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SUBJECTS:
HARVEY, WILLIAM
HUNT, E. HOWARD
KENNEDY, ROBERT
LANSDALE, EDWARD
LAS VEGAS
LAW ENFORCEMENT, WIRED TAPPING
MAHEU, ROBERT
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ORGANIZED CRIME
ROSELLI, JOHN
WARREN COMMISSION, INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM
ZRRIFLE
[Restricted]
PROUTY, FLETCHER
GIANCANA, SAM
EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
EDWARD, SHEFFIELD
DULLES, ALLEN
DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM.
CUBELA, ROLANDO
CUBAN EXILES
CONSPIRACY THEORIES, THREE TRAMPS
COLBY, WILLIAM E.
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CIA
CHURCH COMMITTEE
BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
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The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee on Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

178-10004-10213

178-10004-10112

Friday, May 30, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tapes and Notes turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
700 FIFTH STREET, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

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TOP SECRET
**Testimony of:**

William E. Colby,
Director, CIA,
-- accompanied by --
Scott S. Breckinridge, Jr.,
Deputy Inspector General,
Enno Knoche,
Assistant to the Director,
George L. Cary,
Legislative Counsel

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**TOP SECRET**
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY,
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Friday, May 23, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice at 9:15 o'clock a.m., in Room 407, The Capitol Building, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director, F.A.O. Schwarz, III, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; William Bader, Professional Staff Member.
Chairman Church. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Scott Breckinridge is accompanying the Director this morning and may be called upon from time to time to testify.

For that purpose, Mr. Breckinridge, will you please stand and be sworn?

Do you swear that all the testimony you may give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Breckinridge. I do.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby, did you have some things you wanted to supply to the Committee?
ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTT S. BRECKINRIDGE, JR., DEPUTY
INSPECTOR GENERAL, ENNO KNOCHE, ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR, AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. Colby. I have an answer to a few of the questions
that were raised at the meeting the other day and there are a
couple of clarifications I would like to make.

One, with respect to the security investigations in the
United States. The question was asked whether we ever used
private investigators, and I said we normally used our own
investigators. We have some relationships with private
investigatory firms which provide cover for our investigators
and, secondly, we have a few firms which we own which are
proprietary if you will, whereby our investigators appear to
be private.

I said that in the past it is clear that on occasion we
did ask for private investigator firms to help us to some
degree. It was usually the one that was giving us cover, and
for reasons of overload we asked them to have their own people
to do a few of the investigations.

My General Counsel says that this is illegal. I have a
strong question about its propriety, if not legality, and I
am undertaking to review this matter to see whether we can not
just eliminate that practice entirely, continuing the propriety
and continuing the use of private investigators as cover
But I did want to clarify that. I think I mentioned it last time that there have been occasions on which this was done.

Chairman Church. Mr. Colby, would you in connection with your review of this matter supply the Committee with the specifics in those cases where the Agency has in fact engaged private investigators to do Agency work?

Mr. Colby. I will certainly try to, Mr. Chairman. I confess this may be a tough job to locate every case but I certainly will do my best.

Chairman Church. Will you provide the Committee with the opinion of your Counsel with respect to the legality of such?

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church. Such use of private investigators?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Chairman Church. And then I would ask the staff also furnish the Committee with a brief on that question so that we are fully advised with respect to the law.

Mr. Colby. Right.

The second subject, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mondale asked for our command and control regulations for the approval of covert action projects. These were supplied to the staff on the first of May and are available to the staff.

Thirdly, I was asked if Mr. William Harvey was removed
from the Agency because of his involvement in the assassination
plans against Prime Minister Castro.

The facts are that in June 1963 he was assigned as our
Chief of Station in Rome and in February of '67 he was
reassigned to CIA Headquarters. He retired voluntarily under
our retirement system on 31 of December 1967.

If I may, there is a reason why he was taken out and if I
could go off the record and mention that to the Committee. It
is a matter of his privacy.

Chairman Church. Very well, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Colby. Back on the record.

Senator Schweiker asked me whether Howard Hunt or James
McCord were in charge of Mexican operations at the time of
President Kennedy's assassination on 22nd of November '63.
Howard Hunt from July '62 to August '64 was assigned as a
Section Chief in the Division of Plans Directorate, which is
now the Operations Directorate at CIA Headquarters, which had
no responsibility whatsoever for Mexican operations.

Senator Schweiker. What were those dates again?

Mr. Colby. July '62 to August '64.

Senator Schweiker. Wasn't he at some point in Mexico
City and in charge of that office?

Mr. Knoche. Way back in the '50's he served in Mexico
City. Way back. He was not in charge.
Mr. Colby. He was a case officer then.

Senator Schweiker. So that is the period you are saying he had no jurisdiction in any way with Latin America or Mexican Affairs.

Mr. Colby. No, he was in what we call, and we have since changed the name, to Domestic Operations Division at that time, our operations here in this country, and that is a whole different subject I would have to explain some day.

Mr. McCord from June '62 to June '64 was assigned as a CIA Security Officer in the CIA station at Frankfurt, Germany and he had no responsibilities for Mexican operations at that point.

Senator Morgan last time asked what information was given to the Warren Commission concerning Agency assassination plans concerning Castro, and I have been advised our records do not indicate that the Warren Commission was provided with information on this subject.

Allen Dulles, of course, I would note, who was the CIA Director until the fall of '61, was a member of the Warren Commission, but beyond that fact I have nothing I could offer.

And then who made the decision not to provide it, if none was given? Our records do not indicate that there was a CIA decision on this matter not to tell the Warren Commission.

I could add that I believe the relationship with the Warren Commission was handled by one of our staff which
I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation system was such.

Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

Chairman Church. Where is it now?

Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year. He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in the Washington area.

Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

Mr. Colby. Still working with us to help on the transition of the whole counterintelligence program.

Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case were that I had had some professional differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and took a number of functions away from it. The liaison with the
endeavored to open up the Israeli account to a better relationship with our other Near Eastern activities. We debated this over many months and on several occasions. We could never really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was.

Mr. Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the senior Israelis who were involved in it.

I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab areas.

Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compartmentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December because there were some very substantial retirement benefits that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then unfortunately the Seymour Hersh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from his control and I was going to put some successor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have to
Mr. Angleton himself.

Is it true that he is still being paid as a consultant?

Mr. Colby. I believe it has dropped off, Mr. Chairman.

He did help us for three or four months but I believe that it is terminated. It is about time to terminate it, I know, and whether it is on this particular date has been terminated.
PAGE 10 OMITTED
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we set ourselves about six month period where we would have to --

Chairman Church. There is no plan to retain him indefi-

nently?

Mr. Colby. Absolutely not. It was to help us get over this transition and phase him out.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Senator Mondale: I asked for vouchers on payments with respect to assassinations?

Mr. Colby. I am looking for that. I don't have an answer for you yet, Senator.

The request was also made whether we had any information concerning plots to assassinate Chou En Lai. We have reports of two such examples, incidents, both conducted by the Chinese Nationalists without our prior knowledge and without our participation.

One in April 1955, an Air India aircraft crashed at sea off Indochina after departing from Hong Kong. Several Chinese communist delegates for the Bandung Conference were on board and it had been rumored that Chou En Lai would be on the aircraft.

On the 11th of January 1956, the British Colonial Office in London issued an official statement reporting they had evidence that the Chinese Nationalists had bribed a Hong Kong airport employee to place a time bomb on the airplane. The
and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employee had fled to Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist official informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in November '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to Phnom Penh to supervise the attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and we had nothing to do with it.

We had a relationship with the Chinese Nationalists Intelligence Service over the years and they clearly have done things without our knowledge or involvement, and in a number of areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.

These are two that were separate.

Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hunt and Sturgis that appeared in Newsweek some years ago. We obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock. We had not had it before. We had a copy of the Newsweek edition.

These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and 1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Sturgis. It is taken out of the Newsweek.

We have had no connection with Mr. Sturgis and so we have
We had our photographic experts and analysts and so forth look at these two individuals here who were picked up. We examined them in considerable detail, and talking about the '61 Hunt photograph, comparing it with this, and this is the photograph, Newsweek photograph. You will see that there is a lot of sort of fundamental differences in the kinds of appearances they have, different characteristics of the individuals.

With respect to Sturgis, of course, we are not as confident because we don't have as good a base to work from in our comparison but at the same time we see differences there also.

Now, we further looked, had one of our disguise people -- we obviously have people who can disguise you -- the red wig episode. It wasn't red, they insist, it wasn't ill fitting. That is the thing that they get upset about. But they say that it would not be feasible to have them actually in a disguise, have these individuals actually in this disguise, that it is too big a jump, it differs.

Senator Huddleston. Now about the size of the individual, are they pretty close?

Mr. Colby. These two are. He looks like a shorter man from the surroundings. And Hunt is about medium height, rather than this short.

Mr. Knoche. Hunt is five feet ten and a half inches.
were able to do a pretty good job on Hunt and, what they do is identify certain key points, make measurements and put adjust-
ments, the same thing we do for the satellite photography in terms of these measurements, and things like that, and compare it in that sense, and their conclusion is that clearly this is not Hunt. They are absolutely confident that this photograph is not Hunt. They are less confident that it is not Sturgis because of the base on which they are operating, but they think it is not.

I point out that this analysis was done overnight, about 3 o'clock in the morning. This is Sturgis.

Mr. Schwarz. And to the right?

Mr. Colby. This is a newspaper photograph of Hunt; a recent one. These are sort of Agency photographs of him when he was an employee.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. Were those men ever identified by the Dallas Police?

Mr. Colby. They must have booked them or something if they carried them in. I really don't know. If they took them in I would assume they would have had to book them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What are these pictures on the lower right and left?

Mr. Colby. These are the blowups of the particular photographs.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Not the one you had earlier?

Mr. Colby. They are different.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. They are different angles?

Mr. Colby. This is reversed.

Senator Hart of Colorado. They are different photographs?

Mr. Colby. It is reversed.

Senator Hart Of Colorado. No. They are not A and B even reversed.

Mr. Colby. They can do that kind of a turn through the--

Senator Hart of Colorado. They can twist the photographs around?

Mr. Colby. They can make it appear at a different angle.

Senator Hart of Colorado. B at least is a totally different pose. They turned his mouth down. His eyes are closed. They have really done a job if they changed B to that lower right.

Mr. Colby. They can change them, honest.

Let me get my brief on that and I will answer that question.

They magnified them to the same scale using the eyes and mouth. The contrast and texture differences were minimized, continuous tone photographs employed and angular compensations were made to offset errors incident to the different heads.

They can mix them around in that kind of fashion.

Senator Schweiker. Were these men detained? If they were
detained maybe there are photographs from their detention.

Were these men arrested?

Mr. Colby. At the time we have had to work on this we have just looked at the photographs.

Senator Schweiker. I assume that is where they are going to be detained.

Mr. Schwarz. Wasn't the same analysis done for the Rockefeller Commission about two months ago? In other words, there has been an analysis at least once before last night, hasn't there?

Mr. Knoche. Not by us.

Mr. Colby. Perhaps by someone else.

Chairman Church. Mr. Director, that is a different photograph.

Mr. Colby. It does look like it.

I will answer that question next time I come up.

Chairman Church. All right. How can we follow up on the identity of these two people in connection with the Dallas Police? Would that be done through the FBI?

Mr. Colby. FBI. I could ask or you could ask, it might be better if you ask.

Chairman Church. Well, I think we should. I think these should be marked as Committee Exhibits and staff should be instructed to follow through with the FBI to get what further information there may be about the photographs and these two
Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photograph, the supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

Mr. Colby. I don't have that with me. It is in the Warren Commission published report. It is in there.

Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to conceal where it was taken but it was --

Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.

Just one additional matter.

Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been handled under Mr. Angleton. Before we finish our review with you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailed statement of that matter.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask you in connection with it.

I just wanted to give you notice.

Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover it.
Chairman Church. All right. At some point then in our investigation?

Mr. Colby. Sure, no problem.

The only other one thing I would like to suggest for the record, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the discussion of the attempts made against Mr. Castro, in no way justifying them. My position on this is quite clear. I do think it important to put that exercise in the context of the times, which was the times of the Bay of Pigs, which was a decision made by the Government. The Cuban missile crisis, and following that, a program approved by our normal covert action approval mechanism to try to generate an overthrow of Mr. Castro from within Cuba by assisting various groups to go in with sabotage and by putting economic pressure on the country, and so forth. That went on for a number of years after the 1961-62 episodes and I think it does put a cover of policy attitude toward Cuba and toward Mr. Castro that is an important factor in evaluating the thing, without in any way justifying the particular attempts to assassinate him.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But was there any evaluation done at or about the time of that Cuban missile crisis?

