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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10322-10186

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Remarks:

Attached is material for the House Assassinations Committee (Mr. Berk Requested). Roger Gabrielson has reviewed and requested we provide him the attached for Berk's review here at Headquarters, no release to the Committee.

Assume that we should excerpt only the parts that pertain to Kennedy and Oswald.

No

Let me read all but editing on what if you can't

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jim Pittman	3 Jul 78

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SECRET

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND MR. RANKIN, GENERAL
COUNSEL OF COMMITTEE ON THE ASSASSINATION

12 May 1964

2:50 PM returned DCI's call

R: if ;you'd be so good as to appear personally before the Commission and testify very briefly.

DCI: Yes, I'll do that.

R: Now, all they want to deal with is the question of your knowledge about Oswald being an agent or informer or anything of that character. They also would like to deal with your knowledge of any conspiracy, either domestic or foreign and that kind of thing. We are going to have Edgar Hoover on Thursday at nine to deal pretty much with the same thing. I think we might also ask, Mr. McCone, a little bit about the question of security precautions for the President that you might suggest in a very general way, things that might have occurred to you. I;m sure you know the President is very sensitive about that area for himself. That is, he thinks that sometimes it's just an interference with things he'd like to do.

DCI: Well, all Presidents think that. President Eisenhower used to complain about that all the time and so did Kennedy.

R: And since this testimony is all going to be made public, I thought you might want to keep that in mind. You will have some thoughts about possibly in the domestic area or in the foreign are a or both, in that regard, that they would like to have from you.

DCI: Alright, I'd be glad to come up.

R: Would 10:30 or 11:00 on Thursday be at all convenient.

DCI: Sure, that's be fine.

R: Which would you prefer?

DCI: Well, I'd prefer 10:30, I have a 12:30 luncheon. You have Mr. Hoover at 9:00/

R: I think that we should be well out of the way by then.

DCI: Well, suppose I come up at 10:30 and if you run over, well, I can just wait.

R: Fine.

DCI: Where is this, Mr. Rankin?

R: 200 Maryland Avenue, NE and it's cater-cornered from the Supreme Court Building, it's the Veteran's Foreign War Building on the fourth floor. It's a white marble building...

DCI: I'll find it.

R: If you have any questions about anything that occurred to you beforehand and you want to ask me, don't hesitate to call me.

DCI: Should I come alone or do you want me to bring somebody with me?

R: Whatever your pleasure.

DCI: I see.

R: It makes no difference as far as the Commission...

DCI: I'll tell you what I'll do. I will bring with me the man that's been principally involved in answering any questions that you've had. I know you've had some.

R: And if something occurs to you why we'll just let ;you go off the record and ask him if there's something that ;you don't feel that you could answer yourself and you want to get a little refreshing from him.

DCI: Alright, fine. I'll be there. Tell me, how are you getting along with this Buchannan matter?

R: Well, we've been debating that over here and we're quite unhappy with that fellow. I got a note today saying that in the preface to his London edition he says that he talked ~~w~~ this over with someone in the Co mmission and that the entire text of his report ~~ix~~ has been filed in Washington with the Commission. He's apparently trying to give some respectability to it in that way. Some of the X Commission think that we should call him, some think that it would just advertise him if we do.

DCI: I realize that, and you're always up against that problem of dignifying a book or report; however, I was rather distrubed at a discussion I had a week ago with Mrs. Fluer Cowles Meyer lives in London, and ;you knew her as Fluer Cowles when she was married to Mike Cowles and she told me of the extent to

which Buchanan had captured the radio and television audiences in Great Briton and on the continent and went so far as to say that unless the Commission's report dealt with his allegations and charges with a good deal of finality, there would be quite a feeling that the report itself was a whitewash and that the real facts had not been developed.

R: Well, we had in mind to take every point that he raised , and Mark Lane and every other person that's commented that way in a separate section and just proceed to knock everyone of them clear out.

DCI: That might do it. I spoke to the Chief Justice about it. The fact is I think he talked to Fluer about it.

R: He's one of the strongest against calling him. Did he indicate that to you?

DCI: Yes, he indicated that to me, and for the reason that he was ~~ix~~ afraid that it would just advertise him. I know that, because I get up against that with every book or article that's written criticizing the Central Intelligence Agency. I have a certain number of people who want you to get right on the stump and deny it and when you analyze it, all you've done is advertise what has been said.

R: Right.

DCI: But nevertheless, I think your position is considerably different than the one I mentioned.

