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(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an OSWALD/Cuban connection?

(16) What form did they take?

(17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject?

(18) What action developed from these exchanges?

(19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they?

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From a review of the Agency's file on Lee Harvey OSWALD, it becomes apparent that the Agency and its field stations, particularly in Mexico City and Miami, were not unmindful of the possibility that OSWALD did not act alone. During the first few weeks after the assassination, Headquarters, upon at least three occasions, exhorted the Mexico City Station to continue "all your coverage of the Cuban and Soviet installations . . .". On 28 November 1963, the Chief, WH/3, told the Mexico City Station that "there should be no let down in your efforts to follow all leads and investigate all facts which bear on this case. We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role." (Emphasis added.) [DIR 85655, 28 November 1963] On 30 November, Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to follow all leads and tips. "The question of whether OSWALD acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." (Emphasis added.) [DIR 86064, 30 November 1963] And on the 12th of December 1963, Chief, WH/3, again asked the Mexico City Station to "continue to watch for Soviet and Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case." (Emphasis added.) "FYI only, Soviet intelligence in India had letters sent to . . . (US) leaders demanding full investigation of case." [DIR 88680, 12 December 1963]

The Mexico City Station, however, had already initiated a thorough review of its holdings in an attempt ascertain what information was available on Lee Harvey OSWALD, his presence and his activities in Mexico City. This review turned up the fact that Silvia DURAN, a Mexican national employed by the Cuban Consulate, had dealt with OSWALD during his known visits to the Consulate on 27 and 28 September. In response to a suggestion from the Station, the Ministry of Gobernacion arrested Silvia DURAN and her husband, Horacio, on 23 November 1963. [MEXI-7037 (IN), 23 November 1963] Later the same day, an official of the Ministry informed

the Station that Silvia DURAN was completely cooperative and had given a written statement attesting to two visits by OSWALD to the Consulate. [MEXI-7046 (IN), 23 November 1963]. Although her testimony was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Government authorities, Silvia DURAN was the only live witness on record regarding OSWALD's activities in Mexico City. It is from her statements that it was learned that OSWALD became engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September 1963 with Eusebio AZCUE, the Cuban Consul and a member of the Cuban intelligence unit in Mexico City. He left Mexico on 19 November 1963 after being replaced by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz.

There is no evidence in the OSWALD file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitive interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known or confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the Cuban DGI (Direccion General de Inteligencia), its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story as it stands, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of DGI personnel in the Consulate? This seems unlikely especially because Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez* later cited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD had made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN statements.

[CI Staff Review, dated 23 May 1975, pp. 16-19.]

* Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio SOMOZA.

As of September 1964, Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967, Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him. [Ibid, pp. 19-20.]

Almost immediately after the President's assassination, Agency field stations began receiving information from various sources of undetermined reliability relating to the alleged assassin of President Kennedy.

As the Warren Commission reported on pages 305 and 307 of its report, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated . . ." The authors of the Report go on to state that

"Among the claims made were allegations that OSWALD had made a previous trip to Mexico City in early September to receive money and orders for the assassination [567], that he had flown to a secret airfield somewhere in or near the Yucatan Peninsula [568], that he might have made contacts in Mexico City with a communist from the United States shortly before the assassination [569], and that OSWALD assassinated the President at the direction of a particular Cuban who met with him in the United States and paid him \$7,000 [570]. A letter received from someone in Cuba alleging the writer had attended a meeting where the assassination had been discussed as part of a plan which would soon include the death of other non-communist leaders in the Americas [571]. The charge was made in a Cuban expatriate publication that in a speech he delivered 5 days after the assassination, while he was under the influence of liquor, Fidel Castro made a slip of the tongue and said, "The first time OSWALD was in Cuba", thereby giving away the fact that OSWALD had made one or more surreptitious trips to that country [572].

"Some stories linked the assassination to anti-Castro groups who allegedly were engaged in obtaining illicit firearms in the United States, one such claim being that these groups killed the President as part of a bargain with some illicit organizations who would then supply them with firearms as payment [573]. Other rumors placed OSWALD in Miami, Fla., at various times, allegedly in pro-Cuban activities there [574]. The assassination was claimed to have been carried out by Chinese Communists operating jointly with the Cubans [575]. OSWALD was also alleged to have met with the Cuban Ambassador in a Mexico City restaurant and to have driven off in the Ambassador's car for a private talk [576]. Castro himself, it was alleged, 2 days after the assassination called for the files relating to Oswald's dealings with two members of the Cuban diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union; the inference drawn was that the 'dealings' had occurred and had established a secret subversive relationship which continued through OSWALD's life [577]. Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, in some cases the product of mistaken identification."

