File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

621 THRU 637

639 THRU 650

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#: NW 65994
Date: 11/01/2021
Reference is made to this Bureau’s letter and memorandum dated September 3, 1975, which effected a partial delivery to the SSC of materials concerning Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., based on SSC requests dated July 8, 1975, and July 14, 1975.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of a memorandum in further partial response to the aforementioned two SSC requests.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum which is being delivered to you with a set of the materials which are being delivered to the SSC.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
ST. 100

NOTE: Single copies of the 7/8 and 14/75 SSC requests are attached to the file copy of enclosed LHM. Exact copies of the materials being furnished are maintained in the office of the SENSTUDY Project and a detailed record has been maintained of the materials furnished. Arrangements have been made for a representative of the Legal Counsel Division to deliver the attached memorandum as well as the materials being provided to the SSC.
Reference is made to the letter from the Chairman of the SSC to the Attorney General dated August 28, 1975, requesting delivery of previously-requested FBI materials pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Reference is also made to FBI memorandum dated September 3, 1975, which effected delivery of materials in partial response to SSC requests dated July 8 and 14, 1975.

Materials requested in Items 7 and 19 of the July 8, 1975, request and in Items 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the July 14, 1975, request are being delivered to the SSC with this memorandum.

It is noted that Item 7 of the July 14, 1975, request referred to the original of an FBI Director memorandum dated November 17, 1963, to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Deloach, Rosen, and Sullivan. No such memorandum could be located in FBI files. However, a similarly-addressed memorandum dated November 7, 1963, was located and is being furnished, as it apparently is the memorandum of SSC interest.

With respect to our response to Item 13 of the July 14, 1975, request, two additional documents (13a and 13b) are responsive but are included in response to Item 9 and therefore are not duplicated under Item 13.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
With respect to the excision of the material being delivered herewith, appropriate notations appear where
the excisions concern the protection of an informant or a
peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence operation. All
other excisions pertain to portions which actually summarize
or quote from conversations monitored during electronic
surveillance of Dr. King. In most cases, it can be ascertained
precisely which information in FBI files came from electronic
surveillances of Dr. King; however, there exist areas where
documentation of the information is not precise and no
accurate determination can be made. Therefore, no assurances
can be given that portions of the material being furnished
do not contain information developed as a result of electronic
surveillances of Dr. King.

In connection with any response where we have
included Xeroxes of newspaper articles or news releases, we
have not necessarily furnished all relating to a particular
matter which may be scattered throughout FBI files, but have
included those readily available and generally representative
of the media accounts of the particular matter. An example
would be those included in the response to Item 7 of the
July 8, 1975, SSC request.

The remaining materials in the SSC requests of July 8,
and 14, 1975, and August 20, 1975, (Part VII) are receiving
continuous attention and the results will be forwarded on
a periodic basis as soon as possible.

I - The Attorney General
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/16/74

K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Pursuant to Section III. A. of the notification attached to the Committee's letter of June 27, 1975, I am forwarding herewith an additional request for materials which relate to this matter.

The specificity of this request is not, of course, intended to limit in any way the agreement to come forward with all relevant information and materials, including documents, whether or not they have been brought to the Committee's attention or have been specifically requested by the Committee.

As Mr. Schwarz and I indicated in our meeting with you a few days ago, there are still outstanding several items relating to this matter which the Committee requested some time ago. This request should in no way delay further the availability of the previously requested items, and we would expect that individual items will be supplied whenever they become separately ready for submission.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
1. Access to all memoranda, airtels, teletypes, and any other materials which relate in any way to:

   a. The dissemination to any person or organization outside the executive branch of the federal government of information relating to Martin Luther King, Jr.

   b. Contacts between FBI personnel and persons outside the executive branch of the federal government concerning Dr. King.

2. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to meetings or proposed meetings between FBI headquarters and Dr. King, including, but not limited to:

   a. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting such proposals.

   b. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting invitations extended for such meetings.

   c. All correspondence and any other materials reflecting replies to any such invitations.

   d. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting briefings or preparations for such meetings.

   e. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such meetings.

   f. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting actions recommended or taken following such meetings.

3. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the FBI Director and reporters on November 18, 1964, including, but not limited to:

   a. Proposals, invitations, and replies for such meeting.

   b. Arrangements, briefings, and preparations for such meeting.

   c. Summaries or other evidence of what occurred at such meeting.

6-2-116-35-26-650
4. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Hight, James Farmer, and Jack Greenberg on November 19, 1964.

5. A copy of a November 19, 1964, telegram from Dr. King to Director Hoover, and all notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt of, said telegram.

6. All memoranda and any other materials relating to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. King on or about December 10, 1964.

7. All memoranda and any other materials relating to a banquet held in honor of Dr. King in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 25, 1965.

8. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on February 9, 1965.

9. All materials which formed the basis for the FBI's response dated June 12, 1975, captioned "Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance", which pertained to the travel of certain former agents of the FBI.

10. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to mail openings, and mail covers, with respect to Dr. King.

11. Access to all memoranda and any other materials which relate to electronic surveillance of Dr. King by state or local agencies or governments.

12. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the transfer of former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols to the Oklahoma City office of the FBI in June 1969.

13. All Forms FD 185 and attachments (including forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide for Investigative Personnel") from 1959 until retirement for:
a. Former Special Agent Robert R. Nichols.

b. Former Special Agent Alan Sentinella.

14. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to a letter from former Associate Director Clyde A. Tolson to newspaper columnist Carl T. Rowan concerning Dr. King, as reported in the *Washington Evening Star* on June 18, 1969.

15. All memoranda and any other materials relating to arrangements, briefings, and preparations for an interview of the FBI Director by any reporters for the *Washington Evening Star* on June 19, 1969; all memoranda and any other materials referred to, quoted from, or displayed during such interview; and all memoranda and any other materials reflecting what occurred at such interview.

16. Access to all materials upon which "Black Extremist" COINTELPRO summaries 16, 23, 63, and 156 were based.

17. An August 17, 1964, memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General John Doar to the FBI Director requesting a name check on certain individuals connected with the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

18. All memoranda and any other materials indicating or reflecting the inception of (a) all headquarters files and (b) all Atlanta, Georgia, field office files concerning Dr. King and concerning the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, together with the basis and authority for opening such files.

19. All memoranda and any other materials reflecting or relating to a 1963 meeting at FBI headquarters which was attended by former Special Agents Robert R. Nichols, Henry Rouse, William Sullivan, and other FBI personnel, and which related to Dr. King.

20. All memoranda prepared by the Internal Security Section and by former Assistant Director William Sullivan concerning the August 1963 March on Washington.
21. All memoranda and any other materials which reflect or relate to communications between the FBI Director or FBI headquarters personnel and the President or the President's staff in June 1969 concerning electronic surveillance of Dr. King.

N.B.: The Bureau's search for the above-requested materials should include a check of pertinent field office files as well as headquarters files.
K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Reference is made to your letter of July 8, 1975, transmitting certain materials relating to the Martin Luther King, Jr. monographs.

We would appreciate being supplied the following additional items in response to appendix v, Item 5, of the Committee's letter of May 14, 1975:

1. All materials reflecting the earlier recommendation and approval which are indicated in the first sentence of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

2. The identity of the author of the monograph which was attached to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

3. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates concerning the preparation of the 1963 monograph.

4. All materials which reflect or relate to the transmission of the monograph to Mr. Sullivan from subordinates prior to Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.

5. All materials which reflect Mr. Tolson's transmission to the Director of Mr. Belmont's memorandum of October 17, 1963.
6. All materials which reflect what transpired between the Director's approval of Mr. Sullivan's October 15, 1963 memorandum, and the transmission of Mr. Sullivan's October 18, 1963 memorandum to Mr. Belmont.


9. Access to the original memoranda from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont, dated:
   a. November 22, 1964;


11. All materials which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's instructions to subordinates in 1964 to revise the 1963 monograph.

12. All materials which transmitted for approval and/or signature the December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

13. All materials which reflect the approval of Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of:
   a. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 22, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;
   b. Recommendations contained in Mr. Sullivan's November 27, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Belmont;
   c. The December 1, 1964 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers.

14. Access to the second page (unexcised) of the December 17, 1964 memorandum from Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan.
15. All materials reflecting the approval of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Tolson, and/or the Director of the recommendation contained in Mr. Baumgardner's December 17, 1964 memorandum to Mr. Sullivan.

16. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the preparation of a memorandum captioned "Martin Luther King, Jr.: His Personal Conduct" which is referred to and was apparently enclosed with, the Director's December 21, 1964 letter to Senator Humphrey. (Please do not supply the memorandum.)

17. The identity of the author of the memorandum described in item #16 above and of any other similar memoranda.

18. All memoranda and any other materials which relate to the dissemination to Senator Humphrey of the memorandum described in item #16 and which relate to any other dissemination of the said memorandum or any other similar memorandum.


20. All material which reflect or relate to Mr. Sullivan's and/or Mr. C. D. Brennan's instructions to subordinates in 1967 to revise any earlier Martin Luther King, Jr. monograph.


22. All materials reflecting Mr. Tolson's suggestion, and the Director's agreement, that the King monograph be brought up to date in 1968, as indicated in the February 29, 1968 memorandum from Mr. G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
Addressed: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☑ LTR ☑ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 9/8/75

U.S. Senate Select Committee;
Caption of Document: 7/8/75 request Items 7 and 19
7/14/75 Request, Items 7,8,9 and 13

Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by: [Signature] Date: 9/8/75
Received by: [Signature]
Title: National Intelligence

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE REVIEWED BY [Signature]
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>BRIEFING</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TESTIMONY</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
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2. DATE PROVIDED

9/3/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

<table>
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4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

SSC letters 7/8/75 items 7 and 19 and 7/14/75 items 7/9/9 and 13

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

U

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Material relating to a banquet held in honor of Dr. King on 1/25/65 and materials relating to a 1963 meeting at FBI HQ which was attended by former Special Agents and other FBI personnel, which related to Dr. King. Copies of 11/17/63 and 2/5/64 memorandum from the Director to Mears, Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, Rosen and Sullivan; 11/22/64 and 11/27/64 memoranda from Sullivan to Belmont and materials which reflect the approval of the above two memorandum and a 12/1/64 letter from the Director to Mr. Moyers

62-116395

FMI: fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5/09/75

3791 (6-75)
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8, SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Michael E. Shaheen of the Department of Justice to Mr. John A. Mintz of this Bureau, captioned "Special Procedures for Processing SSC Requests Relating to Mail Surveillances," dated August 8, 1975, in which Mr. Shaheen referred to the pending SSC request for materials relating to mail surveillance and attached a copy of the special procedures to be followed in responding to this request.

Enclosed is a memorandum for forwarding to the Committee which responds to a request originally set forth as Item 4, Appendix B, of the May 14, 1975, SSC request and later amplified in a letter from Mr. John T. Elliff dated June 13, 1975.

Memoranda and documentation requested in paragraph (3) of the June 13, 1975, letter are being delivered with this communication.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

EWL:glw

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
The Attorney General

NOTE:

SSC made general request for information concerning FBI mail surveillances in a letter dated May 14, 1975. This request was later amplified in a June 13, 1975, letter. Response to this request was deferred since Department of Justice was conducting inquiry into mail openings by FBI. By memorandum August 8, 1975, Mr. Shaheen of the Department advised of special procedures which were to be followed in responding to mail opening requests. Since that time we have delivered all material relating to the "Hunter" project which was a mail surveillance by CTA. The LEM enclosed with our letter to the Attorney General contains additional responses concerning eight mail surveys involving interception and opening of mail by the FBI. It is noted that SSC request for names of all individuals who participated in mail openings is not being complied with. They are being told we do have such a list available although it is not considered complete. We feel access to such a list by SSC staff at this time should be specifically authorized by the Department.
SECRET

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
   (1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

September 3, 1975

UNITED STATES SHARED SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: MAIL SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to letter of June 13, 1975, from Mr. John T. Elliff
of the SSC staff to Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of
Justice. This letter amplifies prior request contained in Item 4, Appendix C,
of the SEC document request dated May 14, 1975, with specific reference to the
 technically referred to as "mail surveillance, including mail
covers and opening mail" and the utilization of this technique
"in internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-
intelligence matters, operations, or activities."

The requests in the June 13, 1975, letter were contained
in three sections generally covering (1) certain information
concerning all incidents of mail opening or mail intercept,
(2) certain information concerning all incidents of mail covers
that were specifically conducted by FBI employees, and (3) all
documents and memoranda which discuss, refer, or relate to the
origin, authorizations, conduct and transmission of, and
policies and procedures for, the mail openings, intercepts,
and covers identified above.

The following information is set forth responsive to
the three categories of request outlined above:

(1) In the category of mail opening or mail intercept
from January 1, 1969, until the present, we have identified eight
such surveys which were conducted by the FBI. Available infor-
mation responsive to the SEC request is set forth under the

Classifies by 6283
Except from FBS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐
62-116395 649 649 649 649
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Mail Surveillance

heading of the FBI code name for each such survey. Due to the nature of the records maintained for each of these surveys, you will note that the amount of information furnished may vary considerably from survey to survey. For instance, an appreciable volume of material and detail has been developed concerning the so-called Sam Survey since a control file was maintained and the operation was conducted over an approximate seven-year period, primarily in New York, but with some activity occurring in several other field divisions. The Sun Survey, on the other hand, was a much more narrow operation conducted only in New York for a one-year period. No control file or documentation was located for this program.

With respect to the request for the names of individuals who participated in the programs listed, retrievability of this information also presented a problem. FBI Headquarters' records were not helpful in this area. By canvassing appropriate field divisions, we have been able to reconstruct a partial list of such individuals. However, the nature of these records are such that the list cannot be considered complete. In view of this, and since mail surveillance by the FBI is the subject of an on-going investigation by the Department of Justice, involving matters which may invite sanctions of a criminal nature, a list is not being included in this response. At the direction of the Department of Justice, the list will be made available to SSC staff members.

A description of each of the eight mail surveys is set forth along with the physical location, the type of mail involved, and the purpose of the survey.

Z Coverage. The longest-running program began in Washington, D. C., in 1940, and involved the opening of mail addressed to various foreign embassies then of interest to the United States. At the conclusion of World War II, effort was then concentrated against Soviet and Soviet bloc nations. During the period of operation in Washington, the survey was discontinued at least once and it was completely discontinued in July, 1966. Z Coverage also existed in New York from about 1959 or 1960 until July, 1966, directed against the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. It was also operated against
SECRET

U. S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Mail Surveillance

the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York from
August, 1962, until May, 1965. The mail surveyed under this
program was that specifically addressed to the target establish-
ment and the objective of the program was to detect individuals
in contact with these establishments who might be attempting
to make contact for espionage reasons, for purposes of defecting
or who might be illegal espionage agents. The physical
location in Washington, D. C., was the Main Post Office and
selected mail was opened in FBI Headquarters' space. In
New York, mail directed to the Soviet Mission was intercepted
at the Lenox Hill Post Office and suspect letters were carried
to the New York FBI Office for opening. Coverage against the
Cuban Mission involved the Grand Central Post Office and later
the Lenox Hill Post Office in New York City.

Sam Survey. This survey was aimed at detecting the
presence of Soviet illegal agents in the United States so that
they might be neutralized. The survey was based on certain
indicators and mail addresses in European countries which we
had learned were being used in illegals' communications. The
survey was directed against outgoing airmail from the United States
being sent to certain European cities and countries, Mexico,
Japan, and Canada. The survey was operated in New York
(October 1, 1959, to July 22, 1966); Boston (February 27, 1962,
to September 13, 1962); WFO (August 20, 1961, to August 8,
1966); Detroit (May 14, 1962, to September 21, 1962); Los Angeles
(September 28, 1961, to November 17, 1962) and Seattle
(September 8, 1961, to February 8, 1963).

The following physical locations were used for the
opening or intercept of mail in this survey:

New York - FBI New York Office and U. S. Postal
facilities Idlewild (now J.F.K.) International Airport.

Boston - Airmail Facility, Logan International Airport,
East Boston, Massachusetts.

International Airport Branch, and Dulles International Airport
Branch.
SECRET

U. S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities (ESC)

Re: Mail Surveillance

Detroit - New Post Office.

Los Angeles - U. S. Post Office Airmail Facility,
Foreign Unit, and Los Angeles International Airport Airmail
Facility.

Seattle - U. S. Post Office Airmail Facility,
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.

Gus Survey. This survey was also aimed at detection
of Soviet illegal agents based on our knowledge that communications
were sent through regular mail channels to Soviet illegals by
intelligence personnel stationed in the United States in
official capacities. Type of mail covered was first-class mail
directed to certain target areas such as running house and
transient hotel districts. This program began in March, 1961, in
New York City and was operated with Post Office personnel until
August 22, 1961, at which time we began operating the program
utilizing Special Agents. The program was discontinued in
New York on March 9, 1962. The Detroit Office operated a
similar survey using Postal employees from October, 1961, until
February, 1962, at which time it was discontinued. The
San Francisco Office also operated a similar survey from

Facilities utilized in New York were the FBI Office;
Madison Square Post Office; Cathedral Substation; Planetarium
Substation; and the Ansonia Post Office, all New York City.
The Detroit Office survey was located in the Roosevelt Park

Sun Survey. This survey was a review of mail directed
to known intelligence officers of the Soviet and Soviet bloc
countries who were employees of the United Nations. The purpose
of the survey was to detect contacts of an intelligence nature
with these individuals since it was believed they were receiving
such mail using the secure cover of their United Nations
employment. The program was operated in New York only from
June 25, 1963, to June 26, 1964. The physical locations involved
SECRET

U. S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Mail Surveillance

In this survey were the New York Office of the FBI and the
Grand Central Post Office in New York City. The mail involved
was post cards and first-class letters.

Joe Survey. This survey was instituted to screen airmail from Miami to Cuba and Puerto Rico to Cuba in two specific
Cuban counterintelligence operations. The purpose of this survey
was to locate clandestine communications through the use of certain
indicators on the mail as well as a knowledge of the mail drops
in Cuba. The mail was intercepted at the Biscayne Annex Post
Office in Miami and suspected items opened at that location or
in some instances delivered to the FBI Laboratory at FBI Head-
quarters for special processing. First-class mail was primarily
involved.

