DRAFT OF REPORT
FOR R.C. Delmar
TO Eomay MED 1716

Reference: Memorandum by David W. Belin to Mr. Elwood Hirsch, 15 April 1970 (Attachment A)

1. Referring memorandum suggests it would appear appropriate to reconcile two different sets of facts involving the individual of the subject. The purpose of this study is to present and evaluate each set of facts in relation to the subject.

2. Background. This examination and summary contain a photographic copy of the model commonly referred to as the "Kennedy" version as prepared by the Warren Commission. An examination of president Kennedy's (now after 1963) and its Warren Commission.

[Annotation: Photograph Exhibit No. 1: The Photograph University of Chicago Library Library 19X:36790 Page 671: Kennedy (Annex)]
Highly sensitive
material

originated from a highly sensitive operation
conducted by the FBI and Mexican
security authorities against the direct and
indirect influence in Mexico City.

On 6 October 1963 it was disclosed

that

Under the pressure of the intelligence network,
efforts to develop information on the
assassin and the assassinations were not
this photograph was made available
by the FBI's Mexico Station Chief for the situation
to the local FBI agents this
month. On 22 November, and later that day,
with the concurrence of the ambassador
photograph of this individual
was flown up to the Dallas office by
the U.S. Special Attache, and

as a matter of possible use in the

ongoing investigation.

The FBI photgraph

Anecdotes
It had been

After careful review of the facts, and after being shown to Mrs.

Buckley in the morning of 23 November,

spread of photos of individuals

whose identity has been known to

her and having been known

in contact with her son. Also Marguerite

Oswald died just at the time according

this.

was shown to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald

in Dallas on the evening of November 23, 1963

by FBI Agent, Bardwell. D. ODUM.

The Warren Commission's report

describes

the sequence of events at pp. 365-5

and 667 (Attachment B). The

report, of which ultimately

resulted in Mrs. Marguerite Oswald's

she had been shown to

allegations that the proposed photos

of Jack Ruby sitting there before
In measuring her son, (a fact con-
plicating the defendant's conclusion)
had been the fact that when she had
been shown the same photograph in
her appearance before the commission
by the FBI,
it had been corrected in a slightly
different manner.

No details in the Warren commission's report
majority (and presumably)
illustrate (the one,
that part)
upsetting the defendant. "Simple truths
are proven time presses the self-serving
preferred"
in the political, (rigidly determined
interpretive climate that has	
flourished
been crescensed by the media over the
past decade. (Only besides the photograph,)
not acknowledged to the bulk, to now become a centipede in an alternate explanation that holds Oswald to have been "framed" by the CIA as double in its activity of influencing the Mexican city. 3

3. This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and the Man Who was Not Oswald," by Bernard M. Trainor and George H. Walker, in The New York Times Magazine (Sept. 25, 1977), (reprinted in reference to my article).
and interrogated by the Mexican authorities and
the FBI established that in the observation of
all hotel personnel he left early and
returned late each day of his stay.

Assuming, then, that I late arrived
and that only suspected that he
spent 16 of the 17 his stay at 73
hours), they remain over
78 hours of activity to be accounted
for. ... assume for the basis
of CIA's coverage can account only
the for minutes during 27, 28
September and 1 October. All coverage
was by CIA during this period was technical,
not of the station hotel nor his source
(living agent)

12 from Mexico City. Oswald was
in the sense "made air investigation. None
and spoke in
of the facts of his defection to the USSR and
returns to the U.S., 1959-1962 were
registered in Mexico citizen files. Before
10 October 1963, when this information
was forwarded by KGB in response to
the Station agent J & October forwarding
a routine basis what was judged
to be an American contact for a man
to leave in transit to the USSR for
indicated and deduced from technical
conferences which were the basis and only govern-
agreed information), (At one time

during his stay in Mexico city did the CIA
facility acquire a photo of him). A careful
review of all coverage, voice intercept, and
photographic data substantiate both
Soviet and Cuban exchanges were made
by the Station on the 22nd and 23rd November.
1963, after the assassination, going back to mid-year. It is therefore from that time we now have CIA photo coverage of Oswald at any time having visited his Delaware family. The story is false. The pictures, despite the report in the Times on 25 December, did not appear in the Hearst papers. The intercept data reviewed by the committee on the basis of the 1 October intercept (which had been reported to Ngo and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community) show explications less than those described as a Navy and FBI case under the electricidad. Instead, potentially, AN intrepid to the Depart- ment of State—turned up matches concurred based on content, not on identity, with material intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. Matches were said to exist...
comparison (except what could be recalled by the monitor - and this was uniquely not insignificant because of the poor
Russian system by Conrad) could not be made because the tapes were
unreadable.

It should be noted that Russian intercept
and photographic coverage was not
processed in "real time". The existence of
and the volume of the information
acquiring preceded anything but
the spot reporting of items as judged by
the monitor. Of more than ordinary
importance and therefore remembered:
items in summary log. Full text of selected
item would require an extensive
consultation of the tapes and either a field transcription
or a full translation in both. Photo cameras suspected
to become available in quantity by 

which required scanning and selection 

in a rapid and accelerated basis. One 
of the "triggers" that normally operated 
to focus and accelerate the data review 
and reporting of the kind of raw 
intelligence is the mention of a name, 
without designation. 

This was precisely what occurred 
in the 2nd of two conversations Donald 
had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy, 
to whom he said he was "keen toward" 
and it was this information reported by 
Mr. Rago on 2 October.

[Handwritten note: This is not relevant to the context]
Mexico City Station did one interesting thing in its report on Oswald based on its one 10 October radio intercept. It coupled descriptions that data matching information it had recently received from a collateral source—a photo of a possible Mexican station identified staff member.

The station reported these details to the OSSubit in a coincident detail. The station did not present or suggest that the data produced from the photo was in fact Oswald, nor indeed, in any way related to Oswald.

5. The University of Oxford (1)
ground must be stipulated. Now, the final prerequisite is understanding the context and the player.

The photo of the unknown individual placed in the chain of evidence on 23 November in Dallas by the FBI agent.

Barkett claimed: In my opinion, what didn't occur was the total collapse of CIA coverage on Oswald activity on the afternoon of the 22nd and 23rd when all available coverage had been re-directed.

6. The total collapse of CIA coverage on Oswald, except for one marginally reliable story covered by Oswald, consisted of two (2) wire services as follows:

A. (Signature)
A. 27 Sept 1963

Silvia Dorn, a local employee of the Cuban Embassy, passed on the information to an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy.

Silvia tells me that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union and he wants to know whom he was talking to because she (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if they accepted him and gave him a visa then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work only advising Immigration in Cuba wants to know whom he had talked to because he gave his name and said he was told there would be no problem. He says to wait a month. A different person met me and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This guy says to leave name and telephone number and he will call back. Silvia gave me telephone 11-26-67 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia takes advantage of the occasion and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the bulletin. She wants to call KOUSHK.CO to give her new address, then thanks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa FRANZI and the telephone number is 14-12-26. She says thanks.

B. 27 Sept 1963

At 16:26, an unidentified male came to the Cuban Consulate, spoke Silvia Dorn.
The American had been there. Silvia says he is there now. If the American showed papers from the consulate in Washington, Silvia wanted to go to the Soviet Union right away. She has been there for a long time with his wife, who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa. However, according to this, Silvia had a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union, and now MI has not known what to do with his (the American) because they have to wait for the answer from Washington. Silvia agrees that the problem exists with the Cubans, that he does not know anyone in Cuba or elsewhere if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for Soviet Union), because he knew it would require a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba and from there go to the Soviet Union. MI said the thing is that if his wife and he were in Washington, she would receive her visa, right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, the American is going to receive her visa in Cuba but having this visa, she could communicate to any place the permission, for example here or any place she could receive it (visa or permission) but right now they do not have them. Silvia says, certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. MI says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia says then she will put that on the list. MI says he cannot give a letter of recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and excuse me for bothering you. Silvia says that is alright and many thanks.

C. 28 Sept 1963 (Saturday), 11:51 Munich C.T.

Silvia says that in the Cuban Embassy a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy, returned, and to take the number down - Silvia speaks English with English accent - and continued in Spanish that they gave the number telephone 19-12-53 and to take the number down - Silvia speaks English and he is going to talk with you. American speaks Russian and he speaks in English. They continue in English. American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul, just a minute, he answered and asks American in English what does he want? American says I know that. American, in barely recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it. American says, you cannot go again and leave your address with no, it is not for the Cuban Embassy. Silvia says I'll be there right now.
D. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:31 A.M. (C.S.T.)

SECRET

I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your consular. They say that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? They say I'd like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down 15-60-55 and ask for a consul. Thank you.

E. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:45 A.M. (C.S.T.)

No (the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian) speaks to OBYEDKOV. He says: This is Lee ONSLOW speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything yet? But I don't remember the name of that consul, OBYEDKOV says. NESTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin??) OBYEDKOV says yes, my name is ONSLOW. OBYEDKOV says, just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet. ONSLOW says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. ONSLOW says: And what...? OBYEDKOV hangs up.
1. All of these items are consistent with and
examination by Warren Commission staff in
April and at the Crimei on their having
during their stay from 8 to 13 April
1964. *

* The Warren Commission group that visited
the Miami City station consisted of Mr. Taxman,
Mr. Shawnessy and Mr. Villers. They examined
not only the hectograph副本 of exhibit
A-6 above but also the D-327 from
and documentation that would indicate that

that appeared to have

relevant. These have been omitted from

this summary because

what been included in the summary because

they appeared to be reliable

documents from the Oswald matter in

regard to substantial grounds, in fact.

On the 30th of October, the Warren

Commission

having in mind that the best evidence

receives many calls pertaining to this
visa matters.

On the 27th of October 1987, the Embassy received a call from an unknown individual who said he wanted to receive the visa to Odessa. When told the embassy was not open and to call back at 11:30, Ronald was known to have arrived at the Odessa harbor terminal on Bus 756 at 11:30 on the 27th. It was therefore impossible to verify the relevance of the call. On the 28th, it is unclear how it was verified to official that the call was received for the following reasons: 1. The call was marked "visa" and specifically for Odessa. Ronald was seeking a visa and never in any other context had he previously called the U.S. Consulate for Odessa as late a destination. 2. The call was directed to the correct consulate number: 15-60-55.

On the 1st of October, Ronald first called the wrong number, 15-69-17, (the MFA's number) and had his call redirected to the correct number, 15-60-55. He was unable to reach the correct line. On the 27th, he called again at 11:30, to the correct consulate number. He was able to reach the correct number and spoke with Ronald using the correct number on the 1st of October. There was every reason to believe from the context that the interview A-E showed that Ronald's first destination after arrival.
and scheduled to the luxurious room for the visit to the Cuban embassy. The Spanish language, which normally included Cuban English, failed to make his mark. An American, stretching his hand, translated the highly esteemed Soviet Embassy stand and asked for a visa. This request...

Officer speaks in broken Spanish then in English to Mr. He says "Hello." Visa for Russia." Mr. says, "Call on the other phone." Mr. says, "I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia." Mr. says, "Please, call on the telephone of the consul." 15-60-53. He says, "One moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down." His voice the visa there? "That's depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question." He gives him the number and asks him to ask for the consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He says, "Thank you.

Mr. Soviet says:

Mr. Soviet says:

The voice of the interpreter is unintelligible, en route.

The voice of the interpreter is unintelligible, en route. He is, however, an able listener. He has been trained in English, the local language in English. The substance of the request indicates there was a request in the first stage of initiation. However, he had not heard the request. He said, "Excuse me, the director and the translator.

He speaks to a point next to the substance of the call. A Mr. had left Mexico City, bound on all the credibility evidence before the early morning of the previous day. He had not been inside the consul call.

end postscript
8. Assuming the same can state or reasonably

satisfactorily with

What Howard heard the first

made the following

contacts with the Cuban and Soviet

officials in Mexico City:

(Friday)

a. 27 Sept. 1962. After arrival and check-in

in hotel Howard went at 7:30

P.M. to the Cuban embassy

where

he talked with Mr. Alina. Re

time of his visit is unknown. The

time of his second visit was

about 1600 (i.e. just before closing).

something besides the tragic business

visit the most likely visit to

Soviet Embassy (not known)

without concrete

only in second Cuban Embassy

visit Howard personally

became interested in a person

We have no indication who

he talked with at the Soviet Embassy.

