File #: 62-116395

Serial Scope:

430 thru 435

436
437 thru 440
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM: W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE-SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

DATE: 7/24/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz (J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

This is to recommend attached letter be sent to the Attorney General in response to his memorandum of 7/16/75, also attached. For your information, there are additional attachments relating to prior correspondence with the Attorney General on the matter of direct operational liaison with the White House.

In attached letter to the Attorney General the response to the first matter was prepared by the Special Investigative Division (R. J. McCarthy memorandum to Mr. Cleveland, 7/21/75, captioned as above).

It is to be noted that attached memorandum of N. P. Callahan to the Director dated 4/24/74 captioned "Proposed Management Changes in the Department of Justice" indicates on page 2, item number 5, Department opposition to the FBI exercising any policy-type liaison with the White House. Director Kelley on page 3 of this memorandum wrote, "The President told me the Director of the FBI has direct access to him and he with the Drtr. He described this as a traditional relationship. I do not contemplate bypassing the AG but on the other hand may not be able to keep him completely informed at all times. This may possibly be pertinent to number 5. If not, I see no reason to mention it." In this Bureau's reply to the Department, copy attached, dated 5/2/74 captioned "Revision of the Department of Justice Organization Regulations (28 CFR Part 0)" in which the need for Bureau operational liaison with the White House is documented, the above comments were not mentioned, and there does not appear to be any need for elaboration on this point in our current letter to the Attorney General.

RLM: mam

Enclosures (7) - Sent 7-29-75
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

While our current policy is to send the Attorney General copies of all communications to the White House except special inquiry and name check replies there may be exceptions to this rule. This could only be determined by a complete review of all correspondence to the White House which could be extremely difficult and time consuming. Similarly, there is no control file containing copies of all communications from the White House to this Bureau, and, short of a file by file review, there is no means of determining whether or not such communications bypassed the Attorney General.

ACTION:

The attached letter be sent to the Attorney General.

RLM

WJC

Mc

RM

JW

OK

NW 65994 DocId:32989623 Page 3
Memorandum

TO: Clarence M. Kelley, Director
    Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Edward H. Levi
      Attorney General

DATE: July 16, 1975

SUBJECT: United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making for internal security and intelligence activities. I would appreciate it if you would prepare by July 25, 1975 the fullest possible response to the following questions:

1. What standards and procedures has the Attorney General adopted for the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of organized crime intelligence?

2. To what extent have communications between the White House and the FBI or other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent should such communications be channeled through the Attorney General?

EXP. PROC. 30 JUL 17 1975

ENCLOSURE

62-7116-395 - 440
Memorandum

Clarence M. Kelley
to: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: The Attorney General

SUBJECT: Direct operational liaison with the White House

The Federal Bureau of Investigation may continue to maintain direct operational liaison with the White House Office, for the purposes described in your memorandum of May 2, 1974. As provided in 28 CFR 0.15 (b)(7), the Deputy Attorney General will coordinate Departmental liaison with the White House staff and the Executive Office of the President with respect to policy matters.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Walsh
FROM: R. G. Hunsinger
DATE: 5-2-74

SUBJECT: REVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ORGANIZATION REGULATIONS (28 CFR Part 0)

By attached memorandum of 4-26-74, Attorney General (AG) has responded to two of our communications concerning revisions we requested in Justice regulations. In note on attached copy Director has asked Mr. Callahan: "paragraph 1, pg. 2 - are you going to handle? K."

Cited paragraph deals with two items, our request for revision of regulations to delegate authority to FBI for direct liaison with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on FBI budget matters, and our request that FBI's operational liaison with White House be excepted from scope of regulation under which Departmental liaison with White House staff and Executive Office of the President is to be coordinated under Deputy Attorney General (DAG). It is noted that as a result of reorganization by former AG Richardson this function was placed under the Associate Attorney General, a position the AG has indicated is to be abolished.

AG believes it desirable the same language in regulations be applied to FBI as it does with respect to other organization units of the Department.

In regard to first item above, no further response or request is considered necessary, as we have been assured by DAG that we will be able to make necessary contacts with OMB examiners relative to FBI budget matters, where necessary, after clearance with DAG.

As to second item, AG says our request for direct operational liaison with White House is reasonable and he believes our request can be accommodated by further correspondence without change.
Memo Hunsinger to Walsh
RE: REVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ORGANIZATION REGULATIONS (28 CFR Part 0)

in regulations. However, he adds, Department needs clarification
as to what we regard as "operational" as distinguished from
policy matters. Accordingly, a detailed memorandum (attached)
has been prepared describing our liaison functions and spelling
out our need for continued operational liaison with the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached memorandum be forwarded to the AG, with copy
to the DAG.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

REVISON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ORGANIZATION REGULATIONS (28 CFR Part O)

Reference is made to proposed management changes in the Department of Justice as discussed by Associate Attorney General J. D. Sawyer and FBI Associate Director N. P. Callahan on April 23, 1974, specifically with regard to our request that the FBI's operational liaison with the White House be excepted from the scope of Section 0.6(e), Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, which is to become Section 0.15(b)(7) under your proposed Order. The following is in response to your memorandum of April 28, 1974, titled as above, requesting clarification as to what we regard as "operational" as distinguished from policy matters:

A Special Agent-Liaison Officer is assigned to handle the day-to-day operational liaison matters with the White House Staff. In addition to these duties, he handles liaison with several other agencies of the Executive Branch of Government. By volume, his principal contact is with the White House Security Office. This office requests approximately 1,000 full-field background investigations per year on Presidential appointees, members of the White House Staff and other persons having regular access to the White House complex. Regular operational problems arise relating to deadlines, the scope of the investigations and expeditious transmission of developments in these cases to the White House when such is required. The handling of these problems requires regular, direct, personal liaison. In addition to these investigations, the White House Security Office requests approximately 13,000 name checks per year concerning persons who visit the White House complex and who could pose a physical threat or possible embarrassment to the President, members of his family or officials of the White House Staff. Due to sometimes extremely short deadlines, personal direct liaison is maintained in order to be responsive to the White House needs.

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Boynton
1 - Mr. Haynes
1 - Mr. D. J. Green

1955

62-55047-7956

62-116395-946

CLOSED
The Attorney General

Liaison is also maintained with the National Security Council (NSC) Staff member responsible for personnel security matters similar to that of the White House Security Office but on a more limited basis. Also, liaison contact is maintained with other NSC Staff members concerning matters of very sensitive intelligence involving foreign nationals.

Liaison is maintained with the Vice President’s Staff to assist them in dealing with Soviet-bloc nationals who have shown an interest in developing contacts with that office and also to provide name checks on certain persons contacting the office by correspondence or personally.

The availability of a regularly designated Liaison Officer facilitates the prompt handling of requests of other offices in the White House relating to FBI matters. For example, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requests information and briefings on intelligence matters; the Correspondence Unit requests information to assist in responding to citizens’ mail concerning matters of which the FBI has jurisdiction; and the Visitors Office requests visits to the FBI by persons of interest to the White House.

From time to time, FBI investigative matters develop a requirement for information from the White House Staff. These are handled by the Liaison Officer.

In summary, there is a need for direct personal liaison with various offices in the White House complex to handle operational problems on a daily basis and with specific individuals because of the sensitivity of the matters involved, both of a personnel security and intelligence nature. Matters of a policy nature are not referred to or handled by the Liaison Officer. It is therefore requested that the FBI’s operational liaison with the White House be permitted to continue in the manner and for the purposes described above.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:
See memorandum Hunsinger to Walsh dated 5/2/74, prepared by JMF:slm.

- 2 -
Memorandum

TO: The Director

FROM: N. P. Callahan

DATE: April 24, 1974

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MANAGEMENT CHANGES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

At 10 a.m., Monday, 4/22/74, I delivered to Associate Attorney General J. D. Sawyer the Bureau's memorandum containing our comments on the proposed Order which would amend Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations.

I expressed our appreciation for being given the opportunity to present the Bureau's reaction to the proposed Order and at that time briefly discussed the points raised in our memorandum to the Attorney General. Mr. Sawyer indicated that he would review our memorandum and discuss it with the people in the Department who were working on the proposed Order and be back in touch with me.

On the afternoon of 4/23/74, at about 4 p.m., Mr. Sawyer asked me to stop by his office, which I did. The following points were covered:

1. We had requested specific assurance that the Director of the FBI would be permitted to continue to exercise complete control over FBI personnel, including making assignment to Supergrade positions except those of Associate Director, Assistant to the Director, and Assistant Director, which would be submitted to the Attorney General for approval. Mr. Sawyer stated that the proposed Order would be revised to specify that delegation of authority to the Director.

2. As to continuance of the FBI to be excepted from the Department's Executive Development Program and that no FBI personnel or positions would be included in any intra-Departmental personnel exchange program, Mr. Sawyer stated that he agreed that the Bureau should be excepted but it was not thought desirable to provide for this in the Executive Order. Instead, it was their

1 - Mr. Jenkins (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Miller (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Mintz (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Feeney (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Fitzgerald (Sent Direct)
1 - Mr. Green (Sent Direct)
1 - Each Assistant Director (Sent Direct)

NPC: sch (21)
Memo to the Director from N. P. Callahan
Re: Proposed Management Changes in the Department of Justice

intention to provide the exception for the Bureau in a separate memorandum which the Office of the Legal Counsel of the Department will prepare.

3. Mr. Sawyer referred to Section 0.190 regarding the provision that the Attorney General's approval must be secured for the proposed establishment, transfer, or reorganization of major functions, sections, or other sub-units, these being defined as any organizational activities under the supervision or proposed supervision of an individual at or above the GS-15 or equivalent level. We proposed that this item be revised to read, "The head of each office, division, Bureau, or board may from time to time propose the establishment, transfer, reorganization, or termination of major functions." Mr. Sawyer stated that the new Order would adopt our proposed language.

4. As to the Bureau's request that we be delegated authority to continue unobstructed direct liaison with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on FBI budget matters, Mr. Sawyer stated that there would be no change in the proposed Order but that there would be an understanding that the FBI would have direct access to OMB after clearing with the Deputy Attorney General.

5. As to our request that the FBI's operational liaison with the White House be excepted from the scope of Section 0.6(e), Mr. Sawyer advised that he was opposed to the FBI exercising any policy-type liaison. He suggested that we prepare a communication to the Attorney General and to the Deputy spelling out our need for operational liaison so that a decision could be made based on the specifics we would furnish. This will be prepared by the Intelligence Division and sent through for approval.

6. As to the request that the FBI be specifically excepted from Section O.75(k) dealing with the functions of the Assistant Attorney General for Administration in regard to Automatic Data Processing (ADP), Mr. Sawyer stated that there would be no change except that the Order will specify that security is to be maintained as to operations. He stated that the Department wants to know specifically what these items are and would like to have a separate advisory memorandum. This will be prepared by the Computer Systems Division and sent through for approval.

*Note: The document appears to have been handled by memos and redactions, with some parts of the text being marked as "deleted" or "stripped." The original context is unclear due to these markings.*

OVER
Memorandum N. P. Callahan to The Director
Re: Proposed Management Changes in the
Department of Justice

Mr. Sawyer indicated that the Order will be announced on 4/24/74,
to be effective 5/11/74. In this regard, however, the elimination of the functions
of the Associate Attorney General would be effective immediately and the
Office of Management and Finance, which is headed by the Assistant Attorney
General for Administration, will commence operating under the Deputy Attorney
General immediately.

RECOMMENDATION:

This is prepared for the immediate information of the Director.
I will follow closely to see that the information which Mr. Sawyer requested
is promptly prepared and sent through for your approval.
Memorandum

Clarence M. Kelley

TO: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: The Attorney General

DATE: 

SUBJECT: Revision of the Department of Justice Organization Regulations (28 CFR Part 0)

I respond to your memorandum of April 18, 1974, and your earlier memorandum of April 2, 1974, concerning the revision of the Department of Justice organization regulations. (28 CFR Part 0).

After reviewing your memoranda in light of policies I wish to pursue for supervising the work of the Department, I believe that some of your concerns can be met without specific changes in the regulations. Supergrade positions in the FBI will continue to be controlled by the Director, although any personnel action by any officer of the Department is subject to the discretionary review of the Deputy Attorney General under section 0.15(c). The FBI will continue to be excepted from the Department's Executive Development Program but since that program is not referred to in the regulations, it was not necessary to spell out an FBI exemption.

EX-116 REC-16

With respect to the provision in the regulations for approval of changes within organizational units (§0.190), your suggestion for a clarification of the language has been incorporated in the new order. That section is intended to apply only to the establishment, transfer, reorganization or termination of major functions, and further guidance will be provided in an internal departmental directive.
With respect to your requests that the FBI be given authority for direct liaison with the Office of Management and Budget on FBI budget matters (§0.76(v)) and with the White House on operational matters (§0.15(b)(7)), I believe it desirable to have the same language in the regulations apply to the FBI as applies with respect to other organizational units of the Department. Your request for direct operational liaison with the White House Office is reasonable, but we would need clarification as to what you regard as "operational" as distinguished from policy matters. I believe this request can be accommodated by further correspondence without a change in the regulations.

Because of the desirability for uniform treatment of the various units of the Department in the regulations, I do not believe that the FBI should be exempt from section 0.75(k), relating to policies and procedures applicable to automatic data processing. However, the FBI's security interests will, of course, be protected.

I appreciate your concern in these matters and assure you that the FBI will have an opportunity to submit its views before any policy changes affecting it are finalized.
FBI can’t withhold evidence

Several days ago, Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, charged that the Justice Department had "severely hampered" the committee’s investigation by refusing to come forward with the classified materials the committee needs.

Attorney General Edward H. Levi promptly expressed surprise and dismay, declaring: "I'm sorry he said that, and I hope it isn't true. I don't think we should be severely hampering their investigative work."

The next day, though, Mr. Levi told a meeting of reporters that he might refuse to give the committee all it had asked for. Now Sen. Church, emerging from a closed two-hour session with Mr. Levi and FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, has said they'd been unable to reach a final agreement on what information was to be released.

If this is not "stonewalling," as one committee source put it, it appears to be a pretty good imitation. Mr. Levi, recalling the anti-Communist rampage of the late Sen. Joe McCarthy in the early 1950s, says he is concerned because "lots of individuals can get hurt."

But Sen. Church is not, Joe McCarthy. Neither is Republican Sen. John Tower of Texas, the panel's vice-chairman. Neither are Republican Sens. Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania or any of the other committee members.

On their record so far, we think they can be trusted to be as sensitive to the rights of individuals and the needs of genuine security as anyone in the Justice Department or the FBI.

Indeed, one of the committee's prime concerns is the various ways the FBI itself has hurt lots of individuals by burglaries, wiretapping, disruption, harassment, anonymous letters and the like.

It is not up to the FBI to determine what materials it should turn over to a duly-authorized Senate committee investigating the FBI's own illegal behavior and abuses of power. Sen. Church says the committee is "determined to have all the information it needs," and that is exactly what it should get.
Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by Staff Members of the Committee of former FBI Special Agent Richard H. Davis. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderrotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2
62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-480768 (Personnel File Former SA Richard H. Davis)

SFP: 1hb (11)
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) RICHARD H.
DAVIS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Set out below is information concerning an
interview of former FBI SA Richard H. Davis by SSC Staff
Members. Davis served in the FBI from September 17, 1951,
until his retirement on September 22, 1971.

On advance notice from Mr. Michael Epstein, SSC
Staff Member, Davis was advised that he was to be interviewed
at 9:30 a.m., July 15, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge, 275 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30301.
Davis was informed by the Legal Counsel Division of the FBI
that he was being released from any applicable employment
agreement for purposes of the SSC interview concerning the
former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Stanley David Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC). It was explained to Davis that he had the
right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide
private counsel. Davis was also told that there were certain
privileged areas concerning which he would not be required
to answer questions. These areas concerned information which
might divulge the identities of FBI sources; information
relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information
which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and
information which originated with other agencies, including
foreign intelligence agencies. Davis was informed that if he

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

July 22, 1975

1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 67-480768 (Personnel File Former SA Richard H. Davis)

SFP: 1hb | h6 |

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

SEE NOTE PAGE 7

GPO 584-546

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desired the presence of an FBI representative in Atlanta for consultation purposes, one would be supplied on his request. He then made a request for such assistance.

An FBI representative met with Davis in Atlanta on July 14, 1975, at which time Davis was informed that if a question arose during the interview in one of the areas set out above, he had the privilege, before replying, of consulting with the FBI representative, who would not accompany him to the interview but who would be available in the FBI Atlanta Field Office located in the same building where the interview was to take place.

The details of the interview, as voluntarily furnished by Davis, are as follows.

Davis was interviewed in Senator Talmadge's office for the approximate period 10:40 a.m. to 11:25 a.m., July 15, 1975, by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo. No mention of Davis' rights was made. The following details are not necessarily in chronological order.

Davis was asked his current address and employment which he gave as follows. He resides at 1147 Wild Creek Trail, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30324. He is employed as an Investigator, DeKalb County Juvenile Court, 3631 Camp Circle, Decatur, Georgia. On inquiry, Davis advised he was assigned to the Atlanta FBI Field Office in August, 1964. When asked if he had worked on the technical coverage of Martin Luther King, Jr., he responded in the affirmative. When asked if his work was the monitoring of King's telephone, his answer was in the affirmative. Asked what else he monitored, Davis said the SCLC and that near the end of his assignment on these matters, he also monitored a technical surveillance on the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
Davis was asked how many telephone lines covered the monitoring of the SCLC and he responded that there were at least two but he did not remember the exact number. He was asked what he did if he was alone and calls came in on two lines at the same time. He advised that he would make a judgment as to which one he would and which one he would not listen to. Asked as to how he would make such a judgment, Davis said it would be on the basis of content. If a conversation appeared to be mere idle chatter, he would not record same. However, if it concerned the civil rights movement, he would record it.

Davis was asked how he felt about working on such an assignment. He advised that he felt he was performing a legitimate intelligence operation in that any popular movement, such as the civil rights movement, can be distorted and misused.

Davis was asked if he served his entire FBI career in Atlanta and he responded that he had served in field offices in Omaha, Nebraska; Detroit, Michigan; and New York City, before his assignment in Atlanta where he retired in 1971.

Davis was asked why he was assigned to this type of work in Atlanta and he stated that he had done similar work in the New York Field Office; that is, security work. He was asked who his supervisor in New York was and he gave the name of Jerry Seyler (phonetic), now deceased. He was asked when Seyler expired and he advised it was after Davis had left New York. He was asked what type of work he did in New York; that is, what security squad he was on. He answered that there were many security squads and the one he worked on dealt with Soviet intelligence. He was asked if, while in New York, the name of Levison came up. His response was that he did not recall.
Asked where the monitoring plant was located in Atlanta, Davis said it was in the Peachtree Towers, a hotel-apartment complex. He was questioned as to how he gained access to the plant and whether he had a key. He answered that he did not have a key but that he would be given access by the person on duty when he arrived. Asked when he was assigned to this plant, he gave the time as October or November, 1964, and that he was on this assignment for about 21 months. Asked whether the surveillance continued after he ended his assignment, he stated that he did not know. Asked whether the surveillance was in existence before Davis received the assignment, he responded in the affirmative but he did not know when it started. Davis gave the name of Jerry Roseberry as the person he worked with the most. He did not recall when Roseberry left the assignment.

Inquiry was made as to the disposition of tapes and logs handled by Davis. He said that he would take them to the Field Office and give them to his supervisor, who at one time was Charles Harding and at another time was Charles Haynes. On weekends, Davis would turn the material over to the weekend supervisor on duty for transfer to Davis' supervisor. Davis did not recall whether he delivered the material in envelopes.

Davis was questioned concerning whether any "cleaning person" would enter the plant for the purpose of cleaning up the facility. His recollection was that such a cleaning practice was in effect but that for security reasons, the personnel on duty would lock up all the equipment in a closet so that the person performing the cleaning function would not become aware of the equipment. Asked if there was any other type of installation covering King, Davis said that there was not. He was asked if the plant had ever been inspected and, if so, by whom. It was his recollection that on two occasions the plant was visited in connection with an inspection but he could
not recall the names of the Inspectors. He was asked who had installed the technical surveillances he worked on and he advised that he felt he was not at liberty to divulge this information. Davis told his interrogators of his secrecy agreement with the FBI, especially as to ongoing operations, and that he therefore was not furnishing this information.

Davis was asked whether he had ever had any compunctions about the propriety of the investigations being discussed and he stated he had not.

Davis was asked whom he had been in contact with concerning this interview. He explained that after he had received the initial telephone call from Epstein, he had called Special Agent in Charge DeBruler of the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI. He stated that he had also talked to Supervisor Charles Haynes in the Atlanta Office and when asked why, he explained that Haynes had been his supervisor. He also furnished the name of former SA Sentinella as a person he had talked to. When asked why he talked to Sentinella, Davis said that he had heard that Sentinella had appeared before a committee and Davis wanted to know about the procedure involved. Davis also said that he had called someone in the Legal Counsel Division in the FBI in Washington, D. C., but did not know that person's name. Davis was then asked if he had talked to FBI SA Seymour Phillips on the preceding day (July 14, 1975). Davis acknowledged that he had. He was asked what that discussion was about and whether Phillips had told him what he should say and what he should not say. Davis responded that Phillips had not given any advice along these lines. Davis said that his contact with Phillips was extremely brief and that Phillips had only told him of areas which he was not required to discuss. These encompassed such things as ongoing FBI investigations, identities of FBI sources, etc. Davis also advised that he was reminded by
Phillips that the clearance from his secrecy agreement was for the areas relating to King, Levison and the SGIC.