Chiprop Survey. This survey screened first-class
mail entering the United States from the People's Republic of
China and Hong Kong. The operation began in September, 1956,
as a mail cover and mail opening began on August 1, 1956. The
program was finally terminated in January, 1966. Our original
introduction into this survey was in connection with the efforts
of the U. S. Customs Service, Restricted Merchandise Section,
to intercept communist propaganda being sent into the United States
from abroad. Later the Foreign Propaganda Unit, U. S. Customs,
was our point of contact, which subsequently moved to the Rincon
Annex Post Office. Ultimately, coverage was secured through
the Airmail Facility of the U. S. Post Office in San Francisco.
In all instances, mail selected for opening was processed at
the San Francisco FBI Office.

Chiclet Survey. This survey was initiated in October,
1963, in San Francisco and was concerned with airmail originating
in the United States and being sent to the People's Republic of
China. Coverage was maintained through the Airmail Facility of
the U. S. Post Office, San Francisco; however, all items selected
for opening were further processed at the San Francisco FBI Office.
The purpose of this survey was to obtain foreign counterintel-
ligence information concerning Americans residing in China who
were of interest to the FBI and other agencies of the U. S.
Government; to detect efforts to persuade scientists and others
of Chinese descent in the United States to return to China; and

SECRET

- 5 -
to develop information concerning economic and social conditions in communist China, as well as secure information concerning subjects in the United States of security interest who were corresponding with persons in communist China. This survey was discontinued in January, 1966.

Chican Survey. This survey was conducted from January to November, 1961, in San Francisco. It was aimed at screening first-class mail from Chinese individuals in Canada to Chinese individuals in the United States. The purpose for the survey was to detect Chinese communist intelligence operations directed against the United States. The exact location of the screening in this survey has not been determined from our records.

(2) A review of logical records at FBI Headquarters did not disclose any information concerning mail covers (apart from the surveys listed above) that were physically conducted by FBI employees whether alone or in cooperation with Postal Service employees. Canvas of selected field offices was unproductive of such information except that our Washington Field Division reported that mail covers, physically conducted by FBI employees, were maintained on various Soviet and Soviet bloc establishments in Washington, D. C., from about 1960 to September 30, 1964. We are currently attempting to develop additional information and documentation concerning these incidents and further advice will be forthcoming as soon as it is available.

(3) Documentation and memoranda requested concerning the surveys listed in this memorandum have been prepared, with the noted exception of the Sun Survey, and are being delivered to the Department of Justice under the delivery/access procedures agreed upon by the Department of Justice and the SSC.

1 - The Attorney General
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   - DOCUMENT
   - BRIEFING
   - INTERVIEW
   - TESTIMONY
   - OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
   - 9/8/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   - SSC
   - HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

   Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

   SSC letters 6/13/75 and 5/14/75, Appendix B, Item 4

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)
   - S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   Eight mail opening or mail intercept surveys from 1/6/60, until present have been identified, each survey set forth along with physical location, the type of mail involved, and the purpose of the survey.

   62-116395

FMK: fmk

ORIGINAL VIA LIASON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5. WOC/18
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

REFERENCES


INFORMANTS

PH T-1

PH T-2

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED

NONE

ACQUITALS

CASE HAS BEEN:

PENDING OVER ONE YEAR

PENDING PROSECUTION

OVER SIX MONTHS

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

Bureau (100-453233)(Rm)
1-MI
1-OSI
1-NISO
2-New York(Rm)
1-Philadelphia (100-51132)

Agency

ARMY, OSE, NTS, SS, RA-550

Request Recd.

10/26/70

How Fwd.

215

N:\ 5-8 NOV 4 1970 14717

COVER PAGE
This report is classified Confidential since it contains information from PH T-1 and T-2, informants of continuing value whose compromise would adversely affect the internal security of the United States.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1-MI, OSI, NISO

Report of: JOHN C. F. MORRIS  
Office: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Date: OCT 20 1970

Field Office File #: 100-51132  
Bureau File #: 100-453233

Title: WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Synopsis:
Principal activity of Women's Liberation Movement in Philadelphia has been celebration of Women's Rights Day on 8/26/70. Occasion used by organizations such as Socialist Workers Party and Communist Party to distribute literature. MAREEN/JASON, Socialist Workers Party member active in Women's Liberation Movement up to mid-September 1970. Address used by Women's Liberation Movement at 928 Chestnut Street shared by number of organizations.

PH T-1
September 22, 1970

Details: The Philadelphia Resistance Movement sponsored a meeting of a Women's Liberation Group at St. Mary's Church Parrish House in Philadelphia, Pa., on September 20, 1969. There were approximately sixty persons in attendance, of whom fifty were women. MAREEN/JASINSKI was among those in attendance along with young adults, college students, and some older women. The session which was to last all day had only a few persons present by noon and practically all had left by adjournment time in mid-afternoon.
MAREEN JASINSKI, also known as Jason, held a leadership position in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Philadelphia as of mid-September 1970.

PH T-1
September 14, 1970

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Executive Order #10450.

"The Daily World," an East Coast Communist Newspaper, in its issue dated March 17, 1970, contained an article concerning a discussion of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum held at the Hotel Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa. The topic of the discussion was the Women's Struggle for Liberation. Among the speakers was one MARY McCALL, who identified herself as from "Women's Liberation."

"The Distant Drummer," a local Philadelphia publication, carried an article on June 18, 1970, reporting the establishment of a Women's Liberation Center at 928 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia.

The District Committee of the Communist Party (CP) of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware met in Philadelphia on August 9, 1970. At that meeting an announcement was made that the CP would have a table at the rally of the Women's Liberation group to be held in Rittenhouse Square in Philadelphia on August 26, 1970. It was stated at this meeting that the CP had been invited to participate in the Women's Liberation Movement on that day.

PH T-2
August 19, 1970

JOY SOKEITOUS formed an organization in Philadelphia in early August 1970 called POWER, using the initials from the full title, Philadelphia Organization of Women for Employment Rights. SOKEITOUS was formerly a member of National Organization of Women (NOW); however, she left that organization because of dissension among its members.
While a member of NOW she reportedly met MAREEN JASON who went with SOKEITOUS into the new organization, POWER. JASON arranged for POWER to use the telephone number and address of 928 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, as a telephone listing and a mailing address. "New Mobe" also has an address at 928 Chestnut Street and JASON arranged for that organization to do the printing for POWER at a reduced rate.

SOKEITOUS and others began organizing immediately for a Women's Rights Day rally to be held in Rittenhouse Square, Philadelphia, on August 26, 1970. Their only purpose was to call attention to the need for equal employment rights for women. Most of the details of organizing the rally were taken over by JASON since SOKEITOUS and others did not have the time to devote to it and lacked the necessary organizational ability.

When SOKEITOUS and her associates arrived at Rittenhouse Square for the rally on August 26, 1970, they were shocked to see organizations such as the CP, the SWP, and the Black Panther Party (BPP) all represented there and all distributing literature.

A characterization of the BPP is contained in the appendix hereafter.

JASON made no attempt to conceal from the members of POWER that she was a member of the SWP and stated that she would be departing for Houston in the near future.

The fourth floor at 928 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, where POWER has its headquarters, is shared by a number of organizations to whom the telephone and rental expenses are prorated. These other organizations are the Gold Flower Brigade, Professional Women's Caucus, Homophile Action League, Temple University Women, Pennsylvania Association to Repeal Abortion Law, Women United for Abortion Rights, and several other groups for the study of racism, anthropology, and sex.

Telephones at the address are answered by volunteers and each organization has a folder in which its mail is placed
and later picked up by someone from the specific organization. The Philadelphia Resistance prints material for all of the organizations at reduced rates.

PH T-3
August 31, 1970
September 14, 1970

The Philadelphia Resistance, in its literature, describes itself as a community of young Americans fighting the draft.

Literature distributed by NOW describes the organization as a new civil rights group pledged to work actively to bring women into full participation in the main stream of American Society exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men. Its program calls for the following:

Passage of the Equal Rights Amendment now before Congress
Abolition of Laws penalizing abortion
Revision of State Protective Laws for Women
Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 7
Campaign to change the mass media's portrayal of women
Participation of women on an equal basis with men in Church life and practice
Greater participation of women in programs against poverty
Revision of Divorce and Alimony arrangements
Revision of Social Security laws.
PH 100-51132

Provision of Maternity rights
Expansion of Child care services
Revision of tax laws
Full participation of women in political activities
Revision of the Education System

NOW literature shows their address as Post Office Box 15505, Philadelphia, Pa., telephone JE 3-7474.

Literature distributed by POWER describes its goals as follows:

Equal pay for equal work
Equal job and promotional opportunities
Equal training and educational opportunities

These goals are to be reached through education and political action through the democratic process.

POWER planned a leadership training course on understanding local politics to be held twice weekly for a period of four weeks, beginning September 14, 1970, as a part of their program to attain their stated goals.

A program announcement put out by Women's Liberation Center, 928 Chestnut Street, outlined a series of films, panel discussions, and symposiums for the month of August 1970. One of these, entitled "The Causes of Women's Oppression and the Paths to Their Liberation," was to feature NOW, the Socialist Labor Party, SWP, CP, Gold Flower Brigade, and Independent Women's Liberationists.

Those desiring further information were advised to call the Women's Liberation Center at WA 3-8330, and to ask for MAREEN or NANCY.
Literature distributed at the Women's Rights Day in Rittenhouse Square on August 26, 1970, included the following:

A pamphlet issued by Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) to end the war in Vietnam, 928 Chestnut Street, entitled "Women Unite Against the War."

A pamphlet issued by the Young Socialist Alliance entitled "Women's Liberation - A Socialist View."

"A Woman's Declaration of Liberation from Military Domination," issued by Women's Strike for Peace.

A characterization of the SMC and Young Socialist Alliance is contained in the appendix hereto.
BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) 
aka 
Black Panther Party for Self Defense

According to the official newspaper of the BPP, the BPP was started during December, 1966 in Oakland, California, to organize black people so they can take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of the black community. It was organized by BOBBY G. SEAL, BPP Chairman, and HUEY P. NEWTON, Minister of Defense, BPP.

The official newspaper, called "The Black Panther", regularly states that the BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program to end oppression of the black people. Residents of the black community are urged to arm themselves against the police who are consistently referred to as "pigs" who should be killed.

The newspaper, in its issue of September 7, 1968, had an article by the then Minister of Education, GEORGE MURRAY. This article ended with the following:


The BPP newspaper, issue of October 5, 1968 had an article introduced with the following statement: "We will not dissent from American government. We will overthrow it."

DAVID HILLIARD, Chief of Staff, BPP, in a speech at the San Francisco Polo Field on November 15, 1969, said "We will kill Richard Nixon."

DAVID HILLIARD, in the "New York Times", issue of December 13, 1969 was quoted as follows: "We advocate the very direct overthrow of the government by way of force and violence."

In the issue of April 25, 1970, the BPP newspaper had an article by Minister of Culture EMORY DOUGLAS as follows:
"The only way to make this racist US government administer justice to the people it is oppressing, is...by taking up arms against this government, killing the officials, until the reactionary forces...are dead, and those that are left turn their weapons on their superiors, thereby passing revolutionary judgement against the number one enemy of all mankind, the racist U. S. government."

The BPP Headquarters is located at 1046 Peralta Street, Oakland, California. Branches of the BPP, and Committees to Combat Fascism, under control of the BPP, have been established in various locations in the USA.
STUDENT MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE, aka
Student Mobilization Committee to
End the War in Vietnam;
National Student Mobilization Committee

A source advised on May 16, 1969 that the Student Mobilization Committee originally grew out of the National Student Strike for Peace conference held in Chicago, Illinois, on December 28-29, 1966, which resulted in a call for massive antiwar demonstrations in New York City and San Francisco, California, on April 15, 1967. The National Student Strike for Peace was originally called by the Communist Party. Divisions arose between elements of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), culminating in a takeover by the SWP element in the Summer of 1968 and the Communist Party element withdrawing. Source further advised the Student Mobilization Committee locally and nationally is controlled by the SWP and its youth arm, Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), as evidenced by their participation in Student Mobilization Committee functions and their leadership role played in the Student Mobilization Committee.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A report by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, dated March 31, 1967, entitled, "Communist Origin and Manipulation of Vietnam Week (April 8-15, 1967)" stated that the Student Mobilization Committee and the April 15, 1967 anti-war demonstrations were communist dominated and inspired.

A second source on April 3, 1969 made available a copy of "The Student Mobilizer" dated April 5, 1969, which was self-described as being published by the National Office of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 857 Broadway, Room 307, New York, New York 10003. In this issue the aims of the Student Mobilization Committee were set forth as: Bring the GIs home from Vietnam now; end campus complicity with the war; and win self-determination for Vietnam and Black America.

In this issue of the publication, the Student Mobilization Committee pledged itself to organize high school students, college students, future draftees, GIs and all young people to fight until every last GI is brought home.
A third source on August 5, 1969 advised that the Student Mobilization Committee currently occupies Room 307 at 857 Broadway, New York, New York.

A characterization of YSA is attached hereto.
YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

A source advised on May 15, 1969 that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) maintains its national headquarters at 41 Union Square West, New York, New York, and has as its official publication the "Young Socialist." The YSA is the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and has been described by the SWP as the main recruiting ground for the SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Title       WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Character   INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Reference   Philadelphia report of SA JOHN C. F. MORRIS, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

Insufficient contact has been had with PH T-3 to determine reliability.

-12-
1:34 PM URGENT 10-22-70 KLL
TO DIRECTOR (100-453233)
ALBANY
ALEXANDRIA
BUFFALO
Baltimore
New Haven
New York (100-164665)
PITTSBURGH
WASHINGTON FIELD (100-49208)
FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-51132)

WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (WLM); IS - MISCELLANEOUS.

OO: NEW YORK.

RE WFO TELETYPING TO THE BUREAU DATED TEN TWENTY-ONE LAST.
FOR INFORMATION OFFICES NOT RECEIVING REFERENCED TELETYPING,
WFO ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

RELIABLE SOURCE STATED ON TEN TWENTY-ONE LAST THAT WLM
REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON, DC, DISTRIBUTING LEAFLET TO
SELECTED MEMBER OF WLM TO ATTEND SPECIAL MEETING AT FELLOWSHIP
FARM IN LIMERICK, PA., TEN TWENTY-THREE -- TWENTY-FIVE NEXT
MEETING IS FOR PEOPLE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING NEED FOR ACTIVE

END PAGE ONE
REVOLUTION, "BECAUSE FOR AN OPPRESSIVE, RACIST, SEXIST SOCIETY TO REALLY CHANGE WITHOUT REVOLUTION IS IMPOSSIBLE." INVITATION CONTAINS DIRECTIONS TO LOCATE FELLOWSHIP FARM.

RECEIVING OFFICES ENCOURAGE INFORMANTS WHO MAY HAVE RECEIVED INVITATIONS TO ATTEND. LOCATION OF FELLOWSHIP FARM KNOWN TO PHILADELPHIA.

NO PHILADELPHIA INFORMANTS HAVE RECEIVED INVITATIONS.

PHILADELPHIA INSTITUTING EISUR

END

MKA FBI WASH DC
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-453233)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-51132) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
(WLM)
IS - MISCELLANEOUS
(00: New York)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Re WFO teletype to the Bureau dated 10/21/70, and
New York teletype to the Bureau dated 10/22/70.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of a letter-
head memorandum dated 10/27/70, for referral to Legat, Ottawa,
regarding Quebec license number observed at the WLM meeting.

For information of offices not previously informed,
WFO teletype stated that a source had provided a leaflet con-
cerning a WLM meeting at Fellowship Farm in Limerick, Pa.,
10/23/70 through 10/25/70. Leaflet distributed to selected
WLM members stating the meeting was for people interested in
discussing need for active revolution "because for an oppressive,
racist, sexist society to really change without revolution is
impossible." Attendees told to contact New York telephone number
212-799-1008. Directions given to Fellowship Farm.

Janet destroyed 745 Legat Ottawa

5 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM) For Action
3 - Albany (RM)
2 - Baltimore (RM)
2 - Charlotte (RM)
2 - Indianapolis (RM)
2 - Newark (RM)
2 - New York (100-164665) (RM)
2 - Springfield (RM)
2 - WFO (100-49208) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
New York teletype stated leaflet was distributed at Women's Center, 36 West 22nd Street, New York City, captioned, "About a Meeting of Revolutionary Women for..." Leaflet stated in part, "Some of the suggestions we've discussed for raps are things like - what do we really mean when we say women's revolu-
tion - what are its priorities - what are the pros and cons of collective living for women - are we ready for a group offensive - what forms can it take?..." and "because we are committed to social revolution (underlining supplied) meaning we know that in our form of oppressive, racist, sexist society, any real change without revolution is impossible."

New York teletype further stated that a reliable source advised on 10/22/70, that one JEANETTE at the given New York telephone number had said that "Revolutionary Women's Convention" was being held on a farm in Limerick, Pa. The telephone number PA 6-3008 in Limerick was given for transportation to the farm. JEANETTE said the announcement for the convention was made at a WLM meeting in New York City on 10/12/70.

On 10/22/70, Lt. GEORGE FENCL, Civil Disobedience Unit, Philadelphia, Pa., Police Department, had one of his police women make a pretext telephone call to the New York number. She talked to a woman who identified herself as LEE. LEE said each attendee should expect to contribute $1.00 and should bring food and wine. She said two films would be shown, one on abortion and the other on an actual sex act being performed. The film on the latter subject was to be narrated by one of the women who participated who would describe her feelings at the time. They also planned a guerilla theater called, "Burning City." LEE said to the caller that since the caller was from Philadelphia would she contact the "Plain Dealer" to let them know about this affair and to have them promote it. The "Plain Dealer" is a Philadelphia underground newspaper.

According to an article appearing in the "Pottstown Mercury," Pottstown, Pa., on 6/25/51, a 120 acre farm near Fagleysville, Pa., had been purchased by a national organization to ease racial and religious intolerance and to study other social problems. The farm to be called Fellowship Farm had been owned by a wealthy eccentric Pottstown citizen.

