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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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Discussions between Warren Commission and CIA

31 January 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 31 January 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel:

"Thank you for your memorandum of January 25, 1964, transmitting a detailed chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union and the alphabetical list of persons in the Soviet Union who were known to or mentioned by Lee Harvey OSWALD or his wife.

"Based on an initial review I am confident that this material will be of great assistance to the work of this Commission. However, I have a question regarding the mention of an appendix in the Name List. For example, there are references to 'Appendix B' under items No. 70 and No. 91. I would appreciate knowing whether one or more appendices have been prepared to the materials which can be made available to this Commission."

31 January 1964 :

Letter to Mr. J. Edgar HOOVER, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 31 January 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"We understand you already have furnished the Central Intelligence Agency with the Summary Report entitled 'Investigation of Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 22, 1963', and accompanying exhibits; the Summary Report entitled 'Investigation of Killing of Lee Harvey OSWALD, Dallas, Texas, 24 November 1963'; and the two Supplemental Reports to these summaries. At a conference on January 28, 1964, attended by Mr. MOLLEY and representatives of the Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency, we discussed the possibility of supplying additional reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Central Intelligence Agency in order to enable that agency to be of further assistance to the Commission. It was agreed that F.B.I. reports would be made available to C.I.A. and that representatives of the two agencies would consult regarding the precautions to be taken in the use of these materials.

"Accordingly, the Commission would appreciate your furnishing the C.I.A. (Attention: Mr. Richard HELMS) copies of the following reports:

" . . .

"All correspondence carried on by Lee Harvey OSWALD with persons in the Soviet Union, in particular, the letters referred to on page 63 of your Supplemental Report on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

"As additional materials in these general areas are developed by the Bureau in the course of its investigation, we would like the reports to be furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency. — . . . "

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10 February 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 10 February 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"This will acknowledge with the thanks of the Commission your memorandum dated January 31, 1964, relating to information developed by your Agency on Lee Harvey OSWALD activity in Mexico City during the period of September 28 to October 3, 1963.

"I assume - and would like to be so advised if the contrary is the fact - that your January 31, 1964, report is not final inasmuch as I recall an investigation is currently being pursued with respect to an allegation of some significance which emanated from the White House and which is not referred to in the above-mentioned report. With respect to this allegation, it would be greatly appreciated if you would furnish us with an interim resume of any developments pertinent thereto.

"In connection with your memorandum dated January 31, 1964, the Commission has asked me to request you to submit to the Commission the following:

(There follows twelve requirements.)

12 February 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, Acting Deputy Director for Plans, dated 12 February 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"After your conversation with Mr. WILLENS on Monday, February 10, 1964, the Commission was supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a cropped copy of the photograph reportedly displayed to Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD on November 23, 1963, at Dallas, Texas, by Special Agent ODUM of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"In order to complete the records of the Commission regarding this matter, the Commission would like to be informed of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture by your Agency and the identity of the individual shown, if this information is currently available."

12 February 1964 :

Letter to Honorable John A. McCONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, dated 12 February 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"As you know, this Commission . . .

"We are informed by the Secret Service that the Central Intelligence Agency has disseminated several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret Service in the period since November 1963. All these materials reportedly carry s

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security rating which precludes their delivery to the Commission by the Secret Service. I would appreciate your assistance in sending copies of these reports or other materials to the Commission as soon as possible.

"In addition, I would like your Agency to supply the Commission with a report on the information in your possession regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD prior to November 22, 1963. Some of this information is provided in the footnote on Page 2 of your report dated January 31, 1964, entitled 'Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City 28 September - 3 October 1963'. The footnote indicates that until early October of 1963 the contents of this file consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Navy Department. It would assist this Commission if a copy of the contents of the file as of November 22, 1963, would be made available. If not reflected in the file, we are also interested in knowing what dissemination, if any, was made to other Federal agencies, of items added to the file after October 9, 1963 and prior to November 22."

6 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 6 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission has recently received a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation covering an interview that took place between representatives of the Bureau and the recent Soviet defector, Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO.

"It appears to us that NOSENKO's defection, whether or not it is authentic, is of very great interest to the Commission. I would like to set up a conference early in the week of March 9 between members of the Commission staff and members of CIA to discuss this matter further and to explore generally the work your Agency has in progress of interest to this Commission.

"Will you please contact me at your earliest convenience to set a time for this conference."

12 March 1964 :

Memorandum for the Record, dated 12 March 1964;  
Subject: Meeting with the Warren Commission on 12 March 1964.

"On 12 March 1964, Mr. HELMS, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. ROCCA met with Mr. RANKIN, Chief Counsel for the Warren Commission, Mr. WILLEMS, and other members of Mr. RANKIN's staff. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the current status of the CIA contribution to the work of the Warren Commission.

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"2. The first topic raised by Mr. RANKIN concerned information on Lee Harvey OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union as reported by the FBI, based on their interview of the defector, Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. This discussion is reported in a separate memorandum.

"3. . . . Mr. RANKIN's staff showed us a detailed memorandum they had prepared based on all of the information available to them, including our own contribution concerning OSWALD's stay in the USSR. . . .

"4. Members of Mr. RANKIN's staff then spoke about having found a book in OSWALD's possessions which had certain letters cut out giving the impression that this might have formed the base or key for a cipher system. . . .

"5. Members of Mr. RANKIN's staff then commented on the testimony of Mrs. OSWALD to the effect that the letters from her son regarding his desire to return to the United States had the appearance of being dictated since they contained none of his usual grammatical errors and used legal language with which he would not have been familiar. . . .

"6. Mr. WILLEMS noted that Mrs. OSWALD had introduced a statement to the effect that she suspected her son to be a CIA agent. . . .

"7. A considerable part of the meeting from this point forward consisted of a review by Mr. RANKIN and his staff of the gaps in their investigation to date. . . .

"8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. RANKIN's staff questioned Mr. HELMS and Mr. ROCCA regarding the extent of the CIA file on OSWALD for the period 8 October to 22 November 1963. . . .

"9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that OSWALD was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next discussed. . . .

"10. The Commission, Mr. RANKIN said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack RUBY. . . .

"11. Mr. HELMS was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on OSWALD's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. Mr. HELMS replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemination. Mr. WILLEMS then asked if there were any liaison problems faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affecting internal security. . . .

"12. Mr. WILLEMS then asked if CIA's intelligence collection system was automated. . . .

"13. In speaking of the broader question of protection for the President, Mr. RANKIN asked about our procedures for working with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad. . . .

"14. Mr. WILLEMS asked if we could check on a

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memorandum sent to Mr. KARAMESSINES on 12 February regarding one of the pictures identified by Mrs. OSWALD as that of Jack RUBY. . . ."

16 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 16 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"During our conference of March 12, we discussed informally several questions concerning Presidential protection, which I would like to put informally to obtain any comments your Agency may desire to make.

"First, at the time of the assassination, did the Central Intelligence Agency have any written description of the criteria to be employed by its personnel in determining what information coming to their attention should be furnished to the Secret Service? If not in a written form, was there any general policy with respect to this matter?

"Second, has the Central Intelligence Agency any recommendations to make regarding possible improvements in any aspect of Presidential protection, whether or not involving matters within its jurisdiction, including intelligence arrangements and procedures, liaison among federal agencies, particular protection measures, and any other aspect which appears relevant?"