R: You think about it, whether you think that if we dress ourselves directly to it in a separate section of the report with all of these claims made by people like that, whether you think that might be better than to try to call him here and just have him put on a show. I think they might like an off the record comment from you if you'd care to make one.

DCI: I'll give some thought about it between now and Thursday. Alright fine. Thank you.

62 (5)

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN

11:20 a. m. - 4 May 1964

DCI: I am calling you because last night we had a guest for dinner, a mutual friend yours and mine, by the name of [Fleur Cowles Montague-Meyers.]

W: Whom I know very well.

DCI: Now, she engaged me in a conversation at dinner concerning this Buchanan report and she was very disturbed about it because of the very great impact that she feels it is having in England and throughout Europe. Buchanan has been on TV and on radio, both in Britain and on the continent.

W: And he has got a book coming out on the 8th.

DCI: And he has got a book coming out and she feels that essential in your report that you dispose of his allegations or indicate the errors on which he draws his conclusions. She feels so strongly that she told me that if this were not done, there would be a very strong feeling among groups in Europe that this whole investigation was a whitewash and that we didn't get to the bottom of the thing. Now, strangely enough, there was an article that appeared in the Washington Post on Saturday, which you undoubtedly read.

W: Is that the one by John Henshaw?

DCI: No, the one by Chalmers Roberts.

W: I didn't see the Roberts one, but I have one by Henshaw - I'm just reading it right now. I have it before me. I thought that was probably what you were calling me about. It is from the Inquirer.

DCI: Yes, I have seen that, but that is a kind of sensational thing. Chalmers Roberts, ask your girl to get. . . .

W: Let's see, that wasn't in the News. That was in the Post.

DCI: Yes, it was in the Post.

W: Yes, I read Roberts. Saturday morning, I read that, saying that he thought we ought to go into all of these things.

DCI: Now, [Fleur] is in town today. She is leaving this evening. She would like very much and it might be worth your time if she could drop in and just give you, herself, what she told me last night.

I don't know whether you would want to do that.

W: Well, I know [Fleur] Would like to talk to her. I usually see her when she is here. I am a little surprise that she would doubt that we wouldn't do such a thing.

DCI: Well, you know, sometimes these girls get quite steamed up about things.

W: We have taken closer to 400 than 300 witnesses' testimony and we have taken it deliberately so that nobody can say that we have just been rubber stamped for the Secret Service or the FBI or anybody else.

DCI Well, I told her in great detail at dinner because you had told me only a few days ago, the depth and the penetration of your inquiry.

W: We haven't yet finished and I would think, John, between you and me, that we ought to take this book of Buchanan when it comes out and scrutinize it carefully to see that there is nothing that we have overlooked. Because if he has any allegations in there concerning witnesses who have information we ought to hear them and we will do that. I don't - I hesitate calling him to testify because that might be just what he is looking for to get the sounding board for another book and I don't want to do that.

DCI: Well, you have to be careful about that until you at least see the book. Now, I thought this Chalmers article was very strange coming (1) by Chalmers Roberts and (2) in the Washington Post.

W: It sounded so to me.

DCI: However, it is interesting that Buchanan worked for the Washington Post in 1949.

W: Wasn't it the Star?

DCI: No, I am told he worked for the Post. Now, I may be wrong on that.

W: Well, I just saw in one of the papers the other day he was originally a Star reporter here. He could have been either.

DCI: Could have been either and sometimes those fellows shift from one newspaper to the other.

W: This is ~~not~~ not the kind of thing Chalmers usually indulges in.

DCI: No, it was entirely foreign to his - to areas that are normal to him.

W: The thing that I didn't like about it, he rather intimated that this came from some source within the Commission.

DCI: I didn't read that into it. But you would be more alert to that than I. Well, in any event what shall I do?

W: Well, I'll be glad to see Fleur and talk to her.

DCI: I'll have her call you up.

W: Yes, ybu may tell her as far as this is concerned, we have no intention of letting go uninvestigated any phase of it any of these people have brought up.

DCI: Well, it is always pleasant to see her anyway, you know.

W: It is always pleasant to see her and I'll be glad to see her.

DCI: She is going to call me in a little while and I'll tell her to give you a ring.

W: Fine. Say, John, in this one about - of Henshaw's. Let me see if I can find it quickly here - he alleges that the Central Intelligence Agency was using Ruby to recruit commandos for raids against Castro's Cuba. To prevent this explosive information from being disclosed, the CIA asked the Justice Dept. to step in and stop the Dallas police from arresting Ruby as well as Oswald. This was supposed to be last April and then it says, a top secret document a letter signed by a high official of the Justice Dept. was sent in April 1963 from the Justice Dept. to the Dallas Chief of Police, Jesse E. Curry requesting the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald and Ruby in connection with the attempted slaying of Gen. Walker.

