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of the U.S. Intelligence Community.*

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart has been prepared which illustrates the flow of written information from the CIA to the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning President Kennedy's assassination. This chart sets forth the CIA's designation for each document listed and lists the subject matter of each document and the date of each document's dissemination. The chart also indicates whether the document was made available to the Warren Commission, the U.S. Intelligence community or both. A secondary purpose of this chart is to indicate for selected subjects the volume of information provided to the U.S. Intelligence Community as opposed to the Warren Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid. p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under

[cite supra McCone + Rankin testimony]

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effect. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute ~~lack~~^{laxity} of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.

~~_____~~ Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

~~However~~, ^{when} asked ~~the CIA~~ whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he responded:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (McCone deposition, p.16)

Thus, the evidence indicates that ^{had} Helms ~~to have~~ approached McCone ^{to discuss informing the} Warren Commission ^{of past and ongoing CIA} anti-Castro assassination plots ^{it} might have ^{cost} Helms ~~his job~~ ^{Todo so would have meant} informing McCone that plots were still being considered by the Agency } ^{But see Helms testimony —}

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, ^{Warren Commission Counsel's Slawson and}

~~the CIA's legal counsel, the Agency's working relationship with~~ ^{Spector} ~~the Commission~~ were in agreement (Slawson dep., p.27) that

such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. ^{See also Spector, p.46} (But see Liebeler, depo. ^{From the CIA's perspective}

^{p.171} Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated:

"...in light of what has happened a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that one can say in

the light of history.

What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153)

III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information, and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request. On this point, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)

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Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

at times

However, ~~in some instances, risking the exposure~~ *concern for protecting its* the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ~~relevant~~ *relevant* information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ *effort* to protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ *have* effect ~~on~~ *which* the quality of the information to ~~which~~ the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) *made the* in some instances *As a result* the Agency ~~made~~ unilateral decisions *to withhold or limit* ~~regarding the release~~ *access to CIA* materials ~~to be~~ *by* the Commission. (See also dep. p.158)

This Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These are:

~~Two areas of concern of this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods was an issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission's investigation to some degree:~~

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff~~ *Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff* pertaining to the photosurveillance and ~~the~~ *effects of the* of the CIA's Mexico City Station
- 2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur-

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rounding ^{the} photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined [redacted] herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the ⁱⁿception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. p.158) Scelso further testified:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including [redacted] sources, including the [redacted] and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [redacted] (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ^{ 31 Jan memo } (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The ^{CIA} policy [redacted] limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of [redacted]

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() in order to protect your contin-
uing ops . Will rely instead on statements
of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet
Consular file which Soviets gave () State
(CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964) -

The basic policy articulated in the December 20,
1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of
December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal
of the CIA Counterintelligence / Special Investigations Group
Staff wrote that he had
been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison man to the CIA,
that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren
Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup-
ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of
Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission.
Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated
that some United States Agency ()
in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could
supply the Warren Commission with ^{the} source of ()
(The FBI had knowledge of CIA ()
) in Mexico City, see CIA SQCI-3/779/510)
O'Neal's memorandum ~~referred~~ ^{shows} that he discussed this matter
with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms,
was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed
to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the
Agency's desire to make available to the Com-
mission at least in this manner--via the FBI-
sensitive information which could relate to
() (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File,
20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

O'Neil memorandum and its characterization

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~
all information deemed significant as received by CIA (or found in CIA files, irrespective of the nature, sensitivity or reliability of sources, therefor, was promptly relayed to your Bureau. (Jan, 1964 CIA dissem to FBI, CSC1-3/779/510)

when Helms, ~~_____~~, expressed his concern regarding exposure of Agency sources by the FBI to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA ~~_____~~ might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He ~~then~~ suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work with the Commission and with the Commission's cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated ~~_____~~ were ~~_____~~ two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of information originated by it. ~~_____~~ In this way ~~_____~~ + no CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

1) Your Bureau not disseminat^e information received from this Agency without prior concurrence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory ^(?) to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)

~~_____~~
~~_____~~

^{CIA} This policy ^{of} ~~_____~~ eliminating ~~_____~~ reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was on that date still being withheld from the Warren Commission. Therein, it ~~was~~ stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, CIA ~~was~~ to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However,

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was to be in a form that would

the form of this presentation ~~be~~ pro-
tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

IV and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's
reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during
the initial stage of the CIA ^{of the Commission's work} and photo sur-
veillance operations in Mexico City, ~~the~~

~~the~~ Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these
and surveillance was not only be-
cause it was sensitive from the Agency's
standpoint, but
it would have caused very bad feel-
ings between Mexico and the United States,
and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session
hearing, pp.51-52, ~~the~~)

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to
the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations
prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination
period ~~on a regular basis~~ <sup>(CIA dissem
CSCI 3/779/510 1/14/64)</sup> Furthermore,
of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information
made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council
Director McGeorge Bundy, ^{had been made} aware that the CIA
against the Cuban and Soviet Em-
bassy/Consulates and that through these ^() Oswald's pre-
sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been
corroborated. [cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]

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unwillingness

The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations ~~in the early stages of its in-~~

~~vestigation~~ the ~~transcription of the conversations and~~

those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ~~attitude~~ ^{Agency} ~~on the Agency's part to~~ ^{policy designed to skew in its favor the form and} ~~substance~~ ^{of} ~~information~~ ^{provided}

the CIA felt uncomfortable

the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep. ^{P-7}) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those ^{facts} which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the Commission.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ~~did not mention~~ ^{that} Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Sovieti Embassy/Consulate had

and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memorandum ~~did not mention~~ ^{that} the CIA

and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico ^{Armas} which and transcribed.

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On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ ^{his writing} as of ~~the latter date~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of () or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in # ___ of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of () Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA () in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.

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On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission ^{/n} or indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA () in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to CIA () materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City. ^{Scott} provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from () of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: _____ P)

However, ^P Prior to ~~that time~~ ^{April 9} it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

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1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain

(of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had~~ in its possessed ~~ed~~ transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

Dorticos-Armas

The ~~se~~ conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~and~~ concerned Silvia

Durfa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police ^{memo} (cite?). ~~On that date~~ Helms responded to the Com-

mission's request for access, ^{stating} ~~that~~ that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives'

to review ~~this~~ this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas (.) As detailed above, both the FBI

and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's () in Mexico City.

^{sup} (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep.)

lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