16 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 16 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"I would like to confirm our understanding of the arrangements agreed upon at our conference on March 12, respecting the furnishing to the Commission of certain materials to complete your response to the request of our letter of February 1964.

"As we understand it, you will supply a paraphrase of each report or communication described in the second paragraph of our letter of February 12, 1964, with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual files so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete.

"The same procedure would be followed with respect to any materials described in the third paragraph of our letter of February 12, 1964, which have not hitherto been furnished because of similar security considerations. In addition, we will be furnished actual copies of disseminations on October 10, 1963 to other federal agencies regarding information on OSWALD's activities in Mexico City, and any other materials not already furnished and within the scope of the third paragraph of our letter, which do not present security problems requiring paraphrasing.

"if these arrangements are satisfactory to you, I would appreciate your advising Howard P. WILLENS or Samuel A. STERN for our staff when it would be convenient to have them visit your Agency to review the files involved."

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17 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 17 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"At the conference held in my office last Thursday, March 12, we agreed to forward to you certain documents. Those documents accompany this letter and they are as follows:

"1. Three ring loose-leaf notebook containing a file entitled "Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina OSWALD, Documentary Record of Contacts with the United States Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

"2. Copies of letters written by Lee Harvey OSWALD to his mother, Marguerite OSWALD, when he was living in the Soviet Union.

"3. Memorandum dated March 12, 1964, subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files.

"4. Copy of an undated draft of a letter found among Lee Harvey OSWALD's effects after the assassination, believed to be an initial draft of the letter sent by him to the Russian Embassy, in Washington, D. C., on or about November 12, 1963."

26 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 26 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Enclosed is a letter received by the Commission from the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated March 19, 1964, and various enclosures which set forth the results of a recent investigation by the West German Federal Intelligence Service.

"The Commission would appreciate your analysis of this material. If you believe that additional investigation is appropriate, we would appreciate your initiating the appropriate action through the facilities of your Agency."

30 March 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 30 March 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"By cover letter dated March 23, 1964, the Federal Bureau of Investigation delivered to the Commission 28 reports and memoranda setting forth the results of the investigation concerning George and Jeanne de MORENSCHILDT requested by this Commission. These reports confirm that the present residence of the de MOHRENSCHILDTs is in Haiti and that they have travelled extensively in prior years throughout Mexico and Central America. The Commission would appreciate your furnishing a report from your Agency setting forth

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any information currently in your files regarding these subjects."

2 April 1964 :

Memorandum for the Record, dated 2 April 1964, by Raymond G. ROCCA, Chief, CI/R&A; Subject: Meeting with Representative of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 27 March 1964, Langley.

"1. I talked with Mr. Samuel A. STERN regarding the Commission's interest in original Agency materials on Friday, 27 March 1964, from 2:30 to 4:00. . . .

"2. Mr. STERN hewed closely to the guidelines which had been established between Mr. HELMS and Mr. RANKIN: he read - or asked to read - only papers that had a bearing on the summarized information that had already been forwarded to the Commission. In the course of the discussion, he viewed the following specific items of original Agency documentation:

"a. DIR-74673 dated 18 October 1963 to State, FBI, and Navy reporting contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, by American, Lee OSWALD. (Forwarded to Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1554, dated 24 March 1964.)

"b. MEXI-7019 (IN-66846) dated 22 November 1963 re photos of unidentified American entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October 1963. (To Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1555, dated 24 March 1964.)

"c. MEXI-7020 (IN-66891) dated 23 November 1963 which forwarded names of three persons possibly identical with OSWALD who flew from Mexico to U. S. in November 1963. (To Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1555, dated 24 March 1964.)

"d. MEXI-7021 (IN-66896) dated 23 November 1963 indicating that FBI agent hand-carrying photos of person suspected of being OSWALD to Dallas for mailing to D. C. (To Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1555, dated 24 March 1964.)

"e. Six photos mailed to Washington, referred to in paragraph 2.d. above. (There was no discussion as to how the photos were acquired.)

"f. Copies of the three informal, undated disseminations handcarried to the Secret Service based on 2.b., c, and d above.

"g. DIR-84915 dated 23 November 1963 to the FBI re activities of North American, possibly identical with OSWALD, who visited Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico on 28 September 1963. (To Commission under cover

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of DDP memo dated 31 January 1964, p. 8.)

"h. Originals of the thirty documents from CIA's dossier on OSWALD which were forwarded to the Commission under cover of DDP memo, No. 4-1224, dated 6 March 1964. (See attachment to that memo for inventory of documents.)

"i. Machine run sheets on documents accessioned to CIA's dossier on OSWALD.

"3. Mr. STERN stated he had a keen interest in Agency programs for electronic data handling of information. I pointed out to him the up-dated machine control record on the contents of the OSWALD file, and suggested that I was sure that Mr. HELMS would be pleased to offer him and others in the Commission the possibility of viewing the Agency's data processing mechanisms. It was also noted that a considerable effort had already been made by Mr. HELMS' subordinates to interest members of the intelligence community in an interagency approach to the machine control of counterintelligence and security information. A presentation had been made before the ICIS on this matter and an article had been prepared for Studies in Intelligence. I promised to make a copy of the article available to Mr. STERN.

"4. Mr. STERN was eager to view our actual mechanisms for machine control of our information and readily accepted the suggestion that a briefing take place. It was indicated to him that he would be contacted by CI Staff's Machine Records Officer who would arrange the details for the presentation in the near future.

"5. Mr. STERN volunteered one point in the discussion that the Agency handling of the information in the OSWALD case was unique among what the Commission had found had happened in every other agency. He was critical of the Navy. He raised specifically the question: why had the Navy not forwarded the photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD requested by the Agency? He added that there were six or seven other points on which the Navy had been gipped by the Commission and there would be discussion between him and the Navy in the near future. He stated flatly that no Federal component except CIA had been able to show the Commission hard documentation which indicated there had been immediate action on field reported information by headquarters and full instructions for follow-up. Mr. STERN tended to equate this performance to the way we handled our data and for that reason placed great emphasis upon what the Commission might be able to do in its report for an improved methodology based on machines among departments and agencies involved in security matters."

13 April 1964 :

Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 13 April 1964, by David E. MURPHY, Chief, SR Division; Subject: Discussions with Mr. Allen W. DULLES on the OSWALD Case.

"1. At the instructions of the DDP, I visited Mr. DULLES on 11 April to discuss with him certain questions which Mr. DULLES feels the Warren Commission may pose to CIA. Mr. DULLES explained that while the Commission wished to clarify certain aspects of the OSWALD case in which a response from CIA seemed necessary it

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was not sure how the questions should be posed nor how CIA should respond. Mr. DULLES hoped that our discussions would enable him to advise the Commission on this matter. He first raised the allegation that OSWALD was a CIA agent. He mentioned two sources for this accusation. One was Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD, Lee Harvey OSWALD's mother, and the other was Mr. Mark LANE, Mrs. OSWALD's attorney. . . .

"2. Mr. DULLES then suggested that the response to this question could be in the form of sworn testimony before the Commission by a senior CIA official or a letter or affidavit. He recalled that the Director of the FBI had replied by letter to a similar question. In any event, Mr. DULLES felt that the reply should be straightforward and to the point. He thought language which made it clear that Lee Harvey OSWALD was never an employee or agent of CIA would suffice. We should also state that neither CIA nor anyone acting on CIA's behalf was ever in contact or communicated with OSWALD. . . . I agreed with him that a carefully phrased denial of the charges of involvement with OSWALD seemed most appropriate.