May not have person engaged

in Cuban activities with either the

Cuban or Soviet embassies on the 27th.

His lack of interest in the

Cuban installation is explainable. It

seems based on the recollection of

reactions that I observed in the

water was drawn

from natural
on the 27th because of mechanical breakdown. Why Donald committed suicide is not yet explained.


Barlow, Admiralty and Forest Embankment

were temporarily closed to the public

and Fridays. Photographic coverage

was normally suspended Saturday

and Sundays.

Donald's misunderstanding the

Saturday holiday schedule meant

that on Saturday morning to the

Forest Embankment when he arrived it

was clear. He apparently could not

recall his own note. For several

hours he logged in "Also visited to

to the Admiralty" before he

had negotiated it on the venal

association the day before, the
peared the address from this Brown and she called the State Department, presumably to permit him to give
them the address on the phone. Indeed, the Soviet attaché whom she called explained that no phone for
this Brown's kitchen existed. It came back in person and he met
his world. Immediately thereafter
[p. 3]
[w. 7]
[Soviet installation] (his third visit) to
give them his Texas address.

a. 29 Sept 1963 (Sunday), No activity
registered

b. 30 Sept 1963 (Monday), No activity
registered (It is known that Brown
received a tape this date in a polyethylene
hanging box, delivering 2 October 1963 at
9:30)

c. 1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday), Oswald made
at least two calls to the Soviet Embassy.
One identified him during his 6845 D.I.KOV - a guard - and referred
to Mr. [illegible] phone on Saturday
(probably with KASTIKOV, there
was no photographic description in
Oswald's passport). From this
context of the two calls to Moscow,
they would have been most likely
the same to the bombing. The one
had clearly been placed on the submarine of the USAF Band in Washington. This was a check on the belief that the existence of the USAF Band was concealed with any information that had been received from Washington. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to believe Orwell would have gone to the Soviet Embassy in the late 30s. The camera was nothing to note at about mid-day, it registered 0.1

Was there any photographic evidence? All the photographic evidence was destroyed just before the war. The only photograph that was preserved was that of a woman and a child.

A more Latin spin, possibly American, was involved in the Soviet installation that day. The photograph was taken for the photographer's benefit.

On this chance that they could be an association between the found identification data derived from the mirror reflector and the description data derived from the photograph, the station...
Nature's action was not unusual, considering the circumstances. Considering the extent of the damage, it would be difficult to find a single day-to-day record of the extent of the damage. Many examples of the extent of the damage would be found in the correspondence, both formal and informal, regarding the damage.
4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH FILE.

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED TO HQS OF ODIN, ODACID, ODACS, AND ODAMS. PLS KEEP E-24S ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

WE GET: "According to L'Envoi 1 Oct, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was Oswald. (phonetic) Stated he at Sov Emb. on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.

SR/CI/IA Roll (in draft)
CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft)
CI/SOG/Energy (in draft)
C/TH/3

T. Lawrence
ADCA
ASSISTING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
9. No local dissensions have been raised by the

10. On 10 October 1963 at 20:12 Z time
the US Security component responsible for
acting on the report disseminated to
the Department of State, the FBI and the
Other (by telephone)

the report received from Mexico States idk
Preliminary collateral details drawn from the file record:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.

2. It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Harvey Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikoletyevna Prusakova, and their child.

3. The information in paragraph one is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City. Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

[end of message]

Although the version of the headquarters were "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in the transfer of data to the appropriate departments. However, on the record, were concerned with the Oswald case!
(1) Oswald's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for "Harvey".

(2) His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "KUSAKOVA" for "KRUSAKOVA".

Neither of these errors are significant. More important was,

(c) Para. 2 of the Moyies Station report, which had distinctly separated (dealt with a concerning phenomenon, the disappearances of an unidentified individual observed going into and out of the Soviet Embassy building late that night. I had been locked out and allowed to see Oswald as an observer of sorts.

(6) Comparison of the two cables were

Actuarily the

can be no

These were questions that this theorist misunderstood of the Moyies Station report.
was an analysis even which escaped detection by the law enforcement or the government before release. The deceptive details attributed to Oswald were so true as far off the mark that they would mislead instant.

Immediately recognizable as such by the recipients, (be extrinsic explanation, if not speculation, be it recalled that as of that moment CIA站立 had no photograph of Oswald to refer to.)

12. Confirmation of this judgment was provided by the contents of the cable sent by the same analyst and sent on 2209.2 times 2 turn later.
1. LEE OSWALD who called SOVEM 1 OCT probably identical
LEE HENRY OSWALD b. 25 MAR 1935, BORN 13 OCT 1935, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES
WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN
INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,
BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,
INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1962 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA
IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT
HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT
THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOMES OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OWSALD, CONTAINED NO KEY TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OWSALD STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK, WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OWSALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES, HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD HARDING EFFECT ON OWSALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS FEBRUARY REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING CIRCOLO HAD DETERMINED OWSALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.
of Oswald's correct description should
have been sufficient to

Note: In the original document, the text seems to be cut off or
incomplete.

As an example, to "send,"


in any case of the Mays to "send"

such a photo of Oswald," Admiral

reluctantly delivered to the Department of

Wray the following message:

"To Mr. Oswald...

"It is requested that you forward

to this office as soon as possible
two copies of the most recent
photographs of your home subject.

We will forward them to our representative
in Mexico, who will attempt to
determine if the home Oswald in
Mexican city and subject are the same
individual."
within its limitations and capabilities, Major City status had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions. Headquarters had been advised and took other agencies which investigated firing incidents in Oswald had been advised both in Ray, Washington, and in the field. Major City had no further contact by Oswald it report became as it was necessarily secretory. He had left Major City on 2 October. Oswald was not an agency investigation responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph it would have taken very special efforts trying by the other interested U.S. agencies to have
made a positive identification in receipt of Oswald's dental registration number 5312. The matching was at the post mortem.

22 November 1963.

The insertion of the bullet from the unidentified fusilier into the brain of Kennedy.

15. On 22 November 1963, the Police Dept. at 22:15 p.m.

...the bullets were after leaving of the - possibly I have it entirely in connect

with the assassination and obfuscring

its earlier bullet... message was dated and

14th, poly of 10 October. The Station

REQUEST PRIORITY POUCH PHOTO OSWALD SO THAT STATION

CAN CHECK ALL RECENT PHOTO COVERAGE FOR BERN H. H. FORDING

SOONEST COPIES OF ONLY VISITOR TO SOUVENIR FOT TO WHO COULD

BE IDENTICAL WITH OSWALD.

CEC

16. It is clear that Police Station had lost
provides that according to its own
communication, the modified male
was identified as "M. S.," and
that the accurate description of the
soldier transferred by "B." in the 9th
published

was

for

the

Switz.

honor..." in October. He could
be identified, I think..."

10. The Switz. had meanwhile begun an
exhaustive and accelerated review of all
its technical and photographic intelligence
and dispatch was prepared in accordance
with the indications given in the cable of
22 November, cited in para. 15 above. The
dispatch noted that photoreconnaissance of
the unidentified individual had been
confirmed. Age was 40. Weight 15

October 22nd, 1963

The event of the 22nd of October 1963

1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained on 4th October 1963 which appeared to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4th October 1963.

2. Copies of these photographs were shown to The U.S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief of Mission, Mexico, on that date.

P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as person entered the Cuban Embassy.

Attached were eight photographs (two marked on back as 1 and 2) showing the man involved in a white shirt and tie (impressed on many) shown by individual in a black shirt. I have chosen to be described that the man "poly" was probably involved in the second of 4p.m. at Havana. Photograph 17. That the station was working under pressure.

Draft is apparent from the face of the dispatch which contains a material fact based on a postscript. That fact was noted inserted simultaneously by cable to N.Y. at 00:53 22nd and 23 November.

1. Next Station has photos same unidentified American type who is possibly Oswald entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October. Searching for possibility photo-documented entry Cuban Embassy other days.

2. Also attempting establish Oswald entry and departure Mexico.
Photographs will be forwarded to the

American

The Chief of Station, M. H. Smith, reports directly
via the cable telephone to the
Western Hemisphere
Chief of Station, T. H. King. At
the request of the Ambassador, who has

been to the Embassy,

and secured permission from the

Photography to the Legal Attaché and to

Ambassador.

The most 

development

is clearly reflected in a personal note

by the Chief of Station to the WH Hemisphere

Chief of Station, which

marked for delivery together with copies

of the photographs by the WH Representative.
My cable (8214 2 time, 23 Nov,)

FBI agent left here 2045 local time with two cases each of six photos of a person suspected to be Oswald by special flight for Alaska. He is carrying envelope with one copy each photo for air mail agency from Alaska to Tokyo at home or pub telephone conversation with lift etc I say I reach by this phone plan a call of desk I two photo carriers my some plane leaving the latest Kennedy forwarded by memorandum clearing my regular French letters. No idea I above but this ships want a stuffer 0 curious addition photo(s)

23. J. P. received 8422 3 time 23 Nov 1963
Cancelling its urgent immediately preceding

Agent

1. NO NEED SEND STAFFER WITH PHOTOS. WE HAVE ASKED NAVY FOR PHOTOS AGAIN, BUT MEXI CAN SEE OSWALD'S PICTURE SOONER ON THE PRESS WIRE.

2. HAVE JUST RE-EMPHASIZED TO O'DENY HQ'S THE SENSITIVITY OF PHOTOS YOU ARE Sending AND ALSO RELAYED NAMES OF TRAVELERS WITH SIMILAR NAMES. NOTE RADIO SAYS OSWALD LIVED UNDER ALIAS OF O.H. LEE.
Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attache copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to you.

Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, the Ambassador decided that this was important enough to have a member of the Legal Attache's office take copies of these pictures to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attache is making a special flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal Attache's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to mail this material to you for me.

Copies of these photographs are also being sent by pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of 22 November 1963.

Best wishes,

Win [Signature]

According to the oral brief comment on the letter, the legal attaché's officer was Eldon Rees. He was the one who took the photographs to the Ambassador.

17. The decision to present the photographs to the FBI in Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief Justice, who attended meetings with the FBI agents' department reported to him.
My 20th:

The FBI sent that the photo of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico States sent to Dallas were not of Lee Oswald. Presumably Mexico States has checked the dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent old photos. For possible shots of Oswald.

Nov. 22:48 23rd, 23 Nov 1

20. And at this point, Mexico City States agreed.

Saw photo of Lee Oswald on television might 22 Nov and it showed photos sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee Oswald held in Dallas. Date on photo on Oswalds's in Mexico City. Authorities all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban embassies.

(22:54 2 23rd, 23 Nov 1963)

24. Four hours later the photos reported.

The results of the picture is all in effort to secure all available.
Coverage:

Complete reliance on photos full
width of civilian bodies from
August through first half of
November against good press.
Photos show no evidence of
American deaths. Japanese killed
against all direct civilian photos
from 1 September. Note only
photo ever known to us of the
landing (28 September)
Sabotage on which landing
closed and we have since had
cover... the story goes with
report at least half story...
36. With this communication the reader is
"uninstructed individual" reaches the
end of Phase 1, the key element of
at least which is the conviction latent, then
expressed, that the photographed
individual may be identical with
 Ronald Celschtad, i.e. This applied
especially to the victims, though
at a certain point even they, moved
by their emotional state, depicted the facts
that it was of great
dispute to everyone.

37. The reader has attempted to
deal with literally every item
in the case record that forms a
hearing on what happened. The
presumed guilt, inculpatory and
to high esteem and affection, especially in matters of speech or style, equally evident - because of the
the 10-10 advantage of hindsight -
s to the evidence of non-performance.
Differently, attributably, given
It was a critical failure, for example,
that no photo of Oswald was
made available - though it was
apparently requested both at headquarters
and by the field - or that it was
not more aggressively sought by CIA,
before the 22nd of November. A photo-
graph of Oswald would have attested
in a way the mere possession of a
correct physical evidence could not -
the whole subsequent deterioration
3. It should be clear that additional evidence is necessary to determine the exact cause of cell death, which may be due to factors such as oxidative stress, apoptosis, or necrosis.

