

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
65990 Date: 10-29-2021

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
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DRAFT OF REPORT
FOR RC. Delivered
to Econ Proj. April 15, 1966

Subject: Photo of one
The unidentified individual in the
Warren Commission Report: A Factual
Chronological Survey

Reference: Memorandum by David W. Belin
to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April
1976. (Attachment A)

1. Reference memorandum suggests it would
as appropriate to reconsider full disclosure
of the circumstances and factual data relative
to the subject. The purpose of this ~~the survey~~
~~to be made~~
is to permit an evaluation of the suggestion.
~~by obtaining relevant background and fact~~
~~which it is that would be.~~

2. Background. This examination and summary
^{crossed}
^{has}
of the record concerns ^{and photographs} ~~as items of evidence~~
~~introduced by the~~
at the
considered by the President's Commission
on the assassination of president Kennedy
(hereinafter cited as the Warren Commission)
and introduced into evidence as

Quinn Exhibit No. 1. The photographs
Hearing before the President's Commission
of the Assassination of President
Kennedy (Hearings
1. See Vol. XX:3, page 691. ~~what is, however~~)

resulted ^{highly sensitive}
~~originated~~ ~~with~~ ~~in~~ ~~a~~ ~~CIA~~

as must be seen,
(together, with others of the same individual)
this, and still,
originated from a highly sensitive operation
in October 1963
being conducted by the CIA and Mexican
security authorities against the Soviet and
Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

On 14 October 1963 it was normally

~~Under~~ Under the press of the ~~latest~~ ~~extensive~~
efforts to develop information on the
assassin and the assassin's copies of
the photographs were made available
by CIA's Mexico Station Chief on the afternoon
of 22 November, and later that day,

with the concurrence of the ambassador
copies of ~~the~~ ~~photographs~~ of this ~~ambassador's~~ ~~individual~~
were flown up to the Dallas office ~~of the~~
by the US Naval Attache ~~and~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~file~~
as a matter of possible use in the ~~of the~~ ~~investigation~~
are going investigators. ~~The~~ ~~one~~ ~~photographs~~
are photographs

he misstated her son. (A further con-
 leading
 plication to this erroneous conclusion
 had been the fact that when she had
 been shown ^{a copy of the} same photograph in
 her appearance before the Commission,
 it had been copied, ^{by the FBI} in a slightly
 different manner.) ~~that photo had been~~

No details in the Warren Commission's report
 so vividly ~~by~~ ~~illustrating~~ ^{more vividly than} illustrates (this one,
 that best)
~~the~~ difficulties ~~of~~ simple truths
~~of~~ present ~~and~~ power, ~~and~~ self serving
~~propaganda~~

in the politicized, ~~rigidly~~ rigidly determined
 interpretive climate that has ~~prevailed~~
 the ~~flourished~~
 been ventured by the media over the
 past decade. ~~What~~ ~~was~~ The photograph,

now acknowledged ^{not} to be Ruby, ^{has} now
 become a centerpiece in an alternate
 explanation that holds Oswald to have
 been "framed" by the use of a double in his
~~the activity of his proposed~~
 (in Mexico City. 3)

3. This is the thrust of the article "The CIA and
 the Man who was Not Oswald" by Bernard
 Fensterwald and George O'Toole, in the
New York Review of Books, (attached to reference,
 'a copy of which is')

~~Walter~~
 Christensen's report

②

did with ~~testimony~~ ^{the} information it developed about Oswald ~~in~~ Mexico City, together with Noy's actions on this information before the assassination, 22 Nov 1963, and immediately thereafter.

4. From all credible evidence known to this Trust (none, incidentally, added since the exhaustively unique work of the Warren Commission), Lee Harvey Oswald spent 4 full days and 2 partial days - about 116 hours in all - in Mexico City from about 10:00 27 September 1963 to about 09:00 2 October 1963. His ~~only~~ point of residence was a small commercial

Travellers hotel, ~~for which~~ not frequented by "jugglers" - the ^(where he was registered under alias) Hotel Commercials. Examinations and detailed satellite interviews

(3)

and interrogations by the Mexican authorities and
 the FBI established that in the recollections of
 all hotel personnel he left early and
 returned late each day of his stay.

Assuming, ^{and allowing for the} ~~that~~ fact of late arrival
 and ~~late~~ early departure, ~~that~~ that he
 slept $\frac{1}{3}$ of the ^{time} ~~time~~ of his stay (28 or
 39 hours), there ~~is~~ remain some
 78 hours of activity to be accounted
 for. ~~That~~ Oswald, on the basis
 of CIA's coverage can account solely
 for minutes during ~~the~~ 27, 28
 September and 1 October. All coverage
 by CIA during this period was technical,
 and the station had no ^{source} ~~source~~
 (human agent)
~~the~~ ~~source~~ coverage either ~~from~~
~~or~~ ~~from~~ Mexican liaison. Oswald was

(F)

in *par* sense "under investigation." ~~None~~ ^{and State} ~~of~~ ⁱⁿ
 of the facts of his defection to the USSR and
~~his~~ return to the U.S., 1959-1962 were
 registered in Mexico Station files before
 10 October 1963, when this information
 was forwarded by Hqs. in response to
 the Station report of 8 October forwarding
 and positive basis what was judged
 to be an American contact for a visa
 to Cuba in transit to the USSR as ~~stated~~

indicated and deduced from ~~the~~ ^{the} technical
 on 1 October, ^{which was the first and only occasion}
~~the~~ ^{acquired} information. (At no time ~~was~~ ^{was}

during his stay in Mexico city did the CIA
 facility acquire a photo of him. A careful
 review of all coverage, ^{and} ~~and~~ intercept, ~~and~~
 photographic ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{and} both
 Soviet and Cuban embassies was made
 by the Station on the 22 and 23 November

(5)

1963 after the assassinations going back to materials from mid year. It is therefore firm that there was no CIA photo coverage of Oswald at any time during

Mexico his Mexican trip ~~his~~ stay in Dallas, Texas, despite the request on 15 October City of the press' station had two photos of Oswald in its records but did not receive one from Hqs. before 22 Nov 1963.

Voice intercept data received by the monitor on the basis of the 1 October intercept (which had been reported to Hqs and disseminated to the interested members of the intelligence community — as a ex-clarium has Harvey Oswald was a Navy and FBI case under the Delimitation and, potentially, by interest to the Department of State — turned up matches based on content, not on identity, with material intercepted on 27 and 28 September 1963. Matches based on voice

(6)

comproison (except what could be recalled by the monitor - and this was ^{uniquely} not insignificant because of the procedure system by Oswald) could not be made, because the tapes, in accordance with the normal procedure, had been ~~destroyed~~ ^{crossed} ~~and~~ ^{re-used.}

~~Activity Report~~

It should be noted that Bowie intercept and photo graphic coverage was not processed in "real time". ^{and the volume of the information} The nature of ^{and the volume of the information} acquisitions, precluded anything but the spot reporting of items ~~to~~ judged by the monitor of more than ordinary ^(ordinary) interest and therefore ~~of~~ ^{of} notes in summary logs. Full text of selected items would require ~~reference to~~ consultation of the tapes and either a full transcription or full translation, in both. Photo coverage ^(includes processed)

to become available in quantity lists ~~etc~~
 which required scanning and collection
 on a rapid and accelerated basis. One
 of the "triggers" that normally operated
 to focus and accelerate the processing
 and reporting of this kind of raw
 intelligence is the mention of ~~a~~ a name,
 as will be seen,
 This, was precisely what occurred
 in the 2nd of two conversations Donald
 had on 1 October with the Soviet Embassy,
 to whom he said he was "Lee Coward";
 and it was this information reported by
 the Station ~~to~~ to ~~the~~ Hqs. on 8 October.

