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TITLE : YURIY I. NOSENKO-THE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM DESCRIBES THE
TECHNIQUES USED AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE FIRST
PHASE OF THE PRESENT INTERROGATION OF NOSENKO.
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25 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Yurii I. NOSENKO

1. The attached memorandum describes the techniques used and the results obtained in the first phase of the present interrogation of NOSENKO. The most significant item to emerge from this questioning and related polygraph testing pertained to Subject's story on Lee Harvey OSWALD. Subject's reactions to the polygraph indicate that he never heard of OSWALD until after President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, that he was not an active participant in the case as claimed and that his whole story on OSWALD was prepared by the KGB and given to us at their direction.

2. Other areas of strong reaction refer to Subject's suspected contact with the KGB while in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 and to Abidian and the Pushkin Street drop (key factor in the PENGOVSKYIY compromise). Subject became very upset at questioning on this subject and refused to discuss his own alleged involvement in the case. We also touched upon NOSENKO's parental background, periods of imprisonment and homosexuality. His reactions here all pointed to clear-cut contradictions in the story he has told us.

3. There still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the techniques used to date. We expect to complete this line of questioning by 28 October.

4. This first phase has enabled us to confirm our analyses of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. NOSENKO's reactions have given us hope that we may by this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interrogation, expanded and used even more forcefully, night
break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture. Therefore, we now plan to go beyond the limited aims originally set for this phase of the interrogation. We plan to continue the interrogation in the hope of getting a confession; written plans will be submitted when they are more definitely formulated.

David E. Murphy
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Attachment

cc: Acting DDP (w/attach)
    Chief, CI (w/attach)
    Director of Security (w/attach)
1. This is an interim report on progress to date in the new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 19-21 October. After a break, it will resume on 25 October.

2. Our aims in this phase of the interrogation have been limited: in view of the possibility of losing access to NOSENKO, we have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying points of confusion and revealing new contradictions, and by polygraph examinations of key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of NOSENKO and this KGB operation, to convey to NOSENKO the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interrogation, but at this point there seems little to lose.

3. The first four days have shown that the method is useful. NOSENKO again proved a good reactor on polygraph, he seemed disturbed by our knowledge and the special areas of interest we revealed, and we were able to develop important new information, contradictions and indications concerning the background of this operation.

Method

4. Our basic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific terms on selected and detailed aspects of the story he has told to date. We gave him no explanation for our renewal of the interrogation, nor has he asked for any. Our questions have been pointed and detailed and neither require nor permit long-winded answers; they do not seek new information but are clearly designed to check information he provided earlier; our questions are slanted to build up the impression that they are based on data we have learned independently. The subject matter is taken up in a predetermined order designed for maximum impact on NOSENKO. Interrogation sessions are followed by polygraph examinations on the matters covered in the interrogation and/or other topics. Somewhat more time is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation.
Highlights to Date

5. **OSWALD Case**: The opening session was a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoiahen, whom NOSENKO recognized as his earlier polygraph operator. The questioning was devoted entirely to Lee Harvey OSWALD and NOSENKO's role in the OSWALD case. We hit this point before any other in order (a), to permit clean polygraph testing on this key matter without having disturbed him with other questions, and (b), to get over to NOSENKO the gravity of our concern on this matter of highest state interest. The operator's conclusions were:

   a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

   b. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it.

   c. Subject's alleged association with the OSWALD case both "before and after" the Kennedy assassination was partly for the purpose of supporting and substantiating Subject's cover story "legend".

   d. Subject heard of OSWALD (as a case) only after Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

6. **Geneva Meetings**: We devoted several hours of interrogation and polygraph testing to the Geneva periods, June 1962 and January-February 1964. We hit this point second in order because there are clear signs of important deception behind it and it offers us special opportunities to suggest inside information which in fact derive from observation and deduction. Among the high points were the following:

   a. Pavel SHAKHOV: NOSENKO's story of his "investigation" of SHAKHOV, a Soviet delegation member whom he said was suspected in 1962 to be an American agent, was covered again in detail. The new data we obtained tend to confirm that this is a serious part of NOSENKO's
message. SHAKHOV's background in fact suggests that he is actually a KGB officer; his contact in Geneva with David MARK, a former CIA cooptee in Moscow, is at the center of NOSENKO's story. We slanted our questions to suggest knowledge that SHAKHOV is a KGB officer (not a KGB investigation suspect) and that we may know of some of his important operational contacts. NOSENKO was inconsistent in his story and reacted significantly under polygraph examination. We are currently tracing new names and data and are re-examining the significance of this matter.

