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386 ONLY

62-116395

10216
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DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AUN/SLC

- 2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (Enc. 76)
(J. B. Hotis)
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
July 10, 1975
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6, requested all
memoranda and other materials pertaining to FBI policies,
practices, and procedures for liaison with the CIA from 1960
to May, 1970. General instructions concerning liaison with
other agencies, including CIA, are set forth in Section 102
of the Manual of Instructions, a copy of which has been
furnished to the SSC.

Item number 9 requested all memoranda and other
materials reflecting conversations or communications, during
1970, between Agents of the FBI and the FBI Director on the
subject of liaison or contact between personnel of the FBI
and personnel of the CIA, including, but not limited to, all
memoranda and other materials written by former Special Agent
Sam Papich. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed
copies of 19 FBI communications.

In addition to the documents being furnished, there
are a number of internal memoranda, dated March 6-9, 1970,
prepared by the Intelligence Division in response to the Sam J.
Papich memorandum to the Director, March 5, 1970, which because
of their sensitive nature are being made available for review
by SSC staff personnel at FBI Headquarters. These memoranda
are amplifications of the possible CIA grievances listed by
Mr. Papich.

- Assoc. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Admin. _____
- Comp. Syst. _____
- Ext. Affairs _____
- Files & Com. _____
- Gen. Inv. _____
- Ident. _____
- Inspection _____
- Intell. _____
- Laboratory _____
- Plan. & Eval. _____
- Spec. Inv. _____
- Training _____
- Legal Coun. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director Sec'y _____

RLM:mam
(8) mam

YBR
RLM

ORIGINAL AND COPY TO ATTORNEY GEN'L
SEE NOTE PAGES TWO AND THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

LFS
TJM

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

In response to Item number 9, it has been necessary to excise numerous names, dates, places, and other material in order to protect sensitive operations, sources, and methods and to protect the privacy of individuals. In some instances, to protect privacy, it was also necessary to remove information which could lead to an individual's identity. At the end of numerous paragraphs administrative details, such as file numbers, were deleted.

Enclosures (19)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

All documents responsive to Item number 9 being furnished to SSC were previously furnished to the Rockefeller Commission (see W. R. Wannall memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 4/16/75). Originally the Rockefeller Commission was to review the material in FBI space but the Commission obtained possession of the documents.

The documents being made available for review by SSC staff personnel are the cover memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 3/9/70, and enclosed 37 memoranda. These memoranda have been classified Secret and have been appropriately excised.

Enclosed for the Office of the Legal Counsel are one unexcised and one excised copy of the memoranda being made available for review.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE "HUSTON
PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

The Papich letter and memoranda, and the review of the 38 possible grievances, contain comments and other information which could have an adverse effect on our current relationship with CIA.

While numerous dates have been excised to protect the identity of individuals, any reader can extrapolate the approximate time of an event since Papich wrote his 3/13/70 letter following a chronological scheme from 1951 to 1970. There is some chronological variance in the 3/5/70 letter.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

LTR LHM Memo Report dated 7/10/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Huston
Caption of Document: Plan and Related Developments
Appendix C, Part I, Items 6 and 9.

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul Valby Date: 7/15/75

Received by: Robert E. Duff

Title: Jack Jones Reader

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

#mde16
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CONTENTS

- Tab A - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab B - Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab C - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 6.
- Tab D - Unexcised version of documents furnished to SSC in response to request in Appendix C, Part I, Item number 9.
- Tab E - Excised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.
- Tab F - Unexcised version of 38 memoranda being held at FBIHQ for review by SSC.

#MOR 16
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62-116393-386

ENCLOSURE

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I,
Item number 6

#MDR/6
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DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2 AEM/16

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

#mDR16

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 ALM/HS

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO INS

CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

INFORMATION RELATING TO AGENT TO BE
ASSIGNED TO HANDLE LIAISON WITH INS.ACTION:

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to NAME

~~This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.~~

OK but please
load NAME
w/pt
K10

(E) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) - DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE -- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's Contact Division which has had offices in various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businessmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has reorganized this division and it is now called the Domestic Contact Service.