Davis advised that on several occasions during the interview he informed Epstein and Miss DeOreo that he had had no qualms about what work he had done when in the FBI. Epstein pressed Davis about whether anyone in the Atlanta Office had ever doubted what he was doing. Davis asked Epstein if he was referring to a former SA named Art Murtaugh. Davis was then asked how he knew about Murtaugh possibly having some doubts and Davis advised that he read about it in the newspapers. Davis advised that he was in sympathy with the civil rights movement but nonetheless believed that it needed to be watched for subversive influences. He was asked where he had originally come from and he responded that it was New York.

He was asked if he used fresh or used tapes and responded that he did not recall. Asked for the names of others who worked in the plant, he named in addition to Jerry Roseberry, Dick Hamilton.

Davis was asked if he knew of any contacts made by the FBI with the press in these matters and he stated he did not recall. He said that he only recalled vague rumors concerning the FBI having contacts with the press and cited as an example, the news account that former FBI Director Hoover had called King a notorious liar.

At the close of the interview, Davis inquired, "What is this all about?" He was told that this was a part of a continuing investigation of the investigative activities of the FBI.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC

NOTE:

Debriefing of Davis as reported herein was by S. F. Phillips of INTD who, on prior approval, traveled to Atlanta to be available for consultation purposes. Phillips was not called upon by Davis during the interview.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index  
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>BRIEFING</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TESTIMONY</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. DATE PROVIDED

7/22/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

SSC
HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC Staff Members of former FBI Special Agent Richard H. Davis

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Organization and staffing

Surveillance, electronic

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Stanley David Levison and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference

62-116395

FMK: fnk
(4) ORIGIONAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONECTION WITH SENSSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
Date of Mail 6/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 7/9 JUL 31 1975

File Number 62-116395-438

Permanent Serial Charge Out
Date of Mail 6/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSSTUDY 75

Removed By 7/9 Jul 31 1975

File Number 62-116395-437
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM: W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7/11/75
1. Mr. N. P. Callahan
2. Mr. J. B. Adams
3. Mr. J. A. Mintz
4. Mr. J. P. Thomas

This is to inform you of the current status of responses to Senate Select Committee (SSC) requests of the FBI. SSC Letter to the Attorney General (AG) 7/9/75 claimed that failure of the Justice Department and the FBI to respond fully to the SSC’s request of 5/14/75, had severely hampered the SSC’s work and said the Committee was at a loss to understand what special difficulties are presented by the 5/14/75 request.

The 5/14/75 letter from the SSC chairman to the AG transmitted four Appendices containing 17 pages of broad requests for information and material from the Department and the FBI. We have responded to these inquiries with the following exceptions:

REFERENCE
Appendix A, item 5a
Appendix A, item 5b
Appendix A, item 5c
Appendix A, item 5g
Appendix A, item 5j

SUBJECT
Elsurs
Mail covers
Informants
Incommunicado
Legal authority
for Cointelpro

STATUS
Letter prepared, dated 7/10/75
Letter to AG in preparation recommending handling by oral briefing
Letter in signature process
Letter dated 7/16/75
Letter to be prepared with negative response

Enclosures
62-116395
JPT:bkb bk'b (S)
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall  
Re: SENSTUDY 75  
62-116395

<table>
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<tr>
<th>REFERENCE</th>
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<td>Appendix B, item I, 1,a</td>
<td>SAC letters</td>
<td>Response being prepared per consultation with SSC staff 6/17/75 (This involves the location, review and production of over 2,000 pages of SAC letters and memos back to 1960)</td>
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<td>Appendix B, item I, 1,b</td>
<td>All Intelligence Division programs Policies and procedures Inspection reports</td>
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<td>Appendix B, item I, 5,6</td>
<td>All &quot;Indexes&quot;</td>
<td>Letter dated 7/10/75 in signature process After consultation with SSC staff, original request for approximately 110 reports was reduced to 3; these (over 900 pages) have been reviewed and excisions recommended; transmittal letter will be prepared upon approval of excisions</td>
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<td>Appendix C, item I, 6</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
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<td>Identity of FBI personnel involved in Cointelpro &quot;OwanCIA&quot; files</td>
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<td>Appendix C, item III, 21-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Letter dated 7/14/75 prepared by Legal Counsel</td>
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</table>
Memorandum to Mr. J. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

REFERENCE
Appendix C, item III, 26, 27
Appendix D, item 2
Appendix D, item 3
Appendix D, item 4, 5, 6
Appendix D, item 4, 5, 6
Appendix D, item 7, 8
Appendix D, item 16

SUBJECT
Wounded Knee
Elsur index
List of Elsurs since 1/1/60
Elsurs re Kissinger 17
Elsurs re Martin Luther King 1/1/60-4/5/68
Atlantic City Convention
Atlantic City Convention

STATUS
Letter sent to Department 5/29/75 requesting advice; no response to date
Reply being prepared
In dictation
Letter dated 7/10/75 in signature process
In dictation
Letter dated 7/14/75 in signature process
Letter dated 7/14/75 in signature process

In addition to the 5/14/75 request, we have received several other requests through 7/9/75 which have been handled with the following exceptions:

REFERENCE
Oral request 6/5/75

SUBJECT
Names of FBI employees who moved "Q&C" files

STATUS
Extensive inquiry by Inspection Division conducted; letter 7/3/75 containing results delivered to AG 7/7/75
Letter being prepared recommending handle by oral briefing (This is a follow up to 5/14/75 letter, App A, item 5b).
Reply being prepared (This request requires review of over 3,000 serials (approx. 12,000 pages) and selection, review, excision and production of over 1,000 pertinent pages)

CONTINUED - OVER
Mark Gitenstein, staff member of captioned Committee D' who has been doing an extensive inquiry into the "official and confidential" files reportedly maintained in former Director Hoover's office, telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly 6-5-75 and requested the identities of the employees who had brought the material from the Director's office during May, 1972, to Mr. Hoover's residence and to Mr. Felt's office.

By way of background, Mr. Gitenstein has obtained through interview of Mr. Felt, former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr, and other Bureau personnel familiar with the operations of the Director's office, considerable knowledge concerning the official and confidential files. There is also an extensive request contained in captioned Committee's letter of 5-4-75 pertaining to information surrounding these files. Additionally, we responded to a request of the Committee contained in their letter of 4-28-75 pertaining to the allegation of removal of certain material from Mr. Hoover's residence after the death of former Associate Director Clyde Tolson. We have not, at this point, determined that Bureau documents have been removed from Bureau space to Mr. Hoover's residence or any other place outside the Bureau. However, it is apparent that Mr. Gitenstein has information, or believes he has information, relating to the removal of Bureau documents.

Mr. Gitenstein stated he had recontacted former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr on 6-5-75 and Mr. Mohr, in response to Mr. Gitenstein's question, stated that the identities of employees who may have brought material from the Director's office to Mr. Hoover's residence and to Mr. Felt's office subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death could be learned through an inquiry in the Mechanical Section supply room.

62-116396

1 - Mr. Wasanall
1 - Mr. Botis
0 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Daly
2 - Mr. Mintz

PVD:kjs (10)  CONTINUED - OVER
Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

In light of this response, Mr. Gitenstein requested that the Bureau identify the personnel involved and it is his obvious intention that the personnel will be interviewed.

Inasmuch as the Inspection Division is conducting inquiry into this matter, it would appear proper for that Division to determine the identities of such personnel and, if deemed necessary, interview in connection with the current inquiry. It is also believed that while this request is oral in nature from the Committee, we should consider furnishing the information as to the identities of employees to the Committee inasmuch as if we do not respond to the oral request Mr. Gitenstein indicated, because of the Committee's interest in this matter, there would be no problem in his obtaining authority to furnish the request in writing. It is apparent at this point that we would not be able to keep such information from the Committee if such a written request were to be received. Additionally, by responding to the oral request it will encourage the Committee, in the areas they described as "abuse-type," to give us an advance indication as to their inquiries.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Inspection Division make the necessary inquiry concerning the identities of the employees and, if deemed advisable, make available to the Legal Analysis Office that information which will be furnished to the Committee.
June 10, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Attention: K. William O'Connor

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Would you please arrange to have Mr. Schwarz, the Committee's Chief Counsel, and Mr. Smothers, the Minority Counsel, given access to the memoranda written by Former Director of the FBI J. Edgar Hoover concerning a discussion between him and Former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on May 9, 1962.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman
By memorandum dated May 23, 1975, you were advised that captioned Committee had directed a letter to the U. S. Postal Service requesting information concerning mail covers initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Committee was referred by Postal Service to the Bureau. Mr. John Elliff, Task Force Director, was advised to direct a letter over the Chairman's signature requesting the information.

On May 30, 1975, we recontacted Mr. Elliff again asking that a letter be directed to the Bureau asking for the information. He was instructed that we had been gathering the requested information, however, prior to our responding, we should receive a confirmation from the Committee. Present at this discussion was K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General. The same information was conveyed by Special Agent Paul V. Daly to Paul Wallach, Staff Member of the Committee, who had been making the mail cover inquiries. Mr. Wallach indicated that he would correspond to the Bureau in accordance with this request.

K. William O'Connor advised subsequently that the Department had received a letter from Wallach to the Department June 7, 1975, containing the request. Mr. O'Connor stated that this was not in accordance with our discussion with the Committee and he was to convey the fact that the request should be over the Chairman's signature.

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly

CONTINUED - OVER
Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
SENSTUDY 75

On June 11, 1975, Mike Shaheen of the Department, who is working with K. William O'Connor in handling responses to the captioned Committee, informed Special Agent Paul V. Daly at 5:30 p.m. that we should respond to the request concerning mail covers without waiting for a letter from the Committee over the Chairman's signature. He advised that this instruction was received by Deputy Attorney General, Harold R. Tyler.

Tyler distinguished this postal request from others by stating that inasmuch as the Committee Chairman had authorized the Committee to inquire concerning mail covers in a letter to U. S. Postal Services, it should not be necessary for them to write a subsequent letter.

The requests to the Department were conveyed to the Section Chief of the Intelligence Division, W. O. Cregar, on June 11, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division expeditiously prepare the necessary responses concerning mail covers.

1. 6/30/75
2. 7/2/75
3. —
June 16, 1975

TO: Paul Daly

FROM: Mike Shaheen

The attached is for your attention, action and response.

Please keep me advised as to the currency of the Bureau's contemplated response. Discuss problems as soon as possible.

Thanks.
June 13, 1975

Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

In amplification of Item 4, Appendix B of the Committee's document request to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, I am making the following requests pertaining to the technique referred to as "mail surveillance, including mail covers and opening mail" and the utilization of this technique "in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities:"

(1) For all incidents of mail opening or mail intercept by or on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the opening or intercept was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the opening or intercept, the type of mail opened or intercepted, and the purpose of the opening or intercept.

(2) For all incidents of mail covers that were physically conducted by FBI employees, whether alone or in cooperation with Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, until the present, please state the physical location where the cover was conducted, the names of the individuals who participated in the cover, the type of mail covered, and the purpose of the cover.

cc President Daily
(3) Please provide all documents and memoranda which discuss, refer, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct and termination of, and policies and procedures for, the mail openings, intercepts, and covers identified above.

I would appreciate it if you would treat the requests delineated above with the highest priority.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

JTE: bcm
June 16, 1975

TO: Paul Daly
FROM: Mike Shaheen

The attached is for your attention, action and response.

Please keep me advised as to the currency of the Bureau's contemplated response. Discuss problems as soon as possible.

Thanks.
June 13, 1975

Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

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Mr. K. William O'Connor
Page -2-

June 13, 1975

(3) Please provide all documents and memoranda which discuss, refer, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct and termination of, and policies and procedures for, the mail openings, intercepts, and covers identified above.

I would appreciate it if you would treat the requests delineated above with the highest priority.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
June 24, 1975

K. William O'Connar, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this date, I am making the following request which relates to matters originally covered in Appendix D, items 5, 6, 9, 13, and 20.

Please provide the present offices of assignment or last known addresses of the following agents or former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation:

- Donald Burgess
- Robert T. Thompson
- Richard Hamilton
- Charles Haynes
- John Benton
- James Kellogg
- James McCann
- Henry Rouse
- Charles Harding
- Charles Haynes
- Richard Hamilton
- Timothy Gorch
- Richard Fuggett
- Larry Gurley
- John Bassett
- Marion Cheek
- Ed Hagerty
- William Sitesis
- Joseph O'Rorick
- William Bolliard
- William D. Campbell

1. 7/2/75
2. 7/2/75
3. 7/2/75
June 24, 1975

All of these individuals are believed to possess information relevant to the Martin Luther King matter. With the exception of Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell, all of these persons are believed to have served at either the Atlanta or Albany, Georgia, office of the FBI. We understand that Mr. Gurley and Mr. Campbell were at one time assigned to headquarters.

It would be most helpful if this information could be provided telephonically to Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

One of the COINTELPRO case studies that the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities is examining concerns measures directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960's and early 1970's, in San Francisco-Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, by the Field Offices of the FBI. Prior to the time that the Petersen Report case summaries became available for our review, on June 12, 1975, two members of our staff, Lester B. Seidel and John L. Smith, met with members of the FBI for an informal briefing concerning this case study.

Please consider this letter a further notification pursuant to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, part III, item E. In order to pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents relevant to this COINTELPRO:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the response thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and the media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to their whereabouts and current relationship to the FBI:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. Primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field.
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

Please note that the above listed nine (9) categories of documents and six (6) categories of witnesses were furnished to the FBI on June 12, 1975, at the noted briefing, so that progress on this request should be well underway.

I would appreciate it if you would contact me to let me know when this information will be available.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

JTE: mb
March 19, 1975

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on February 26, 1975, to discuss the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation for your willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under the mandate of S. Res. 21. I believe we are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Toward that end we are seeking initial documentation from various agencies whose activities fall within the mandate given us by the Senate. Enclosed with this letter is a copy of an initial request for documents relating to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has been previously discussed with staff representatives of the Bureau. With the unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the documents be supplied to the Committee at the earliest opportunity.

We expect to make similar initial requests for documents to other parts of your Department that fall under the mandate of S. Res. 21.

I trust that our respective staffs will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman

Enclosure

6-21-76
FIRST REQUEST FOR FBI DOCUMENTS

I. Legal Authorities

All memoranda discussing the legal authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to (1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials asserted as sources of such authority.

II. Jurisdictional Agreements

All delimitations agreements, jurisdictional agreements, agreements for coordination, and memoranda or understanding, between the FBI and any other Federal departments or agencies, insofar as they pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities.

III. Organization

A. A detailed current organizational chart reflecting all divisions, sections, branches, and units of the FBI, and the subject matters assigned to each by generic and numerical designation.

B. A list of names, titles, and offices of assignment of all Intelligence Division personnel at FBI Headquarters, down to and including unit chiefs, together with the number of personnel below the level of unit chief categorized by unit or other office of assignment.

C. At the field level, the titles and the number of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters, operations, and activities.
IV. Policies and Procedures

A. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions, and those portions of the Manual of Instructions which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities.

B. The table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, and those portions of the Manual of Rules and Regulations which pertain to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-intelligence matters, operations, or activities.

V. Studies and Reports


B. The original report on COINTELPRO activities prepared by the Committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen.
April 28, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Last week's issue of Newsweek, on page 15, states:

Hoover's Secrets

Following the death last week of Clyde Tolson, J. Edgar Hoover's close friend and No. 2 man at the FBI, two FBI agents reportedly removed some documents from the late director's house in Washington, where Tolson had been living. Officially, the FBI denies taking any such action, and a friend of Tolson's says the only Hoover documents Tolson had were old canceled checks and tax returns. But Newsweek had reported earlier that some of Hoover's private dossiers, including information "very, very damaging" to persons in the Nixon White House, were left in Tolson's custody, and a source told Newsweek this week that the materials were carted away in a truck.

Assuming that the files in question may be part of the so-called "Official and Confidential" files, your testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 27, 1975, is instructive. You said that the number of files which you reviewed contained matters relating to "Presidential directives regarding the role of the FBI in the security field" and to the matters related to "domestic..."
violence", "intelligence activities by hostile nations", "domestic extremist activities", and use of the FBI to gather political intelligence.

Furthermore, at the same time, Director Kelley suggested that materials from the "Official and Confidential" files were taken to Director Hoover's home. He stated:

Immediately after his death /Mr. Hoover's/ some of his employees, including his personal secretary, went through his files and completed the destruction of the remainder of the files that were purely personal. These were destroyed by shredding. Some I understand were taken out to his home and placed in his home, they being historical I presume to some extent. There is no indication that they were other than personal files.

Please determine for the Select Committee whether any documents were removed from Mr. Tolson's or Mr. Hoover's residence by FBI agents or former FBI agents after Mr. Tolson's death. If agents of the FBI did go to Mr. Hoover's or Mr. Tolson's residence to remove files, please provide the Select Committee with a complete description of the documents taken into custody by the FBI. Were any such documents copies or originals of documents relating to the business of the FBI? If so, please describe the subject matter of each such document. Also indicate the individual within the FBI who has custody over these files. Furthermore, I respectfully request on behalf of the Select Committee that such files not be destroyed or removed from the FBI's custody until further notice.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL TYLER AND DIRECTOR KELLY

April 30, 1975

This memorandum concerns paragraph IV of the attachment to Senator Church's letter of March 19 to the Attorney General. On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, I would like to request the following:

1. **Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions.**

Certain sections of the Manual currently in effect have been produced to us. We had intended by the request to ask for the relevant superseded sections (note the absence of the word "current" in Section IV as compared to Section IIIA) and we did indicate previously to the liaison staff that we were interested in superseded sections. But without regard to that, it is clear from documents such as the Director's letter of August 7, 1973 to the Attorney General that certain superseded sections will be highly relevant in analyzing the question of legal authority, as well as in understanding particular events in earlier years. We would appreciate their being sent to us promptly or if that causes mechanical problems, being able to promptly review them at the FBI in order to select particular portions for copying. At a minimum we would be interested in superseded Manual provisions for the sections set out in Appendix A.

Copy to Harold Mowitt, Ad Hoc Coun...
2. Sections of the Manual of Instructions Not Previously Produced. Based upon the previous production to us of the table of contents to the Manual of Instructions, we have identified certain additional sections of the Manual which we would like to examine. Rather than having these made available to us in the first instance in our offices, we suggest that they be made available to Mark Citenstein, and other designated members of the staff, for initial examination at the FBI offices. A listing of those sections is annexed as Appendix B.

3. Manual of Rules and Regulations. Again, based upon the procedure whereby we were first furnished with the table of contents of the Manual of Rules, we have identified those sections which we want to examine initially. To expedite matters, these sections, identified in Appendix C, could be examined by Mr. Citenstein, or other designated staff members, at the FBI offices.

4. Filing System. It would also be most helpful if you could provide the Committee with any other written materials on administration of any of the filing or information systems, manual or automated, which are used in the course of intelligence or internal security activities. This does not fit within our prior request but should serve to make future requests more focused.

I have in mind specifically any memoranda prepared by the Bureau on its indexing system and the so-called Clerk's Manual,
if such a document exists. Please also provide the Committee with a list of the classifications used in the FBI's filing system as well as a complete set of printed forms used by the Bureau (e.g., FD-165, etc.).

1. 5/22/75  1. 7/2/75
2. 5/27/75  2. 7/3/75
* * 3. 5/29/75  3. 7/8/75

We believe that all the foregoing material will help expedite and focus the inquiry. I assume that Mr. Hotis will contact me promptly to arrange for our review of this material.

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
### Appendix A

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Appendix C

Part I

Section 9 - Disciplinary Matters

Part II

Section 1 - Authority--Training--Submission of Information
Section 2 - Supervision--Availability-Resident Agencies
Section 3 - Administration of Offices
Section 4 - Communications
Section 5 - Dissemination of Information
Section 6 - Publications, Press, and Public Contacts
Section 7 - Payments--Property
Section 8 - Miscellaneous Regulations
Section 9 - Classification--Character--Copies--Abbreviations
SECRET
July 28, 1975

SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS

I. Materials to which the Committee staff has been given access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. FBI file #100-00.
B. FBI Inspection Guidelines.
C. Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters.
D. Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including all appendices and case summaries (names of authors of analytical appendices may be deleted).
E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections 105, 107, and 130).
F. All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
G. Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents.
H. FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.

Treat as Original.

Disclosure 6-16-395-435

3 JUL 20 1975

6-16-395
II. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations, as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.

B. Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers, proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15, 1975.

C. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.

D. Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966 of the investigative techniques referred to in President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).

E. Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept, requested in letter of June 13, 1975.


G. Communications regarding the activities of SSC which have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

H. Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).
III. Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.

A. Materials pertaining to the reported investigation of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969, other than the "logs" of any surveillance of Delany clearance or search subjects.

B. Materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory information about individuals, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22.

C. Access via agreed procedure to certain information regarding materials contained in the so-called "Official and Confidential" files which do contain derogatory information about individuals.

D. Materials, including inspection reports or related surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 23.

E. SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo of June 17, 1975.

F. Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b, 8, 16.

G. Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c.

H. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 8, 1975.

I. Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of July 14, 1975.
Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:

A. Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from January 1, 1960, to the present


D. The annual five-year budget projections of the FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present.

E. The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests from 1970 to the present.

F. Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI at the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970, until the present.

G. All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated to the President, the Attorney General, or any other recipient during the period 1969 through 1973.