4. Despite the presence of various potential causes, the specific mechanism of cell death remains unclear.

Cell death can be categorized into several types: apoptosis, necrosis, and autophagy. Apoptosis is a regulated form of cell death that involves the activation of a series of enzymes and proteins leading to the disassembly and engulfment of the dying cell by neighboring cells. Necrosis, on the other hand, is an uncontrolled form of cell death that occurs due to severe injury or damage to the cell. Autophagy is a process where cells degrade their own components in a lysosome-like structure to recycle materials and energy.
evidence of conspiracy.

and Development
38. The Genesis, ODUM Exhibit No 1 and
Commission Exhibit 3287
Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell

Heber D. Odum, on 23 November
1963, had after an unsuccessful
search of the six photos,
& flown up from Mexico City to
presumably to Oswald's mother,
Marquita Oswald. ODUM himself
had trimmed the top the background
by straight cut. Mrs. Oswald had no recognition of the image in
the photograph. Bardwell's own details
account may be found in the

Hearings, p. 268, p

with these few
39. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It is one of the 5 photos taken of him in front of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after Oswald had left the city.

40. At this point, for the record, the total available coverage of the unidentified individual comprises 12 photographs:

- 5 taken later on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet embassy. He is wearing a high-necked white shirt;
- 5 taken on 4 October 1963 in front of the Soviet embassy. He is shaved, in a dark, open-necked shirt and dark trousers;
- 2 taken on 65 October 1963 in front of the Cuban embassy.
a history of mental instability and was committed to Crewe Hospital (originally for nervous invalids) in April 1866.
Interested conversation with Cuba housing
Employee Hugh McGeeon, 12th Floor

About 5 hours after the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, Hugh, a Cuba housing employee, received a telephone call from an "incident reporter" male reporter. The caller
asked if he had heard the latest news. Hugh, feeling a little
nervous, replied: "Yes, of course. I hear it almost before Kennedy.... Imagine, one, two, three such news, that makes three (three times), what
hammarica!.....

But, speaking again on the conversation, Hugh also states that just at
Sloan Dorrin's short been ended the 1st words, just again that they were celebrating to
Beto and Kennedy, one word by the group, just coincided with burial. Just, although
she planned to move that might into the house of
my doctor (unrecorded),

Hugh asked, "What's going to post party scene?"

"It's going to be a beautiful tenancy,

Hugh, in fact, is simply slightly
talking.

by the following week:"

NW 65990, Docld:32374797, Page 51
regarded by the Mexican authorities. It is
from various sources that it is known that he became engaged in an assassination on 27 September last year.

Evelin Azcarraga

J. Manuel Eugenio Vela. [Note: In the text, the name of an individual is repeated, possibly indicating a mistake or emphasis.]

(Vela was) a member of the National Assembly and his last name was Eugenio. Vela was identified on 27 September last year by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of agents for the purposes of assassinating General Cesar Canseco. Vela was identified as a member of the National Assembly. The assassination was attempted on 27 September last year.

On 27 September last year, Vela's principal

operation was mentioned as being the assassination project of the year.

The letter above is (likely handwritten) on 31st

Of the events mentioned in the letter, it was

important to note that all individuals, either legally or illegally, were not free from suspicion. The letter also stated the importance of checking a procedure which
There is no evidence in the Correll case that Robert Brown was subjected to a systematic identification interrogation that isolated him. I would have related this situation dealing with Correll, etc., to which I am not

concerned by intercept — with the

With the

data which I have not had on the

With the column which is its perception and

methods — in cipher city, I don't remember

for a case with something particular, etc.,

As far the allegedly made to state for the application to broadside reality

by a local employee.
Dear Chief,

What was the answer to the question, "Was that the real question?" Before accepting the union stay in its form, could it have happened without the key elements above cited knowledge and premonitions?

The reply was: It is doubtful that the reply could be other than a qualified negative and in that case, it is probable that Carter's renunciation of intelligence and security services that became more in the file than had been surfaced in the form of statements. But the former, this suggests that

Interesting to the beginning: "without

..."
would make what she said to the uninformed.

[Handwritten text:]

...[illegible texts]

...[illegible texts]

This was confirmed at the time.
Since then we can, but limited, singularity to

[Handwritten note]

The intercepts, however, in hindsight of

[Handwritten note]

the Soviet Union investigations have been neglected

[Handwritten note]

(or that content to criticism at least;

[Handwritten note]

he superintendent to reconsider the implications

[Handwritten note]

of the intercepted telephone conversations

[Handwritten note]

on 26 November 1963.

[Handwritten note]

(Until now the Cuban President, Mr. Roca,

[Handwritten note]

and the Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquin

[Handwritten note]

Jimenez Arrieta, became the blunt of

[Handwritten note]

the conversation dealt with the matter of

[Handwritten note]

question relations with the United States,

[Handwritten note]

in which the President and the United States

[Handwritten note]

leaders about money payments, and the Cuban

[Handwritten note]

interrogations.)

As of September 1963, the Cuban leaders

[Handwritten note]

spread the Cuban Communist Party. In the spring
the account of how
she had been taken into custody
and had been interrogated after the examination

suggested

that most of what was said was already

verified. She added that under circumstances

which did not permit the lawyer to challenge
a strict verbatim report of what she said or
let alone obtain any kind of personal
information with her.
He is walking in a dark alley with the lights on.

The photographs of all of them were taken and are now held by the federal prosecutors.

The result of O'Dell's display of the photograph - the agent, a cropped version of one of the victims under gun 40(1), Moore - was Mrs. Hagwood, Oswald's alleged sister, shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack Ruby, a day before he perpetuated that deed! Again, the Warren commission Report 2 (pp. 364-367) exonerating disparities of this erroneous charge, must not be repeated here.

And requires no repetition here. A complicating fact, sparked along developed along the way was Mrs. Oswald's (correct)
Observation when she finally admitted

that the Commission that the Odum

photograph

can not be Ruby, nor that the

Photograph had been crossed differentially

from the one she had been shown

in Dallas. Under the Odum photo-

graph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see


42. The net effect of these events

of the Commission was to acquire

the admission of the photograph into
evidence in a new set of proceedings

beginning with Odum, including

the FBI photo inspectors, James R. Nalby

who had been the chief photographer

by the Commission in Washington) and

Mr. Holmes, who had the photograph

that originated was derived for the

originate. These documents speak
for themselves and will be found in the Harrigan, Vol. XI pp. 468-20.

43. Mexico City Station and other senior agency officials strongly advised against the publication of the photograph in any form on the grounds that the Soviet Union would be immediately alerted to the existence of a useful and still continuing U.S. intelligence operation and the operation would go down the drain. (Astrophysics in the Atomic Age.)

Despite repeated cable exchanges and most cordial discussions by this topic, there were repeated cables on this point between headquarters and Mexico City.
station failed during the summer of 1964 and in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the station
failed and plans were underway to abandon the operation.

[Signature]

44. In accordance to the United States
commissioners request for a deposit
Mr. Reich, then the Deputy Director for
Affirmative Action replied to Mr. Roskin by
memorandum on 25 June 1964 stating

"The Central Intelligence Agency
45. The needs of the Commission provided once the President's statutory obligation to protect persons and methods. The "unidentified individual" remains to this day unidentified and there is no credible evidence to rebut the assertions made by Mr. specifying the concluding sentence of his memorandum to Mr. Requiring re 23 June 1964,... And the photo...
soon, as predicted, go down the drain. Within a year much of the public exposure of the Okhran Exhibit #1 and Communist Exhibit #37, members of the Soviet embassy began systematic effort to survey buildings for rental space. The operation was continuing in any case. Within a year it had become almost totally unproductive in Congress or American public with the embassy -- a clear sign that the category of visitors had been been warned away by the Soviets themselves.
INDEX OF CONTENTS SELECTED

Documentation Archaic Bearing
On the Unidentified Photograph of The Individual

1. Mexico Station telegram 6453 (IN-36017) 9 October 1963. 1 page.

2. CIA Headquarters telegraphic dissemination to Department of State, FBI and Department of the Navy. (DIR-74673), 10 October 1963. 2 pages.

3. CIA Headquarters Cable to Mexico Station (Act 74830), 10 October 1963, 22:09 2 times. 3 pages.
4. Mexico Station telegram 6534
(IN- 40357), 15 October 1963, 1 page
(CC, A-1, G-1, Headquarters,
electrical distribution to
the Department of the Navy), 23
October 1963, 1 page.

5. Mexico Station telegram 7014
(IN- 66781), 22 November 1963, 1 page

6. Priority Dispatch from Mexico
City Station (HMMA- 225753),
22 November 1963. [Encloses copy
of photo of unidentified individual,
taken 1, 4 and 15 October 1963.] 1 page and attachment.

7. Mexico Station telegram 7019
(IN- 66846), 22 November 1963,
(1 page, 00:53 24 Nov.)

8. Private letter by Chief of Station,
Mexico, Mr. Win Scott to Chief
of WH Division, Mr. J. K. King,
22 November 1963.

9. México Station telegram 7021 (IN- 66896), 23 November 1963, 1 page.

10. México Station telegram.

10. CIA HQ telegram to México Station, DIA- 81822, 23 Nov- 1963, 1 page.


[Forward transcript texts]
1. Mexico: Action - Telegram, 2027 (In = 671899)


Mail H. Em. in Mexico #29 to Mexico, E. Zabala


15. Mexico: Action - Telegram, 2027 (In = 671899)
17. Alpayin Station: 7035 (Enr-67255)
   23 Nov 1965, 22:54 2 tons.
18. Memorandum for the Record by Chief 2 Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission, 3 pages and covering dispatch (MA-23288, 11 April 1964)

19-23. Extracts 27, 28 September, end 1, 3 October 1963. For 27 and 28 texts in both German and English, for 1st and 3rd, in English translation only.

24-26. Four photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, 1 October 1963.

27-29. Four photographs of unidentified individuals in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.

30. Four photographs of unidentified individual, total in front of Soviet Embassy, 15 October 1963.
31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hyo correspond-
cence, vol. pages 3

218, 29 May and 26 June and
3 July 1967 relating to negative of
photograph stated at 24-30, above.

35. letter by DG1 Deputy Director for Plans,
Mr. Kelmer to Mr. J. E. Robert, 23
July 1947, 1 page.

36-7. Two 2 affidavits by Trudeau D.
ODUM, James R. MALCOLY and Richard
UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproduction J. Odum Exhibit No1
[Handwritten note: (Hearings, vol. XX, p. 691)] and
Commission Exhibit 237 (Hearings
vol. XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED
39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 864-8 and 867, dealing with the photograph of the unidentified individual. \textit{UNCLASSIFIED}

\ldots (Classified)

40. A Selection of Sentimental Documents reflecting Age and Mexico Hatos Reacting to and Handling J. F. the Warren Commission Publication of the Photograph of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letters by CIA General Counsel, Associate R. Houston to the Honorable Bernard J. Bagert, Limousit District Court, for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967, 2 pages. \textit{UNCLASSIFIED}

42. Correspondence with Emory C. Brown 4, 17 April 1970, 3 pages. \textit{UNCLASSIFIED}
Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. Hoch, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 4 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

Correspondence and related to Bernard Feist-Wald Jr. March 22, 1971 (8 April (2 works); 9–18 February 1972; 24 Feb – 6 March 1972; 11–13 April 1972; 26 and 27 June 1972; 28 Apr and 13 August 1972; and 24 August

by Mr. Houston to Director, FBI re

11 October 72 together with ten supporting pages, a Cable from Mexico City dated 3 October, and a memo of interview, dated 11 October, 1972.

43 pages.
De/ Apr

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the Hon. George Ball File on Allegations of the Castro-Cuban link to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The attached is to submit at the express request of Mr. David B. Belin as a follow-up to question 83 of his letter to this Agency of 15 April 1975.

The results as I have already told him should answer, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and its staff had laid before them in 1964 on the subject.

The results of the review are stipulated in the attached text portion of this Addenda.
Photograph - the
undistinguishable individual, submitted
again with age.

The seems to be no reason to
attach these copies of the F Paper
from the file to this Summary. These
are for use in
significant.
Background

Saturday evening, September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in an act unusual for him, appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana. Even more unusual was his submission to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent Daniel HARKERS.