An examination of CIA's activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated that the Bureau can strengthen its position by having our field offices establish direct contact with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. [This particularly applies to those situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations.] We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i. e. information regarding Soviet-bloc capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from such visitors but we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. - You therefore are authorized to establish liaison with local offices of the Domestic Contact Service. (S)

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 5 -

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

(5) In each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a [visiting Soviet-bloc national] you should obtain from the local Domestic Contact Service the nature and extent of CIA interest and all pertinent information which CIA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, you should so advise the Seat of Government, clearly setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau's discharge of its internal security functions.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9-28-65

SAC LETTER NO. 65-54

- 6 -

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 10/25/65

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

10016
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DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-7 ALM/STC

Re Section (E), SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65.

NAME, Philadelphia Office, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Domestic Contact Service, was contacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter.

NAME advised he had just returned from conferences at his Agency Headquarters in Washington, where he had been advised the Bureau was directing its field offices to establish liaison with the local offices of the Domestic Contact Service.

NAME offered his complete cooperation with this office in matters of mutual interest.

Arrangements were perfected wherein Agents of this office making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-Bloc National can contact NAME and he will place them in contact with the Domestic Contact Service representative handling the case, so that information of interest to us can be secured. Any information coming to the attention of the Domestic Contact Service relating to our internal security responsibilities will be immediately reported to this office.

NAME requested, in view of his Agency's regulations, that CIA not be identified as the source in the event

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

information received from his office should be included in a communication going to anyone outside the Bureau. NAME was assured that CIA's identity in this regard would be fully protected.

INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
TERRITORY COVERED BY THE PHILADELPHIA
OFFICE CIA DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
INCLUDING NAMES OF CIA PERSONNEL.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU:

In the course of future contacts with CIA in these cases, it is anticipated that CIA representatives may at times request information relating to Subjects' background, habits, and characteristics, as well as any available photographs.

The Bureau is requested to advise if it will be permissible to orally furnish such background information to the CIA representative and to furnish copies of photographs, if they are available.

The Bureau is also requested to advise if the establishment of liaison on the field office level with CIA's Domestic Contact Service envisages the furnishing of reports and letterhead memos to this Service at the field office level where they have a legitimate interest in the Subject.

SAC, Philadelphia

10/29/65

Director, FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP7 ALM/AB

Reference is made to your letter dated 10/25/65.

The Bureau has been following a policy of not disseminating Bureau information to the Domestic Contact Service at a local level. This policy will continue unless you are advised to the contrary.

In the event that the local CIA office desires information concerning any subject, such requests should be directed by CIA to Bureau Headquarters.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2ALM/STG

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field. For example, _____

SPECIFIC EXAMPLE GIVEN:

In addition, CIA has a domestic operations office in the District which makes name checks with WFO and secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel. No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts is the handling of immediate operational matters.

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/26/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP-2 AM/FR

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most, certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

It is possible that other field offices have working-level contact with the CIA offices in their territories. If the Director desires, similar instructions will be issued to them.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

no.
/s/

(2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

no
/s/

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Response to SSC request, Appendix C, Part I
Item number 9

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-8-01 BY SP2-HEM/116

March 2, 1970

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2Aml/HG
ON 1-2-01

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I ask that you approve my request to retire from Bureau service and, if it is convenient, to have this retirement become effective April 1, 1970.

For several weeks I have been giving this matter serious thought since I began questioning my capability to bring about a better coordinated effort directed against foreign intelligence targets, particularly those of the Communist-Bloc. I have always aimed for perfection, but I do not find that the desired results are being achieved. For almost 18 years I have handled an assignment during a period of turbulent, hectic, and controversial developments in the area of Internal Security - U. S. Intelligence. It was most challenging, very rewarding, but also punishing. Because of this deep involvement I now realize that I have badly neglected my responsibilities as a father and husband. With the time I may have left I would like to give my family the attention it rightfully deserves.

It would be most dishonest of me if I didn't comment on the recent events which have led to the severance of direct liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. Since I have been the principal Bureau element in the day to day relations between the organizations, it has been my responsibility to anticipate problems, move in on the situation, and protect Bureau interests in an efficient and effective manner. I have reviewed my position in this latest development, and I certainly must share responsibility for the tragic turn of events. I believe that I might have employed better perception by following developments in Denver more closely. I deeply regret this. I do not like to fail. I do not like to lose.