The Warren Report makes reference (bracketed numbers in the above text) to Commission Exhibits (see Attachment I for list of Commission Exhibits) most of which had been furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Only the first reference - the ALVARADO interrogation - was furnished by the Agency. The Agency did, however, provide assistance and information to the FBI in the latter's investigation of three ~~of the~~ allegations (see asterisked Exhibits). The results of the Agency's investigation of other rumors and allegations relating to OSWALD and the possible involvement of the Cubans and Soviets in the assassination, were disseminated to the FBI, primarily, and to the Warren Commission (see attachment II for a list of disseminations to the FBI, and attachment III for a list of memoranda to the Warren Commission).

Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States and Mexico City - was the Nicaraguan, Gilberto ALVARADO, who contacted the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 25 November 1963.

The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission, in its report, under the cryptograph "D" as being illustrative of the attention given to the most serious allegations.

On 25 November 1963, a young Nicaraguan, Gilberto Nolasco ALVARADO Ugarte

telephoned the United States Embassy in Mexico City. Later that day he met with the Embassy security officer and a Station officer at which time he claimed he had been in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on 18 September 1963. While in the Consulate he saw a man whom he later recognized as Lee Harvey OSWALD receive \$6,500 in cash to kill an important person in the United States.

ALVARADO described the circumstances as follows: While standing by a bathroom door about noon he saw a group of three persons conversing on a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair, obviously dyed, who spoke rapidly in both Spanish and English. He had prominent cheek bones and a noticeable scar on the lower right side of his chin. The second was a white person whom ALVARADO had seen previously in a waiting room carrying a Canadian passport. The white person had green eyes, blondish hair, with a pompadour hairdo, and dark eyeglasses. The third person allegedly was Lee Harvey OSWALD. ALVARADO was convinced of this from published photographs of OSWALD following the assassination. OSWALD was wearing a black sport coat, buttoned-up white shirt with short collar tabs, no tie, dark gray pants, and clear eyeglasses. He had a green passport in his pocket wore a wrist watch with a yellow band, and appeared to have a pistol in a shoulder holster. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed American currency to the Negro. The Negro then allegedly said to OSWALD in English, "I want to kill the man." OSWALD replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The Negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you. I have a lot to do." OSWALD replied, "The people are waiting for me back there." The Negro then gave OSWALD \$6,500 in large denomination U. S. bills, saying, "This isn't much." After hearing this conversation, ALVARADO said that he telephoned the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City several times on 20 September before the assassination in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed, but was finally told by someone at the Embassy to stop wasting his time.

ALVARADO was known to this Agency as a former informant of Nicaraguan security service. His reliability was considered questionable by American authorities although he had not been wholly discredited. ALVARADO claimed he was in Mexico City working against the Cuban communists for his service. The service, however, has denied that he was acting on its behalf. While investigation in the United States showed that OSWALD could not possibly have been in Mexico City on 18 September (he was known to have been in New Orleans on both 17 and 19 September), intensive interrogation failed to shake ALVARADO's story.

On 28 November 1963, the Mexican police interviewed him. At first ALVARADO persisted in his story but on 30 November he admitted in a signed statement that his whole account about OSWALD was false. He admitted he had not seen Lee OSWALD at all and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted he had not tried repeatedly to phone a warning to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 20 September as he had previously claimed. Instead he had first contacted the U. S. Embassy after the assassination. ALVARADO said that his motive in telling this false story was to help get himself admitted into the United States so that he could participate in action against Fidel CASTRO. He said that he hated CASTRO and thought that his story about OSWALD, if believed, would help cause the United States to take action against CASTRO.

Following the above interrogation, ALVARADO retracted the confession he had made to the Mexican authorities asserting that it had been extorted from him under pressure. He was then questioned by U. S. authorities using a polygraph machine. ALVARADO voluntarily consented to the use of this equipment. During the questioning it was pointed out to him that he was not being truthful, according to the polygraph, in identifying photographs of OSWALD as the person he saw in the Cuban Consulate. He replied that he had full faith in the polygraph, that he would not attempt to refute the results, and that he "must have been mistaken". In addition, he