HARKERS' interview reached New York on Sunday, September 8, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, September 9. There can be no question from the facts surrounding which had not been expected, the Castro appearance, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message through registration on the record in the
Carter's statements

United States. The Carter interview

concerned to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally
with Cuban American
government leadership, with particular
President Kennedy whom he
extravagant in extraordinarily provocative
for the ("... Kennedy is a crook;... the
Batista of his time... the most important
American President of all time.").

There

were also links to Senator Goldwater,

The interview broached other content
with uncomplimentary reference
to Senator Goldwater and Cuban delay
in signing the limited nuclear test
stand. There were significant differences
here and agreements played by
the Times, the New York and
Washington, whereas this with a result
that Castro's "message" was significantly modulated.

In New Orleans, where he briefly resided until the middle of September 1963, the Hacker story appeared in the principal morning newspaper, the *Times-Picayune* on Monday, Sept. 9, page seven under the column headline: "Castro Blasts Rebels on Cuba. Says U.S. Leader Imprisoned by Aid to Rebels." The story then appeared under the banner headline:

---

The *New York Times*, in its coverage on Sept. 9, read a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat.
on the Kennedy assassination. The
Cobb interview was considered a
following up leads for in dealing
with the the Warren Commission and
its Staff. 

Although Mexico States
specifically directed its attention
to the AP story, there is no evidence that the Warren Commission
staff itself pursued
Dublee's activities. Cobb
is the most important
implication.

The purpose of this report is to
reconsider the timing of Oswald's activity
and the assumptions
that Oswald was a newspaper reader
and that or on
which the based from
Marina Oswald's testimony and other
she read the Dallas Times Morning
and threat on reports alone.
The results of the review—admittedly

looking backward on the 20-20

guilt of hindsight—may be

stipulated in summary:


1. There is no increment of evidence of
    of JFK's Secret or Cuban political,
    intelligence or security service involvement
    to what was developed and
    considered by the Warren Commission
    and its staff. The Commission’s
    finding therein that LEO made the bullets
    for the Irish Catholic evidence
    of JFK and staff, or was involved
    therein in any way, must stand.

2. “Credible evidence” that would
   significantly modify the Judge did (and how)
   not exist in Washington, so far as
   is shown that such evidence could
pathological functions of Oswald...
which represented gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post
had rewritten (Sept 9, p. A-7) which,
pointedly, omitted any reference to the
main thrust of Carter's remarks. The
Evening Star omitted the Hersea Star
merely in its entirety (not truncated
in the seventeen section of the paper
(9 Sept 1963, Page B-4). But rendered
the context of the Hersea interview,
placing the emphasis on the Cold political
aspect - in particular heighting the Cold-
water element between and bringing
the Carter's explicit warning to US.
leadership in the middle part of
this piece.

There is no evidence in the file...
with or without his knowledge or
mon policy. His knowledge of the
President's directive, Robert Kennedy
was not personally involved with
crime under matters at the
federal level after the Bay of Pigs
failure.
Delgado was probably the closest personal friend to General MacArthur during his period at El Toro Marine Corps Base in 1957.

The Women's Commission Report states:

"General MacArthur told Delgado that he was in touch with him, but Delgado was not sure, and felt this was not accurate."

Mr. Delgado testified:

"...I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I knew was to get in touch with the Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that still being粒子

and his life was to continue as usual."

The period was one of transition in U.S.-Cuban relations, often tense. Delgado and Belgrade at the outset, were

little critical supporters, believing in the potential for a peaceful resolution. Delgado testified:

"...I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I knew was to get in touch with the Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that still being party.
"...I see this envelope in his front box, addressed to..."

...I see this envelope in his front box, and it was addressed to his wife, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could estimate that was signed from Los Angeles, and I never took more than was a letter from him. And just after he actually mailed this letter, if you knew how it would never go out, and stay more than just all the way....

"...he laid one minute, after he started receiving letters. The last one written..."
Then, when it came back, we were meeting
we had every meeting

"He asked, how long did he expect to live?

"He asked, about an hour and a half, a

"He asked, you were asked because in the

"He asked, No No...

"He asked, had you seen the one that

"He asked, I did; because I thought it

"He asked, I did, because I thought it

"I used to pick up my mail and take it

"... and he also started sending

"... and he also started sending

NW 65990 Docld:32374797 Page 89
"The buckle. Was that written in Spanish, isn't it?

"I think so, do you know?

"Belgardo, but I can't recall..."

"Belgardo. Did you have any memory of believing these things came to kinds from the Cuban corregidores?

"Belgardo. Well I have it for granted that they did after I saw the college icon... something like a Mexican eagle, with a key, mysterious sort of thing. They have different colors on it, red and white, that looked like some colors you know, but I can't recall, the school, I just know, been in Cuba, Burundi, something like that. I couldn't remember, two, three, it was Cuba..."

"The buckle. You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban corregidores?

"Belgardo. No. But he first told me, yes, just before I found out that such a... in the wall, because he was drawing much from them, and one time she appealed to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested, because of the time we had to work to do, and I never got to see that for you again, you know..."

"The buckle. Did he tell you what his correspondences with the Cuban corregidores was about?"

"Belgardo. No, he didn't..."
The lady, who we met, indicated to your mother that she would like to have a conversation with you about going home to Korea?

Mr. Kelly. No. The only thing he told me was that right after we had this conversation with the people, they were that he was going to have the summer off, he was going to go back home.......

Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives.


Hearings cited as, Hearings.

March 27, 1959. In May 1959 he was appointed as a U.S. lawyer for the Iran oil company, a position for which he had previously applied.


Delgado's testimony concerning the cost of wounded soldiers, indicating that it would be of great importance to ensure their treatment at the most effective rate. The direct costs involved were substantial.
In the interest of secrecy, a cover-up by CPK, September 1963, Washington stations forwarded to NAP in January 1964 a duplicate copy of a new report by a penetration team dated 5 January 1962, describing events at the year's cell meeting. The cell leader, Homer SWANZEBERG, told the NAP that he had told that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a new sect party: "We need not occupy ourselves over the politics of President Kennedy because we know according to our information, that he will die within the present year, 1963."

The report supposedly had been transmitted by the NAP dispatch, but it had been received and was not forwarded until the dispatch was received, all of its content, in compliance.
assumptions, The fig which we follow up
formal
be confirmed, the document not from

will to be any significant necessity

issues in that regard.


some reputedly after the American invasion, indicated that at the secret meeting on 7 Nov. 1863, "Colonel" [illegible] mentioning Ricardo’s efforts to discuss the cause,[illegible] and the implications with a British military diplomat, concluding with the following admonition: "...just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." After the more specific threat, what would happen were stated. Scott replied: "Just wait, just wait." [illegible]

(These facts were passed to the American Commissioner, Mr. [illegible], subsequently reported to someone.)
Some immunities extended certainly
given to all patrician communities
contract between monarch and agent e
by later governments, etc. in principle

8

6. [Signed, K. H. C. S.]

[Handwritten note: V. M. S. in circles, I think.]

Among these cases, which concerned in V.
with names in large and other wise and
principally the 35 in the 2.5 per cent.

Nineteenth century, 26 November, 1903, etc.

[Handwritten note: I. V. D. S. in circles, I think.]


And opposite, in New York (to the
right) William N. Halsey, Jr.
Roy Dobkin

The Alvarez case is discussed in detail by the Warren Commission, with the cryptograph "D." [Alvarez claims]


account

that he had seen a man, whom he identified as Oswald, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in a

queue at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City.

Alvareno's story was ultimately "tested" and

the conclusion reached that he was lying

by the construction of

the use of the polygraph method.

Although

Oswald's deceptions, and this brings

Alvareno's Nuremberg piracy
The Alvarado story is particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence. When it occurs, certain elements of the Alvarado story persist despite the modification of its major premises. In the case of ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1961, it followed consistently with the veracity of the presence in the transaction of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

Cesar Gaviño de Paz is a medical, articulate and socially prominent citizen,
married, has separated, from a high-risk, Mexican American service officer. She is, also, the cousin of Heracio Duran, the husband of Silvia Duran. Listed above. Key names.

There is a strong personal antipathy between these two women. Virginia descending from Elena Carrillo's trenchant anti-communist.

Butler's Secret Service appointment from October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1965. The former Political, Charles Thomas, now a U.S. Embassy, Ottawa, has kept up a steady stream of reports and memoranda reflecting 690RD's account of what actually had gone on between Oswald and Silvia Luban and particularly Thorne in September 1963. His testimony, including an alleged interview to a Negro writer.
The first reference to the Garro's

_The Grandfather_ was mated in
Mexico Stalin

a memorandum of Record dated

12 Oct 1864.

Elena Garro (said) that she

and her daughter were invited
to a party at the Cuban Embassy
during the period she was in Cuba.
She would never have been
invited by a Cuban society
in the Cuban Embassy unless her husband
was a cousin of the Garro family.

At the party there were

some other Spaniards, not

drinking, not playing cards, and

not just standing around
together like there were on a
town. The were so obviously

out of place, she asked someone
in the Cuban Embassy about

them and was told by them,

"they were just passing through.
" She

asked, and one of the many

Spaniards sitting with

her asked a good looking lady

and her daughter. When morning

arrived, tomorrow and tomorrow's
pictures were spread out the next

year, both Elena and her daughter,
immediately said that he was one of the three gunmen without a doubt, at the party.

Coppo repeated her story to Mr. William Aricka Thomas, the shipping officer, on 10th Aug 1963. He said that after her return from abroad, she went accompanied by her daughter to a party, at the home of Ruby Darroch. 

[Emphasis added. Ruby is one of the two brothers of Horace Darroch], who was married to a cousin. She met Oswald and a young American. At the party she was desconversad from others with him. Other guests were the Cuban couple, Arce; General Clark flour, Silvia O'Hara, who she later learned was Oswald's mother, whom he was here, Envia Cora O'Hara, and a later American Negro man with her.
and had. Chevalier added. I saw

November 1963 when the identity of the

conspirators became known, she and her

doughter went to the American Embassy

dressed "American" and acting as relays

of the spy team. Shortly afterward,

she and her daughter (now writing as a
friend, Manuel, P. V. K., then

an official in the State Department) were

arrested. The copies were searched at the

time by E. Chevalier, and were

found to be blank and obscure letters

in the center of France. The women kept

silent for 8 days under protest

that they were in danger. When

she told that Chevalier she wanted

to go to the American Embassy and

explain, without the knowledge of Conrad,

she was told that the American

Embassy was full of Communist

agents.

On the 25 Dec 1965 and 9 Jan 1966 to

further interview with Thomas, Chevalier

and her daughter elaborated and so...
My memory, I think, is not very clear, but I remember the incident in November 1968. My father was in the church and heard the children singing. He did not give much credit to them. They did not sing in a very concerted manner. Afterward, my father turned around and said, "I wonder if they are all Christians?"

I am not sure if he meant anything by this, but it was certainly a question to me. He always seemed to be very particular about matters of faith. All who knew him knew that
und his disengagement from the chart at the CIA chief of staff in 23 Dec 1965 and to the Ambassador in 23 Dec 1965.

Phil.

The embassy political officer, present in his interview and reporting, a memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which Mr. Moiseyev identified the letter to which he had been taken by Col. Voskod, as the 46626

Vernon. (This detail checked out affirmative.) At the

date of 23-24, 25-26, and 28-29, November 1963.) Luncheons on 7 Feb 1967 in which Col. Voskod continued discussions with the Embassy are set out. He and

finally, began Thomas's retirement from U.S. State Government service, by August 28 August 1969,

int. 7 State at his request, discontinue to CIA and FBI a cooperate program.
HERNÁNDEZ

BEGINNER in March 1962. He joined

Benjamin J. ROYCE

CUBA in June 1962 and trained in

Contras. He was sent to Cuba to

work with CIA and later met with CIA officers.

Cuban students at the

University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

Also in 1963, Contreras was introduced to

by a CIA officer.

