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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Reviewed on mm 7/30/98

14 September 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 14 September 1962

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale; General Carter; Mr. Donald Wilson

1. The Group approved in principle General Lansdale's paper of 31 August, with the amendments that had been agreed upon at last week's meeting and which were attached to General Lansdale's memorandum of 12 September. However, Mr. Bundy made it clear that this did not constitute blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis.

2. General Lansdale noted that he has asked appropriate people in the Pentagon to draw up estimates covering requirements for personnel, space, communications, etc., against the contingency that Cuban operations will move into a more active phase and will require such facilities.

1,2,3,5

3. General Carter said that CIA would examine the possibilities of sabotaging airplane parts which are scheduled to be shipped from [redacted] to Cuba.

1,2,4,5

4. CIA will attempt to develop hard intelligence on the reported landing of subversive elements [redacted] and perhaps elsewhere, [redacted] Mr. Johnson emphasized that any such evidence which could be adduced before [redacted] Ministers' meeting would be highly valuable.

5. General Lansdale reported that the NSA collection program is being stepped up considerably and should be in full swing by 1 November.

6. Mr. Bundy expressed his concern about the necessity for linking planning in the political and military fields with the MONGOOSE operations. He said that his tentative conclusion is that what is required is a tightly knit interagency group closely tied to the MONGOOSE group but not a part of it. He said he would discuss this concept with higher authority.

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OSD, NO OBJECTION AS REDACTED 23 JUNE 98

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7. General Carter reported on CIA's contacts with Pan American regarding its Havana flights. He said that the company had asked the Agency to buy its blocked pesos at a one-for-one rate at a scale of \$140,000 a month retroactive to last May 1st. He said that in the face of this proposal, CIA had agreed to buy \$200,000 worth, provided Pan American makes no move at this time to discontinue its service. He said there were assurances that no such move would be made before October 1st at the earliest.

After some discussion, the Group agreed that it is highly desirable to maintain this service. On the other hand, it appears that Pan American's estimates of the amount of money it is losing and the amount of subsidy required to break even are apparently excessive. General Carter undertook to look into the possibility, suggested by the Attorney General, that Pan American could lower its quoted fare, inasmuch as the company is not getting the benefit of the \$20 now in any case.

It was generally agreed that government operation of this service would be just as expensive as having Pan American continue it.

8. The Attorney General raised the question of actions by Cuban exile students against the Castro regime. He recognized, as did the rest of the Group, the fact that these activities can serve as a cover for future U.S.-sponsored operations. On the other hand, it was recognized equally that bad publicity could result. It was suggested that CIA might talk to selected students and spread the idea that any active operations planned by them must in fact be reasonable and worthwhile ones, and to leave the idea that irresponsible actions might lead to trouble for them in the future.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale

revised 4/19/63. mmm

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