Also referred to as Fellowship House, according to the article, the farm would be open to students of junior and senior high school age who had used the area in the past for meetings. Fellowship House is sponsored by the Society of
Friends but also supported by leaders of all denominations, according to the article. There were at that time 15 Fellowship Houses in the country following the establishment of the movement in 1931. Fellowship House acquired Fellowship Farm, according to a spokesman, "because we simply overflowed all available places in Philadelphia."

SA W. RICHARD THIRLWELL and SA JOHN C. F. MORRIS surveyed the area at Fellowship Farm in the early hours of 10/25/70, and cruised through at first light. They obtained the license numbers from cars parked in the parking area, observing a number of people sleeping in sleeping bags on the ground near the cars. Following this they gave a ride to a white female, age about 55, who said she was an early riser and was out looking for coffee and cigarettes. Agents took her to the Limerick Diner for breakfast. She later introduced herself as PHYLLIS SCHUYLER, nee Harlow, from New York City. She said members of WOMEN'S LIBERATION had gathered at the farm for a weekend of discussions. Agents listened to her talk for about 40 minutes without revealing their identity. She talked incessantly about women's rights, exploitation, unfair salary schedules, the need for better, cheaper medicine for all, the evils of military industrial complex which contributes to the exploitation of women, the necessity for ending the stigma attached to homosexuals of both sexes, and the need to erase social pressures against illegitimate children.

Mrs. SCHUYLER seemed to be hung up on sex. She said there were a number of lesbians at the camp who had put up posters "Lesbians Unite." The avowed lesbians shared quarters somewhat separated from the other women. Mrs. SCHUYLER has an aversion to lesbians, she said, but she does not think they should be penalized for their sexual habits.

She estimated that there were 200 to 300 people in attendance at the conference. (This is very doubtful.) She said they had shown a film on the evening of 10/24/70, but she had not seen it. She understood it was newsreel type footage. Some of the women also put on a theater presentation on the subject of exploitation, intending to illustrate how the upbringing of children results in attitudes which cause them to exploit each other.

She said the discussions and meetings held on Saturday impressed her as mainly bickering and yelling sessions with all of the women trying to talk at once and the moderator
unable to maintain order. They put forth no clear-cut program, arrived at no conclusions, and as of Sunday morning, appeared to be no more cohesive than they had been when they first arrived at the camp. Mrs. SCHUYLER said she personally was not sure what she wanted, and she thought many of the other women felt the same way. She regarded the whole thing as an opportunity for a pleasant weekend in the country among other females of more or less common interests.

Agents took Mrs. SCHUYLER back to the farm, secured additional license numbers, and observed a number of women of various ages who appeared to be just getting up.

Mrs. SCHUYLER said that each attendee had contributed $1.00 and had brought some food. She thought the $1.00 might have been to help pay some of the overhead and to pay kitchen help which was provided to prepare the meals. She said Fellowship Farm is owned by the Quakers and that they made the farm available to groups who desired to study means of bringing about social improvements.

LEADS

GENERAL

Receiving domestic offices have motor vehicle records reviewed for information on registered owners of cars from your division. Advise interested office if residence not covered by your division.

Inform New York and Philadelphia of results, with information available from your files on the individuals.

ALBANY

AT ALBANY, N.Y.: At Department of Motor Vehicles, check the following New York licenses:

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</table>
PH 100-51132

AT MONTPELIER, VT.: At the Motor Vehicle Department, check the following Vermont licenses:

T8611
V7518

BALTIMORE

AT GLEN BURNIE, MD.: Check Department of Motor Vehicles on Maryland license GR5632.

CHARLOTTE

AT RALEIGH, N.C.: Check Department of Motor Vehicles on North Carolina license XKF669.

INDIANAPOLIS

AT INDIANAPOLIS, IND.: Check Commissioner of Motor Vehicles on Indiana license 3B856.

NEWARK

AT TRENTON, N.J.: Check Commissioner of Motor Vehicles on New Jersey license SYV497.

SPRINGFIELD

AT SPRINGFIELD, ILL.: Check Auto File Section, Office of Secretary of State, on Illinois license FH152.

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: At Department of Motor Vehicles, check following District of Columbia licenses:

629758  725367
818090  800121

PHILADELPHIA

Pennsylvania licenses 64N483 and CK61787 were observed. This is being handled separately.

AT LIMERICK, PA.: Determine identity of subscriber to Limerick telephone number FA 6-3008.
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

A conference of members of the Women's Liberation Movement was held on a farm near Limerick, Pennsylvania, during the weekend of October 23 through 25, 1970. Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed license numbers on automobiles parked in the area where the conference was being held. Among them was Ottawa license 9A6952.
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

LEAD

Please determine registered owner of car bearing Ottawa license 9A6952 and provide any information already on record with respect to this individual.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE
NEW YORK

OFFICE OF ORIGIN
NEW YORK

DATE
3/12/71

INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
8/15/70 - 3/2/71

TITLE OF CASE
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

REPORT MADE BY
J. ROBERT NEWTON

CHARACTER OF CASE
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

REFERENCE:
New York report of SA J. ROBERT NEWTON, dated 8/14/70.


ADMINISTRATIVE:

Concerning information included in this report about women's conferences in Canada with Indochinese women, March 24 - April 7, 1971, a case file has been opened in the NYO captioned "PROJECTED CONFERENCES IN CANADA WITH INDOCHINESE WOMEN - MARCH 24 - APRIL 7, 1971; IS - MISCELLANEOUS (NYfile 100-171548)".

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED
NONE

CONVICTED
NONE

AUTO.
NONE

FUG.
NONE

FINES
NONE

SAVINGS
NONE

RECOVERIES
NONE

ACQUITTED
NONE

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR
YES
NO

PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS
YES
NO

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW:

Bureau (100-453233)(RM)
1 - Baltimore (INFO)(RM)
1 - Boston (100-40255)(INFO)(RM)
2 - Los Angeles (RM)
1 - New Haven (157-1498)(INFO)(RM)
1 - Newark (100-51168)(INFO)(RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100-51132)(RM)
1 - San Francisco (100-62721)(INFO)(RM)
2 - New York (100-164665)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency
DIA

Request Rec'd.

Date Fwd.
3/11/71

How Fwd.

By

Notations

A-
NY 100-164665

ADMINISTRATIVE: (cont'd)

The SAS who observed demonstrations set forth in this report on the dates indicated were:

√ 8/26/70 (At City Hall) HENRY E. NAEHLE and J. ROBERT NEWTON

√ 8/26/70 (At 59th Street and Fifth Avenue and Bryant Park, NYC) VINCENT A. ALVINO, JAMES T. BURNETT, RAYMOND F. MOHR and EUGENE F. O'NEILL

√ 12/2/70 WILLIAM H. BATTS and J. ROBERT NEWTON

√ 12/12/70 JOHN W. MINOGUE and J. ROBERT NEWTON

Case files have been opened and investigation instituted regarding all persons listed in this report as officers of the Women's Liberation Center of New York as well as DEBORAH ENSIGN (listed as a paid staff member of WLC).

It is noted that WLC bank account is with the Amalgamated Bank of New York, whose records are no longer available to the NYO because of a law suit brought against the bank and the FBI by the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee.

This report is classified "Secret" to protect the sensitive nature of the relationship between NY T-15 INFORMANT with the Revolutionary Union (RU) as specified by the CITY Office.

The attached report is not being disseminated to the local intelligence agencies in view of SAC letter 71-4, dated 1/26/71. It is felt that information contained herein is not of sufficient interest to Army, Navy or Air Force to warrant dissemination to these agencies.
NY 100-164665

**ADMINISTRATIVE:** (cont'd)

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in this report have been included where they are available.

Because of the extensive information furnished by **INFORMANT** regarding WIM organization and activities, two T symbols, NY T-1 and NY T-3 are being used to further conceal the identity of this informant.

**INFORMANTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity of Source</th>
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-C- COVER PAGE
NY 100-164665

INFORMANTS: (cont'd)

Identity of Source

[CONFIDENTIAL]

NY T-4
NETTIE DI MAURO
(Panels Source)

NY T-5
Detective WALTER KIRBY
SSD, NYC
New York, New York
(by request)

NY T-6
Detective JOHN JUDGE
SSD, NYC
New York, New York
(by request)

NY T-7
Detective FRED JENOUR
SSD, NYC
New York, New York
(by request)

NY T-8
INFORMANT

NY T-9
Detective MICHAEL O'CONNOR
SSD, NYC
New York, New York
(by request)

NY T-10
INFORMANT

File Where Located

100-164665-660
-898
-899

100-164665-660

100-164665-660

100-164665-660

134-17781A-19

100-164665-823

100-164665-823

+D+

COVER PAGE
NY 100-164665

INFORMANTS (cont'd)

Identity of Source

NY T-11
Detective HENERETTA LANGE,
SSD, NYPD
New York, New York

NY T-12
Detective FRANK MURPHY
SIS, NYPD
New York, New York
(by request)

NY T-13
INFORMANT

NY T-14
INFORMANT

NY T-15
INFORMANT

NY T-16
INFORMANT

Used to characterize RUTHANN MILLER

Used to characterize WENDY REISSNER

Used to characterize RACHAEL TOWNE

File Where Located

100-164665-823

100-164665-898

100-164665-856

100-164665-612

100-164665-1815(1)

100-164665-690

100-164665-630

134-9382-1443

134-9382-1450

100-164665-829

134-17094A-341

COVER PAGE
NY 100-164665

INFORMANTS: (cont'd)

Identity of Source

NY T-19
INFORMANT

NY T-20
INFORMANT

NY T-21
INFORMANT
Used to characterize
DIANNE DONGHI

NY T-22
INFORMANT
Used to characterize
JOSEPH GRUBISI [DIANNE DONGHI]
Intelligence Division
Chicago, Ill. PD
(by request)

NY T-23
INFORMANT
Used to characterize
CATHERINE HENRY

NY T-24
INFORMANT
Used to characterize
BARBARA REILLY

File Where Located

134-12736A-127
100-164665-708

134-6858A-787
100-164665-876

Two copies of this report are being designated for the Offices requiring investigation (Los Angeles and Philadelphia) based on information that WLM organizations are active in these Divisions. One copy of this report is being furnished to other Offices for information purposes.

LEADS

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. Will conduct appropriate
NY 100-164665

LEADS (cont'd)

investigation as set forth in Section 87E of the Manual of Instructions, based on information in this report and information in referenced New York letter to Los Angeles and furnish results of investigation in report form.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. Will report on Women's Conference held in the Philadelphia Division, October 23 - 25, 1970 and conduct any additional investigation pursuant to Section 87E, Manual of Instructions and furnish report to Bureau and New York.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow activities on subject organization.

-Cover Page-
Synopsis:

Women's Liberation Movement (WLM), NYC maintains an Office (New York Women's Liberation Center) (WLC) at 36 West 22nd Street, NYC. Although officers are listed for WLC for bank account purposes, there are no officers of WLM in the usual sense. Paid staff member of WLC and WLC Steering Committee members set forth. WLM is not a membership organization however, WLC, NYC maintains a mailing list of approximately 3,000 names. Listing of NYC area WLM groups set forth. Meetings and activities of NY area WLM groups set forth. Affiliation and/or sympathy with other organizations and contact with foreign women's groups set forth.
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NR001 PH CODE AM NITEL 4-9-71 JEW
TO DIRECTOR
NEW YORK (100-172646)
ALEXANDRIA
WASHINGTON FIELD
FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-52802)

Liberation Movement

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM TO DIRECTOR, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

SOURCE AND INFORMANTS AT PHILADELPHIA UNABLE TO FURNISH ANY INFORMATION ON ALLEGED WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL TEN NEXT. ESTABLISHED SOURCE AT BUS COMPANIES, PHILADELPHIA, ADVISED NO BUSES LEASED FOR THAT DATE FOR WOMEN'S TRIP. PHILADELPHIA HAS ALERTED INFORMANTS AND WILL FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

END

100-455252-127
12 APR 24, 1971

56 APR 19 1971
Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-453233)  DATE: JUL 16 1971
FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-51132) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (WLM) IS - MISC.
(CO: New York)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE relecled by 2PAM

Re New York report of SA J. ROBERT NEWTON dated 3/12/71; and Bureau communication to Philadelphia on 6/17/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM dated as above. Two copies are enclosed for New York.

The LHM is being classified confidential as it contains information furnished by confidential sources, the disclosure of whom could impair their future effectiveness.

Records of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Harrisburg, Pa., as reviewed on 4/1/71, revealed the following information regarding license numbers observed at the Fellowship Farm Conference on 10/25/70.

Pennsylvania 64N-483
    DAVID A. SELTER
    429 Semple Street, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Pennsylvania CK61787
    RICHARD L. BARTHOLO

A review of captioned file reveals that there is no active chapter or organization of the Women's Liberation Movement in Philadelphia. In view of the above, no further investigation is being conducted in Philadelphia UACB.

Identities of sources utilized in the LHM are maintained on Philadelphia copy.

1 - Bureau (100-453233) (Encls. 10) (RM)
2 - New York (100-164665) (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (100-51132)
EAB: pad
(5)
PH 100-51132

First Source is Officer DIXIE GILDON, Intelligence Unit, MPD, WDC.

Second Source is Informant

Third Source is Lieutenant GEORGE FENCL, CD Unit, Philadelphia PD.

Fourth Source is SA JOHN C. F. MORRIS, Philadelphia Division.
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONFERENCE
HELD AT FELLOWSHIP FARM, LIMERICK, PA.,
ON OCTOBER 23-25, 1970

Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) is made up of
loosely structured groups throughout the country, which
groups have been publicly described as advocating complete
equality for women.

On October 21, 1970, a reliable source advised that
Betty Garman, WLM representative in Washington, D.C., had dis-
tributed a leaflet to selected WLM members to attend a special
meeting at a "Fellowship Farm" in Limerick, Pa., on October

The leaflet stated the meeting was for people in-
terested in discussing the need for an active revolution
"because for an oppressive racist, sexist, society to really
change without revolution is impossible." The leaflet advised
those planning to attend to contact New York telephone number
212-799-1008 and furnished directions to the farm.

On October 22, 1970, a second reliable source advised
that a leaflet was distributed at Women's Center, 36 West 22nd
Street, New York City, concerning a meeting of revolutionary
women. The leaflet furnished directions to a "Fellowship Farm"
in Limerick, Pa.

On October 22, 1970, a third reliable source stated

This document contains neither recommenda-
tions nor conclusions of the FBI. It is
the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not
to be distributed outside your agency.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONFERENCE
HELD AT FELLOWSHIP FARM, LIMERICK, PA.,
ON OCTOBER 23-25, 1970

A phone call was made on October 22, 1970, to New York phone number 212-799-1008. The phone was answered by a woman who identified herself as Lee. Lee stated that each attendee should contribute $1.00 and should bring food and wine. She stated two films would be shown, one on abortion, and the other on an actual sex act being performed. A guerrilla theater called "Burning City" was also being planned.

On October 25, 1970, a fourth reliable source was in the area of Fellowship Farm during the early morning hours and spoke with a white female, age about 55, who identified herself as Phyllis Schuyler from New York City. This woman told source that members of Women's Liberation had gathered at the farm for a weekend of discussions. She talked incessantly about women's rights; exploitation; unfair salary schedules; the need for better, cheaper medicine for all; the evils of the military industrial complex which contributes to the exploitation of women; the necessity for ending the stigma attached to homosexuals of both sexes; and the need to erase social pressures against illegitimate children. She advised there were a number of lesbians at the farm who had put up posters "Lesbians Unite" and that the lesbians shared quarters somewhat separated from the other women.

Mrs. Schuyler estimated that there were 200 to 300 people in attendance at the conference. She stated that a film had been shown on the evening of October 24, 1970, but that she had not seen it. Some of the women also put on a theater presentation on the subject of exploitation, intending to illustrate how the upbringing of children results in attitudes which cause them to exploit each other.

She said the discussions and meetings held on Saturday impressed her as mainly bickering and yelling sessions with all of the women trying to talk at once and the moderator unable to maintain order. They put forth a no clear-cut program; arrived at no conclusions; and, as of Sunday morning, appeared to be no more cohesive than they had been when they first arrived. Mrs. Schuyler said she personally was not sure what she wanted, and she thought many of the other women felt the same way. She regarded the whole thing as an opportunity for a pleasant weekend in the country among other females of more or less common interests.
The Bureau has been receiving numerous requests from the House and Senate Select Committees. As an indication of the number of requests being received, on September 3, 1975, we received four requests from the House Committee alone. Many of the requests involve complex research and review of Bureau materials, etc. We have recently experienced continuing pressure by both Committees to comply with their requests as quickly as possible. Additionally, we have received individual telephonic requests from Staff personnel of the Committees to expedite one particular request ahead of another; and in many instances, the request for expeditious handling of a particular item conflicts with the request of some other Staff Member.

The current guidelines with the Senate Select Committee require responses be prepared on short deadlines and it has reached the point with regard to the Senate Select Committee that it is not possible to comply with their requests within the stated deadlines. While every effort is being made to abide by the guidelines adopted by the Department and the Committee, the sheer volume of the material requested and the work involved makes compliance with these guidelines not possible.

SA Daly of this Division brought this matter to the attention of Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, and Shaheen stated he understood the problems being generated by the volume of requests being received by the FBI.
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: HOUSTUDY
SENSTUDY 75

Shaheen subsequently advised SA Daly that he had brought this matter to the attention of the Senate Select Committee orally in a conversation with Mark Gitenstein on 9/4/75 including the problems being encountered with individual Staff Members declaring that their particular request had a higher priority than any other particular request. Gitenstein told Shaheen that he would attempt to correct this problem.