H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the following individuals: (See O.C. Witness list)

I. Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media Program.
OC WITNESS LIST

S.A. Battle
James Crawford
Joseph Dowling
Thomas Dudney
John Dunphy
Mark Felt
Annie Fields
Helen Gandy
Albert Gunser
Robert Kunkel
Irina Metcalf
John Mohr
Tom Payton
Kenneth Peffer
Jessie Peterson
S.A. Clark Shoaff
Kenneth Shoffer
Dorothy Skillman
Raymond Smith
Carol Tschudy
Ralph Windear
V. Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic surveillance index, requested in part on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 2.

B. Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney General, dated July 7, 1975.

C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.

D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to incommunicado interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.

E. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining bank, credit, or other personal information, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.

F. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions, policies, and procedures with regard to the use of informants, including possible entrapment, provocation, interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B, item 4.

G. Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L. Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list of persons contacted not to include persons in their capacity as sources).
VI

Outstanding previously requested materials; access to screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:

A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances identified by subject and target which were instituted or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3.

B. All written justifications for the specific authorizations by the Attorney General for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.

C. All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney General of specific requests for warrantless electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present, requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.

D. Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless electronic surveillance and other controversial intelligence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975.


F. Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations and to the general subject of fictitious and cover organizations (political, commercial, or other), requested in letter of July 14, 1975.

G. Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of July 14, 1965.

H. Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of 1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 28.

SECRET
July 24, 1975

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Would you please provide the Senate Select Committee a list of all FBI special agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's who had the surname "Kehoe"? Please include the unit to which they were assigned and their current addresses.

Your prompt response to this request is appreciated. If feasible, a telephonic response would be preferred.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force

cc: Paul V. Daly
July 21, 1975

Mr. Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Kelley:

This will acknowledge your letter of June 25 pertaining to a classified document sent to the Director of the National Science Foundation in 1964. This is to advise you that the document in question (letter to Leland J. Haworth, Director, National Science Foundation, from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated December 18, 1964, transmitting summary entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement--A Current Analysis") was destroyed by burning on May 31, 1973. A copy of the disposition record is enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

H. Guyford Stearman
Director

Enclosure

R.

[Signature]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>CONTROL NO</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>ORIGIN</th>
<th>COPY NO.</th>
<th>BRIEF SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>TS</td>
<td>4038C</td>
<td>12/18/64</td>
<td>Dept of Justice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ltr to Howarth/transmitting summary &quot;Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis&quot; dated 11/27/64.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
<td>4039C</td>
<td>12/21/64</td>
<td>Dept of Justice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ltr to Howarth/fr J. Edgar Hoover, FBI, transmitting a memo, subj: &quot;Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The documents listed above have been received:

[Signature]

The documents described herein have been destroyed by burning:

[Signature]

NSF Form 584, Jan. 1971
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Adams
FROM: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: 7-18-75

On July 15, 1975, Loch Johnson, Senate Select Committee staff member, telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and advised that the Committee desired to interview SA Fred J. Cassidy and former Agents Donald E. Moore and George C. Moore, Jr. He advised the purpose of the interviews was to discuss the "Houston Plan" and the meetings of the group which participated in the formulation of that plan. Johnson stated these would be staff interviews.

Fred J. Cassidy is currently assigned to the Intelligence Division.

The Department advised us on July 8, 1975, that staff interviews shall be considered a demand under Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations, Section, 16.21 et seq. These sections require Departmental approval when a current or former employee in response to a demand of a court or authority is requested to furnish material contained in Departmental files or to disclose information contained therein.

The Department also advised that the Director may grant a release from the aforementioned Code of Federal Regulations sections in coordination with the Department.

Regarding current employees the Department has informed the Committee that pending further discussion concerning the rights of current employees, they would

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-Personnel File of SA Fred J. Cassidy
1-Personnel File of Former SA George C. Moore, Jr.
1-Personnel File of Former SA Donald E. Moore

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PVD:1lgp
84 JUL 31 1975
Memorandum to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SENSTUDY 75

not allow current employees to submit to interview. This matter has not been resolved to date.

With regard to former employees the Department indicated that the same problems are not present and has allowed interviews of former employees to continue.

In view of this, no recommendation is being made at this time pending the Department's decision concerning interviews of current employees for the interview of SA Cassidy.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) The applicable Bureau employment agreements be waived for Donald E. Moore and George C. Moore, Jr., and that the provisions of Title 28 Section 16.21 Code of Federal Regulations be also waived for the purpose of these interviews.

(2) The Intelligence Division ascertain current addresses of Donald E. Moore and George C. Moore, Jr. Advise them of the Senate Select Committee request.

(3) That the Intelligence Division, when details are finalized concerning these interviews, make arrangements where appropriate for Agents to accompany the interviewees and be available for consultation during interview by the Committee.
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz  
   (I - Mr. J. B. Hotis)  
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall  
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar  

July 18, 1975  

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan  
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall  

Reference is made to the letter from SSC dated June 30, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part to the requests contained in referenced letter.

A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 2

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General  
Attention: K. William O'Connor  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

GTT: 1hb/bbk/k6  
(10)
U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request for Documents Pertaining to COINTELPRO Measures Directed Against the Black Panther Party (BPP) in San Francisco-Oakland, Los Angeles and San Diego, California

Reference is made to letter dated June 30, 1975, to Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of Justice from Mr. John T. Elliff of the SSC which sets out that "one of the COINTELPRO case studies" that SSC is examining concerns "measures directed against the Black Panther Party in the late 1960's and early 1970's in San Francisco-Oakland, Los Angeles and San Diego, California, by the Field Offices of the FBI."

Referenced letter sets out requests concerning nine categories of documents and six categories of witnesses. Regarding Requests 1, 2 and 3, requested documents are not being included at this time due to the extensive volume of documents to be reviewed and reproduced.

Regarding Request Number 4, these documents are being submitted separately pursuant to previous requests.

Regarding Request Number 5, the requested information was not compiled as part of COINTELPRO files. To compile such a list would require a complete review of all three field offices' substantive files which have been maintained on all BPP members and supporters. In light of the magnitude of such a review no further effort is being made to respond to this request.

Original and one copy to AG

GTT: 1hb/bkb
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ON COINTELPRO MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST BPP IN SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

Information requested in Number 6 and 7 is not included as it touches on sensitive areas such as confidential sources and/or cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. This is in accordance with Senator Church's letter to Mr. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, dated March 12, 1975. If in the event the Committee believes the identity of police department and media personnel contacted by the FBI relative to this COINTELPRO are necessary, it should be the subject of discussion between a senior member of the SSC staff and a representative of the FBI Legal Counsel Division.

Regarding Request Number 8, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve the names of all Agents involved in COINTELPRO-BPP, as all Agents investigating Racial and Extremist Matters in the three offices may have made suggestions which were later incorporated into COINTELPRO. Accordingly, only the names of the Coordinators and their Supervisors are included below:

LOS ANGELES

COORDINATOR -

October, 1968 - June, 1969  SA Leroy V. Sheets (retired)
                          5725 72nd Street, W. E. MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON 98270

June, 1969 - September, 1969  SA Wallace E. Ward
                              (Currently assigned Los Angeles Office)

September, 1969 - May, 1971  SA Richard W. Held
                              (Currently assigned FBI Headquarters (TBHQ))

SUPERVISOR -

Entire Period  SA Richard A. Bloeser
               (Currently assigned to Los Angeles Office)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ON Cointelpro Measures Directed Against BPP in San Francisco-Oakland, Los Angeles and San Diego, California

SAN DIEGO

COORDINATOR -

March, 1968 - October, 1968  SA Earl M. Peterson
                            (Currently assigned
                            San Diego Office)

October, 1968 - August, 1970  SA Roy L. Burns
                                (Currently assigned Butte
                                Office)

August, 1970 - March, 1971  SA Lawrence F. Wirick
                             (Currently assigned San Diego
                             Office)

SUPERVISOR -

Entire Period  SA Robert S. Baker (retired)
                    4268 Hortensia
                    San Diego, California  92103

SAN FRANCISCO

COORDINATOR -

April 3, 1968 - April 18, 1968  Raymond H. Byers
                                (Currently on foreign
                                assignment)

April 18, 1968 - May 16, 1969  William Cohendet (retired)
                                1557 Balboa Way
                                Burlingame, California  94010
RE: REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ON COINTELPRO MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST REP IN SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

May 16, 1969 - May 1, 1970 Leo S. Brenneisen (Currently assigned San Francisco Office)

SUPERVISOR -

April 3, 1968 - May 9, 1970 Albert P. Clark (retired)
66 Hill Avenue
Sausalito, California 94965

February 9, 1970 - May 1, 1971 David E. Todd (retired)
20 Cozzolino Drive
Milbrae, California 94030

Regarding Request Number 9, no further data is being included as the volume of material being furnished concerning COINTELPRO is believed to be sufficient for a full understanding of the program.

With regard to the six categories of witnesses requested, the following information is set forth:

1. Robert D. Gebhardt, assigned FBHQ, but under transfer to Los Angeles as Assistant Director.
2. Harry Morgan (retired), 5314 Elmcrest Lane, Cincinnati, Ohio 45242.
3. David E. Todd, referred to in Number 3.
5. Primary Case Agents are included in Number 3 above in the category of Coordinators.
6. Bureau Supervisors for this COINTELPRO were Thomas J. Dealin, currently assigned to FBHQ, and Joseph A. Marion, currently on foreign assignment.

1 - The Attorney General
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ON COINTELPRO MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST BPP IN SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

NOTE:

Information contained in this LHM was compiled from a review of COINTELPRO Black Nationalist-Hate Groups by SA Garnett T. Tunstall. Information furnished by Los Angeles teletype dated 7/11/75, San Diego teletype dated 7/12/75, and San Francisco teletype dated 7/14/75.
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR  ☑ LHM  ☐ Memo  ☐ Report dated 7/18/75
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt
Caption of Document: Operations: Re Documents Pertaining
to COINTELPRO-BPP, West Coast

Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: Paul Taylor  Date: 7/24/75
Received by: J. Erwin  Title: ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN
                    HERBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   - DOCUMENT
   - BRIEFING
   - INTERVIEW
   - TESTIMONY
   - OTHER
   7/18/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   - SSC
   - HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

   SSC Letter 6/30/75

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

   U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   SSC was furnished names of Coordinators and their Supervisors in relation to GUMILPRO-BPP on the West Coast.

   62-116395

   FMK: fmk

   ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

   TREAT AS YELLOW

   5/19/75

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR: mjg  (10)
SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - J. B. Hotis
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

July 16, 1975
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

COINTELPRO

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Item 18, Part II, Appendix C, requested Committee staff access to a list of all FBI Headquarters supervisory personnel involved in the origin, implementation, and termination of each Cointelpro Program.

Twelve files relating to FBI Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros) have been located. There are 23 documents in these files which could be considered as originating or implementing documents and two documents relating to the termination of all Cointelpros. Twelve of the above documents (four memoranda and eight communications to the field) have been publicized through Freedom of Information Act actions, although several of those publicized contained excisions.

There are practical difficulties in conforming to the Committee's request in this instance. While the FBI Headquarters file copy of each document clearly indicates

1 - 62-116009

SEE NOTE PAGE ELEVEN

DR:njc (9)

SECRET

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

NW 65994 Docld:32989623 Page 79
Coistelpro

through the stenographic reference the identity of the
Bureau supervisor who prepared each document, in some
instances it is impossible to identify all of the initials
placed on the document by reviewing supervisors and officials.
The problem of identification of initials is compounded
because in many instances, a supervisor or official would
sign for another in the absence of the latter. Also, during
the existence of these programs (1956-71), there were a
number of reassignments of personnel, thus making identification
of initials difficult.

Set forth below are the identities of each memorandum
or communication which could be described as originating,
implementing and terminating documents for each of the twelve
Coistelpros. Under each identified document, the name of the
individual who prepared the memorandum or communication is
listed as are the names of all those individuals who can be
identified as indicating review of the action by initialing
the document. Where a document was not specifically initialed
by former Director J. Edgar Hoover, a notation has been made
if the document indicates it was time stamped through Mr. Hoover's
office, thus indicating he was knowledgeable. Where the
identity of an individual's initials are not known, a question
mark is listed. Where readily known, it is indicated if a
reviewing supervisor or official is retired.

I. Communist Party, USA Program

1. Memorandum from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman,
dated 8/28/56, captioned "Communist Party, USA -
Counterintelligence Program," classified "Secret."

Prepared by Edward B. Reddy (Retired)
Fred J. Baugartner (Retired)
Ian McLennan (Retired)
Joseph A. Sisco (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.
(Office procedures indicate reviewed by Mr. Hoover).
Cointelpro

2. Memorandum from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman, dated 9/5/56, captioned "CP, USA, Counterintelligence Program," classified "Secret."

Prepared by J. O'Connor (Retired)
Fred J. Baumgardner (Retired)
Ian McLennan (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)


Prepared by Fred J. Baumgardner (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Ian McLennan (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)

II. Socialist Worker's Party Program

4. Letter to SAC, New York, dated 10/12/61, captioned "Socialist Worker's Party, Disruption Program."

Prepared by Theodore P. Rosack
John Kleinkauf (Retired)
Richard Corman (Retired)

III. Disruption of Hate Groups Program

5. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 8/27/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups."

Prepared by David Ryan
Arbor W. Gray (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
SECRET

Cointelpro

Robert Wick (Retired)
Ian McLennan (Retired)
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)

6. Letter to SAC, Atlanta, dated 9/2/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups."

Prepared by David Ryan
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Robert Wick (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
Ian McLennan (Retired)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.

IV. Black Nationalist - Hate Groups Program


Prepared by David Ryan
Robert Putnam (Retired)
Jack E. Herington
Donald E. Moore (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.
(Office procedures indicate reviewed by Mr. Hoover).

SECRET

- 4 -
Cointelpro

8. Memorandum from Mr. G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 2/29/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups."

Prepared by Thomas J. Deakin
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Thomas E. Bishop (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)


Prepared by Thomas J. Deakin
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Thomas E. Bishop (Retired)
?
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.

V. Disruption of New Left Program

10. Memorandum from Mr. C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 5/9/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left."

Prepared by Edward P. Grigalus and Bernard A. Wells (Retired)
Charles D. Brennan (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)
Cointelpro

11. Letter to SAC, Albany, dated 5/10/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left."

Prepared by Edward P. Crigalus and Bernard A. Wells (Retired)
Jack E. Herington
Charles D. Brennan (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.

VI. Soviet-Satellite Intelligence Program

12. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/14/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program (Soviet-Satellite Intelligence)," classified "Secret."

Prepared by David Ryan
Fred J. Baumgardner (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Otho Ezell (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)

13. Airtel to SACs, New York, Chicago, and Washington Field, dated 7/15/64, captioned "Cointelpro (Soviet-Satellite Intelligence)," classified "Secret."

Prepared by David Ryan
Fred J. Baumgardner (Retired)
Otho Ezell (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.
Cointelpro

VII. Counterintelligence and Special Operations Program

   Prepared by David Ryan
   Andrew J. Decker

   Prepared by David Ryan
   Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
   Richard D. Cotter (Retired)
   ?
   ?
   ?

(It is noted the above cannot be strictly defined as a Cointelpro-type program. The file was maintained for control purposes for use in encouraging a variety of intelligence and counterintelligence activities primarily directed against foreign or foreign-influenced elements. The above two communications are indicative of operations considered in this file of a domestic character.)

VIII. Mexican Program (Border Coverage)

   Prepared by H. L. Ferris (Retired)
   Herman O. Ely (Retired)
   Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
   Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
   ?
SECRET

Cointelpro

IX. Yugoslav Program

17. Memorandum from Mr. E. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 2/3/69, captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Nationalities Intelligence - Yugoslav Matters)," classified "Secret."

Prepared by Herbert D. Clough
David Ryan
Arbor W. Gray (Retired)
Richard D. Cotter (Retired)
Donald E. Moore (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)


Prepared by Herbert D. Clough
David Ryan
Richard D. Cotter (Retired)
Arbor W. Gray (Retired)
Donald E. Moore (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Time stamped into Mr. Hoover's office.

X. Cuban Matters Program


SECRET

- 3 -
Cointelpro

Prepared by Eugene R. Harrell (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Donald E. Moore (Retired)
W. Raymond Wannall
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
Edgar R. Clayton (Retired)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)


Prepared by Eugene R. Harrell (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Donald E. Moore (Retired)
W. Raymond Wannall
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
Alan H. Belmont (Retired)
Edgar R. Clayton (Retired)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)

XI. Groups Seeking Independence for Puerto Rico Program


Prepared by Troy Coleman (Retired)
Herman O. Bly (Retired)
Harold P. Higgins (Retired)
James F. Bland (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
James Gale (Retired)

XII. Hoodwink Program

22. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 10/4/66, captioned "Hoodwink."

SECRET

- 9 -
SECRET

Cointelpro

Prepared by Thomas J. Deakin
David Ryan
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
Cartha D. DeLoach (Retired)
James Gale (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)


Prepared by Thomas J. Deakin
David Ryan
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
James Gale (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)

Terminating Documents

24. Memorandum from Mr. C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 4/27/71, captioned "Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros)."

Prepared by David Ryan
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Charles D. Brennan (Retired)
John A. Mintz

SECRET

- 10 -
Cointelpro

William C. Sullivan (Retired)
?
?
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
John P. Mohr (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
J. Edgar Hoover (Deceased)

25. Airtel to SAC, Albany, dated 4/28/71, captioned "Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpro)."

Prepared by David Ryan
Daniel F. X. Callahan (Retired)
Joseph A. Sizoo (Retired)
Charles D. Brennan (Retired)
Sterling B. Donahoe (Retired)
John A. Mintz
?
?
William C. Sullivan (Retired)
John P. Mohr (Retired)
Clyde A. Tolson (Deceased)
?

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" because it sets forth our interest in Cointelpro activities targeted in the Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican and Yugoslavian areas and this information was classified by the Attorney General in his letter dated 5/17/75 to Chairman Don Edwards, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary because reference to these operations could damage or relations in those areas.
Cointelpro

NOTE CONTINUED:

It is noted Senate Select Committee has only asked for access to names of Bureau officials which, in other requests, has been interpreted as meaning requested material would be made available for review to Senate Select Committee representatives at FBIHQ. As Senate Select Committee representatives, while reviewing material made available, could easily copy the names of personnel in which they are interested, and as we have on several other occasions declined to furnish sensitive material requested in favor of review at FBIHQ by Senate Select Committee personnel, it is believed expedient in this instance to furnish requested names to Senate Select Committee in LIM form.

See letter to the Attorney General, dated 7/15/75, captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," prepared by E:\mju.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term, if a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   X DOCUMENT
   BRIEFING
   INTERVIEW
   TESTIMONY
   OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
   7/17/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   X SSC
   HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents, give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum re: Exhibit D.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
   SSC 5/14/75 letter, Appendix C, Part II, Item 18

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)
   S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)
   Counterintelligence

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Identities of memoranda or communication which could be described as originating, implementing and terminating documents for each of the twelve Cointelpros. Under each identified document, the name of the individual who prepared the memorandum or communication is listed as are the names of all those individuals who can be identified as indicating review of the action by initiating the document.

62-116395

FMK: fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5/10/75

3791 (6.75)
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN FBI FILES BY SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER D. HUDDESTON, CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, WALTER F. MONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMBERS OF THE U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

This is in reference to a letter to you dated May 28, 1975, signed by Senator Frank Church and Senator John C. Tower, Chairman and Vice Chairman, respectively, of captioned Committee, in which they requested any files or documents in the Department or FBI concerning five members of this Committee. These five members were identified as Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale, and Robert Morgan. A copy of this letter was made available to this Bureau on June 10, 1975, by Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General.

In response thereto, there are attached one copy each of five letterhead memoranda along with the five sealed envelopes which contain the original of these letterhead memoranda and pertinent documents from our central files concerning each of the above-mentioned Senators. In the explanations furnished to each Senator, certain documents are being excluded and various deletions are being made based on certain provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Each Senator has been advised that if he wished to have any of the material reconsidered it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with you.

Our search in response to this request located four Department documents. We assume you will be making release of these documents. They are as follows:

Letter from Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General, to William D. Ruckelshaus, Acting Director, FBI, dated June 26, 1973, subject "Attached Mathias Correspondence."

1 - Bufile 62-116395 (SSC)
The Attorney General

Letter from John C. Keene, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Director, FBI, dated March 27, 1975, subject "Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr; Possible Violation of 18 United States Code 602 and 603."

Letter from Administrative Assistant Attorney General, to Director, FBI, dated June 5, 1963, subject "Hart, Gary N. MR."

Letter from William A. Googhegan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, dated May 1, 1964, subject "Gary Warren Hart."

Concerning the four above-mentioned documents, we have copies in our files. In attached documents to Senators Mathias and Hart respectively, we advised them of locating Department documents and that the matter has been referred to the Attorney General.

Enclosures (10)

2 - The Deputy Attorney General
   Attention: K. William O'Connor - Enclosures (5)
   Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
   Attention: Susan M. Hauser - Enclosures (5)

NOTE: See Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum of 6/11/75 captioned, "Senstudy 75," in which it was recommended and approved that the FOIA Section review Bufiles for any documents or records concerning each of the above-mentioned Senators.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to memorandum from Senate Select Committee, dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and 23 enclosures which are responsive to one of the Committee's requests.

A copy of the memorandum and copies of the 23 enclosures are being provided for your records.

Enclosures (48)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:ifj
(11)

? ENCLOSURE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hoots)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

62-116395

July 18, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
"HUSTON PLAN," COINTELPRO, AND
OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS

2-17-74
Rmb/KSR

COINTELPRO

Reference is made to memorandum from captioned Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto, which contained requests for information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Item 17, Part II, Appendix C, requested the Committee be provided all memoranda and other materials pertaining to the origin and implementation of all Cointelpro Programs including, but not limited to, the seven programs set out in the airtel from the FBI Director to SAC, Albany, dated April 28, 1971, entitled "Counterintelligence Programs (Cointelpros), Internal Security - Racial Matters."