~~The above was not developed that evening~~

~~that the Hqs.~~

Reading in mind that the Station reported
 had information on ~~about~~ ~~the~~ ~~idea~~
 to Hqs. only the voice notes captured on October
~~which~~

The Mexico City Station did not mention
 in its report on Oswald ^{has} based on its
 own Houston wire intercepts: It compared
 this data with ^{descriptions} information it had
 acquired from a collateral source
 a photo graph ~~by the Mexico station~~
~~did not state this was~~ ^{was}
 apparently ^{an individual,} ^{American,} who was observed
 entering the Soviet Embassy ~~Room~~
 on 1 October.

The station reported these details as a
 coincident detail. The Station
 did not ~~state~~ assert or suggest that
 the data deduced from the photo was
 in fact Oswald, or indeed, in any
 way related to Oswald.

5. Lee Harvey Oswald ^{CIA?} - Coverage of his Mexico
 City stay. One additional element of back-

ground must be stipulated [REDACTED] ~~now~~ on
 the final preconditions to understanding
 the ~~relevance or irrelevance of~~
 the ~~photograph~~ and the ~~presence~~ of
 the photo of the unknown individual,
 placed in the chain of evidence on 23
 November in Dallas by the FBI agent,
 Bordwell Chum: ~~stated~~ ^{with agent} what
 was the totality of CIA coverage ~~present~~
 of Oswald's activity as of the afternoon
 of the 22nd and 23rd when all available
 coverage had been re-checked?

b. The totality of ~~the~~ ^{on, or reasonably inferable the,} ~~the~~ ^{or reasonably inferable the,}
 coverage of Oswald, consisted of five (5)
 voice intercepts as follows:

A.

(Friday)

A. 27 Sept 1963 16:05 Mexico City train:

(A Mexican national)
Silvia Duran, a local employee of the Cuban Embassy, consular section, a receptionist, speaks with an unknown male at the Soviet Embassy:

Duran
Silvia tells ~~me~~ that the American citizen was there, the one who wants a visa for Cuba on his way to the Soviet Union and he wants to know with whom he was talking there because she (Silvia) had sent him to the Soviet Embassy saying that if they accepted him and gave him a visa then the Cubans (Embassy) would also give him a visa without further paper work only advising Immigration in Cuba. ~~He~~ wants to know with whom he had talked there because he says he was told there would be no problem. ~~He~~ says to wait a moment. A different ~~man~~ and Silvia explains the same thing to him. This ~~man~~ says to leave name and telephone number and ~~he~~ will call back. Silvia gives telephone 11-28-47 (Cuban Consulate). Silvia takes advantage of the ~~man~~ and states she has moved and wants to advise the Soviet Embassy of her change of address so that she can receive the Bulletin. ~~He~~ says to call KOUKHARENKO to give her new address, then ~~he~~ asks the name of the Consul or Cultural Attaché. Silvia says the name is Teresa PROENZA and the telephone number is 14-16-26. ~~He~~ says thanks.

(L. Duran)

(Friday)

B. 27 Sept 1963 16:26 Mexico City train:

An unidentified male ~~tells~~ ^{calls} the Cuban consulate, only Silvia Duran →

~~MI says~~ If the American had been there, Silvia says he is there now. MI says the American showed papers from the Consulate in Washington that he wants to go to the Soviet Union and be there for a long time with his wife who is Russian, but the answer has not come from Washington in respect to this problem, and according to this procedure it takes four or five months, but without having permission from the Soviet Union they should ask, or better said, they cannot issue a visa here without asking Washington; however, according to this man he showed a letter indicating he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and that the Cubans said that they cannot issue a visa without his having a visa for the Soviet Union; and now MI does not know what to do with him (the American), because they have to wait for the answer from Washington. Silvia agrees the

FK

same problem exists with the Cubans, that the problem for (the American) is that he does not know anyone in Cuba and therefore if that is true it will be difficult for him to get a visa for Cuba, because he was thinking of processing his visa (for Soviet Union), because he knew it would require waiting a long time for his visa to the Soviet Union while in Cuba and from there go to the Soviet Union. MI said the thing is that if his wife right now were in Washington she would receive her visa right now, or permission, from the Soviet Union, to return to her country, she is going to receive her visa in Washington but having this visa, she could communicate to any place this permission, for example here or any place she could receive it (visa or permission) but right now they do not have them. (no las tienen). Silvia says certainly and they cannot give a letter either because they do not know if the visa will be approved. MI says they only give visas according to indications. Silvia says then she will put that on the list. MI says he cannot give a letter of recommendation either because he does not know him (the American) and excuse us for bothering you. Silvia says that is alright and many thanks.

C. 28 Sept 1963 (Saturday), 11:51 Mexico City

Silvia says that in the Cuban Embassy is a North American who was at the Soviet Embassy. MI says wait a minute. Silvia speaks English with fifth someone - and comments in Spanish that they gave APARCIO telephone 13-12-33 and to take the number down - Silvia says about the American ~~because~~ he is going to talk with you. American speaks Russian and speaks in English. They continue in English. American talks broken Russian and says I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul, just a minute. MI takes phone and asks American in English what does he want? American says, Please speak Russian. MI says what else do you want? American says I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address. MI says I know that. American, in hardly recognizable Russian, says I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it. MI says why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it is not far from the Cuban Embassy. American says I'll be there right away.

cc - the Soviet. The

(11)

D. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:31 Moscow City time. An unknown male (American) contacts the Soviet Embassy, the Military Attaché's residence, 15-69-07, and says to an unidentified Soviet respondent:

SECRET

The Soviet

~~NO~~ I was at your place last Saturday and talked to your Consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new? ~~He~~ says I'd like to ask you to call another phone number. Please write it down 15-60-55 and ask for a consul. Thank you.

E. 1 October 1963 (Tuesday), 10:45 Moscow City time.

NO (the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian) speaks to OBYEDKOV. He says: This is Lee OSWALD speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul. OBYEDKOV says: NOSTIKOV. He is dark (hair or skin?). ~~Oswald~~ says yes, my name is OSWALD. OBYEDKOV says, Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet. OSWALD says: Have they done anything? OBYEDKOV says: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet. OSWALD says: And what...? OBYEDKOV hangs up.

(A Soviet Embassy guard).

including the texts of the ~~now~~ ^{read} ~~reference~~ ^{read} ~~reference~~
 7. All of these items, ^{read} were discussed with and
 examined by Warren Commission staffers in
 Mex. and at the ^{Mexico City} ~~State's~~ ~~detention~~ ^{detention} during
~~their stay there~~ a stay of from 8 to 13 April
 1964. *

* The Warren Commission group that visited
 the Mexico City station consisted of Mr. Coleman,
 Mr. Shawson and Mr. Willes. They examined
 not only the ~~intercepted~~ ~~intercepted~~ ~~intercepted~~ intercepts
 A-E, above, but others ~~from~~ ^{from} the 27th
 and ~~admitted~~ ~~later~~ ~~that~~ ~~they~~ ~~had~~ ~~been~~
 that appeared to have
 relevance. These have been omitted from
 this summary because ~~they~~

that have included in this summary because
 they appear, on review to be includable ~~on~~
~~logical~~ ~~grounds~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~Oswald~~ ~~matters~~ ~~on~~
 logical or substantial grounds, or both,
 on the 27th at 1037 the Soviet Embassy
 account as ~~is~~

Keeping in mind that the Soviet Embassy ~~etc.~~
 received many calls pertaining to visa

visa matters.