"3. The next question concerned the possibility of OSWALD's having been a Soviet agent. Mr. DULLES suggested that the Commission's question on this matter be phrased somewhat as follows: 'In the knowledge or judgement of CIA was Lee Harvey OSWALD an agent of the Soviet intelligence services of the intelligence services of other communist states at any time prior to 22 November 1963, or was OSWALD solicited by these intelligence services to become such an agent?' . . . Mr. DULLES and I felt that it would be better to . . . confine our response to a precise statement of fact. This statement, in Mr. DULLES' view, could note that CIA possessed no knowledge either gained independently or from its study of the materials supplied by the Commission tending to show that Lee Harvey OSWALD was an agent of the Soviet intelligence services, or the services of any other communist country, or for that matter of any other country.

"4. . . .

"5. . . . Mr. DULLES mentioned other issues which concerned the Commission. He remarked that members of the Commission could not understand why CIA had not begun an investigation of OSWALD as soon as it received word that he had defected. I noted that this question had been discussed with Mr. RANKIN and his staff and there seemed to be considerable [mis]understanding of the practical circumstances which made it impossible for CIA to undertake such investigation inside the USSR. I expressed the hope that it would not be necessary for CIA to place matters of this sort in the public record. Mr. DULLES agreed.

"6. Mr. DULLES then asked if it were normal for the Soviet Government to permit a Soviet woman to marry a foreigner and then allow her to leave with her husband shortly after the marriage. This question perturbed the Commission and they would like to have an answer. I said that . . . the problem seemed to lie more in the consular field and I suggested that the best way to obtain an opinion on what constituted 'normal practice' in marriage cases in the USSR would

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be to question the Department of State. Mr. DULLES agreed.

"7. . . . I did offer a personal opinion in regard to the way in which CIA should respond. Noting that testimony on questions such as these would be difficult to insert in the public record, I suggested that it would be best if the CIA response were in written form. However, much will depend on the form in which the questions are eventually put to us and I imagine that a final decision can be made at that time.

"8. . . . "

21 April 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 21 April 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"On behalf of the Commission I would like to thank you and your representatives for the fine cooperation which was extended to representatives of the Commission during the course of their work in Mexico City from April 8 through April 13, 1964. . . .

"During their stay in Mexico City the Commission representatives discussed with Mr. SCOTT and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that portion of the Lee Harvey OSWALD investigation which concerned Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. . . .

"Upon review of our complete file on this matter, we find that we lack full documentation of the investigation conducted of these allegations. It would be helpful if our records could be supplemented by a report from your Agency supplying more details regarding the investigation undertaken by your Agency and other concerned agencies into this matter and your evaluation as to the truth of ALVARADO's assertions. In particular, it would be helpful if a report could be submitted by the expert who conducted the polygraph examination which emphasizes the specific conclusions which he made based on the responses by ALVARADO in answering key questions on this matter."

22 April 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 22 April 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Throughout the course of the investigation . . .

"The Commission would like to know whether your Agency possesses any information not hitherto disclosed to this Commission concerning the association of Lee Harvey OSWALD with any communist or subversive organizations or individuals either in the United States or abroad, or with any criminals or criminal groups either in the United States or abroad.

"The Commission is anxious to be assured that it possesses the full extent of your Agency's knowledge and information concerning the aforementioned associations of Lee Harvey OSWALD."

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24 April 1964

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 24 April 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"As an aid to testing the reliability of information we possess on Lee Harvey OSWALD's dealings with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in late September and early October of 1963, the Commission would like to have as much information as can be obtained regarding the hours at which these two embassies are open to the public, their normal working hours for other purposes, and the procedures and regulations, whether formal or informal, involved in issuing Cuban visas or other permits to travel to or through Cuba. In addition, we would like to have a description of the procedures and regulations enforced by the Mexican authorities, whether formal or informal, in connection with travel by Americans to and from Cuba through Mexico.

"We are advised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from which agency representatives of the Commission requested this information in Mexico City, that your agency is in a better position to respond to this request."

5 May 1964 :

Memorandum for the Record, dated 5 May 1964; Subject: Meeting with Mr. SLAWSON of the Presidential Commission.

"1. On 5 May, Mr. WHITTEN and Mr. HALL met with Mr. SLAWSON of the Commission in Mr. WHITTEN's office. This meeting had been requested to ask for a fresh translation of the taped conversation between Cuban President BORTICOS and Ambassador ARMAS (sic - HERNANDEZ Armas). Win SCOTT had told the Commission staff visiting Mexico City that his translators, in the rush at that time, might have misconstrued certain nuances of meaning in what was a difficult recording. In view of this, Mr. SLAWSON asked that a new translation be made, if possible, by a person knowledgeable of the Cuban dialect.

"2. According to Mr. SLAWSON, only Messrs. RANKIN, WILLENS, COLEMAN, and he presently know of the telephone taps in Mexico City. SLAWSON, WILLENS, and COLEMAN were briefed on the taps during their visit to Mexico City.

"3. In about three weeks the staff will begin presenting to the Commission evidence on the conspiratorial aspect of the assassination. At this time, apparently, their evidence is against the existence of a plot. They will wish to present to the Commission the ARMAS-DORTICOS conversation. SLAWSON suggested the possibility that a knowledgeable CIA man could make this presentation, interpreting the conversation in the light of our study.

"4. Mr. WHITTEN said that we will again translate the tape, using the best available Cuban linguist, and once again study the nuances of the conversation. Any presentation to the Commission, however, would have to be referred to Messrs. HELMS and ROCCA for decision.

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According to Mr. SLAWSON, no member of the Commission now knows of the telephone taps in Mexico City (he did not mention Mr. DULLES).

"5. Mr. WHITTEN carefully briefed Mr. SLAWSON (probably rebriefed him) on the importance of these telephone taps to U. S. security and the grave damage that would be done to U. S. - Mexican relations if knowledge of their existence became public.

"6. - 10. . . . "

19 May 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 19 May 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"At a meeting on March 12, 1964, between representatives of your Agency and this Commission, a memorandum prepared by members of the Commission staff was handed to you which related to the background of Jack L. RUBY and alleged associates and/or activities in Cuba. At that time we requested that you review this memorandum and submit to the Commission any information contained in your files regarding the matters covered in the memorandum, as well as any other analyses by your representatives which you believed might be useful to the Commission.

"As you know, this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to comply with this request in the near future."

19 May 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 19 May 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission wishes to consider the possibility that during his stay in the Soviet Union Lee Harvey OSWALD may have received medical or psychological treatment or conditioning designed to reinforce or accentuate his apparent hostility to authority and thereby render him a disruptive factor in this country after his return.

"We think that a study of the latest Soviet techniques in 'mind conditioning' and so-called 'brain-washing' would be helpful in that regard. We would greatly appreciate your making such materials as you may have on that subject available to Mr. Wesley J. LIEBELER of our staff. Perhaps a conference on this subject between appropriate members of your organization and members of our staff would be desirable."