Mr. Colby. There was an evaluation done after the Bay of Pigs, a rather intensive Investigation Internal Security Branch Review of the activity and then the Cuban missile crisis came along shortly thereafter before anything very much
get going. Thereafter, however, a number of programs were conducted, which I am sure the Committee might want a general summary of. I am just giving you one sort of a paragraph summary of it, which were aimed at putting economic pressure on Cuba in the hopes that this would put pressure against him and lead to its disorder and problems there and, secondly, to encourage revolutions, sabotage and so forth, from within Cuba through a variety of programs of propaganda, support of exile movements, landing of teams on the coast, things of this nature.

Chairman Church. The difficult with this is, as I see it, although what you say is true, once an agency begins to in assassination attempts the disease spreads. Your own testimony shows it spread at least as far as the Dominican Republic and we are going to get into closer questions on other matters such as Lumumba and Chile.

So that I don't think this issue can be confined really to the emergency that did in fact exist between the US and Cuba and the seriousness of that emergency at the time.

Mr. Colby. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. I am against it and have been against it for a long time, but nonetheless I think in fairness to the people involved at that period I think it is important to give total context.

Chairman Church. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz.
to determine, assuming internally the CIA might have contemplated additional efforts to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs, after the missile crisis, it would not have acted unless directed by the very highest authority, would it?

Mr. Colby. That is not that clear, Senator Hart. I think the evidence we have is that the then Director was not aware of some of these activities and, therefore, one would have a very difficult time saying that it was pursuant to a specific authorization. It was consistent with an overall policy which was the point I was saying, but nonetheless I think the specific action we cannot say was approved even within the Agency at the Director level.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Is there any indication that the Director, who did know of at least an earlier attempt -- is there any indication that following the Bay of Pigs, or following the missile crisis, he explicitly brought the subject up for review?

--- Mr. Colby. There is one documentary evidence that Mr. McCone dictated in 1967, I believe it was, in which he recounted being informed of a meeting, of an inter-Agency meeting at which the subject of assassination was raised, and he made a particular point of indicating after the meeting -- he was not at the meeting; I believe, but he heard of the meeting and he made a particular point of saying he disapproved of this
and did not agree with it, to the other members.

Senator Hart of Michigan: Who was at that meeting McCone heard about?

Mr. Colby. That was the meeting we were talking about at the last session.

Mr. Schwarz. You brought up a new document which was Mr. McCone's dictation of recollection of '67.

Mr. Colby. Yes, I think you have that.

Mr. Schwarz. That I have not seen. I know we do not have that.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry, I thought you did.

Mr. Schwarz. Could that be supplied?

Mr. Colby. No problems, yes. This is our document and Chairman Church. Will you supply the Committee with the document?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Excuse me, I beg your pardon. He states in '67, at one of these meetings, about this time, I recall a suggestion made being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the US Government and CIA were concerned. The idea should not be discussed nor should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers.

Senator Mondile. Mr. Colby, the other day when you
testified there was a memorandum that you gave us from I think Mr. Osborn, which objected to a memorandum by General Landstald which referred to assassinations of political leaders, in a memorandum regarding Operation Mongoose, which was Cuba. And it referred to an attached memorandum which I think you said was the property of the FBI.

Mr. Colby. Of the National Security Council.

Senator Mondale. NSC.

I gather you have a copy of that, but you don't feel authorized to let us see it?

Mr. Colby. I do have a copy of it. The understanding we have had with the other agencies is that each of us gives our own material but we refer to the other agency for any documents belonging to the other agency.

Chairman Church. Well, it is very difficult for the Committee to operate that way. I think that since the Committee is entitled to this information, that when it is pertinent and as we proceed in our hearings from one subject to another, we ought to be able to secure the information without having to go back through executive channels.

Mr. Colby. May I undertake to get the permission to give it to you? I will undertake to do this today.

Chairman Church. Any observations that the Committee wishes to make on this kind of a problem?

It is the first time it has come up.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Is this the understanding we have had or not?

Mr. Schwarz. It has been a total frustration to the staff and I am very happy it has come up here because we get chased around the corner by one agency to another. It is called the "third agency rule." It was intended to have nothing to do with Congressional hearings. Obviously, it had to do with declassification to the public, and it has happened to completely delay our ability to get information because we go at one agency and then they determine that it really isn't their document or it mentioned some other agency, and then we have to go to the other agency.

This is an example of how frustrating it is.

Senator Mondale. Have we tried to get this document from the NSA?

Mr. Colby. No; this particular document had just come up on Wednesday --

Senator Schweiker. Does the counsel have any suggestions as to what he feels the Committee position should be in this area to enable him and staff to do an effective job?

Mr. Schwarz. I think the Committee's position ought to be that pertinent information should be produced by any agency that possesses it, and if they wish to inform another agency that they are doing it, then that is their business. But I think they should have to produce it if they possess it.

TOP SECRET

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Senator Mondale. Apparently this memo from McCon refers back to the meeting about which Osborne memorandum and the Lansdale --

Mr. Colby. The series of two or three meetings at that time, yes.

Senator Mondale. I think this is very important because apparently this was a meeting at which McNamara and Rusk were present, and apparently McCon was present, so we had all of the top principals.

Mr. Colby. At least one of them.

Senator Mondale. And they discussed assassinations at that meeting. And then Osborne came back with a memo which is now part of the record.

Mr. Colby. I think it is Edwards in that case. Harvey, excuse me.

Senator Mondale. Harvey. He came back with a memo which the Director supplied, objecting not to the assassination but to putting it in writing.

Chairman Church. Of course what we don't know is whether the assassination or subject of assassination that came up at this meeting was conjecture or whether it had to do with a revelation of actual attempts that had involved the CIA or that it had to do with an ongoing assassination effort by the CIA.

Senator Mondale. Yes.
Chairman Church. All we know is the subject of assassinations apparently came up in the course of the meeting.

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, as one of the agencies involved, if I could offer one explanation for the Third Agency Rule even in this circumstance. And I am particularly interested in this because sometimes our documents have material whose sensitivity is not apparent on the face and we assume that this will be handled in certain compartmented channels, and if it gets out of the compartment it might give problems that the individual at the other end wasn't aware of. That is the basis for the rule. The thought being go back and ask the originator, and he has a feeling for that and could make the particular case if something particularly sensitive is involved.

Chairman Church. I would suggest, Mr. Colby, without binding the Committee to a precedent, with respect to dealing with the Third Party Rule, that in this case you undertake to secure from the NSA --

Mr. Colby. I will.

Chairman Church. -- its permission to turn this particular document over to the Committee so it may be made a part of these hearings.

Mr. Colby. I will endeavor to do that today, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Morgan. I am going to inquire from Senator Mondale what memorandum were you reading about Mccone and the group being present?
Senator Mondale. We have a memorandum, it is right here, from Mr. Harvey. Do I have the wrong one?

Yes, it is dated, I will show it to you, in which he objects to --

Chairman Church. What is the date of it?


Senator Morgan. Do we have that?

Mr. Schwarz. It was shown to us on Wednesday, marked or deemed marked as part of the record, and returned to the CIA who returned it to us today.

Mr. Colby. I have another copy of it.

Senator Mondale. It refers to a meeting in Mr. Rusk's office at which presumably McNamara and Rusk, I gather from the later memo, and McCone were present, and it says this.

"I called Lansdale's office and in his absence pointed out to Frank Head the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in a document. The words he objected to were including liquidation of leaders. I advised him as far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting to discuss it."

I read that to mean we will go ahead and do it but we don't want anything in writing and don't want to be in a meeting where it is going to leak. That makes a lot of sense. No living politician wants to be associated with an assassination, ever.

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if he wants someone assassinated. I think that is common sense.

That is why I think these documents are so crucial.

Chairman Church. Of course they are crucial and we must have them.

The ambiguity, however, that we have yet to clear up is in the third paragraph, Senator Mondale, where the memorandum reads the question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at a meeting of the special group augmented in Secretary Rusk's office in August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record, the subject being the question of assassination.

Now, that leaves us still without any documentary proof that it was revealed at this meeting that the CIA was in fact engaged in an effort to assassinate.

Senator Mondale. Was Lansdale working for the CIA at this time?

Mr. Colby. Pardon?

Senator Mondale. Was General Lansdale working for the CIA at this time?

Mr. Colby. General Lansdale was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, not CIA, at that time.

Senator Mondale. Had Lansdale been with the CIA?

Mr. Colby. He was with CIA in about 1952 to about 1955.
more or less.

Senator Mondale. During the Philippines --

Mr. Colby. During the Philippines and in Vietnam at that time. Then he left CIA. He was a regular Air Force officer all this time but he was assigned to CIA for the time he was in the Philippines and the time he was in Vietnam. He then reverted to the Air Force and was an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until about 1964 or 1965. Then he went out to Vietnam where he was an Assistant to the Ambassador, not working for CIA. We were associated with him but he was not a CIA officer at that time.

Senator Mondale. Do we know what his job at the Pentagon was?

Mr. Colby. It was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. I can't tell you exactly what the job was entitled but he was active in the Secretary of Defense's participation in a variety, you might call it a 40 Committee type of operation. I think he probably was most cognizant of the various 40 Committee --

Senator Mondale. If he were involved with that, he would have close liaison with all members of the 40 Committee, including the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. I would like to call your attention also to this sentence.
I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point and the special group augmented in not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

There, again, the ambiguity.

It is within the range of the possible that one of the ongoing efforts of the CIA was in fact raised and discussed. It is also possible that the question of assassinating Fidel Castro --

Senator Mondale. Do we have those notes?

Chairman Church. I was going to ask that.

And that it was agreed that no study or review of this should be submitted as an abstract matter, should be submitted in written form.

So we are left without an answer to this question.

However, with respect to the notes that are referred to here, can you tell us whether those notes exist?

Mr. Colby. I don't know of any, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Church. He said he took careful notes.

Mr. Colby. I don't know of any but I certainly will look.

Mr. Breckinridge. When we reviewed this problem in 1967 we found no such notes.

Senator Huddleston. Let me inject a thought or two along this line.

It seems to me like one of the things we are going to have to determine as we go along is as to what extent there was or
there is a standard operating procedure of your Agency an
effort not to make notes, an effort for certain individuals
not to have certain knowledge by design.

For instance, I was reading your memorandum here dated
1 June 1973 in which you are reporting on a meeting that occurred
You make a point to say that you briefed someone orally. The
word "orally" is in there -- assuming that for the purpose
someone should know that you did not put anything in writing
or you did not give him a written report.

You also say that I personally managed to avoid gaining
any knowledge of what precise actions were taken.

I think a reasonable inference there is that there is a
deliberate on your part here -- and maybe this is standard
operating procedure -- for you not to get specific information
so that you always will be in the position of not knowing some-
thing.

Mr. Colby. I don't recognize the reference. Certainly,
I think in past years there were situations we did not want
to commit to writing.

There is a great deal of effort made by us to what we
call compartment information so that it is known only to certain
people and not known to others. The compartment is still to
be open at the top, however.

There are things that I purposely try not to know. I don't
want to know the name of an agent in the Soviet Union. I have

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absolutely no desire to learn his name because I don't need
to know that information.

Senator Huddleston. Here we are referring to action in
this case and not individuals.

Mr. Colby. I don't recognize that. I could perhaps put
it in context if I could see the memorandum.

Mr. Schwarz. Perhaps we ought to mark that memorandum.

Senator Huddleston. Memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby.
I thought it was by Mr. Colby.

Mr. Colby. I am sorry.

Senator Huddleston. Someone within the Agency apparently
is informing you about something and the subject is special
activities. I don't see a name on it.

It has information in it about both the President and
Attorney General being involved in briefings.

Mr. Schwarz. I think for convenience of reference we
ought to mark it as an exhibit.

Let's number as today's number, and we have put in the
three charts so far, and we will call this, which is the
June 1973 memorandum for Mr. William E. Colby, subject special
activities, from stamped pages 00457, 00458, and 00459, of
the so-called 694 pages.

(The document above referred to was
marked Colby Exhibit No. 4.)

Mr. Colby. I recognize what that is, Senator Huddleston.
The reason it was addressed to William E. Colby is we were going through that period in the middle of 1973 where I was technically, I guess, Director of Operations but had been nominated to become Director. This was the kind of thing that normally would be addressed to the Director but we had an Acting Director, General Walters, but it was pretty clear I was responsible for making the machinery run and we had a lot of things around the Agency addressed to me and signed by me.