I have been involved in intelligence operations dating back to our S.I.S. history, and I think I can speak with some authority in stating that never in our history has this nation been faced with greater security threats from communist intelligence services who, through police state organizations, have developed unusually sophisticated capabilities to strike at our vulnerabilities of a democratic and free society. A continuing and priority target of the Bloc is to penetrate and split or disrupt our internal security and intelligence organizations. Contrary to the tempo of the times many years ago, there is hardly an intelligence operation or an internal security case which does not have direct or indirect international ramifications. The course of events and the highly capable effectiveness of Communist-Bloc intelligence services have placed increasing burdens on us and have necessitated close working relations with CIA, military intelligence services and other agencies. The complex nature of many cases, the rapid means of travel and communication, the daily occurrence of emergency type political developments in various parts of the world have warranted direct liaison with approximately twenty CIA officials on a daily basis. In addition, there are about thirty officials contacted with lesser frequency. The Bureau is a member of the U. S.

Classified by 19-
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Board and its sub-committees which cover matters such as handling of defectors, development of computer programs, leaks of classified information and production of intelligence studies. Our Legal Attaches have reason to contact CIA on a regular basis, and although it has been a small volume of business, the line of communication between our domestic offices and local CIA representatives has been definitely useful. The daily business with CIA relates to hundreds of cases pertaining to activities of all Communist-Bloc services, the New Left, Black Nationalists, the Communist Party and related organizations, and political crises in areas such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. Theoretically, all business could be handled by mail, but from a practical standpoint such a procedure will lead to unbelievable chaos. There will be almost insurmountable obstacles if we are to discharge our duties in a responsible manner and if we are to counter a relentless enemy in the interest of national security. Because interests of other agencies are frequently intertwined with cases involving the Bureau and CIA, the break in FBI-CIA liaison will adversely affect our liaison with such agencies.

I think you will share my alarm over the consequences once the word is received by the "troops" in all U.S. agencies that FBI and CIA no longer have any liaison. Unfortunately, there will be individuals who will maliciously distort and misinterpret the true facts. Within a short period, there will be stories in the press, and worst of all the Communist-Bloc services will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of subtle, skillful and extremely harmful disruption. I am absolutely convinced that the intelligence services of Great Britain, France, West Germany and others are well penetrated by the Soviets. I can't believe that the Philbys, the Blakes, the Alger Hisses were the last of the penetrations. I mention this because if such penetrations exist, the break in relations between the FBI and CIA will provide a basis for promoting further rifts. This is the first time in our history that such an event has occurred, and it is difficult to believe that the enemy will not make every effort to reap the greatest profit possible. Briefly, Mr. Hoover, I have too much respect for you and our FBI to expose us to a potentially disastrous situation.

Although the Denver incident is a blight on the relations between the FBI and CIA, it would be most unfair of me not to comment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA who strived for honest and harmonious relations. As a result of their endeavors there have been many services performed in behalf of the Bureau including notable and outstanding accomplishments. We have been furnished sources, informants, solid productive cases, technical advice and equipment, and there have been instances of cooperation which led to substantial saving of Bureau funds. There also have been examples of alertness on the part of CIA employes which prevented Bureau commission of errors and averted embarrassment. Among some of the more significant examples of cooperation I cite the excellent and badly needed assistance of CIA in the Rudolph Abel case. I also refer to the Agency's providing us with one of the better criminal informants we have had in recent years in the person of **NAME**. I only refer to the foregoing to emphasize that, if at all possible, we should preserve the good friends and the supporters of the Bureau.

~~SECRET~~

It is recognized that one can also present a bill of particulars relating to examples of poor cooperation and deliberate skulduggery. I hold no brief for those in CIA who disrupted relations between


the two agencies been... of unneeded-for actions. Some of these were the parasites who crowded their bureaucratic empires, never had a creative idea, and lived off the efforts of the dedicated people. I believe that an honest and thorough examination will reveal that the presence of such types at the present time is negligible or their influence is almost completely neutralized. Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances. You may not realize that a few years ago we enjoyed a poor reputation among CIA employees. We were characterized as being devious and there was a decided atmosphere of mistrust. Happily, that is not the situation today. I am confident that you can go into any segment of CIA, here and abroad, and you will find that Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity are sincerely related to the FBI. The problems in past years primarily arose from unbelievably poor communication among interested parties. This communication has been greatly improved because of the efforts of many dedicated people. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. In our own Bureau there are numerous officials and employees who have little or no knowledge of the background and the principles of the National Security Act of 1947 and of the National Security Council Directives. In addition, these same people have a vague conception of the objectives and functions of an intelligence organization. Similarly, within CIA there are very many whose conception of the FBI, its jurisdiction, its objectives, its law enforcement character, is shocking at times. Tremendous progress has been made, but it is not easy to harmoniously coordinate the operations of an organization designed to operate in a clandestine manner with an agency which is basically a law enforcement body. This difficulty is further aggravated because our relationship is still composed of a fragile fabric. One incident potentially can destroy years of constructive effort.