In a subsequent conversation with Staff Member Mark Gitenstein, Gitenstein stated he had been informed by the Department of the problem the Bureau is encountering in responding within the deadlines set for various Committee requests. He indicated that he would take steps to make sure individual Staff Members do not on their own initiative attempt to place their request ahead of any other particular request without coordinating it with him. Additionally, he stated it was his intention to bring this to the attention of John Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Task Force of the Senate Select Committee, and suggest a meeting be held with Bureau representatives on Monday, 9/8/75, in an effort to solve this particular problem. If a meeting is held on that date, it is expected that a representative of the Intelligence Division, Legal Counsel Division and the Department will be in attendance.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

[Handwritten notes]

[Signature]

- 2 -
Reference is made to my letter to you captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," dated April 14, 1975, wherein a copy of "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, was enclosed. This position paper was also furnished to GAO pursuant to its request in confirmation with its review of FBI operations.

Enclosed herein is a copy of GAO letter dated July 3, 1975, which transmitted a list of questions posed by GAO concerning the paper of February 13, 1975, and a copy of the response to these questions.

It will be noted that responses are not provided to certain questions concerning the FBI Manual of Instructions and the paper dated May 18, 1972. The determination to omit responses to these questions was made during consultations with Mr. Alan S. Goldberg, GAO research staff, to facilitate an expeditious reply focused on those issues of primary importance to its analysis. We have agreed to provide responses to such questions if advised by GAO that further clarification is necessary.

Inasmuch as this material deals with jurisdiction, it is being forwarded for your information and review.
Mr. W. Raymond Wannall  
Assistant Director  
Intelligence Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Department of Justice

Dear Mr. Wannall:

On April 24, 1975, Director Kelley responded to our request regarding the Bureau's legal authority to conduct domestic intelligence operations by providing material concerning the collection, maintenance, dissemination, and destruction of information resulting from such investigations.

We have reviewed that portion of the Bureau's response relating to its authority to conduct domestic intelligence investigations and believe that some clarification of matters therein is necessary for us to better understand the Bureau's position. Accordingly, we would appreciate a written response to the enclosed questions which relate to the papers prepared by you and Messrs. Watters and Lacey; a portion of the Domestic Intelligence Division position paper, "Investigations of Subversion," May 19, 1972; and portions of Sections 87 and 122 of the FBI Manual. To facilitate analysis, we would appreciate if the Bureau could use the same format as the questions with any questions not requiring an answer because of a prior response being so noted.

Should you or your staff desire to discuss these questions for any reason, we would be glad to do so. If any clarification is needed, please call Alan S. Goldberg on 386-3575. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel F. Stanton  
Associate Director

Enclosures

cc: Mr. John Mintz  
Assistant Director  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

PAUL BIBLER, FORMER ASAC, SEATTLE, WAS CONTACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN BUTEL ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1975, AT HIS RESIDENCE AT RT. 1 BOX 743, PARKDALE, OREGON. BIBLER STATED HE CANNOT RECALL PARTICIPATING IN "MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES" WHILE IN FBI. HE ADVISED HE WOULD NOTIFY PORTLAND OFFICE IF HE IS CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF AND, SHOULD THIS OCCUR, PORTLAND WILL THEREAFTER ADVISE FBIHQ.

PM FBIHQ CLR

RE: BUTEL

84 SEP 18 1975

NW 65994 DocId:32989641 Page 68
RE BUREAU TELETYPING DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, WAS TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED BY ASAC BARGER, SAN DIEGO DIVISION, LATE THIS AFTERNOON, CONCERNING CONTENTS OF REFERENCED TELETYPING. MR. PRICE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE ADVANCE NOTICE AND ADVISED THAT HE HAS NO INTENTIONS OF TALKING TO THE SSC. HE RECALLED THAT HE SIGNED AN OATH AND AGREEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY WHEN HE JOINED THE BUREAU, AND HAS NO INTENTION OF VIOLATING THAT OATH EVEN THOUGH THE BUREAU MAY UNILATERALLY RELIEVE HIM OF THAT OBLIGATION. HE WAS FURNISHED TELEPHONE NUMBER OF THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND WAS INVITED TO CALL THAT OFFICE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SSC. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT HE HAS BEEN OUT OF THE BUREAU FOR ELEVEN YEARS, AND HIS MEMORY OF SPECIFIC DETAILS OF BUREAU OPERATIONS AND EVENTS OCCURRING DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT WOULD NOT PERMIT HIM TO FURNISH ANY ACCURATE TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER UNDER STUDY.

END

MPM FBIHQ ACK FOR TWO AN D CLR
NR 051 LA PLAIN
09:31 PM I N I T E L 9-5-75 BDW
TO BUREAU (62-116395)
FROM LOS ANGELES (66-6243)
S E N S T U D Y 7 5

RE BUTEL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING FORMER EMPLOYEES OF THE BU RESIDING IN
LA TERRITORY, WERE PERSONALLY CONTACTED SEPTEMBER 5, 1975,
BY SAC RALPH J. RAMPTON, CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF RE

TELETYPE:

WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2035 LOMBARDI ROAD, SAN MARINO,
CALIFORNIA.

WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS,
CALIFORNIA.

ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE,
CALIFORNIA.

EACH EXPRESSED SUPPORT OF THE BU AND PLEDGED COOPERATION
IN THIS MATTER.

ST. 100

JOSEPH K. PONDER, AS THE BU IS AWARE, WAS INTERVIEWED
AUGUST 31, 1975, BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF MEMBER MIKE
EPSTEIN AND HAS PREPARED A LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM WHICH CONTAINED
THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERVIEW AND WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO THE BU.

IN VIEW OF THIS, NO CONTACT WAS MADE WITH MR. PONDER AS A RESULT OF RE TELETYPEx.

END

HOLD
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM SAC, DALLAS (105-5731)
SENSTUDY 75

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ETAL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS
DRIVE, TELEPHONE 915-949-4817) AND PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014
CHATTERTON DRIVE, TELEPHONE 915-549-1820), BOTH SAN ANGELO,
TEXAS, CONTACTED SEPTEMBER 5, 1975, AND ALERTED REGARDING POSSIBLE
PROACH FOR INTERVIEW BY SSC STAFF.

BOTH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF
POSSIBLE CONTACT AND OFFER OF ASSISTANCE BY BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION.

NEITHER MR. COMMONS NOR MR. STODDARD ANTICIPATES ANY PROBLEM
IF CONTACTED BY SSC, BOTH STATING THEY HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT
MATTER INVOLVED.

END.

HOLD PLEASE

RECV-16

62-116395-645

ST 100

COMMEND

COMMONS

STODDARD

84 SEP 18 1975

NW 63994 Docld:32989641 Page 72
NRO09 JN CODE
10:00PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975 SRW
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM JACKSON (80-490)
SSTUDY 75

REBUTEL TO ALEXANDRIA, ET AL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

FORMER SAC WILLIAMS WEBB BURKE, 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON,
MISSISSIPPI, PERSONALLY CONTACTED BY ASAC JACKSON EVENING
SEPTEMBER 5, 1975, AND PERTINENTLY INFORMED AS INSTRUCTED
RETIE. BURKE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND CORDIAL BUT OFFERED
NO FURTHER REACTION OR COMMENT.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/75 BY STEELE

ST. 100
REC-16
42-116395-64
SEP 18 1975
WA DE EP STAND BY FRO THREE SEP 05 1975

TELETYPETE

NR 002 EP PLAIN

7:20PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975 SMC

TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)

FROM EL PASO (66-1587)

SENSTUDY 75

RE BUNITEL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

FORMER SAC KARL W. DISSLY, 7800 BIG BEND, EL PASO,
TEXAS, TELEPHONE NO. 755-8798, CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY
SAC IN ABSENCE OF SAC. DISSLY WAS ADVISED THAT HE
MIGHT BE CONTACTED BY A SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
STAFF AND WAS ADVISED CONCERNING CONTACT WITH BUREAU'S
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED BUREAU
NITEL. FORMER SAC DISSLY ADVISED THAT THERE IS NOTHING
HE COULD TELL THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. HE ADVISED
THAT HE WILL NOTIFY BUREAU IF HE IS CONTACTED BY SSC
STAFF CONCERNING THIS MATTER.

END 8-4 SEP 1 8 1975

(DISSLY)
On 9/5/75, SA Paul V. Daly of this Division was advised by Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, that Paul Wallach of the Senate Select Committee had informed him that the Committee desired the presence of Shaheen and SA Daly at an executive session at 2 p.m., Tuesday, 9/9/75, to explain why the material requested relating to mail openings had not been delivered to the Committee.

Shaheen requested that every effort be made by the Bureau to avoid the necessity of explaining to the Committee the lack of production of the mail opening material at the executive session.

The above information was brought to the attention of Paul Mack, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Associate Director (Investigations) who in turn advised that Mr. Adams had instructed that every effort be made to produce the requested material prior to the executive session.

Unit Chief James Lee was advised of this decision.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

September 2, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the memorandum from the SSC dated May 14, 1975, and appendices thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI and my letter to you dated June 20, 1975, enclosing a memorandum dated June 20, 1975, for the SSC.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosure which supplements our response to the SSC contained in the June 20, 1975, memorandum referred to above. The enclosure to the memorandum is a copy of your letter to Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler, dated August 5, 1975, which has a direct bearing on this matter since it authorized the FBI to review the sealed material contained in the Kraft file.

A copy of this memorandum with enclosure is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - (4)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)

Re: Request pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Reference is made to SSC letter to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, with appendices attached thereto, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI and to FBI memorandum to the SSC dated June 20, 1975, captioned as above.

Item number 17 in Appendix D of referenced SSC letter requested all memoranda and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft.

Referenced June 20, 1975, FBI memorandum responded to the above request as it pertained to the unsealed portions of the Joseph Kraft file. The sealed portion of the file was not reviewed for the requested information since material contained therein was subject to an arrangement between Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler, as attorney for Joseph Kraft, and the Attorney General. This agreement precludes examination of the sealed portion of Mr. Kraft's file except upon personal approval of the Attorney General subsequent to his notification of Mr. Kraft or his counsel, in writing, at least ten days prior thereto and providing him or them with an opportunity to discuss the matter personally with the Attorney General before the grant is made.

Original and one to Attorney General

See note page 2

Note that note on yellow, pp 2-3, is secret.
By letter dated August 5, 1975, the Attorney General advised Mr. Cutler that pursuant to the above arrangement the Attorney General was furnishing notification that no sooner than ten days from such date an appropriate official of the FBI may remove from the sealed files memoranda requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations.

A review of the sealed portions of the Joseph Kraft file by a representative of the FBI on August 25, 1975, failed to reveal any written or oral authorization or re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft as requested in referenced SSC letter dated May 14, 1975.

Enclosed with this memorandum for your information is a copy of the Attorney General's August 5, 1975, letter to Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler, referred to above.

Enclosure

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The subject of above SSC inquiry, Joseph Kraft, is the well-known newspaper columnist. A review of the Kraft file reveals that the French security service, the DST, conducted a microphone surveillance on Kraft's hotel room for approximately one week during a 1969 visit by Kraft to Paris. Such coverage was effected through the urging of W. C. Sullivan former Assistant to the Director who travelled to France at such time apparently at the direction of deceased FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Details of the above coverage have appeared in the media apparently as a result of leaks within the administration of former President Nixon. Kraft himself testified in detail 5/10/74, regarding this matter before the United State Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Pursuant to an agreement between Kraft and the Attorney General certain documents, recordings
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

NOTE CONTINUED: and other records which describe the contents of the overhears from the electronic surveillance were sealed. The above memorandum to the SSC reflects review of such sealed documents for requested information as per authorization from Attorney General contained in the enclosure to such memorandum. This note has been Classified "Secret" in order to protect the confidentiality of our relationship with the French security service the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to national security. Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, Indefinite. 

SECRET

SECRET
Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler, Esq.
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Cutler:

My office has received your letter, of July 23, 1975, concerning the Church Committee access to FBI files which may be under seal pursuant to my agreement with Mr. Joseph Kraft. In order to comply strictly with that agreement, I am writing to notify you that no sooner than ten days from today appropriate officials of the FBI may remove from the sealed files memoranda requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations.

After these documents are removed and prepared for submission to the Committee pursuant to the procedure you suggested, you will be furnished copies of those documents.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE OF UNCLASSIFICATION
03/14/72
John,

Here's the letter to Joseph Kraft's lawyer, Michael Shallen. He sent a set of the materials the Church Committee seeks.

[Signature]

Jack Fuller

Note: Fuller called me at 2:45 8/20/75 and said the A.C. intended for FBI to review Kraft material now made read for the purpose of responding. Fuller informed him to committee requests. Fuller inquired how such review could be initiated in Bureau. The above draft from Fuller and the Director. The above draft with Fuller and the Director. The above draft with the 8/5 letter were referred to FBI. JF

ENCLOSURE

FEB 17 1976
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

August 5, 1975

Mr. Lloyd N. Cutler, Esq.
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
1666 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Cutler:

My office has received your letter, of July 23, 1975, concerning the Church Committee access to FBI files which may be under seal pursuant to my agreement with Mr. Joseph Kraft. In order to comply strictly with that agreement, I am writing to notify you that no sooner than ten days from today appropriate officials of the FBI may remove from the sealed files memoranda requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations.

After these documents are removed and prepared for submission to the Committee pursuant to the procedure you suggested, you will be furnished copies of those documents.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAYS 10/14/72 BY
[Signature]
On September 2, 1975, Mark Gitenstein of the Senate Select Committee requested the following current employees of the Bureau be made available for Staff interview by the Senate Select Committee concerning their knowledge of the "official and confidential" files which were maintained in former Director Hoover's Office. The current assignment of these personnel set forth in this memorandum was furnished by Mr. Gitenstein.

(1) Thomas Barden Dudney-Chief Clerk, WFO;
(2) Special Agent Joseph E. Dowling-WFO;
(3) Special Agent Joseph E. Battle-WFO;
(4) Kenneth Shaffer-Clerk, WFO;
(5) Raymond Smith-Auto Mechanic, FBI Academy, Quantico;
(6) Jesse Peterson, Jr.-Mechanical Section, Administrative Division, FBIHQ;
(7) Thomas F. Peyton-Exhibits Section, Administrative Division, FBIHQ;
(8) Inspector John P. Dunphy-Administrative Division, FBIHQ; and
(9) Mrs. Erma D. Metcalf-Director's Office, FBIHQ.

All of the aforementioned employees were interviewed during the inspection inquiry into the "official and confidential" files matter which was conducted at the request of the Department. The Committee has already been delivered a summary of the results of that inspection inquiry and has reviewed FD-302's reporting the interview of employees concerning this matter.

1 - Personnel File - Thomas Barden Dudney
1 - Personnel File - Joseph E. Dowling
1 - Personnel File - Joseph E. Battle
1 - Personnel File - Kenneth Shaffer
1 - Personnel File - Raymond Smith
1 - Personnel File - Jesse Peterson, Jr.
1 - Personnel File - Thomas F. Peyton
1 - Personnel File - John P. Dunphy
1 - Personnel File - Erma D. Metcalf

# RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER

By U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the aforementioned employee's be released from existing employment agreements for purposes of interview by the Senate Select Committee.

(2) That the Legal Counsel Division will advise the Senate Select Committee when appropriate clearance has been received for the aforementioned employees and make the necessary arrangements.

\[Signature\]

OK
FBI memorandum August 18, 1975, in response to an
SSC request for FBI materials, contained information that
materials responsive to Part I. of that request relating to
"Women's Liberation" would be available for review by SSC
Staff Members. Those materials were reviewed by SSC Staff
Members Michael Epstein on August 20, 1975, and Martha Talley
on August 21, 1975.

On August 25, 1975, Mr. Epstein requested delivery
of the aforementioned material.

Enclosed is a memorandum for your approval for
forwarding to the Committee in response to Mr. Epstein's
request.

Also enclosed for your records is a copy of the
memorandum prepared for the Committee.

Enclosures (2)

NOTE:

Materials being furnished are serials 67, 83, 87, 90X
(Philadelphia air tel to Bureau 10/27/70) and enclosed LHM, 126,
137 and 165 of Bureau file 100-453233. Regarding serials 67
and 126, New York reports dated 8/14/70 and 3/12/71, no pages
after the table of contents were reviewed by the SSC nor are
they being furnished herewith, in as much as the SSC did not
request the details of the reports.
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the oral request of SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein on August 25, 1975, for delivery of FBI materials relating to "Women's Liberation," which materials were previously reviewed by SSC Staff Members, pursuant to the request made by the SSC on August 5, 1975, Part I.

The Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, United States Department of Justice, has approved compliance with the aforementioned oral request of Mr. Epstein. It is noted that normally such requests are submitted in writing and future requests for delivery of materials should be submitted in writing to the Special Counsel.

The requested material has been processed and will be delivered to the SSC with this memorandum.

1 - The Attorney General

JPT:jvl

ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 16/8/75 BY SPALAC

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

8/26/75

FBI

Richard T. Jardine

Martha Tally

Researchers

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/1975 BY SFLM

ENCLUSES

62-3111-578-640
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>DOCUMENT</th>
<th>BRIEFING</th>
<th>INTERVIEW</th>
<th>TESTIMONY</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. DATE PROVIDED

8/26/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

| SSC | HSC |

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum and enclosures

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

Oral request of SSC Staff Member on 8/25/75 for delivery of material previously requested on 8/5/75 Part I, for review

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or "Codeword"

S

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

Information handling
Intelligence collection

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

Material relating to "Women's Liberation".

62-116395

FMK: Fmk

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

5, 1960
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY — enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE: NEW YORK
OFFICE OF ORIGIN: NEW YORK
DATE: 8/14/70
INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD: 1/15/70 - 8/3/70

TITLE OF CASE:
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

REPORT MADE BY: J. ROBERT NEWTON
CHARACTER OF CASE: IS-MISCELLANEOUS

REFERENCE

ADMINISTRATIVE
The SAS who observed the demonstration on 4/15/70, at Foley Square, NYC, were HORACE P. BECKWITH and ANTHONY E. CONSTANTINO.