I believe this follows a conversation I had with a Mr. Walter Elder, who was an Assistant to Mr. John McConie -- he was Executive Assistant when he was Director -- I think Mr. Elder told me that there were certain things that he knew of in the background that related to this effort of identifying various questionable activities of the Agency, and I asked him to go write them down so we could get them into the Inspector General's report.

Senator Huddleston. The only question I raise, I don't want to get off into the contents of a particular memorandum, but the context with the area you were pursuing, just whether or not standard operating procedure would require at times there be a deliberate avoidance by certain people in the Agency of facts and whether or not there is a great body of decisions that are made and implemented without anything written down, so that there would never be any documentary evidence of it?
Mr. Colby. Well, I think that you certainly can say that there is an avoidance by a lot of people of learning things that they are not authorized to know. I mean the more loyal in a sense of our employees, say that they have authority to know what it going on in, say, Cuba, they don't have a right to know what is going on in, say, China, and they rather carefully keep themselves from learning what is going on in China. I think that is a prevalence.

I think the question you are asking, however, is whether we are trying to keep activities off of paper and it is pretty clear that the assassination story was essentially kept off the paper.

And I would think that is about the only one. No, the drug thing. I assume some of that was kept off of paper?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. The lesson that I have frequently given to my colleagues in the bureaucracy is that however hard you try to keep it off of paper, you will not succeed in a bureaucracy, somebody will write it down and, therefore, it is a totally feckless exercise to pretend that you can keep it secret by not writing it down. But the fact is there were situations in which a conscious effort was made in the past to keep things off the record.

Senator Huddleston. To sum up, you, as Director, with the exception of individual names for which there would be no TOP SECRET
particular value to you and no advantage to you knowing, except for that you make no deliberate effort not to know about operations?

Mr. Colby. No. As a matter of fact, I take the opposite position, Senator. I say that to my subordinates and have reiterated a number of times, I cannot be subjected to surprise. You have got to let me know the things I ought to know. And I have undertaken the same obligations to my oversight committees for example, that I am responsible getting to them before they hear about it some place else.

Senator Huddleston. The other is in this inquiry. Can the Committee expect that every effort will be made to supply to us information about various things, even though they may not be written down?

Mr. Colby. You have my commitment to that effect.

Senator Huddleston. Going further and looking through the files for notes and documents?

Mr. Colby. It is my hope, Senator, that I can help you on this investigation rather than defending myself against you.

Senator Huddleston. That is all.

Mr. Colby. That is what I would like to have the relationship, that I am trying to help you do this investigation.

Chairman Church. We want such a relationship and we are trying to work it out.

Mr. Colby. I know you do. You have said it a number of
times and I agree with you.

Chairman Church. Now, Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. The memorandum from John McCone that we received this morning, dated 14 April, 1967, is addressed to the Director.

Was McCone an employee or related with the CIA at that time?

Mr. Colby. No, he left in 1965.

Senator Mondale. So this was a memorandum from a person no longer with the CIA, as former Director to the current Director, which begins "no memorandum can be located covering the August, '62 meeting."

That is the one that earlier says the question of assassination was discussed. However, it is highly probable that one exists.

Now, I would like all documentation, records, and notes that bear on the question of what McCone was referring to, because I get the impression that the then Director, Mr. Helms —

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Mondale. -- was reviewing the question of documentations and records affecting that meeting, or the question of assassination, and I think we need to know what transpired, what was happening then, what kind of responses he received.

Mr. Colby. We will certainly give you that. I can give you a basic explanation.

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This exercise stemmed from the revelation in Jack Anderson's columns, I believe, of our relationship with the Mafia figures at that time. This then generated the request to Mr. Breckinridge to do an Inspector General's report of this whole subject, which he did, and which we will certainly make available to this Committee.

In the course of it, and with the publicity, Mr. McCone, who does maintain an occasional contact with the Agency, he is a friend of it and an ex-Director -- I see him every now and again and try to sort of keep him up with what is going on in general terms without getting into political or sensitive matters or anything -- but he does maintain this contact and I am sure that somebody made contact with him or he made contact with the Agency about the Jack Anderson column, and that then generated this particular memorandum.

Senator Mondale. And there was an Inspector General's study done at that time?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir; and you will get access to that.

Senator Mondale. Can we have documentation as to how it was originated and the response to what was done?

Chairman Church. Yes, we should have that information.

And I might say that you are aware, no doubt, that charges have been made that documents have been destroyed in the CIA which may have been connected with the general subject of CIA involvement in assassination efforts.
Can you tell this Committee whether, to your knowledge, documents have been destroyed?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think we can talk in terms of what we know is there.

On the Castro assassination, the involvement with the Mafia, there were a few memoranda in the Office of Security, and I think you have copies of those.

On the second phase of that, there are practically no records at all and our investigation at that time was made entirely on interviews.

Based entirely on interviews, an attempt to reconstruct that activity.

The final action which involved a Cuban by the name of Cubella --

Mr. Colby. This was the Cuban major we discussed last time.

Mr. Breckinridge. Started in the minds of the people who were involved, was an attempt to generate an internal political action, revolt, and the records are very full because there was no attention on the part of the people who were involved at that time that that would be an assassination in the sense that the original work with the Mafia was engaged in and there is a full record and that exists today.

In the case of the Dominican Republic, this developed later.

Let me finish.

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I will go back to the Cubella case.

In the instance of the Dominican Republic, the record was very full then and it is still very full today. I am certain that record is complete.

Again, in the minds of the people who were involved, they drew a line between the support they gave to the coup group and conscious association with assassination as such. Those records are complete and those records were developed at the time and they were retained. It was in the period of the Mafia was involved where people knew the purpose was assassination.

The records are practically non-existent and I believe they never existed.

Harvey, who conducted the second phase of that, at the time of our investigation had a handful of cryptic notes that only he could interpret. We couldn't interpret them. And it is my understanding that those notes no longer exist. They were retained by him and he brought them in at the time that we were questioning him. He was then on sick leave prior to retirement. Those notes were totally unrevealing.

I think that those records are in the same state today that they were then.

There were none in the Castro affair except the results of our investigation involving the Mafia.

The Cubella case is true. That case did progress to the
point that on the very day of President Kennedy's assassination a man was meeting with Cubella in Paris, and in response to Cubella's request offered him an assassination device that at the time of the investigation we understood he accepted but I have since been told he did not accept. It was a ballpoint pen converted into a syringe for injecting poison.

Subsequently, arms were handed to Cubella by a Cuban refugee in Madrid, in the very early part of 1965, and two catches were put down by boats off Cuba for Cubella. I think he may have recovered one of those but not the other. The records on that are pretty complete.

So, generally speaking, on those things where the Agency was involved, with the exception of the association with the Mafia, where from the beginning the intent was assassination, the records are complete, and I think that if people look at those they will find this is so.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the understanding that all records dealing with this subject, whether they are in Inspector General reports or underlying documents, would be produced for our inspection?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

If I may ask only the Committee's consideration of the normal treatment of compartmentation and some discussion of possibly some individual names in it that we would hope that we might be able to handle very privately, or necessary, or even
Chairman Church. Very well.

Now, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Just to tidy up one matter.

Let me mark as Committee Exhibit 5 the John A. McCon...to the Director memorandum of April 14, 1967.

(The above mentioned document was marked as Colby Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Might I come down with you on this document and we will look at it together?

Mr. Colby. I have a copy.

Mr. Schwarz. As of April, 1967, Mr. McCon... was no longer at the Agency, was he?

Mr. Colby. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Was he then in his position with ITT, or did he have some other position?

Mr. Colby. I really don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event he wasn't at the Agency?

Mr. Colby. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. The thing that is curious about this memorandum, with respect to the state of the record, is paragraph one, which reads as follows:

"No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962; however, it is highly probable that one exists."
Now, Mr. McCona, was not in the Agency, is writing a
memorandum to the Director, who was in the Agency, referring to
a search by or on behalf of Mr. McCona.

Now, did Mr. McCona have documents outside the Agency,
or how do you explain?

Mr. Colby. I don't believe he has any documents. I have
never asked him. But I don't believe he has any documents
outside of the Agency.

Mr. Knoche. Mr. McCona wrote me that memorandum while on
Agency premises. It was during a visit to the Agency and he
had the benefit of his ex-staff assistant, Mr. Walter Elder,
helping him in doing a little research in this connection.

Mr. Colby. All that says is that they hadn't located it
by then. I think we have located some since that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on a question of Senator Hart
of Michigan, he asked you whether there had been evaluations
in connection with the Cuban missile crisis, and then you
testified about evaluations post-Bay of Pigs and rather continual
evaluations of the subject of Cuba. But I take it those were
not evaluations or re-evaluations of the subject of assassination.

Mr. Colby. All I can say is I think that question is
a little obscure.

I know that after the Bay of Pigs failure there was an
investigation made of the whole episode, and in the course of
that a discussion of what we were then to do and a program was
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developed. And I am speaking at second hand here. But a progr
was developed of keeping some economic pressure on Cuba, and
that was a national policy, not just a CIA -- keeping an
economic pressure on Cuba and continuing to support the
various elements which might eventually lead to a change in
the Cuban government through some overthrow or otherwise.

I think some propaganda programs were kept up, some exile
activities were kept up, some training of teams to be infil-
trated into Cuba were kept up, some sabotage operations were
continued. And those continued over the following several
months.

Right after the 1962 missile crisis -- I cannot identify
right offhand here any particular review of that -- but I
know that that was a subject of 40 Committee consideration at
various times.

Whether that included assassination or not I cannot say.

My guess, as I say, is that if John McCone didn't know
about it, it was not covered in those discussions because it
would be very hard to cover them without his being involved.

Chairman Church. Are you telling us that the much publi-
cized investigation of the CIA, which took place following the
Bay of Pigs fiasco, and as I remember this review was ordered
by the President in order to determine what had gone wrong and
why, and it was a matter of great urgency and importance to the
government at that time -- are you telling us that in the course of that review the Agency's involvement in the assassination efforts against Castro never came to light?

Mr. Colby. I just don't know, Mr. Chairman. That is the answer I have to give you. I do not know.

I believe the Inspector General report after the Bay of Pigs does not mention it, does it?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. The report of the Committee that looked into it, General Taylor, and the Attorney General and somebody else -- there were three members of it -- maybe Mr. Dulles. I don't believe that report mentioned it.

Chairman Church. Do we have a copy of the Taylor Report?

Mr. Colby. I think it has been made available. Or is that a third agency problem?

Mr. Schwarz. That is another frustration. That one has been denied to us on the theory that it is part of the Kennedy Library and, therefore, we have to go through another channel to get that.

Does the CIA have a copy of the Taylor Report?

Mr. Colby. I don't believe we do. I know we looked for it a couple of years ago and at that time I was told we didn't have it.

I have to say here under oath we do not have one, but I know I tried to get a hold of it and was told a couple of years
ago that we couldn't have one. But there are lots of drawers
in those safes in that building.

I am not trying to evade the question. I am trying to
say I don't think we have one. It could be.

We have a copy of our own Inspector General's report
at that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Does that contain any mention of the
assassination subject?

Mr. Colby. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you find it puzzling that the CIA doesn't
have a copy of the report designed to review its activities
in the Bay of Pigs, a report that led to substantial Presidential
changes in the instructions with respect to your jurisdiction?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. I mean, it is an important document --
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. -- relating to the CIA.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Schweiker. I wonder if Mr. McCona has a copy?

Mr. Colby. I would doubt it.

Senator Schweiker. That is why he came in, because of that?

Mr. Colby. Roughly, yes.

Chairman Church. In the course of the investigation that
took place, this investigation that led to the Taylor Report,
that took place in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.
Were records kept, that is to say --

Mr. Colby. Of contributions?

Chairman Church. No. Did the investigation involve written records? Did it involve testimony taken under oath and transcribed? Is there raw material relating to that investigation to which this Committee could gain access?

Mr. Colby. I don't know the answer to the question, Mr. Chairman. Maybe Mr. Breckinridge can help us.

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not familiar with that study. I am familiar with the approach that was taken at the time within our organization when the Inspector General -- I was not involved in that study but I have heard it discussed how they approached it.

Their understanding of the Bay of Pigs problem was the overall invasion plan and organization for that and concentrated on that.

By way of explanation for the omission of reference to the assassinations, so few people knew about it, and I think it came to no one's attention -- simply did not discover it at that time. And it may not have been by way of explanation, not a justification. It may not have been associated in the minds of the people who did know about it with the inquiry into the military operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell knew about it and he was certainly the main architect of the Bay of Pigs; right?
Mr. Breckinridge. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Dulles, at least the records we put in on Wednesday, knew about it and he was substantially involved in the Bay of Pigs. Those gentlemen surely would have been questioned by General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy. Is that fair?

Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume so.

Mr. Colby. Certainly, yes. But again, if the focus was on the military operation, it might have been that that other operation was not involved in it.

Mr. Schwarz. The record further shows that on May 7, 1962, a meeting was held with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in which the contemporaneous document describing that meeting indicates that he was not told that there was a continuing and ongoing operation, but rather was told of something which was not called an assassination but was called a project. He was told of something which was referred to in the past tense: is that right?

Mr. Colby. It was in the past tense. Whether there was any other discussion in that meeting on this subject we just don't know.

Mr. Breckinridge. I think I can interpret what happened. The people who briefed Attorney General Kennedy are the ones who knew about what we call the first phase of the operation with the Mafia.
Colonel Edwards, who was Director of Security, under whose supervision the first portion of that activity was carried on, had withdrawn from it.

The operation, when it was reactivated later, was reactivated on a compartmented basis, and Colonel Edwards did not know about it.

Mr. Schwarz. Even though it continued to involve the Mafia until early 1963?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct. Colonel Edwards no longer knew what was going on. So when he briefed the Attorney General he did not know that this second operation, this reactivation of the operation that had formerly run under his responsibility -- he did not know that it was ongoing.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was responsible for the selection of Colonel Edwards and General Counsel Houston as being the persons who would go to brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure I know that.

Mr. Schwarz. It would have been someone of higher authority within the CIA; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. We have tried to determine.

Mr. Houston, if I understand it, feels that he would not have done this unless he thought the Director knew.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge. Knew that he was going to do this. But he did not talk to the Director about it.
I gather that it is not all that clear in Colonel Edwards either at this point in time.

Mr. Schwarz. So someone selected these persons to go and brief Attorney General Kennedy, number one.

Number two, they did not know the plot for assassination was ongoing, although in fact it was?

Mr. Breckinridge. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Number three: therefore, Attorney General Kennedy was given the impression that whatever was going on was over; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is correct as I reconstruct it.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we determine then who was responsible for selecting those persons to brief Attorney General Kennedy, instead of including in the group other persons who knew that the Mafia part of the assassination attempt was ongoing?

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't think that we can now.

As I say, there is no written record.

Mr. Schwarz. Who could it have been? Who was in a higher position of authority, in a position to make a decision as to who should brief Attorney General Kennedy?

Mr. Breckinridge. I would assume that Mr. Bissel could have.

Mr. Schwarz. Was he still in the Agency in May of 196?

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know. I think he may have
left by then.

May I reconstruct because much of my understanding is based on my analysis of what happened and not on clear facts.

The FBI approached Colonel Edwards when their investigation and incident in Las Vegas eventually produced his name, and his conversations, I think, were with the General Counsel at that time. I cannot reconstruct beyond that so I really can't give you an answer to the specific question. But the initiative came from the FBI. Colonel Edwards and Mr. Houston discussed it. Mr. Houston, I have been told, believes that the Director must have known.

Mr. Schwarz. Which Director are we talking about?

Mr. Breckinridge. Whoever the Director was at that time?

Mr. Colby. By that time.

Mr. Schwarz. Of what agency?

Mr. Colby. CIA. That would have been Mc Cone.

Mr. Breckinridge. He operated on the assumption that Mr. Mc Cone knew.

Mr. Schwarz. Knew what?

Mr. Breckinridge. Knew that they were going to brief the Attorney General.

Mr. Schwarz. About?

Mr. Breckinridge. The record on this is very unsatisfactory and I can't clarify it for you because we have been trying to find out when Mr. Mc Cone first learned of it after the fact.
as it was.

When people discussed this with one another, what they conveyed to one another accurately as to what it was they were discussing, the record is simply not clear and I don't think that we can reconstruct that satisfactorily today.

Mr. Schwarz. Is Mr. Edwards still alive?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Houston is still alive and is in Washington, D.C.?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McConé is still alive and is in --

Mr. Colby. California.

Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr. Halms the successor to Mr. Bissel?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's leave a place in the record where we will insert it was either Mr. McConé or Mr. Bissel who had the job of Deputy Director for Plans in May, 1962.

Mr. Colby. It certainly wasn't Mr. McConé.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Halms or Mr. Bissel?

Mr. Colby. Yes.
Chairman Church. You see, the state of the record now suggests a cover-up, another cover-up. It suggests that those who were selected by the higher authority in CIA to brief the Attorney General had knowledge limited to an attempt on the life of Castro that had been concluded.

It further suggests that they had no knowledge of continuing efforts then underway, even though presumably their superiors did have such knowledge. This leaves the Attorney General in a position of being told about the past program and not being told about the present program, and we know that he later said to certain assistants of his that he had put a stop to assassination attempts on Fidel Castro and he may have been left with the impression, as a result of this meeting, that there were no further attempts. He may have said he wanted no further attempts. We don't know. But clearly he was not told that there were further attempts then underway.

Senator Morgan. Were we told yesterday or the day before yesterday that he knew of the Cuban majors' operation?

Mr. Schwarz. We were not told that.

Mr. Breckinridge. I cannot clarify the question completely but I can introduce a little bit more.

When the discussion occurred Mr. Houston did go and talk with General Carter, who was then the Deputy Director -

Mr. Schwarz. Which discussion are we talking about now?

Mr. Breckinridge. The discussion about going to the Attorney
To go back, how the question arose, and it goes far afield, John Roselli, who was the Chicago member of the Mafia who arranged the introduction of Giancana to the Cuban syndicate head, through whom they initially tried to run this operation — Giancana had a personal love affair with a well known entertainer who was then in Las Vegas, and she was suspected by him of then having an affair with another well known entertainer.

Giancana went to Robert Maheu, through whom these introductions were first made —

Mr. Schwarz. Introduced to the Mafia personnel?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. Between CIA and the Mafia.

Mr. Breckinridge. And asked Maheu to arrange to have the room of the male entertainer in Las Vegas bugged. They hired a private detective who then did this. The roommate stumbled on the equipment, the private detective was arrested, and the FBI investigative trail led from the private detective to Maheu to Giancana and eventually to CIA. Giancana had insisted that Maheu help him because he had helped Maheu with the introduction to the head of the Cuban syndicate, and Maheu had then agreed to get a private detective to do it.

So this arose in the context of a domestic violation of wiretapping laws and the FBI was investigating it on that basis.

Because the trail led to Giancana and Roselli, who was a
third member of the syndicate involved in this, both of whom
were high on the FBI list, as they progressed towards developing
a prosecution, they came to Colonel Edwards, the FBI did, and
said what is your position on this. The position of the Agency
as stated by Colonel Edwards was we did not want them prosecuted
because it would expose what he understood to be this operation,
and I guess the time sequence gets a little fuzzy in my mind.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell the Director of the FBI the
nature of the operation, or simply he told him it would concern
some sensitive matter?

Mr. Breckinridge. He told him it was an intelligence
operation in country, and the Mafia was being used for that
purpose. So in the discussions as it progressed, it dealt with
the wiretap prosecution. Colonel Edwards in discussing it
with us in 1967, according to our notes, said that they briefed
the Attorney General all the way, but at that time Colonel
Edwards, I think by the time they did it, Colonel Edwards thought
it was over. So the Attorney General and the FBI were not told
the complete story.

Mr. Schwarz. They weren't told the most important part
of the story, and that was that it was continuing.

Mr. Breckinridge. They didn't know that, that is correct.
Chairman Church. So you have here two violations of law.
Apart from what was told to the Attorney General, you have two
violations of law. One, the wiretap, it was an illegal operation.
We may have three. Second, it is certainly an activity that
the basic law prohibited CIA from engaging in, domestic activity.

Mr. Colby. CIA was not involved in the wiretap.

Chairman Church. As I understand it, the CIA was involved
because it engaged a private --

Mr. Breckinridge. I am sorry.

Chairman Church. Maybe I misunderstood.

Mr. Breckinridge. We didn't learn about this until after
the FBI found out about the Mafia involvement in that wiretap.
This was done by a private detective hired by a private business
at the request of Giancana.

Mr. Schwarz. CIA agents had committed the crime, in this
case, but not on behalf of the CIA.

Mr. Breckinridge. No, no.

Mr. Schwarz. Isn't that accurate?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. I wouldn't call Giancana an agent, getting
back to our definitional problems.

Mr. Schwarz. CIA associates.

Mr. Colby. CIA instrument. We had a contact with Giancana,
obviously, and with Maheu. They decided on their own to do
this wiretapping, or bugging, or whatever it was, without our
prior knowledge. They got caught. Then they said if this is
fully investigated and brought out, it will bring out the CIA
collaboration on the other subject, and then decision was made.
to go and brief the Attorney General to the degree briefed.

Chairman Church. After which the Justice Department dropped
the case?

Mr. Colby. It was dropped.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Was the CIA not concerned that Giancana may have told something about this Cuban operation to the female entertainer who also may have told the male entertainer?

Mr. Breckinridge. No. If I understand what happened, and I am now describing what Mr. Maheu said, and I get this from having read some files at the Department of Justice recently -- when Mr. Maheu tried to explain to the FBI his position and tried to provide a rationale for doing this, he said I thought there was a leak in Chicago and I wanted to have the room of this entertainer bugged so I could find out if Giancana had leaked.

The FBI gave this the kind of credit I think it was entitled to. They didn't pay much attention to it. This was something he tried to develop to justify his involvement.

There is no indication that there were any leaks from Chicago that we know of, something that he would know of, and there was no instruction on our part for him to do such a thing, and it was for another reason Giancana asked him to do it.

Senator Hart of Colorado. As far as you can tell from the record, the CIA was not concerned that Giancana and his female friend, or her male friend, may have blown the Cuban operation?

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It was purely who was sleeping with whom?
Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is still the case.

I would like to add one further thing. That prior to going over to brief the Attorney General, the general counsel did go speak to General Carter. General Carter said that he understood --

Mr. Colby. General Carter was Deputy Director of the Agency at that time.

Mr. Breckinridge. -- he understood the situation and in due time might brief the Director. We don't know that he did brief the Director, who was then Mr. McCona. Our notes written in 1967 say there is no indication that General Carter was briefed on the full details of the assassination plot. So while he did approve their going and briefing the Attorney General about this association with the Mafia, there is no indication that he was told the full story then either.

Mr. Schwarz. Then in August of 1963, the document that you provided for us last time, Mr. Helms did know about the ongoing operation; is that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think by then he knew that the operation was going.

Mr. Schwarz. He sent to Director McCona the memorandum which had been prepared concerning the meeting with Attorney General Kennedy, which indicated that the operation was completed. So the inference from that paper record is that Mr. Helms was concealing affirmatively from the Director of Central Intelligence.
in the same way as somebody had concealed from the Attorney General the fact that the plot was ongoing.

Is that a fair characterization?

Mr. Colby. I don't know.

Mr. Breckinridge. Could I see the memo?

Chairman Church. The memo uses verbs in the past tense.

Mr. Schwarz. The cover memo from Helms to McCone transmitting a copy of the memorandum concerning the May, 1962 meeting with Attorney General Kennedy.

Mr. Breckinridge. May I say first I don't know. I just call your attention to the third paragraph.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the memorandum from Director Helms?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. He was then D.D.

Mr. Colby. The basic memorandum, of course, merely referred to a sensitive CIA operation and then in Mr. Helms in the paragraph says I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment.

Again, this was an attempt not to refer on paper to what it was.

Mr. Schwarz. But the attachment refers to it in the past tense.

Mr. Colby. I agree.

Senator Morgan. Who is this memorandum from?

Mr. Colby. The memorandum we are discussing now of August 1963 was to the director from Mr. Helms. It attaches
a copy of the briefing of the Attorney General in May, 1962.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Breckinridge, the transcript or report
that you were reading from a few moments ago, who prepared
that?

Mr. Breckinridge. This was prepared by another inspector
and me in 1967.

Senator Morgan. When you say there is no indication that
he knew, that is just an assumption on your part, that you
don't have any positive evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Senator Morgan. The truth is you sort of suspect they
all knew what was going on. Don't you think that is true?

Mr. Breckinridge. No, not necessarily.

When we conducted our investigation we interviewed the
people directly involved in the operation, those that were
available, and tried to reconstruct what happened with them.

We interviewed different people. I did not interview
Mr. Bissel. I did interview Mr. Harvey.

We submitted this report to then-Director Helms, one copy
only. We did not interview him.