b. KGB Control in Geneva: NOSENKO reacted very strongly and consistently to the question of whether or not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB to contact CIA, whether he was receiving KGB direction there, and on related questions, including some related to his ostensibly investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV.

c. U.S. Personnel and Installations in Geneva: NOSENKO was interrogated on his earlier story that he had seen in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB activity against American installations in Geneva (KGB cryptonym "SKORPION"). His version this time conflicted with his 1964 version but contained the same message, that the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little interest, limited facilities and no success in operations against the Americans and had practically no idea of the identities of CIA personnel there. In addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions related to whether the KGB had told him the name of his CIA case officers. On the other hand, he did not react to the names of the then COS Switzerland and COS Geneva, which suggests that he was not told them (these names were buried in lists of names).

d. KGB Personnel in Geneva: NOSENKO's answers to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOV conflicted with certain details earlier reported, including KISLOV's role in the ACHITCHAT case. He seemed disturbed by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw no reason to answer any more of them. However, his polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was as sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matters covered in the same series of questions. We also asked, with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything
concerning his alleged agent Oleg GRINEVSKIIY, an official of the Soviet delegation; his reactions suggested that he may genuinely be ignorant of GRINEVSKIIY's KGB activities as handler of a British double agent in Geneva at the time. He had earlier said that his daily access to the KGB Residency in Geneva in 1964 was due to his frequent contacts with Mikhail S. TSYMBAL; this time he said that he only saw TSYMBAL twice in Geneva in 1964 and failed to mention a Sunday meeting with TSYMBAL which he had reported to us at the time it occurred. This leaves open the whole question of how NOSENKO can explain his daily access to the Residency, which he himself now says - evidently on the basis of what he has learned from our previous interrogations - is not normally permitted. This will be covered in further questioning.

7. Matters Related to the PENKOVSKIY Compromise:

a. John ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Deaddrop: NOSENKO reacted with special sensitivity and intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. In addition, he refused for the first time to discuss his own participation in the incident, adamantly claiming that he does not remember when or even whether he visited the drop or whether he read reports on surveillance coverage of it after ABIDIAN's visit. (He had earlier said he visited the drop at least twice, immediately after ABIDIAN's visit; he described the location and named the KGB officers he went with.) In sharp contrast to his reluctance to discuss his personal role was his unhesitating and confident response to other aspects of the Pushkin Street drop story: he reiterates that ABIDIAN was under full time, double-strength surveillance throughout his tour in Moscow and that ABIDIAN was surveilled to the drop. He now adds, for the first time, that the KGB concluded that the drop had been initially found by a U.S. tourist or delegation member and that ABIDIAN was merely checking out its suitability for some eventual use. (In fact, PENKOVSKIY proposed the drop and ABIDIAN went there only in response to the agreed telephonic signal triggered by persons unknown, not by PENKOVSKIY.)
b. ONGKO-ZEPP: NOSENKO was again queried on Colonel DULACI's bugged restaurant meeting with an Indonesian officer, whose name he gave as ZEPP in 1962 and ONGKO in 1964. He could not clarify why he had confused the names. Since we now know through Greville WYNNE that the Soviets were interested as late as early 1963 in clarifying PENKOVSKY's allusion in a bugged conversation in 1961 to "Zepp", we believe that NOSENKO's 1962 version was a KGB fishing expedition. However, NOSENKO did not react to a polygraph question concerning the name Zepp, and he may not himself know that he was given a wrong name for the Indonesian officer, nor why.

c. Admiral VORONTSOV: It had been speculated that when NOSENKO mentioned in June 1962 meetings the name of his "big friend" in the naval GRU, Admiral VORONTSOV, he may have been fishing for comments from us concerning Marshal VARENTsov, PENKOVSKY's protector. Queried this time about Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSENKO said that he had never met him and had no personal or similar connection; he seems to have completely forgotten ever having claimed a personal relationship.