On the 27th of 1957, the Embassy received a call, from an unknown individual who said he wanted to ^{presumably in England,} needs to go to Odessa. He was told the consul was not in and to call back at 1130. Oswald is known to have arrived at the Fletcher Page Bus terminal on Bus #566 at c. 10:45 on the 27th. It seems therefore ~~it is possible to include the substance of this call~~ for him to have made this call. Granting this, it ~~seems~~ seems unreasonable to believe the call was awarded for the following reasons: (a) the caller wanted visas and specifically for Odessa. Oswald was seeking a visa and never in any other context did he specify Odessa the Black Sea port of Odessa as his destination. (b) the call was directed to the ^{correct} ~~correct~~ consular number: 15-60-55. ~~Oswald seemed to have~~ ^{seemingly}

On the 1st of October -

Oswald first called the wrong number, 15-69-17. (the M's) number and had to be directed to ~~the correct~~

^{his} ~~his~~ call to the correct number, 15-60-55. It seems unlikely ^{what would have been his} he would have made ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~initial~~ ^{initial} call, on Friday the 27th, to the correct consular number and ~~made~~ ^{called} ~~an~~ ^{the} incorrect number on 1 October. (c) There is every reason to believe from the context ^{of the intercepts A-E above,} that Oswald's first destination after arrival

and check in to the his hotel room on the
 visit to the Cuban Embassy. (D) The use of
 the Spanish language & broken Spanish would be made use of as an intermediary, which is
 included in the report of the M.O. (On 3 October at 15:39 an individual
 speaking broken Spanish then English, called
 the Soviet Embassy and asked for a visa.
 The Soviet respondent. The Soviet

Oswald speaks in broken Spanish then in English to MI. He says
 Hello. Visa for Russia. MI says: Call on the other phone.
 He says: I'm looking for a visa to go to Russia. MI says: Please,
 call on the telephone of the consul, 15-60-55. He says: One
 moment please, I'll have to get a pencil to write the number
 down. They issue the visa there? He: That depends on your
 conversation. I don't know about this business. Please call
 the office of the consul and ask your question. He asks for the
 number again. He gives him the number and tells him to ask for
 the Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He says Thanks.

The Soviet says:
 The request is:
 The Soviet

The relevance of this intercept is eliminated
 excludable on three grounds: (A) the use
 of broken Spanish. Oswald throughout
 used broken Russian or English, he had
 no competence in Spanish. (B) the substance of
 the request indicates that a visa request in
 the first stages of initiation. Oswald had
 put his matter to the with the Cubans and
 developed

the Soviets to a point well beyond the
 substance of the call. (C) Oswald had
 left Mexico city, based on all the credible
 evidence before the early morning of
 the previous day, Oswald could not
 have made this local call.

end foot note

from evidence

8. Summing up, one can state or reasonably infer the following with

Edward Oswald, head the ~~type~~ (made the following

contacts with the Cuban and Soviet official establishments in Mexico city:

(Friday)

a. 27 Sept 1963. After arrival and check-in to his hotel Oswald went at least twice to the Cuban ~~embassy~~ ^{first Cuban embassy} ~~office~~ ^{first visit} to the Cuban Embassy, where he talked with Silvia Roman. The time of his ~~first~~ ^{first Cuban embassy} visit to the Cuban Embassy was about 1600 (i.e. just before closing).

Sometime between the two ~~visits~~ ^{visits at the Bureau's indications}, he must have visited the Soviet Embassy. ~~(We have coverage only on the second Cuban Embassy visit. Jonathan Oswald presumably became embroiled in a person~~ ~~(We have no indications who he talked with at the Soviet Embassy.~~

There was no photographic coverage of Oswald's entries into either the Cuban or Soviet embassies on the 27th.

The lack of coverage on the ~~embassy~~ ^{embassy} visitation is explainable: the camera ~~used~~ ^{based on the recollection of} officer's ~~at~~ ^{in service as the}, was down

in connection with correct info

on the 27th because of mechanical
malfunction. Why Oswald was
missed at the ~~Embassy~~ installation
in his ~~own~~ ^{own} ~~entrance~~ ^{entrance} to the
~~embassy~~

is not yet explained.

① (Saturday) 28 Sept 1963. Note: ~~the~~

~~was a holiday~~, a Holiday ~~in~~

~~Embassy~~
Both Cuban and Soviet Embassies
~~were closed on Saturday~~
~~were~~ ~~temporarily~~ closed to the public
and Saturdays. Photographic coverage
was normally suspended Saturday
and Sundays.

Oswald, notwithstanding the
Saturday holiday schedule went
to the ~~embassy~~ ^{his second visit} on Saturday morning to the
Soviet Embassy where he spoke to a
counsel. He apparently could not
recall his new ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~address~~ ^{address}.
~~He then~~ ^{He then} ~~went~~ ^{went} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Cuban~~ ^{Cuban} ~~Embassy~~ ^{Embassy} where he
had registered it on his visa
applications the day previously. He

3

had clearly been placed ~~at~~ the
the entrance of the USSR Embassy in
Washington. His two calls on the 1st
~~first~~ were concerned with
whether any reply had been received
from Washington. Under these circum-
stances, it is ~~unreasonable~~ the belief
Oswald would have gone to the
Soviet Embassy on this date. The
camera was working however at
at about mid-day it registered the

~~entry~~
entry into the Soviet Embassy of a
white suited individual, who among
others of all the photographic coverage
was the only ~~person~~ person
who entered the
who ~~appeared~~ appeared
could be

~~a man later, said~~
possibly American - who entered
the Soviet installation that day. ~~He~~
~~was~~ ~~seen~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~photograph~~ ~~coverage~~
~~coverage~~
~~coverage~~ ~~coverage~~ ~~coverage~~

On the chance that there could be
an association between the ~~above~~
data derived from the voice intercept
and the descriptive data derived
from the photograph, the station ~~was~~

4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO ^{Embassy} ~~the Embassy~~, ^{the Navy and I&NS} ~~the Navy and I&NS~~, ^{the State} ~~the State~~, ^{the FBI} ~~the FBI~~, ^{the CIA} ~~the CIA~~, ^{the Defense} ~~the Defense~~, ^{the AEC} ~~the AEC~~, ^{the NSAS} ~~the NSAS~~, ^{the NSIC} ~~the NSIC~~, ^{the NSR} ~~the NSR~~, ^{the NSC} ~~the NSC~~, ^{the NSD} ~~the NSD~~, ^{the NSI} ~~the NSI~~, ^{the NSJ} ~~the NSJ~~, ^{the NSK} ~~the NSK~~, ^{the NSL} ~~the NSL~~, ^{the NSM} ~~the NSM~~, ^{the NSN} ~~the NSN~~, ^{the NSO} ~~the NSO~~, ^{the NSP} ~~the NSP~~, ^{the NSQ} ~~the NSQ~~, ^{the NSR} ~~the NSR~~, ^{the NSS} ~~the NSS~~, ^{the NST} ~~the NST~~, ^{the NSU} ~~the NSU~~, ^{the NSV} ~~the NSV~~, ^{the NSW} ~~the NSW~~, ^{the NSX} ~~the NSX~~, ^{the NSY} ~~the NSY~~, ^{the NSZ} ~~the NSZ~~. INFO PARAS TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH ~~the State~~.