The demonstration on 6/22/70, was observed by SA RAYMOND F. MOHR.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED: NONE

ACQUITALS:

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS

APPROVED:

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE:

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

100-7453233
14
AUG 19 1970

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency: OST, ADW, NIS, SS, RAC-ESD, IRS
Request Recd.: 2cc 9100 62-11C 375 670
Date Fwd.: 70 SEP 1 1970
How Fwd.: JWYC
By: 70}

COVER PAGE
The demonstration on 7/15/70, was observed by SAS ALBERT E. FALLER and J. ROBERT NEWTON.

With regard to future planned activity by Women's Liberation Movement (WLM), included in this report, a separate case file has been opened for this activity captioned "AUGUST 26 WOMEN'S STRIKE FOR EQUALITY" (NY 100-170260). The August 26 strike will be worked under the new case and reported accordingly.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in this report have been set forth where they are available.

This report is being classified "Confidential" because the disclosure of information from informants of continuing value (NY T-1 through NY T-22) could reveal the identity thereof and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

Because of the extensive information furnished by regarding WLM organization and activities, two T symbols (NY T-1 and NY T-3) are being used to further conceal the identity of this informant.

In view of the fact that advised that there are no elected officers of the WLM, no active investigation of those persons listed on the bank account declaration is being instituted at this time.

COPIES CONT'D

2 - Chicago (100-46797) (RM)
2 - Charlotte (100- ) (RM)
1 - Newark (100-51168) (INFO (RM)
2 - New Haven (157-1498) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100- ) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (100-62721) (RM)
2 - Seattle (100-30009) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-49208) (RM)
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NY 100-164665

INFORMANTS CONT'D

Identity of Source Used to characterize

NY T-22 MARY ALICE WATERS

File Number Where Located

Copies of this report are being furnished for information to local intelligence agencies.

Copies of this report are also being designated to offices which information listed in this report indicates WLM organizations in those field offices.

All offices receiving copies of this report with the exception of Philadelphia and Charlotte have received previous copies of WLM reports.

LEADS

CHARLOTTE

AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA. Will conduct appropriate investigation as set forth in Section 87E of the Manual of Instructions to determine organization activities of captioned organization in their respective division and submit results of investigation in report form.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. Will conduct appropriate investigation as set forth in Section 87E of the Manual of Instructions to determine organization activities of captioned organization in their respective division and submit results of investigation in report form.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow activities of subject organization.
United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Confidential

4 - 108th MI Group, NYC (RM)
1 - NISO, NYC (RM)
1 - OSI, 2nd Air Force, NYC (RM)

Copy to:

Report of: J. ROBERT NEWTON
Office: New York, New York
Date: 8/14/70
Field Office File #: 100-164665
Bureau File #: 100-453233

Title: WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Synopsis: Women's Liberation Movement (WLM), NYC, maintains an office (Women's Liberation Center) (WLC) at 36 West 22nd Street, NYC. Although officers are listed, for bank account purposes, there are no officers of WLM in the usual sense of the term. Financial data set forth. Listings of nation-wide and New York area WLM groups set forth. WLM is not a membership organization, however, WLC, NYC, maintains a mailing list of 3,200 names. Meetings and activities of New York area WLM groups set forth. Affiliation and/or sympathy with other organizations set forth.

Details:

DECclassified by sp22ALW/ESCN on 10/16/77

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency, it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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Memorandum

TO: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

DATE: 8/25/75

On 8/22/75, Supervisor David Rarity, Jr., advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that it was his understanding that the Senate Select Committee was going to interview Dr. Sidney Gottlieb of the CIA in the near future. Rarity stated that the Bureau had a pending investigation captioned "Dr. Sidney Gottlieb—Destruction of Government Property" involving Gottlieb relating to his destruction of certain records at the Central Intelligence Agency and requested that a determination be made as to whether such an interview was being contemplated by the Committee.

John Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Task Force for the Senate Select Committee, was telephonically advised of our investigative interest in Mr. Gottlieb and of our desire that the Committee be aware of this investigative interest so that their activities would not adversely impact on the Bureau's investigation. Elliff was appreciative of being advised and indicated that he was also aware of the Senate Select Committee's interest in Dr. Gottlieb and would insure that the Committee Staff Member was apprised of the Bureau's investigative interest. He stated they would take care to make sure that their inquiry would not hamper the Bureau's investigation in this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

ST 100 REC-16

SEP 11 1975

PVD: ladlad

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
This is to identify nine serials, copies of which were furnished to Arthur Jefferson, staff member of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), on 8/15/75 for retention in SSC offices.

The nine serials, eight of which relate to Black Extremist matters and one to New Left, comprise a total of 34 pages.

Jefferson originally requested the serials for delivery on 8/12/75. Subsequent to the request for delivery, the serials were excised to insure information which would tend to identify sensitive sources was deleted. Excisions in each serial, prior to being made available for delivery, were approved by appropriate Section Chief. Jefferson accepted delivery from SA Pettus and signed attached list indicating receipt.

Barbara Banoff, SSC staff member, previously requested that a number of serials relating to White Hate matters be excised so that they could be delivered to SSC offices. The attached list contains 212 copies relating to White Hate which have been excised and reviewed by the appropriate Section Chief for delivery to SSC offices. One set of the 212 serials is being permanently maintained in room 4426, JRH. An exact duplicate set, which is available for delivery to SSC offices, is also being maintained in 4426 until a specific request is made by an appropriate SSC staff member for delivery.

Enclosures
62-116009

1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)
1 - 100-449698 (New Left)
1 - 100-448006 (Black Extremist)
1 - 157-9 (White Hate)
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Cointelpros
62-116009

Attached are nine copies of serials which were delivered to Jefferson on 8/15/75 as well as the list indicating receipt which was also signed by Jefferson.

ACTION:

None. For information.
This is to identify additional copies of excised serials which are being made available in room 4171, JEH building, for review by staff members of the Senate Select Committee (ESC). The copies have been excised to protect sensitive sources and delete information from other agencies where there were sensitivities.

Prior to being made available for review to members of the ESC staff, each serial is approved by the Section Chief.

A total of 138 copies of excised serials regarding CPUSA was made available to SSC on 8/19/75. 278 copies of CPUSA were also made available on 8/22/75. The initial 138, which consists of two volumes, and the latter 278, which consists of four volumes, are being maintained in room 4426, JEH.

ACTION:

None. For information.

62-116009
1 - 100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1 - 62-116395 (Senstudy)

DKP:lfj
(9)
This memorandum addresses itself to the attached letter, 8/14/75, from Chairman Frank Church of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to the Attorney General and the letter 8/20/75, from Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., of the Department to Mr. Mintz, also attached herewith. These two communications involve the suggestion of removal of myself from a certain important phase of the SENSTUDY-75 project which concerns the Martin Luther King, Jr., case. I intend to set forth in this memorandum arguments and other observations which I believe will best serve the Bureau's (and, thusly, also the Department's) interests in considering the suggestions of Senator Church and of the Department.

My Motivation in Resisting the Suggestions for Removal

It would be easy indeed for me to sit back and accept my removal from the King case aspects of SENSTUDY-75. I have not found my efforts in this matter to be necessarily a picnic or Sunday fun-outing. Rather, I have experienced mental strain and fatigue from this work but, nonetheless, have always tried, to the best of my ability, to do what I have felt is in the Bureau's best interests. I do not think my removal is in the Bureau's best interests and being the most knowledgeable person in the Bureau on this matter I feel compelled to present my views in as candid a way as I can for the benefit of the Director and other Bureau officials in their consideration of this matter.

Though it is unfortunate, in a way, that the issue involves me personally, I believe that the issue should be viewed in a much larger sense because it may involve a confrontation between the Bureau and the SSC. The entire investigation by the SSC of the FBI has developed into an adversary proceeding which it was undoubtedly destined to be. The SSC has continuously dictated its demands, its procedures, etc., to us. We have had only minimal support from the Department and have, in most instances, had to subjugate ourselves to the SSC. Up to now

Enclosures - 2
62-116395
1 - 67-(Personnel File of Seymour Fred Phillips)
1 - 106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
about the only real issue on which we have shown unbending resistance has been that concerning the revelation of the identities of our confidential informants—and that issue is still in dispute.

Now comes another issue which on its surface may appear small but which I consider a major one. And this issue concerns me personally and is difficult for me to be 100 percent objective about, try as I might. On every review of this matter I still come up with the same conclusion. We must not let ourselves be dictated to in how and with what personnel we intend to defend ourselves. (And let us not kid ourselves. When I say "defend," I mean that we are playing this "game" with our defensive unit). To sum it up, it is as though the opposition not only wants to make the rules of the game, but also insists on dictating who and who not we can use in the game. It is that simple.

What Is the SSC's Motivation Which Has Created This Issue?

Obviously, I cannot answer this question with any degree of certainty. But I can make a studied guess. I have been the Bureau's consultant on the interviews by the SSC, most of them by SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein in the King case. There have been instances when, after consulting with me, an Agent or former Agent would be counseled by me to not answer a particular question. I have done this generally for two main reasons. First and foremost, it has been vitally necessary for me to protect the identities of most important and valued informants relating to the SOLO operation and more will be said about this later in this memorandum. Secondly, there have been many instances where the interview has gone well outside agreed upon parameters necessitating my advice in some instances for personnel to not answer certain questions. This was the correct and only course of action I could take. It has obviously rankled the SSC (actually, probably just Epstein). I believe that this is evident from the 34-page LHM which I recently prepared on Epstein interview of me and which I have been told the consensus is that it clearly indicated my considerable cooperation with the SSC but that at the same time I was not permitting myself to be dominated. If Epstein believes me a hindrance to his work, it is logical to believe he would desire my removal. I might add at this point that there have been a number of instances where the consultation with me by personnel
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY-75
62-116395

has resulted in my directing that answers be given. As a matter of fact, I am sure that I more often directed answers to be given that to not be given.

When the issue (involving my removal) first arose about two weeks ago, I was given to understand that Epstein, as a result of interviewing me, might believe that I had a direct involvement in the King composite tape which was prepared in the Laboratory and mailed to the King family and that there, therefore, appeared to be a "conflict in interest" on my part if I continued to handle the King case aspects for SENSTUDY-75. As I fully well know, and as I believe my superiors are also convinced, I have been honest and forthright on this issue. I was not directly involved in the composite tape preparation or mailing and thus there is no "conflict of interest."

The Shaheen Letter of 8/20/75

I do not believe that Shaheen's letter and its relay of the Deputy Attorney General's (DAG) suggestion as to my removal is altogether timely under the circumstances. First, Shaheen is aware that I was interviewed on the King case and that he would receive the results thereof, as he has of all King interviews we know details about. Shouldn't Shaheen and indeed the DAG have first had the benefit of the results of the interview of me? (Shaheen now has it as my 34-page LHM was delivered to him 8/20/75). Secondly, wouldn't it have been far more appropriate for the Department to have at least first asked for our views before making the suggestion as to my removal?

The DAG refers to Church's letter as having "some merit." I find "some merit" unconvincing. It seems to me that for the action being asked for by the DAG's suggestion there should be a showing by Church of considerable or substantial merit, not just "some." To me, "some" could apply to merit which is minuscule in proportion.

Arguments Persuasive of My Not Being Removed

I am concerned of the precedent that might be set by my removal. Just as I have by chance become the Bureau's "expert" on the King case and also had supervised that case, we have two other similar situations in the hopper at the moment. Supervisor
James Lee has been considerably involved in handling our responses to the SSC concerning mail opening operations and he personally supervised matters relating to this down through the years. Supervisor David Ryan has been immersed in preparing material and coordinating the preparation of material relating to COINTELPRO. He likewise was the principal overall Bureau supervisor relating to COINTELPRO down through the years. Significantly, both of these areas, like the King case, have been designated as abuse areas by the SSC. Remove Phillips today from the King case and we might be asked to remove Lee and Ryan tomorrow from their participating in the SENSTUDY-75 project. Surely we cannot permit the loss of these men in these important areas.

In his letter, Church refers to my "personal interest." I have no personal interest as I am not guilty of any illegality, impropriety, abuse or whatever. My only interest in the King case has and remains an official one and I am prepared to defend anything and everything I did officially in that case.

There is no showing in either of the communications attached that the FBI's (and, thusly, also the Department's) interests will be adversely affected by my continued assignment in this matter. Conversely, there are strong arguments available to show that my being removed could well work to the detriment of the FBI/Department. I refer now to our SOLO operation and the overriding necessity for protecting the informants engaged therein. There has already been one clear cut important example where I believe it is likely that I prevented information from being acquired by the SSC which could well have been damaging to us and the informants. This concerned the testimony in an Executive Session of former SA Robert Nichols. I accompanied him to that Session although not present. My questioning of him in advance of his testimony revealed that he had, or at least believed he had, certain information which, if given to the SSC, about one Stanley Levison, could well have been most damaging to us. (Levison was the secret Communist Party member who was King's principal advisor). When questioning of Nichols turned to Levison's background, Nichols resisted questioning and eventually told Epstein that he was proceeding on advice of me. I felt that it was imperative to have given him that advice and the record of the Nichols testimony and factors relating thereto are clear on this.
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY-75
62-116395

Immodestly I must be candid to let you know that there is not likely another individual presently on the rolls of the Bureau who would have the background and knowledge of all aspects of the King and related matters to be able to handle the important consultation phase of the SENSTUDY-75 project relating to the King matter.

Additional Observations Which Should Be Considered in Any Overall Judgment On This Matter

In his letter, Shaheen refers to "for the sake of appearances." To me this is far too general and imprecise to be used as an argument of merit. Just exactly who does he have in mind in respect to "appearances?" Appearances to whom?

Senator Church is equally imprecise in his reference to "standpoint of appearances." Appearances to whom? He refers to "some may conclude" that there is a conflict between my personal interest and the interests of the FBI and the Department of Justice. Exactly who are the "some" he refers to?

It appears to be an irony indeed that Church can very indirectly and obliquely suggest possible improprieties on my part, improprieties in the eyes of unspecified persons, without the Senator citing even a single specific example or incident and his obvious lack of ability to do so after the exposure by the SSC to considerable involvement on my part. I say it is ironical because at the same time that there is an oblique suggestion as to an impropriety on my part, the SSC staff, which is looking into abuses, has been guilty. There are a number of improprieties which I am prepared to document. Some examples are illustrated.

After my first consultation experience which occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, when SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel interviewed retired SA Alan G. Sentinella, I wrote a memorandum from W. O. Cregar to you (Mr. Wannall) dated 5/13/75. I pointed out two instances related to this interview which were very suggestive of a lack of objectivity on the part of Seidel. One concerned Seidel's comment that the FBI was not letting Sentinella give him "good information." I pointed out that to begin with this was an unjustified allegation and Seidel was set straight immediately after his remark. Actually, the mere fact that Seidel was referring to "good" information suggested that certain information fits SSC's desires and others does not. There appeared to be a lack of regard for merely securing the facts regardless of what those facts might indicate. Another indicator of lack of objectivity was Seidel's inquiry about "illegal use of taps."
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY-75
62-116395

Our files are replete with instances where Epstein, in questioning present and former SAs, has gone outside the parameters agreed upon for interviews.

There have been instances where interviews were conducted with former SAs without giving us agreed advance notice. Noteworthy, recently one pertained to former Laboratory Section Chief Richard Millen and John Elliff of the SSC, when it was brought to his attention, agreed that we should have had advance notice and apologized. Another concerned an interview of former Assistant Director Charles Brennan.

I find the bulk of Church's letter is comprised of weasel-worded innuendos. He uses such terms as "may be a cause of concern"; "possible problem"; "presumably, compiling materials." The latter reference is to a presumption that I am compiling materials for the SSC on the King case. It seems to me that the Senator should either know or not know the fact, and if he does not know, he should not presume anything. To set the record straight, I have not been compiling materials. The assignments have been made to other personnel. I have, however, assisted the other personnel in locating materials and in coordinating replies. And, of course, I do review the replies prior to their transmittal. As a matter of fact, if the SSC's insistence that I be removed were to come to pass, I believe that it would end up having actually suffered to a degree in securing information from us. Our retrieval system is not the best for the purposes we have encountered and my participation in the retrieval of much of the material involved has placed me in a position to locate or assist in locating material which might well otherwise never be located for the SSC.

It seems strange indeed that in these days of such concern by Congress for the rights and privacy of individuals, there seems to be no addressing my privacy or rights in this matter.

I find it also strange that the Senator never once mentioned my name in his letter. He, or whoever prepared the letter, certainly knew my name. I would like to know why the Senator chose not to mention my name.

CONTINUED-OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY-75
62-116395

Again referring to when this matter first surfaced about two weeks ago, the initial advice to me of it was by you, Mr. Wannall, who had obtained your information orally from Messrs. Shaheen and Blackhurst of the Department, who had apparently received their information orally from the SSC. I explained my position and I received from you your confidence in me. One aspect related to the fact that the SSC "complaint" was far too general and that if the SSC had something to say it ought to be in writing and specific. I appreciated and so stated to you this confidence in my integrity in this entire matter. You next told me that you had discussed this matter with Associate Director Callahan who shared your views both as to my integrity and as to the issue relating to obtaining specifics, not generalities, and in writing. It heartened me. Finally, you passed to me the fact that Mr. Callahan had discussed the matter with the Director and the general reaction was that the SSC would first have to "put up or shut up" before any action would be taken as to my removal. This was likewise most heartening to me.

I see nothing in either the Church or Shaheen letters that indicates the SSC has "put up." As far as I am concerned the SSC has dealt with generalities and has produced nothing of substance. I trust that our position today would be the same as it was initially, "put up or shut up."

Not surprising is Church's verbiage, such as serving "the interests of the country" and "assure the American people." To me, this may sound alright as a speech on the floor of the Senate or a political speech. It is very unconvincing to me in the context of the issue involved.

Summarizing and concluding as to the Church letter, I am reminded of the often told story about the Texan, a man of considerable proportion, some 6'6" in height and weighing about 250 pounds. As the story goes, when all the BS is squeezed out of him there remains a mere midget. That's how I feel about the Church letter. (I would not mention this closing item were Jim Adams in town and this memorandum would have to pass through him. Sorry Jim!).

CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY-75
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

I believe it is obvious as to how I feel about acceding to the suggestion of the SSC and the Department. I hope I have been helpful in preparing this memorandum. I would be happy to discuss it with the Director. The final decision is, of course, his and I will, as I have done for almost 35 years, be guided by that decision.

