JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10308-10197
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PLSLSTEEL-1 (Formerly AMANVIL-1, AMCLOCK-1 and INDEVOUT-3) Project and 201 Files

1. Description:

SENSITIVE SOURCE; information should be handled accordingly. DO NOT USE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF LAD/COG. HANDLE WITH UTMOST CARE.

2. Findings:


   Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action /missile crisis/ was an "election affair"; that President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

   b. GNSA 4357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1962 filed 68-6-147/4

   MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he /President Kennedy/ had become the "man of the nation" again, and the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him.

   c. GNSA 4376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 62 filed 201-9239

   At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was aware that Kennedy was mad, an adventurer, and must not be allowed to pull strings, meaning, to retain initiative or control pace in the current international situation.
d. GNVA 4470 (OUT 53909) 19 Nov 62 (TDCSDB 2/652,244)
   Filed 68-6-147/4

SLSTEEL-1 reported the following on the probable
reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the
Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S.
demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot
inspection: Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no
matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet
officials, he must have been furious at the fact that the Soviet
Union had "backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with
the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered
himself as being in a desperate situation. Source said that
CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and
possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion
his compulsion caused him to reach back as far as twenty years to
revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that
in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking
an act of desperation, for example the aerial bombardment of the
U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

e. GNVA 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 63 (TDCSDB 3/653,939)
   Filed 68-6-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO
harangued a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of permitting
U.S. planes to photograph Cuba. The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's
persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a
U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer
was returned to the USSR under arrest.

f. GNVA 6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 Filed 68-6-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit
or Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession.
There was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Missions
as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert
was still in effect 9 December 1963.

g. GNVA 6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)
   Filed 68-6-147/4

Report that circa 2 days after the assassination
of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive
a series of messages placing them on a special alert status.
These messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuban
Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination
of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed
against the missions. They were instructed among other things, to
be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the premises."

h. **GNVA 6513 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 Filed 201-9239**

INDEVOUT-3 reported at 29 February meeting that CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced that CASTRO's Caribbean P-ace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY, Page 112 - Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings. HURWITCH of State, and McGeorge BUNDY, White House, among others, attended 10 Aug 62 Special Group (Augmented) meeting at Dept. of State. Bill Harvey attended with McCon for CIA. Remember Harvey's Mafia contacts. Also, keep in mind that Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch, both President and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCon recalled that liquidation of CASTRO, and other regime officials, was mentioned at JCS op room meeting 8 or 9 August 1962. It was later determined that McCon's recollection was probably faulty, that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August State meeting.

Attachments: 8

Researcher: KGB