Where his name appeared in the course of our inquiry we
put it in our report so that he would see how the record appeared
to people who approached it as we did.

The extent of the knowledge of these different people is
not easy to reconstruct nor fair to assume.
I can't answer your question.

Senator Morgan. In other words, if you didn't have evidence that they did know, you just assumed that -- you didn't assume that they didn't know, you just said there is no evidence?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Senator Schweicker. Let me ask the question another way.

The documentation you collected and what you do have positively, who was the highest ranking official, according to your records, who knew?

Chairman Church. According to the positive documents that you have of knowledge.

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me say we did not have documentation. It was based mostly on interviews, this period involving the Mafia.

The highest person that we understood that knew during the first phase with Mr. Bissel. That we clearly did know about it. There was discussion at one point in which Mr. Bissel, Colonel Edwards, the two of them, met with Mr. Dulles and had a conversation in which I can best say there was doubletalk as to what they were discussing.

It is open to question how clearly this was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles understood.

At the time that we were making the inquiry it was our opinion that Mr. Dulles probably knew, but I can't put it beyond
Senator Schweicker. He left the Agency in 1961, as I recall.

When was your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. Our investigation was in 1967.

And our discussion with Colonel Edwards, who described this meeting when it occurred in 1960, left us with the impression while they had met with Mr. Dulles, that the conversation was not in precise terms. As Colonel Edwards said to us, we didn't use any bad words, which meant they didn't use the word "assassination," but they discussed an operation against Castro in such terms that he felt that they had conveyed the message to Mr. Dulles. But there is room for doubt.

Senator Schweicker. Once Mr. Dulles left the Agency, who then became the highest ranking person to know, according to your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. If Mr. Dulles did in fact understand, he would be the highest person at this point.

Senator Schweicker. At this point. But he left the Agency in 1961. Five years of assassination attempts went after that.

You conducted an investigation in 1967. What did that period show as to who was the highest ranking person who knew?

Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. McGeorge did not know until much later until after it was all over.
Mr. Colby. We knew in 1963.

Mr. Breckinridge. About a past event.

Mr. Colby. There was still activities going on.

Mr. Breckinridge. That is right.

Chairman Church. Can we get the answer first?

Mr. Breckinridge. Excuse me. I can't give you a more precise answer because sometimes the record that we were able to reconstruct is not precise and in some instances not at all clear. We were left with some uncertainty.

Senator Schweicker. Wouldn't that be the key issue of your whole investigation, and you mean to say you can't tell me?

Mr. Breckinridge. No, sir.

Senator Schweicker. I am flabbergasted.

Mr. Breckinridge. Let me describe the investigation. We were doing the investigation for Mr. Helms as the Director. Mr. Helms' involvement was something known to him and we submitted our description of what happened to him. We did not interview him in the course of our investigation. We did not interview Mr. McCone. We did interview the other parties who were available to us. But when we gave it to Mr. Helms the assumption was that he could complete the gaps.

In this sense, ordinarily, when we conduct an investigation, a general investigation, we would conclude with recommendations, and in this instance we did so. We reconstructed as well as
we could what happened. And the report went one copy only to Mr. Helms who held it. We had only one discussion. The Inspector General then may have had others. We had only one discussion with him, which was when we gave him the first portion of the report, because we investigated three different assassination plans, as we described them then, and our discussion with him had to do with the approach we had taken, and we said that we simply undertook to reconstruct what had happened as best we could reconstruct it.

So we were reporting to Mr. Helms what we had reconstructed without having interviewed him as such. It was in one copy only, and quite frankly in 1967 we expected that it would have no purpose other than to tell him what the situation was for decisions as he felt appropriate.

Senator Mondale. Now, you say it is not clear whether Dulles knew, but yet there is a memorandum from Oshorn to the Executive Director dated 2/15/72, which states, I quote:

"Individuals who were aware of this project" —

That is the Mafia project —

"were Messrs. Dulles, Bissel, Colonel King, Colonel Sheffield, Edwards, William Harvey, James P. O'Connell, and attorneys for Robert Mahon."

Mr. Brackinridge. Mr. Osborn is writing that on the basis of his understanding of what Colonel Edwards had to say.

Our discussions with Colonel Edwards left us with this uncertain...
Colonel Edwards believes that Mr. Dulles understood the conversation. He also said that he engaged in double-talk so that there was room for misunderstanding.

Mr. Schwarz. I show you a document stamped 0012, headed John Roselli and ask you what it is.

Mr. Breckinridge. This is a memo prepared in the Office of Security describing John Roselli, who is the first of the members of the syndicate who was used to arrange the introduction to the head of the syndicate in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. And written when?

Mr. Breckinridge. I am not sure. I suspect it was written in 1973 but I would have to check.

Mr. Schwarz. Does it refer to a Castro assassination attempt involving the Mafia?

Mr. Breckinridge. Does the word "assassination" appear?

I think it refers to the Mafia.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any doubt, in fact, this is referring to the assassination effort involving Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante, in connection with Castro?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And does this document prepared by the Office of Security state "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval"?

Mr. Breckinridge. It does.

Mr. Schwarz. And who was the DCI in August, 1960?
Mr. Breckinridge. That was Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, therefore, either Mr. Dulles did approve which the document says, or somebody wrote a document in connection with the investigation which irresponsibly says Mr. Dulles approved. Which is the case?

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't think that either is necessarily the case.

The understanding of the Office of Security is that Mr. Dulles does know or did know. The question that was raised in the course of our inquiry was that the nature of the meeting as described to us raised a question of doubt. That we did not resolve.

Chairman Church. I think if we accept your testimony that there was at least an element of doubt as to whether or not Mr. Dulles knew of the connection between the CIA and the Mafia, and its purpose, to assassinate Mr. Castro, let's get back to Senator Schweicker's question. After Mr. Dulles left several more plots were formed involving the CIA and having to do with subsequent attempts on the life of Castro.

Now, what does your investigation show and what can you tell us with respect to the highest officials in the CIA, following the departure of Mr. Dulles, who may have had knowledge of these ongoing operations?

Mr. Breckinridge. When the operation was renewed I think it is clear that the Director at that time did not know.
Senator Schweicker. And who was the Director at that time?

Chairman Church. When was the operation renewed?

Mr. Breckinridge. The operation was actually reactivated in April of 1962. It was planned to be reactivated prior to that but the employee who had responsibility for it did not get free until April of '62 when he actually reactivated it.

There is no indication that anyone above the level of Mr. Bissel in 1961, at the time that this was discussed, there is no indication that anyone above his level knew that it was to be reactivated. This officer, Mr. Harvey, then took it over and attempted to run it again through the balance of 1962, after April.

Mr. Schwarz. We did that at the instruction of Mr. Helms, did he not?

Mr. Breckinridge. Mr. Helms became aware of this at a later point.

The confusion, as perhaps we discussed the other day, Mr. Helms signed off on a project that was originally initiated by Mr. Bissel called ZR Rifle, and ZR Rifle was a project that Mr. Bissel was quoted as saying was at the urgency of the White House. It was made no more specific than that. We don't know where in the White House ZR Rifle was described as an executive action capability, a capability to permit assassinations if someone called for
Mr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissel and originally it continued as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded.

Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle as a project. ZR Rifle had a dual purpose that has not been clarified by our inquiry. It apparently was in fact used for the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went along, which was to steel codes, and Mr. Helms, when he approved the project, authorized accounting on certification, which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify that the money had been spent and this would be accepted.

It had a project amount of some dollars, $7500 - $10,000 -- some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to include operating expenses.

So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifle does not necessarily equate with the date when he became familiar with the Castro operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle means both, rifle files and used rifles?

Mr. Breckinridge. It may mean either or both.

Mr. Colby. It is supposed to dissociate but sometimes
there is that kind of association.

Mr. Breckenridge. I told you that I would look for when Mr. Helms' name first clearly appeared and I haven't done that. I was out of town yesterday.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have the memo of February 1962 when Mr. Helms, according to Mr. Greer, Inspector General, "authorized William Harvey by memo to handle the project on a special basis"?

Mr. Breckenridge. Do I have a copy of that memorandum?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Breckenridge. It is in the files and we can retrieve it.

Chairman Church. Mr. Bissel was the Deputy Director of Plans. The record would indicate that he knew of the re-activation of the operation to assassinate Castro in April of 1962, and Mr. Harvey, I take it, was assigned that duty?

Mr. Breckenridge. If I may go back, it was in the fall of 1961.
Mr. Schwarz. November 1961?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It was in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment by Mr. Bissell. I think Mr. Bissell left in 1962. I am not sure of the dates. So Mr. Bissell would have known at that time. But I am not sure after that.

Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissell as chief of operations?

Mr. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executive capability -- whatever that means. Presumably that means a capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized by proper authority?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that based upon what has been revealed through your interrogation?

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me go back and clarify, then I will answer this question, if I may.

Mr. Helms approved ZR Rifle, which the record shows has the responsibility of stealing codes, essentially.

My understanding, from my interviews, is that ZR Rifle had
also the responsibility for executive action capability. That is a difficult phrase.

The record does not show that Mr. Helms knew when he approved the project that it had this dual role. So from that point of view, I have a record that shows what the project was supposed to have been as far as its open description, though classified, and the result of our interviews with Mr. Harvey which tell the other story about executive action capability. So it does not, the record does not show that Mr. Helms at that time knew what that was.

Chairman Church. If Harvey knew that it had this other aspect, who would have told him to develop such a capability, if it were not his superior?

Mr. Breckenridge. I think that is a logical conclusion, but I was distinguishing what the record showed and what our interviews developed.

Chairman Church. Didn't you ask Harvey in interviewing him whether or not Helms had told him to develop this capability as a part of the ZR Rifle?

Didn't you ask him who told him to develop this capability, or did he do it on his own?

Mr. Breckenridge. Your question is a very proper one, and my difficulty is with the record which goes back to what Bissel instructed Harvey to do.

Mr. Schwarz. Before Helms took the job, Bissel told Harvey
to take charge of the Castro assassination project?

Mr. Breckinridge. Bissel told Harvey to create the execution action capability.

Mr. Schwarz. But he also told him to take charge of the Castro assassination project using the Mafia; isn't that correct?

Mr. Breckinridge. Now, there is no record except the record that came from our interviews on this score. All I am trying to do is draw the distinction between what the record shows and what our interviews developed, and there are gaps in that.

Chairman Church. Your interviews show that Mr. Bissel, who preceded Helms, told Mr. Harvey to develop an executive action capability, which was a capability to assassinate if and when ordered; right?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is correct.

Chairman Church. And your records show that Mr. Bissel also instructed Harvey to take over the Castro assassination attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship between the CIA and the Mafia?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is a correct assumption.

Chairman Church. Now, when do your records show that Helms became aware of Harvey's whole assignment as given him by Bissel?
Mr. Breckinridge. I don't have the accurate date. We have
the 16 August 1963 memorandum. I promised Mr. Schwarz that I
would try and find the date, and I was out of town yesterday
and simply didn't do it. But I have to go through the record
to find the earliest date that we have, and I simply have to go
into the record to dig this out.

Senator Schweiker. Do your records show the date of when
the actual latest assassination attempt was finished?

Mr. Schwarz. For Castro?

Senator Schweiker. Yes. When was that timeframe, roughly?

Mr. Breckinridge. You are talking about the Mafia connecti-

Senator Schweiker. No; I am talking about when did we
finally cease and desist in attempting to assassinate Castro,
from your records?

Mr. Breckinridge. Let me, if I may, and I don't mean to
confuse the issue -- the Mafia connection from beginning to end
was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called
off finally in the Spring, perhaps February, of 1963.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What year?

Mr. Breckinridge. 1963.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Mafia part?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. The Cuballa Association has a
different origin.

Chairman Church. First, who called off the Mafia operati-

Mr. Breckinridge. As near as I could tell, Harvco.
Chairman Church. Harvey?

Mr. Breckinridge. Harvey. Harvey decided that it couldn't
succeed. Harvey was leaving the country for a foreign assignmen-
and in conversation with Roselli—Roselli was the man who was
in the Mafia through whom the Agency had continued to work --
and Roselli agreed that nothing was happening, nothing could
happen, and it should be called off. We don't have a record
that Harvey went anywhere for approval. This doesn't mean that
he may not have discussed it, but I don't have the record of it.

So Harvey in his conversation with Roselli, terminated the
operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The memo which we saw at the
last session, which I don't know we officially have, Mr. Colby
made it available to us -- was a wrap-up of the whole thing, or a
memo to the files, and I can't recall now who did it.

