

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : FBI  
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10186-10063

Released under the John F. Kennedy  
Assassination Records Collection Act of  
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW  
65994 Date: 11-01-2021

RECORDS SERIES :

BH

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 66-2204-17 THRU 21

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :  
FROM :  
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/00  
PAGES : 0

SUBJECTS :

NAR

DOCUMENT TYPE :  
CLASSIFICATION : U  
RESTRICTIONS : NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED  
CURRENT STATUS : P  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/27/94

OPENING CRITERIA :  
INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Date: August 2, 2021

From: National Archives and Records Administration

Subject: Reconstructed FBI File BH 66-2204, Serials 17-21

To: The File

This memorandum briefly summarizes the status of missing original Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) case files or portions of case files in the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) and documents the National Archives and Records Administration's (NARA) efforts to reconstruct these records, where possible, from duplicate copies of documents located in other FBI files.

As the JFK Collection was first compiled and reviewed in the 1990s, the Assassination Records Review Board and the FBI designated some records as "not believed relevant" (NBR) or "not assassination related" (NAR). The FBI retained custody of the NBR/NAR records and postponed their transfer to NARA until a later date. Every document or group of documents ("serials"), however, received an indexed Record Identification Form (RIF) and FBI inventory sheet for insertion into the JFK Collection.

After an extensive search, neither the FBI nor the National Archives could locate a small number of NAR documents or case files.

This compilation represents NARA's efforts to reconstruct the original file or portions of the file, as completely as possible, with duplicate copies of documents located in the FBI field office and headquarters files within the JFK Collection. Each reconstructed file or compilation contains a Record Identification Form, an explanatory cover memo, existing administrative documents available within the JFK Collection, and copies of identified duplicate documents. The table below summarizes the status of FBI file BH 66-2204, Serials 17 through 21.

RIF Number	FBI File Number	List of Serials From Inventory Sheet	List of Identified Serials at NARA	Reconstructed Status (None, Partial, Complete)
124-10186-10063	BH 66-2204	17-21	17, 19-20	Partial

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
POSTPONEMENT INFORMATION SHEET (JFK MATERIALS)

85 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file.  
One or more of the following statements, where indicated,  
explain this deletion (these deletions).

- Deletions were made pursuant to the postponement rationale indicated below with no segregable material available for disclosure. All references relate to Section 6 of the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992."
  - Subsection 1A (intelligence agent's identity)
  - Subsection 1B (intelligence source or method)
  - Subsection 1C (other matter relating to military defense, intelligence operations or the conduct of foreign relations)
  - Subsection 2 (living person who provided confidential information)
  - Subsection 3 (unwarranted invasion of privacy)
  - Subsection 4 (cooperating individual or foreign government, currently requiring protection)
  - Subsection 5 (security or protective procedure, currently or expected to be utilized)

Information pertained to a matter unrelated to the JFK Assassination investigation.

For your information: \_\_\_\_\_

The following number is to be used for reference regarding this page (these pages):

BH 66-2204-17 thru 21

XXXXXXXXXX  
XXXXXXXXXX  
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XXXXXXXXXX  
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JFK Inventory Sheet  
(Committees Files)

File #: BH 66-2204 - - Section #: 1 Re: CHURCH COMM.

Serial Number	Document Date	Document Type	Document From	Document To	3rd Agy	Direct Dupes	ACTUAL	PERT.	Rev.	Rel.	With- held	FBI Ref	Duplicate	Location	Postponements
1	03/24/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		1	1	2	0						NAR
2	03/25/75	TT	BH	HQ		2	1	3	0						NAR
3	05/02/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		2		2	0						NAR
4	05/20/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		1		1	0						NAR
5	06/16/75	RS	BH			1		1	0						NAR
6	05/28/75	MEMO	HQ	ALL EMPLOY		8		8	0						NAR
7	06/28/75	TT	HQ	AT		3		3	0						NAR
8	09/04/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		3		3	6	0					NAR
9	09/05/75	TT	HQ	AX		7		7	14	0					NAR
10	09/11/75	TT	BH	HQ		1		1	2	0					NAR
11	09/12/75	TT	BH	HQ		1		1	2	0					NAR
12	09/26/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		1		1	0						NAR
13	10/09/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		2		2	0						NAR
14	11/12/75	MEMO	BARNETT	BH		2		2	0						NAR
15	11/21/75	RS	HQ	BH		1		1	0						NAR
15	11/20/75	NEWS ARTIC	NY			1		1	0						NAR

