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OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

MEXICO CITY

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION REVIEW OF OSWALD FILE

CASTRO INVOLVEMENT

CUBA

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penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatamala should form a single new party; "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present year, 1962."

15. This report apparently had been discounted when it was received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination of the report.

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAUGE, 7 NOVEMBER 1963

- KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary,
 Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."
- 17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have

a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

INVERCEPTED CONVERSATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE,
LUISA CALDERON, AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963

- 18. At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.
- 19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians! ..."
- 20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a ... doctor (a woman) friend.
- 21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.

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There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that 23. Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known or confirmed by interacept, with the data held on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of the DGI personnel above cited? seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later cited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN

was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned on 13 February 1963.

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statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City could very well have known something that would make what
she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of
boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time.

SILVIA DURAN, SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967

- 24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two integrated telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez ARMAS, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about [or been offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)
- 25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that

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