Mr. Hoover, I respectfully request that you reconsider the decision to sever liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency. I appeal to you to leave the door open for further deliberation because I am confident this conflict can be satisfactorily resolved. I believe that my removal from the scene provides the opportunity to appoint another agent who will measure up to your desired capabilities and who will be able to rapidly resolve the problem with a new and fresh approach. It is a good time to reexamine our relations with CIA and to make adjustments satisfactory to you.

I sincerely regret that this situation arose, since I readily appreciate you are burdened with so many heavy responsibilities. Yet I feel that I had a firm obligation and duty to communicate with you because of the very nature of my assignment these many years and because of my involvement in this controversial case.

My years with the Bureau gave me more satisfaction than anyone can imagine. You would have to know me better to appreciate this. I want to assure you that wherever I go or whatever I do I will be prepared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected FBI.

Sincerely yours,


Sam Papich

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

#MDR16
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 DATE 1-2-01 BY SP-2ALM/ZTG

DECLASSIFIED BY
 ON

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

(5668SLD/KCL-JFK 2/9/98)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7CLC/ALM
ON 12-7-94
CIA # 88-1826
PER CFA REVIEW OF 6/2/94

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KPM/1/92

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources;

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

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Exempt from GDS, Category 263
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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~~SECRET~~

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly feuded with CIA officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
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(JFK) 2/9/98 4/21/98
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With regard to dealing with the French, we took the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Directives. CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau.

(2) SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION

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SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2)

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

SENSITIVE ONGOING OPERATION (continued from page 2 and 3)

(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, *NAME* because CIA took the full responsibility for moving *NAME* from *PLACE* to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport *NAME* to the U. S. It should be noted that *NAME* was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in *PLACE* raised questions concerning *NAME* mental stability.

After *NAME* arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped *NAME* because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of *NAME* but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was concerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with *NAME* and subsequently develop the leads which led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has maintained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that *NAME* was mentally and physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial. *NAME* was a key witness. CIA has also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau. CIA has complained that the Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its cooperation and CIA has been particularly irked because the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

(4) *NAME OF SUBJECT*

In July, 1953, Senator *NAME* sought to subpoena *NAME AND OCCUPATION* to testify before the Senator's Committee. *NAME* claimed that *NAME* alleged communist activities were clearly documented. The most serious allegation was that *NAME* had *IDENTIFYING DATA*. All of this was publicized. The information set forth in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information to Senator *NAME*. CIA officials held numerous conferences concerning the matter but charges were never made against the Bureau. What information CIA has on this particular item is not known but the Agency did know that we maintained liaison with *NAME* Committee.

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning *NAME*. This information had been furnished to us by *NAME* a former official of the

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Department of Labor. When interviewed by us, NAME made several accusations against CIA. We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took the position that by disseminating derogatory information concerning his Agency, he had been placed on the spot because the NAME data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part of the Bureau.

(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many of the visitors left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the public and nothing more. CIA was so informed but periodically indicated that our policy prevented the Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad. CIA never lodged an official complaint.

It should be emphasized that for the past several years there would not be any basis for any form of complaint with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention given to such officials by NAME and other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

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countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

(7) [CIA] - [DUTCH] INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

(s) In 1965, the [Dutch Internal Security Service] (s) was in the process of investigating individuals in [Holland] who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The [Dutch] wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached [CIA] to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the [Dutch] had been practically nonexistent because the [Dutch] had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of NAME AND IDENTIFYING DATA who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When [CIA] approached us, we told the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told [CIA] (s) we would not handle the interviews for the [Dutch]. (s) We stuck to our position. (s) [CIA] surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.