Mr. Schwarz. That is the one referring to the meeting
with Robert Kennedy that we spent some time looking at.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was the Sheffield-Edwards
memo which say with the collapse of the Bay of Pigs invasion
operation, no further attempt was made with the Mafia. It tied
it directly to the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Colby. That was the first phase. There was a second
phase that followed with the Mafia.

Chairman Church. We now know from what you have said that
Harvey called off the Mafia connection, and we don't know whether
that was done with the knowledge or authority of anyone more high placed in the CIA.

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know.

Chairman Church. All right, after Harvey left the country who was then assigned to undertake the subsequent efforts again the life of Castro?

Mr. Breckinridge. This brings us to Senator Schweiker's question. A man by the name of Orlando Cubella, who had been met in Mexico City by the Agency in 1961, who had been one of the leaders of the anti-Batista groups and held the rank of Major in the Cuban army, that is the highest rank they have, Cubella was an M.D. and had been a youth leader and attended youth conferences around the world, and was met first in Mexico City, and later he was met in Scandinavia on several occasions. And the conversations during these various meetings had to do with Cubella's desire to have a change in Cuba, and the attempt on the Agency people who met with him to explore his ability to substitute a government as well as be able to overthrow the existing government.

These conversations were very general, exploratory, and non-productive.

In one of the early meetings with Cubella, he talked about eliminating Castro, and the Agency employee used the word assassination, which was reported back as being an offensive word to Cubella, and instructions were issued that Cubella was
not to be given a mission of elimination of Castro or anyone else.

He was met in October of 1963, at which time he made the proposal that he wished to have weapons with which to commit an assassination, and this proposal was rejected.

He continued to speak in these terms, and finally, I cannot give you the level of approval -- that might be at the level of Mr. Fitzgerald -- and I don't recall which job Mr. Fitzgerald had then, whether he headed the Cuban Task Force or whether he had become --

Mr. Knoche. He replaced Harvey.

Mr. Schwarz. He did meet with this man and gave him a weapon or poison pen with which to kill Castro?

Mr. Breckinridge. Fitzgerald did not give him the pen.

Mr. Schwarz. But discussed the subject?

Mr. Breckinridge. I was considering the question of level of authorization, and I don't recall. I would assume Mr. Fitzgerald was the highest level of authorization that I know of.

Chairman Church. And Fitzgerald's position at that time?

Mr. Breckinridge. I was questioning whether he had -- he had three jobs in fairly quick succession. Whether he replaced Harvey as head of the Cuban Task Force, then he became Chief of WHM, the Western Hemisphere Division, and then he became for a short time Deputy Director of Plans. But he died of a heart
attack. I don't know whether he had at that time -- it would be in October of 1963.

Mr. Colby. I think at that time he was either head of the Cuban force or Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

Chairman Church. Will you get that for the record?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The decision was taken to try and give Cubella some instrument. A ball point pen was designed that could be used as a syringe. Because Cubella was a doctor, the pen was given to him in Paris on the 22nd of November, 1963, with the suggestion that he use it.

Chairman Church. By whom was the pen given?

Mr. Breckinridge. It was given by a case officer of the Agency. In fact, Cubella refused to take it. When we wrote our report, we thought he accepted it, but I've since learned he refused it. He said it was not practical.

Because he was a doctor it was suggested that he could acquire the material to put in the pen, but he refused to accept it.

Conversations continued, and finally the Agency arranged to put down two caches at sea off the coast of Cuba, one of which had weapons in it, one of which had just general equipment.

Senator Schweiker. Could either of those involve the story that appeared in the press under Colonel Prouty's statement?

Mr. Breckinridge. No, sir.
Senator Schweiker. Did that come later, Colonel Prouty?

Mr. Breckinridge. We still don't know what Colonel Prouty's statement refers to.

Mr. Knoche. Prouty's allegations go back to 1959.

Senator Schweiker. What?

Mr. Knoche. 1959, late 1959 and early 1960.

Mr. Breckinridge. We arranged to have a Cuban refugee leader meet Cubella in Spain, at which time he gave him an additional weapon. That would have been in February of 1964, I think.

Chairman Church. What kind of weapon was given to him?

Mr. Breckinridge. It is my recollection it was a rifle.

I am not sure of that.

Cubella continued to have conversations and meetings from time to time as he came out of Cuba, and finally in the middle of 1965 the decision was taken to cut off contact with him because there were serious questions about the security of his organization.

He was arrested, I think. I think I have gotten my dates right. It is subject to correction. He was arrested in the early part of 1966 and tried, made a confession, had a public trial, which was reported in the press.

I wonder if I might check those dates?

Chairman Church. Surely.

While you check those dates, perhaps Mr. Colby could
explain how it was during this period that Cubella was able
to return to Cuba and travel to Europe.

I assume he was able to return to Cuba?

Mr. Colby. He was a Cuban officer at that time, and
apparently loyal to Castro. He would go out on various trips
and things like that, and we would meet him there.

Mr. Schwarz. He was the man who met with Mr. Hunt in
Madrid?

Mr. Colby. He met with a friend of Mr. Hunt. A Cuban exile
met Cubella in Madrid. That is when the weapons were handed
over.

Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr. Hunt in Madrid at that time?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Mr. Breckinridge. No, because this man by the name of
Artimo, met Cubella in Madrid in December of 1964, and in
February 1965 he made the delivery of the weapons. Hunt was
not assigned there until the middle of 1965, after this was
over. We don't know where that story came from.

Mr. Colby. Hunt and Artimo are very close, and he is the
godfather of one of their children, and things like that. He
may have told him about it.

Chairman Church. During this period you have described,
when these various contacts were made with Cubella, who was
the highest officer within the CIA who had knowledge of these
contacts and who authorized them to be made, as far as your
investigation shows?

Mr. Breckinridge. I don't know the level at which the contacts were known. I would assume that the continuing contacts were known at a high level, but I have to assume that, and this goes to a point when Senator Schweiker was asking the question at the last time. This is the last instance that we know of in which assassination was involved.

Senator Schweiker. That is, both your records and your interviews indicate that this was the last known activity, according to your investigation?

Mr. Breckinridge. That was specifically related to Castro.

Senator Schweiker. And that date was when?

Mr. Breckinridge. Well, our contact with the Cubella group was broken off in June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker. June of when?

Mr. Breckinridge. 1965.

I don't want to confuse you, but I would like to introduce a consideration that relates to this.

Chairman Church. Before you do that, I have asked what your investigation shows is the highest officer who knew and under whose authority these continuing contacts were made, and you said you assumed it must have been known to higher authority.

Mr. Breckinridge. I said that about the contacts. About the contacts, I assumed this was known fairly high in the Agency.
Chairman Church. The contacts and their purpose?

Mr. Breckinridge. This is a distinction I want to make.

The people who were involved, and this is difficult --

but their statement of state of mind, and your interpretation,

may be different things. But the people who were involved

considered that the purpose of the association with Cubella was

he was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a

man who represented a dissatisfied element, he had people who

agreed with him, and the hope was that this could be developed

into a group in Cuba that in some way could replace the govern-

ment.

The conversations with Cubella were really not productive,

and Cubella wanted demonstration of support, tangible support,

and the conversations progressed to the point that he wanted

equipment with which he could commit and assassination.

In the minds of the people who dealt with him, the question

of assassination was not uppermost, so much as it was to give

him a material demonstration of support.

I don't mean to be trite, but the United States or the

Agency has in the past provided weapons of one kind or another

to people, paramilitary. In the minds of these people, however

credible to you this distinction is drawn, so assassination

became a consideration, but assassination had not been the

objective.

I am sorry, one more point.
The point at which they began to provide weapons to him should have required higher level approval. I don't know what the level of approval was.

Mr. Schwarz. It should have under the normal procedures?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. At one point a meeting took place and an agent of the CIA gave him a ballpoint pen that had been specially designed to camouflage a syringe, and gave it to him with the recommendation that it would be filled with poison and used to kill Castro.

Are you saying that the agent may have done this without the knowledge of the Director or the Deputy Director for Plans, someone high in the Agency?

Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am saying there should have been authorization. I don't know the level of that authorization. I merely tried to draw a distinction because it is a question raised in my mind, it was raised by Senator Schweiker's question -- when was the last attempt of assassination?

This developed to the point where assassination was involved, and this was the last such interest that we know of.

Senator Schweiker. Are you saying after the incident that Senator Church just asked you about, at that point the emphasis shifted from assassinating him to replacing him?

Is that what you are trying to tell us, or did I misconstrue that, too?
Mr. Breckinridge. No; I am confusing the issue by trying to describe the state of mind of the people who were involved in the operation.

Chairman Church. We don't even know who were involved. You tell us that.

Mr. Breckinridge. As far as I know, Mr. Fitzgerald would be the highest level that I know was aware of this.

Chairman Church. What was his position? We are back to that.

Mr. Colby. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.
Senator Morgan. Is he dead?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Breckinridge. The problem that you are having, which is one that we have, is reconstructing certain aspects of this, quite frankly, and we have attempted to reconstruct it by the record, where the record supports it by interviews, where the interviews can fill gaps, and it was of some interest to try to get from the people involved their rationales. The rationale is difficult, complex, and I have tried to convey that because it was brought to my mind by Senator Schweicker's question.

Mr. Colby: 'If I could help interpret this from a cultural pattern.

I think the point is that we located this major, he looked like a very promising contact within Cuba who could possibly replace Castro or bring about his disposition, and so forth, just remove him without any specifics.

In the course of the conversations, the 1963 meeting with the ballpoint pen took place. We don't have any clear record as to who authorized that particular aspect of the relationship concerning the ballpoint pen. The fact that we then went on with him until '64 and '65 with the offers of weapons fits into the general support of that effort and doesn't necessarily coincide with the deliberate attempts to assassinate him, although it could, and our records don't clearly indicate one.
way or the other on that.

Chairman Church. A cache of weapons delivered on the coast of Cuba hardly constitutes an arsenal by which it reason could be assumed that the government can be overthrown. It does, however, fit into a scheme of providing the major and his cohorts with a capability of assassinating the Cuban leader Mr. Colby. It also coincides with the possibility of the first step toward additional arms.

I am not denying it, Mr. Chairman. I am saying that the records don't clearly indicate it, and this gets back to Mr. Schwarz's original question to me -- can you define "assassination"?

I would respectfully request that I don't get into that because there is a question as to when you are supporting armed action and when you are committing an assassination. Chairman Church. All right. During this whole period we understand that the Director of the CIA, who was Mr. McCona, had said he had no knowledge of these ongoing activities.

Mr. Colby. I would imagine that his testimony that he did not know of an assassination would be consistent with my comment as to the weapons being given in support of armed action but not the specific assassination plans. I don't know that but I am saying that is a possible explanation of the difference between those stories.

Chairman Church. We will have to question Mr. McCona much.
more closely on that point.

But you are unable now to tell us in connection with these later activities whether or not there was specific knowledge of their connection with the assassination purpose, above the level of Mr. Fitzgerald?

Mr. Brackinridge. At this moment I cannot.

Senator Morgan. May I pursue a line of questions for just a few minutes?

First of all, Mr. Schwarz, this document, Exhibit A, who prepared it?

This is the original rough draft that was prepared only by the typists?

Mr. Schwarz. That is the Ken Greer document.

Mr. Colby. Prepared by one of Mr. Brackinridge's associates, Mr. Kenneth Greer.

Senator Morgan. What was the purpose of the preparation of this document?

Mr. Colby. It followed the 9th of May, 1973 directive by Mr. Schlesinger for a report on all questionable activities. These were gathered together by Mr. Greer and the other members of the Inspector General's office and a summary of them was provided to me to use to brief the Chairman of the two committees.

Senator Morgan. This was the best information that the Agency was able to obtain at the time?

Mr. Colby. That was the information available to the
Inspector General at the time. I think I would say it was abl
I don't think we instituted an aggressive, positive investigat.
We rather collected what we had available.

Senator Morgan. Well, there have been assassination
attempts or efforts on the part of the government. There's no
question in my mind. The question I want to pursue is that
in the document marked here Exhibit A, project ZR Rifle, it
stated that early in the Kennedy Administration, "the White
House urged Richard Bissel to create an executive action
capability."

That is a general standby capability to carry out
assassinations.

Now, that was the primary purpose of ZR Rifle; is that
your understanding?

Mr. Colby. It was one of the purposes of the ZR Rifle
project.

Senator Morgan. And it was done at the instigation of
"the White House"?

Mr. Colby. We have one record which states that Mr.
Bissel made this statement without further precision.

Senator Morgan. And where is Mr. Bissel?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Bissel, I think, lives in Connecticut now.