He studied law at the University of Mexico for 3 years, approximately 1960-1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-Castro Revolutionary group at the University. Despite the opposition, Oswald was extremely

Contras and although he was not able to meet

with students and see them, he said

Oswald visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban 'hustler' refused him a

visa to visit Cuba. Oswald made inquiries regarding pro-

Cuban Revolutionary groups at
the University and was directed to continue and his friends. Oswald met Contursi and some other persons in the crime but she, like many other figures, was not involved in the events held in the faculty of Philadelphia. Oswald took the group of his friends to visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy showed them around the city. He requested and from Congress’s group, Contursi and others maintained. Oswald became very upset he was in Cuba’s provocation. The group allowed Oswald to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. Oswald was very interested and seemed to be slightly relieve. Oswald met some members of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

With 781 knowledge,
At this point, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that Contursi was indeed at the University of Mexico but during only two years, 1954 and 1960. that he had been publicly associated with activity in the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BEC) in
No further work was reflected in the file on the虐待 allegations. In contrast from the uncorroborated claims made by Contoso about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility which was itself adequate to substantiate a number of his accounts. Over time, being accused made him less likely to admit having been there. The University had a policy of not allowing for an extended period with a University student group.
22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021
(IN -- 66896), 23 November 1963.
02.44 2 twin.

10. Mexico Station telegram

11. Mexico Station telegram
7027 (IN -- 67185), 23 Nov 1963.
20:43 2 twin 1 paga.

12. Mexico Station telegram
7025 (IN 67186, 23 Nov 1963
20:34 2 twin) and 7033 (IN --
Forward transcript texts.
11. MFA Nyp. telegram to Mexico Nyp.,
     Dlr - 84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,
     0136 z.t.w. and 04:22 z.t.w., respectively.
     1 page, each.

12. MFA Station telegram, 7027 (In - 67879),
     23 Nov 1963, 20:43 z.t.w. 1 page.

13. MFA Station telegram, 7025, 23 November
     1963, 16:55 z.t.w. [7025 transcript
     information] 2 pages

14. MFA Station telegram, 7025, 23 November
     1963, 17:24 z.t.w. 1 page.

15. Mexico Station telegram (De - 89789),

16. Mexico Station telegram 7024, 23 Nov 1963,
17. Bioply Station 7035 (Inv-67255), 23 Nov 1963, 22S-2 TNN.
18. Memorandum For the Record by Chief I.
Station, Myer, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit
by Their Staff Representative to Warren
Commission, 3 Farrar and Overly,
February (NHRA 23.0249, 14 April 1964)

19-23. Intercept 27, 28 September,
and 1-3 October, 1963. 2 Feb 27 and
28, text in fifty groups and English, for
15 and 35, in English translation only.

24-26. Four photographs of unidentified
individual entering and leaving
Soviet Embassy (1 October 1963.
Myer City, St. Louis)

27-29. Four photographs of unidentified
individuals in front of Soviet Embassy,
Myer City, 4 October 1963.

30. Two photographs of unidentified
individuals taken in front of Soviet
Embassy, 15 October 1963.
31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hyg correspondance, 1964, 3

   18, 24 May and 26 June and

   3 July 1967 relating to negative of
   photographers noted at 29-30, above.

35. Letter by Mr. Deputy Director for Plans,
    Mr. Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23
    July 1977. 1 pgs.

36-7. Test 3 affidavits by Charles D.
       Odum, James R. Maclay and Richard
       UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No. 1

   (Herning, vol. X, p. 691) and

   Commissioner Exhibit 237 (Herning
   vol. XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED
39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, page 364-5 and 667, dealing with the photograph of the unidentified individual. UNCLASSIFIED

40. A Selection of Pertinent Documents reflecting Hugo and Mexico Hatios Reactions to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publication of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Insurance R. Hortenstine to the Honorable Bernard I. Bajerst, Cameron District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with Jerry L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNCLASSIFIED
Correspondence with Mr. Paul C. Hich, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 4 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

SIFED

[Redacted]

Correspondence with [Redacted]

Request by [Redacted] for [Redacted]

Bernard Furst, Wald Jr., March 22

1971 8 April (2 MORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 April - 1 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 15 August 1972; and [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Mr. Houston, FBI, an

11 October, 22 written with two supporting,

copies, a cable to [Redacted], dated 3 October, 1972, minutes of interview, dated 11 October, 1972.

43 pages.
The attachment was written at the express request of Mr. David W. Behring, as a follow-up to Question 83 of his letter to the Agency on 15 April 1975.

The results, as I have already told him, add nothing, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and its staff had said before them in 1964.

The subject of the never, nor stipulated in the present act, page 8 of the attach-
The documentation in which
The documentation in which

The documentation in which

The documentation in which

Then seemed to be no reason to
attach these copies of the file reports
from the file to this summary. These

request.
Background

On 9 September 1963, Field Corses, in an act unusual for him, increased at a Brazilian Embassy reception in London. Even more unusual Corses submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker.

Harker's interview occurred on Sunday, September 9th, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, September 10th. There is no question from the facts surrounding the Corses appearance and his agreement to the interview, that the event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message through.
As Castro's statements:

"...Kennedy is a dictator...the Batista of his time...the most opportunist American President of all time."
that Castro's "message" was significantly modulated.

In New Orleans, where the story
reached until the middle of September,
1963, the HARKER story appeared in
the principal morning newspaper, the TIMES-PICAYUNE on Monday, Sept
19, page seven under the
column headline: "Castro Blasts
Rebels on Cuba. Says U.S. Breed
Impeached by Act to Rebels."

The story then followed under the sub-
head:

The New York Times, in its coverage on
Sept 19, used a UPI wire service report which
omitted any reference to the Warning Agent
The results of the review - a summary, as initially intended - are:

1. There is no increment of evidence of a Soviet or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement to what we developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff.

2. "Credible evidence" that would significantly modify this judge's 'findings' (and his) is nowhere found.
of this kind and that varied from the opinion of the working class, particularly in its, count, intelligentsia, component in 1964.


In the absence of additional credible evidence there are "meaning" elements in the sector that emerge about which further research is necessary.


Conclusively, with the light of the


other.


Dear Sir,


shrink, shrink, shrink.


id. Lasts 14-15 minutes, ticket at $1.00. In 1967, survey of 10,000. hms.


important, important, important, important, important, pathological potential.


NW 65990 Docld:32374797 Page 122
political revolution of 1913

for the purpose of redistributing power
to the mass, the

City Council meeting with Field trying to

find a solution.

(Handwritten)

- [Handwritten]

- [Handwritten]

[Signature]

[Handwritten]

[Handwritten]

- [Handwritten]

[Signature]

[Handwritten]

- [Handwritten]

[Signature]

[Handwritten]

[Handwritten]

- [Handwritten]

- [Handwritten]
well is without "As far as the prover: It is knowledge to the intellect of the, studentprather, Brain conscious, who, really unities and to the" thought which, at its, federal level after the say of, Ps. 104
... I saw this envelope in his handwriting, with his name, and it was addressed to me, and my name on it, and so far as I could remember they were even from Los Angeles, and the words he was using were the same letter. And just as he was writing this letter I opened it, and he wrote: "When I go out of jail today, I'll write you the whole story."
"Mr. Delgado. Were they in groups?"

"Yes, sir, in groups."

"How long is the train?"

"The Delgados. Not that, I can see all now..."

"Mr. Delgado. Did you leave any money with them—then they came?"

"Mr. Delgado. Well, I took it for granted that they did, but I never knew: something like a Mexican eagle, with a bag, impressions, and you know. They had different colors in it, red and yellow; but black. They also asked your name, but I don't recall, the older I just knew it was in Latin, 'Austid', something like that, I couldn't understand it, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. You don't know for sure what it was from the Cuban consulate?"

"Mr. Delgado. No. But he had told me privately just before I found the envelope. So the whole doctrine that he was receiving must have been there, and one thing she offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested. Because of the thing. I had the work to do, and I didn't want to see that figure again, you know."

"Mr. Delgado. And to tell you what he could have done, exactly the Cuban consulate was about?"

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

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"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

"Mr. Delgado. Ask. I don't know, sir."

...
"He said, the mood of the crowd was that he was gone — once he got out of the camera he was going to better things."


Honorable, dated 24, October, 1959 to, Hearings.

Congress, application to Stratford College, 1867. 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 1867, 1959.

Dade's statement, the crowd was going...

Nun 65990 Docld:32374797 Page 129
second reflects no significant, identifiable categorization.

In contrast, adjacent paragraphs simply assume that

"control [argue] in less bright hues. The question

therefore is: more than reporting to someone

that would represent, at a minimum, quick

the opening of a file on Oswald?"

US-Canada Border and consular relations

were renewed on 3 January 1961.
...
Some popularities while the author's decisions, indicate that at the present condition, or that the labor and sanctifying Richards. (Refuge) in the Russian labor front, write on labor and their implications with a direct conflict diplomat, reminding us the Sverdlov's admonition: "...just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Author to more specific that what would happen some. Sverdlov replied: "Just wait, just wait, just wait.

(These facts were passed to the Russian Commission for Memoranda, and Brooks. Some trusts were subsequently reported to have a..."
(5) In May, 1965, the Israeli army captured the city.

(6) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(7) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(8) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(9) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(10) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(11) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(12) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(13) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(14) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(15) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

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(17) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(18) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(19) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(20) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(21) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(22) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(23) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

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(39) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(40) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

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(45) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(46) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(47) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(48) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(49) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.

(50) The Israeli army captured the city in May, 1965.
...
the reply would be taken as a valid negative
and in that case, it is probable that
estimates of intelligence and security would be
more precise in the light than has been suggested
in the above the statement. Thus, for example,
this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning, "must
would make sense, so said to be unimportant.

This fact of the case
is also clear.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of the issue, I believe
that we should proceed.

This was examined for
the issue.
The intercepted telephone conversation on 26 January 1963
between the Cuban Incident, 617005
and the American D-5459 in Sargam
seemed to indicate that the theme was
related to the Cuban incident, and

the conversation dealt with the question
of
whether it was known to Cuba.

The theme was related to the Cuban
incident and its consequences in the

later years.
the account I have
illustration that she had been taken into custody
but had been returned after a short
interrogation

repeated
but with no substantiation of what was already
known. She added, "Intelligence
classified information

Just that did not permit the prisoner to challenge
or react with constructive action, but she
went out with the desire for help in her
situation.

best regards. I learned she had received
relatives with lawyers
SUBJECT: THE PHOTO OF AN UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL IN THE
Warren Commission Report: A Factual
Chronological Survey

REFERENCE: Memorandum by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Harry Knoche,
15 April 1975 (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would be appropriate
to reconsider full disclosure at this time of the circumstances
and factual data relative to the subject. The purpose of this
survey is to permit a realistic evaluation of the suggestion.

2. Background. This examination and summary of the record
cconcerns a cropped photograph considered by the President's
Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (hereinafter
cited as the Warren Commission) and introduced into evidence as
Odam Exhibit No. 1. The photograph (together,

labeled, with others of the same individual) originated from a highly
sensitive operation being conducted in October
1963 by the CIA and Mexican security authorities against the
Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

3. Under the extraordinary efforts to develop
information on the assassin and the assassination, copies of the

1 See Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassina-
tion of President Kennedy (hereinafter cited as Hearings), Vol. XX,
page 691.
photograph were made available by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the afternoon of 22 November to the local FBI representative, and later that day, of the Ambassador, copies were forwarded by the U.S. Naval Attaché and conveyed by FBI, by a special flight carried out by the U.S. Naval Attaché, representative to the Dallas office for possible use in the ongoing investigation. One photograph was shown to Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD in Dallas on the evening of 22 November 1963 by FBI Agent Baldwin D. ODUM.

4. The Warren Commission's Report describes the sequence of events at pp. 364-365 and 667 (Attachment B) which ultimately resulted in Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a cropped photo of Jack RUBY the day before he murdered her son. (A further complication leading to this conclusion was the fact that when she had been shown a copy of the same photograph in her appearance before the Commission, it had been cropped by the FBI in a slightly different manner.)

5. No detail in the Warren Commission report illustrates more vividly than this one the difficulties that beset simple truth in the politicized, rigidly determined interpretive climate that has been nurtured by the media over the past decade. The photograph, now acknowledged not to be RUBY, has become a
centerpiece of another hypothesis that holds OSWALD to have been "framed" by the use of a double in his activity in Mexico City. 2

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD - Reporting Mexico City Stay. Although in no way related to Lee Harvey OSWALD or his stay in Mexico City from the morning of 27 May 1963 to the morning of 2 October 1963, it is important to an understanding of the circumstances and handling that was done with the photograph by the Mexico City Station to review the facts about what the Station ascertained and did with information it developed about OSWALD in Mexico City, together with Headquarters action on that information, before the

Nov. 22 November 1963, and immediately thereafter.