Serial Number	Document Date	Document Type	Document From	Document To	3rd Agy	Direct Dupes	ACTUAL	PERT.	Rev.	Rel.	With- held	FBI Ref	Duplicate	Postponements
16	12/12/75	TT	HQ	BH	1	1	2	2	2	2	2			NONE
17	12/02/75	TESTIMONY	CHURCH COM		14	14	0							NAR
18	12/04/75	RS	HQ	BH	1	1	1	0						NAR
19	12/10/75	TT	HQ	ALL SACS	4	4	8	0						NAR
20	12/02/75	TRANSCRIPT	CHURCH COM		61	61	0							NAR
21	12/05/75	RS	HQ	BH	1	1	1	0						NAR
22	12/24/75	AT	BH	HQ	1	1	2	2	2	2	2			NONE
22	12/24/75	LHM	BH	HQ	17	17	34	34	34	34	34			NONE
23	01/05/76	RS	HQ	BH	1	1	1	0						NAR
24	11/11/76	AT	BH	HQ	1	1	1	0						NAR
25	01/28/76	LHM	BH	HQ	8	8	16	16	16	16	16			NONE
26	01/28/76	AT	BH	HQ	1	1	2	2	2	2	2			NONE
27	02/12/76	TT	HQ	ALL SACS	2	2	4	0						NAR
28	02/24/76	AT	BH	HQ	1	1	1	0						NAR
29	07/16/76	AT	HQ	AL	1	1	1	0						NAR
29	04/21/76	MEMO	THIRD PART	NY	2	2	2	0						NAR
29	03/01/70	MEMO	THIRD PART	NY	2	2	2	0						NAR
30	08/24/76	MEMO	HQ	ALL SACS	5	5	5	0						NAR

Serial Number	Document Date	Document Type	Document From	Document To	3rd Agcy	Other	Direct Dupes	ACTUAL	PERT.	Rev.	Rel.	With- held	FBI Ref 3rd Agcy	Duplicate Location	Postponements
31	08/31/76	TT	HQ	ALL SACS		1	1	2	0						NAR
32	09/07/76	TT	HQ	BH		1	1	2	0						NAR
33	06/28/77	MEMO	HQ	ALL SACS		2	2	2	0						NAR

Page: 3

Grand Totals.....

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End of Report.....

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY  
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR --  
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS  
TESTIFYING BEFORE THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,  
GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND  
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI  
TO PREVENT VIOLENCE

*Good*

DECEMBER 2, 1975

*102-2368-14*

*Copy  
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LETTER - FOR ALL  
AGENTS: *done 12/16 AS*  
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SERIALIZED <i>h</i>	FILED <i>h</i>
DEC - 8 1975	
FBI-ALBANY	

QUESTION:

....You do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not?

MR. ADAMS:

We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems.

With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance.

We also know that in certain instances the information upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead



memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials.

So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information--and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated.

QUESTION: In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.

MR. ADAMS: The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation.

Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an

individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons.

QUESTION: . . . .A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption?

MR ADAMS: No sir, and we don't....

QUESTION: Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?

MR. ADAMS: No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.

This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the 1st Amendment right, yet at the same time, being

aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case.

Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagreements fall.

QUESTION: In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known.

MR. WANNALL: Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be the one to answer the question.

MR. ADAMS: The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals

since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency.

We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.

This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the

Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.

QUESTION: What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?

MR. ADAMS: We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized.

QUESTION: On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have.

MR ADAMS: Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning

for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that time.

QUESTION: Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership.

MR. ADAMS: That's right.

QUESTION: I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.

MR. ADAMS: Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures

we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time.

QUESTION: I acknowledge that.

MR. ADAMS: Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could

create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.

QUESTION: I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation?

MR ADAMS: I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something.

QUESTION: ... Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have.



MR. ADAMS: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.

QUESTION: To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime.

MR. ADAMS: Not necessarily knew.

QUESTION: Your informant told you that, hadn't he?

MR. ADAMS: The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information.

QUESTION: You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order...

MR. ADAMS: That's right. He furnished many other instances also.

QUESTION: So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.

MR. ADAMS: We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.

QUESTION: ...This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent.

MR. ADAMS: A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had

QUESTION: But you also told him to participate in violent activities

MR. ADAMS: We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.

QUESTION: That's what he said.

MR. ADAMS: I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence.

QUESTION: Just to do what was necessary to get the information.

MR. ADAMS: I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files.

QUESTION: Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going

to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a ---

MR. ADAMS: There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking an active part in a criminal action.

QUESTION: It's true. He was close enough to get his throat cut apparently.

QUESTION: How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.

MR. ADAMS: Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever.

QUESTION:            You don't know of any such case where these instructions  
                         were given to an Agent or an informant?

MR. ADAMS:            To get involved in sexual activity?    No Sir.

NR050 WA PLAIN

10:34PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE  
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975

A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN  
SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A  
SYNOPSIS ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S  
QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:

(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED  
WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF  
INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE  
WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS  
ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING  
WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER  
PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE  
INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING  
THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE

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PAGE TWO

PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).

(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT; THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.

PAGE THREE

(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.

(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION

PAGE FOUR

FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.

A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.

END

PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS

LVV FBI ALBANY

ACK FOR TWO CLR

TKS