Senator Morgan. Now later on we find that this project
continued on under a man by the name of Bill Harvey, did it
not?
Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator Morgan. And then on June 27, 1973, he wrote a memorandum to the Chief PI staff.

What does PI staff mean?

Mr. Colby. A foreign intelligence staff.

Senator Morgan. Stating that the original justification for employing Q.J. Winn no longer existed and raised the question of his termination?

Mr. Colby. '63 was it?

Senator Morgan. June of 1963. He was terminated in April of 1964?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Morgan. Now there is no doubt in your mind but what this project was known by the Director of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. Approved by the Director. I don't think we can say for sure.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, isn't it a reasonable assumption that if a project of this magnitude was to carry out the assassination, it would not be created without the approval of the Director of the CIA?

Mr. Colby. It better not be created without my approval now, I will guarantee you.

Senator Morgan. It certainly is not reasonable to assume that even in 1961 it would have been so created?

Mr. Colby. I would think that the general idea. Whether
the specific project or not but the general idea is so significant, and that is the indication that Mr. Dulles did know of this act at the time. Whether it was specifically brought to the attention of his successor I could not actually testify one way or the other.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Colby, can you make any more sensitive a project at the CIA than one of assassination?

Mr. Colby. When Mr. Schlesinger came in I made sure he was aware of anything I knew.

Senator Morgan. And this being true, aren't you satisfied in your own mind that all your directors were aware of this project ZR Rifle until such time as it was terminated?

Mr. Colby. That is a conclusion, Senator. I can't give testimony on that.

Senator Morgan. It is a conclusion, but you are an expert.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Morgan. You are the Director of the CIA and you have had the experience and knowledge of the history of the CIA.

Let me ask you, based upon your history, the history and the knowledge of the CIA that you know of, have as Director, and you have gained as Director, aren't you satisfied that every director knew of this project?

Mr. Colby. In the face of the statement by Mr. McCone...
he did not know of it, I find that statement difficult to
challenge.
I agree with you, he should have known about it, but I
could not say for sure that statement is not accurate.

Senator Morgan. One final question. Mr. McCon 6
the Agency when?

Mr. Colby. In 1965.

Senator Morgan. I won't ask any other questions except
for the record I would like to say this so I can remember why
I was pursuing this later on.

I asked these questions not to try to show the assassination
plan, because I think that has already been established, and
if that is all we are after we can move on to something else.

But the thing that does concern me is that if this proj-
continued on until and past the time that President Kennedy
was assassinated, then it raises a question in my mind as to
whether or not Castro himself may not well have known about it
and whether or not the President's assassination may not have
been a part of a recrimination plan and it may just open the
doors to whether or not later on we should decide to look into
that.

That is the reason I have followed that line of questions.
Chairman Church. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection with

ZR Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this was

a multi-purpose operation, including stealing codes, and the
development of the capability of what euphemistically is called
executive action.

In your professional judgment, and with your history of
your background in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that

a major operation, a major intelligence gathering operation of
the sort of stealing codes, which I assume means from other
governments, would be mounted under the direction of a man
about whom all I know is that Mr. Harvey has a background of
something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the level,
I should say, of $7500 to $10,000?

Does it not suggest to you that stealing codes was in

fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination
operation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability?

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

In the first place, Mr. Harvey had a very successful tour
in Berlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which was
one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very colorful figure who had his lifestyle,
which is different than some others, but he had been very
effective at that, and very adventuresome in that category of
signals intelligence and a very venturesome idea of that nature.

TOP SECRET
He was in the assignment of Chief of the FI Division staff. That staff's major function is to conduct the signals intelligence work which must be done in the clandestine service.

It handles our efforts today to penetrate into foreign code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated material.

Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability", executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth.

Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of the work of that particular group.

You also are dealing with some very venturesome people who are willing to crawl into somebody else's code room and take the chance of getting caught.

So, given you have a man who had some good technical experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a program which is not too far off the requirements of high compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and therefore, for Mr. Bissel to have selected Harvey to carry out this project seems to me that it is compatible that he could be running code-breaking projects, or code stealing projects.
as well as this other activity.

Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me, but to say that the code stealing was only a cover I think is probably an unwarranted conclusion.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding of $7,500 to $10,000?

Mr. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of an operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I think it is too little.

Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't think you can draw much conclusion from the actual number on the figure, one way or the other.

This might not have been the only such project. You know, an assassination project would cost you more money than that, too.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.

Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is the only amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation where additional money would be put into either of those kinds.
of activities. I wouldn't get hung up on the bureaucratic aspect of the number of dollars.

Senator Hart of Colorado. So Mr. Harvey, if the decision were made to try to liquidate a foreign leader, and Mr. Harvey found the instrumentality, the individual to do that, and that required $100,000, all he had to do was come back in and say?

Mr. Colby. He could get it.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we should have the record reflect two things. The two gentlemen talking are not eyewitnesses to what we have been talking about.

Second, and related to that, for us to pursue this matter, we must have, and must have right away, the better evidence which is in the possession of the CIA, which is at least the Inspector General report of 1967; and more importantly than that, the interview notes reflecting whatever interviews you had with whomever you interviewed at that time or later.

Mr. Colby. These we will make available to you to the extent we have them.

Mr. Breckinridge. We retained no notes. We kept only the one report that we submitted to Mr. Helms at that time, the one copy. When he left the Agency he returned it to us.

Now, the files on the Cubella affair and the Trujillo affair exist, and they are available.

Mr. Schwarz. Can we have it understood that, Mr. Breckinridge, you will as you did with the initial material,
come down sometime early next week and we can go over it and
so forth?

Mr. Colby. Sure. If we can just have the same sort of
ground rules about the papers.

Chairman Church. Sure. They always apply unless —

Mr. Colby. I know.

Chairman Church. — unless we say differently.

Mr. Schwarz. No, just following up one more thing on
Senator Hart's question of some time ago.

Would you determine with respect to five different periods
of time whether, first, there was any internal evaluation
within the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether or not
the assassination attempts should continue and, second, whether
there was any discussions with persons outside of the Central
Intelligence Agency as to whether or not the plot should continue
and the period of time would be the initial authorization, which
was March 1960, after the Bay of Pigs, during the missile
crisis. And, parenthetically there, will you state whether it
was possible Castro might have been assassinated pursuant to
an ongoing plan during a period of time when the United States
and Russia were close to a nuclear confrontation. The next
case is John F. Kennedy's assassination.

Finally, at the time of the break-off in June of 1965,
which I believe was Mr. Breckinridge's testimony, was anybody in
higher authority told that the operation had been broken off?
Because that will bear upon whether anybody in higher authority
had authorized or requested the operation.

Mr. Colby. Yes, fine.

Mr. Schwarz. Can I pick up then on another subject which
we just barely touched on last time, Mr. Colby?

This is related to the question I asked you about the use
of criminal elements.

Senator Mathias. Before we leave this, I have one question.
Chairman Church. Senator Mathias.

Senator Mathias. In light of the fact this poison pen was
actually proffered on the 22nd of November, 1963, is there a
scintilla of evidence — and was proffered to a Major in the
Cuban Army on active duty — is there a scintilla of evidence
that anyone in the Cuban Government had any knowledge or suspicion
prior to that date that this was a project that was planned?

Mr. Colby. There is certainly no evidence that anyone
had that information with respect to the Cubella operation.

Mr. Breckinridge. No.

Mr. Colby. The second phase of the Mafia operation had been
wrapped up by then, I think.

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes.

Mr. Colby. The individual in Cuba involved in it had
take asylum, I think.

Mr. Breckinridge. No, the sequence is a little different.

Mr. Colby. A little later.
Mr. Breckinridge. Yes. There were people who reportedly were sent into Cuba, a team of three people -- and I said reports because we were working then through a Cuban exile leader.

They had the assignment of recruiting additional people to carry out such plans as might be developed. We never knew what happened to those people -- whether they came back -- only that they were sent in.

But if you are looking for a possibility of knowledge of an assassination plot, conceivably those three people could be the source of it, but not that the United States Government was behind it.

Senator Mathias. But it is conceivable that Castro and his government could have come upon some evidence that some plot was afoot?

Mr. Colby. He certainly could have cross allegations, and you really must assume that various of the other kind, even independent activities, or the first phase of the Mafia program could have produced allegations of attempts against him with the comment that CIA or the United States was behind it. The possibility of that kind of allegation is just almost infinite.

Senator Mathias. Particularly considering the nature of the instruments that were being deployed?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Brockinridge. There is another consideration.

Chairman Church. You really haven't told us on the record
until just now, in response to Senator Mathias, just what the second phase of the Mafia connection for assassination Castro was. We really haven't had the detail except as you gave it to Senator Mathias.

I wonder if you could complete the record on this second phase. Give us all the information that you know about that.

Mr. Breckinridge. Before I do, one additional consideration.

The Cuban exile community in Miami was engaged in a great deal of plotting of its own and a great deal of hyperbole, and it is safe to assume that Castro also had reports of assassination schemes or threats from that group. So there is one more source to that sort of thing.
Senator Morgan. Where is Cubella now? Is he still in prison?

Mr. Breckinridge. In jail on the Isle of Pines.

Senator Morgan. Are we sure of that?

Mr. Breckinridge. I asked somebody the other day and they said that is where they think he is.

Senator Morgan. I just wondered whose agent he really was.

Mr. Colby. He has been in jail for a long time if he was Castro's.

Senator Morgan. You testified he was able to go in and out of Cuba fairly frequently.

Mr. Colby. He was an associate of Castro's, there is no question about that, but he had an independent relation with us that finally got picked up. I think that is important. Mr. Chairman, that we try to keep his name out of any published documents for that reason. There is no use getting him in more trouble.

Senator Schweicker. That is for sure.

Chairman Church. There is no argument on that score.

Would you please furnish us with all of the details as to the second phase of the Mafia connection?

Mr. Breckinridge. We will give you more accurate detail when we give you the report, but I will recite now the best that I can recall.

TOP SECRET
Chairman Church. Before you do, would you just explain exactly what the relationship between CIA and Giancana and Mahru was because that is not clear in my mind.

Would you develop for the Committee that whole relationship?

Mr. Breckinridge. Robert Mahru used to work for the FBI and he resigned from the FBI and opened a private investigative firm here in Washington and CIA used him from time to time for certain kinds of support activities.

Chairman Church. What kind of support activities?

Mr. Breckinridge. On one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader.

Chairman Church. What other kind of support?

Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days -- and this becomes an embarrassment. As nearly as I can reconstruct, the people who knew him decided to put him on a retainer in the Office of Security, which they did for awhile, until he was so successful he said he no longer needed the retainer, which he didn’t do much to earn. He later got involved representing one of the Greek shipping interests and we were given the results of some of the information that he obtained from that where there was a fight between Niarchos and Onassis. We think he may have had some involvement in another foreign leader’s companionship when he was in this country. I don’t have the details. I think we can probably reconstruct it for you.
Chairman Church. Can we have the file on him?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think we will provide one on that.

We have one, yes.

Chairman Church. Very well.

Mr. Breckinridge. When Maheu left Washington and moved out west, I think first to Los Angeles, later to Las Vegas, where he became associated with the Hughes organization, and when the question arose about getting an introduction to the Mafia, because they did have gambling interests in Cuba at that time, the Office of Security, Colonel Edwards was asked if he could establish a contact, and he went to Maheu, or had someone go to Maheu, to see if Maheu could make such an introduction.

Maheu knew a man by the name of Johnny Roselli, who lived in Los Angeles, who had the concession for the icemaking machines on the strip in Las Vegas, and he arranged, Roselli arranged an introduction to -- the CIA actually arranged, our man didn't meet Giancana, I don't believe, arranged an introduction, but Giancana who in turn arranged an introduction to a man by the name of Santos Trafficante.

Trafficante was the head of the Cuban gambling interests and Castro had allowed them. First he had closed them, then he reopened them hoping to attract tourists. And Trafficante travelled to and from Cuba.

Giancana served only as the introduction to Trafficante.
This was all done through Roselli.

Our people never -- they all dealt with Roselli, who in turn dealt with the others.

Roselli was in essence a cut-out or served as the middle man. Roselli was never paid for his services.

Giancana clearly knew eventually the government association Roselli came to know of it, though initially he was introduced to the CIA person as a man who worked for Mahou on an assignment by a private client.

So initially the cover story was Mahou's private client who had an interest inside Cuba. Giancana never really was involved subsequently.

He did arrange -- it was Trafficante from then on -- and Trafficante had a source inside Cuba who had an office, had a position in the Office of the Prime Minister. He was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food. The pills were sent in to this man. What we did not know at the time was the man had lost his job and lost his access and the pills were returned.

