon was inclined to think that any contrived solution such as broadcasting television programs from an aircraft would be less than productive in our relations with Latin American countries unless the operation produced a very definite dividend. Mr. Allen said it had been suggested that we broadcast Big League baseball games to Cuba since the Cubans appeared to be baseball fans. Mr. Dillon doubted that broadcasting baseball games to Cuba would advance our policy very far. Mr. Allen said of course we would mention other news in the pause between innings of the baseball game. On balance, Mr. Allen agreed that while baseball broadcasting to Cuba had some attractions, it was not sufficiently dignified for a U.S. program. The Vice President agreed that broadcasting from an airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce enough benefits to compensate for its disadvantages. The Vice President had no objection to taking action which would be bitterly protested by Castro provided such action would really damage the Castro regime but he saw no point in taking action which would merely irritate Castro without producing tangible benefits for the U.S. No doubt Castro would charge the U.S. with aggression if a U.S. broadcast prevented Cubans from listening to his speeches. Overt action of this kind should not be undertaken by the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result in great benefits to us. The Vice President wondered about the possibility of buying time on Miami stations. Mr. Allen said most of these stations were low-powered stations although there was a Spanish-language station in Miami. The Vice President thought the power of the low-powered stations might be increased. Mr. Allen felt we should expand our short-wave broadcasts, investigate the possibility of buying more time on local stations, etc. He also pointed out that the International Telecommunications Conventions contained the principle that nations wishing to broadcast internationally should do so by short-wave and that standard wave or television broadcasts should use only enough power to cover the territory of the broadcasting state. The Conventions also contain the principle that nations should not broadcast on standard-wave or television from the high seas.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether it would not be more useful to expend available funds for the purpose of introducing more short-wave sets into Cuba rather than to buy time on local radio stations. Mr. Allen felt the introduction of more short-wave radio sets would be feasible. Mr. Dulles said distribution of these sets might present a problem but he would look into the matter. The Vice President said he understood the number of people in Cuba disenchanted with Castro was constantly increasing. He wondered whether twenty per cent of the population was disillusioned with Castro by now. Mr. Dulles said disillusionment with Castro

had occurred principally among the educated classes of the population; there was not much evidence of any change in the feeling of other classes for Castro. A change in the sentiment of the lower classes would only occur over a long period of time, probably as a result of economic difficulties. Mr. Dulles reported that some Cuban intellectuals would soon be broadcasting to Cuba from Boston at night. It was hoped that a second radio station over which Cuban refugees might broadcast would be installed in five or six weeks. Mr. Dulles then read from a report of the Secretary General of the Popular Socialists (communist) Party in Cuba. This report indicated that the Communist Party recognizes that Castro, as the leader of the revolution, can do more to promote communist aims in Cuba than anyone else. The report indicates that the communists are keeping in the background in order not to make difficulties for Castro in his international relations. The report declares that the major aims of communism are being accomplished in Cuba. It declares that Castro knows that he has the strong support of the communists, that he has said that anti-communists are imperialist agents, that he has given the communists credit for creating during the last thirty years the anti-imperialist sentiment which made the revolution possible and that he has admitted that the revolution could not have succeeded without communism. The report declares that Castro and the leaders of his government consult the communists regularly, that communists are in key positions in the army and in the government, and that a communist-controlled Cuban government could not make as much progress towards the aims of communism as the present government is making.

The Vice President said this report appeared to indicate that the communists feel they have the Castro government well in hand. Mr. Gates asked to whom the report was made. Mr. Dulles said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The Vice President wondered whether the report could not be publicized. He felt publicity would be very effective in this case. Mr. Dulles said he would investigate to determine how widely the report had been circulated already. He would not want to publicize it in such a way as to uncover his sources of information. The Vice President agreed but thought that if the report had been widely disseminated, it would be impossible for the Cubans to tell which recipient had passed it on.

Mr. Allen wished to turn to the situation in India for a moment. He said he had just returned from New Delhi and it was his impression that one of Nehru's great difficulties was his promise to parliament that he would not negotiate on the border dispute until the Chinese Communists had evacuated the territory

12 January 1961

Gray Ex #5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group, reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday.

5. Contingency Planning for Cuba

Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential step. Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 Apr 98 WD

7. Capture of Supplies in Cuba

In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.

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✓ 9. Dominican Republic

Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.

✓ 11. U-2 Flights - Vietnam

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the three successful U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission to cover that area as soon as the weather permits.

The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results, for the meeting of the 19th.

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29 December 1960

Gray Ex # 6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

3. Air Drops - Cuba

Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in the next three days.

5. Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such, since this would be impractical in view of requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

6. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 Apr 98

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25 August 1960

Reviewed on 7 Apr 98 *nd*

E-3
Gray Ext 7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through [REDACTED] the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials [REDACTED] in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of [REDACTED] the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature [REDACTED] who could be useful.

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Mr. Merchant commented that [REDACTED] in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

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4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LMS 3-19-96

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Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)

Reviewed on 7 April 98

SECRET - EYES ONLY

know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country. V

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. //

Thomas A. Parrott
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25 August 1960

E-3
Gray Ext 7

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