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED TO HDQS OF ~~the State~~, ~~the Navy~~, ~~the Defense~~, ~~the AEC~~, ~~the NSAS~~, ~~the NSIC~~, ~~the NSR~~, ~~the NSC~~, ~~the NSD~~, ~~the NSI~~, ~~the NSJ~~, ~~the NSK~~, ~~the NSL~~, ~~the NSM~~, ~~the NSN~~, ~~the NSO~~, ~~the NSP~~, ~~the NSQ~~, ~~the NSR~~, ~~the NSS~~, ~~the NST~~, ~~the NSU~~, ~~the NSV~~, ~~the NSW~~, ~~the NSX~~, ~~the NSY~~, ~~the NSZ~~. PLS KEEP HQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

[Large handwritten scribble]

REF: According to LIENVOY 1 Oct, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was ~~Lee Oswald~~ (phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.

T. H. BASSINER

ADMIN
ISSUING OFFICER

- SR/CI/A/Roll (in draft)
- CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft)
- CI/SPG/Exertor (in draft)
- C/WH/S
- WH/COMS

201-20248

W. J. H. H. H.
J. C. H. H. H.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS	
SECRET	
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Development from 8 Oct - 22 November

9. Mexico City station reported to Hqs on 8 Oct (red top 9 Oct) the following initial information on Oswald:

Center (1.00)

~~1. 100-115400-1~~ OCT 8, AMERICAN MALE WHO SPOKE BROKEN RUSSIAN and SAID HIS NAME WAS OSWALD (PHONETIC), STATED HE AT SOVIETS ON 28 SEPT WHEN SPOKE WITH CONSUL WHOM HE BELIEVED RE VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH MOSTIKOV. SUJ ASKED SOV GUARD IVAN OBYEDKOV WHO ANSWERED, IF THERE ANYTHING NEW RE TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON. OBYEDKOV UPON CHECKING SAID NOTHING RECEIVED YET. BUT REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT. ~~2. HAND PHOTOS~~ ~~PHOTO~~ ~~APPEARS RE AMERICAN ENTERING SOVIETS 1216 HOURS, LEAVING 1222 ON 1 OCT. APPARENT AGE 35, ATHLETIC BUILD, CIRCA 6 FEET, RECEDING HAIRLINE, ~~W~~ ~~HAIR~~ ~~TOP~~. WORE KHAKIS AND SPORT SHIRT.~~

3. NO LOCAL DISSEMINATION has been made by the Station.

10. On 10 October 1963 at 20:12 Z time the WH Division component responsible for acting on this report disseminates to the Department of State, the FBI and the Navy Dept by teletype ~~country electrical transmission~~ the report received from Mexico Station together

*preliminary collateral details drawn from the
a file review:*

Context

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 A RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE
IN MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, WHO IDENTIFIED
HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED
ANY HINTS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO
WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY
35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL,
WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE
(Is.c)
HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA,
A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN
OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED
STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH
HIS RUSSIAN BORN WIFE, MARIE NIKOLAEVNA PUSKOVNA, AND THEIR
(Is.c)
CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED
TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION
RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION
IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE. ~~END OF MESSAGE~~

*11. Although the reactions of the headquarters desk
was "by the book" and in good form, there
were a number of errors in this outgoing
advisory to the principal departments which
on the record were concerned with the
Oswald case!*

(A) Oswald's middle name was misspelled: "Henry" for Harvey.

(B) His wife's maiden name was misspelled: "RUSAKOVA" for RKUSAKOVA.

Neither of these errors were significant.

More important was,

(C) Para 2 of the Mexico Station's report which had already ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~separated~~ ^{separated} dealing with a concurrent phenomenon,

the description of an unidentified individual

observed going into and out of the Soviet

Embassy ~~on 10/22/63~~

had been locked ^{alleged} ~~out~~ to be Oswald as a descriptive fact.

(E) A comparison of the two cables was

actually the

can be no
There ~~is no~~ ^{can be no} question that this ~~misreading~~ ^{misreading} by the Mexico Station report

was an analyst error which escaped
 detection ^{despite the} ~~with the~~ ~~aid of~~ ~~coordinates~~
 in the ~~process~~ before release: the descriptive
 details attributed to Oswald were
 as far off the mark ^{as to be} that they
 would ~~immediately~~ ~~instant~~

Immediately recognizable as such
 by the recipients. (In postal
 explanation, if not reculation, he it
 recalled that as of that moment
 CIA/NSA had no photographs
 of Oswald to refer to.)

12. Confirmation of this judgement ~~is~~
 is provided by the contents of the
 cable ^{composed} sent by the same analyst and
 sent 7 22 09 2 times Σ two hours

6

Notes to Mexico Station:
Continued

1. LEE OSWALD WHO CALLED SOVEMB 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL
LEE HENRY OSWALD ^(sic) *201-289219* BORN 13 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES
WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN
INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,
BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,
INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1962 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA
IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 3 JULY ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT
HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT *10 Oct 63*

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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declassification

(CONTINUED)
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80 0000

6

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINKA WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS ^{an FBI} ADACED REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING ^{FBI} ADACED HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

ISSUING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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13. The Headquarters ~~statement~~ feed back of Oswald's correct description should have been sufficient ~~to~~ in view of the incongruity with the ^{the} photo of the unidentified male, to keep these two matters apart as investigative facts.

~~In any case Mexico Station, possibly Staff~~
~~cannot~~

on 15 October 1963,

(in any case, ~~which~~ Hqs to 'Please
procure a photo of Oswald'. Headquarters

electrically delivered to the Department of the

Worry the following message:

"See (Hqs) (sic) Oswald...
"It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photographs of your home of subject, (the ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ Oswald) (We will forward these to our representative in Mexico, who will attempt to determine if the ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ Oswald in Mexico City and subject are the same individual."

(4)

makes a positive identification in view
of Oswald's hotel registration under
alias. This ^{is} matter rested ~~at this point~~
~~is~~ until mid-day

22 November 1963.

The insertion of the photo of the unidentified
individual into the chain of evidence.

15. On 22 November 1963 the Mexico City
at 22:52 time
station called ^{to} ~~Wage~~ after learning of the
arrest of Lee ^{Case 24 possibly} H. Oswald, in connection
with the assassination and ^{and 18} ~~reference~~
its earlier ~~letter~~ message of 9 Oct and
Mex. reply of 10 October. The station

REQUEST PRIORITY POUCH PHOTO OSWALD SO THAT STATION
CAN CHECK ALL RECENT ~~media~~ COVERAGE FOR ^{Oswald} ~~ITEM~~. FORWARDING
SOONEST COPIES OF ONLY VISITOR TO SOVEMB ¹⁷ OCT WHO COULD
BE IDENTICAL WITH OSWALD.

Cent's
pl

16. It is clear that Mexico Station had lost

Furthermore, that according to its own
 commentaries, the unidentified male in
 the photo has an "approximate age 35" and
 that the accurate description of Oswald
 furnished by Hqs. on the 10th precluded
~~that the best candidate when they regarded as~~
~~the identity of the only visitor to the~~
 Soviet Embassy on 1 October who could
 be identical, ~~was~~ ^{could} indeed be.

16. The Staffs had meanwhile begun an
 exhaustive and accelerated review of all
 its technical and photographic intelligence
 as dispatch was prepared in accordance
 with the indications given in the Cable of
 22 November, cited in para 15 above. The
 dispatch noted that photo coverage of
 the unidentified individual had been ^{turned} ~~been~~
 discontinued on 4 ~~November~~ and 15

October at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies,
respectively. The text of the 22 Nov 1963
forwarded dispatch was:

1. Attached are copies of the only photographs obtained
on 4 October 1963, which appeared to be an American. This same man visited
the Soviet Embassy on 4 October 1963.