Mr. Colby. That is the first phase.

Senator Schweicker. Would you date that?

Mr. Brackinridge. That would go into the early part of 1961, March-April, 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. The pills were given as part of the first phase to a second person in Cuba; is that correct?
Mr. Breckinridge. Just before the first phase ended, Roselli, through Trafficante, was introduced to another Cuban exile leader in Miami by the name of Anthony Varona. Again, his name is a sensitive matter.

Varona was the leader of one of the groups that was being supported by the CIA as part of the preparation for the Bay of Pigs.

Varona was unhappy with his association, with the association with the CIA. He felt he had not been given enough money. Varona had previous contact with the criminal element in Cuba and he was approached by Roselli with Trafficante's introduction to take on this mission.

Roselli's story was that he represented some private client who had interest in Cuba. The Roselli identity was apparent, as was Trafficante's.

Varona said he knew someone who was in a restaurant that Castro frequented and then the pills were transported again.

Mr. Schwarz. Could you state for the record who made the pills?

Mr. Breckinridge. The pills were made in what was then the Technical Services Division of the CIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Had they ever made such pills before?

Mr. Breckinridge. Not that I know of.

Mr. Schwarz. Had they ever used Botulinum as a poison in any way before?
Mr. Breckinridge. On one previous occasion Botulinum had been considered for use on cigars that someone had hoped to get to Castro, and eventually that never got off the ground. This was a scheme that was never approved and never went forward I know of that one instance in which it was considered.

Botulinum was made into pills and these pills were taken again to Cuba. Castro stopped going to the restaurant where this man was. The Bay of Pigs occurred and the operation was called off.

When Harvey took over and then reactivated the second phase in April of 1962, they went back to Varona, and one of the strange things is that Varona started off with the repetition of the original restaurant approach, which I think caused some question as to the gap between what we were told and what was happening.

Varona after this didn't materialize. Varona then stated that he had sent three men into Cuba whose job was to recruit additional people for such plan as may develop. He later planned to send in three more people. We don't believe they ever went. The missile crisis intervened. There were a number of delays and we don't think they ever did go in.

The first three men, if in fact they did go in -- we don't know who they were, we don't know what they did, we don't know whether they came out or not.

As a matter of interest, the man who was to go back --
Chairman Church. It is possible they went in and could have been captured by Castro?

Mr. Breckinridge. It is possible.

The question that Senator Morgan asked earlier, what they could have known -- these men we don't believe could have known the actual backers of the operation, because Varona was dealing with a member of the syndicate with whom he had previous connections. The people who dealt with Varona felt that Roselli was discreet and careful.

But those men could have been captured. They could have supplied the interpretation that they might not have known.

Nothing came of the operation, it was called off, but essentially that is the first and second phase.

Chairman Church. These three men were to be sent from --

Mr. Breckinridge. They were Cuban exiles.

Chairman Church. To be sent in from the United States?

Mr. Colby. From the United States.

Chairman Church. And why is it you don't know whether or not they were sent?

Mr. Breckinridge. The question exists in my mind. I am not sure it exists in other people's minds.

As I reviewed the record, when we got the record back, in preparation for these inquiries, I was struck by the fact that Varona had told us at the very end of the first phase that he was using this restaurant, and when a year later the phase
was reactivated, the same story was used and already had been
proven not to be so.

Later he talked in general terms about the three men and
I began to develop some reservation in my mind as to whether
or not Varona had in fact told us the truth.

That is purely speculation on my part.

Mr. Colby. This is a problem we live with in the intelli-

business. When you are not able to be in direct contact, for
good reasons you are subject to fabrication, particularly if
there is some money involved.

Chairman Church. Did the CIA, in connection with phase
one or phase two, pay any of these agents for their services?

Mr. Breckinridge. In phase one I think we paid expense
money. In phase two we gave money to Varona.

Mr. Schwarz. And to Roselli?

Mr. Breckinridge. We paid expense money for Roselli.

Mr. Schwarz. You paid him money to buy guns?

Mr. Breckinridge. I was going to tell the gun story.

Varona wanted money and guns and some of the equipment that
he specified could be obtained only from the United States
military. And the equipment that was acquired at that time
did not include that kind of equipment. It included equipment
that could be obtained from other sources and excluded U.S.
military equipment. It was provided through the assistance

of the Miami station. A U-Haul truck was picked up and deliv-

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I know.

Mr. Breckinridge. The first man who had the job in the Office of the Prime Minister, this man did get kickbacks from the criminals. I think that must be the one you remember. He took refuge in the Venezuelan embassy and stayed there until 1964. He finally was given safe conduct to pass out. The Mexican embassy took over from Venezuela. Cuba broke diplomatic relations. He continued to be a political refugee in that embassy until the fall of 1964.

Chairman Church. What was Varona's motive for participating in the plot?

Mr. Breckinridge. Varona was one of the exile leaders who wanted to overthrow Castro. He wanted more financing than he had. He would cooperate with anyone.
Mr. Schwarz. I would like to pick up on the discussion we had.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz has five minutes more, and we will conclude, and I would like to ask the Committee to stay on for ten more minutes for an executive session.

Mr. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of criminal elements, we have dealt with the Castro operation. In the middle of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge earlier this week, there is a discussion about the Lumumba operation, and the Agent Q. J. Win.

Now, is it a fact that Q. J. Win was the agent, or asset, however you would refer to him, who apparently was considered for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never took place; is that right?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that Q. J. Win operated in Europe trying to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in safecracking operations?

Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite possible.

Mr. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA officers who first met Q. J. Win in Luxembourg, was on a trip overseas to find safecrackers and document suppliers?

Mr. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, just as a matter of historical record, is the OSS the predecessor of the CIA in some sense?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it correct that "Lucky" Luciano was used to help the OSS in connection with operations in Italy during the Second World War?

Mr. Colby. I don't know, but I have heard that story as well. It is an extensive story but I don't know the facts.

Mr. Schwarz. For the record, Mr. Luciano was a Mafia figure who had been deported from the United States, or was in jail in the United States?

Mr. Colby. Was in jail, I guess, and was later deported after the War.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with the instructions which you issued in 1973 concerning activities outside of the Charter of the CIA, you received, as we went through the other day, a report from the Inspector General leading up to that in May of 1973?

Mr. Colby. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And was part of the report that the CIA had itself conducted for local police departments in Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria, during the period 1968 and 1969, a series of classes in items which included basics in surveillance, photography, basic audio and counter-sabotage; and in addition, this is what I particularly call your attention to,
locks and picks and surreptitious entry?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. I am now reading from pages 225 and 226 of the 694 pages, which I will mark as Exhibit No. 6. (The above-mentioned document was marked as Colby Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Is it the fact that, for example, between October 7 and October 18, 1968, the CIA conducted a course for the Washington Police Department in the subject of surreptitious entry?

Mr. Colby. It was included in that, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the purpose of conducting such a course?

Mr. Colby. We had a relationship with various police departments around the country. They from time to time would like to learn our knowledge of certain subjects that are quite unique to the CIA. There are a number of things that we have to do in CIA which are quite frankly outside the norm of most other agencies of the Government.

Chairman Church. Doesn't surreptitious entry refer to illegal entry?

Mr. Colby. Going in secretly, that is what it means. Entering secretly in some fashion or other, yes.

Chairman Church. That is an illegal activity for local
Mr. Colby. Presumably, yes.

Chairman Church. Why is CIA conducting courses teaching local police illegal activity, h.c. to conduct illegal operations?

Mr. Colby. I think at that time, Mr. Chairman, that was at the request of the police department of that area, that they were interested in this thing, and there is a defensive element of it. In order to know how to protect against something, it is well to know how it is actually conducted.

Chairman Church. Do you construe this activity to be within the law, the basic statute which restricts your domestic activities?

Mr. Colby. I don't think it is a violation of the law, Mr. Chairman.

I did give some directive on that in 1973, that we not engage in this anymore, in compliance with the spirit of the amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Act, which says that CIA will not provide support to the LEAA in its assistance to local police departments. And as far as I was concerned, that is a policy that they don't want CIA in touch with local police departments.

The fact of sharing our knowledge of techniques with a local police department does not in my mind get us into actually conducting domestic police activity. There is a difference there.
Chairman Church. Yes. But apart from the technical
question of your jurisdiction, when you engage in teaching local
police departments how to conduct break-ins, surreptitious
break-ins, you are teaching them how to break the law.

Mr. Colby. You are teaching them how the law is broken.

Chairman Church. That is right.

Mr. Colby. Which can be useful to them in their knowledge
of how the law is broken, the techniques that are feasible.

Chairman Church. Or can be useful to them in knowing how
to break the law?

Mr. Colby. It could. It is an item of information that
they can use in any way they wish, either properly or improperly.

Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any situations where govern-
mental officials, either state, local or Federal, have in fact
engaged in break-ins within the United States?

Mr. Colby. I know of certain situations related to foreign
intelligence operations where access to appropriate targets has
been obtained either through subterfuge of pretending to be a
workman or something of that nature, and I think in that history
there are some cases of actual break-ins.

Now, I assure you, Mr. Chairman, we have been conducting
break-ins abroad. There is no question about that. That is,
we train our people to be able to do that.

Chairman Church. That is not the question I am raising
with you.

TOP SECRET
In other words, these courses, it is my impression, were
generalized discussions of techniques. They were not particular
handholding on conducting a specific operation.

I think I am accurate in that statement.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Colby, just a couple of quick questions.

First, with regard to the files, memoranda or diaries you
might have of former directors, are those still on Agency
premises? Do you have those matters still there that were
left by former Directors?

Mr. Colby. Certain ones we do. I don't know of any that
we don't have.

As far as I am concerned, they are Agency property, and when
I leave I am going to walk out without any paper.

Mr. Smothers. With respect then to the inquiries you have
made with regard to information in the files on assassinations,
have these inquiries extended to an examination of these files
of former Directors?

Mr. Breckinridge. In one or two instances on specific
points we have made inquiries. We have not gone through the
files in general for that purpose.

Mr. Colby. We have gone through that collection I know of
Mr. Helms' files. I don't know of any specific set of files
called Mr. McCona's files.

There is an executive registry where my correspondence is
kept, for instance.

- Mr. Smothers. What I am searching for is the situation
where the generic classification of materials might somehow
have not been complete enough for us to get particular knowledge,
and I was wondering prior to our next meeting if a search
oriented with respect to the issue of knowledge might be a
fruitful exercise?

Mr. Colby. Knowledge by previous directors of specifics
on this topic?

Mr. Smothers. Yes.

Mr. Colby. I think it is easy for Mr. Helms. I think
we have gone through his files. I don't know of any separate
set of files on Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone. We will look.

Senator Mondale. There is a reference to John McCone's
files in one of the memos that I looked at this morning.

Mr. Colby. I will check that, Senator.

Chairman Church. That is a good point, and I am glad you
have raised it.

I think we will conclude the hearing at this point with
the understanding, Mr. Colby, we will be back in touch with you.

Mr. Colby. Surely. Many times, I think, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Church. Yes.

I think that next week we will not have any formal meetings
of the Committee, owing to the recess, but we will then, I
think, we are going to have to go into tri-weekly meetings,
beginning after the recess, so we can step up the pace for the investigation.

Senator Mondale. If they could get the Lansdale memo.  

Mr. Colby. I will do that this afternoon.

I would like to add two things that have come to my attention on the subject of assassinations, both of which are allegations, both of which have been knocked down.

There was an allegation, some man has alleged that he was working or conducting an assassination in Colombia, and we have looked into the specifics of it, and there is absolutely nothing to it. I thought I would mention it. I have the facts here and will include them at some time.

There is another allegation that one of our officers had some knowledge of an attempt against Chou En-Lai, and he has written me a note that points out that it is impossible for that to have happened because he wasn't in the place at the time.

Chairman Church. Since they are allegations into which you have inquired, I think you should make the papers available.

Mr. Colby. I will make sure the staff gets those.

Chairman Church. Thank you very much.

Mr. Knoche. Could I point out, I think we have the answer to the photographs.

There were seven of these photographs taken at different angles at the same time, but absolutely different time intervals during the time that the police had these men in custody.
Mr. Knoche. I am not sure. I am not certain for that particular board that you were looking at.

With the blowup, they took this one of the seven photographs which gives the best opportunity to look at the face.

Mr. Colby. So they were separate photographs.

Chairman Church. Yes.

Mr. Knoche. I will be glad to leave that with you if you would like to have it for your file.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o’clock p.m., the Committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)