Enclosed are 23 documents which could be considered as originating or implementing documents for Cointelpros. These consist of nine Headquarters memoranda and 14 communications to field offices. Eleven of these documents are classified "Secret." Ten of the documents (three memoranda and seven communications to field offices) have previously been publicized through Freedom of Information Act actions, although the publicized documents contained excisions which have not been made in the attached documents.

1 - 62-116009

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL

CLASSIFIED

Classified by 6285
Exempt from GIP Category Number 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unlawful Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPIC UNIT ☐
SECRET

Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,
Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

These documents may be described as follows:

I. CPUSA PROGRAM.

1. Memorandum from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman, dated 8/28/56, captioned "Communist Party, USA - Counterintelligence Program," classified "Secret." (While the first two paragraphs of the above memorandum indicate prior action had been taken to foster factionalism, discredit leaders and cause confusion within the Communist Party, we are unable to locate any information in our files indicating that these were anything other than disruptive actions, believed to have been conducted on a very limited scale in conjunction with our continuing investigation of the Communist Party, and were not implemented under any formalized Cointelpro.)

2. Memorandum from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman, dated 9/5/56, captioned "CP, USA, Counterintelligence Program," classified "Secret."


II. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY PROGRAM.


III. DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS PROGRAM.

5. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 8/27/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups," classified "Secret."

6. Letter to SAC, Atlanta, dated 9/2/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of Hate Groups."

IV. BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS PROGRAM.

Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan, Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

8. Memorandum from Mr. G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 2/29/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist - Hate Groups."


V. DISRUPTION OF NEW LEFT PROGRAM.

10. Memorandum from Mr. C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 5/8/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left."

11. Letter to SAC, Albany, dated 5/10/68, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Disruption of the New Left."

VI. [SOVIET-SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.] *(5)*

12. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 7/14/64, captioned "Counterintelligence Program [Soviet-Satellite Intelligence]," classified "Secret." *(5)*


VII. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS.


SECRET

Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,"
Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

(It is noted the above cannot be strictly defined as a Cointelpro-type program. The file was maintained for control purposes for use in encouraging a variety of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities primarily directed against foreign or foreign-influenced elements. The above two communications are indicative of operations considered in this file of a domestic character.)

VIII. MEXICAN PROGRAM (BORDER COVERAGE).


[X. YUGOSLAV PROGRAM.](S)

17. Memorandum from Mr. R. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated 2/3/69, captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Nationalities Intelligence - Yugoslav Matters)," classified "Secret." (S)


[X. CUBAN MATTERS PROGRAM.] (S)


Documents Pertaining to the "Huston Plan,"
Cointelpro, and Other Practices and Programs

XI. GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO PROGRAM.

21. Letter to SAC, San Juan, dated 9/13/60, captioned "Groups
Seeking Independence for Puerto Rico (Counterintelligence
Program)," classified "Secret."

XII. HOODWINK PROGRAM.

22. Memorandum from Mr. F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C.
Sullivan, dated 10/4/66, captioned "Hoodwink."


Administrative information has been excised from the
above documents. Also, in three instances, references to sources have
been excised. A sentence in the initiating document (memorandum dated
7/14/64) for the Soviet-Satellite Intelligence Program has been excised (S)
to delete reference to a sensitive counterintelligence operation with
foreign ramifications. In the event the Committee desires, an oral
briefing will be provided regarding the information excised.

Enclosures (23)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

See letter to Attorney General, dated 7/18/75, captioned
"United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,
prepared by DR:Ifj.

Classified "Secret" because it identifies the Mexican,
Cuban, Puerto Rican and Yugoslav programs by country name. This (S)
information was classified by the Attorney General in his letter-dated
5/17/75 to Chairman Don Edwards, Subcommittee on Civil Rights and
Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, because
reference to these operations could damage our relations in those areas.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6

SECRET

- 5 -
NOTE: (continued)

Memorandum from Mr. Fulton to Mr. Wannall, dated 6/3/75, captioned "Cointelpro," set forth the identities of originating and implementing documents listed above and indicated the Deputy Attorney General had instructed that should the Senate Select Committee request attachments (exhibits) to the Petersen report on FBI Cointelpros, it should be offered as an alternative the memoranda which originated and initiated each of the Cointelpros. Subsequently, the Department decided to make available to the Senate Select Committee certain exhibits to the Petersen report, thus not requiring the originating and implementing Cointelpro documents as an alternative. However, the letter from the Senate Select Committee dated 5/14/75, with appendices, also requests these documents.
Address: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Capitol of Document: "Pertaining to "Huston Plan," Cointelpro & other practices and Programs; Cointelpro. (Item 17, Part II, Appendix C)."

Delivered by: Barry Daily Date: 7/13/75

Received by:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff  
ATTN: Central Index  
FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>BRIEFING</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TESTIMONY</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. DATE PROVIDED

| 7/18/75 |

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<table>
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<td>HSC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

**Memorandum and enclosures**

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SSG letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part II, Item 17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

| S |

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

**Counterintelligence**

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Enclosed documents which could be considered as originating or implementing documents for Cointelpros. Ten of the documents have previously been publicized through Freedom of Information Act actions.

**62-116395**

**FMK: fnk**

**ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75**

**TREAT AS YELLOW**

5/20/75
INSTRUCTIONS

• Type or print clearly in ink.

• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Mr. L. V. Boardman
FROM: Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 28, 1956

SUBJECT: CP, USA - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

During its investigation of the Communist Party, USA, the Bureau has sought to capitalize on incidents involving the Party and its leaders in order to foster factionalism, bring the Communist Party (CP) and its leaders into disrepute before the American public and cause confusion and dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of the CP.

Generally, the above action has constituted harassment rather than disruption, since, for the most part, the Bureau has set up particular incidents, and the attack has been from the outside. At the present time, however, there is existing within the CP a situation resulting from the developments at the 20th Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union and the Government's attack on the Party principally through prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 which is made to order for an all-out, disruptive attack against the CP from within. In other words, the Bureau is in a position to initiate, on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP, not by harassment from the outside, which might only serve to bring the various factions together, but by feeding and fostering from within the internal fight currently raging.

We have been considering possible courses to implement such a program and, at the present time, we are actively working on the following four:

1) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is making an all-out effort to win over CP members who have become disillusioned with Stalinist communism. SWP members are distributing copies of "The Militant" (SWP publication) at CP rallies and meetings and are contacting individual CP members in an attempt to sell...
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

them the SWP philosophy. This SWP program could very definitely benefit the Bureau provided we can achieve through our informant coverage in the SWP some degree of control and direction over it. The ultimate goal would be to continue and intensify pressure on the CP from the left. Since the Party is already under pressure from the right, the combined pressure would contribute materially to distracting the CP from its primary goals.

**ACTION:** A memorandum, together with a letter to the 15 offices having SWP activity in the U. S., is attached, sounding out these offices through their SWP informants as to the possibility of initiating several specific steps aimed at the Bureau's furthering, assisting and possibly *adding to:* the current SWP disruptive program.

2) The CP national convention is scheduled to be held during February 1957. At the present time there appear to be 4 separate views within the CP leadership as to the degree of change to be made in the organization and program of the CP, USA. The Party has publicly announced that the theory of democratic centralism has been modified and that each CP member has the right to express his views as to the past mistakes and future path of communism in the U. S. Preliminary material for the draft resolution for the national convention has been prepared and is being discussed on a national level prior to being sent to the various districts for preconvention discussions on a local level.

**ACTION:** A memorandum, together with a letter to 12 key offices is being prepared, requesting these offices to submit to the Bureau the identities of certain informants who will be briefed and instructed to embark on a disruptive program within their own clubs, sections, districts or even on a national level. These informants will raise objections and doubts as to the success of any proposed plan of action by the CP leadership. They will seize every opportunity to carry out the disruptive activity not only at meetings, conventions, et cetera, but also during social and other contacts with CP members and leaders. It is noted that
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

A letter has been sent to 12 key offices (dated August 27, 1956) requesting information as to the views of the national and district leaders relative to the faction within the CP that each appears to favor. This information can be used by the various offices in briefing the informants who will carry out the disruptive program. It is pointed out that the informants chosen and approved for this program should not be endangered, since, as pointed out above, the Party has publicly encouraged all members to participate in the current discussions.

3) Recently, Albert Blumberg, a national CP leader and convicted Smith Act subject, was assigned by the Party to contact A. J. Muste, secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a semireligious socialist-pacifist organization. Blumberg suggested that Muste prepare and distribute a document calling for an exchange of opinions by individuals interested in forming a new socialist organization. This is the first step taken by the CP in forming a new socialist coalition in which it hopes to participate. Muste has prepared a document which criticizes the absence of civil liberties, free trade unions and outlets for dissenting opinions in the Soviet Union. It further urges that European satellite nations be free from Soviet domination. The CP hopes to persuade Muste to mollify his criticism of the Soviet Union before the document is released. At the same time the CP feels that some mild criticism of the Soviet Union and the CP, USA, will be beneficial in gaining noncommunist support for Muste’s proposal.

ACTION: This plan of the CP may create a situation which would lend itself to a disruptive operation by the Bureau. It appears that it is too early to actually make a move, but we are alerting certain offices to this plan of the CP and are instructing that this operation be closely watched so that if a situation does present itself we will be in a position to make any move which appears logical and workable.
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

4) When the CP underground was put in operation on a large scale in 1951, CP leaders decided after extensive study, that underground personnel should either disregard their tax obligations or file under false names.

**ACTION:** We have obtained from the field, the names and current addresses of former underground leaders with a view toward furnishing them to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for appropriate action. A memorandum has gone through (August 28, 1956) recommending that the names and current address of 102 such leaders, all of whom have Smith Act ramifications, be transmitted to the Department and the Department be requested to advise if there is any objection to the Bureau furnishing this material to IRS. If there is no objection, the Bureau proposes to transmit the names and addresses to IRS via Liaison for appropriate action. We will then follow IRS very closely since IRS action should: (1) uncover the aliases and whereabouts, from 1951 to 1954, of these subjects who actually filed returns under aliases and admit such action, or (2) result in possible prosecution of those subjects who did not file returns or who refuse to furnish details if they did file. It is believed that action by IRS at this time would deal a further devastating blow at the CP and would certainly reflect very unfavorably on the Party leadership for the instructions issued in 1951.

**OBSERVATIONS:**

We are going ahead with the 4 courses of action listed in this memorandum. A detailed memorandum is attached covering the SWP angle; a memorandum has gone through separately covering the first phase of the IRS angle, and a detailed memorandum covering the disruptive program by confidential informants is being prepared as is a memorandum covering the [A. J. Muste] phase.

For the present, our disruptive tactics will, of necessity, be general in nature, that is, along the line of "keeping the pot boiling." The time may come, however, when it will be desirable to direct our disruptive tactics toward a
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

specific goal. A national committee has been set up to work exclusively on the resolution for the forthcoming CP national convention. This resolution may be that the CP be dissolved and reconstituted under a new name; a coalition be effected with certain liberal and right-wing elements or that the CP remain as constituted but that several drastic changes be made in its constitution. When this resolution has been drawn up and the Bureau receives a copy of it, serious consideration will be given as to whether it will be of benefit to the Bureau's operations and to the security of the country for us to set a specific goal in this disruptive program.

The Internal Security Section is giving this program continuous thought and attention and we are remaining alert for situations which might afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA.

ACTION:

This memorandum has been prepared for your information and to advise you of the initiation of this program.
TO: Mr. L. V. Boardman

FROM: Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 5, 1956

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Reddy
Mr. Bly
Mr. O'Connor

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY

In high Communist Party (CP) circles there are indications that the CP is considering dissolution and incorporating itself in a broad socialist organization. In order to explore this possibility the CP has instructed Albert Blumberg to contact A. J. Muste to influence him in the preparation and distribution of a document calling for opinions by individuals interested in formation of this new organization. The CP rejected Muste's document as being anti-Russian and anticommunist. Blumberg was instructed to have Muste tone down this document. The CP has furnished a leaflet announcing a symposium to be held 10/5/56 at Chicago to discuss the formation of this new organization. Speakers include Muste and Claude Lightfoot, CP functionary, which evidences the serious intent the CP has in the possibilities of the new organization.

The Bureau should (1) attempt to learn the CP plans for this new organization and (2) attempt to prevent the CP from dominating, or at least influencing, this organization for its own desires. The Bureau does not desire the CP to develop this organization and after careful study inherent dangers are foreseen. With the CP as is, the Bureau is better equipped to combat it under existing legislation, i.e., Smith Act - 1940, etc. With the dissolution of the CP and emergence of a new organization under a new name it is doubtful if the afore-mentioned existing legislation would be effective or could be applied against it. Successful prosecutions under existing laws have acted as a deterrent to the growth of the CP and have in the past upset its operation.

Bufiles reflect Abraham John Muste is the secretary-emeritus of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a semireligious, socialist-pacifist organization founded in England in 1914. The organization advocates no peace-time conscription, abolition of Selective Service laws, racial equality, opposition to the use of thermonuclear devices and has denounced communism although many of its ideals closely parallel those of the CP. Muste presently resides at 513 West 166th Street, New York City. Bufiles reflect that Louis F. Budenz reportedly was Muste's "lieutenant" when Muste started a radical political group in New York City in approximately 1933-1936. Muste has a daughter and son-in-law.

Enclosure: Doc. 477-56
cc - Bufile 100-42-101 (Symposium to Form a New Organization: October 5)
cc - Bufile 100-16922 (A. J. Muste)

SECRET
Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

Mr. and Mrs. John Baker, Rolling Hills, Thornwood, New York; a son, John Martin Muste, who, in 1951, was teaching school in the State of Maryland; and a daughter, Constance Hamilton, whose address is unknown.

It is believed the Bureau at this time should consider engaging in an enlarged program of counterintelligence activities in connection with the formation of this new broad socialist organization which the CP appears to be attempting to create. It is believed that a possible approach to this end might be made through Muste by using a third-party contact whereby Muste would be unaware of the Bureau's interest. In considering this possibility the Chicago Office has been instructed to initiate an intense investigation to determine the extent of CP domination of the 10/5/56 symposium; to determine whether the CP is the driving force behind the symposium; and to afford complete coverage of this affair. By this coverage Muste's attitude and line of thinking regarding this new organization might be ascertained. Upon receipt of this information the Bureau would be in a better position to make a definite determination concerning the feasibility of this plan and the best course to be followed.

In finding a suitable and reliable third-party contact to carry out the Bureau's intentions in this matter it is desired that the New York Office be instructed to thoroughly review its files concerning Muste in an effort to locate close contacts of his who might be willing to assist the Bureau; to institute an investigation of Muste's activities solely for the purpose of developing such information; to develop information concerning the present whereabouts of Muste's son and daughters; and to consider, depending upon the results of its file review, the desirability of Muste's son and daughters as possible third-party contacts. In order to enlarge on Muste's background, authority should be granted the New York Office to interview Louis F. Budenz regarding Budenz's contacts with Muste as well as the possibility that Budenz might make a good third-party contact. Outside of this contact of Budenz, the New York Office will be instructed not to make any contacts whatsoever until it has submitted a "plan of attack" together with its comments and recommendations regarding the reliability of the individuals to be contacted to insure that no embarrassment would be caused the Bureau.

ACTION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to the New York Office dated 9/7/56 outlining the Bureau's plans and instructions regarding this matter.

Our purpose in this connection is to prevent the communists from controlling any new organization established or cause such organization to 2 - reject the philosophy of communism.
SAC, New York

September 6, 1956

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY-USA
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReBulet dated August 27, 1956, captioned
"Communist Party, USA, Factionalism, Internal Security - C,
requesting information as to the viewpoints of the national
and district leaders relative to the particular faction
within the Communist Party (CP) which each leader appears
to favor.

There is existing within the CP at the present
time considerable internal friction resulting from the
developments at the 20th Congress of the CP of the Soviet
Union and from the Government's attack on the Party,
principally through prosecutions under the Smith Act of
1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950. This situation
appears made to order for an all-out disruptive attack
against the Party on a broader scale than heretofore
attempted by the Bureau. Accordingly, the Bureau is thinking
in terms of a counterintelligence program aimed at the CP,
not by harassment from the outside which might only serve to
bring the various factions together but by feeding and
fostering from within the internal fight currently raging.

Among the several courses of action under
consideration by the Bureau is one which will involve the
use of certain confidential informants who will be briefed
and instructed to embark on a disruptive program within
their own clubs, sections, and districts. It is contemplated that these informants will seek to continue and increase the current confusion existing within the CP by raising questions and doubts as to the success of any proposed plan of action by the CP leadership. For example, when the draft resolution for the forthcoming national convention comes up for discussion in the various districts throughout the country, these informants can point up the weaknesses inherent in the resolution; the weaknesses and mistakes of the present leadership; the conditions which existed in Russia during Stalin’s leadership; failure of the CP leadership in this country to make any progress in the labor field; the Negro question; and many others.

The aim of the informants will be to take advantage of the CP requests for open discussion by the membership to force discussion of topics reflecting on the effectiveness of CP leadership, programs, and philosophy. Such discussion is intended to shake the confidence of CP members in their movement and render them more susceptible to development as informants or cause them to abandon the Party or to follow some other course of action which would interfere with an effective reorientation of the policies of the CP. It is not intended that the informants compromise themselves in advancing these topics for discussion. Their approach should be overtly constructive and exploratory rather than critical. Under no circumstances will any indication be given to the informants participating in the program that other informants may be engaged in similar activity, and the questions and topics raised by our informants will be so carefully planned and introduced at the meetings in such a manner that they will not attract any more attention than other members who are taking part in the discussions.

It is contemplated that the informants will seize every opportunity to carry out this disruptive activity not only at official Party functions but also during social and other contacts with CP members and leaders. It is felt that if the informants are properly selected and briefed, there should be no danger involved in such action on their part since all CP members have been encouraged by the national leadership to participate fully in current and forthcoming discussions.
Letter to SAC, New York

The Bureau desires that each office receiving copies of this letter submit by September 15, 1956, the names of several informants who appear to possess the necessary background and intelligence to carry out this program successfully. The Bureau will consider each informant individually and will, thereafter, issue additional specific instructions with reference to this entire operation. This program should not be discussed with any informant until the Bureau so instructs. You are instructed to afford this matter serious consideration and attention and to include in your reply to this communication pertinent comments or suggestions of your own or of the Agent personnel of your office who are or who have been assigned to security work.

NOTE ON YELLOW

In a memorandum from Belmont to Boardman dated August 28, 1956, which has been approved by the Director, it was pointed out that a letter would be prepared to twelve key offices requesting those offices to submit to the Bureau the identities of certain informants who will be briefed and instructed to embark upon a disruptive program within their own clubs, sections, districts, or even on a national level. These informants will raise objections and doubts as to the success of any proposed plan of action by the CP leadership. They will seize every opportunity to carry out the disruptive activity not only at meetings, conventions, et cetera, but also during social and other contacts with CP members and leaders.
The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office and strongly directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. The SWP has also been in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups. The youth group of the SWP has also been operating on this basis in connection with SWP policies.

Offices receiving copies of this letter are participating in the Bureau's Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program. It is felt that a disruption program along similar lines could be initiated against the SWP on a very selective basis. One of the purposes of this program would be to alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky.

It is pointed out, however, that this program is not intended to be a "crash" program. Only carefully thought-out operations with the widest possible effect and benefit to the nation should be submitted. It may be desirable to expand the program after the effects have been evaluated.

Each office is, therefore, requested to carefully evaluate such a program and submit their views to the Bureau regarding initiating a SWP disruption program on a limited basis.
Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to give consideration to the application of counterintelligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and thereafter make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised, coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other hate groups.

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these organizations.

We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups, and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago, and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities for one hate organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program. Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the participating offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting...
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

157-9-Main

forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-month period. Each office will be instructed to open and maintain a pending investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA, and in our current 90-day trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence, all recommended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved at the Seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs directed against the Communist Party, USA, and Soviet-Satellite intelligence. His efforts will be closely coordinated with supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At such time as the program is considered to be successfully under way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the 17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence program setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program.
Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting a coordinated Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) directed against Klan-type and hate organizations. Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately open an active control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for this program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in investigation of hate and racist-type organizations and their membership.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various Kans and hate organizations, their leadership and adherents. The activities of these groups must be followed on a continuous basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The devious maneuvers and duplicity of these groups must be exposed to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally and at the seat of Government. We must frustrate any effort of the groups to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.
Letter to Atlanta

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

The following Klan organizations, currently under active investigation, should be considered for counterintelligence action:

1. Association of Arkansas Klans of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
2. Association of Georgia Klans.
3. Association of South Carolina Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
5. Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
6. Improved Order of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
7. Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn.
8. Independent Klan Unit, St. Augustine, Florida.
10. Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
11. National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
12. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
15. United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
17. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

The following hate organizations currently being afforded active investigation are included in this program.