7. From all credible evidence known to this time (none, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey OSWALD spent 4 full days and 2 partial days--about 116 hours in all--in Mexico City from about 10:00 a.m. 27 September 1963 to about 8:30 a.m. 2 October 1963. His point of residence was a small commercial traveler hotel, not frequented by "gringos"--the Hotel Commercio --

2 This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and the Man Who Was Not Oswald" by Bernard Fensterwald and George O'Toole in the New York Review of Books, a copy of which is attached to reference (Attachment A).
where he was registered under alias. Exhaustive and detailed
interviews and interrogation by the Mexican authorities and the
FBI established that in the recollection of all hotel personnel
he left early and returned late each day of his stay.

8. Assuming, and allowing for the fact of late arrival and
early departure, that he slept one-third of the time of his stay
(38 or 39 hours), there remain some 78 hours of activity to be
accounted for. Overall, much of CIA's information
can account solely for visits during 27, 28 September and 1 October.

All coverage by CIA during the entire period was technical. The
Station had no live source (living agent) coverage either unilateral
or from Mexican liaison. Oswald was in no sense "under investi-
gation." None of the facts of his defection and stay in the USSR
and return to the U.S., 1959 – 1962, were known to the Mexican
Station files before 10 October 1963 when the information was
forwarded by Headquarters in response to a Station report of
8 October forwarded on a routine basis, what was to be an
American contact for a visa to Cuba in transit to the USSR. This had
indicated and deduced from technically acquired information on
1 October, which was the first and only occasion in which Oswald
identified himself by true name. At no time during his stay in
Mexico City did the CIA acquire a photo of him.
A careful review of all coverage, voice intercept, as well
as photographic, of both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies was made conduct
by the Station on 22 and 23 November 1963 after the assassina-
tion, going back to materials from mid-year. It is, therefore,
firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of OSWALD at any time
during his Mexico trip or stay in Mexico City. Moreover, despite
the request on 15 October, the Mexico Station had no photo of
OSWALD in its records, nor did it receive one from Headquarters
before 22 November 1963.

10. (Voice intercept was processed by the monitor on the
basis of the 1 October intercept—which had been reported to
Headquarters and disseminated to the interested members of the
intelligence community (as an ex-Marine, OSWALD was a Navy and FBI
case under the delimitations, and potentially of interest to the
Department of State)—tuned up matches based on content, not on
announced identity, with materials intercepted on 27 and 28
September 1963. These matches were reported to HQ on 23 November 1963. Judg
based on voice comparison (except what
could be recalled by the monitor—and this was not insignificant amount
because of the uniquely poor Russian spoke by OSWALD) could not
be made because the tapes, in accordance with the normal practice,
had been erased and re-used.)
IV. It must be noted that voice intercept and photographic coverage was not processed in "real time." The nature of acquisition and the volume of the information precluded anything but the spot reporting of items judged by the monitor of more-than-ordinary interest and, therefore, noted in summary logs. Full texts of selected items would require consultation of the tape and either a full transcription or full translation or both. Photo coverage tended to become available in quantity lots which required scanning and selection on a rapid and accelerated basis. One of the "triggers" that normally operated to focus and accelerate the prompt review and reporting of this kind of raw intelligence was the mention of a name. This was precisely what occurred in the second of two conversations Ambassador had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy. During the second, he said he was "Lee OSWALD," and it was this information reported by the Station to Headquarters on 8 October 1963.

13. The Mexico City Station did one more thing in its report on Lee OSWALD based on its 1 October voice intercepts: it coupled this data with descriptive information it had acquired from a collateral sensitive source—a photograph of a male individual, apparently an American, who was observed entering the Soviet Embassy on 1 October. The Station reported these details as a
DRAFT

The Station did not assert or suggest that the

information from the photo was in fact OSWALD, or indeed, in any
way related to OSWALD.

13. Lee Harvey OSWALD - CIA Coverage of His Mexico City Stay.

One additional element of background must be stipulated now as the
final precondition to understanding the relevance (or irrelevance) of
the photo of the unknown individual placed in the chain of
evidence on 23 November in Dallas by FBI Agent Bradwell ODUM:
what was the totality of CIA coverage of OSWALD's
activity as of the afternoon of the
23rd when all available
coverage had been rechecked?

14. The totality of Mexico City Station coverage on, or
reasonably inferable to be OSWALD, consisted of five (5) voice
intercepts as follows:

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1605 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN, a local employee of Mexican nationality of the
Cuban Embassy, conversed as usual, a receptionist, speaks with
an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia DURAN tells
the man that the American citizen was there, the one who
wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union, and he
wants to know with whom he was talking there because she
(Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if
they accepted him and gave him a visa, then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work, only advising Immigration in Cuba. The American (she says) had talked there because he says he was told there would be no problem. The man in the Soviet Embassy says to wait a moment.

A different man (speaks, and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This man says to leave name and telephone number and says he will call back. Silvia gives the telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia also takes advantage of the conversation and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the

Soviet Embassy Bulletin. The man says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then he asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number is 14-13-26. The man says thanks.

b. 27 September 1963 (Friday), 1626 Mexico City time.

An unidentified male calls the Cuban consulate, asks Silvia DURAN if the American had been there. Silvia DURAN says he is there now. The Soviet says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington, that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife, who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in
respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it
takes four or five months, but without having permission from
the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot
issue a visa there without asking Washington. However,
according to this man, he showed a letter indicating he was a
member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans
said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa
for the Soviet Union, and now he (the Soviet) does now know
what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait
for an answer from Washington.

Silvia DURAN agrees the same problem exists with the
Cubans, that the problem with him (the American) is that he
does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it
will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he
was thinking of processing his visa (for the Soviet Union);
because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his
visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba, and from there go to
the Soviet Union. The Soviet said the thing is that if his
wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa
right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to
her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington
but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this
permission, for example here or any place she could receive it
(visa or permission), but right now they do not have them.

Silvia DURAN says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. The Soviet says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia DURAN says then she will put that on the list. The Soviet says he cannot give a letter or recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and asks to be excused for bothering her. Silvia DURAN says that is all right and many thanks.

C. 28 September 1963 (Saturday), 1151 Mexico City time.

Silvia DURAN calls the USSR Embassy and to an unidentified Soviet, says that in the Cuban Embassy there is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet says wait a minute. Silvia DURAN speaks English with someone—-and comments in Spanish that they gave APARICIO telephone 14-12-99 and to take the number down—-Silvia DURAN then says the American citizen is going to talk with you, i.e., the Soviet. The American first speaks Russian and the Soviet speaks English. They continue in English. The American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute. A Soviet takes the phone and asks the American in English what does he want? The American says please speak
Russian. The Soviet says what else do you want? The American
saying I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.
The Soviet says I know that. The American, in hardly recogniz-
able Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the
Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.
The Soviet says why don't you come again and leave your address
with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. The American
says I'll be there right away.

1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1031 Mexico City time.

An unknown male (American) called the Soviet Embassy, the
Military Attaché's number, 15-69-67, and says to an unidentified
Soviet respondent: I was at your place last Saturday and talked
to your Consul. They said that they would send a telegram to
Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?
The Soviet says I would like to ask you to call another phone
number. Please write it down: 15-60-55, and ask for a consul.

Thank you.

1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 1045 Mexico City time. The
same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken
Russian speaks to OSIYEDKOV (a Soviet Embassy guard). He says:
This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday
and spoke to a consul, and they said that they would send a
I telegraph to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul.

OBYEDKOV says: KOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin-?).

OSWALD says yes, my name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, just a minute. I'll find out. They say that they have not received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says, and what . . . ?

OBYEDKOV hangs up.

15. All of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by the Warren Commission staffer in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.3
3. The Warren Commission group that visited the Mexico City Station consisted of Mr. COFLMAN, Mr. SHAWSON, and Mr. WILLIAMS. They examined not only the intercepts a through e above, but others for the 27th and one for 3 October that appeared to have relevance. These have not been included in this summary because they appear, on review, to be excludable from the OSWALD matter on logical or substantive grounds, or both, bearing in mind that the Soviet Embassy received many calls pertaining to visa matters.

On the 27th at 1037 the Embassy received a call from an unknown individual who said he wanted visas to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. OSWALD is known to have arrived at the pla Roja bus terminal on bus #516 at ca. 1000 on the 27th. It was, therefore, possible for him to have made this call. Granting this, it seems unreasonable to believe the calls were OSWALD’s for the following reasons:

a. The caller wanted visas, and specifically for Odessa. OSWALD was seeking a visa and never in any other context did he specify the Black-Sea port of Odessa as a destination.

b. The call was directed to the correct Soviet consular number: 15-60-55. On 30 October, OSWALD first called the wrong number, 15-69-87 (the MA’s number), and had to redirect his call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely he would have made what would have been his initial call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct number, and called the incorrect number on 1 October.

c. There is every reason to believe from the context of the intercepts a through e above that OSWALD’s first destination after arrival and check-in to his hotel, was a visit to the Cuban Embassy.

d. The use of the Spanish language would exclude OSWALD unless he made use of an intermediary, which seems unlikely given what is known of his modus operandi.

1 (footnote)
FOOTNOTE 3 (continuation)

On 3 October at 1539 an individual speaking broken Spanish, then English, called the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa. The Soviet respondent says: Call on the other phone. The requestor says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. The Soviet says: Please call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. The requestor says: One moment please. I'll have to get a pencil to write the number down. They issue the visa there? The Soviet: That depends on your conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call the office of the consul and ask your question. The requestor asks for the number again. The Soviet gives him the number and tells him to ask for the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

The relevance of this intercept to OSWALD is excludable on three grounds:

a. The use of broken Spanish. OSWALD throughout used broken Russian or English. He had no competence in Spanish.

b. The substance of the request indicates a visa request in the first stages of initiation. OSWALD had developed his matter with the Cubans and the Soviets to a point well beyond the stage indicated by the substance of this call.

c. OSWALD had left Mexico City, based on all the credible evidence, the early morning of the previous day, and could not have made this local call.

2 (footnote)
16. Each of these items, including the texts of the raw intercepts, were read, discussed with, and examined by Warren Commission staffers in Headquarters and at the Mexico City Station during a stay from 8 to 13 April 1964.\footnote{footnote is on a separate page, but should be inserted in the final typing as part of the continuous text.}

16. Summing up, we can state, or reasonably infer from the evidence, that OSWALD made the following contacts with the Cuban and Soviet official establishments in Mexico City.

a. 27 September 1963 (Friday). After arrival and check-in to his hotel, OSWALD went first to the Cuban Embassy, where he talked with Mrs. Silvia DURAN. The time of his first Cuban Embassy visit is unknown. The time of his second Cuban Embassy visit was about 1600 (i.e., just before closing). Sometime between the two Cuban Embassy visits, at Mrs. DURAN's indication, he must have visited the Soviet Embassy. We have coverage only on the second Cuban Embassy visit. We have no indication who he talked with at the Soviet Embassy. There was no photographic coverage of OSWALD's entries into either the Cuban or Soviet Embassies on the 27th. The lack of coverage on the Cuban installation is explainable: the camera, based on the recollection of officers still in service in Headquarters, was
Draft

down on the 27th because of mechanical malfunction, which was probably in course of correction. Why OSGARD was missed in his entry to the Soviet installation is not yet explained.

b. 28 September 1963 (Saturday). [Note: Both Cuban and Soviet Embassies were closed to the public on Saturdays. Photographic coverage was normally suspended Saturdays and Sundays.] OSGARD, notwithstanding the holidays schedule, went on Saturday morning to the Soviet Embassy (his second visit) where he spoke to a consul. He apparently could not recall his new Texas address. At ca. 1251 he went to the Cuban Embassy—his third entry—where he had registered it in his visa application the day previously. He secured the address from Mrs. DURAN and she called the Soviet Consulate presumably to permit him to give them the address over the phone. Instead, the Soviet with whom OSGARD spoke over Mrs. DURAN's telephone invited OSGARD to come back in person, and he said he would. (Presumably OSGARD thereupon went back to the Soviet installation (his third entry).)

c. 29 September 1963 (Sunday). No activity registered.

d. 30 September 1963 (Monday). No activity registered.