20 May 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 20 May 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission has just received certain of the materials which it requested of the Russian Government on March 24, 1964. I am enclosing herewith two copies each of the documents received from the Russian Government and one copy of the translations of the same. The only documents which the

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Commission has not yet received from the Department of State which were handed to the Department by the Government of Russia are the documents entitled 'Medical Documents'. These will be forwarded to you as soon as the Commission receives them.

"Any comments which the Central Intelligence Agency cares to make on the enclosed documents will be appreciated."

25 May 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 25 May 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"In connection with some discussions recently had with Mr. Abram CHAYES, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, Mr. CHAYES has informed the Commission that members of the Department of State have informed him that at the time Lee Harvey OSWALD received his tourist visa to enter Russia from the Soviet Embassy at Helsinki, Finland, at least a week ordinarily transpired between the time when the tourist applied for his visa and the issuance of that visa. If this is true, then the fact that Lee Harvey OSWALD obtained his tourist visa in from two to four days may have some significance.

"From material previously supplied to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency we have concluded that OSWALD arrived in Helsinki on an airplane from London on October 10, 1959, that his Soviet tourist visa was issued from the Embassy in Helsinki on October 14, and that he departed for Moscow on a train on October 15. Assuming that he applied for a visa the same day he arrived in Helsinki, four days were required for him to obtain the visa. If, however, his airplane arrived too late on October 10 for him to reach the Soviet Embassy and apply for a visa that same day, he probably would have had to wait until Monday, October 12, to tender his application. We have no information on the probable time of arrival of his flight or the closing time of the Embassy, so we cannot estimate whether he had sufficient time to get from the airport to the Embassy before it closed on Saturday, October 10.

"We have already asked that the Department of State look further into this matter and give us its best opinion regarding the average time required to obtain a Soviet tourist visa from Helsinki in October 1959 and also the regularity or lack of regularity evidenced by the Soviet Embassy in this regard. We are of course interested in the question of the regularity of procedures because we want to know whether, if OSWALD did in fact obtain his visa more quickly than was normal, his doing so was significant, or whether it may have been only the result of a not-infrequent deviation from normal procedures.

"If it is still possible at this time to determine the approximate hour on October 10, 1959 when OSWALD's flight arrived in Helsinki and the hour when the Soviet Embassy closed, this information, plus an estimate of the time required to travel from the airport to the Embassy by commercial transportation, would also be of assistance to the Commission."

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24 June 1964

Memorandum for the Record, dated 24 June 1964;  
subject: Talk with Chief Justice Earl WARREN; signed  
by Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans.

"1. Pursuant to the Director's suggestion, I called on Chief Justice WARREN at 11:30 in the office of the President's Commission. I presented him the letter which I had drafted for the Director's signature. Chief Justice WARREN read the letter carefully, after which I gave him some highly classified details about the NOSENKO case and why we were unwilling to vouch for him as a bona fide defector. The Chief Justice that he and Congressman FORD had already expressed reservations about the use of the NOSENKO material in the Commission's published report, although other members of the Commission desired to use it in some form or other. He concluded his remarks by saying that based on the Director's letter and my observations he would see to it that the NOSENKO information was not used. He asked permission to show the Director's letter to the other members of the Commission, to which I replied that he could use the letter in any way that would be useful to him.

"2. The Director told me that later in the day he saw the Chief Justice who confirmed to him that the NOSENKO material would not be used in the Commission's report."

~~8 July 1964~~

~~Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated  
8 July 1964; subject: Discussion with Mr. DULLES re-  
garding the NOSENKO Information on OSWALD.~~

~~"1. Mr. DULLES, with whom I spoke today, recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the NOSENKO information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission report. I told Mr. DULLES that this concern was understandable but that we felt the best course by far would be to omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO might someday be in a position to claim that he provided information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were included as is in the final Commission report and then later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater negative affect on the standing of the Commission's report. The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still use the information would be for them to indicate that doubt existed regarding the source of the information. We would be opposed to this because it would signal to NOSENKO's~~

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3 July 1964

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 3 July 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Leonard C. MEEKER, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to J. Lee RANKIN dated June 23, 1964, and all the enclosures thereto. Most of these enclosures are in Spanish. The Commission would appreciate the Central Intelligence Agency translating them for us at its earliest convenience. The Commission would also appreciate any comments which the Agency cares to make.

"Also enclosed is a memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated March 26, 1964, entitled 'Signed statement of Silvia Tirado de DURAN'. We believe that this memorandum is a translation of one of the enclosures in the letter dated June 23, 1964, and have enclosed it in case it may be of assistance to your translators. The information in the memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was obtained confidentially at an earlier date."

3 July 1964

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 3 July 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Enclosed is a letter from Leonrad C. MEEKER, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to J. Lee RANKIN, dated June 29, 1964, and the enclosures thereto. The information obtained in the third enclosure to this letter seems inconsistent with the comments made by the Central Intelligence Agency in paragraph 6 of its memorandum dated April 6, 1964, subject: 'Reply to questions contained in your memorandum dated 12 March 1964'. We bring this to your attention because of the obvious importance of the point at issue.

"We would appreciate the comments of your Agency in the light of the information developed by the Department of State. If you believe that a conference with a representative of the Commission or with a person or persons at the Department of State, or both, would be desirable, please feel free to contact Mr. W. David SLAWSON of the Commission staff. The Department of State, through Mr. Thomas ERLICH, has already indicated its willingness to confer on this point at any reasonable time."

8 July 1964

Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 8 July 1964; subject: Discussion with Mr. DULLES regarding the NOSENKO Information on OSWALD.

"1. Mr. DULLES, with whom I spoke today, recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the NOSENKO information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren

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Commission Report. I told Mr. DULLES that this concern was understandable but that we felt the best course by far would be to omit any reference to the NOSENKO information in the final report. While it is conceivable that NOSENKO might someday be in a position to claim that he provided information on the KENNEDY assassination, I said that the difference between NOSENKO's situation and that of other bona fide defectors was such that it would be less likely that NOSENKO would be allowed to surface in this way. I noted that if the NOSENKO information were included as is in the final Commission report and then later the facts of NOSENKO's agent mission became public knowledge, this could have perhaps an even greater negative affect on the standing of the Commission's report. The only way for the Commission to avoid this and still use the information would be for them to indicate that doubt existed regarding the source of the information. We would be opposed to this because it would signal to NOSENKO's principals something of how we viewed this case and could also bring about renewed press and public interest in NOSENKO.

"2. Mr. DULLES and I then exchanged views on the possibility of finding language which would allude to the existence of otherm unverified information on the OSWALD case. This language would permit the Commission to say if challenged in the future on this issue that it had taken the NOSENKO information into consideration in the final report but at the same time it would not be presented in a manner which would be at variance with the important operational considerations we have raised.

"3. It was agreed that an effort might be made to find such language if Mr. DULLES is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the NOSENKO information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Commission intended to make use of the NOSENKO information. This, Mr. DULLES will have to determine from Mr. RANKIN. . . .

"4. . . . "

9 July 1964 :

Memorandum for the Record, dated 9 July 1964; subject: Discussion with Warren Commission Staff Member; signed by Lee H. WIGREN, C/SR/CI/Research.

"1. With the approval of C/SR and the DDP, I met with Mr. W. David SLAWSON of the staff . . . . The purpose of this meeting was to discuss apparent inconsistencies in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of State which were called to our attention in a letter from the General Counsel of the Commission to Mr. HELMS, dated 3 July 1964.