DCI: There is no truth in that. Let me get you all the dpepe on that.

W: Oh, I'm just positive there is no trugh in it. The only thing is I'm trying to find a way where we can counteract any such thing because that paraded over Europe and around the world is a terrible thing. Do you know anything about this so-called Inquirer?

DCI: No.

It is apparently an insert in some paper he bought on the stands yesterday and he doesn't remember which it was. It looks to me like New York news print.

DCI: I don't know from where it came. In fact I didn't see that article until last night when Fleur was leaving, I sent out to try to find the Chalmers article and they came back with this Inquirer article. But that is the first time I had seen it. I guess it came out in one of the Sunday papers.

W: Yes.

DCI: We get the Star, Times, Herald-Tribune and the Post, so it was one of those four.

W: I am sure that the Roberts one was in the Post.

DCI: Yes, Saturday morning. Fine Earl.

W: All right, John. Thank you very much for calling and we will find a way to meet this whole thing and I will be happy to see Fleur Cowles.

DCI: Fine.

(tape) mcm

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6E (a)

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND J. EDGAR HOOVER
26 November 1963 - 11:20 a. m.

DCI: I just want to be sure that you are satisfied that this Agency is giving you all the help that we possibly can in connection with your investigation of the situation in Dallas. I know the importance the President places on this investigation you are making. He asked me personally whether CIA was giving you full support. I said that they were, but I just wanted to be sure from you that you felt so.

H: We have had the very best support that we could possibly expect from you.

DCI: Good. Well you can call on us for anything we have.

H: We will feel free to do that

DCI: I think it is an exceedingly important investigation and report and I am delighted that the President has called on you to make it.

H: We are trying to do it as fast as we can so we can dispel various wild rumors that have been circulating as to whether this man was the right man etc. that fired the gun. But there is no question that he is the right man. There are a lot of aspects that we have dug up, for instance, with regards to the matter in Mexico City. We have now found that the photograph that was taken was not that of Oswald. We do find from our informant down there that Oswald did call at the Embassy that day and the informant has given us the conversation that he had. He wanted to get a permit to go back to Russia and the Cuban Embassy couldn't give him the permit. The Soviet Embassy stated that it would take three weeks. He had, I think, a visitor's permit for about a week or ten days so that is why he came back to the United States.

DCI: Well, all of that ties in importantly into the story and we have those operational sources down there. We want to handle them very carefully. It involves some very high level people down there. Sam Papich and I have talked about that a couple of times.

H: Mr. ^{Katzenbach} Katzenbach who is handling it for the Department - it is our intention when the Bureau finishes the report, he will of course go over it very carefully because it will be a report that will be released to the public, probably through the White

House, but it is the intention after it is in final form to be checked with each of the Government agencies that are mentioned in it. State Department is involved in regard to the issuing of the passport to the man to come back to this country and that has got to be explained why it was done, the law requires it, etc. all of which of course we are gathering. The aspects of the Mexico City thing. It will have to be mentioned. It is his intention to check with the agencies, Secret Service, etc. to be sure that whatever is said in the report is conferred in and it is agreed to by the various agencies mentioned. So you will have that opportunity to go over it and see exactly what is said and I know he will welcome any suggestion that you care to make.

DCI: Well that will be fine. Thank you

H: Good bye.

(tape) mcm

cc: DDCI
DD/P

FILES ONLY

62 (11)

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND DR. MILTON EISENHOWER

27 November 1963 - 10:25 a. m.

E: I have a little problem here which I think you can help with. A professor of Russian history who has spent many years studying the details of the Russian Secret Police is convinced in his own mind, based on a study of their methods and other developments, that the assassination of President Kennedy was engineered by the Police. Now, he is so convinced of his being right that if he doesn't do anything else he would like to give a public lecture on this theory and I am just a little afraid that in the emotional environment at the moment, that this might be given more attention by the public than it may deserve. I have persuaded him at least to wait until the evidence which President Johnson has insisted be developed and be given to the American public, so at least he could weigh this against that. But he wants to get it off his conscience and what I am wondering is this: Do you have a couple of knowledgeable subordinates who would be willing to take the time let him come over and simply state his thesis in order to relieve his conscience and perhaps in this way he will give up doing anything else. I don't know how important this is.