8. PREISFREUND and STORSBERG: NOSENKO was asked about Johan PREISFREUND, whom he had earlier claimed to have handled in 1960-61 in Moscow as an agent against the military code clerk Jim STORSBERG. NOSENKO again said he first met PREISFREUND in 1960. We told NOSENKO that PREISFREUND told us that he had not met NOSENKO until 1962. NOSENKO denied this. We then added to his concern by telling him (untruthfully, but with a reasonable estimate of the true situation) that PREISFREUND also said that the KGB had told him to say he first met NOSENKO in 1960. When polygraphed NOSENKO reacted strongly and consistently to questions on the subject. These reactions and our follow-up may well bear on the question of whether STORSBERG was actually recruited by the KGB, an issue we have reviewed with the FBI. NOSENKO must be concerned because he now says that the STORSBERG case was primarily GRYNAZOV's, not his own, although he, NOSENKO, "supervised" it. Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO has claimed as his very own.

9. Identity and Personal Background: One of the basic questions underlying this operation is NOSENKO's real identity and personal background. There are many indications, reported
earlier, that he has spent time in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB officer; similarly, his stories of his early school and military service are inconsistent and unbelievable. We are trying in this interrogation to clarify this important point. Among the points covered so far are the following:

a. **Identity:** NOSENKO was questioned extensively on the polygraph concerning his identity. In one series of tests, for example, he was asked whether Minister of Shipbuilding Ivan NOSENKO was the father of Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO and was then asked whether Minister NOSENKO was his father; similarly with Tamara NOSENKO, his ostensible mother. NOSENKO did not react to the question phrased "Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO", but reacted consistently when asked if these were his own parents. He was sensitive to questions concerning his marriage. (There is reason to believe he is not, in fact, married.) He was also given a series of tests asking for the first letter of his given name. The whole alphabet was covered, and the polygraph charts show that he became increasingly tense, culminating at the letter S (or perhaps T) on both runs. While we recognize that testing of this sort may not give valid results, it certainly gets over to NOSENKO the degree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really is. We will pursue this further, covering his patronym and family name as well.

b. **Homosexuality:** We tested polygraphically our observations that NOSENKO has homosexual tendencies and experience. He showed himself extremely sensitive to this line of questioning. The test results tend to show that he had homosexual experience in Soviet imprisonment (see below) and with the KGB homosexual agents whom he has told us he recruited and handled.

c. **Imprisonment:** In view of the strong indications that NOSENKO has spent considerable time in prison (as reported in the past), we questioned him on this. He reacted strongly and consistently to the question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR. We then ran a series of tests to determine his relative sensitivity to various types of imprisonment, various crimes for which he may have been imprisoned, various areas of the USSR where he may have been imprisoned,
and various years of imprisonment. He seemed consistently sensitive to correctional labor camps as the type of prison, and to several possible causes of imprisonment: particularly homosexuality, desertion and felony. Interestingly enough he was not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment for self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he had shot himself in the hand during the war. He seemed more consistently sensitive to Siberia as the area of imprisonment but the results were not as clear as on other aspects of his story. He seems particularly sensitive to the years 1954-1956, which immediately precede the period from 1956 onward, when he began to appear in KGB operations.
SUBJECT: Polygraph Examination of Yuri Ivanovich KOSENKO
Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD on 18 October 1966

Background:

Subject of this report is a thirty-eight year old married male who, on 4 February 1964, established contact with United States authorities in Geneva, Switzerland and asked for political asylum.

Subject was initially polygraphed on 4 April 1964 at a covert security location in Washington, D.C. suburbs (see IND Report #67491, dated 8 April 1964). The purpose of the 1964 polygraph interview was to establish whether Subject was a bona fide defector, or if he was a dispatched Soviet agent sent by Soviet Intelligence on a specific mission. The conclusion arrived at during the 1964 polygraph testing was that Subject was attempting deception; that he was not a bona fide defector, but a dispatched Soviet agent.