(8) TWO NAMES

NAME	IDENTIFYING
<u>DATA</u>	<u>DATA</u>
, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. <u>NAME</u> established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, <u>NAME</u> who periodically called	

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on us and furnished information which NAME felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through NAME continued during the period of relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and NAME clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with NAME [the Agency] had (s) successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between NAME organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was [financed by the Agency.] (s)

(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission. - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of NAME. In MONTH, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator NAME had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA

We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives.

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(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL -

In YEAR the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in [Brazil].^(S) Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a [Brazilian] who was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in [Brazil] had not coordinated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. ^(S)

(13) BORDER COVERAGE

INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

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SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(Continued from page 10)

(14) CODE NAME

In May, YEAR the Bureau's double Agent in the captioned case was advised by [his Soviet contact] that he was to have a meeting in PLACE during the period DATE. A question arose as to whether CIA should be informed concerning the double Agent's travel to PLACE. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA. (s)

What is important here is that CIA established contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the [Soviet] in PLACE. The case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidence to demonstrate that we were operational in PLACE and we did not coordinate with the Agency. (s)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if NAME could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that NAME give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make NAME available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal.

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

(16) CASE OF NAME

On July 9, YEAR, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that NAME a CIA employee in PLACE, had been involved in an affair with a FOREIGN girl. According to NAME allegedly had furnished information to the FOREIGN girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed NAME involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that NAME involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind.

(17) NAME OF CASE

In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to FOREIGN Government intentions to conduct espionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, NAME who was in a position to make available highly important FOREIGN documents. On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in PLACE had locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Headquarters was highly disturbed because its office in PLACE had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

SECRET

- 12 -

SECRET

determined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in PLACE in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to FOREIGN authorities. We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated FOREIGN services and has had access to sensitive information in PLACE. The FOREIGN have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in PLACE. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the FOREIGN through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to PLACE without conferring with the Agency.

In connection with alleged FOREIGN espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach.

For some time, CIA has held to a position that the FOREIGN Intelligence Service, NAME is penetrated by the Soviets. The Agency has pointed out that if the FOREIGN are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in Moscow. In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of FOREIGN intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by NAME. I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized.

SECRET

- 13 -

SECRET

(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National Review." The publication carried a column authored by an unidentified individual who was making derogatory references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the author as *NAME* a former CIA employee. CIA investigation indicated that *NAME* was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents. In checking on *NAME*, CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as *NAME* former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and *NAME* former Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information as it might have pertained to *NAME* in this particular matter. CIA may have additional data not revealed.

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

In September, 1965, we received information indicating that one of our informants on the Mexican border was in a position to travel to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or his trip to Cuba.

It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The Agency could charge that we were operating outside of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency.

(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The monograph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN PLACE

In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in PLACE. At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in PLACE. In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in PLACE with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. (S) It is true that the CIA Chief in PLACE was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest. (S)

CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in PLACE bearing in mind that in a place such as PLACE, it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with FOREIGNERS. Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in PLACE without coordinating with CIA.

(22) CODE NAME

CURRENT SENSITIVE
OPERATION

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CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION -

Continued from page 15

(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one *NAME* who was harrassing CIA in the Miami area. *NAME* allegedly was seeking information concerning the Agency's covert operations. We told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within the Bureau's jurisdiction. CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U. S. intelligence operations.

(24) SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

CIA became very irked when we restricted dissemination of our *SENSITIVE DOCUMENT* to two copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material. The Agency never made an official issue of this matter. The Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1960

In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities.

NAME raised questions, pointing out that over the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives.

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions.

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - DATE

By letter dated DATE, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the Foreign Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate.

(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the SOURCE He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information.

(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments.

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The actual fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was subsequently corrected.

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with *NAME* to discuss allegations made by *NAME* a Soviet defector, relative to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. *NAME* was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved.

There are officials in CIA who continue to be seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the Agency and have not discarded *NAME'S* allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA has developed any substantive evidence to support *NAME'S* allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots and attacks which were directed against the Vice President and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

SECRET

- 20 -

SECRET

to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA. Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable of the referenced communication. As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that *NAME AND TITLE* CIA, was attached to Vice President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage in Latin America.

(33) *NAME OF SUBJECT*

The captioned individual is a criminal informant whom we have been utilizing to very significant advantage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable criminal intelligence and has been a key witness in prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. We acquired access to *NAME* through CIA. A covert CIA operator in New York City had become acquainted with *NAME* saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence, and then conferred with *NAME* CIA. *NAME* contacted the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we subsequently acquired the services of *NAME*. Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable.