"2. By way of introduction, Mr. SLAWSON said that in the portion of the Commission's report that he was writing, he would have to deal with the question of whether or not the OSWALDs' departure from the USSR - and the circumstances (i.e. timing) of that departure - were unusual or suspicious in any way. He expressed his belief that they probably were not and cited Soviet relaxation in such matters in the post-Stalin era. However, he wanted to be sure in his own mind

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that our information was not in conflict with that which the Commission had received from State since all of that information would remain in the records of the Commission.

"3. After stating my belief that there was no real disagreement or inconsistency between the information from CIA and that from State, I expressed the view that the matter resolved itself into three questions:

"a. Do the Soviet authorities normally permit Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the homelands of their spouses?

"b. Do they normally permit such Soviet citizens to accompany (i.e. depart simultaneously with) their spouses from the Soviet Union?

"c. How long does it take such Soviet citizens to get Soviet exit visas for such a purpose (time lapse from application to granting of visas)?

"4. Concerning the first two questions (3a and 3b above) I pointed out that we had addressed ourselves mainly to the question of Soviet citizens being allowed to accompany their spouses abroad while State dealt only with the larger question of Soviets married to foreigners being allowed to emigrate without reference to whether or not they left simultaneously with or at another time from their spouses. Mr. SLAWSON commented that this explanation was most helpful and he reread what both we and State had said in that light.

"5. By way of further explanation, I said that the statements in paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 concerning Soviets being permitted to accompany their foreign spouses abroad were based on a review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans. In only four of these cases did a Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her foreign husband; in 14 of the cases the foreign spouse departed alone; and in the remaining seven cases insufficient details are known to permit us to categorize them. I added that although State's information began by citing the issuance of 724 quota and non-quota immigrant visas by the American Embassy in Moscow during the period FY 1954 to December 1963, it did not indicate how many of these visas were for Soviet citizens who had married U.S. nationals. Actually State provided detailed information for only sixteen cases and did not indicate in many of these whether or not the Soviet was permitted to accompany the foreign spouse.

"6. In response to a question from Mr. SLAWSON I stated that most of the 26 cases upon which we based our statements involved foreign students, exchange teachers and other relatively transient persons, and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear little similarity to the OSWALD case in that none involved a defector who married prior to repatriating. I noted that paragraph 6 of our 6 April 1964 memorandum to the Commission had pointed this out. Mr. SLAWSON indicated he was now satisfied on this matter.

"7. Concerning the length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process visas for Soviet citizens married

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to foreign nationals (question 3c above), I stated that, in my opinion, the information provided by State (in the third enclosure to Mr. MEEKER's letter) substantially corresponded to the views expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7 of our memorandum to the Commission dated 6 April 1964. Mr. SLAWSON asked if it would be possible to elaborate paragraph 7 of our memorandum of 6 April by providing a statistical breakdown of the cases on which our statements were based. I indicated that this could be done.

"8. At this point Mr. SLAWSON stated that as a result of our discussion he felt that the question of possible inconsistencies had been resolved. However, he asked that we send a brief written reply to the Commission's letter of 3 July 1964 embodying the substance of what I had said concerning the basis for statements included in our 6 April 1964 memorandum.

"9. . . .

"10. . . .

17 July 1964 :

Memorandum of Conversation, dated 17 July 1964;  
subject: Use of NOSENKO Information in Warren Commission Report. [Participants in meeting held on 16 July 1964: J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel of the Commission, Mr. SLAWSON, Mr. Tennent H. BAGLEY, and Mr. Lee WIGREN.]

"1. At Mr. HELMS' request we discussed with Mr. SLAWSON and Mr. RANKIN how and in what manner NOSENKO's information might be used in the published report of the Warren Commission. Mr. HELMS had discussed this problem with Mr. DULLES and Mr. RANKIN and Mr. MURPHY had also discussed it with Mr. DULLES (the latter conversation was reported in a memorandum of 8 July 1964). Mr. HELMS' instructions to me were to discuss the matter cooperatively but to leave all decisions to Mr. HELMS.

"2. Mr. SLAWSON, with whom we spoke alone for the first 20 minutes, had drafted a memorandum to Mr. RANKIN proposing a text embodying NOSENKO's information for the Commission's report. He invited us to read and comment on it. . . .

"3. After reading Mr. SLAWSON's proposed text, I told him that CIA wanted to assist the Warren Commission in any way possible. For a number of reasons the proposed text could be damaging to the interests of the Commission:

"a. Regardless of the wording of the source description, it was very likely that the press would very quickly be able to identify the 'confidential Soviet Union Source' as NOSENKO. (Neither Mr. SLAWSON nor, later, Mr. RANKIN disagreed with this.)

"b. NOSENKO is very likely to be uncovered publicly as a KGB plant at some time in the future. When this occurs unsophisticated readers of the

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Commission's report will be inclined to read his statements through a mirror and to assume that the reverse of what he said was true; i.e., that OSWALD was a KGB agent, perhaps dispatched on a mission to kill President Kennedy.

"c. The inclusion of NOSENKO's information, followed by the later revelation that he was a Soviet plant, would cast a shadow over the reliability of the report and the judgement of the Commission.

"d. Revelation that NOSENKO had any specific knowledge of OSWALD's case in the Soviet Union would be seized upon by an alert press as the most intriguing new item in the whole report. It would make NOSENKO into a public figure again and would raise demands for public appearances and testimonies. This would have catastrophic results on our current plans to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO affair and, among other things, would lessen our chances of eventually learning the true story behind his OSWALD information. If we do, we might be able in this way to contribute significantly to the work of the Commission.

"4. Mr. SLAWSON immediately and without further discussion said that he was convinced of the validity of our arguments. . . .

"5. Mr. RANKIN was convinced that whether or not NOSENKO's name or information were included in the report, the press representatives would specifically ask Commission spokesmen whether or not NOSENKO, the well-publicized KGB defector, had been asked for his knowledge of the affair. The Commission did not want to be in the position of having overlooked this source nor of having withheld matters relevant to the investigation. However, since NOSENKO appears to be a KGB plant, it did not appear necessary or desirable to use his information in full and Mr. RANKIN agreed that there would be a public tendency to mirror-read NOSENKO's statements after he was revealed to be a KGB plant.

"6. At this point we all agreed that some language could be found which would protect the Commission from later accusations of having used planted information or of withholding testimony. CIA's aim was to avoid NOSENKO's becoming a public figure or mystery or center of attention. We wanted if possible to slide through the publication of the Warren Commission report with our handling of NOSENKO as untroubled as possible. Since Mr. RANKIN seemed rather certain that the press would ask whether NOSENKO had been consulted, even if his name did not appear in the report, it might very well be in CIA's interest, as well as the Commission's, to have NOSENKO's name mentioned in the report. (in a manner which would discourage further questions). Mr. RANKIN was inclined to say, at one point, something to the effect that the Commission received information from various confidential sources, without specifying what information or which sources were involved, which information 'did not affect the Commission's conclusions'. We also discussed the possibility of drafting a statement to be used by Commission members should they be questioned by the press.

"7. It was agreed that Mr. RANKIN and Mr. SLAWSON would work out some phraseology which would meet our needs and that they discuss this wording with CIA, perhaps with Mr. HELMS present. . . .