1. Alabama States Rights Party (Origin: Mobile)
2. American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)
Letter to Atlanta
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

3. Council for Statehood, aka, Freemens
   (Origin: Miami)
4. Fighting American Nationalists
   (Origin: Baltimore)
5. National States Rights Party
   (Origin: Birmingham)
6. National Renaissance Party
   (Origin: New York)
7. United Freemens (Origin: Miami)
8. Viking Youth of America (Origin: Tampa)
9. White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)

On or before 10/15/64, participating offices are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence action against pertinent organizations and individuals active within their respective territories and specific recommendations should be included for any logical immediate counterintelligence action. Recommendations submitted under this program must include all necessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently pass upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In instances where a reliable and cooperative news media representative or other source outside the Bureau is to be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon the recommending office to furnish assurances the source will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

Offices participating in this program who have investigative responsibility for Klan organizations should specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau regarding "Action Groups." As these offices are aware, these groups have been described as the relatively few individuals in each organization who use strong-arm tactics and violent actions to achieve their ends. Often these groups act without the approval of the Klan organization
Letter to Atlanta
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

or membership. The Bureau considers it vital that we expose the identities and activities of such groups and where possible disrupt their efforts. These groups should be subjected to continuing counterintelligence action.

No counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.

Commencing 1/1/65 and every 3 months thereafter, each participating office should submit to the Bureau a status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including comments under the following captions:

1. Potential Counterintelligence Action
2. Pending Counterintelligence Action
3. Tangible Results

If necessary, a 4th caption "Miscellaneous" may be utilized for additional comments.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action should not be included in 90-day status letters to the Bureau but following the initial analysis due 10/15/64, should be submitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of Klan-type and hate organizations and their membership should be alerted to our counterintelligence plans relating to these groups. Counterintelligence action directed at these groups is intended to complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded this sensitive operation.
The Bureau is pleased with past successes achieved by our counterintelligence efforts in other phases of our investigative responsibilities. To insure our success in this new endeavor, the Agent to whom the program is assigned in each office must have a detailed knowledge of the activities of the racist groups in the territory and that knowledge must be coupled with interest, initiative and imagination. The Agent must be alert for information which has a disruptive potential. The information will not come to him — he must look for it. The most effective way of being assured of keeping on top of the situation is to maintain close contact with those Agents who handle the investigation of the racial and hate groups and their membership and also to periodically review relevant files.

If an enthusiastic approach is made to this new endeavor, there is no reason why the results achieved under this program will not equal or surpass our achievements in similar-type programs directed against subversives.
SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

August 25, 1967

PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL OFFICES

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Traitor
1 - Mr. B. A. Wells
1 - Mr. C. W. Thompson
1 - Mr. Ryan

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITY

Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately establish a control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new counterintelligence program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent well versed in investigations relating to black nationalist, hate-type organizations. The field office control file used under this program may be maintained in a pending inactive status until such time as a specific operation or technique is placed under consideration for implementation.

The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder. The activities of all such groups of intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The pernicious background of such groups, their duplicity, and devious maneuvers must be exposed to public scrutiny where such publicity will have a neutralizing effect. Efforts of the various groups

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Jackson
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Memphis
2 - Newark
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York

2 - Philadelphia
2 - Phoenix
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Richmond
2 - St. Louis
2 - San Francisco
2 - Washington Field Office

Mailed 8
COMM.FBI

SEP 25, 1967

TOT: 53

MAH-ROOM TELETYPE UNIT
Letter to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents must be frustrated. No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations. When an opportunity is apparent to disrupt or neutralize black nationalist, hate-type organizations through the cooperation of established local news media contacts or through such contact with sources available to the Seat of Government, in every instance careful attention must be given to the proposal to insure the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or discredited through the publicity and not merely publicized. Consideration should be given to techniques to preclude violence-prone or rabble-rouser leaders of hate groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media.

Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations have backgrounds of immorality, subversive activity, and criminal records. Through your investigation of key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or warranted counterintelligence may be instituted.

Intensified attention under this program should be afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam. Particular emphasis should be given to extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary or militant groups such as Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown, Elijah Muhammad, and Maxwell Stanford.

At this time the Bureau is setting up no requirement for status letters to be periodically submitted under this program. It will be incumbent upon you to insure the program is being afforded necessary and continuing attention and that no opportunities will be overlooked for counterintelligence action.

This program should not be confused with the program entitled "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," (File 100-3-104), which is directed
Letter to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

against the Communist Party and related organizations, or the—
program entitled "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security,
Disruption of Hate Groups," (Bulletin 157-9), which is directed
against Klan and hate-type groups primarily consisting of white
memberships.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the
investigation of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and
their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence
interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to
call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator
suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program.
You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor
is such that under no circumstances should the existence of
the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate
within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations
and techniques considered under the program.

No counterintelligence action under this program may
be initiated by the field without specific prior Bureau
authorization.

You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative
approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau
will be pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you
may recommend.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
FROM: G. C. Moore  
DATE: February 29, 1968

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS  
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

PURPOSE:
To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country.

BACKGROUND:
By letter dated August 25, 1967, 23 field offices were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:
In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field.

Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic progress letters to stimulate thinking in this area.

Attached airtel also reminds the field that counterintelligence suggestions to expose these militants or neutralize them must be approved by the Bureau.

ACTION:
That attached airtel expanding this program, defining goals and instructing periodic progress letters be submitted be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.

Enclosure

TJD: rmm (6)
Transmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
Via

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI (100-448006)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Title is changed to substitute Racial Intelligence for Internal Security for Bureau routing purposes.

PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR ALL THE FOLLOWING SACs

2 - Atlanta 2 - Minneapolis
2 - Baltimore 2 - Mobile
2 - Birmingham 2 - Newark
2 - Boston 2 - New Haven
2 - Buffalo 2 - New Orleans
2 - Charlotte 2 - New York
2 - Chicago 2 - Omaha
2 - Cincinnati 2 - Philadelphia
2 - Cleveland 2 - Phoenix
2 - Denver 2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Detroit 2 - Portland
2 - Houston 2 - Richmond
2 - Indianapolis 2 - Sacramento
2 - Jackson 2 - San Diego
2 - Jacksonville 2 - San Francisco
2 - Kansas City 2 - Seattle
2 - Los Angeles 2 - Springfield
2 - Memphis 2 - St. Louis
2 - Miami 2 - Tampa
2 - Milwaukee 2 - WFO

Date: 3/4/68

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/60 BY SP2125774

Sent Via NW 65994 DocId:32989623 Page:129 M Per
Airtel to SAC, Albany  
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM  
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS  

BACKGROUND  

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

- Albany  
- Atlanta  
- Baltimore  
- Boston  
- Buffalo  
- Charlotte  
- Chicago  
- Cincinnati  
- Cleveland  
- Detroit  
- Jackson  
- Los Angeles  
- Memphis  
- Newark  
- New Orleans  
- New York  
- Philadelphia  
- Phoenix  
- Pittsburgh  
- Richmond  
- St. Louis  
- San Francisco  
- Washington Field  

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah:" he is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position. (Elijah Muhammad is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. (Carmichael) has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community,
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM).
Nation of Islam (NOI).

Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammad of NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

INSTRUCTIONS

Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office should:

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Special Agent assigned to coordinate this program.
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black nationalist movement in the field office territory. Include name, number of members and degree of activity of each black nationalist group. Also state your estimate of each group's propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences should suffice.

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize Stokely Carmichael's travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation.

Thereafter, on a ninety-day basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations effected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Bureau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan  DATE: 5/9/68
FROM: C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, INTERNAL SECURITY, DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police brutality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes. The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses. With this in mind, it is our recommendation that a new Counterintelligence Program be designed to neutralize the New Left and the Key Activists. The Key Activists are those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left and on whom we have intensified our investigations.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of this group and persons connected with it. It is hoped that with this new program their violent and illegal activities may be reduced if not curtailed.

General instructions are being furnished to all offices relating to the purpose and administration of this new program. Briefly, these instructions require all offices to submit an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations on the New Left and on the Key Activists on or before 6/1/68, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter, all offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting forth a summary of their accomplishments and future plans. Each office will maintain a pending case and assign experienced personnel to the program.

Enclosure

EPG/BAW:jms (9)

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. C.W. Thompson
Memo to Mr. Sullivan
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

personnel to this program. All proposed counterintelligence action must be approved at the Seat of Government prior to instituting it. This new program will be supervised at the Seat of Government by a Special Agent supervisor in the Internal Security Section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated Counterintelligence Program directed at exposing, disrupting, and otherwise neutralizing the New Left and Key Activists.

2) That the attached letter setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program be forwarded to all offices.
SAC, Albany

Director, FBI

RE: 25 104 449698

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting a Counterintelligence Program directed against the New Left movement and its key activists. All offices are instructed to immediately open an active control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for this program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in investigation of the New Left and its membership.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership and adherents. It is imperative that the activities of these groups be followed on a continuous basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The devious maneuvers and duplicity of these activists must be exposed to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally and at the seat of government. We must frustrate every effort of these groups and individuals to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups and any opportunity should be seized to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.

On or before June 1, 1968, all offices are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence action against New Left organizations and key activists within their respective territories. Specific recommendations should be included for any logical immediate counterintelligence action. Recommendations submitted under this program must include all necessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently assess upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In instances where a reliable and cooperative news media representative or other
Letter to Albany
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Source outside the Bureau is to be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon the recommending office to furnish assurances the source will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

Offices which have investigative responsibility for Key Activists should specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau regarding these individuals. As these offices are aware, these individuals have been identified as the moving forces behind the New Left.

No counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.

Commencing July 1, 1963, and every three months thereafter, each participating office should submit to the Bureau a status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including comments under the following captions.

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action

2) Pending Counterintelligence Action

3) Tangible Results

If necessary, a fourth caption "Miscellaneous" may be utilized for additional comments.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action should not be included in the 30-day status letters to the Bureau, but should be submitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of the New Left and the Key Activists should be alerted to our counterintelligence plans relating to these groups. Counterintelligence action directed at these groups is intended to complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are cautioned
Letter to Albany
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded this sensitive operation.

The Bureau has been very closely following the activities of the New Left and the Key Activists and is highly concerned that the anarchistic activities of a few can paralyze institutions of learning, induction centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society. The organizations and activists who spout revolution and unlawfully challenge society to obtain their demands must not only be contained, but must be neutralized. Law and order is mandatory for any civilized society to survive. Therefore, you must approach this new endeavor with a forward look, enthusiasm, and interest in order to accomplish our responsibilities. The importance of this new endeavor cannot and will not be overlooked.

NOTE:

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: July 14, 1964

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
(SOVIET-SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE)

Since initiated in 1956, the Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro), directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has had continuing and cumulative successes in exposing, disrupting and neutralizing the communists. Most significant is our recent counterintelligence action which resulted in the expulsion of National Committee member William Albertson from the Communist Party on 7/7/64. We now believe consideration should be given to applying the Cointelpro against Soviet and Satellite espionage activities in the United States.

We desire to immediately embark upon a 90-day trial program which will be participated in by the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices to determine if we can successfully direct our counterintelligence activities toward Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities. At the end of this 90-day trial period, we will evaluate our success and thereafter submit recommendations relating to the feasibility of permanently establishing this program against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel be forwarded to the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices setting out instructions for these offices to immediately devise and submit to the Bureau their recommendations for counterintelligence activity to be directed against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States for a trial 90-day period.

100-3/104, Main
Enc. dated 7-1-64
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. R.W. Smith
1 - Mr. Ryan

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY NNE

NEG. 155994 Docket 32989623 Page 163

JUL 20 1964

BECR 56

1555-555

Gandy
Airtel

July 15, 1964

To: SACS, New York (100-123802)
    Chicago (100-32864)
    Washington Field (100-421177) (Enc - 2)

From: Director, FBI (100-3-104-Main)

Cointelpro —
INTERNAL SECURITY
(SOVIET-SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE)

Since initiated in 1956, the Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro), directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and related organizations, through a variety of techniques has disrupted, exposed and neutralized the communists. Some successful Cointelpro operations such as anonymous letters and mailings, in spite of their simplicity, have caused unexpected consternation and disruption among the comrades. Cointelpro-initiated publicity has been a tremendous deterrent to the comrades, while at the same time it has alerted the general public to their insidious maneuvers. More sophisticated techniques and operations have caused defections and expulsions within Party ranks.

Successes resulting from the enthusiastic 1964 imaginative efforts of Special Agents participating in this program warrant the expansion of the Cointelpro to cover Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States.

1 - Boston (100-31640)
1 - Buffalo (100-4379-106)
1 - Cleveland (100-230329)
1 - Detroit (134-706)
1 - Los Angeles (100-51554)
1 - Milwaukee (100-42-JJ)
1 - Minneapolis (100-1879-FTT)
1 - New-Haven (100-16559)
1 - Newark (100-42359)
1 - Philadelphia (100-42512)
1 - Pittsburgh (100-12394)
1 - St. Louis (100-16700)
1 - San Francisco (100-42399)
1 - Seattle (100-23650)
Effective immediately, the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices are requested to consider and devise Cointelpro action directed to disrupt, expose and neutralize Soviet and Satellite intelligence activity. Agents assigned as Cointelpro coordinators in the Chicago and New York Offices should immediately confer with key personnel assigned to Soviet-Satellite-type investigations for the purpose of devising one or several sophisticated counterintelligence techniques against Soviet-Satellite intelligence activities or personnel. As the Washington Field Office has not previously participated in Cointelpro action against the CPUSA, an imaginative, experienced Agent with a general knowledge of Soviet-Satellite intelligence activities should be immediately appointed as coordinator for this program. Within 30 days each of these offices should submit to the Bureau recommendations and detailed plans for implementing one or several such operations. Care should be taken to insure plans devised under this program do not conflict with existing programs or operations directed against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities. No Cointelpro action should be initiated without specific Bureau authority.

This new application of the Cointelpro is not meant at this time to be an all-out attack against Soviet-Satellite intelligence, but is a trial to determine the feasibility of extending our organized counterintelligence effort. The results of our expanded efforts will be reviewed at the end of a 90-day period to determine the feasibility of over-all Cointelpro efforts directed against foreign intelligence activities in the United States.

Other offices participating in the Cointelpro against the CPUSA are urged to immediately discuss with key investigative personnel possibilities for counterintelligence action against Soviet-Satellite intelligence personnel and to promptly make available any comments or suggestions to the Bureau and the 3 offices participating in this new endeavor.
Attached for the Washington Field Office are copies of Bulets dated 9/13/63 and 3/16/64 which were directed to offices participating in the Cointelpro. These letters summarize some of the many successful recent Cointelpro actions and may be of value in connection with the formulation of Cointelpro operations against Soviet-Satellite intelligence activity.

You are urged to utilize the services of your most experienced investigative personnel who have proven their ability through consistent application of imagination and ingenious investigative approaches to make this new endeavor a success.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReSFairtel 3/26/69 under dual caption of
"Revolutionary Union" and "Progressive Labor Party,"
suggesting disruptive action relating to the two organ-
izations.

ReaFirtel designated copies for the Bufile and the SFFile on "Cointelpro - New Left."

There is no objection to your action, but you are
reminded of the existence of the captioned case file which
may be used for a broad range of disruptive activity and
which has a specific interest in techniques and operations
in the pro-Chicom area.

l - San Francisco (100-61281)
l = 105-184369

DR:sfw
(7)

REC-10

19 APR 2 1969

105-174254
The Bureau would like to offer for your consideration a proposal for a disruptive-disinformation operation targeted against the national office of the Black Panther Party (BPP). This proposal is not intended to be all inclusive or binding in any of its various phases, but only as a guide for the suggested action. You are encouraged to submit recommendations relating to revisions or innovations of the proposal.

1. The operation would be effected through close coordination on a high level with the Oakland or San Francisco Police Department.

2. Xerox copies of true documents, documents subtly incorporating false information, and entirely fabricated documents would be periodically anonymously mailed to the residence of a key Panther leader. These documents would be on the stationary and in the form used by the police department or the FBI in disseminating information to the police. FBI documents, when used, would contain police routing or date received notations clearly indicating they had been pilfered from police files.

3. An attempt would be made to give the Panther recipient the impression the documents were stolen from police files by a disgruntled police employee sympathetic to the Panthers. After initial mailings, brief notes by the alleged disgruntled employee would be included with the mailed documents. These notes would indicate the motive and sympathy of the police employee, his bitterness against his department, and possibly a request for money.

4. Depending on developments, at a propitious time, consideration would be given to establishing a drop office box or other suitable "drop" address for the use of the alleged disgruntled employee to receive responsive funds and/or specifications relating to the documents from the Panthers.
5. Although the operation may not require inclusion of a live source to represent the disgruntled employee, circumstances might warrant the use of such a source for face-to-face meetings with the Panthers. During early stages of the operation, an effort should be made to locate and brief a suitable police employee to play the role of the alleged disgruntled employee.

6. A wide variety of alleged authentic police or FBI material could be carefully selected or prepared for furnishing to the Panthers. Reports, blind memoranda, LIEIs, and other alleged police or FBI documents could be prepared pinpointing Panthers as police or FBI informants; ridiculing or discrediting Panther leaders through their ineptness or personal escapades; espousing personal philosophies and promoting factionalism among BPP members; indicating electronic coverage where none exists; outlining fictitious plans for police raids or other counteractions; revealing misuse or misappropriation of Panther funds; pointing out instances of political disorientation; etc. The nature of the disruptive material and disinformation "leaked" would only be limited by the collection ability of your sources and the need to insure the protection of their security.

Effective implementation of this proposal logically could not help but disrupt and confuse Panther activities. Even if they were to suspect FBI or police involvement, they would be unable to ignore factual material brought to their attention through this channel. The operation would afford us a continuing means to furnish the Panther leadership true information which is to our interest that they know and disinformation which, in their interest, they may not ignore.

Although this proposal is a relatively simple technique, it has been applied with exceptional results in another area of intelligence interest where the target was of far greater sophistication. The Bureau believes with careful planning this technique has excellent long-range potential to disrupt and curtail Panther activity.
Letter to SAC, San Francisco
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

San Francisco is requested to submit comments and/or recommendations relating to the implementation of this proposal.

Copies of this letter have been designated for Los Angeles for background and information purposes. Any suggestion Los Angeles may have for strengthening or further implementing the technique will be appreciated.

NOTE: Above proposal is based on the Bureau Tarpro operation.
Mailed 27
JAN 6 1961
COMM.FE

To implement this program, the following factors should be considered:

In connection with the Counterintelligence-Border Coverage Program, the best method for disrupting the Communist party (CP) or related organizations is disruption from within. This can be done through the use of selected informants within the organization, activities, or factionalism. In connection with this, the tactics are not to be undertaken merely for the sake of harassment but in each instance to disrupt communist activities.

It is believed that sufficient time has now elapsed for each office to have made an analysis of the situation faced by it and should be in a position to furnish suggestions to the Bureau regarding means which could be taken to apply counterintelligence tactics. Much assistance could be given in this connection by the Bureau.

SAC, San Diego
Rebuttal 11/14-60, captioned "300," which set forth action taken on the recommendations made by the 10/24-60 Border Coverage Conference which was held at San Diego, that letter in part advised that there is currently a place for consideration of some of the tactics currently employed in the Counterintelligence Program on the border offices and the Legal Attaches' office should be alerted for the application of disruptive tactics and in each case should clear with the Bureau in advance any suggestions along those lines.
1. Selection of Informants - An analysis of the available informants should be made by each office with counterintelligence potential in order to select those informants who could be used for disruptive tactics. Each informant approved for use in connection with counterintelligence operation will, of course, have to be briefed individually on issues and controversial subjects which are to be raised. The informants should not be told that there is any over-all counterintelligence program or that disruptive tactics are being undertaken as a program but each informant should be given the impression that he is operating on an individual basis. Bureau approval must be obtained for the informants selected for this operation before the informant is briefed. In the event a review of the available informants shows that additional informants with counterintelligence possibilities are needed, plans should be laid to develop such informants, bearing in mind that this is a long-range program. The analysis should also include the adequacy of informants who can keep the office effectively advised of the internal operations of the organizations involved so that disruptive tactics can be undertaken on a sound basis.

2. Organizational Tactics - Consideration should be given to placing informants in each opposing faction of an organization to play one group against the other. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having anonymous telephone invitations issued to one group to attend open meetings of the other group; possible use of press contacts on a cutout basis to publicize derogatory remarks made by one group about the other. All border coverage agents in offices with counterintelligence potential should be alert for any tactics of this type which can be used.

3. Psychological Tactics - Consideration should be given to activities to disillusion CP leaders through anonymous mailing of literature regarding the weaknesses and inhumanitarian aspects of the communists either as a party or as individuals. The Mexico City Office particularly should be alert for any such newspaper
Letter to SAC, San Diego
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

or magazine articles which could be clipped and mailed to susceptible communist leaders either in Mexico or in the border area. Mexico City should be promptly furnished the Bureau sufficient copies of such articles for forwarding to interested border offices so that if desirable, arrangements can be made to have those articles anonymously mailed to selected communist leaders locally or from some other area in Mexico.

4. Neutralization of Individuals - Consideration should be given to tactics which would bring individual communist leaders under suspicion of being "imperialist agents," agents provocateur, etc., or generally discrediting them in the eyes of their fellow communists.

The Bureau will consider any well-conceived plan of causing disruption inside the CP or related organizations. In any counterintelligence operation, however, it is imperative that the office submitting the recommendations make sure that it will not jeopardize informant coverage or cause embarrassment to the Bureau.

Consideration should be given to the possibility of setting up thoroughly safe cutout arrangements for contacts with good newspaper sources through which information can be fed to the press regarding semipublic procommunist meetings or communist domination of front groups and through which information can be fed to the press to produce bad publicity relative to CP activities. Any proposals to set up such an arrangement must be submitted to the Bureau for approval before implementing them.

The Bureau appreciates the fact that Albuquerque, through absolute lack of communist activity, is not in a position to implement a counterintelligence program; however, a copy of this communication is being sent for information of that office.