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions with regard to the exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses. CIA has felt that through a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity to describe CIA's organization, objectives, and operational problems. Furthermore, it has been expressed that Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over-all orientation on the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field. When the matter has been brought up for any discussion by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guidelines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

This is an area where discussion with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assistance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is not only important as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and which falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services. Our work in the positive intelligence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants, and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

(S) In DATE , CIA requested the Bureau to install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary residences of two FOREIGN Government officials visiting the U. S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was told to seek the authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel.

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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on NAME who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the FOREIGN Intelligence Service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the PLACE

On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

SECRET

- 24 -

SECRET

There also have been instances, but cases cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

SECRET

- 25 -

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 11, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a letter be directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States. Purpose of this letter is to protect Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments it may have concerning current use of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and CIA. Director instructed "Prepare same and let me see it."

We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called "ground rules" drawn up between Bureau and CIA in January, 1966, with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. At that time Vice Admiral Raborn was head of CIA and we are enclosing a copy of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention.

In letter we have also pointed out the Bureau's primary responsibility concerning internal security of the United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence, we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other interested agencies. Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms may desire to make after reviewing this matter, including the 1966 agreement.

A copy of the 1966 "ground rules" between CIA and the Bureau is attached to this memorandum for the Director's information.

ACTION: If the Director approves, the attached letter to Helms should go forward.

OK

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/4/09 BY SP2A/ML/STG

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

January 19, 1966

SECRET

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES**

(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. (S)

(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (S)

(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (S)

(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. (S)

(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that each case will have its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will be positive intelligence interest as weighed against internal (S)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling the training, the procurement of positive foreign intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his next assignment abroad. (S)

(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
ON 4/2/98 (JFK)

Dear Mr. Helms:

As I am sure you will agree, the need for close coordination of the intelligence-gathering and counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter is one which requires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems.

During January, 1966, representatives of this Bureau met with officials of the CIA to consider coordination of our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn up and agreed to by both agencies. A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have been encountered since its adoption in the areas it covers.

The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintelligence operations in

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this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory responsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, and policy-making officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a selective basis developed sources, both live and technical, providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the United States. The product of this coverage has been furnished on a regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and officials of the Government.

I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I would welcome any observations you may desire to make.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : The Director

DATE: 3/13/70

FROM : SA Sam Papich

DECLASSIFIED BY ~~5658 SLD/CLL~~
ON ~~2/6/98 (JFK)~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SWITZED
10/11/93 JBH (10300/GAT
GMB 6-22-94 (103 JF)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my understanding that the Director desired that this list be identified. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.

This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown. This also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.

I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area immediately thereafter for an extended period.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

~~SP8 MAC/MSR
6-24-94
Classified by 90310A/GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~

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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

There is no
need for a
personal discussion.
H

~~Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS Category 263
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~SECRET~~

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LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
(JFK) 4/2/98

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU PLACE 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in PLACE and PLACE reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddell Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting.

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

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IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

KP 1-8-98

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3. NAME

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a FOREIGN defector who had been placed under CIA control in PLACE. The Bureau had been interested in interviewing NAME as soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreed to by CIA. Without notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted NAME to arrive in the United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional committee. We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject in any detail.

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originating in this case to CIA. The source was a key double agent in one of the most important cases handled by the Bureau, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned.

5. CASE OF NAME

NAME a CIA employee whom that Agency considered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its own investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. We considered this most uncooperative and we protested.

6. NAMENAME AND OCCUPATION

defected to the communists PLACE AND DATE .A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were collected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing NAME permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau.

7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to NAME, Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.

NAME disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to NAME that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement.

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in Guatemala.] This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate.

10. NAME

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with NAME and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA.

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956 *NAME AND POSITION* made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." *NAME* furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner.

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays particularly related to investigations of applicant matters being handled by the Bureau.

13. NAME

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that *NAME AND POSITION* Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. *NAME AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA* admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. *ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE DATA.*

Although we did not object to the appointment of *NAME* this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect in dealings with CIA.

14. NAME

NAME was a leading scientist assigned to the *LOCATION*. He had been used as a consultant by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA. In October, 1955, he met a Soviet scientist and, with the knowledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. *NAME* informed

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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter.