2. Copies of these photographs were shown to The U. S. Ambassador
on 22 November 1963 and a copy of each of the two photographs was given to
Chief of Mission Mexico, on that date.

FBI

P.S. Photographs dated 15 October 1963 were inserted after typing
of dispatch. These were taken as person entered the Cuban
Embassy.

Attached were eight photographs: 4 (of which two marked
1 Oct on reverse) showing the individual in a white shirt and
4 (unmarked on reverse) showing the individual in a black shirt.
It would seem to be logical that the word "sets" was
probably omitted in the second line of para 2, between "two" and "photos".

17. That the Station was working under forward
draft is apparent from the text of the dispatch, which
contains a material fact ~~that~~ (as a postscript).

That fact was ~~not~~ reported simultaneously
by cable to Hqs, at 00:53 2 time 23 November:
Centamps

1. MEXI² STATION HAS PHOTOS SAME UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN
TYPE WHO IS POSSIBLY OSWALD ENTERING CUBAN EMBASSY ON 15
OCTOBER. SEARCHING FOR POSSIBILITY PHOTO-DOCUMENTED ENTRY
CUBAN EMBASSY OTHER DAYS.

2. ALSO ATTEMPTING ESTABLISH OSWALD ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
MEXICO.

by cable (@ 2:44 P time, 23 Nov):

FBI agent left here 2000 local time with two copies each of six photos of a person suspected to be Oswald, or, special flights for Dallas. He is carrying envelope with one copy each photo for air mail agency from Dallas to JC King at home or per telephone conversation with Scott. 1 copy of each of the two photos plus a copy of each of two photos showing the same person sitting the Cuban Embassy forwarded by memorandum leaving by regular post tomorrow. In order of above has Hqs still want a Staffer to with additional photo(s)?

20. Hqs responded 1:422 P time, 23 Nov (1963), cancelling its ~~own~~ immediately preceding request:

1. NO NEED SEND STAFFER WITH PHOTOS. WE HAVE ASKED NAVY FOR PHOTOS AGAIN, BUT MEXI CAN SEE OSWALD'S PICTURE SOONER ON THE PRESS WIRE.
2. HAVE JUST RE-EMPHASIZED TO ODENVY HQRS THE SENSITIVITY OF PHOTOS YOU ARE SENDING AND ALSO RELAYED NAMES OF TRAVELERS WITH SIMILAR NAMES. NOTE RADIO SAYS OSWALD LIVED UNDER ALIAS OF O.H. LEE.

21. On the 23rd at 17:29 2 times, ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~embassy~~ ^{embassy}

Mexico City:

The FBI says that the photos of the man entering the Soviet Embassy which Mexico station sent to Dallas were not of Lee Oswald. Presumably Mexico station has doubtfully checked date of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald.

22. And at this point, ^{Nor} 22:48 2 times, 23 ~~Nov~~ ^{Nov} 1
 Mexico City station agreed ~~to~~ ^{to}

Saw photo of Lee Oswald on television night of 22 Nov and it obvious photo sent to Dallas were not identical with Lee Oswald held in Dallas. Dates are as given on photos. ^{is} Mexico station ^{is} reviewing all available photos of persons entering Soviet and Cuban embassies.

(22:54 2 times, 23 Nov 1963)
 24. Two hours later, the station reported the results of ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~check~~ ^{check} of all ^{its} effort to review all available

Coverage:

Complete review of photos of all
visits to Labour Embassy from
August through first half of
November against good press
photo shows no evidence of
Oswald visit. Similar blank
against all Soviet Embassy photos
from 1 September. Note, only
visit we know he made was
to Labour Embassy 28 September,
Saturday on which Embassy
closed and we have not had
coverage... ~~the day after we will~~
~~against at least half day~~

36. With this communication the matter of the
 "Handwritten Individual" reaches the
 end of Phase I, the key element of
 which is the conviction ^{at first} latent, then
 expressed, that the photographed
 individual ^{might} be identical with
 Oswald. The detail, in this applied
 especially to the letters, though
 at a certain point even Hqs. missed
 no detail ^(the word) but later reports ^{the facts}
~~that~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~of~~ quite
 disparate descriptions.

37. This review has attempted to
 deal even-handedly with all items
 in the case record that have a
 bearing on what happened. The
 operational goal, in summarizing and

the high commitment of all involved,
 especially in Mexico City, speaks for itself.
 Equally apparent - because of the
 the 20-20 advantages of hindsight -
 is the evidence of non performance.
 and, perhaps, inhibited action.
 It was a critical factor, for example,
 that no photo of Oswald was
 made available - though it was
 repeatedly requested both at headquarters
 and by the field - or that it was
 not more aggressively sought by CIA,
 before the 22nd of November. A photo-
 graph of Oswald would have obviated
 in a way the mere possession of a
 correct physical identity could not -
 the whole successive deteriorations

of what began as an ²² ~~impressionistic~~
~~tract~~ (selection of the photograph on
 1 October 1963, ~~to~~ into a course
celebre ~~today~~ today.

38. It should be clear) ~~above all~~
 from this factual survey that issue
~~was~~ ^{has} ~~been~~ ^{been} there a course celebre with ~~low~~
 intrinsic merit. Equally clear,
 should be the demonstration of
 the fact themselves that there was
 nothing contrived, or contrived
 about ~~what~~ in what happened;
 unless ~~we~~ ... we have now
 descended to that point in ~~the~~
 human values ~~which~~ ~~reached~~ ~~during~~
~~achieved~~ ~~under~~
~~Stalinism~~ ~~or~~
 Stalin in the USSR and under Hitler
 in Germany, where just a plain
 mistake is ~~per se~~ ~~misinterpreted~~

evidence of conspiracy.

and Development

38. The Genesis of ODUM Exhibit No 1 and
Commission Exhibit 287

Special Agent of the FBI, Bardwell
Hoscoe D. Odum, on 23 November

1963, ~~showed~~ ~~after an unsuccessful~~

showed one of the six photos
of flown up from Mexico City the
previous day to Oswald's mother,
Marguerite Oswald. ODUM himself
had trimmed the off the background
by straight cuts. Mrs Oswald ~~could~~
had no recognition of the image in
the photograph. Bardwell's own details

account may be found ^{among} ~~in~~
Hearings Exhibits, ~~Vol XX of the~~

Hearings, op cit, Vol XX: p. 268 ~~and with this for me~~

39. The photograph shows the unidentified individual in a black shirt. It is one of the 5 photos taken of him in front of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 4 October 1963, two days after Oswald had left the city.

40. At this point for the record the total available ^{photo} coverage of the unidentified individual consists of 12 photographs:

- (a) 5 taken ~~later~~ on 1 October 1963, entering and exiting the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a ~~light colored (khaki?) trousers~~ ^{with a high neckline under-shirt showing,} and a light colored shirt and light trousers.
- (b) 5 taken on 4 October 1963 in front of the Soviet Embassy. He is garbed in a dark, open button-down dark shirt and dark trousers.
- (c) 2 taken on 15 October 1963 in front of the Cuban Embassy

2

a history of mental instability, and was summoned,
recalled from the home,
for reportedly for reasons related to that fact,
in August 1966.