(It is known that OSGARD reserved space this date on a Mexico City-Laredo bus, departing 2 October 1963 at 0630.)
e. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday). OSSWALD made at least two calls, at 10:31 and 10:45, to the Soviet Embassy. He identified himself twice during the second call when he talked with OBYEDIKOV—a guard—and referred to his talk on Saturday, probably with KOSTIKOV. There was no photographic coverage of OSSWALD on 1 October (from the context of the two calls, one known to the KGB, there would have been no reason for him to go to the Embassy. His case had clearly been placed at the sufferance of the USSR Embassy in Washington. His two calls on 1 October were concerned with whether any reply had been received from Washington. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to believe OSSWALD would have gone to the Soviet Embassy on that date.

19. The camera at about mid-day registered the entry into the Soviet Embassy of an white-shirted individual who among all the photographed people—seemed to be the only person—a non-Latin, and possibly an American—who entered the Soviet installation that day. On the chance that there could be an association between the identification data derived from the voice intercept and the descriptive data derived from the photograph, the Station reported the two elements in its cable to Headquarters on 8 October.
The station’s action was not unusual (considering the primitive and initiatory status of the OSWALD identification).

Many examples of a similar kind of thing can be found in the day-to-day record of Station/Headquarters correspondence and reporting.

19. Developments from 8 October – 22 November 1963. Mexico City station reported to Headquarters on 8 October (received in Headquarters 9 October) the following initial information on OSWALD.

1. On 1 Oct 63, an American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name Lee OSWALD (phonetic), stated he was at SovEmb on 28 Sept when spoke with a consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. Subject asked the Soviet guard [Ivan] OBYEDKOV, who answered, if there anything new regarding a telegram to Washington. OBYEDKOV upon checking said nothing had been received yet, but the request had been sent.

   Mexico Station said it 2./ had photos of a male who appeared to be an American entering Soviet Embassy 1216 hours, leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top.

   Wore khakis and sport shirt.

3. No local dissemination was being made by the Station.
Headquarters responded 0422Z time, 23 November 1963, cancelling its immediately preceding request:

"1. No need send staffer with photos. We have asked Navy for photos again, but Mexico can see OSWALD's picture sooner on the press wire.

"2. Have just re-emphasized to FBI how the sensitivity of photos you are sending and also-relaying names of travelers with similar names. Note radio says OSWALD lived under alias of O. H. LEE."

31. On the 23rd at 1729Z time, Headquarters advised Mexico City:

"The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico Station sent to Dallas were not of Lee OSWALD. Presume Mexico Station has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent photos for possible shots of OSWALD."

31. And at this point, 2048Z time, 23 November, Mexico Station finally agreed:

"Saw photos of Lee OSWALD on television night of 22 November and it obvious photos sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee OSWALD held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos."
"Mexico Station is reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban Embassies."

35. Two hours later (2254Z time, 23 November 1963) the Station had reported the results of its effort to review all available coverage:

"Complete recheck of photos of all visitors to Cuban Embassy from August through first half of November against good press photos shows no evidence of OSWALD visit. Similar against all Soviet Embassy photos from 1 September. Note, only visit we know he made was to Cuban Embassy 28 September, Saturday, on which Embassy closed and we had not had coverage . . . ."
16. With this communication the matter of the

"unidentified individual" reaches the end of Phase 1, the key

element of which is the conviction at first latent, then

expressed, that the photographed individual might be identical

with OSWALD. This applies especially to the Station, though

at a certain point even Headquarters moved no rebuttal despite

the hard facts of quite disparate descriptions of the descriptions of Oswald and the unidentified

individual were quite deplorable.

17. This review has attempted to deal even-handedly with

all items in the case record that have a bearing on what

happened. The operational zeal, innovativeness and the high

commitment of all involved, especially in Mexico City, speaks

for itself. Equally apparent - because of the 20 - 20 advantage

of hindsight - is the evidence of non-performance. It was

a critical failure, for example, that no photo of OSWALD was

made available - though it was expressly requested both at

Headquarters and by the field - or that it was not more

aggressively sought by CIA, before the twenty-second of November.

A photograph of OSWALD would have obviated - in a way the mere

possession of a correct physical evidently could not - the whole

successive deterioration of what began as an impressionistic

selection of the photograph on 1 October 1963 into a cause

celebre today.
never has there been a case quite so clear with less intrinsic merit. Equally clear should be the demonstration of the facts themselves that there was nothing contrived or conspired in what happened unless which we have now descended to that point in human values achieved under STALIN in the USSR and under HITLER in Germany, where just a plain mistake is per se evidence of conspiracy.


Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell D. ODUM, on 23 November 1963 showed one of the six photos flown up from Mexico City the previous day to OSWALD's mother, Marguerite OSWALD. ODUM himself had trimmed the background by straight cuts. Mrs. OSWALD had no recognition of the image in the photograph Bardwell's own detailed account may be found in HEARINGS, op cit, Vol. XX, p. 268

40. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It was one of the five photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after OSWALD had left the city.

41. At this point for the record the total available photo coverage of the unidentified individual numbers twelve photographs:

a. Five taken on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a white shirt a light colored (khaki) trousers.
the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open, button-down shirt with a high neckline under-shirt showing and dark trousers.

c. Two taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy. He is wearing a dark, collarless T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of these are extent and are now held in Headquarters as integral parts of the OSWALD and related file holdings.

42. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph - to repeat, a cropped version of one of those noted under paragraph 41b, above - was Mrs. Marguerite OSWALD's allegation that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack RUBY, a day before he perpetrated the deed! Again the Warren Commission Report (pp. 364 - 365, 367) exhaustively disposes of this erroneous charge and requires no repetition here. A complicating fact developed along the way was Mrs. OSWALD's (correct) observation when she finally admitted before the Commission that the ODUM photograph was not RUBY, was that the photo had been cropped differently from the one she had been shown in Dallas. Inspector MALLEY'S cropped version of the ODUM photograph became Commission Exhibit 237 (see HEARINGS, Vol. XVI, p. 638).

43. The net effect of the developments in the hearing of the Commission was to require the admission of the cropped photograph into evidence in a chain of depositions beginning with
ODUM, including the FBI Inspector, James R. VALLEY (who had trimmed the photograph used by the Commission in Washington) and Mr. HELMS, who deplored for the originator. These documents speak for themselves and will be found in the HEARINGS, Vol. XI, pp. 468-470.

44. Mexico City Station and other senior Agency officers strongly advised against the publication of the photograph in any form on the grounds that the Soviets would be immediately alerted to the existence of a useful and continuing U.S. intelligence operation and the operation would go down the drain. There were repeated cables exchanged on this point between Headquarters and Mexico City Station during the summer of 1964 in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station had plans underway to abandon the operation.

45. In acceding to the Commission's request for a deposition Mr. HELMS, then the Deputy Director for Plans, replied affirmatively to Mr. RANKIN by memorandum of 23 June, 1964 which including the following additional observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as the Agency is aware had no connection with
Lee Harvey OSWALD or the assassination of

President KENNEDY."

46. In this instance the needs of the Commission prevailed
over the DCI's statutory obligation to protect sources and
methods. The "Unidentified Individual" remains to this day
unidentified and there is no credible evidence up to this
time to rebut the assertion made by Mr. HELM's in the concluding
sentence of his memorandum to Mr. RANKIN on 23 June 1964:

And the photo operation did, as predicted, go down the drain.

Within a week of the public appearance of the ODUM Exhibit
No. 1 and Commission Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet Embassy
began systematic efforts to survey the surrounding buildings,

ostensibly for rental space, but clearly their inquiries
were directed to spotting possible camera sites. The operation

was continued in any case. Within a year it had become almost
totally unproductive in coverage on Americans in contact with
the Embassy - a clear sign that this category of visitor was

being warned away the the Soviets themselves.
PHASE THREE: THE "UNIDENTIFIED MAN" PHOTOGRAPHS, 1964 - 1975

As could be foreseen, there has been persistent pressure by critics of the Warren Commission Report to exploit OUX Exhibit No. 4 and Commission Exhibit No. 237 for partisan interpretive purposes. A considerable correspondence has accumulated since the end of 1964 in which the Agency has attempted to be responsive to these requests simultaneously to satisfy what has been the sole interest from the inception of the matter: to protect the method of acquisition of the photograph and the foreign liaison relationship which made the acquisition possible.

Following are highlights from the correspondence from the current phase:

a. On 16 May 1967 over the signature of the General Counsel of the Agency, Lawrence R. Houston, CIA voluntarily submitted a statement to Judge Bagert of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana. The response dealt affirmatively with the contents of the subpoena that had been delivered to the United States Marshall in the District of Columbia, despite the fact that the subpoena could not be executed because of the lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Houston proffered on Agency behalf categoric assurances to the court regarding inaccurate statements and inferences made by Mr. Garrison in New Orleans about the
photograph of the unidentified individual. The following is quoted from Mr. Houston's memorandum:

"Because of the publicity which has surrounded the Orleans Parish Grand Jury proceedings, we have recently carried out an exhaustive search of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency for any picture of Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico. As a result of this search, I can state categorically that the files of this Agency do not contain, and never have contained, any such picture of Lee Harvey Oswald taken in Mexico and that we have no information whatsoever that any such photograph ever existed. To the best of our knowledge and information, therefore, there is no such photograph. Furthermore, the photograph which is printed in the Warren Commission Report, Exhibit No. 237 in Volume XVI, never contained more than one figure, and the figure in the photograph depicts an individual who, to our knowledge, has not been identified. The circumstances of the filing of this photograph with the Warren Commission are set forth in affidavits of pages 468 and 469 of Volume XI, Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Consequently, we have no record of any photograph that answers in any way the description of the one we understand was requested in the subpoena.

"I hope you will accept this information in this form in the spirit of cooperation in which it is preferred."

The Agency has repeatedly serviced requests about the identity of the unknown individual from Mr. Emory L. Brown, Jr., Rte. #4, Box 82

Squanum Road, Farmingdale, New Jersey. The last exchange of correspondence in our record covered the period 4 - 17 April 1970.
20. On 10 October 1963 at 11:55 a.m. the WH Division dispersed component responsible for action on this report to the Department of State, the FBI, and the Navy Department by routine electrical transmission. The report received from Mexico, Station 15 together with preliminary collateral details drawn from a file review:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a "receding" hairline.

2. It is believed that OSWALD may be identical to Lee Henry (sic) OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian-born wife, Marina Nikolaevna PUSAKOVA (sic) and their child.

3. The information in paragraph one is being disseminated to your representatives in Mexico City.
Any further information received on this subject will be furnished you. This information is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

214. Although the reaction of the Headquarters desk was "by the book" and in good time, there were a number of errors in this advisory to the departments which on the record were concerned with the OSWALD case:

a. OSWALD's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for Harvey.

b. His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "PUSAKOVA" for "PUSAKOVA." (though they persist in the Headquarters communications)

Neither of these errors are significant. More important was:

c. Paragraph 2 of the Mexico City Station's report which had dealt with a concurrent, but separate, phenomenon, the description of an individual observed going into and out of the Soviet Embassy had been locked on to Lee OSWALD as an alleged descriptive fact. There can be no question that this misreading of the Mexico City Station report was an analyst's error which escaped detection in the coordination before release:

the descriptive details attributed to OSWALD were so far off the mark as to be immediately recognizable as such by the recipients. The partial explanation, if not exculpation, of Lee OSWALD's...
be it recalled that as of that moment CIA had no photograph

of OSWALD to refer to."

22. Confirmation of this judgment is provided by the contents
of the cable composed by the same analyst and sent as of 2209Z time
(two hours later) to Mexico City Station, referring to October cable 1:

1. Lee OSWALD who called SecEmb 1 Oct

probably identical Lee Henry [sic] OSWALD born

18 Oct 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar
operator in United States Marines who defected
to USSR in Oct 1959. OSWALD is five feet ten
inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light
brown wavy hair, blue eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce
his United States citizenship to the United States
Emb in Moscow, indicating he had applied for Soviet
citizenship. On 13 Feb the US Emb Moscow received
an undated letter from OSWALD postmarked Minsk on
five Feb 1961 in which subj indicated he desired
return of his US PPT as wished to return to USA
if "we could come to some agreement concerning
the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."