DCI: Well, I think it is very important because the unfortunate slaying of Oswald removes any opportunity to establish from direct testimony the possibility of any such international plot and I am being beset by communications from all parts of the world by people feeling they know of an assassination plot by the KGB or more frequently assassination plots by Cuba of which Oswald was merely the trigger man. And of course investigation of those is a very important part of this study the FBI is making which we are supporting in every possible way. Now I think it would be extremely useful to talk to this man. We have men who are students of this particular area of activity and if you would give me his name..

E: It is Professor Robert Slusser. Professor of Russian history. He is more than a historian. He worked with Mosley at Columbia for some years where a deep study of the Russian Secret Police was made. He has also had foreign experience, but mainly what I want to give him an opportunity to do is to talk to a couple of knowledgeable people in absolute confidence hoping that this will satisfy him and not lead to his making public statements.

DCI: How do I reach him?

E: I think the best thing to do -- I could give you his telephone number but I think the best thing to do is if you can set up an appointment with someone

at a particular time and place is to call me back and I will see to it that he is there. Wouldn't this be the easiest thing to do?

DCIP Probably would be.

E: By the way I have a direct line and just tell your secretary she can get me on BElmont 5 4088 in Baltimore.

DCI: I'll call you right back.

E: Thank you Sir.

(taped) mcm

CE

Mr. Elder:

Copy to Warner? ~~no~~ no

Anybody else? ~~no~~ no

marge

EYES ONLY

14

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND SENATOR RUSSELL

2 December 1963 - 12:30 p. m.

DCI: I called you either on Thursday or Friday to tell you of this matter that had been developing in Mexico City in connection with a fellow -- Nicaraguan -- presumably had some information and reported to us he had some information on Oswald having received some money in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. This (fellow) was greatly disturbed, -- we went into it in great detail with the Mexican authorities and with the Nicaraguan Foreign Intelligence Service. Finally it blew up because this fellow finally signed a statement on Sunday that everything he said was a falsehood and he was misrepresenting because he was trying to win favor in some future assignment from us. But it was a matter of great concern for a few days and I knew ^{from} Senator Saltonstall's call you were worried about things like that and I wanted to keep you fully advised.

R: Thank you very much. When did it clear up?

DCI: Cleared up yesterday afternoon -- about noontime-- but it was thoroughly run down and we think disposed of.

R: But he had been down in the Cuban Embassy hadn't he?

DCI: Yes he had been down in Mexico City seeking a passport and travel papers to go to Havana and from Havana to Moscow. These were refused but he spent from September 26th to October 3rd in Mexico City during which time he had a number of contacts with both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies but our information which is from extremely sensitive sources indicates he was there in the interest of getting travel rights. What I think he hoped was he could escape quickly from Dallas and follow that course.

R: Wonder where he expected to get the money?

DCI: I don't know. We gave him \$450 to bring him back from Russia.

R: And they say he paid that back.

DCI: That is what I understand.

R: Well, I have just raised hell about bringing back everyone of these fellows who went off and renounced their citizenship. I have fought and fought it.

EYES ONLY

I have complained to the President, and to the Secretary of State. I have done it for the last 4 or 5 years, even while Eisenhower was President. It is a disgrace to pay their way back here when (. . . .) on this country. Let them stew in their own juice as far as I am concerned.

DCI: Well . . .

R: Well, thanks for calling.

DCI: All right, fine, and if anything along this line develops -- delighted you are serving on that committee. That will be a very important thing.

R: I am certainly not delighted. I really think the President took unfair advantage of me. He called me and talked to me about going on that committee, who he could get on there and I didn't think any of the Supreme Court judges would serve and I told him I didn't think they should, so he said, well, they had to have a judge. I said well get Madina (phonetic) or somebody like that and the next thing I knew he called me and said here is the committee I just announced to the press and he had me on there and there wasn't anyway in the world I could get out of it then. I haven't got time to do it in the first place and not of the disposition and I just don't like Chief Justice Warren either.

DCI: Well, I am afraid you are on the committee anyway.

R: I just can't figure how to get out of it now.

DCI: Well, I'll keep you posted.

R: All right. Thank you very much.

(taped) mcm

TOP SECRET

WJ (16)
2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a. m. , November 30th,
in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately
1 1/2 hours

1. Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediately raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault. He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the policy meeting.

TOP SECRET

4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.

6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.

8. Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.

ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.

9. I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.

TOP SECRET

18

10. I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.

11. Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General Carter and instructed him to proceed.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

TOP SECRET

29 November 1963

19

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of
Oswald's activities

1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received. Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.
2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been received.
3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request of Ambassador Mann.
4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request of the FBI.

NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until FBI request received because FBI is in control of the investigation.

5. Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had received \$5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963 with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

TOP SECRET