CONFIDENTIAL
TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant Director  
Legal Counsel Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.  
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: Seymour Phillips

The attached letter is self-explanatory and, though mentioning no name, concerns Seymour Phillips.

On Friday, August 15, 1975, I orally advised Messrs. Callahan and Wannall that the Deputy Attorney General thought that Senator Church's letter had some merit and that for the sake of appearances it was the Deputy's suggestion that Mr. Phillips be removed from such conspicuous and open involvement with the SSC's requests and agent interviews as they may relate to Martin Luther King matters.

cc: Mr. Callahan  
Mr. Wannall

ALL FII INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBY IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE DELETED BY SEPH

ENCLOSURES

6 2-1/6 3 5 = 631
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 14, 1975

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing to call your attention to a matter which may be a cause of concern to you and to the Select Committee at some time in the future.

As you may know, a special unit has been established in the FBI Intelligence Division to handle this Committee's requests for materials and to handle certain arrangements for the Committee staff's interviews. The Special Agents assigned to this unit accompany Bureau witnesses to the Committee offices, travel to out-of-town locations where Committee staff interviews are conducted, and apparently "de-brief" interview subjects after the interviews.

One possible problem has arisen with this arrangement. As you are aware, one of the alleged abuses which the Committee is examining pursuant to S. Res. 21 involves the FBI's activities with respect to the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As the inquiry has proceeded, information has been developed to indicate that one of the Special Agents who has been handling Committee staff interviews, "de-briefing" witnesses, and, presumably, compiling materials with respect to the King matter was also the supervisory case agent during the time that some of the alleged FBI improprieties regarding Dr. King took place. Moreover, as a logical step in our investigation, it was
recently necessary to interview this Special Agent to
determine the nature and extent of his involvement in and
knowledge of the alleged abuses at the time when he served
as supervisory case agent with respect to the King case.
During the interview he did provide detailed information
concerning his substantial participation in this matter.

The Committee in no way intends at this juncture
to pre-judge the propriety of the FBI's activities with
respect to Dr. King, and it would be inappropriate to
characterize the conduct of any of the Bureau's personnel
regarding this case until all the facts are in. Neverthe-
less, I am concerned that in this kind of situation, the
interests of the FBI and the Department of Justice might
best be served, from the standpoint of appearances, by re-
considering the assignment of this Special Agent to the
King matters. It is possible that some may conclude that
there is a conflict between the Special Agent's personal
interest, and the interests of the FBI and the Justice
Department in ensuring that full disclosure to the Commit-
te is made with respect to this case.

Finally, let me assure you that the Committee
has no evidence that the present arrangement has prevented
the Committee from obtaining the full disclosures sought;
but it seems to me that it would be mutually beneficial
for appropriate steps to be taken so that we will both be
able to assure the American people and the Congress that
our oversight responsibilities were fulfilled in an objec-
tive and impartial way.

I hope you will share my view that this course
will best serve our respective interests and, of course,
the interests of the country.

Sincerely,

Frank Church
Chairman
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)  
(ATTN. INTD - W.O. CREGAR)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)  
SENSTUDY '75

Rebutels 7/30 and 31/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies each of LHM's covering interviews by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities covering interviews of SAC CHARLES W. BATES, SA LEO S. BRENNISEN, and former SAs DAVID E. TODD, ALBERT P. CLARK, and WILLIAM A. COHENDET.

It is noted that accompanying the LHM concerning interview of former SA DAVID E. TODD is a three-page xerox of a brief summary and chronology prepared by TODD and furnished to Mr. SEIDEL. It is noted that the chronology under the date of 8/19/70 bears a notation, "CLEAVER released from prison." TODD obviously meant HUEY NEWTON, instead of CLEAVER.
On the evening of August 11, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel and Mr. L. J. Johnson, Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee, met with Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates of the San Francisco Office. This meeting occurred over dinner. No statements were made by either of these individuals as to any rights that SAC Bates might have in connection with the interview.

During the dinner, Mr. Seidel referred to COINTELPRO involving the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco. Bates advised him that he was in charge of the San Francisco Office from July, 1967 until the end of April, 1970, when he was transferred to Chicago. Bates stated that he was aware of the investigation being conducted on the Black Panther Party but was not personally conversant with all the details of this investigation as such details were all contained in the FBI's file. On at least two occasions Mr. Seidel referred to specific facts occurring in other parts of the country involving anonymous letters sent to individuals under COINTELPRO. He asked if Bates agreed that these actions were proper. Mr. Seidel was told that Bates had no way of knowing the facts as he related were true or any other of the circumstances involved and that, therefore, he was unable to comment at all.

Mr. Seidel asked if Bates had any recommendations for legislation which the Committee could propose that would assist the FBI in the domestic counterintelligence field. Bates informed him that he was not fully conversant with this entire field and that it was the prerogative of FBI officials at Washington and Department of Justice officials to recommend such legislation.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

\[ 62 + 16 = 39 \times 16 = 636 \]
Mr. Seidel also inquired as to whether Bates felt that an extension of electronic surveillances into the domestic intelligence field would be of assistance. Bates informed him that the FBI was operating according to current court decisions as involve electronic surveillances and that the courts had recently precluded this action in strictly domestic intelligence matters. Mr. Seidel was informed that this was a decision for FBI officials in Washington.

On several occasions during the evening, Mr. Johnson asked Bates if he was aware of the "Houston Plan." On each occasion Bates informed him that he was not aware of the "Houston Plan" and his only knowledge of it is what he has seen in the public press. At one time Mr. Johnson asked if Bates thought that Mr. Hoover had turned down the "Houston Plan" because he was afraid for his job. Bates again replied that he had no firsthand knowledge having anything to do with the "Houston Plan" but he was certainly aware that Mr. Hoover was not afraid of anything or anyone.

Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the use of "black bag jobs" would be of advantage in conducting domestic counterintelligence operations. Bates replied that he had no personal direct knowledge of such matters and had never been involved in such matters.

During the evening, Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that a congressional oversight committee of the FBI was sound and proper. Bates informed that he certainly agreed with the concept of congressional oversight as long as it was constructive and not destructive. Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the FBI's security operation should be completely divorced from its criminal responsibilities and handled as a separate agency or a separate part of the FBI. Bates informed him that it appeared that the FBI's efforts in both the criminal and the security field had been effective and appeared to be proper in its present context. Mr. Seidel inquired if Bates was personally acquainted with Mr. William C. Sullivan, former FBI official. Mr. Seidel was informed that Bates worked in the same division with Mr. Sullivan in the 1950's and knew him as another supervisor at FBI Headquarters.

Seidel then asked if Bates was aware of the disagreements that Mr. Sullivan had had with Mr. Hoover and he was informed that he had no details concerning this matter.
Mr. Seidel asked if Bates knew former SAC Harry Morgan. Bates told him that he knew him as he had replaced him as SAC in San Francisco at the end of April, 1970. He then asked if Bates was aware of why Mr. Morgan was transferred from San Francisco. Bates told him that some problem had arisen in connection with his running the San Francisco Office but that he was not personally aware of the specific details. But that they would be available at FBI Headquarters. Seidel said the only reason he was asking was that he was thinking about interviewing Mr. Morgan but he did not want to embarrass him and then asked if Morgan's transfer from San Francisco had anything to do with a drinking problem. Bates said again that he was not aware of the specifics.

On the afternoon of August 13, 1975, Mr. Lock Johnson came into the San Francisco FBI Office saying he had just a few more questions he wanted to ask Bates. He then asked if the San Francisco Office was involved in foreign counter-intelligence work, and he was informed that we were as were many other FBI offices. He then asked if we surveilled everyone who went into or came out of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. He was informed that Bates did not intend to discuss with him any investigative techniques or anything having to do with pending investigations. Mr. Johnson said he was attempting to find some individual who was an expert in foreign counterintelligence, particularly the Soviet threat to the United States. Bates informed him that there were probably a number of people in the United States who would qualify in this category but Bates did not consider himself as an expert in this field.

The above represents specific matters brought up during these discussions.
Prior to interview by SSC Staff Member, SA LEO S. BRENNERSEN telephonically contacted SA DENNIS MILLER at FBI Headquarters making four inquiries on August 6, 1975; on the same date, the following answers were received:

Is it permissible for agent to give general answers concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP) as to membership number and Chapter numbers at various dates?

Answer: Yes.

Local media has previously set forth a memorandum purportedly from the FBI, San Francisco Office, suggesting consideration should be given to furnishing fabricated documents originating with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI, San Francisco, when, in fact, the memorandum came from the Bureau. If questioned concerning this memorandum, may agent point out that this document originated with the Bureau rather than San Francisco?

Answer: Yes.

In contemplation of possible questioning concerning false correspondence directed to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER and others abroad, can agent refer SSC Staff to Bureau when questioned concerning identity of agents preparing correspondence?

Answer: Yes.
Is it necessary for agent to express an opinion as to morality, legality of said Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL)?

Answer: You are not obliged to answer those questions you do not desire to answer, but if you wish you may comment on the legality or morality of the plan.

SA DENNIS MILLER related that he desired that it be borne in mind that the Bureau in no way wished to impede the SSC investigation.

LESTER B. SEIDEL, SSC Staff Member, appeared at the San Francisco Office of the FBI on August 11, 1975, and interviewed SA LEO BRENNEISEN from 1:03 PM to 2:30 PM. SEIDEL prefaced the interview by explaining that he had been advised that BRENNEISEN was the Coordinator for the COINTEL in San Francisco from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1970. It was pointed out to him that the case was assigned to agent from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1971.

SEIDEL asked if agent had, in fact, approved all proposals coming from the San Francisco Office. He was advised that not necessarily because if another agent made a proposal the person approving it in San Francisco would be the person signing the outgoing mail, namely, the Supervisor or Relief Supervisor.

SEIDEL asked what Squad agent had been assigned to during this Program, and he was advised S-6. He inquired if there was any COINTEL in San Francisco against US; he was advised to the contrary. He inquired as to the usual number of cases assigned agent, and was advised that to agent's best recollection probably 30 at any one time. He asked if agent's work was exclusively security during the handling of the COINTEL Program and he was advised agent did have some criminal assignments. He inquired if there was any relationship between COINTEL and criminal assignments, and he was advised no and that agent desired to limit the scope of his questioning to the COINTEL Program.

SEIDEL then asked how many suggestions the agent had submitted in COINTEL. He was advised that an estimate would be difficult but probably the nearest figure would be some two suggestions a month with possibly six months in two years when no suggestions were made. He inquired as to agent's knowledge of what percentage of total proposals from all sources submitted to the Bureau had been approved, and he was advised only a small percentage.
At this point, SEIDEL requested agent to outline the types of COINTEL proposals submitted by San Francisco. He was answered that anonymous letters, letters with pseudonyms, and letters signed with the name of an existing person had been used.

It was pointed out that the program had included the use of anonymous letters, including those directed to landlords advising that the Black Panther Party was occupying their property; letters to people supporting BPP programs, including the Breakfast Program and enclosing copies of the BPP color book for children encouraging the shooting of police officers and/or articles from the "Black Panther Party", the official BPP newspaper, showing their propensity and advocacy of violence; letters to organizations containing articles that showed the BPP in direct opposition to their aims, such as a letter to a Jewish organization showing BPP support of Palestine guerrillas.

It was pointed out that letters had been directed to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER in Algeria in the names of BPP members. At this point, SEIDEL interrupted to explain that he was enlisting the complete cooperation of the interviewee, that there had been some Congressional criticism of the COINTEL, that there were some segments of the population that were anti-FBI and that he desired to present the FBI in a proper light, and that he had good friends in the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked, was it necessary to have utilized COINTEL. Agent advised that it was difficult to correctly judge the effect of the program but it was felt it was not without some effect because the Black Panther Party had not only dwindled from a membership of approximately 1,000 in 1969 to perhaps 200 in 1973, but that the organization became split with dissension and had dropped much of its former advocacy for violence.

SEIDEL then requested that the agent give his recommendation on what COINTEL in the future should be; whether there should be a division between security and criminal investigations to different agencies in order that a possible intrusion on the rights of an individual in intelligence matters might not necessarily preclude his being prosecuted by the Bureau in a criminal matter. Agent
refused to furnish his "off-the-cuff" opinion, pointing out that he felt that it was without the scope of his release.

Without further questioning agent concerning the types of COINTEL proposals, SEIDEL next asked if the Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) on the BPP was in operation at the time COINTEL was initiated, and what proposals were submitted in COINTEL based on information from ELSUR.

SEIDEL was advised agent's release would not allow him to discuss ELSUR.

SEIDEL asked if the San Francisco Division had made any "snitch" proposals. When asked to clarify the question, he stated that this was a suggestion to the effect that a Black Panther Party member be accused of being an FBI informant. Agent replied that to the best of his recollection no such recommendations had been made to the Bureau by San Francisco, and on the contrary, agent knew that it had been pointed out by San Francisco that any such allegation should be most carefully considered inasmuch as BPP history has indicated that they had dealt severely with suspected informants, even to the point of killing them.

SEIDEL then asked if the San Francisco Division had received a great deal of "flak" from the Bureau on this program. He was advised that the Bureau operates a "tickler system" for following investigations and that the program had received some priority from the FBI but agent had never considered correspondence from the Bureau as being "flak".

SEIDEL at this point instead of questioning made the statement that the Bureau gave this matter "high priority". No comment was made to this statement.

SEIDEL next questioned agent if he had read any publicity concerning a May 11, 1970 letter from the Bureau to San Francisco entitled, "Special Operations Research", in which it was suggested that some consideration be given to furnishing the BPP spurious documents that supposedly originated with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI. He explained that some newspaper had received a copy of the document under the Freedom of Information Act and thereafter published it. He inquired if a response to the letter
had been made by San Francisco. Agent advised that it was
his recollection that San Francisco had responded recommending
against both proposals, pointing out that the BPP had in the
short past published contingency plans of the Berkeley Police
Department for a raid on National Headquarters to the
embarrassment of that agency. San Francisco was of the
opinion that if spurious documents were furnished to the
BPP they would immediately publish them, rather than attempt
to develop an informant and the operation presented a great
deal of possible embarrassment and publicity for the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked for agent's knowledge of why the letter
had been captioned as previously described rather than
Counterintelligence Program, Black Panther Party. Agent
stated he had no recollection of exact caption of the letter.
SEIDEL then went on to explain that he had been advised that
the Bureau had several COINTELS and the one covering Special
Operations Research was a COINTEL covering foreign operations.
Agent made no comment.

SEIDEL requested what proposals had been made to
disrupt the BPP newspaper; how did the proposals originate,
and what offices submitted them. He was advised that it was
agent's recollection that the Bureau may have requested
suggestions from several offices but that to agent's knowledge
none had been approved. When SEIDEL continued to question the
agent concerning specific proposals and why their approval
was not recommended by San Francisco, he was advised that one
proposal was the use of a foul-smelling chemical to put on
the paper. San Francisco was of the opinion it would not
be practical inasmuch as it would contaminate an airplane
and would subject the airline or the printing company to
damages. SEIDEL was further advised that it was believed
the suggestion may have been made for the changing of a first
page of an issue at the printing company to embarrass the BPP,
but it was pointed out that this would also merely result in
a claim being filed against the printer.

SEIDEL was advised that there may have been a
suggestion that some thought should be given to the possible
delay of the plates for the paper, that suggestion coming
at the time when the paper was being printed in New York
with the master copy being filmed in San Francisco. San
Francisco did not suggest approval because a mere delay would
have been of little benefit because the paper was not timely.
SEIDEL asked about the disruption of the BPP Breakfast Program. The answer was given that agent had no recollection of this, and SEIDEL was asked did he have any information from the Bureau that we had attempted a disruption of the program in San Francisco. He related that he believed not and that it probably happened in San Diego.

SEIDEL asked about a suggestion that informants set up a possible confrontation between the BPP and the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Agent stated he had no recollection of such a proposal and did not believe it had been submitted by San Francisco because the membership and activity in RNA had been minimal in this area.

SEIDEL then asked if we had suggested that landlords in the San Francisco area be encouraged to insist on their rent from the BPP. Agent advised he had no recollection of this, but could see nothing wrong in it.

SEIDEL inquired as to the amount of knowledge that SAC CHARLES BATES would have had concerning COINTEL. He was advised that agent had no information, that he, himself, had never discussed the program with Mr. BATES while it was in operation. SEIDEL then inquired if former SAC HARRY MORGAN had been ill during the time he was assigned to San Francisco and the reason for his transfer. Agent replied he had no information concerning this matter.

SEIDEL was asked if he felt that any of the actions agent described as being taken by the San Francisco Division were illegal. SEIDEL stated that he did not believe that these were matters that were in violation of any existing criminal statutes, but there might be some question as to whether the FBI had the specific authority to do these things.

SEIDEL ended the interview by again reiterating that he was a friend of the Bureau, that he was making an inquiry and desired to obtain the opinions of both Headquarters and agents in the field, and that he may make a request to the Bureau to widen the scope of agent's release.
Agent was not placed under oath and when agent refused to furnish opinions in those cases noted above or to discuss ELSUR, SEIDEL suggested that he, SEIDEL, put away his pencil and pad. Agent replied that that was not necessary. The only right explained to agent was the fact that all information furnished by him was at his own volition and was entirely voluntary. No mention was made that any part of the interview might be utilized in a possible court proceeding against the agent.

Agent did not consult with Bureau representative during course of the interview.
On August 13, 1975, former Special Agent Albert P. Clark, who was a supervisor in the San Francisco FBI Office and who retired in December of 1969, advised as follows:

He was interviewed in his home at 66 Elm, Larkspur, California, by SSC Member Lester B. Seidel from 5:40 P.M. to 6:55 P.M., August 12, 1975.

Clark was not placed under oath and no mention was made of his rights. However, Seidel was pleasant and in no way antagonistic. The interview was general, not penetrative, not in depth, and very few specific questions were asked. There appeared to be no discernible criticism of either the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) or the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) by Seidel.