"8. . . . ."

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28 July 1964

Memorandum of Conversation, dated 28 July 1964;  
subject: Use of NOSENKO Information in Warren Commission  
Report. [Participants in a meeting on 27 July 1964:  
Mr. Allen W. DULLES, Mr. J. Lee RANKIN, and Mr. David  
SLAWSON of the Warren Commission; Mr. Richard HELMS, Mr.  
David E. MURPHY, and Mr. Tennent H. BAGLEY of CIA.]

"1. This discussion, following earlier ones on the same subject, was called by Mr. RANKIN to discuss proposed drafts for inclusion or non-inclusion of NOSENKO's information in the report of the Commission. Mr. SLAWSON had prepared a short memorandum with three attachments, offering alternative drafts. A copy of Mr. SLAWSON's memo, which was an informal one and not for permanent Commission records, is attached.

"2. Of these drafts, one (#2) names NOSENKO, admits he had direct knowledge of OSWALD's case in the USSR and comments that his reliability is uncertain. Another (#3, parts 1 and 2) includes information from NOSENKO about OSWALD which would be included in the report; NOSENKO is not named as the source. A third (#4) is for inclusion in the Commission report if no NOSENKO information is used, explaining why certain information was not included in order to protect the Commission from later charges of having failed to use NOSENKO's information.

"3. The CIA representatives thought that it would be undesirable to include any NOSENKO information in the report, and after some discussion, there was general agreement on this view. The circumstances which contributed to this conclusion are summarized here:

"a. NOSENKO is a KGB plant and may be publicly exposed as such some time after the appearance of the Commission's report. CIA cannot at this time, however, evaluate the accuracy of what NOSENKO has reported on the OSWALD case, nor the significance of his having reporting it.

"b. Even without public discrediting of the source, specific aspects of NOSENKO's information are likely to lead to questions and doubts on the part of perceptive readers.

"c. Once NOSENKO is exposed as a KGB plant, there will arise the danger that his information will be mirror-read by the press and public, leading to conclusions that the USSR did direct the assassination.

"d. The Agency's greatest contribution to the resolution of the questions at hand would be to break NOSENKO and get the full story of how and why he was told to tell the story he did about OSWALD. While we have no certainty that we can ever do this, if we are to succeed we need time and must in the meantime avoid creating pressures which might force us to release NOSENKO to the public domain. (There, articulate and plausible, he would unquestionably be able to establish himself beyond hope of dislodging, since his story cannot be easily be pierced even by trained specialists, much less by private citizens

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however intelligent.) The release of the fact that NOSENKO knew specifically about the OSWALD case would, of course, create such pressure, and no hedging on source description could protect his identity.

"4. The Commission representatives, particularly Mr. RANKIN, felt that some mention of NOSENKO might be inevitable, at least when after the publication of its report, the press would ask the Commission about him and whether he had had anything to contribute. Mr. HELMS suggested that CIA could provide a number of Soviet intelligence defectors to testify to the Commission, and the Commission could then report that 'defceters', in general, and without naming NOSENKO, had given information. It was agreed that the Agency had already provided such defector information in its previous reports, and that wording to this effect could be worked into the Commission's draft #4, which was otherwise quite suitable from the point of view of the Agency and the Commission. At Mr. HELMS' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA would undertake to draft a few sentences to this effect.

"5. . . .

"6. . . .

"7. Mr. BAGLEY reported that, in response to the Commission's request, we have tested, in the Soviet Embassies in Stockholm and Helsinki, the time required to get a Soviet tourist visa, and find that 2-3 days is impossible and five days the apparent minimum in both places. In one, however, it was implied that shortage of hotel space might be a contributing factor, so these findings might not be valid for the month of October, when OSWALD apparently got his visa in two or three days."

10 August 1964 :

Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 10 August 1964; subject: Status of Support to the Warren Commission.

"3. Further on the status of our work with the Commission, we have supplied them with the study on hunting clubs in the USSR. We are now awaiting a call from Mr. RANKIN or Mr. SLAWSON to go over with them the Soviet portion of the chapter on foreign conspiracy to determine how they have handled the NOSENKO material. On 28 July we agreed they would try to fit it in with that from other defectors which we have supplied. If we do not hear from them by 12 August, we will call Mr. SLAWSON."

11 August 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 11 August 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Department of State has very recently informed the Commission that it has files which include information about persons who were confined to the Botkinkaya Hospital in Moscow during the Fall of 1959, the same period during which Lee Harvey OSWALD

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was, according to his Historic Diary and information supplied by the Russian Government, also confined to that Hospital. W. David SLAWSON of the Commission staff discussed with Mr. Raymond ROCCA of your Agency on August 10, 1964, the possibility of the Agency's attempting to locate and question Mr. Waldemar Boris KARA-PATNITZKY in West Berlin. Mr. KARA-PATNITZKY, according to information furnished by the Department of State, was admitted to the Botkinkaya Hospital in late September, 1959, is an American, and is now 75 years old. He, therefore, may very well be the 'elderly American' OSWALD referred to in his Historic Diary as having been confined in the same ward with him.

"Mr. SLAWSON forwarded to Mr. ROCCA via hand delivery on August 10, 1964, Mr. KARA-PATNITZKY's passport file, obtained from the Department of State, a Secret Service Memorandum to me dated August 7, 1964 and carrying Secret Service no. 1720, a Secret Service Memorandum dated August 5, 1964 by Special Agents Thomas and Wong and a copy of a letter I wrote to the Secret Service describing the work we asked the Service to do in respect to this problem in connection with two other persons who might have related to it.

"Mr. ROCCA told Mr. SLAWSON the Central Intelligence Agency would proceed immediately to locate Mr. KARA-PATNITZKY and carry out whatever questioning of him is deemed appropriate, and he asked that this matter be confirmed to you by letter."

~~20 August 1964 :~~

~~Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 20 August 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.~~

~~"Enclosed is a copy of a letter to me from the Department of State dated August 4, 1964, concerning the allegations of a Soviet citizen, Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY, who walked into the British Embassy in Moscow on July 29, 1964. The Commission would appreciate receiving the comments of the Central Intelligence Agency on this matter."~~

~~24 August 1964 :~~

~~Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 24 August 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.~~

~~"Enclosed and marked attachment A is a list of documents supplied to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency which the Commission contemplates using as authority in the 'Possible Foreign Conspiracy' section of its report. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission contemplates publishing each such document in its entirety.~~

~~"We would appreciate receiving a letter from you approving the publication of the documents on the attached list. If you believe that some of these documents, or portions of them should not be published, will you please provide me with an itemized list of your objections, as a basis for discussion.~~

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20 August 1964

Memorandum for the Record, dated 20 August 1964,  
subject: Report of the President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy.

"David SLAWSON, during a discussion on another topic, mentioned that he was sending over this afternoon or tomorrow (via Mr. RANKIN) an advance copy of a draft of the portion of the Commission's report on the foreign conspiratorial angle of the Kennedy assassination. It would include a precise indication of what attachments and quotations were going to be used. This would be for our reading and approval."

24 August 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans,  
dated 24 August 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Enclosed and marked Attachment A is a list of documents supplied to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency which the Commission contemplates using as authority in the 'Possible Foreign Conspiracy' section of its report. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission contemplates publishing each such document in its entirety.

