10 April 1961

NOKOKEN FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meetings with Miro Cardona and Carr on 5 and 6 April 1961

1. On Wednesday, 5 April 1961, Miro Cardona accompanied by Mr. Carr came to Washington for a meeting with Messrs. Berle, Bonaal, Schlesinger and Bowles. Carr and Droller were briefed by Miro Cardona on this meeting in the late afternoon of that day in the Shoreham Hotel suite.

2. Miro, who came to the Droller/Carr meeting accompanied by Carlos Pialt, was much depressed. He said that Berle and his friends seemed to promote a "Fidelismo sin Fidel" line; they are all the way to the left. Miro stated, adding that during the conversation Ray's name was mentioned eleven times in highly laudatory terms. "I knew I would have a cross to bear when I asked Ray to join the council," Miro said, "now I am convinced that this is a very, very heavy cross in deed." When Droller remarked that it might be wise not to read too much into the statements made by Mr. Berle, and that after all the postures of a future Cuban Government would be a completely Cuban affair, Miro looked at Droller with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do not worry, once I have my feet firmly on the ground I know precisely what needs to be done; up until then I make a 180 degree turn and I am more left than they are." Miro then advised Carr and Droller that Mr. Berle had suggested that he, Miro, get together with Mr. John Plant--Political Scientist at Harvard--for the purpose of having the latter assist him in drafting the proclamation of the Revolutionary Council. According to Miro he was rather lukewarm to the proposal and said he would see if he needed the ship's services.

3. Miro advised that another completely private meeting had been scheduled for him by Mr. Berle on the afternoon of 6 April.

   a. In the evening hours of 6 April Carr and Droller met again with Miro for the purpose of:
   a. Obtaining Miro's report on the aforementioned meeting with Mr. Berle, and
   b. Briefing Miro on specific publicity lines Miro was to take during the forthcoming weeks.
5. Miro advised that again Mr. Berle had taken the "Ray line" but that in view of his, Miro's, pliability the meeting had been very friendly. According to Miro, Mr. Berle had again stressed the fact that it would be highly desirable for the Cuban Revolution to start inside the country rather than by an invasion. In this connection Miro said he requested an answer from Berle as to whether Cuban troops would be supported by the U.S. Mr. Berle wanted to side-step this question but Miro said he was pressing Mr. Berle asking him again and again, "Are we going to be alone or not?" At that time Berle is allegedly to have told Miro, "I give you my word of honor, you will not be alone." After having related the above to Droller and Carr, Miro locked at Droller and said, "I now have Berle's word of honor, but I need Bender's assurances as well." After some moments of silence, I said the following: "Many things would depend on specific situations at any given time; clearly the question was not so much one of assurances of commitment of Marines but one of devising proper techniques which would assure the desired effects. Miro as a Cuban patriot had to think primarily of Cuba, but I wanted to assure him that the U.S. interests and stakes in Cuba and the Hemisphere were as great or even greater than those of Miro. Clearly, I said, the U.S. does not intend to become the loser in this struggle. Miro smiled thanking me for my views.

6. Miro then continued to relate that during his meeting with Berle he had asked assurances for three types of financial support:

a. A small credit for immediate Revolutionary Council use.

b. A bigger credit to be used during the actual struggle inside Cuba for the purchase of medicine, food and other necessary reconstruction measures,

c. A big "global credit" which is viewed by Miro as an essential measure for putting Cuba back on its feet economically after the overthrow of Castro. According to Miro, Mr. Berle made no commitment except to say that those matters were under consideration.

7. Miro then informed us that Berle had suggested that he and the Council go to New York to take such steps as necessary to give a rebuttal to Raúl Roa's 10 April speech before the United Nations. In connection with the last point, Carr and Droller briefed Miro as follows:

a. It is desired that Miro meet the press prior and after Raúl Roa's anticipated speech before the United Nations General Assembly. Miro should let Lem Jones or associates arrange the technical details for these press conferences.
b. The press conference prior to Raul Roa's speech should take place on Tuesday 8 April. At that time Miro should announce the political, economic and social posture of the Revolutionary Council; using the Castro Government's past and current sins as a backdrop for his remarks, Miro is expected to sound a clarion call primarily directed at Latin American audiences; Fidel Castro will be labeled a counter-revolutionary; the Revolutionary Council's objective will be a recapitulation of the basic goals of the revolution; the 1940 constitution--a very liberal document—is considered to provide adequate answers to the problems which are facing Cuba today; some themes conveyed to Miro by Nearest, Barlo, Schlesinger and others will be surfaced.

c. The press conference which is to follow the anticipated Roa speech before the United Nations General Assembly is tentatively scheduled for 10 April 1961. (Since Roa may not speak before Monday, 10 April, lawyer Miro wants to have a transcript of the speech on hand before making his rebuttal.) Details of this rebuttal cannot be pinpointed at this moment; however, it would be essential that the themes cited in the attachment would be injected into Miro's and his colleagues' utterances at that time and at any other time they would be meeting with the press.

Miro expressed full agreement and the meeting was adjourned.

8. On 7 April 1961 Miro went to New York to work on the aforementioned conference. He gave an interview to the New York Times correspondent (attachment C) which reflected the guidance given to Miro the previous night.

9. On 8 April Miro and the revolutionary Council held a press conference at the Roosevelt Hotel which was highly successful.

GERARD DROLLE
C, WH/4/7A

Attachments: (3)
1. Guidance for Miro
2. New York Times Article of 8 April
3. Declaration of the Cuban Revolutionary Council