SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manuel Day and Kent Oliver in the latter's residence in New York City on the 14th November, 1965.

DATE AND PLACE:

1. Notes were taken at a meeting held by me in order to discuss the activities of one of our agents working in contact with the KGB. (Of which a report dated 31st November 1965, T/53, 1952, C/558, 6, and a similar memorandum to C/558, 7 November, 1965; also see I/23 of 16th November 1965.) Kent obtained numerous correspondence on 31st November, 1965 from the FRD controller, which he also delivered to you on 1st December, 1965.

2. The meeting was held by me telling Kent that I had received a somewhat garbled message containing a certain amount of the situation. I was informed as follows:

(a) There are two garrisoned stations at the base of Stone with whom the organization has contact. One station is commanded by a certain Captain Jones, and is approximately 100 miles below the station, and is known to me by an agent of the FRD controller.

(b) Another station in the same base has approximately 100 miles to this station, and is known to me by an agent of the FRD controller.

(c) Quite separately from the above, there are two garrisoned stations at the base of Stone with whom the organization has contact. One station is commanded by a certain Captain Jones, and is approximately 100 miles below the station, and is known to me by an agent of the FRD controller.

(d) Kent obtained a message on 31st November, 1965 from the FRD controller, which he also delivered to you on 1st December, 1965.

SECRET
SECRET

1. The initial discussions on the subject of action against Castrea's ground forces were held during the last week of December, 1950. At that time the main concern was the establishment of a reliable means of communication with the troops in the front line and the provision of adequate supplies of food and ammunition. The question of attacking Castrea's ground forces was not raised at this time, although it was understood that such an operation would be a major undertaking requiring careful planning.

2. The operation was planned for early January, 1951, and the necessary preparations were made in secret. The plan involved the use of air power and ground troops to capture key positions in Castrea's defense network.

3. After the operation began, the following actions were taken:

   a. The support for the forces fighting in Castrea was increased.

   b. Intelligence was gathered on Castrea's air defenses.

   c. Supplies were sent to the forces in Castrea by air.

   d. Maps and other information were prepared by the AEC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

4. Without going into details, I only note that the enemy was not prepared for our attack.

5. At this point in the operation the situation was such that the implementation of the plan was not possible. The enemy's defenses were better than anticipated, and the air support was not as effective as hoped.

SECRET
SECRET

undoubtedly knew he Smith was also the military adviser to the FBI.

any directive which unilaterally carry the FBI position and in all like-

lihood FBI-ordered anti-Castro literature would accompany such equip-

mental plans and plots utilized in such an undertaking were FBI assets

and identified as such.

4. Prior reply to this was somewhat as follows. While the FBI

takes it conceals these pilots I, Bender, should at least realize that

the pilots who were seeking (as in the Cuban Air Lines) really

belonged to the KGB. In any case he, Ray, and the KGB would accept the

proposed arrangement because it would not imply that the FBI is politi-
cally beholden to the KGB; it would simply indicate to the people inside

Cuba that the KGB was utilizing all resources to obtain the equipment

necessary to overthrow the reCuba. Naturally he was not enthusiastic about

this formula but he could live and cope with it.

7. I told Ray that I would have to get in touch with our military

people in order to find out whether or not we now had sufficient data on

them of which to base a decision. (Comments: C/W/X was briefed tele-

phonically by us on the foregoing and on additional aspects of this

meeting which are reported in part two of this support report. C/A/F/4/1/4/4,

and I felt that we did not have as yet sufficient data to make any

commitments) C/W/X instructed me to write Ray that

(f) Either the KGB should submit a detailed plan which we would consider

post on the basis of which we would then decide whether to be of assistance or not.

(b) The KGB could go it alone and ask us for some assistance

after the operation has been launched and we would make our

decision then on the basis of existing circumstances.

Above was transmitted to Ray who indicated that the KGB did not desire

to go it alone and that he would instruct Berquin to immediately con-

tact Smith in Miami to work out a coordinated operational plan.

8. At this point at the meeting I felt that the time was ripe to

make the final pitch (by witness only) and to get Ray that whether

$7500 would be acceptable to him. I recalled to him the plan in which the

approved lines contained in my 19 November 1955 memorandum to C/A/F/4/1/4/4.

and Cuba's reactions were not unexpected; they rejected this particular

funding proposal. (Comments: For additional details and other items covered

during this meeting see parts two and three, "Report, 21 November,

Meeting with Ray and Cholea.)