"We would appreciate receiving a letter from you approving the publication of the documents on the attached list. If you believe that some of these documents, or portions of them should not be published, will you please provide me with an itemized list of your objections, as a basis for discussion.

"The second page of attachment A also contains a list of documents entitled 'State Department Files'. These are papers which were sent to the State Department by the Central Intelligence Agency and turned over to the Commission by the Department. The Commission does not contemplate citing any of them in its report. However, unless the Central Intelligence Agency objects, the Commission will leave them in the State Department files, where they will presumably be transferred to some depository, such as the National Archives, and there made available for examination by anyone with a legitimate interest in them. Copies of each of these State Department documents have been enclosed with this letter to aid in your identification of them."

1 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans,  
dated 1 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Enclosed are the original and only photographs in our possession of Lee Harvey OSWALD's application for a Cuban visa and the reply from Havana to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City conditionally rejecting that application, both of which have just been delivered to us by the government of Cuba. Also enclosed are copies of the translations of these documents prepared for the Commission by the Department of State.

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"The Commission would appreciate the Central Intelligence Agency, at its very earliest opportunity, analyzing and testing these documents to ascertain their authenticity and for any other purpose it deems appropriate. In particular, but not intended as a limitation, we would appreciate your attempts to ascertain whether the signature 'Lee H. OSWALD' is in the handwriting of Lee Harvey OSWALD, and whether the notation at the bottom of the application, 'Hotel del Comercio, Room 18-46-50-61', is in the handwriting of Silvia DURAN or some other appropriate person employed in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at the time OSWALD was there.

"We would also appreciate your preparing several copies of the enclosed photographs for the Commission's use."

11 September 1964 :

Memorandum for the Record, dated 11 September 1964,  
subject: Delivery of Backup Memoranda to the Warren  
Commission.

"1. At 1430 hours on this date, I departed Headquarters enroute to the offices of the Warren Commission to deliver a series of memoranda designed to back up certain statements contained in the Warren Commission report.

"5. Mr. SLAWSON indicated that there would probably be additional requests for backstopping memoranda coming to CIA for the Commission next week. He said he realized that responding to these requests would take time and merely asked that they be handled as expeditiously as possible."

11 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans,  
dated 11 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would like to publish as a part of its Report the memorandum to me from yourself, Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, dated 2 July 1964 (Commission Document No. 1216) concerning statements made by an official in the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

"We would appreciate receiving the approval of the Central Intelligence Agency to do so as soon as possible or, if necessary, a substitute memorandum containing substantially the same information which can be published."

12 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans,  
dated 12 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would like permission to publish your memorandum to me dated 19 May 1964, subject: Hours of work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates' Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U. S. citizens' Travel to and from Cuba. (Commission Document No. 944).

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If it is not possible for us to publish the entire document, we would like at least to be able to publish paragraphs 3 through 6."

12 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 12 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would appreciate receiving memoranda from the Central Intelligence Agency which can be published and cited as authority for the following propositions:

"(1) It is not unusual for a Latin American to exaggerate the lightness of a North American's skin or hair color. (This is in reference to Silvia DURAN's identification of OSWALD as 'blond'.)

"(2) The Hotel Berlin and the Hotel Metropole were both under the same administration and both are closely watched by the KGB.

"(3) The 'Passport and Visa Office' which Rimma SHIRAKOVA told Lee Harvey OSWALD had been notified of his desire to become a citizen of the Soviet Union, is probably the Visa and Registration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

"(4) There have been allegations that Sylvia DURAN and her husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, are members of the Communist Party.

"(5) The usual Soviet procedure is to send defectors who have carried out their defection in Moscow to some place in the Soviet Union other than Moscow reasonably soon after it has been determined to accept the defector. (In establishing how long Lee Harvey OSWALD probably waited to be accepted by the Soviet Union for residence there, the Commission would like to have authority for relying upon the fact that so long as OSWALD was in Moscow staying in a room at the Metropole Hotel, he probably had not yet been accepted for residence in the Soviet Union.)"

21 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 21 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"FBI photograph exhibit No. D33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625) shows Lee Harvey OSWALD with a group of men who Marina has identified as fellow workers at the Minsk radio and TV factory. A copy of this photograph has been enclosed with this letter in order to assist your ready identification of it.

"I know that the CIA has already furnished to the Commission a 'Name List with Traces', (Appendix C to Chronology of OSWALD in USSR, October 1959 - June 1962 - Commission Document No. 680). Since we do not know the names of the persons in the

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photograph, however, we have no way of identifying them from the name list. If the CIA can be of help in this matter, it will be greatly appreciated."

22 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 22 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"Reference is made to paragraph d of Attachment C to your memorandum dated 31 March 1964, subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD (Commission Exhibit 2676); concerning the hotels at which OSWALD stayed in Helsinki, Finland.

"The Commission would appreciate receiving a memorandum from you stating the substance of the referenced paragraph which will be published."

22 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 22 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would like to publish as a part of its Report your memorandum to me dated May 4, 1964, subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD (Commission Exhibit No. 869).

"We would appreciate receiving the approval of the Central Intelligence Agency to do so. A copy of the memorandum was given to Mr. ROCCA on September 18, 1964 for ready reference."

22 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 22 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would like to publish as a part of its Report paragraph 10 of your memorandum dated February 19, 1964, subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, September 28 to October 3, 1963, which pertains to Cuban Consul Usebio [sic] AZCUE.

"This letter is to confirm clearance for publishing this portion of your memorandum with the sole exception of the words 'to us' which are to be deleted. This clearance was given by Mr. Raymond ROCCA on September 18."

23 September 1964 :

Letter to Mr. Richard HELMS, Deputy Director for Plans, dated 23 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"The Commission would like to publish as a part of its Report your letter of May 4, 1964, subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Commission Exhibit 869)

"This letter is to confirm clearance for

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publishing this memorandum. Verbal clearance was given on September 18, 1964."

30 September 1964 :

Letter to Honorable John A, McCONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, dated 30 September 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"We appreciate the cooperation of your Agency in furnishing to the Commission a number of documents which aided us in the preparation of our summary report.

"The Commission wishes to publish at the earliest opportunity the attached list of classified documents which were cited in the summary report, and requests your authorization to declassify these documents."

13 October 1964 :

Letter to Honorable John A. McCONE, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, dated 13 October 1964, from J. Lee RANKIN, General Counsel.

"We are enclosing a copy of your SECRET document dated January 31, 1964, concerning information developed by CIA on the activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

"We have deleted all references to the Secret Agent by the marking, 'D'. Since this document was cited in our summary report, we are requesting your authority to publish it in this form. If this is not agreeable, may we have a synopsis of this document which may be published."

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LIST (INCOMPLETE) OF REQUESTS FROM THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF  
INVESTIGATION FOR ASSISTANCE AND INFORMATION FROM THE CIA

26 November 1963 :

Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON

(Paraphrase) During the afternoon of 26 November, INANITION/17 passed to the FBI representative in Bern a report (quoted in full in the cable). The FBI representative immediately notified ELMARD (P) and after discussing the content of the report it was agreed that ELMARD would contact Swiss authorities soonest. ELMARD emphasized the utmost importance the United States Government attached to follow-up of this matter. ELMARD received prompt answers to initial questions and arranged to meet with Swiss security officials in company with the FBI representative in Bern.