Seidel was compelled on more than one occasion to declare that he was pro-FBI, that the object of his inquiries was to assist the United States Senate in understanding the problem in order that they could consider possible legislation that may eliminate any abuses in the future.

Seidel did mention the fact several times that information had been leaked to the press that Jane Seberg, the movie actress, had become pregnant by a BPP official.

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Seidel finally asked Clark if he would have okayed a COINTEL proposal like this and he answered that he would have if he felt that it would have sufficiently hindered the BPP, stating that possibly in some of these occasions someone might get hurt but on the other hand, investigation of the BPP by the FBI might be made easier and it might also cut down on the number of BPP supporters.

Clark was asked to whom the main BPP case was assigned and to whom COINTEL had been assigned in the San Francisco Division. Clark replied that he did not remember but possibly during the time of his supervision, more than one Agent had handled the matters.

Seidel asked how many BPP informants the San Francisco Division had. Clark replied he did not recall how many he did not believe that Seidel had a right to know.

Seidel inquired about the BPP wiretap, asking who had requested the tap, the Bureau or the San Francisco Division. Again, Clark replied that he did not recall but the San Francisco Division would not have necessarily waited for the Bureau to initiate the matter but might have requested the Bureau rather than the Bureau having initiated the matter.

Seidel wanted to have an example of a COINTEL proposal. He was not given a specific example but general conversation was had to the effect that any move that might be suggested that would aid the San Francisco Division in their investigation of the BPP in determining their supporters and financiers and possibly disenchainting those individuals might be an example.

Seidel did not ask Clark whether he had done a particular thing.

Questioned concerning whether he felt COINTEL had been effective, Clark replied he did not believe the matter was susceptible to proof but the BPP had sure gone into a steep decline.
Seidel again brought up the Seberg matter and asked if it had done any good. Clark stated he replied, "Maybe."

During this conversation, Clark got the general impression that perhaps Seidel did not feel that COINTEL had been necessary but Clark had argued that it had made the BPP more difficult to operate and possibly easier for the FBI to investigate.

Seidel then wanted to know what there was about the BPP that caused such a concentration of FBI investigative attention. Clark pointed out that this would have to be answered in the context of time, that at the time the program was initiated, there was no doubt that the BPP was a violent, racist organization opposing all law enforcement, attacking officers and generally disturbing the tranquility of the community.

Seidel then went on to discuss the business of pressure. Had Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates and the Bureau put too much pressure on the matter? Clark stated there was undoubtedly pressure because everyone was interested in doing the best type job possible and finding out everything possible concerning the BPP. There was obvious pressure from the Bureau in the matter and the Bureau, in a case like this, could never be satisfied. Clark stated that he related that perhaps too much pressure had come from the Bureau because he had felt at the time he was a supervisor that San Francisco Division knew more about the BPP than the Bureau. On the other hand, he related that Bureau officials were probably under pressure because of the national interest and the demands on them in Washington.

Seidel related that he was interested in ascertaining what Agent would make the best witness to appear in Washington to explain and testify concerning COINTEL. He specifically requested Clark's recommendation and mentioned the names of Special Agents Leo S. Brenneisen of San Francisco and Bob Baker of Los Angeles. Clark stated that he had countered by suggesting that somebody in Washington who directed the program and approved all proposals might be a better witness.
Clark recalled that near the first of the interview, Seidel probably, more to make conversation than to obtain information, asked a few questions concerning US and the Republic of North Africa (RNA). He was advised that US had not been active in this division and there had been no pertinent RNA activity brought to his attention. Seidel asked if Ron Karenga of US had visited San Francisco and Clark replied he had no exact recollection of this.

Seidel talked and asked Clark's opinion on the separation into different agencies of the Bureau's criminal and security investigations. Clark stated that he told Seidel that in the past he had considered this and felt that frankly it might have advantages, and at the same time, might have disadvantages. He pointed out that the disadvantages were that you could not be sure that it, in fact, would work and that if you remove the security investigations from the Bureau, you would undoubtedly lose a great deal, including public support.

Seidel asked if Clark had worked under former SAC Harry-Morgan. He advised that he had retired prior to the time Morgan was assigned to the San Francisco Division.

Clark pointed out that during the interview, a recorder appeared prominently on his desk, and Seidel could, of course, not be sure that it was not in operation, although as the duration of the interview lengthened, it must have been obvious to Seidel that it was not operating.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California
August 14, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SA WILLIAM A. COHENDET
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 14, 1975, retired former Special Agent William A. Cohendet was interviewed from 9:30 A.M. to 11:15 A.M. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). The interview took place at the Holiday Inn on Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco.

Mr. Seidel mentioned that he was serving as a counsel for the SSC, investigating all phases of the United States intelligence community, and he had chosen the Black Panther Party and the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) as his field. He stated that he was hoping for full cooperation on the part of the former Special Agent.

He was advised that former Special Agent Cohendet was willing to cooperate with the committee and he trusted that something constructive would come out of the effort being put forward. Former Special Agent Cohendet also pointed out that in his opinion the Black Panther Party (BPP) had been a group devoted to violence, thievery, and fraud, and the committee should realize the type of Subjects with whom they are dealing in order to place the investigation in its proper framework.

The first question concerned the former Special Agent's background and Bureau service. This was briefly furnished.

Seidel then asked when and how the technical surveillances had been installed, who initiated them, and who approved them.

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The former Special Agent replied that he was not party to any of these arrangements and did not know any of the details.

Seidel then asked if former Special Agent Cohendet knew the origin and purposes of the COINTEL Program. He was informed that the former Agent did not know the origin of the program, and said he believed its purposes were those as set forth in the instructions which Seidel had and which spoke for themselves. The former Agent admitted that said program at one time had been assigned to him but due to the press of other functions, he had been unable to give it a great deal of time and felt that during the period that it had been assigned to him, it had been largely ineffective.

Seidel then asked if there was any connection between ELSUR and COINTEL and the reply was given that obviously there would be if the ELSUR material being reviewed could be considered as having any pertinence to a COINTEL operation. However, former Special Agent Cohendet could not recall having used this material while the case was assigned to him, at least to any significant degree. Not having the files available made it impossible to state positively if there had been any specific instance of use of this material.

Seidel asked as to the possible effectiveness of anonymous letters and he was informed that in the opinion of the former Agent, such letters, particularly having to do with personal infidelity or thievery, which were the usual suggested avenues, would have little effect on the recipients who were active in such fields themselves much of the time. In the more serious areas of perhaps trying to falsely show that an individual was an FBI or police informant, the former Special Agent said that the use of this technique would not be used for fear of causing bodily harm or death to an innocent person due to the well-known propensity of the BPP of dealing harshly with any suspected deviator let alone informant.
Seidel then asked as to the value of ELSUR to the BPP investigation and the former Special Agent stated that in his belief it was extremely valuable in many ways. For instance, it assisted and gauged the true Huey Newton, his plans, and weaknesses. It was also valuable in estimating the possible effect of a certain COINTEL program as possibly suggested by some other office. As a result of their information, the San Francisco Office usually rejected most suggestions as being unlikely to be successful.

Seidel wondered if ELSUR was not the most valuable, single investigative aid that the Bureau had had in this investigation, and the former Special Agent agreed that he was probably correct.

Seidel then wondered if the COINTEL proposals should be part of some legislation proposed by Congress and the former Special Agent replied that the Bureau officials, in his opinion, should be allowed to comment on this because the fact that the program would be ineffective against the BPP might not be a valid argument that it would not work to better advantage in other circumstances.

Former Special Agent Cohendet declined to comment on the effectiveness of COINTEL as used against the Socialist Workers Party, not having had any experience with its use in that field.

Seidel then asked about informants and asked if there had been any pressure from the Bureau in the development of such sources. Former Special Agent Cohendet acknowledged that there certainly had been great pressure in this direction, as it was well known that informants were a necessary part of any investigation and a police organization can never give up on this phase of its work no matter how difficult the circumstances were in their development. In the case of the BPP, the development of informants was particularly difficult because of the fear that many persons in the black community felt concerning the BPP as well as the lack of desire to cooperate against another black person.
Seidel asked about foreign funds being raised and given to the BPP, and former Special Agent Cohendet recalled that "Masai" Hewitt and others went to Sweden and other countries where the BPP raised money on speech making tours.

Seidel then asked about any investigation of BPP funds and former Special Agent Cohendet said that it was his recollection that investigation of BPP funds had been undertaken through legal channels but he had no personal knowledge of the investigation and declined to go further into this field.

Seidel asked about referrals of Bureau information to the Internal Revenue Service and former Special Agent Cohendet said that he had no personal knowledge of what had been done in this direction.

Seidel then asked about the affair between Actress Jean Seberg and "Masai" Hewitt, which had appeared in a Hollywood gossip column and had alleged that Seberg had become pregnant by Hewitt. Seidel said that the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had admitted leaking this information to someone in the press.

Former Special Agent Cohendet knew that this couple had been lovers for a brief period but denied any knowledge of any leak to the press by either San Francisco or Los Angeles.

Seidel asked if the former Agent thought that leaking this type of information was appropriate. No comment was offered as to this question.

Seidel, at the conclusion of the interview, said that he had noted that the "faking" of police records as suggested had never been undertaken and he observed that he believed the COINTEL abuses were being overplayed by the press. From what he learned in interviews in San Francisco, it seemed to him that the program had been mostly played down and indeed, an independent judgment had been exercised in the implementation of the program.
A general discussion of the BPP ensued in which former Special Agent Cohendet reiterated the criminal background and threatening attitude of many of the BPP members, their mendacious ways, and their lack of credibility in their public statements. The former Special Agent credited the news media with helping to build up the BPP beyond its actual strength and influence.

Seidel asked about the former Agent's knowledge of the removal of former SAC Harry Morgan from San Francisco. He said the only reason he was asking this question was in order to avoid embarrassing former SAC Morgan when he interviews him concerning his possible knowledge of BPP activities sometime in the future. Former Special Agent Cohendet had no knowledge as to why Mr. Morgan was transferred.

In summation, Seidel ventured the opinion that he thought the ELSUR technique was far more valuable in the carrying out of the investigation of the BPP than the COINTEL. Former Special Agent Cohendet had to agree to the above observation.

Former Special Agent Cohendet was not advised of any rights that he might have in declining to answer any questions and Seidel said he was actually seeking witnesses for a possible hearing in Washington, D.C. He stated that no names would be mentioned in any write-up he would make concerning his interviews.
On August 12, 1975, retired former SA David E. Todd was interviewed from 1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the SSC. The interview took place at the Holiday Inn, San Francisco.

By way of background, in all contacts with Seidel previously, former SA Todd has indicated to him great reluctance to discuss these matters without clearance from the Bureau, and pointed out to Seidel that the Bureau had released former SA Todd from the Employment Secrecy Agreement for the purpose of a staff interview, but Seidel was told that former SA Todd did not think it was either his responsibility or his prerogative to provide information or make information public; that while employed he was acting as an Agent of the Federal Government and felt it was the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide the information, and that if the Senate Committee desired information from former SA Todd, the questions should have been submitted to him in writing, and his answers should have been made in writing and first forwarded to the FBI, and then after the FBI determined it advisable to make these answers available to the Committee, that would have been the proper channel.

Seidel pointed out the Committee and the Bureau had made an agreement whereby the Bureau would make Agents available to the Committee for interview. Former SA Todd pointed out to Seidel that he is not in the category of an Agent, being a retired Agent, and at this point there was no additional discussion on this matter.

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Seidel was also told that nothing that was said by former SA Todd should be interpreted as being critical of the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) itself, and that if the Bureau felt that such a Program was necessary in the interest of national defense, he had carried it out in the best way he saw fit, and that in recommending against specific proposals as being impractical or inadvisable, these recommendations were against the specific incidents recommended and not against the Program as a whole.

Seidel's first questions dealt with former SA Todd's background and the extent of his Bureau service, and whether he had worked security or criminal matters. Former SA Todd gave him chronologically the offices in which he had served in the Bureau, and stated he had been associated from 1952 to 1956 with the Domestic Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C., and had become Supervisor in San Francisco in December, 1969, of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and that during his Bureau career he had worked both criminal and security matters.

Seidel asked the name of the squad which was originally the Racial Squad, and subsequently changed to Extremist Matters, and he asked whether the work was strictly intelligence, or whether it combined intelligence or criminal work. It was pointed out Bombing Matters were originally being handled on this Squad for a period of time, and that both the criminal activities of the Panthers, as well as intelligence activities, were combined in the assignment.

Seidel then asked when the technical surveillances on the Panthers were installed. Former SA Todd replied that they were functioning at the time he was appointed Supervisor. Seidel then asked how was the technical surveillance related to the COINTEL, if at all, and specifically whether information coming from the technical surveillance was used in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd advised that he could not recall specifically what was done in either Program without reviewing the files and comparing the information therein with the source. Seidel seemed very interested in this, but actually the question could not be answered on the basis of recollection alone, and was not.
Seidel then asked how would the Panther COINTEL be defined with regard to aims, techniques and results. The answer to this was that the aims were to counter generally the revolutionary objectives and activities of the Panthers. The question concerning techniques was left unanswered, and as far as results go, former SA Todd told Seidel that he did not feel there had been any great results from the Program as it was pursued in the San Francisco Office, but he could not speak for the rest of the Program as far as the Bureau is concerned.

Seidel asked whether the Agents working the criminal aspects of the BPP received information that was received from a technical source, and he was told procedures by which information had been routed to them in their cases, and that at the time we operated these technical surveillances, we felt they had been installed lawfully, and that the information received could be used.

Seidel asked whether there was a great deal of pressure put on the San Francisco Office for the development of informants. He was told yes, that informants were the backbone of good law enforcement and the Bureau constantly urged better informant coverage.

Seidel asked if there had been similar pressure placed on the office in the COINTEL, and former SA Todd replied that he did not feel that any great pressure had been put on the office to carry out this Program, but that the Bureau had recommended the Program, however, had left it up to the office pretty much as to how it should be carried out.

Seidel asked whether the Program had been successful in causing dissension within the Party. Former SA Todd told him that he did not feel this had been particularly effective in any way, and that causing dissension had not been a primary objective of the Program in the San Francisco Office, and that the policy had been to use the Program for primarily two purposes: 1) for the purpose of developing informants by attempting to dissuade them from their loyalties to the Party; and 2) to make representations to Panthers for whom outstanding arrest warrants had been issued in order to flush them out so they could be apprehended.
Seidel asked specifically about the COINTEL involving the Breakfast Program, and was told a recommendation had been made for putting some kind of contamination in the Breakfast Program food, and that this office had felt this extremely inadvisable and recommended against it, and it was not carried out here.

Former SA Todd was also asked about a COINTEL proposal relating to "The Black Panther" newspapers, and was told that such a proposal had been made involving saturating the papers with a foul smelling fish oil or some substance, however, we recommended against this as it would serve no purpose.

Seidel was advised that the San Francisco policy had been to recommend against harassment, per se, and also recommended against leaking information to the press. Seidel then raised the question about the incident where Huey P. Newton's high standard of living was given to the press, and he was told that this fell into the category of informant development on the basis it was felt that if those Panthers who were living practically in poverty could realize what Newton's standards of living were, it might change their allegiance to him and they could be contacted for informant purposes.

Seidel was also told that in this phase of the COINTEL, it was former SA Todd's recollection that this information regarding Newton's high standard of living had been disseminated by informants, and that the press was well aware of Newton's standards of living without having to make this information available to them.

Seidel asked what the instructions had been from the Bureau in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd told Seidel that he had reviewed this file after being appointed Supervisor, but could not recall specifically what the Bureau instructions were. The only other instructions received were at a two day conference in Washington, D.C., on BPP matters conducted by former Assistant to the Director William Sullivan, and Section Chief George Moore, at which time it was pointed out that the Bureau desired the COINTEL to be coordinated with the Bureau, but that former SA Todd did not recall any firm prohibition against
taking certain actions without Bureau authority, and that the field had some leeway in what they did, but, in general, offices made proposals to the Bureau with copies to San Francisco prior to taking any action. Seidel asked why San Francisco got copies of all proposals, and was told this was because San Francisco was office of origin in the BPP case and other offices were required to furnish a copy of all correspondence.

Seidel then asked to what extent Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates had knowledge of the COINTEL as it related to the BPP, and he was told that former SA Todd could not speak for Bates and his knowledge would be dependent upon how carefully he read incoming mail and reviewed files, and former SA Todd had no knowledge as to what extent Bates did this.

Seidel was told that under the supervisory setup in the office at the time, former SA Todd felt it was his responsibility to direct this Program in San Francisco and not Bates.

Seidel indicated that out of his investigation in the hearings, undoubtedly there would be some legislation coming out of Congress that would either enable or prohibit such things as the COINTEL, and he stated that was one reason he was asking concerning its effectiveness, and wondered what former SA Todd would recommend. Seidel was told that former SA Todd felt it essential that the Government should have the right to defend itself against individuals and groups who advocate violent revolution or who are aligned with foreign powers, and that there was a need for some sort of legislation within the framework of constitutional government which would enable the Government to do this; but, of course, it should be done under proper control. Seidel asked for suggestions as to what sort of control, and was told that this was a matter for Congress to decide, but perhaps Congress should look into some legislation similar to wiretap legislation, where the responsibility is upon a Federal judge to issue a warrant.

Former SA Todd had prepared a brief summary of what he recalled of the activities of the BPP, and he made a copy of this available to Seidel. Former SA Todd also had made a chronology to assist him in answering questions, together with
some notes concerning COINTEL policy, former SA Todd's general recollection of matters, questions of law regarding agent privilege, privileged information problems, ongoing litigation and national defense, and informants and sources. Seidel asked for a copy of this chronology and this, too, was given to him.

Seidel expressed great interest in receiving the one page summary of the Panthers' activities, and stated that he had chosen the Panthers for a case study, and he seemed more interested in this than in the COINTEL. He also indicated that there might be future interviews and that former SA Todd might be called as a witness before the Committee at a later date.

At the outset of the interview, Seidel asked whether former SA Todd desired his rights be read to him. Former SA Todd told him that since he did not interpret this as a custodial interview, and it was his understanding Seidel had no police power, that he could forego reading the rights.