On 8 July on his own initiative he appeared at the
Emb with his wife to see about his return to States.
for Soviet citizenship and that his application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to OSWALD, contained no ref to Soviet citizenship. OSWALD stated that had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian radio and tv factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research shop. OSWALD was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna BUSAKOVA (sic) a dental technician born 17 July 1941 USSR. No Hqrs traces. He attempted arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American visa was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on OSWALD.

3. Latest Hqrs info was an FBI report dated May 1962 saying FBI had determined OSWALD is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass info ref and para one to the Embassy to the FBI, the Navy, and I&NS locally. The information
as paras two and three originated

with the FBI.

5. No, and possible identification being
disseminated to Hq's of FBI, State, Navy, and INS.

Pis. keep Hq's advised on any further contacts or
positive identification of Oswald.

211. The headquarters feedback of Oswald's correct description
should have been sufficient, in view of the incongruities with the
details deduced from the photo of the unidentified male, to keep
out that did not work out that way
these two matters apart as investigative facts.

Mexico City
Station on 15 October 1963, Browne asked Headquarters to
"please pouch a photo of Oswald." Headquarters electrically

delivered to the Department of the Navy the following message on 24 Oct.
1963:

"Lee Henry [sic] Oswald . . .

"It is requested that you forward to this office as
soon as possible two copies of the most recent photo

graph you have of subject. We will forward them to our
representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine

if the Lee Oswald in Mexico City and subject are the

same individual."

No photo had been received by CIA by 22 November 1963.
24. Within its limitations and capabilities, Mexico City Station had done all it could to comply with Headquarters instructions:
   
   a. Headquarters had been alerted and in turn those agencies with an investigative or policy interest in OSWALD had been alerted, both in Washington and in the field.

   b. Mexico City had no further contacts by OSWALD to report because—as it was ultimately ascertained—he had left Mexico City on 2 October.

   c. OSWALD was not an Agency investigative responsibility, in any case. Even with a photograph, it would have taken very special efforts triggered by the other interested U.S. agencies to have made a positive identification in view of OSWALD's hotel registration under alias.

   There the matter rested until mid-day 22 November 1963.

25. The Insertion of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual with the Chain of Evidence. On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters at 2229Z time after learning of the arrest of Lee H. OSWALD, age 24, possibly in connection with the assassination and referencing its earlier message of 10, 11, 14, and 15 October and Headquarters' reply of 10 October. The station requested priority pouch/photo of OSWALD so that Station can check all recent coverage for OSWALD. Forwarding nearest copies of only visitor to Sov/Emb 1 Oct who could be identical with OSWALD.
It is clear that Mexico City Station had forgotten that according to its own communication the unidentified male in the photo was of "apparent age 35" and that the accurate description of OSWALD forwarded by Headquarters on the 10th precluded the person whom they regarded as the "only visitor to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could be identical," could indeed be.

27. The Station had meanwhile begun an exhaustive and accelerated review of all its technical and photographic intelligence. A dispatch was prepared in accordance with the indication given in the cable of 22 November, cited in paragraph 25 above. The dispatch noted that photo coverage of the unidentified individual had turned up on 4 and 15 October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies, respectively. The text of the 22 November 1963 pouch dispatch read:

"1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained ... on 1 October 1963, which appeared to be an American. This same man visited the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

"2. Copies of these photographs were shown to the [sic] U.S. Ambassador on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to Chief FBI, Mexico, on that date... .

"P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing of dispatch. These were taken as [the] person..."
entered the Cuban Embassy."

Attached were eight photographs: four (of which two were marked 1 October on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and four (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.

It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was probably omitted from paragraph two of the dispatch between the words "two" and "photographs."

30. That the Station was working under forced draft is apparent from the text of the dispatch, which contained material fact inserted as a postscript. That fact was reported simultaneously by cable to Headquarters at 0053 hours, 23 November:

"1. Mexico Station has photos same unidentified American type who is possibly OSWALD entering Cuban Embassy on 15 October. Searching for possibility photo-documented entry Cuban Embassy other days.

"2. Also attempting establish OSWALD entry and departure Mexico."

29. Headquarters, at 01:36 Z time, asked Mexico Station to send a staff member with all photographs to Headquarters on the next available flight.

30. Concurrently with or before the foregoing cables to Headquarters, the Chief of Station, Mexico City spoke directly by double-talk telephone with the Western Hemisphere Chief of
Station J. C. KING, and secured permission to give copies of the photographs of the unidentified individual to the Legal Attaché

and to make them known to the Ambassador. The next development is clearly reflected in a personal note by the Chief of Station to the

Division Chief, mailed to the latter from Dallas, together with

copies of the photographs by the FBI representative who delivered

them to the FBI in that city.

"22 November 1963"

"Dear J.C. [KING]:

"Reference is made to our conversation of 22 November

in which I requested permission to give the Legal Attaché
copies of photographs of a certain person who is known to

you.

"Attached are copies of each of the photographs we have

with the dates of the visits stamped on the back.

"At 6 p.m. Mexico time on 22 November, The Ambassador

decided that this was important enough to have a member of

the Legal Attaché's office take copies of these pictures
to Dallas, Texas. The Naval Attaché is making a special

flight from Mexico City for this purpose. The Legal

Attaché's officer who is going to Dallas has promised to

mail this material to you for me.

"Copies of these photographs are also being sent by
pouch which will leave Mexico City on the night of

22 November 1963.

"Best wishes.

"Win [SCOTT]"

According to the sidelined comment on this letter, the Legal
Attache's officer was Eldon RUDD.

3 1/2. The decision to remit the photographs to the FBI in
Dallas had been made by the Ambassador, according to the Chief of
Station, who simultaneously with the FBI agent's departure reported
to Headquarters by cable (02442 time, 23 November):

"FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each
of six photos of a person suspected to be OSWALD, on a
special flight for Dallas. He is carrying envelope with
one copy each photo for airmail special from Dallas to
J. C. KING at home as per telephone conversation with
SCOTT. One copy of each of these photos plus a copy of
each of the photos showing the same person exiting the
Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular
pouch tonight. In view of above does Hqs still want a
staffer with additional photo(s)?"
be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible evidence of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding, on the basis of credible evidence, that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them alone and of his own determination, must stand.

b. "Credible evidence" that could upset or significantly modify this finding did not exist in Washington, but such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, where voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and designed to cover up any knowledge or connection with OSWALD which might be directly or indirectly with the assassination. The evidence that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection will persist and grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency, which, indeed, was the opinion at the working level particularly in the counterintelligence component in 1964. As was indicated by McElvain in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue in the absence of additional or new elements of "credible" evidence, there are "henceforth" in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of the other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

1. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Hearings before the Joint Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, 1964), vol. 15.
CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 -
if OSWALD did indeed read it in New Orleans - must be considered
of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution
of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup and his identification with
Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable
as far back as his Marine Corps service in EL Toro, California.
CASTRO's warning and threat to AP correspondent HARKER is ir-
respective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even
security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the
Russians - would be an act of singular irresponsibility
and under no circumstances excusable or defensible. Retrson for what
the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963
without CIA's knowledge - or, more properly, the knowledge of
the President's brother, Robert KENNEDY, who was personally
invested with oversight of Cuban matters at the federal level
after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
Cuban Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD, Santa Ana, California, early 1959(?),

The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed'."[2]

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report and does not appear to have been rued over or developed by investigation. The record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters. OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get DELGADO testified

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time /I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so there wasn't no subversion or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ..."

"... I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ..."

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours talking. I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing."

"Mr. Liebeler: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?"

"Mr. Delgado: About an hour and half, two hours ..."

"Mr. Liebeler: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?"

"Mr. Delgado: No. No ..."

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?"

"Mr. Delgado: I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, often af
he started to get in contact with these Cuban people, he started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers...

... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. Liebeler: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. Delgado: Not that I can recall; no.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did you have any reason to believe that these things come to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope knock ... Something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white, almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin. United something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. Liebeler: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. Delgado: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. Delgado: No, he didn't.

"Mr. Liebeler: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. Delgado: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to - once he got out of the service he was going to Switzerland...
OSWALD's application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD accelerated his exit on alleged grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel - among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

DELCADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contact OSWALD at El Toro camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELCADO's recollections; actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States or after. The record reflects no identification of the contact. DELCADO's presumption is that the was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the question is: Why was it and was there reporting to from his daughter in Washington and rumors the opening of a file on OSWALD?

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1 U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.
Prediction of President KENNEDY's Demise by Communist Party Cell Leader Morse BENITEZ Zabola, 1962.

Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party: "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present years, 1962."

This report apparently had been discounted when it had been received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no followup or formal dissemination of the report.
Enigmatic Threats by Cuban Third Secretary in The Hague, 7 November 1963.

15. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Peña, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

16. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was subsequently reported to have a history of mental instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.
Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy Employee, Luisa CALDERON, afternoon of 22 November 1963

At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. Luisa jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before Kennedy ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs), what barbarians!"

Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman) friend.

Later hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage containing the suggestion for knowledge or expectation.

The enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

1. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI).
She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI headquarters.

2. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Emilio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Enginio VEGA Perez.

The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversations was the receptionist, a Mexican
The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who had met Harvey OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban installations in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness regarding LHO's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented solely by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements that it was learned that LHO became engaged in a altercation on 27 September with Estela AZCUE.

Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Bogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio Somoza. VEGA, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took 15 days.

There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitive interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD known and confirmed by intercept with the data held on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to the question, they were.

For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa.
and facilitation of the trip to Cuba were no longer viewed as
was taken by Vincent Theodor for the decision of the Paris\planned committees for Cuba, with which
he was closely involved in the formation of relations from Cuba to
the United States and from New Orleans.

During the period of 2-11 Nov 1962. There is no indication provided of Voge's

oversea visits, although there is a note that he visited Cuba during

stay period: VEG, departed Cuba on 6 January and returned on 13 February 1963.
remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the DGI cited above (knowledge and participation)? The answer is clearly negative and in that sense it is palpable that CASTRO's unique intelligence and security service could have more in its files than surfaced in the DURAN statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" - Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at that time.
The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, Dorticos, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquin Hernandez Armas, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvian DURAN had been asked about money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that she had gone out with DUO during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.
As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated. Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - is the Nicaraguan walk-in in Mexico City on 26 November 1963.

Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte (1) the case of Victor Carlos Villanueva in Cosamóvil and Guadalajara (2) the allegations of Enrique Ruedo Bender in New York. (3) The claims of Robert Edward Gallant in Santa Clara, present in California, and (4) Roy Dobkin.

The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money sometime in mid-September 1963 in Mexico City. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed deception and bringing ALVARADO's Nicaraguan security service contact into the case.

The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. In this case, ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the publication of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

Elena GARRO de Paz is a mercurial, articulate and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is, also, the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.

See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the other writers: the case of Yriarte ROSAS Villeneuve in Cosamóvil and Guadalajara; the allegations of Enrique Ruedo Bender in New York; the claims of Robert Edward Gallant, Santa Clara, present in California, and the allegations of Roy Dobkin.
From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U.S. Embassy officer, Charles Thomas, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting Garro's account of what had actually gone on between Oswald, the Cubans and in particular Silva Duran in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red hair.

The first reference to the Garro story was noted in Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena Garro [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that Oswald was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the Garro family (Horacio Duran). At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place, she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and Oswald's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos without a doubt at the party."

Garro repeated her story to Mr. Charles William Thomas, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965. In September 1963 after her return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben Duran [emphasis added]. Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio Duran, who married her cousin. She met Oswald and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul Azcue, General Clark Flores, Silvia Duran, who she later learned was Oswald's mistress while he was here, Emilio Carballido, and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and
her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO (or CALVILLO), then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernacion and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were in danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

32. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, CARRO and her daughter elaborated and on certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very completed story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything she said.

33. It was developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attaché on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS, but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1965 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

34. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. A memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, in which GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27 and 28 - 30 November 1963.) Another, on 7 February 1967, in which GARRO's continuing vicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And finally, upon THOMAS' retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews.

There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in...
EMBER 1963 never coincided with the confirmed facts of OSWALD's presence there. Her story, however, had two points of convergence with allegations by others regarding OSWALD: (a) ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's account of the "D" case] and (b) Sylvia DUÑAN's later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RYULE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar CONTRERAS Latique, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-Castro students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

In June 1969, CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-Castro Revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of that day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.
At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publically associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962 and Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near in hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.