[BERN 2492 (IN 68312), 26 November 1963]

28 November 1963 :

Subject: Rumored \$5,000 bank deposit made by OSWALD upon his return from Mexico on 3 October 1963.

The FBI has just levied on us an official request for full information on source and origin of rumor about five thousand dollars bank deposit.

[DIR 85654, 28 November 1963]

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28 November 1963

Subject: Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO.

The FBI liaison officer (S. PAPICH) officially advises that the FBI requests CIA turn ALVARADO over to Mexican authorities and that CIA request the Mexican authorities to interrogate ALVARADO in detail.

FBI reports that it understands that the Mexican authorities have a capability of polygraphing and requests that CIA request Mexican authorities that he be polygraphed.

The FBI expressed a desire to have the results of the interrogation as soon as possible and that the Legal Attache be kept advised of developments.

[DIR 85663, 28 November 1963]

29 November 1963

Subject: Ricardo SANTOS

Mr. PAPICH referred me to DIR 85665, 28 November 1963. He referred to the fact that there is a report that the Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague, Ricardo SANTOS, has a pro CASTRO brother in the United States. He stated that he would appreciate our checking our files or taking such other steps as may be indicated to provide the Bureau with the identity of the brother said to be in the U. S.

[Memorandum from CI/SIG to Chief, WH/3, 29 November 1963.]

9 December 1963

Subject: Chinese Communist and CASTRO Plot.

At 0900 on 9 December 1963 Mr. PAPICH of the FBI called and advised that the Bureau had a communication from their Miami field office setting forth information which had been received in a memorandum from our office in Miami concerning a report which had been received from a Western diplomat alleging that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a plot prepared and executed jointly by the Chinese communists and CASTRO through intermediaries.

Mr. PAPICH stated that the Bureau would like to evaluate this information if possible. He said the Bureau was very much interested in identifying the source and it would appreciate any information we can give on where and how this diplomat got this information since it would help the Bureau to evaluate this information. He said that the Bureau would find the

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identity of the source and possible access to the source, if in this country, most helpful.

[Memorandum for the Record, dated 9 December 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

18 December 1963

Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon possibly owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD.

On 18 December 1963 a representative of your Bureau requested clarifying information about certain Soviet nomenclature believed to refer to a firearm once possessed in the Soviet Union by Lee OSWALD.

We were asked to determine what kind of weapon this might be.

[CSCI-3/779,225 to the FBI, dated 19 December 1963; Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

7 January 1964

Subject: Jack L. RUBY

Mr. Carlos VILLA, Miami, Florida, furnished to the FBI on December 21, 1963, a letter which had been forwarded to a friend of his named Jose Antonio Juan. Mr. Juan had received the letter from his son living in Cuba.

In the letter the statement was made, "it is known here that RUBINSTEIN was here a little less than a year ago visiting a Mr. PRANSKI, owner of a shop dealing in tourist articles, located on Prado Street between Animas and Trocadero, opposite the Sevilla Biltmore."

It is requested that, through available sources of your Agency, you develop any information possible relating to the above quoted statement in an effort to resolve the allegation that Jack L. RUBY has possibly visited Cuba since 1959 and has connections there.

[FBI Memorandum to the DDP, dated 7 January 1964; Subject: Jack L. RUBY.]

9 January 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Lee Harvey OSWALD dated 31 December 1963 and an enclosure to the memorandum containing names and addresses found in OSWALD's address book and other papers at the time of his arrest in Dallas, Texas. It will be noted that the Bureau has asked us to

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determine whether any of the listed names, addresses or telephone numbers have in the past been connected with the Soviet intelligence services.

[Memorandum for Chief, OS/SRS, dated 9 January 1963; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

14 January 1964

Our Chief of Station in Mexico dispatched cable [MEXI- (IN 98273)], advising of a request on the part of the Legal Attache for the development of information concerning one Daniel SOLIS' knowledge of ROJAS, whose name appears to be Ylario ROJAS Villanueva, a 31-year old Mexican citizen residing in Guadalajara, and information concerning the names of Cubans appearing in an alleged notebook said to be in the possession of SOLIS, and an alleged official of the American Government said to have been in contact with OSWALD in Cozomel, named Albert LNU.

[Memorandum for the Record, dated 15 January 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

7 February 1964

Subject: Eladio ROJAS Villanueva.

The Legal Attache in Mexico City would prefer that the COS tell Luis ECHEVARRIA, acting minister of gobernacio, name of subject and that with ROJAS' agreement plan to give him a polygraph and promise ECHEVARRIA a brief statement of the results of the test.

The Legal Attache in Mexico City would prefer have the polygraph given in Mexico City; he could, if CIA strongly prefers, get their headquarters' and subject's agreement to go to Texas.

[MEXI-8117 (IN 15081), 7 February 1964]

12 February 1964

Legal Attache (in Mexico City) requests the following additional questions be put to Daniel SOLIS:

- a. Verify if SOLIS has received two letters recently from Eladio ROJAS Villanueva aka Eladio VILLANUEVA regarding notebook.

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b. Ask SOLIS to forward notebook if found to:

Mr. Edwin O. JOHNSON, Consulado Americano, Guajalajara, Jalisco.

c. Letters in possession of VILLANUEVA indicate he was in Cozumel with Daniel SOLIS for at least three months in 1963. Can SOLIS recall dates?

d. Ask SOLIS if VILLANUEVA was in contact with Cubans or Americans while in Cozumel. Ask him how VILLANUEVA occupied his time.

[MEXI-8194 (IN 18129), 12 February 1964.]

25 February 1964

Subject: Jack L. RUBY.

"It would be appreciated if you could promptly advise of any information available to you to tend to verify this travel by RUBY."

[Memorandum to Mr. Winston M. SCOTT, dated 25 February 1964, from Clark D. ANDERSON, Legal Attache (Mexico City); Subject: Jack L. RUBY.]

13 April 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2.

"Reference is made to your letter, dated 13 April 1964, captioned 'Lee Harvey OSWALD, Internal Security - Russia - Cuba', and to the attachment which contained statements made by one Eugene J. HOBBS, HMC, USN. Your letter requested certain information regarding subject's Marine assignment at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, in 1957 and 1958."

[Memorandum for Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 13 May 1964, from CIA.]

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~~SECRET~~10 June 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

"It is believed this allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco, should be investigated and you are requested to conduct the necessary inquiries, if possible, to resolve the allegation. Inasmuch as it appears that the President's Commission contemplates the issuance of its report in the near future, it is believed this matter should be handled expeditiously."

[Memorandum to Director, Central Intelligence Agency: Attention: Deputy Director, Plans, dated 10 June 1964, from Director, FBI.]

28 July 1964

Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

"In view of the foregoing factors, it would be appreciated if you would review material available to you concerning the activity of Radio Moscow in an effort to identify the two-minute broadcast referred to by OSWALD in the aforementioned documents.

"We would also appreciate advice as to the telephone number in 1959 and the current telephone number of Radio Moscow and we would appreciate advise as to whether or not telephone number V 36588 was listed in the 1959 Moscow Telephone Directory.

"It would appear to us that if OSWALD participated in a radio program for Radio Moscow, this fact would have been known to the KGB and a reference to such participation would likely have

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