Intercepted Conversation of Cuban Embassy
Employee Luisa CAJEDON, afternoon of
22 November, 1963. At 1730 Mexico City, time -

Some about 5 hours after the Kennedy
assassination in Dallas, ~~Miss~~ a
Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa"
~~subsequently identified as Luisa CAJEDON~~
received a telephone call from an
unidentified male ~~subject~~. The caller
asked her if she had heard the
latest news. Luisa ~~Valderrama~~ jokingly
replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it
almost before Kennedy.... Imagine,
one, two, three and now, that
makes three (she laughs), what
barbarians!...."

R. Galt. speaker agreed on the circumstances of the
assassination. "Luisa" also states that party at
Silvia Duran's had been called off so it would
not appear that they were celebrating the
death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the
party coinciding with burial. Family she might
she planned to move that night into the home of
of doctor (a woman) friend.

later hypothesis? ~~Correctly or not party seen from~~
~~unsubstantiated? "Luisa" is the only item to be taken into~~
~~consideration and subject after the assassination that party~~
~~to the numerous, insignificant elements of this~~

conversation ~~shows address. Person~~
~~is simply highlighting~~

by the following post:

(A) "Luisa" is probably identical with
Luisa Cordeiro, a cable worker at the
Cuban Consulate General in Washington
(W-91). ~~in this city~~ She was chief in
~~Washington~~ ~~city~~ ~~at~~ She returned to
Cuba in 1954 and was reported to be working in
Havana.

(B) The first major element in this city
in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo
MIRABEL ~~the deputy chief~~
1963, ~~for~~ ~~long~~ who had arrived on 2 Sept
1963 in the replacement of
the Cuban Consulate General (deposed 19 Nov
1963). The Deputy Chief (and as of June
1964, MIRABEL's successor) was named
Enrique VEST Perez.

(C) The
"Silva" source ~~believe~~ named in
Luisa's conversation was the receptionist,
~~and~~ a Cuban national, who handled
LHO's ~~the~~ ~~handling~~ his ~~visits~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~
Cuban ~~consulate~~ ~~in~~ ~~Washington~~
on 27 and 28 September, to the Cuban
installations ~~presumably~~ in connection
with a ~~visa~~ ~~application~~ ~~for~~ ~~entry~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~
Cuba. ~~Since~~ ~~there~~ ~~is~~ ~~the~~ ~~only~~ ~~line~~
between ~~the~~ ~~two~~ ~~regarding~~ ~~LHO's~~ ~~activity~~ ~~in~~
this city. For technical reasons, in its
entirety was taken and presented ~~only~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~
Mexican government ~~and~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~authorities~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~
~~United States~~

(A list of conversations with Luisa)
The women ~~summarized~~ ~~the~~ ~~conversations~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~authorities~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~United~~ ~~States~~

regarded in the Mexican authorities). It is from Silvia Alvarez's ~~former~~ statement that it was learned that LEO became engaged in an altercation on 27 September with personal

Enriquez Azcar

D. Manuel Cuevas VEGA, Pres. & Alvarez and his wife, assistant. Rogelia RODRIGUEZ Lopez were positively identified early in Feb. 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training ^{of agents for} the purpose of assassination General Anastasio SERRANO. VEGA ~~is~~ established, was ~~located~~ in Mexico (support)

City during ~~the period of the~~ Consul's stay there

27 Sept. 23rd 1963. ~~Heats principal~~ operation ~~was~~ permanently ~~the~~ to

He left Mexico City (for Havana) on 3 Nov 1963 ~~and~~ remained until 16 ~~at~~ It was ~~report~~ report about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, must pass through him first ~~with~~ the ~~best~~ best ~~and~~ and ~~sent~~ sent ~~it~~ it ~~to~~ to ~~Cuba~~ Cuba ~~for~~ for ~~some~~ some ~~checking,~~ checking, ~~a~~ a ~~procedure~~ procedure ~~which~~

numerous took to days.

~~My report~~
Evidence of the work

There is no evidence in the Bowdler case
file that Walter Brown was subjected
to a systematic distortion interrogations
that distorted her words.

I would have related her admitted
dealings with Bowdler with — confir-
— Brown and

confirmed by intercept — with the

~~data~~

data held in the file on the

~~Walter~~ Carlson ^{personnel} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~per~~ ^{and}

methods — in Mexico City. Was it unusual

for a case like Bowdler's application — applying

to pass he allegedly made with RCOC —

for the application to be made solely

by a trust employee Walter and a Brown

As well as
the question that had been taken earlier by

of chief? ~~What was the answer~~

to this question, there remains the more
fundamental question: Which by accepting
the Bureau story on its face, could it
have happened without the W.G. elements
above stated knowledge and participation?

~~That reply was~~ It is doubtful that

the reply could be other than a total negative

and in that case, it is probable that Costas

^{was in} intelligence and security services ^{could} ~~that~~ ^{was}

~~was~~ more in its file than has been surfaced

in the Bureau's statements. ~~Was he~~

this suggests that

Coming back to the beginning: "Wise" —

(member of the W.G. unit) therefore
Luisa Calderon — as a ^{with the W.G.} ~~W.G. member~~ could
very well have had ⁱⁿ ~~implications~~ ^{that}
~~in~~ ^{some} ~~something~~

(b)

would make what she said to be unimpeached

rather than of a court

(call her a matter of)

more substantial than a host of self indulgence

that is, ~~generally excluded~~

has been examined at the time.

(6)

Silvia Duran, Substantial Amplification of
Her Admission of Personal Relations with
KGB, 1967.) Eliminated

The defects ^{noticed} ~~noticed~~ viewed in hindsight of
the Silvia Duran testimony ^{already} have been suggested
above. (In that context of criticism it should
be also pertinent to reconsider the implications
^{two} of the intercepted telephone conversation
on 26 November, 1963.)

(Noting that the Cuban President, IDORTICO
and ^{his} Ambassador in Mexico, Joaquin
Demoudez Amos, because the thrust of
the conversation dealt with the matter of
question whether Silvia Duran had ^{been} ~~been~~
~~she had~~ ^{she had} been forced to make, any admission
about money payments by the
Mexican interrogator.)

As per September 63: Silvia Duran ~~had~~
graduated from Urban Education Inst. in the Spring

1967 Silvia Buzian was reported by a
and sensitive
likely source to have broken out all
relations with Cuban. She stated that she
traveled with [unclear] [unclear]
described the

After a search of [unclear]
[unclear] that she had been taken into custody
and had been interrogated after the assassination
without [unclear]

[unclear]
did not add substantively to what was already
known. ^{she} She added, under circumstances
[unclear]

That did not permit the source to challenge
or limit her corroborative detail, that she
gone out with [unclear] during his stay in Mexico
city and [unclear] claimed only her personal
relations with [unclear]

in HQ

He is wearing a dark, collared T-shirt or light sweater.

The negatives of all of them are extant and are now held as integral parts of the Oswald ^{and related} file holdings.