The San Antonio Office has no organized communist group at the present time outside of Santa Apolonia. In considering whether disruptive tactics should be undertaken by that office at this time, San Antonio should give consideration
Letter to SAC, San Diego
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

to the possibility that disruptive tactics in the Santa Apolonia area at present might make coverage of the activities of that group more difficult and any disruptive tactics recommended should be conceived in a manner which will not destroy the ability of San Antonio to continue to follow communist activities in Santa Apolonia. Consideration should be given, however, to the possibility of utilizing disruptive tactics, through raising controversial issues, among the various communist sympathizers or former CP members who are still considered to be sympathetic to communism in order to make sure that those groups continue to be disorganized.

In view of the ineffectual operations of the CP in Juarez and the excellent informant coverage existing in that group at the present time, it would appear that disruptive tactics among the CP cells in Juarez may not be desirable. El Paso, however, should give consideration to possible use of disruptive tactics, through raising controversial issues and sharpening antagonisms, among the communist sympathizers and former communists who are still sympathetic to the communist movement in the Juarez area. El Paso should also submit its observations regarding the possibility of using informants to raise controversial issues in the Chihuahua State Committee of the CP of Mexico. Any recommendations along this line will be referred by the Bureau to the Legal Attache's Office, Mexico, for comment to insure that such tactics will not destroy existing informant coverage of that office in the Chihuahua State Committee.

Both El Paso and San Antonio should give consideration to the possibility of using discrediting techniques in connection with individual communists who, although not active members of the CP, are a threat to the security of the United States in order to bring out into the open their communist sympathies and destroy their potential usefulness as Soviet intelligence agents or to neutralize their propaganda value to the communist movement.

The Phoenix Office should give consideration to the possible use of disruptive tactics to further divide the pro-communist groups in their area and to sharpen antagonisms without jeopardizing established informant coverage. In this connection, consideration might also be given to possible means of focusing public attention, through highly discreet operations, on the communist affiliations and sympathies of communist sympathizers or adherents.
Letter to SAC, San Diego  
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

It would appear that the broadest use of counterintelligence tactics could be made by the San Diego and Mexico City Offices due to the highly-organized communist groups in the area covered by them. Those offices should, therefore, submit to the Bureau their analyses of the counterintelligence potential in their areas and particular attention should be paid to the possibility of undertaking such tactics in connection with the Popular/Socialist Party as well as the CP and its related organizations. Any specific tactics decided upon, however, must be submitted to the Bureau for approval before implementation.

Both as to the instructions contained in this letter and prior instructions issued regarding counterintelligence operations in connection with the Border Coverage Program, you are cautioned that no action should be taken to implement such procedures without specific clearance and approval by the Bureau.

Attention is called to the fact that a new file has been opened at the Bureau, under file number 100-434445, for correspondence relating to this project. The following subfiles will be designated at the Bureau for correspondence from the individual offices relating to this project:

- El Paso - 100-434445-16
- Phoenix - 100-434445-38
- San Antonio - 100-434445-45
- San Diego - 100-434445-46
- Mexico City - 100-434445-221

Correspondence directed to the Bureau by each office should utilize the appropriate file number indicated above. Each office should open a separate file concerning this project and appropriate steps should be taken to insure that the file is kept under fully secure conditions and is given only restricted accessibility so that it will be available only to appropriate personnel on a need-to-know basis.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM: R. D. Cotter

DATE: 2/3/69

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE - YUGOSLAV MATTERS)

This memorandum is to recommend mailing of flyers from the national organization "Temporary Committee for the Protection of Serbian Nationalism, Newark, New Jersey," to Serbian leaders throughout the U. S. and Canada.

Chicago believes that at the present time there is an apparent tide of feeling against Mihir Radovanovic, Dragisa Kastovic and other co-conspirators in the bombing of Yugoslav establishments, 1/67.

Text of the flyer styled for Serbian nationalism appeal is designed to discredit those who capitalize on bombings to build their reputations in the Serbian communities; encourage Serbs to respect and adhere to the laws of the U. S.; and discourage future bombings of Yugoslav establishments. Chicago proposal has definite merit. Cost of purchase of material and postage of mailing of approximately 500 flyers is estimated not to exceed $100.

ACTION:

If you approve, attached letter will be sent Chicago, authorizing initiation of this operation including Chicago expenditure of up to $100 for postage and materials. Translation is being arranged separately with Laboratory and reproduction of flyer is being arranged with Exhibits Section of Administrative Division.

Enclosure
SAC, Chicago (105-3406)

Director, FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE - YUGOSLAV MATTERS)

Reurlet 1/8/39, one Xerox copy each of which is being forwarded to the Newark and New York offices for information.

Bureau approves your proposal and expenses are authorized up to $100 for postage and purchase of necessary materials.

You should now prepare your list of Serbians in the U. S. and Canada to whom you intend to mail the flyer, and advise Bureau of the total number of intended recipients. Translation of the proposed text in the Serbo-Croatian language is being handled by the Translation Unit of the Laboratory and reproduction of the flyer will be handled by the Exhibits Section at the Bureau.

You will be advised of further instructions subsequent to the completion of necessary arrangements at the Bureau. Bureau is most appreciative of your initiative in proposing this operation which could serve to disseminate future bombing of Yugoslav establishments and develop a respect and adherence to U. S. laws throughout the Serbian Communities.

1 - Newark (Enclosure)
1 - New York (Enclosure)
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 MB)

NOTE:

See memo of R. D. Cotter to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned same as above, dated 2/3/39 and prepared by HOC sbw.
Memorandum

TO: W. C. Sullivan
FROM: S. B. Donahoe
DATE: 8/3/61

SUBJECT: CUBAN MATTERS - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

New York Office suggested a program be instituted to disrupt and harass pro-Cuban factions in U. S. through anonymous telephone calls, anti-Castro press releases and similar methods capitalizing on antidemocratic and dictatorial methods used by Castro regime and its proponents in this country. New York Office has advised plan had merit but it should submit details for its separate plans to carry out over-all counterintelligence program.

Paul Archic, a New York Office source, has furnished information indicating Treasurer of July 26th Movement has been found de-clic in his handling of Movement funds. An audit of his books revealed shortages and charges against him by the auditor resulted in a fight and lack of full trust in Trujillo by officials of the Movement in New York. New York Office has suggested we capitalize on this distrust by making anonymous telephone calls to Movement leadership indicative of general doubt and lack of confidence by Cubans in New York in the leadership of the Movement.

The July 26th Movement was scheduled for its annual registration with the Department of Justice on July 18, last. Audit of the Movement's books may have been in preparation for financial statement required in registration. Anonymous source in New York has revealed slipshod bookkeeping methods and while the shortage may not actually exist, it offers an excellent opportunity for us to capitalize on the allegations in order to throw leadership of Movement into disrepute. This disruptive action should not be limited just to the Movement in New York as such information could easily be quashed by the controlling leadership within the Movement. It should be appropriately "leaked" to Cuban officials at the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations and to the director of the Movement's activities in Havana. Such individuals may institute inquiry of their own which will result in replacing current officials of the Movement. Such action would give us opportunity to interject our own live informers into positions of control of the Movement, allowing for more complete receipt of intelligence information received through the Movement's activities.
ACTION:

Attached for New York is a letter approving its proposed plan of anonymous telephone calls and instructing New York to make similar calls to Cuban United Nations officials and direct an anonymous letter to Cuban director of July 26th Movement. New York instructed to be alert to introduction of its informants to positions vacated by anyone ousted as a result of this disruptive tactic.
Permission granted for your office to effect anonymous telephone calls mentioned in referenced letter provided full security of your source of information can be assured. Recontact Archad and contact NY 30-2-3 to determine degree of publicity given to date to Trujillo's dereliction in handling of July 26th Movement funds. If publicity of a degree indicating common knowledge among members of July 26th Movement, Bureau interposes no objection to course of action outlined in referenced letter.

Disruption of relations within July 26th Movement in New York should not be considered as ultimate objective of your counterintelligence program. To extend your program, anonymous telephone calls of the nature described in referenced letter should also be made to appropriate Cuban officials of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. You should also prepare an anonymous letter containing details of Trujillo's dereliction and indications of distrust of entire leadership of July 26th Movement in New York City. This anonymous letter should be sent to Geriberto Gonzalez Pensoza who is well known to you as the individual responsible for direction of the July 26th Movement in the United States. Gonzalez's address in Cuba has been reported as being c/o Movimiento Revolucionario, 33 De Julio, Grove 27, Havana, Cuba. Subsequent to preparation of this letter in the Spanish language and prior to forwarding it to Gonzalez, it should be furnished to the Bureau in its proposed finished form for review and appropriate approval.

To fully realize all advantages of your plan, bear in mind necessity of having appropriate live informants in a position to volunteer to assume duties of any officials ousted from the Movement as a result of adverse publicity or disciplinary action originating within the Movement from Havana.
Anonymous calls made by your office in carrying out the approved program should be to select individuals only and should be spread over a suitable period of time to preclude the recipients thereof concluding that the callers are participating in a concentrated move to harass them.

**NOTE:** See cover memo Donahoe to Sullivan dated 2/3/61, same caution, prepared by ERH:ams.
SAC, San Juan (105-3353-Sub 1)  

September 13, 1960  

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO  
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)  
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL  

Re San Juan letter 8-22-60 and New York letter 8-24-60.  

The operation of a counterintelligence program against Puerto Rican organizations which seek Puerto Rico's independence through other than lawful, peaceful means is a very important endeavor. Such a program must be most discreet to preclude embarrassment to the Bureau and must be conducted in a manner to insure that none of our confidential sources are jeopardized. No action should be taken to implement this program without specific Bureau approval. 

For the purposes of this program, San Juan and New York should consider the suggested tactics to be employed set out herein where it appears the tactic could be successfully employed in its locale. 

It certainly appears that we could capitalize upon statements made by Puerto Rican subjects either in New York or in Puerto Rico where the individual makes inconsistent statements in two different localities. Where you have a Puerto Rican nationalist or communist leader engaging in activities or making statements in one location and subsequently making a report in another locality, which is at variance with his original activity or statement, the details should be furnished the Bureau with your recommendation as to how it may be used to disrupt the activities of the individual. 

Consideration should be given to circulation and publicity of facts concerning affiliates, particularly leaders of subversive Puerto Rican independence organizations, through local newspaper contacts where such data could disrupt the activities of the individual or the organization.  

2 - New York (105-32972)  

See yellow page 3.
Letter to SAC, San Juan
Re: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL

Both the San Juan and New York Offices should prepare, from public source information, a proposed timely article which would not jeopardize any informant or Bureau technique showing the nationalist and/or communist Puerto Rican independence organizations to be basically anti-Puerto Rico. These articles will be considered for publication through either Bureau contacts or contacts of the San Juan and New York Offices.

We should particularly direct our efforts against the leaders of the Puerto Rican organizations which advocate to any degree the use of force or violence to obtain Puerto Rico's independence. Consider the use of anonymous letters where disparaging statements are made by one leader against another.

The Agents concerned with this matter in the New York Office should review for ideas, techniques and tactics employed in the counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA.

It appears that in Puerto Rico the most immediate target of international communism is to influence the Federacion de Universitarios Pro Independencia (FUPI). San Juan should, therefore, consider tactics designed to lessen communist influence in the FUPI and to lessen FUPI's influence among the student body at the University of Puerto Rico.

Future communications should be captioned as above.

San Juan is being considered office of origin in this matter and copies of communications prepared by San Juan should be furnished the New York Office. New York should furnish San Juan copies of communications prepared by New York.
Letter to SAC, San Juan
Re: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL
105-66754

NOTE ON YELLOW:

There has been an increasing boldness apparent in the activities of organizations which seek independence for Puerto Rico through other than lawful, peaceful means. Because of their utter disregard of the will of the majority, the nationalist, communist and/or Soviet desire to embarrass the United States, and the courage given to the cause by Castro's Cuba, a more positive effort must be made, not only to curtail, but to disrupt, the activities of these organizations. Bulet 8-4-60 instructed San Juan and New York to furnish the Bureau their observations and suggestions. San Juan and New York have furnished general observations and have indicated that such a program may be feasible. This is not a program of harassment, and disruptive tactics will be employed only after specifically approved by the Bureau.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: HOODWINK (INTERNAL SECURITY)

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend a long-range counterintelligence program designed to provoke a dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra under the code name of Hoodwink.

OBJECTIVES:

A dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra would cause disruption of both groups by having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking the other. This would help neutralize the activities of both groups which are detrimental to this country.

BACKGROUND:

La Cosa Nostra has no sympathy for the communists. The Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra come in contact with each other in the labor field where hoodlums operate businesses under "sweatshop" conditions. By making it appear that the Party is attacking hoodlum labor practices, over a period of time we could provoke a bitter dispute between the two organizations.

The New York Office has recommended a specific technique to initiate this program. This technique consists of anonymously forwarding one leaflet to a local La Cosa Nostra leader attacking the labor practices of one of his enterprises. The leaflet would ostensibly be published by a local Party unit. A note with the leaflet would give the impression that it has received wide circulation.

Enclosure:

TJD: jes
(6) CONTINUED - OVER

18 OCT 1966
Memo to Mr. Sullivan
RE: HOODWINK

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be sent the New York Office authorizing the anonymous mailing of a spurious leaflet, allegedly from the Communist Party, USA, attacking La Cosa Nostra, to a local hoodlum leader as the first step in a long-range program to provoke a dispute between the two groups.
SAC, New York

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

Director, FBI

(Rec 10)

10/5/66

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Deakin

HOODWINK
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ALL INFORMATION CONVEYED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/1/66 BY CP2 ALM131G

ReNYlet captioned "Communist Party, USA; Counter-intelligence Program; IS - C; (La Cosa Nostra)," dated 9/22/66. Hoodwink is the code word designated for this program.

New York is authorized to mail the anonymous letter and leaflet set out in relet as the beginning of a long-range program to cause a dispute between La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). To strengthen this alleged attack, add a last sentence to the leaflet: "Let's show the hoodlums and the bosses that the workers are united against sweatshops."

Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing cannot be associated with the Bureau and advise of tangible results. New York should also submit follow-up recommendations to continue this program.

The Party has been the subject of recent bombings a typical hoodlum technique. Consider a spurious Party statement blaming the LCN for the bombings because of Party efforts on behalf of the workers. This statement could be aimed at specific LCN members if appropriate.

In developing this program, thought should also be given to initiating spurious LCN attacks on the CPUSA, so that each group would think the other was mounting a campaign against it.

The Bureau very much appreciates New York's careful analysis of this program and the initial "low-key" technique suggested.

1 - Special Investigative (Route through for review) -

TJD:jes

NOTE: See memorandum Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, 10/4/66, captioned as above, prepared by TJD:jes.
During its investigation of the Communist Party, USA, the Bureau has sought to capitalize on incidents involving the Party and its leaders in order to foster factionalism, bring the Communist Party (CP) and its leaders into disrepute before the American public and cause confusion and dissatisfaction among rank-and-file members of the CP.

Generally, the above action has constituted harassment rather than disruption, since, for the most part, the Bureau has set up particular incidents, and the attack has been from the outside. At the present time, however, there is existing within the CP a situation resulting from the developments at the 20th Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union and the Government's attack on the Party principally through prosecutions under the Smith Act of 1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950 which is made to order for an all-out, disruptive attack against the CP from within. In other words, the Bureau is in a position to initiate, on a broader scale than heretofore attempted, a counterintelligence program against the CP, not by harassment from the outside, which might only serve to bring the various factions together, but by feeding and fostering from within the internal fight currently raging.

We have been considering possible courses to implement such a program and, at the present time, we are actively working on the following four:

1) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is making an all-out effort to win over CP members who have become disillusioned with Stalinist communism. SWP members are distributing copies of "The Militant" (SWP publication) at CP rallies and meetings and are contacting individual CP members in an attempt to sell Enclosures
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

them the SWP philosophy. This SWP program could very definitely benefit the Bureau provided we can achieve through our informant coverage in the SWP some degree of control and direction over it. The ultimate goal would be to continue and intensify pressure on the CP from the left. Since the Party is already under pressure from the right, the combined pressure would contribute materially to distracting the CP from its primary goals.

ACTION: A memorandum, together with a letter to the 15 offices having SWP activity in the U. S., is attached, sounding out these offices through their SWP informants as to the possibility of initiating several specific steps aimed at the Bureau's furthering, assisting and possibly 'adding to' the current SWP disruptive program.

2) The CP national convention is scheduled to be held during February 1957. At the present time there appear to be 4 separate views within the CP leadership as to the degree of change to be made in the organization and program of the CP, USA. The Party has publicly announced that the theory of democratic centralism has been modified and that each CP member has the right to express his views as to the past mistakes and future path of communism in the U. S. Preliminary material for the draft resolution for the national convention has been prepared and is being discussed on a national level prior to being sent to the various districts for preconvention discussions on a local level.

ACTION: A memorandum, together with a letter to 12 key offices is being prepared, requesting these offices to submit to the Bureau the identities of certain informants who will be briefed and instructed to embark on a disruptive program within their own clubs, sections, districts or even on a national level. These informants will raise objections and doubts as to the success of any proposed plan of action by the CP leadership. They will seize every opportunity to carry out the disruptive activity not only at meetings, conventions, et cetera, but also during social and other contacts with CP members and leaders. It is noted that
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

A letter has been sent to 12 key offices (dated August 27, 1955) requesting information as to the viewpoints of the national and district leaders relative to the faction within the CP that each appears to favor. This information can be used by the various offices in briefing the informants who will carry out the disruptive program. It is pointed out that the informants chosen and approved for this program should not be endangered, since, as pointed out above, the Party has publicly encouraged all members to participate in the current discussions.

3) Recently, a national CP leader and convicted Smith Act subject, was assigned by the Party to contact a semi-religious socialist-pacifist organization. He suggested that another member of the CP prepare and distribute a document calling for an exchange of opinions by individuals interested in forming a new socialist organization. This is the first step taken by the CP in forming a new socialist coalition in which it hopes to participate. He has prepared a document which criticizes the absence of civil liberties, free trade unions and outlets for dissenting opinions in the Soviet Union. It further urges that European satellite nations be free from Soviet domination. The CP hopes to persuade them to mollify his criticism of the Soviet Union before the document is released. At the same time the CP feels that some mild criticism of the Soviet Union and the CP, USA, will be beneficial in gaining noncommunist support for his proposal.

**ACTION:** This plan of the CP may create a situation which would lend itself to a disruptive operation by the Bureau. It appears that it is too early to actually make a move, but we are alerting certain offices to this plan of the CP and are instructing that this operation be closely watched so that if a situation does present itself we will be in a position to make any move which appears logical and workable.
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

4) When the CP underground was put in operation on a large scale in 1951, CP leaders decided after extensive study, that underground personnel should either disregard their tax obligations or file under false names.

ACTION: We have obtained from the field, the names and current addresses of former underground leaders with a view toward furnishing them to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for appropriate action. A memorandum has gone through (August 28, 1956) recommending that the names and current address of 102 such leaders, all of whom have Smith Act ramifications, be transmitted to the Department and the Department be requested to advise if there is any objection to the Bureau furnishing this material to IRS. If there is no objection, the Bureau proposes to transmit the names and addresses to IRS via Liaison for appropriate action. We will then follow IRS very closely since IRS action should: (1) uncover the aliases and whereabouts; from 1951 to 1954, of these subjects who actually filed returns under aliases and admit such action, or (2) result in possible prosecution of those subjects who did not file returns or who refuse to furnish details if they did file. It is believed that action by IRS at this time would deal a further devastating blow at the CP and would certainly reflect very unfavorably on the Party leadership for the instructions issued in 1951.

OBSERVATIONS:

We are going ahead with the 4 courses of action listed in this memorandum. A detailed memorandum is attached covering the SWP angle; a memorandum has gone through separately covering the first phase of the IRS angle, and a detailed memorandum covering the disruptive program by confidential informants is being prepared as is a memorandum covering the phase.

For the present, our disruptive tactics will, of necessity, be general in nature, that is, along the line of "keeping the pot boiling." The time may come, however, when it will be desirable to direct our disruptive tactics toward a
Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

specific goal. A national committee has been set up to work exclusively on the resolution for the forthcoming CP national convention. This resolution may be that the CP be dissolved and reconstituted under a new name; a coalition be effected with certain liberal and right-wing elements or that the CP remain as constituted but that several drastic changes be made in its constitution. When this resolution has been drawn up and the Bureau receives a copy of it, serious consideration will be given as to whether it will be of benefit to the Bureau's operations and to the security of the country for us to set a specific goal in this disruptive program.

The Internal Security Section is giving this program continuous thought and attention and we are remaining alert for situations which might afford additional opportunities for further disruption of the CP, USA.

ACTION:

This memorandum has been prepared for your information and to advise you of the initiation of this program.
In high Communist Party (CP) circles there are indications that the CP is considering dissolution and incorporating itself into a broad socialist organization. In order to explore this possibility the CP has prepared and distributed a document calling for opinions by individuals interested in formation of this new organization. The CP rejected a document as being anti-Russian and anticommunist. It was instructed to have a leaflet announcing a symposium to be held 10/5/56 at Chicago to discuss the formation of this new organization. Speakers include CP functionary, which evidences the serious intent the CP has in the possibilities of the new organization.

The Bureau should (1) attempt to learn the CP plans for this new organization and (2) attempt to prevent the CP from dominating, or at least influencing, this organization for its own desires. The Bureau does not desire the CP to develop this organization and after careful study inherent dangers are foreseen. With the CP as is, the Bureau is better equipped to combat it under existing legislation, i.e., Smith Act - 1940, etc. With the dissolution of the CP and emergence of a new organization under a new name it is doubtful if the afore-mentioned existing legislation would be effective or could be applied against it. Successful prosecutions under existing laws have acted as a deterrent to the growth of the CP and have in the past upset its operation.

