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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorganized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concerned with tourists from the United States and the British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the most important section of the Seventh Department".

In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he supervised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT, although Seventh Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments--DREW, LUKIS, WILBY, TAYLOR, and MERTINS. NOSENKO stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL. NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.]

NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintelligence mission, on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

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-FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met FRIPPEL but once in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. He freely related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the USSR. His account of FRIPPEL's activities is consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as noted above.

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with OSWALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959.

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was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB position during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO returned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD"). SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG personnel in New York City. NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. SVENCHANSKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency.

SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form.

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The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD.

NOSENKO's InformationResidence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR.

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Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.

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NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically instructed local authorities there to take no action concerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter, and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically nil."

Request to Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962, by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. No further word on him was received at KGB Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, requesting information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter-intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD. The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, V.K. ALENSEYEV, received the call and reported the inquiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.

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NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

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Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. This summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction". GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specific instructions to carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

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OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assignments. If any other department of the KGB or the GPU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSWALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particularly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Headquarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States.

Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had

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Comment: (Continued)

earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD.

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trustworthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten documents which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVFNCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOPEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHURIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. Lastly, his credibility is diminished by his assertion that he invented the recall telegram (nevertheless apparently confirmed by SCOTCH) to prompt immediate CIA acceptance of his defection.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

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