41. The result of ODUM's display of the photograph — to repeat, a cropped version of one of those notes under para 40 (b), above — was Mrs. Marguerite

Oswald's allegations that she had been shown a picture of her son's killer, Jack Ruby, a day before he perpetrated the deed! Again, the Warren Commission

Report, ~~and Hearings~~

(pp. 364-5, 367) ^{elaborating} dispose of this erroneous charge ~~and will not be repeated here~~

and requires no repetition here. ~~It~~

A complicating fact, ~~which developed along~~ developed along the way was Mrs Oswald's (correct)

observation when she finally admitted
 before the Commission that the Odium
 (photograph) ~~was~~ was not Rusty, was that the
 photo had been cropped differently
 from the one she had been shown
 in Dallas. ^{(Inspector Malley's cropped version}
 Middle of the Odium photo-
 graphic became Commission Exhibit 237 (see
Hennings; Vol XVI, p. 638).
 42. The net effect of these developments

in the opinion of the Commission was to require
 the admission of the ^{cropped} photograph into
 evidence in a ~~chain~~ chain of depositions

beginning with Odium, including
 the FBI Lab Inspector, James R. Malley
 (who had ~~been the originator of the photograph~~
^{trimmed the photograph used}
~~in the photograph~~
 by the Commission in Washington) and
 Mr Helms, ~~who had the photograph~~
~~had original~~ who deposed for the
 originator. These documents speak

station press during the summer of 1964 and in particular from 23 September to 15 October 1964 when the Station ~~had~~ had plans underway to abandon the operation.

by The ~~Station~~ needs of the Warren Commission presented ~~by the~~

44. In accordance to the results of
 Commission request for a deposition
 Mr Helms, then the Deputy Director for
 Plans, ^{approved by} replied to Mr Roubin by
 memorandum on 25 June 1964 which
 press included the following additional
 observation:

"The Central Intelligence Agency

recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individuals involved who as far as this Agency is aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy.

In this instance

45. The needs of the Commission prevailed over the ~~Statute~~ ~~Act's~~ statutory obligation to protect sources and methods. The "Unidentified Individual" remains to this day unidentified and there is no credible evidence ^{up to this time} to rebut the assertions made by Mr. Helms in the concluding sentence of his memorandum to Mr. Ransby on 23 June 1964, ... About the photo opera-

ations did, as predicted, go down
 the drain. Within a few weeks of
 the public appearance of ^{the} Odum
 Exhibit 237 No 1 and Commission
 Exhibit 237, members of the Soviet
 Embassy began systematic efforts to
^{the surrounding}
 survey buildings, ~~there~~ potentially
 for rental space, but clearly these
 inquiries were directed to spotting possible
 camera sites. The operation was contained
 in any case. Within a year it had
~~been~~ become almost totally
 unproductive in coverage on Americans
 in contrast with the Embassy - a
 clear sign that this category of
 visitor ~~had~~ been was being
 worned away by the Soviets themselves

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DOCUMENTATION BORING BEARING
ON THE UNIDENTIFIED
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE
INDIVIDUAL

1. Mexico Station telegram 6453
(IN-36017) 9 October 1963. 1 page
2. CIA Headquarters ^{electrical} telegraphic dissemination to Department of State, FBI and ^{the} Department of the Navy. (DIR-74673), 10 October 1963, (2 pages)
(20:122 time.)
3. CIA Headquarters cable to Mexico Station (Oct 74830), 10 October 1963, 22:09 2 time. 3 pages.

(2)

4. Mexico Station telegram 6534
(IN-40357), 15 October 1963. 1
page; and, USA Headquarters
electrical dissemination to
the Department of the Navy, 23
October 1963, 1 page.

5. Mexico Station telegram 7014
(IN-66781), 22 November 1963, (1 page
~~22:29 2 times~~)

6. Priority Dispatch from Mexico
City Station (HMMA-22533),
22 November 1963. [Encloses copies
of photo of the Unidentified Individual
taken 1, 4 and 15 October 1963.]
1 page and attachment.

7. Mexico Station telegram 7019
(IN 66846), 22 November 1963,
(1 page. 00:53 2 times)

8. Private letter by Chief of Station,
Mexico, Mr. Win Scott to Chief
of WH Division, Mr. JC King,

(3)

22 November 1963.

9. Mexico Station telegram 7021
(IN - 66896), 23 November 1963. 1
page. 02:44 2 times

10. Mexico Station telegram -

10. CIA Hqs. telegram to Mexico
Station, DIR - 84822, 23 Nov
1963. (1 page. 04:22 2 times.)

11. Mexico Station telegram,
7027 (In - 67189), 23 Nov 1963.
20:43 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram
7025 (In 67186, 23 Nov 1963
20:34 2 times) and 7033 (In -
67232, 23 Nov 1963, 22:46 2 times).
[Forward transcript texts.]

104-10196-10354

10 Mexico Station telegram, 7020 (In-66891),
23 Nov 1963, 02:31 - 2 times

11. CMA Hqs. telegrams to Mexico Station,
DIR - 84821 and 84822, 23 Nov 1963,
01:36 - 2 times and 04:22 - 2 times, respectively.
1 page, each.

Mexico Station telegram, 7027 (In - 67189),
23 Nov 1963, 20:43 - 2 times. 1 page.

12. Mexico Station telegram 7025, 23 November
1963. 16:55 - 2 times. [Forward transcript
informator] 2 page

~~Mexico Station~~

13. Hqs. telegram to Mexico Station, ~~DIR~~
(DIR - 84888), 23 Nov 1963, 17:29 - 2 times.
1 page

New
item 14. [This is Mexico 7025 & 7033, which you
already have.]

15. Mexico Station telegram 7020
(In-67189)

16. Mexico Station telegram 7029, (23 Nov 1963,
20:48 - 2 times.

17. Mexico Station 7035 (Inv 67233),
23 Nov 1963, 2254 2 hrs.

18. Memorandum for the Record by Chief of Station, Mexico, 11 April 1964. Subject: Visit by Three Staff Representatives of Warren Commission. 3 pages and covering dispatch (HANA 23249, 14 April 1964)

~~19-23~~ Text 2
 19-23. ~~Text 1~~ Intercepts 27, 28 September, and 1, 3 October 1963. (For 27 and 28 texts in both Spanish and English, for 1st and 3rd, in English translation only).

24-26. Five photographs of unidentified individual entering and leaving Soviet Embassy, (1 October 1963.
 Mexico City, Graham)

27-29. Five photographs of unidentified individuals in front of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 4 October 1963.
 Graham

30. Two photographs of unidentified individual, taken in front of Cuban Embassy, 15 October 1963.

31-34. Mexico Station - CIA Hqs correspondence, 10 pages 3

18, 29 May and 26 June and
3 July 1967 relatives to negatives of
photographs noted at 24-30, above.

35. letter by D.A. Deputy Director for Plans,
Mr Helms to Mr. J. Lee Rankin, 23
July 1967. 1 page.

36-7. Texts of affidavits by Bradwell D.
ODUM, James R. MALLEY and Richard
Helms. Hearings, vol. XI, pp. 468-70.

UNCLASSIFIED

38. Reproductions of Odum Exhibit No 1
Doc C (Hearings, vol XX, p 691) and
Commissioner Exhibit 237 (Hearings
vol XVI, p. 638). UNCLASSIFIED

39. Extracts from Warren Commission Report, pages 864-5 and 667, dealing with the photographs of the Unidentified Individual. UNCLASSIFIED

. . . (Classified)

40. A Selection of Postment, Documents reflecting ^{CIA} Hqs and Mexico Stations Reaction to and Handling of the Warren Commission Publications of the Photo of the Unidentified Individual, September - October 1964

41. Letter by CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston to the Honorable Bernard T. Bagert, United District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, 16 May 1967. 2 pages. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Correspondence with ^{Hq.} Emory L. Brown 4, 17 April, 1970. 3 pages. UNclassified

43. Correspondence with Mr. Paul L. HOCH, 1 and 15 November 1971 and 24 and 14 Dec. 1971. 8 pages. UNCLAS-SIFIED

44. Correspondence ~~with~~ ^{with and related to} ~~the~~ ^{Requests by} ~~Mr.~~ ^{Chenoweth of Bureau} ~~with~~ ^{Mr.} Bernard Finsterwald Jr. March 22 1971; 8 April (2 MORS); 9-18 February 1972; 24 Feb - 6 March 1972; 11-13 April 1972; 26 and 29 June 1972; 28 July and 17 August 1972; and ~~other~~ ^{memorandums} by Mr. Houston ^{to} Director, FBI on ^{interest,} 11 October 72 ^{together with two supporting} pages, a Cable ~~to~~ ^{from} Mexico Station dated 3 October 1972 ^{under the auspices of} interview, dated 11 October, 1972. 43 pages.