Bureaus reflect organization founded in England in 1914. The organization advocates no peace-time conscription, abolition of Selective Service laws, racial equality, opposition to the use of thermonuclear devices and has denounced communism although many of its ideals closely parallel those of the CP.
Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

It is believed the Bureau at this time should consider engaging in an enlarged program of counterintelligence activities in connection with the formation of this new broad socialist organization which the CP appears to be attempting to create. It is believed that a possible approach to this might be made through by using a third-party contact whereby would be unaware of the Bureau's interest. In considering this possibility the Chicago Office has been instructed to initiate an intense investigation to determine the extent of CP domination of the 10/5/56 symposium; to determine whether the CP is the driving force behind the symposium; and to afford complete coverage of this affair. By this coverage attitude and line of thinking regarding this new organization might be ascertained. Upon receipt of this information the Bureau would be in a better position to make a definite determination concerning the feasibility of this plan and the best course to be followed.

In finding a suitable and reliable third-party contact to carry out the Bureau's intentions in this matter it is desired that the New York Office be instructed to thoroughly review its files concerning in an effort to locate close contacts of his who might be willing to assist the Bureau; to institute an investigation of activities solely for the purpose of developing such information; to develop information concerning the present whereabouts of son and daughters; and to consider, depending upon the results of its file review, the desirability of!

the New York Office will be instructed not to make "any contacts whatsoever until it has submitted a "plan of attack" together with its comments and recommendations regarding the reliability of the individuals to be contacted to insure that no embarrassment would be caused the Bureau.

ACTION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to the New York Office dated 9/7/56 outlining the Bureau's plans and instructions regarding this matter.

Our purpose in this connection is to prevent the communists from controlling any new organization established or cause such organization to 2 - reject the philosophy of communism.
SAC, New York

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY-USA.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

September 6, 1956

Re: Bulletin dated August 27, 1956, captioned
"Communist Party, USA, Factionalism, Internal Security - C,"
requesting information as to the viewpoints of the national
and district leaders relative to the particular faction
within the Communist Party (CP) which each leader appears
to favor.

There is existing within the CP at the present
time considerable internal friction resulting from the
developments at the 22nd Congress of the CP of the Soviet
Union and from the Government's attack on the Party,
principally through prosecutions under the Smith Act of
1940 and the Internal Security Act of 1950. This situation
appears made to order for an all-out disruptive attack
against the Party on a broader scale than heretofore
attempted by the Bureau. Accordingly, the Bureau is thinking
in terms of a counterintelligence program aimed at the CP,
not by harassment from the outside which might only serve to
bring the various factions together but by feeding and
fostering from within the internal fight currently raging.

Among the several courses of action under
consideration by the Bureau is one which will involve the
use of certain confidential informants who will be briefed
and instructed to embark on a disruptive program within

2cc - Boston
    Chicago
    Cleveland
    Detroit
    Los Angeles
    Minneapolis

2cc - Newark
    New Haven
    Philadelphia
    San Francisco
    Seattle
Letter to SAC, New York

their own clubs, sections, and districts. It is contemplated that these informants will seek to continue and increase the current confusion existing within the CP by raising questions and doubts as to the success of any proposed plan of action by the CP leadership. For example, when the draft resolution for the forthcoming national convention comes up for discussion in the various districts throughout the country, these informants can point up the weaknesses inherent in the resolution; the weaknesses and mistakes of the present leadership; the conditions which existed in Russia during Stalin's leadership; failure of the CP leadership in this country to make any progress in the labor field; the Negro question; and many others.

The aim of the informants will be to take advantage of the CP requests for open discussion by the membership to force discussion of topics reflecting on the effectiveness of CP leadership, programs, and philosophy. Such discussion is intended to shake the confidence of CP members in their movement and render them more susceptible to development as informants or cause them to abandon the Party or to follow some other course of action which would interfere with an effective reorientation of the policies of the CP. It is not intended that the informants compromise themselves in advancing these topics for discussion. Their approach should be overtly constructive and exploratory rather than critical. Under no circumstances will any indication be given to the informants participating in the program that other informants may be engaged in similar activity, and the questions and topics raised by our informants will be so carefully planned and introduced at the meetings in such a manner that they will not attract any more attention than other members who are taking part in the discussions.

It is contemplated that the informants will seize every opportunity to carry out this disruptive activity not only at official Party functions but also during social and other contacts with CP members and leaders. It is felt that if the informants are properly selected and briefed, there should be no danger involved in such action on their part since all CP members have been encouraged by the national leadership to participate fully in current and forthcoming discussions.
Letter to SAC, New York

The Bureau desires that each office receiving copies of this letter submit by September 15, 1956, the names of several informants who appear to possess the necessary background and intelligence to carry out this program successfully. The Bureau will consider each informant individually and, thereafter, issue additional specific instructions with reference to this entire operation. This program should not be discussed with any informant until the Bureau so instructs. You are instructed to afford this matter serious consideration and attention and to include in your reply to this communication pertinent comments or suggestions of your own or of the Agent personnel of your office who are or who have been assigned to security work.
The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office and strongly directing and/or supporting such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South. The SWP has also been in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups. The youth group of the SWP has also been operating on this basis in connection with SWP policies.

Offices receiving copies of this letter are participating in the Bureau's Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program. It is felt that a disruption program along similar lines could be initiated against the SWP on a very selective basis. One of the purposes of this program would be to alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky.

It is pointed out, however, that this program is not intended to be a "crash" program. Only carefully thought-out operations with the widest possible effect and benefit to the nation should be submitted. It may be desirable to expand the program after the effects have been evaluated.

Each office is, therefore, requested to carefully evaluate such a program and submit their views to the Bureau regarding initiating a SWP disruption program on a limited basis.

2 - Chicago
2 - Detroit
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Newark
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: August 27, 1964

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64 captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence Division to give consideration to the application of counterintelligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised, coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other hate groups.

This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these organizations.

We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities for one hate organization each) relating to the administration and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program. Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the participating offices will submit a 30-day status letter setting
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
    INTERNAL SECURITY
    DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

For the summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-month period. Each office will be instructed to open and maintain a pending investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible for following and initiating counterintelligence action.

As is the instance in our established counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA, and in our current 90-day trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite intelligence, all recommended counterintelligence action against Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved at the Seat of Government.

This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs directed against the Communist Party, USA.

His efforts will be closely coordinated with supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At such time as the program is considered to be successfully under way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the 17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17 field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence program setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program.
Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting a coordinated Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) directed against Klan-type and hate organizations. Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately open an active control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for this program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in investigation of hate and racist-type organizations and their membership.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various Klans and hate organizations, their leadership and adherents. The activities of these groups must be followed on a continuous basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The devious maneuvers and duplicity of these groups must be exposed to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable news media sources, both locally and at the Seat of Government. We must frustrate any effort of the groups to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.

2 - Baltimore
2 - Birmingham
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Jackson
2 - Knoxville
2 - Little Rock

2 - Memphis
2 - Miami
2 - Mobile
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York
2 - Richmond
2 - Savannah
2 - Tampa
Letter to Atlanta

Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

The following Klan organizations, currently under active investigation, should be considered for counterintelligence action:

1. Association of Arkansas Klans of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
2. Association of Georgia Klans.
3. Association of South Carolina Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
5. Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
6. Improved Order of the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
7. Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn.
8. Independent Klan Unit, St. Augustine, Florida.
10. Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
11. National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
12. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
15. United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
17. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi.

The following hate organizations currently being afforded active investigation are included in this program:

1. Alabama States Rights Party (Origin: Mobile)
2. American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)
Letter to Atlanta
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

3. Council for Statehood, aka, Freemem
   (Origin: Miami)
4. Fighting American Nationalists
   (Origin: Baltimore)
5. National States Rights Party
   (Origin: Birmingham)
6. National Renaissance Party
   (Origin: New York)
7. United Freemem (Origin: Miami)
8. Viking Youth of America (Origin: Tampa)
9. White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)

On or before 10/13/64, participating offices
are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis
of potential counterintelligence action against pertinent
organizations and individuals active within their respective
territories and specific recommendations should be included
for any logical immediate counterintelligence action.
Recommendations submitted under this program must include
all necessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently
pass upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In
instances where a reliable and cooperative news media
representative or other source outside the Bureau is to
be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed
counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon
the recommending office to furnish assurances the source
will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our
confidence.

Offices participating in this program who have
investigative responsibility for Klan organizations should
specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau
regarding "Action Groups." As these offices are aware,
these groups have been described as the relatively few
individuals in each organization who use strong-arm tactics
and violent actions to achieve their ends. Often these
groups act without the approval of the Klan organization.
Letter to Atlanta

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

No counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.

Commencing 1/1/65 and every 3 months thereafter, each participating office should submit to the Bureau a status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including comments under the following captions:

1. Potential Counterintelligence Action
2. Pending Counterintelligence Action
3. Tangible Results

If necessary, a 4th caption "Miscellaneous" may be utilized for additional comments.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action should not be included in 90-day status letters to the Bureau but following the initial analysis due 10/15/64, should be submitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of Klan-type and hate organizations and their membership should be alerted to our counterintelligence plans relating to these groups. Counterintelligence action directed at these groups is intended to complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded this sensitive operation.
Letter to Atlanta
EE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
      INTERNAL SECURITY
      DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS

The Bureau is pleased with past successes achieved by our counterintelligence efforts in other phases of our investigative responsibilities. To insure our success in this new endeavor, the Agent to whom the program is assigned in each office must have a detailed knowledge of the activities of the racist groups in the territory and that knowledge must be coupled with interest, initiative and imagination. The Agent must be alert for information which has a disruptive potential. The information will not come to him — he must look for it. The most effective way of being assured of keeping on top of the situation is to maintain close contact with those Agents who handle the investigation of the racial and hate groups and their membership and also to periodically review relevant files.

If an enthusiastic approach is made to this new endeavor, there is no reason why the results achieved under this program will not equal or surpass our achievements in similar-type programs directed against subversives.
SAC, Albany

August 25, 1967

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL OFFICES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
INTERNAL SECURITY

Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately establish a control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new counterintelligence program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent well versed in investigations relating to black nationalist, hate-type organizations. The field office control file used under this program may be maintained in a pending inactive status until such time as a specific operation or technique is placed under consideration for implementation.

The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder. The activities of all such groups of intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The pernicious background of such groups, their duplicity, and devious maneuvers must be exposed to public scrutiny where such publicity will have a neutralizing effect. Efforts of the various groups:

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Jackson
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Memphis
2 - Newark
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York

Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Richmond
St. Louis
San Francisco
Washington Field Office

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/60 BY SP 2 MRT 16
Letter to SAC, Albany

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

To consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents must be frustrated. No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations. When an opportunity is apparent to disrupt or neutralize black nationalist, hate-type organizations through the cooperation of established local news media contacts or through such contact with sources available to the Seat of Government, in every instance careful attention must be given to the proposal to insure the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or discredited through the publicity and not merely publicized. Consideration should be given to techniques to preclude violence-prone or rabble-rouser leaders of hate groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media.

Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations have backgrounds of immorality, subversive activity, and criminal records. Through your investigation of key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or warranted counterintelligence may be instituted.

Intensified attention under this program should be afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam. Particular emphasis should be given to extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary or militant groups such as

At this time the Bureau is setting up no requirement for status letters to be periodically submitted under this program. It will be incumbent upon you to insure the program is being afforded necessary and continuing attention and that no opportunities will be overlooked for counterintelligence action.

This program should not be confused with the program entitled "Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," which is directed
Letter to SAC, Albany

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

against the Communist Party and related organizations, or the program entitled "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Groups," which is directed against Klan and hate-type groups primarily consisting of white memberships.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program.

No counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated by the field without specific prior Bureau authorization.

You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau will be pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you may recommend.
Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

G. C. Moore

DATE: February 29, 1968

All information contained herein is unclassified.

Subject: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Purpose: To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country.

Background: By letter dated August 25, 1967, 23 field offices were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone elements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.

Current Developments: In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field. Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic progress letters to stimulate thinking in this area.

Attached airtel also reminds the field that counterintelligence suggestions to expose these militants or neutralize them must be approved by the Bureau.

Action: That attached airtel expanding this program, defining goals and instructing periodic progress letters be submitted be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.

Enclosure
transmit the following in

(Type in plaintext or code)

via

(Priority)

To: SAC, Albany  
From: Director, FBI (100-448006)

COUNTERTESLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Title is changed to substitute Racial Intelligence for Internal Security for Bureau routing purposes.

PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR ALL THE FOLLOWING SACS

| 2 - Atlanta     | 2 - Minneapolis |
| 2 - Baltimore   | 2 - Mobile      |
| 2 - Birmingham  | 2 - Newark      |
| 2 - Boston      | 2 - New Haven   |
| 2 - Buffalo     | 2 - New Orleans |
| 2 - Charlotte   | 2 - New York    |
| 2 - Chicago     | 2 - Omahá       |
| 2 - Cincinnati  | 2 - Philadelphia|
| 2 - Cleveland   | 2 - Phoenix     |
| 2 - Denver      | 2 - Pittsburgh  |
| 2 - Detroit     | 2 - Portland    |
| 2 - Houston     | 2 - Richmond    |
| 2 - Indianapolis| 2 - Sacramento  |
| 2 - Jackson     | 2 - San Diego   |
| 2 - Jacksonville| 2 - San Francisco|
| 2 - Kansas City | 2 - Seattle     |
| 2 - Los Angeles | 2 - Springfield |
| 2 - Memphis     | 2 - St. Louis   |
| 2 - Miami       | 2 - Tampa       |
| 2 - Milwaukee   | 2 - WFO         |
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

Albany
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Jackson
Los Angeles
Memphis
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Richmond
St. Louis
San Francisco
Washington Field

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence Program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Might have been such a "messiah;" he is the martyr of the movement today.

... all aspire to this position. is less of a threat because of his age. could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism.

has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community,
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM)
Nation of Islam (NOI)

should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

INSTRUCTIONS

Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office should:

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Special Agent assigned to coordinate this program.
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black nationalist movement in the field office territory. Include name, number of members and degree of activity of each black nationalist group. Also state your estimate of each group's propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences should suffice.

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation.

Thereafter, on a ninety-day basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations effected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Bureau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.
The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM: C. D. Brennan

DATE: 5/9/69

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF THE NEW LEFT

Our Nation is undergoing an era of disruption and violence caused to a large extent by various individuals generally connected with the New Left. Some of these activists urge revolution in America and call for the defeat of the United States in Vietnam. They continually and falsely allege police brutality and do not hesitate to utilize unlawful acts to further their so-called causes. The New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigation of it and to drive us off the college campuses. With this in mind, it is our recommendation that a new Counterintelligence Program be designed to neutralize the New Left and the Key Activists. The Key Activists are those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left and on whom we have intensified our investigations.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize the activities of this group and persons connected with it. It is hoped that with this new program their violent and illegal activities may be reduced if not curtailed.

General instructions are being furnished to all offices relating to the purpose and administration of this new program. Briefly, these instructions require all offices to submit an analysis of possible counterintelligence operations on the New Left and on the Key Activists on or before 6/1/68, including any specific recommendations for action. Thereafter, all offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting forth a summary of their accomplishments and future plans. Each office will maintain a pending case and assign experienced

Enclosure
Memo to Mr. Sullivan
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

personnel to this program. All proposed counterintelligence action must be approved at the Seat of Government prior to instituting it. This new program will be supervised at the Seat of Government by a Special Agent supervisor in the Internal Security Section.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized to immediately initiate a coordinated Counterintelligence Program directed at exposing, disrupting, and otherwise neutralizing the New Left and Key Activists.

2) That the attached letter setting forth instructions for the administration and immediate enactment of the program be forwarded to all offices.
Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting a Counterintelligence Program directed against the New Left movement and its key activists. All offices are instructed to immediately open an active control file, continued as above, and to assign responsibility for this program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in investigation of the New Left and its membership.

The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various New Left organizations, their leadership and adherents. It is imperative that the activities of these groups be followed on a continuous basis so we may take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The obvious maneuvers and duplicity of these activists must be exposed to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable media sources, both locally and at the seat of Government. We must frustrate every effort of these groups and individuals to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents. In every instance, consideration should be given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups and an opportunity should be seized to capitalize upon organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.

On or before June 1, 1967, all offices are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis of potential counterintelligence action against New Left organizations and key activists within their respective territories. Specific recommendations should be included for any logical immediate counterintelligence action. Recommendations submitted under this program must include all necessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently assess upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In instances where a reliable and cooperative news media representative or other
source outside the Bureau is to be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon the recommending office to furnish assurances the source will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.

Offices which have investigative responsibility for Key Activists should specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau regarding these individuals. As these offices are aware, these individuals have been identified as the moving forces behind the New Left.

No counterintelligence action may be initiated by the field without specific Bureau authorization.

Commencing July 1, 1963, and every three months thereafter, each participating office should submit to the Bureau a status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including comments under the following captions:

1) Potential Counterintelligence Action
2) Pending Counterintelligence Action
3) Tangible Results

If necessary, a fourth caption "Miscellaneous" may be utilized for additional comments.

Recommendations for counterintelligence action should not be included in the 90-day status letters to the Bureau, but should be submitted individually by separate letter.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of the New Left and the Key Activists should be alerted to our counterintelligence plans relating to these groups. Counterintelligence action directed at these groups is intended to complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence investigations. Each investigative agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are cautioned
Letter to Albany

To: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded this sensitive operation.

The Bureau has been very closely following the activities of the New Left and the Key Activists and is highly concerned that the anarchistic activities of a few can paralyze institutions of learning, recreation centers, cripple traffic, and tie the arms of law enforcement officials all to the detriment of our society. The organizations and activists who spout revolution and unlawfully challenge society to obtain their demands must not only be contained, but must be neutralized. Law and order is mandatory for any civilized society to survive. Therefore, you must approach this new endeavor with a forward look, enthusiasm, and interest in order to accomplish our responsibilities. The importance of this new endeavor cannot and will not be overlooked.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. V. C. Sullivan
FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: July 14, 1964

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
(SOVIET-SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE)

Since initiated in 1956, the Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro), directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), has had continuing and cumulative successes in exposing, disrupting and neutralizing the communists.

We now believe consideration should be given to applying the Cointelpro against Soviet and Satellite espionage activities in the United States.

We desire to immediately embark upon a 90-day trial program which will be participated in by the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices to determine if we can successfully direct our counterintelligence activities toward Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities. At the end of this 90-day trial period, we will evaluate our success and thereafter submit recommendations relating to the feasibility of permanently establishing this program against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel be forwarded to the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices setting out instructions for these offices to immediately devise and submit to the Bureau their recommendations for counterintelligence activity to be directed against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States for a trial 90-day period.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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Enc.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
EXEMPT FROM EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SCHEDULE OF EXEMPTION CATEGORY
July 15, 1964

Airtel

To: SACS, New York
Chicago
Washington Field

From: Director, FBI

COINTELPLO
INTERNAL SECURITY
(SOVIET-SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE)

Since initiated in 1956, the Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro), directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and related organizations, through a variety of techniques has disrupted, exposed and neutralized the communists. Some successful Cointelpro operations such as anonymous letters and mailings, in spite of their simplicity, have caused unexpected consternation and disruption among the comrades. Cointelpro-initiated publicity has been a tremendous deterrent to the comrades, while at the same time it has alerted the general public to their insidious maneuvers. More sophisticated techniques and operations have caused defections and expulsions within Party ranks.

Successes resulting from the enthusiastic and imaginative efforts of Special Agents participating in this program warrant the expansion of the Cointelpro to cover Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States.

1 - Boston
1 - Buffalo
1 - Cleveland
1 - Detroit
1 - Los Angeles
1 - Milwaukee
1 - Minneapolis
1 - New-Haven
1 - Newark
1 - Philadelphia
1 - Pittsburgh
1 - St. Louis
1 - San Francisco
1 - Seattle
Airtel to New York, et al
RE: COINTELPRO

Effective immediately, the Chicago, New York and Washington Field Offices are requested to consider and devise Cointelpro action directed to disrupt, expose and neutralize Soviet and Satellite intelligence activity. Agents assigned as Cointelpro coordinators in the Chicago and New York Offices should immediately confer with key personnel assigned to Soviet-Satellite-type investigations for the purpose of devising one or several sophisticated counterintelligence techniques against Soviet-Satellite intelligence activities or personnel. As the Washington Field Office has not previously participated in Cointelpro action against the CPUSA, an imaginative, experienced Agent with a general knowledge of Soviet-Satellite intelligence activities should be immediately appointed as coordinator for this program. Within 30 days each of these offices should submit to the Bureau recommendations and detailed plans for implementing one or several such operations. Care should be taken to insure plans devised under this program do not conflict with existing programs or operations directed against Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities. No Cointelpro action should be initiated without specific Bureau authority.

This new application of the Cointelpro is not meant at this time to be an all-out attack against Soviet-Satellite intelligence, but is a trial to determine the feasibility of extending our organized counterintelligence effort. The results of our expanded efforts will be reviewed at the end of a 90-day period to determine the feasibility of over-all Cointelpro efforts directed against foreign intelligence activities in the United States.

Other offices participating in the Cointelpro against the CPUSA are urged to immediately discuss with key investigative personnel possibilities for counterintelligence action against Soviet-Satellite intelligence personnel and to promptly make available any comments or suggestions to the Bureau and the 3 offices participating in this new endeavor.
Airtel to New York, et al.