15. NAME

On July 20, 1956, we determined that one NAME had been in contact with [FOREIGN DIPLOMAT] (S) Washington, D. C. We further ascertained NAME was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning NAME contacts with FOREIGNER. We later interviewed NAME it was indicated NAME in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with the [DIPLOMAT] (S). We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology.

16. NAME

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity.

17. NAME

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States.

18. NAME

was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a [Soviet assigned to the United Nations.] In December, 1956, NAME made a trip to [Russia] where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was a [Colonel in the KGB] and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When NAME returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed NAME at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made.

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H"

20. NAME

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned (FOREIGN) alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to PLACE ... CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency.

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21. ^(S) CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR ^(S) COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957

^(S) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several ^(S) Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the Colombians, because in the past a Colombian ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. ~~(S)~~(U)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. ~~(S)~~(U)

22. [REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957] ~~(S)~~(U)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. ~~(S)~~(U)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. ~~(S)~~(U)

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23. NAME

In October, 1957, we received information from NAME indicating that [a Polish] scientist then visiting in the United States might defect. We followed developments through NAME and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with NAME. We subsequently received information indicating that NAME, a CIA employee, established contact with NAME for the purpose of developing information concerning the work [of Polish] scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by NAME possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation.

24. NAME

By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, FOREIGN alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with NAME, an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. NAME gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from NAME who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that NAME denied that she had made such representation.

26. NAME

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement.

27. NAME

We received information in May, 1958, that a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia National Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investigation being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

NAME furnished a signed statement indicating that he personally had no knowledge of the existence of the above information in the National Guard records.

28. NAME

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests.

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, PLACE furnished information volunteered to him by NAME of G-2. NAME was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies. He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

30. NAME

The Legal Attache, PLACE advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit NAME the head of the FOREIGN Intelligence Services. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with NAME. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative.

31. CIA INTEREST IN [CHINESE] ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of [Chinese] aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any [Chinese] alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958.

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, PLACE, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in PLACE by NAME Chief of the CIA Office PLACE. In his communication NAME belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman.

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33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF [INDONESIAN] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES

(S)

(S)(U)

In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - NAME all employees of the NAME Government and assigned to the United States. NAME had been developed as a source of information by CIA in PLACE. NAME came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. NAME had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of NAME, we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (S)(U)

34. NAME

The subject, a former member of FOREIGN intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA may have opened a letter in PLACE which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as NAME. The writer further indicated that he might be connected with FOREIGN intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [United States Ambassador] PLACE. We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [Ambassador] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in PLACE. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. (S)(U)

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35. NAME

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a FOREIGN alien whom CIA was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA.

36. COMPROMISE OF FBI SENSITIVE SOURCE

DETAILS CONCERNING
SENSITIVE SOURCE
[OPERATED AGAINST A
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC
ESTABLISHMENT] (S)

SECRET

SENSITIVE SOURCE
(continued from page 12)

37. CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS (S)(U)

In DATE, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in PLACE. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in PLACE. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the FOREIGN Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in PLACE claimed that his Agency was not involved. (S)(U)

The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain FOREIGN officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (S)

38. NAME

(S)(U) We expressed our displeasure to CIA in September, 1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a FOREIGN citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The FOREIGNER indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a

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possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency.

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN PLACE

(u) The Legal Attache, PLACE reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that NAME AND POSITION was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source of CIA. This information was given to the Legal Attache by NAME AND POSITION. According to NAME CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H."

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE

During the period October DATE, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a lecture given by NAME of CIA. Subsequent to the briefing, General NAME of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by NAME. He was particularly critical of NAME reluctance to furnish certain information, using the excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General NAME stated that the position taken by NAME was only an excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA.

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA.

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of (CIA in Cuba.) This could be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States.

42. NAME

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. The individual involved was NAME

, a well-known expert in the field of TYPE OF research as it applied to SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER was also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. In [April,] DATE. NAME was preparing to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to NAME concerning his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us.

43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA.

44. NAME MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, DATE,

In September, DATE: NAME magazine carried an article captioned TITLE OF ARTICLE which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

which led to an almost open break between the Bureau and CIA. The article was written by NAME who was connected with the NAME AND LOCATION OF ORGANIZATION AND NAME'S CONNECTION WITH CIA. The article was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau for an extended period; and he related a story very critical of the Director.