During the interim, April 1964 - October 1966, Subject has undergone additional interrogation during which an attempt was made to obtain the truth from Subject, and to clarify the many inconsistencies and discrepancies which were evident throughout Subject's version of his personal and professional background history. Subject admitted to lying and falsifying about some phases of his background only after long and tedious interrogation and after confrontation with irrefutable facts which Subject could not argue against. Subject has admitted to exaggerating his own personal participation, his KGB rank, and certain areas of his personal background. He has not, however, admitted deception concerning two main elements of his KGB operational history, even when confronted by logical and factual contradiction in his story.

Purpose:

The specific purpose of the 18 October 1966 polygraph test was to:

a. Attempt to establish whether Subject was in fact actually involved in the OSWALD case while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union, or if his association with the OSWALD case was only part of his cover story legend.
b. Determine if Subject was personally active in the OSWALD case in 1963 after President Kennedy’s assassination.

c. Ascertain if Subject received special instructions from the KGB to pass on to the American Government regarding the OSWALD case.

Procedure:

The undersigned polygraphed Subject at a covert security location on 18 October 1966 between the hours of 1305 and 1810. The testing was conducted in the Russian language. The specific area covered during the 18 October polygraph interview dealt with questions concerning the Lee Harvey OSWALD case and Subject’s knowledge and association with the OSWALD case in the Soviet Union. The series of questions asked of Subject about the OSWALD case was based entirely on the information Subject gave regarding OSWALD.

Subject immediately recognized the undersigned as the polygraph officer who had administered the previous polygraph test, and recalled the specific date of the test, 4 April 1964. Subject was told that he would again participate in another polygraph interview. Subject’s polygraph patterns revealed a certain amount of muscular movement during some of the phases of testing, however, not withstanding this evidence it is the opinion of the undersigned that there are polygraphic indications of attempted deception by the Subject to some of the specific questions asked of him (see conclusion). When Subject was challenged and accused of deception, he would repeat that he was telling only the truth now, and was telling the truth during his last polygraph test. Then he was confronted with the fact that he had lied to specific questions during his 1964 polygraph, and that these lies were subsequently conclusively proven to be lies, when he himself later (1965-1966) admitted that he had fabricated about portions of his background story, he admitted that this was so, but that the lies were minor and regarding personal areas of his background only. He justified his past deception on the ground that he did so only to embellish his personal background to improve his image in our eyes.

Discussion which took place during the polygraph testing and Subject’s additions to and revisions of his previous statements are incorporated in the SB report.
In analyzing Subject's polygraph charts, polygraphic evidence or indication of deception was considered from the standpoint of consistency and significance (strength) of the reaction.

Reactions found to exist on norm or unimportant lead-in questions, especially if these reactions are inconsistent, are not noted as such in this report. There is no logical explanation for Subject's sensitivity to this category of questions other than the possibility that some of these questions may be more meaningful to Subject than we are at present aware, or that Subject is acquainted with the polygraph technique and is attempting to create false, controlled reactions to lead-in and harmless questions in an attempt to mislead polygraph analysis.

However, Subject's reactions to important questions when noted as "reaction" are, in the opinion of the undersigned, definite indications of deception.

The following are questions asked during the polygraph testing, Subject's answers and his reactions to the questions:

Series No. 1

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?
   Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?
   Answer: No. (Reaction)
7. Other than what you told me, did you actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?
   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?
   Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?
    Answer: No. (Reaction)

11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the 1st Chief Directorate?
    Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?
    Answer: No. (No reaction)

13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?
    Answer: No. (No reaction)

24. Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?
    Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Subject's most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24—other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.
Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?
   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

24. Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?
   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?
   Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered "Before and after". When the question was repeated, he again answered "Before and after". Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer "No". (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered "Before and after" and when he answered "No".

25. Did KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?
   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)
28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered "Yes", hence the (No reaction) notation. However, it is noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S. - OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961.

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

Series No. 3

Additional pertinent questions included among those already asked in Series No. 1 and No. 2:

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

15. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

A. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No Reaction)
18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?
   Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

C. Did KGB give the OSWALDS any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?
   Answer: No. (No reaction)

3A. Did you receive special instructions from KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?
   Answer: No. (Reaction)

Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.

Conclusion:

On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 13 October 1966 session, it is the undersigned's opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

c. Subject received special instructions (from KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it.

Nicholas P. Stoikaten