AC/Agg

Subject: Review of Selected Items in the
Lee Harvey Oswald File re
Allegations of the Castro Cuban
Involvement in the John
F. Kennedy Assassination.

~~Reference~~

The attached ^{review and summary.} cover written at
the express request of Mr David W. Belin,
as a follow up to questions # 3
of his letter to the Agency of 15 April
1975.

The results - as I have already told
him - add nuance, not evidence, to
what the Warren Committee and its
staff had laid before them in 1964, on
~~the subject of~~ ^{the subject of}
~~the assassination~~

The results of the review are stipulated
at the outset at para 8 of the attach-

ment.

~~to be~~ ^{file}
~~not~~ ~~documentation~~ ~~del~~ ~~book~~
~~but~~ ~~not~~ ~~instead~~ -

~~This is a comparison piece to the~~
~~series of the~~ ~~Photographs~~ - this -
 Unidentified individual, submitted
 a few weeks ago.

~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~case~~ ~~data~~

There seemed to be no reason to
 attach ~~the~~ copies of the ^{case} ~~file~~ reports
 from the file to this summary. There
 can be made ^{promptly}
 available ~~however~~, ~~with~~ on
 request.

I:

①

Background

Saturday evening,
 On September 7, 1963, Fidel Castro, in
 an act unusual for him, appeared at
 the Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana.
 Even more unusual Castro submitted
 to an informal interview by the
 Associated Press correspondent Daniel
 HARKER.

HARKER'S interview ~~was~~ ^{reached} New York
 on Sunday, September 8th, and was
 in print throughout the country on
 Monday, September 9th. There can be
 no question from the facts surrounding
 the Castro appearance, ^{which had not been expected,} and his agreement
 to the interview, that this event repre-
 sents a more-than-ordinary
 attempt to get a message ~~through~~
~~registered~~ on the record in the

on the Kennedy assassination that this
Costa interview was considered, ^{by the Agency} in

following up leads, or in dealings
with the the Warren Commission and
its staff, ~~otherwise~~ ~~except for a~~

although Mexico States
specifically directed Ag's attention

to the AP story ^{very shortly} ~~published~~ after the
~~There is no evidence, either, that the Warren Commission~~
Dallas ~~letter~~ ^{staff, itself, perceived} calling this ~~page~~ implication
of the Costa interview in dealing with the
conspiracy hypothesis.

The purpose of this review is to
reconsider Lee Harvey Oswald's activity

~~that Ag's in its light~~ on the assumption

that (avid newspaper reader ~~that~~
that as an ~~top~~ ~~was~~ which we know from

Marius Oswald's (testimony) and others -
he read the ~~that~~ Costa warning
and threat as reported above.

The results of the review - admittedly
bearing ^{utilizing} ~~the~~ the 20-20'
quality of hindsight - may be
stipulated in summary:

(a) There is no increment of ^{credible} evidence ~~of~~
of ~~any~~ Soviet ^{and} or Cuban political,
intelligence or security service involvement
~~with~~ to what was developed and
considered by the Warren Commission

and its staff. ~~THE~~ The Commission's
~~to the effect that the report project was done over the~~
~~finding thereof, that LEO was the killer~~
on the basis of ^{credible evidence}
of JFK and Officer Tippett and did
and of his own determinations
~~that~~ them in alone, must stand.

(b) "credible evidence" that would ^{upset} ~~change~~
significantly ~~of~~
as modifies this judge's ~~and does~~
not exist in Washington ^{of Mexico}
) but it
~~is clear that~~ such evidence could

exist in Moscow and Havana,
where voluntary inputs to the Warren
Commission, ~~are~~
were minimal in
quantity and to ~~fulfill~~ ~~design~~

~~design~~
The design ~~of the~~ ~~connection~~ cover
up any ~~other~~ connection by ~~with~~
Oswald which might be connected
directly or indirectly with the
assassination. They ~~are~~ ~~admittedly~~

~~at the~~ ~~of the~~

~~judgment~~ ~~of the~~ ~~of the~~ ~~of the~~
as a belief
of reasonable doubt, ~~with~~
that there was ~~indeed~~ a KGB ~~link~~
or a ~~link~~

Soviet and or Cuban (KGB and/or
DGI) connection will persist,
and grow with time, until there
has been a full disclosure by
the governments of all ~~of the~~
elements of Oswald's ~~contacts~~
in the Soviet Union, ~~and~~ ~~his~~

stay

and his
contacts in Mexico City are
made available by these two
governments. The Warren Commission
Report should have left a wider
"window" for ~~the~~ ~~Portuguese~~

pathological protection of Oswald
possible progressive syndromes are
his identifications with Fidel Castro
and Cuban going back to his
and the Cuban.
etc

going back.
this
and Cuban revolution which is directly
traceable as far back as his Marine
Corp service in El Toro, California.
If Oswald had Castro threat and
warning?

What about

What about steps
warning and threat,
Castro's statements to AF respondents
Hoshea - irrespective of the extent
whether there was any formal meeting
or even secret, periodic contact with
Oswald by the Cubans or the Russians,
may have
could have been acts of singular
importance and under no circumstances
allowable. ~~for~~ ~~reasonable~~ ~~the~~ ~~first~~
allowable reference for what the Cuban agencies
were doing during the summer of 1963,

which ~~represented~~ gave the interview
 its real significance. The Washington Post
^{abbreviated}
 did ~~a rewrite~~ (Sept 9, p. A-7) which,
 similarly, omitted any reference to the
 main thrust of Coster's remarks. The
^{of Washington DC.}
Evening Star printed the Harker story
 nearly in its entirety ~~but~~
 in the shorter section of the paper
 (9 Sept 1963, page B-4). ^{it} But reordered
 the content of the Harker interview,
 placing the emphasis of the ~~the~~ political
 aspects - in particular highlighting the Gold-
 water element ~~which~~ and burying
 the Coster's explicit ~~the~~ warning to U.S.
 leadership in the middle ~~part~~ of
 the piece.

There is no evidence in the ^{Agency's} files ~~the~~

with or without CIA's knowledge or
more properly, the knowledge of the
President's brother, Robert Kennedy,
who was personally involved with
overnight Cuban matters at the
Federal level after the Bay of Pigs
failure.

Delgado ^{background}
 Cuban Contact with Oswald, Panama, California, ^{and}

1959? The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains ^{an} important section of general significance to any review of the background of LHO's feelings toward and ^{possibly} relations with Costa Rica. After the
the Cuban record is examined.

Delgado was probably the closest non-group member to Oswald ^{his} during special training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base in 1959.

See ST-1, p. 1759. The Warren Commission Report files note of this:

"Oswald told Delgado that he was in trade with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country; which Delgado at first took to be "one of his hobbies, but later believed."

2. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Wash. 1964), p. 687. Hereafter cited as Report.