We learned that the author had been in contact with CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that NAME a CIA official, had read and approved the article prior to its publication. As a result of this information, NAME became persona non grata with the Bureau.

The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles and NAME concerning the matter. We took the position that based upon the information made available CIA had promoted, condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles denied that this was so and then NAME produced information indicating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article before it was published. The author had contacted NAME one of NAME subordinates, and had discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised the question of strained relations between the two agencies and at that time NAME reportedly told the author that relations were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless, the final draft of the article included the derogatory information and the facts available to us indicate that NAME had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the article before it was published. He did not do so. He told us that this was an oversight.

Consideration was given to severance of liaison relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not immediately answer letters which had been sent to the Bureau by Dulles and NAME in connection with this particular matter. It was also recommended and approved that we cut off all contact with NAME.

By letter dated September DATE to Dulles, the Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any concern or objection to NAME OF MAGAZINE and furthermore, had failed

to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September DATE was also sent to NAME and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau.

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959 (S)(U)

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area; which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting Soviets. (S) CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. (S) By letter (S) dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (S)(U)

DEFECTUALS

46. APPEARANCE OF NAME BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On DATE, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining NAME AND CHARACTERIZATION to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that NAME was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on DATE 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making NAME available.

On DATE 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that NAME could be made available.

By memorandum dated DATE 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request.

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

On April 11, 1960, NAME of NAME OF COMPANY, Caracas, Venezuela, informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with NAME an official of the U.S. Embassy in PLACE. NAME was a CIA employee. NAME took exception to complimentary statements made by SOURCE concerning the Director and the FBI. S/A stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960.

48. NAME, CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

In February, 1960, NAME AND POSITION for the NAME Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by NAME a top CIA official. NAME allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of NAME talk, and was satisfied that NAME had not made the statement attributed to him.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that NAME had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA.

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly,

SECRET

had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations.

50. NAME

(u) We received information indicating that the subject, a [former Cuban] intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect [in New York City] (S) We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative [in New York City] had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (u)

51. NAME

Miss NAME a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of [the NAME Delegation to the United Nations] (S) Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that NAME had informed [the DELEGATION] (S) that she was leaving her job. The DELEGATION inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss NAME.

The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending NAME to [the DELEGATION] (S) that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau.

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SECRET

52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors.

53. TITLE AND AUTHOR OF BOOK

In July, 1961, our PLACE Office received galley proofs of the book TITLE written by AUTHOR. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for NAME and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau.

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, PLACE 1961

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, PLACE received information indicating that FOREIGN Embassy in that city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [local CIA office] that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (S) (u)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in DATE 1961, NAME furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, NAME was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on DATE 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation.

SECRET

On DATE - 1962, NAME AND POSITION

CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with NAME on DATE 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on NAME over an extended period. NAME explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to NAME that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H."

56. NAME

In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request.

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA established contact with NAME AND CHARACTERIZATION who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, NAME

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SECRET

The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that NAME was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA.

58. NAME

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling.

59. NAME

On DATE 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting FOREIGN national. We immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On DATE 1963, a strong protest was lodged with NAME AND POSITION CIA.

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed NAME and NAME that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received \$6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one NAME a FOREIGN national. Interrogation of NAME including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to NAME it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations.

SECRET

SECRET

61. NAME

The subject is a FOREIGN national who first made contact with CIA in DATE expressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in DATE and he is currently in the United States. He has been the source of considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in CIA took a very strong position indicating that NAME was a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, NAME although controversial, continues to furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned.

If it is finally concluded that NAME is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of the subject over a period of years.

62. NAME

On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an operation directed against the WHOM [in] WHERE [in Texas] in 1964 and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the FOREIGNER could have been in contact with WHOM without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the FOREIGNER prior to his POSITION assignment in the United States, but CIA, nevertheless, had an obligation to give us proper notification. (S)(U)

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY [IN MIAMI] - 1965 (S)(U)

We received information in June, 1965, that certain Cuban exiles in the Miami area were representing themselves as being with the "Department of National Security." These exiles had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political conditions in Cuba. We ascertained that this activity was being performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the exiles under the cover of "Department of National Security." We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients (S)(U)

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