RE: Cointelpro

Attached for the Washington Field Office are copies of Bulletins dated 9/13/63 and 3/18/64 which were directed to offices participating in the Cointelpro. These letters summarize some of the many successful recent Cointelpro actions and may be of value in connection with the formulation of Cointelpro operations against Soviet-Satellite intelligence activity.

You are urged to utilize the services of your most experienced investigative personnel who have proven their ability through consistent application of imagination and ingenious investigative approaches to make this new endeavor a success.
SAC, San Francisco 4/2/69

Director, FBI

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

ReSFairtel 3/26/69 under dual caption of "Revolutionary Union" and "Progressive Labor Party," suggesting disruptive action relating to the two organizations.

ReSFairtel designated copies for the Bufile and the SFfile on "Cointelpro - New Left."

There is no objection to your action, but you are reminded of the existence of the captioned case file which may be used for a broad range of disruptive activity and which has a specific interest in techniques and operations in the pro-Chicom area.

1 - San Francisco
The Bureau would like to offer for your consideration a proposal for a disruptive-disinformation operation targeted against the national office of the Black Panther Party (BPP). This proposal is not intended to be all inclusive or binding in any of its various phases, but only a guide for the suggested action. You are encouraged to submit recommendations relating to revisions or innovations of the proposal.

1. The operation would be effected through close coordination on a high level with the Oakland or San Francisco Police Department.

2. Xerox copies of true documents, documents subtly incorporating false information, and entirely fabricated documents would be periodically anonymously mailed to the residence of a key Panther leader. These documents would be on the stationery and in the form used by the police department or by the FBI in disseminating information to the police. FBI documents, when used, would contain police routing or date received notations, clearly indicating they had been pilfered from police files.

3. An attempt would be made to give the Panther recipient the impression the documents were stolen from police files by a disgruntled police employee sympathetic to the Panthers. After initial mailings, brief notes by the alleged disgruntled employee would be included with the mailed documents. These notes would indicate the之意 and sympathy of the police employee, his bitterness against his department, and possibly a request for money.

4. Depending on developments, at a propitious time, consideration would be given to establishing a drop office box or other suitable "drop" address for the use of the alleged disgruntled employee to receive responsibility for funds and/or specifications relating to the documents from the Panthers.
Letter to SAC, San Francisco
REL: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

5. Although the operation may not require inclusion of a live source to represent the disgruntled employee, circumstances might warrant the use of such a source for face-to-face meetings with the Panthers. During early stages of the operation, an effort should be made to locate and brief a suitable police employee to play the role of the alleged disgruntled employee.

6. A wide variety of alleged authentic police or FBI material could be carefully selected or prepared for furnishing to the Panthers. Reports, blind memoranda, LIMs, and other alleged police or FBI documents could be prepared pinpointing Panthers as police or FBI informants; ridiculing or discrediting Panther leaders through their ineptness or personal escapades; espousing personal philosophies and promoting factionalism among BPP members; indicating electronic coverage where none exists; outlining fictitious plans for police raids or other counteractions; revealing misuse or misappropriation of Panther funds; pointing out instances of political disorientation; etc. The nature of the disruptive material and disinformation "leaked" would only be limited by the collection ability of your sources and the need to insure the protection of their security.

Effective implementation of this proposal logically could not help but disrupt and confuse Panther activities. Even if they were to suspect FBI or police involvement, they would be unable to ignore factual material brought to their attention through this channel. The operation would afford us a continuing means to furnish the Panther leadership true information which is to our interest that they know and disinformation which, in their interest, they may not ignore.

Although this proposal is a relatively simple technique, it has been applied with exceptional results in another area of intelligence interest where the target was of far greater sophistication. The Bureau believes with careful planning this technique has excellent long-range potential to disrupt and curtail Panther activity.
Letter to SAC, San Francisco
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

San Francisco is requested to submit comments and/or recommendations relating to the implementation of this proposal.

Copies of this letter have been designated for Los Angeles for background and information purposes. Any suggestion Los Angeles may have for strengthening or further implementing the technique will be appreciated.
SAC, San Diego

Director, FBI

SECRET

PERSONAL ATTENTION

1-9-61

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER

COVERAGE PROGRAM

Reddetc 11-14-60, captioned "BICOV," which set

forth action taken on the recommendations made by the

10/24-25/60 Border Coverage Conference which was held at

San Diego. That letter in part advised that there is defini-

tely a place for consideration of some of the tactics

currently employed in the Counterintelligence Program on

the Border Coverage Program. It was pointed out that the

five border offices and the Legal Attache's Office should

be alert for the application of disruptive tactics and in

each case should clear with the Bureau in advance any

suggestions along these lines.

It is believed that sufficient time has now

elapsed for each office to have made an analytical study of

the situation faced by it and should be in a position to

furnish suggestions to the Bureau regarding means which

could be taken to apply counterintelligence tactics where

such tactics may be feasible.

In connection with the Counterintelligence-Border

Coverage Program, the best method for disorganizing the

Communist Party (CP) or related organizations is disruption

from within. This can be done through the use of selected infor-

nants under proper guidance to raise controversial issues within

the organization, to make legitimate criticisms of organizational

operations, activities, or lack of activities, or to bring out

into the open latent factionalism. In connection with this

program, it must be borne in mind that harassment is not to

be undertaken merely for the sake of harassment but in each

instance the tactics are to be undertaken with a specific

purpose in mind of disrupting communist and related

activities.

To implement this program, the following factors

should be considered:

1. El Paso
2. Mexico City
3. San Antonio
4. Phoenix
5. Albuquerque

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECRET

Page 207
Letter to SAC, San Diego
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

1. Selection of Informants - An analysis of the available informants should be made by each office with counterintelligence potential in order to select those informants who could be used for disruptive tactics. Each informant approved for use in connection with counterintelligence operation will, of course, have to be briefed individually on issues and controversial subjects which are to be raised. The informants should not be told that there is any over-all counterintelligence program or that disruptive tactics are being undertaken as a program but each informant should be given the impression that he is operating on an individual basis. Bureau approval must be obtained for the informants selected for this operation before the informant is briefed. In the event a review of the available informants shows that additional informants with counterintelligence possibilities are needed, plans should be laid to develop such informants, bearing in mind that this is a long-range program. The analysis should also include the adequacy of informants who can keep the office effectively advised of the internal operations of the organizations involved so that disruptive tactics can be undertaken on a sound basis.

2. Organizational Tactics - Consideration should be given to placing informants in each opposing faction of an organization to play one group against the other. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having anonymous telephone invitations issued to one group to attend open meetings of the other group; possible use of press contacts on a cutout basis to publicize derogatory remarks made by one group about the other. All border coverage agents in offices with counterintelligence potential should be alert for any tactics of this type which can be used.

3. Psychological Tactics - Consideration should be given to activities to disillusion CP leaders through anonymous mailing of literature regarding the weaknesses and inhumanitarian aspects of the communists either as a party or as individuals. The Mexico City Office particularly should be alert for any such newspaper
Letter to SAC, San Diego  
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

or magazine articles which could be clipped and mailed to susceptible communist leaders either in Mexico or in the border area. Mexico City should be prompt to furnish the Bureau sufficient copies of such articles for forwarding to interested border offices so that if desirable, arrangements can be made to have those articles anonymously mailed to selected communist leaders locally or from some other area in Mexico.

4. Neutralization of Individuals - Consideration should be given to tactics which would bring individual communist leaders under suspicion of being "imperialist agents," agents provocateur, etc., or generally discrediting them in the eyes of their fellow communists.

The Bureau will consider any well-conceived plan of causing disruption inside the CP or related organizations. In any counterintelligence operation, however, it is imperative that the office submitting the recommendations make sure that it will not jeopardize informant coverage or cause embarrassment to the Bureau.

Consideration should be given to the possibility of setting up thoroughly safe cutout arrangements for contacts with good newspaper sources through which information can be fed to the press regarding semipublic procommunist meetings or communist domination of front groups and through which information can be fed to the press to produce bad publicity relative to CP activities. Any proposals to set up such an arrangement must be submitted to the Bureau for approval before implementing them.

The Bureau appreciates the fact that Albuquerque, through absolute lack of communist activity, is not in a position to implement a counterintelligence program; however, a copy of this communication is being sent for information of that office.

The San Antonio Office has no organized communist group at the present time outside of Santa Apolonia. In considering whether disruptive tactics should be undertaken by that office at this time, San Antonio should give consideration
Letter to SAC, San Diego
Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

to the possibility that disruptive tactics in the Santa
Apolonia area at present might make coverage of the activities
of that group more difficult and any disruptive tactics
recommended should be conceived in a manner which will not
destroy the ability of San Antonio to continue to follow
communist activities in Santa Apolonia. Consideration should
be given, however, to the possibility of utilizing disruptive
tactics, through raising controversial issues, among the
various communist sympathizers or former CP members who are
still considered to be sympathetic to communism in order to
make sure that those groups continue to be disorganized.

In view of the ineffectual operations of the CP
in Juarez and the excellent informant coverage existing in
that group at the present time, it would appear that dis-
ruptive tactics among the CP cells in Juarez may not be
desirable. El Paso, however, should give consideration to
possible use of disruptive tactics, through raising contro-
versial issues and sharpening antagonisms, among the communist
sympathizers and former communists who are still sympathetic
to the communist movement in the Juarez area. El Paso should
also submit its observations regarding the possibility of
using informants to raise controversial issues in the Chihuahua
State Committee of the CP of Mexico. Any recommendations along
this line will be referred by the Bureau to the Legal Attache's
Office, Mexico, for comment to insure that such tactics will
not destroy existing informant coverage of that office in the
Chihuahua State Committee.

Both El Paso and San Antonio should give con-
sideration to the possibility of using discrediting techniques
in connection with individual communists who, although not
active members of the CP, are a threat to the security of
the United States in order to bring out into the open their
communist sympathies and destroy their potential usefulness
as Soviet intelligence agents or to neutralize their propa-
ganda value to the communist movement.

The Phoenix Office should give consideration to
the possible use of disruptive tactics to further divide the pro-
communist groups in their area and to sharpen antagonisms
without jeopardizing established informant coverage. In this
connection, consideration might also be given to possible
means of focusing public attention, through highly discreet
operations, on the communist affiliations and sympathies of
communist sympathizers or adherents.
Letter to SAC, San Diego

Re: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - BORDER COVERAGE PROGRAM

It would appear that the broadest use of counterintelligence tactics could be made by the San Diego and Mexico City Offices due to the highly-organized communist groups in the area covered by them. Those offices should, therefore, submit to the Bureau their analyses of the counterintelligence potential in their areas and particular attention should be paid to the possibility of undertaking such tactics in connection with the Popular Socialist Party as well as the CP and its related organizations. Any specific tactics decided upon, however, must be submitted to the Bureau for approval before implementation.

Both as to the instructions contained in this letter and prior instructions issued regarding counterintelligence operations in connection with the Border Coverage Program, you are cautioned that no action should be taken to implement such procedures without specific clearance and approval by the Bureau.

Attention is called to the fact that a new file has been opened at the Bureau, under file number for correspondence relating to this project. The following sub files will be designated at the Bureau for correspondence from the individual offices relating to this project:

- El Paso
- Phoenix
- San Antonio
- San Diego
- Mexico City

Correspondence directed to the Bureau by each office should utilize the appropriate file number indicated above. Each office should open a separate file concerning this project and appropriate steps should be taken to insure that the file is kept under fully secure conditions and is given only restricted accessibility so that it will be available only to appropriate personnel on a need-to-know basis.
TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM: R. D. Cotter
DATE: 2/3/69

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE - YUGOSLAV MATTERS)

This memorandum is to recommend mailing of flyers from the national organization "Temporary Committee for the Protection of Serbian Nationalism, Newark, New Jersey," to Serbian leaders throughout the U. S. and Canada.

Chicago believes that at the present time there is an apparent tide of feeling against and other co-conspirators in the bombing of Yugoslav establishments, 1/67.

Text of the flyer styled for Serbian nationalism appeal is designed to discredit those who capitalize on bombings to build their reputations in the Serbian communities; encourage Serbs to respect and adhere to the laws of the U. S.; and discourage future bombings of Yugoslav establishments. Chicago proposal has definite merit. Cost of purchase of material and postage of mailing of approximately 500 flyers is estimated not to exceed $100.

ACTION:

If you approve, attached letter will be sent Chicago, authorizing initiation of this operation including Chicago expenditure of up to $100 for postage and materials. Transition is being arranged separately with Laboratory and reproduction of flyer is being arranged with Exhibits Section of Administrative Division.

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
SAC, Chicago (105-8499)

2/5/69

SEX

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE
YUGOSLAV MATTERS)

Reurlet 1/3/69, one Xerox copy each of which
is being forwarded to the Newark and New York offices for
information.

Bureau approves your proposal and expenses are
authorized up to $100 for postage and purchase of necessary
materials.

You should now prepare your list of Serbians in
the U. S. and Canada to whom you intend to mail the flyer,
and advise bureau of the total number of intended recipients.
Translation of the proposed text in the Serbo-Croatian
language is being handled by the Translation Unit of the
Laboratory and reproduction of the flyer will be handled by
the Exhibits Section at the Bureau.

You will be advised of further instructions
subsequent to the completion of necessary arrangements at
the bureau. Bureau is most appreciative of your initiative
in proposing this operation which could serve to distance
future bombing of Yugoslav establishments and develop a
respect and adherence to U. S. laws throughout the Serbian
communities.

- Newark (Enclosure)
- New York (Enclosure)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

NW 65994 Docld:32989623 Page 213
Memorandum

TO: W. G. Sullivan

FROM: S. E. Donchoe

DATE: 07/3/61

SECRET

SUBJECT: CUBAN MATTERS - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

New York Office suggested a program be instituted to disrupt and harass pro-Cuban factions in U. S. through anonymous telephone calls, anti-Castro press releases and similar methods capitalizing on antidemocratic and dictatorial methods used by Castro regime and its proponents in this country. New York Office advised plan had merit but it should submit details for its separate plans to carry out over-all counterintelligence program.

a New York Office source, has furnished information indicating of July 26th Movement has been found dealing in his handling of Movement funds. An audit of his books revealed shortages and charges against him by the auditor resulted in a fight and icon of full trust in... by officials of the Movement in New York. New York Office has suggested we capitalize on this distrust by making anonymous telephone calls to Movement leadership indicative of general doubt and lack of confidence by Cubans in New York in the leadership of the Movement.

The July 26th Movement was scheduled for its annual registration with the Department of Justice on July 18, 1960. Audit of the Movement's books may have been in preparation for financial statement required in registration. Anonymous source in New York has revealed slipshod bookkeeping methods and while the shortage may not actually exist, it offers an excellent opportunity for us to capitalize on the allegations in order to throw leadership of Movement into disrepute. This disruptive action should not be limited just to the Movement in New York as such information could easily be quashed by the controlling leadership within the Movement. It should be appropriately "leaked" to Cuban officials at the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations and to the director of the Movement's activities in Havana. Such individuals may institute inquiry of town which will result in replacing current officials of the Movement. Such action would give us opportunity to interject our own live informers into positions of control of the Movement, allowing for more complete receipt of intelligence information received through the Movement's activities.
Memo Donohoe to Sullivan
Re: Cuban Letters - Counterintelligence Program

ACTION:

Attached for New York is a letter approving its proposed plan of anonymous telephone calls and instructing New York to make similar calls to Cuban United Nations officials and direct anonymous letter to Cuban director of July 26th Movement. New York instructed to be alert to introduction of its informants to positions vacated by anyone ousted as a result of this disruptive tactic.
Permission granted for your office to effect anonymous telephone calls mentioned in referenced letter provided full security of your source of information can be assured. Recontact and contact to determine degree of publicity given to date to Trujillo's Correlation in handling of July 26th Movement funds. If publicity of a degree indicating common knowledge among members of July 26th Movement, Bureau interposes no objection to course of action outlined in referenced letter.

Disruption of relations within July 26th Movement in New York should not be considered as ultimate objective of your counterintelligence program. To extend your program, anonymous telephone calls of the nature described in referenced letter should also be made to appropriate Cuban officials of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. You should also prepare an anonymous letter containing details of dereliction and indications of distrust of entire leadership of July 26th Movement in your area. This anonymous letter should be sent to: [Redacted] who is well known to you as the individual responsible for operation of the July 26th Movement in the United States. [Redacted] address in Cuba has been reported as being c/o Movimiento Revolucionario. 26 De Julio, Arrovo 27, Havana, Cuba. Subsequent to preparation of this letter in the Spanish language and prior to forwarding it to it should be furnished to the Bureau in its proposed mimeographed form for review and appropriate approval.

To fully realize all advantages of your plan, bear in mind necessity of having appropriate live informants in a position to volunteer to assume duties of any officials ousted from the Movement as a result of adverse publicity or disciplinary action originating within the Movement from Havana.
Anonymous calls made by your office in carrying out the approved program should be to select individuals only and should be spread over a suitable period of time to preclude the recipients thereof concluding that the callers are participating in a concentrated move to harass them.
SAC, San Juan

September 13, 1969

Director, FBI

GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL

Re San Juan letter 8-22-60 and New York letter
8-24-60.

The operation of a counterintelligence program against Puerto Rican organizations which seek Puerto Rico's independence through other than lawful, peaceful means is a very important endeavor. Such a program must be most discreet to preclude embarrassment to the bureau and must be conducted in a manner to insure that none of our confidential sources are jeopardized. No action should be taken to implement this program without specific bureau approval.

For the purposes of this program, San Juan and New York should consider the suggested tactics to be employed set out herein where it appears the tactic could be successfully employed in its locale.

It certainly appears that we could capitalize upon statements made by Puerto Rican subjects either in New York or in Puerto Rico where the individual makes inconsistent statements in two different localities. Where you have a Puerto Rican nationalist or communist leader engaging in activities or making statements in one location and subsequently making a report in another locality, which is at variance with his original activity or statement, the details should be furnished the bureau with your recommendation as to how it may be used to disrupt the activities of the individual.

Consideration should be given to circulation and publicity of any concerning affidavits, particularly letters of subversive Puerto Rican independence organizations, through local newspaper contacts where such data could disrupt the activities of the individual or the organization.
Letter to SAC, San Juan

Re: GROUPS SEEKING INDEPENDENCE FOR PUERTO RICO
(COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM)
SUBVERSIVE CONTROL

Both the San Juan and New York Offices should prepare, from public source information, a proposed timely article which would not jeopardize any informant or Bureau technique showing the nationalist and/or communist Puerto Rican independence organizations to be basically anti-Puerto Rico. These articles will be considered for publication through either Bureau contacts or contacts of the San Juan and New York Offices.

We should particularly direct our efforts against the leaders of the Puerto Rican organizations which advocate to any degree the use of force or violence to obtain Puerto Rico's independence. Consider the use of anonymous letters where disparaging statements are made by one leader against another.

The Agents concerned with this matter in the New York Office should review for ideas, techniques and tactics employed in the counterintelligence program against the Communist Party, USA.

It appears that in Puerto Rico the most immediate target of international communism is to influence the Federacion de Universitarios pro Independencia (FULI). San Juan should, therefore, consider tactics designed to lessen communist influence in the FULI and to lessen FULI's influence among the student body at the University of Puerto Rico.

Future communications should be captioned as above.

San Juan is being considered office of origin in this matter and copies of communications prepared by San Juan should be furnished the New York Office. New York should furnish San Juan copies of communications prepared by New York.
TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan  
FROM: Mr. F. J. Baumgardner  
DATE: October 4, 1966

SUBJECT: HOODWINK
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend a long-range counterintelligence program designed to provoke a dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra under the code name of Hoodwink.

OBJECTIVES:

A dispute between the Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra would cause disruption of both groups by having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking the other. This would help neutralize the activities of both groups which are detrimental to this country.

BACKGROUND:

La Cosa Nostra has no sympathy for the communists. The Communist Party, USA, and La Cosa Nostra come in contact with each other in the labor field where hoodlums operate businesses under "sweatshop" conditions. By making it appear that the Party is attacking hoodlum labor practices, over a period of time we could provoke a bitter dispute between the two organizations.

The New York Office has recommended a specific technique to initiate this program. This technique consists of anonymously forwarding one leaflet to a local La Cosa Nostra leader attacking the labor practices of one of his enterprises. The leaflet would ostensibly be published by a local Party unit. A note with the leaflet would give the impression that it has received wide circulation.

Enclosure
Memo to Mr. Sullivan
RE: HOODWINK

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be sent the New York Office authorizing the anonymous mailing of a spurious leaflet, allegedly from the Communist Party, USA, attacking La Cosa Nostra, to a local hoodlum leader as the first step in a long-range program to provoke a dispute between the two groups.
SAC, New York

Director, FBI

HOODWINK
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReNYJet captioned "Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS - C; (La Cosa Nostra)," dated 9/22/66. Hoodwink is the code word designated for this program.

New York is authorized to mail the anonymous letter and leaflet set out in relet as the beginning of a long-range program to cause a dispute between La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). To strengthen this alleged attack, add a last sentence to the leaflet: "Let's show the hoodlums and the bosses that the workers are united against sweatshops."

Take the usual precautions to insure this mailing cannot be associated with the Bureau and advise of tangible results. New York should also submit follow-up recommendations to continue this program.

The Party has been the subject of recent bombings, a typical hoodlum technique. Consider a spurious Party statement blaming the LCN for the bombings because of "Party efforts on behalf of the workers." This statement could be aimed at specific LCN members if appropriate.

In developing this program, thought should also be given to initiating spurious LCN attacks on the CPUSA, so that each group would think the other was mounting a campaign against it.

The Bureau very much appreciates New York's careful analysis of this program and the initial "low-key" technique suggested.