Former SA Todd did not feel it was necessary to consult with a Bureau representative at this time.

The above information was furnished by former SA Todd voluntarily and was not solicited.
CHRONOLOGY

Approximate Dates

Dec. 1969

Feb. 1970

May 1970
Cointelpro letter. Suggestion rejected by S. F.

Aug 1970
Marin Court shootout (Jonathan Jackson-Judge Haley)

Aug 1970
Cleaver released from prison.

Jan 1971
Letters to Algeria to provoke Cleaver to return to U. S. so arrest could be effected.

Feb 1971
Newton becomes Supreme Commander, Cleaver expelled.

March 1971
Robert Webb murder.

April 1971
Sam Napier murder.

April 1971
Two New York police officers wounded.

May 1971
Four New York police officers murdered.

August 1971
George Jackson killed in prison break attempt.

August 1971
Officer Kowalski murder attempt - Washington & Bottom arrest

August 1971
S. F. Ingleside Station attack - Officer Young murdered.

Dec. 1971
Retired.

Cointelpro:
Recommended against many proposals. Approved recommendation to try to induce Cleaver to return to U. S.
Would have approved actions to persuade Panthers to change loyalty from Party and become informants, but cannot recall any specific ones.
Would not have approved any proposals solely for harassment or for leaking information to press; there must have been some bona fide investigative purpose behind proposal before considering it.

Recollection:
Recall only generalities. Requested if could review Bureau files prior to interview. This was denied. Cannot testify with any specificity without review of files.

Agent-Principal Privileged Information:
Sensitive techniques
Informants & Sources
Ongoing Investigations
Foreign Intelligence
Ongoing litigation: Panthers v. FBI & IRS, USDC, S. F. Civil rights.

National Defense: Documents reviewed were classified. Does executive branch have right to defend nation against advocates of revolution (public interest issue).

Informants & sources: Cannot reveal. (Includes information that might reveal identity.)

Neither my responsibility nor my prerogative to provide or make this information public. I was acting as an agent of the Federal government, and it is responsibility of government to provide the information.

Any questions should be submitted in writing and my answers in writing should be forwarded to FBI and if FBI deems it advisable to make these answers available to Committee, that should be proper channel.
The investigation of the Black Panther Party was a national defense matter. Information on file points to collaboration with foreign powers by leaders of the Party.

Throughout the two-year period in which I supervised the investigation there were strong liaisons between Black Panthers and dissident groups abroad as well as with the governments of foreign nations. The Black Panthers had support and/or branches in France, Germany and Scandinavia, and were international in scope. Eldridge Cleaver, wanted on felony warrants, had been granted asylum in Algeria and with his entourage was residing in a villa provided by the Algerian government. During this period he made at least one trip to Moscow, Russia. Several Black Panthers travelled to Cuba. Huey Newton, in 1971, travelled to Red China by way of Canada and Hong Kong at the invitation of the Chinese government at a time when the United States had no diplomatic relations with them.

At the time I began serving as supervisor in late 1969, the Black Panther Party was under co-leadership of Huey Newton, then confined to prison in California, and Eldridge Cleaver, living in exile in Algeria. The Black Panther Party, both in the newspaper it published weekly at San Francisco, and in public statements by its officers and leaders, advocated violent revolution; it published instructions on guerrilla warfare, directions for the use of weapons, and printed detailed drawings and instructions on the manufacture of bombs and explosive devices, and it agitated openly for the murder of police officers. The term "off the pigs," which means "kill the police," was a Black Panther catchphrase. The history of the Black Panther Party during the period I acted as supervisor is replete with incidents of murder, violence and inciting to revolution. The revolutionary quotation of Mao Tse-Tung, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," became a Black Panther motto.

Sometime in early 1971 a split occurred in the Black Panther Party. Huey Newton, following his release from prison in 1970, gained control of one faction headquartered in Berkeley, California, and he broke openly with Eldridge Cleaver, publicly expelling Cleaver and Cleaver's lieutenants from the Party. The Newton faction thereafter gradually took a more moderate approach, advocating social change through community service in place of its prior profile of violence. No change was noted in the policies of the Cleaver faction directed from Algiers, and it continued to advocate violent revolution; it began publication in New York of its own newspaper proclaiming its revolutionary policies; and followers belonging to this faction continued to commit crimes of violence.

The following crimes of violence attributed to the Cleaver faction of the Black Panthers have been documented in the book "Target Blue," by former Deputy Police Commissioner Robert Daley of New York City (Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973):

Ambush attacks against police officers which resulted in 7 officers murdered, 3 wounded, and one attempted murder thwarted, which led to the solution of the other cases and established these attacks to be a nationwide conspiracy; and the murder of two Newton-faction Black Panthers.
On the evening of August 11, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel and Mr. Loch Johnson, Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee, met with Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates of the San Francisco Office. This meeting occurred over dinner. No statements were made by either of these individuals as to any rights that SAC Bates might have in connection with the interview.

During the dinner, Mr. Seidel referred to COINTELPRO involving the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco. Bates advised him that he was in charge of the San Francisco Office from July, 1967 until the end of April, 1970, when he was transferred to Chicago. Bates stated that he was aware of the investigation being conducted on the Black Panther Party but was not personally conversant with all the details of this investigation as such details were all contained in the FBI's file. On at least two occasions Mr. Seidel referred to specific facts occurring in other parts of the country involving anonymous letters sent to individuals under COINTELPRO. He asked if Bates agreed that these actions were proper. Mr. Seidel was told that Bates had no way of knowing the facts as he related were true or any other of the circumstances involved and that, therefore, he was unable to comment at all.

Mr. Seidel asked if Bates had any recommendations for legislation which the Committee could propose that would assist the FBI in the domestic counterintelligence field. Bates informed him that he was not fully conversant with this entire field and that it was the prerogative of FBI officials at Washington and Department of Justice officials to recommend such legislation.

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Mr. Seidel also inquired as to whether Bates felt that an extension of electronic surveillances into the domestic intelligence field would be of assistance. Bates informed him that the FBI was operating according to current court decisions as involve electronic surveillances and that the courts had recently precluded this action in strictly domestic intelligence matters. Mr. Seidel was informed that this was a decision for FBI officials in Washington.

On several occasions during the evening, Mr. Johnson asked Bates if he was aware of the "Houston Plan." On each occasion Bates informed him that he was not aware of the "Houston Plan" and his only knowledge of it is what he has seen in the public press. At one time Mr. Johnson asked if Bates thought that Mr. Hoover had turned down the "Houston Plan" because he was afraid for his job. Bates again replied that he had no firsthand knowledge having anything to do with the "Houston Plan" but he was certainly aware that Mr. Hoover was not afraid of anything or anyone.

Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the use of "black bag jobs" would be of advantage in conducting domestic counterintelligence operations. Bates replied that he had no personal direct knowledge of such matters and had never been involved in such matters.

During the evening, Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that a congressional oversight committee of the FBI was sound and proper. Bates informed that he certainly agreed with the concept of congressional oversight as long as it was constructive and not destructive. Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the FBI's security operation should be completely divorced from its criminal responsibilities and handled as a separate agency or a separate part of the FBI. Bates informed him that it appeared that the FBI's efforts in both the criminal and the security field had been effective and appeared to be proper in its present context. Mr. Seidel inquired if Bates was personally acquainted with Mr. William C. Sullivan, former FBI official. Mr. Seidel was informed that Bates worked in the same division with Mr. Sullivan in the 1950's and knew him as another supervisor at FBI Headquarters.

Seidel then asked if Bates was aware of the disagreements that Mr. Sullivan had had with Mr. Hoover and he was informed that he had no details concerning this matter.
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INTERVIEW OF SAC
CHARLES W. BATES
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Seidel asked if Bates knew former SAC Harry Morgan. Bates told him that he knew him as he had replaced him as SAC in San Francisco at the end of April, 1970. He then asked if Bates was aware of why Mr. Morgan was transferred from San Francisco. Bates told him that some problem had arisen in connection with his running the San Francisco Office but that he was not personally aware of the specific details. Bates said again that they would be available at FBI Headquarters. Seidel said the only reason he was asking was that he was thinking about interviewing Mr. Morgan but he did not want to embarrass him and then asked if Morgan's transfer from San Francisco had anything to do with a drinking problem. Bates said again that he was not aware of the specifics.

On the afternoon of August 13, 1975, Mr. Loch Johnson came into the San Francisco FBI Office saying he had just a few more questions he wanted to ask Bates. He then asked if the San Francisco Office was involved in foreign counterintelligence work, and he was informed that we were as were many other FBI offices. He then asked if we surveilled everyone who went into or came out of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. He was informed that Bates did not intend to discuss with him any investigative techniques or anything having to do with pending investigations. Mr. Johnson said he was attempting to find some individual who was an expert in foreign counterintelligence, particularly the Soviet threat to the United States. Bates informed him that there were probably a number of people in the United States who would qualify in this category but Bates did not consider himself as an expert in this field.

The above represents specific matters brought up during these discussions.
Prior to interview by SSC Staff Member, SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN telephonically contacted SA DENNIS MILLER at FBI Headquarters making four inquiries on August 6, 1975; on the same date, the following answers were received:

Is it permissible for agent to give general answers concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP) as to membership number and Chapter numbers at various dates?

Answer: Yes.

Local media has previously set forth a memorandum purportedly from the FBI, San Francisco Office, suggesting consideration should be given to furnishing fabricated documents originating with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI, San Francisco, when, in fact, the memorandum came from the Bureau. If questioned concerning this memorandum, may agent point out that this document originated with the Bureau rather than San Francisco?

Answer: Yes.

In contemplation of possible questioning concerning false correspondence directed to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER and others abroad, can agent refer SSC Staff to Bureau when questioned concerning identity of agents preparing correspondence?

Answer: Yes.

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Is it necessary for agent to express an opinion as to morality, legality of said Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL)?

Answer: You are not obliged to answer those questions you do not desire to answer, but if you wish you may comment on the legality or morality of the plan.

SA DENNIS MILLER related that he desired that it be borne in mind that the Bureau in no way wished to impede the SSC investigation.

LESTER B. SEIDEL, SSC Staff Member, appeared at the San Francisco Office of the FBI on August 11, 1975, and interviewed SA LEO BRENNEISEN from 1:03 PM to 2:30 PM. SEIDEL prefaced the interview by explaining that he had been advised that BRENNEISEN was the Coordinator for the COINTEL in San Francisco from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1970. It was pointed out to him that the case was assigned to agent from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1971.

SEIDEL asked if agent had, in fact, approved all proposals coming from the San Francisco Office. He was advised that not necessarily because if another agent made a proposal the person approving it in San Francisco would be the person signing the outgoing mail, namely, the Supervisor or Relief Supervisor.

SEIDEL asked what Squad agent had been assigned to during this Program, and he was advised S-6. He inquired if there was any COINTEL in San Francisco against US; he was advised to the contrary. He inquired as to the usual number of cases assigned agent, and was advised that to agent's best recollection probably 30 at any one time. He asked if agent's work was exclusively security during the handling of the COINTEL Program and he was advised agent did have some criminal assignments. He inquired if there was any relationship between COINTEL and criminal assignments, and he was advised no and that agent desired to limit the scope of his questioning to the COINTEL Program.

SEIDEL then asked how many suggestions the agent had submitted in COINTEL. He was advised that an estimate would be difficult but probably the nearest figure would be some two suggestions a month with possibly six months in two years when no suggestions were made. He inquired as to agent's knowledge of what percentage of total proposals from all sources submitted to the Bureau had been approved, and he was advised only a small percentage.
At this point, SEIDEL requested agent to outline the types of COINTEL proposals submitted by San Francisco. He was answered that anonymous letters, letters with pseudonyms, and letters signed with the name of an existing person had been used.

It was pointed out that the program had included the use of anonymous letters, including those directed to landlords advising that the Black Panther Party was occupying their property; letters to people supporting BPP programs, including the Breakfast Program and enclosing copies of the BPP color book for children encouraging the shooting of police officers and/or articles from the "Black Panther Party", the official BPP newspaper, showing their propensity and advocacy of violence; letters to organizations containing articles that showed the BPP in direct opposition to their aims, such as a letter to a Jewish organization showing BPP support of Palestine guerrillas.

It was pointed out that letters had been directed to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER in Algeria in the names of BPP members. At this point, SEIDEL interrupted to explain that he was enlisting the complete cooperation of the interviewee, that there had been some Congressional criticism of the COINTEL, that there were some segments of the population that were anti-FBI and that he desired to present the FBI in a proper light, and that he had good friends in the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked, was it necessary to have utilized COINTEL. Agent advised that it was difficult to correctly judge the effect of the program but it was felt it was not without some effect because the Black Panther Party had not only dwindled from a membership of approximately 1,000 in 1969 to perhaps 200 in 1973, but that the organization became split with dissension and had dropped much of its former advocacy for violence.

SEIDEL then requested that the agent give his recommendation on what COINTEL in the future should be; whether there should be a division between security and criminal investigations to different agencies in order that a possible intrusion on the rights of an individual in intelligence matters might not necessarily preclude his being prosecuted by the Bureau in a criminal matter. Agent
refused to furnish his "off-the-cuff" opinion, pointing out that he felt that it was without the scope of his release.

Without further questioning agent concerning the types of COINTEL proposals, SEIDEL next asked if the Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) on the BPP was in operation at the time COINTEL was initiated, and what proposals were submitted in COINTEL based on information from ELSUR.

SEIDEL was advised agent's release would not allow him to discuss ELSUR.

SEIDEL asked if the San Francisco Division had made any "snitch" proposals. When asked to clarify the question, he stated that this was a suggestion to the effect that a Black Panther Party member be accused of being an FBI informant. Agent replied that to the best of his recollection no such recommendations had been made to the Bureau by San Francisco, and on the contrary, agent knew that it had been pointed out by San Francisco that any such allegation should be most carefully considered inasmuch as BPP history has indicated that they had dealt severely with suspected informants, even to the point of killing them.

SEIDEL then asked if the San Francisco Division had received a great deal of "flak" from the Bureau on this program. He was advised that the Bureau operates a "tickler system" for following investigations and that the program had received some priority from the FBI but agent had never considered correspondence from the Bureau as being "flak".

SEIDEL at this point instead of questioning made the statement that the Bureau gave this matter "high priority". No comment was made to this statement.

SEIDEL next questioned agent if he had read any publicity concerning a May 11, 1970 letter from the Bureau to San Francisco entitled, "Special Operations Research", in which it was suggested that some consideration be given to furnishing the BPP spurious documents that supposedly originated with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI. He explained that some newspaper had received a copy of the document under the Freedom of Information Act and thereafter published it. He inquired if a response to the letter
had been made by San Francisco. Agent advised that it was his recollection that San Francisco had responded recommending against both proposals, pointing out that the BPP had in the short past published contingency plans of the Berkeley Police Department for a raid on National Headquarters to the embarrassment of that agency. San Francisco was of the opinion that if spurious documents were furnished to the BPP they would immediately publish them, rather than attempt to develop an informant and the operation presented a great deal of possible embarrassment and publicity for the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked for agent's knowledge of why the letter had been captioned as previously described rather than Counterintelligence Program, Black Panther Party. Agent stated he had no recollection of exact caption of the letter. SEIDEL then went on to explain that he had been advised that the Bureau had several COINTELS and the one covering Special Operations Research was a COINTEL covering foreign operations. Agent made no comment.

SEIDEL requested what proposals had been made to disrupt the BPP newspaper; how did the proposals originate, and what offices submitted them. He was advised that it was agent's recollection that the Bureau may have requested suggestions from several offices but that to agent's knowledge none had been approved. When SEIDEL continued to question the agent concerning specific proposals and why their approval was not recommended by San Francisco, he was advised that one proposal was the use of a foul-smelling chemical to put on the paper. San Francisco was of the opinion it would not be practical inasmuch as it would contaminate an airplane and would subject the airline or the printing company to damages. SEIDEL was further advised that it was believed the suggestion may have been made for the changing of a first page of an issue at the printing company to embarrass the BPP, but it was pointed out that this would also merely result in a claim being filed against the printer.

SEIDEL was advised that there may have been a suggestion that some thought should be given to the possible delay of the plates for the paper, that suggestion coming at the time when the paper was being printed in New York with the master copy being filmed in San Francisco. San Francisco did not suggest approval because a mere delay would have been of little benefit because the paper was not timely.
SEIDEL asked about the disruption of the BPP Breakfast Program. The answer was given that agent had no recollection of this, and SEIDEL was asked did he have any information from the Bureau that we had attempted a disruption of the program in San Francisco. He related that he believed not and that it probably happened in San Diego.

SEIDEL asked about a suggestion that informants set up a possible confrontation between the BPP and the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Agent stated he had no recollection of such a proposal and did not believe it had been submitted by San Francisco because the membership and activity in RNA had been minimal in this area.

SEIDEL then asked if we had suggested that landlords in the San Francisco area be encouraged to insist on their rent from the BPP. Agent advised he had no recollection of this, but could see nothing wrong in it.

SEIDEL inquired as to the amount of knowledge that SAC CHARLES BATES would have had concerning COINTEL. He was advised that agent had no information, that he, himself, had never discussed the program with Mr. BATES while it was in operation. SEIDEL then inquired if former SAC HARRY MORGAN had been ill during the time he was assigned to San Francisco and the reason for his transfer. Agent replied he had no information concerning this matter.

SEIDEL was asked if he felt that any of the actions agent described as being taken by the San Francisco Division were illegal. SEIDEL stated that he did not believe that these were matters that were in violation of any existing criminal statutes, but there might be some question as to whether the FBI had the specific authority to do these things.

SEIDEL ended the interview by again reiterating that he was a friend of the Bureau, that he was making an inquiry and desired to obtain the opinions of both Headquarters and agents in the field, and that he may make a request to the Bureau to widen the scope of agent's release.
Agent was not placed under oath and when agent refused to furnish opinions in those cases noted above or to discuss ELSUR, SEIDEL suggested that he, SEIDEL, put away his pencil and pad. Agent replied that that was not necessary. The only right explained to agent was the fact that all information furnished by him was at his own volition and was entirely voluntary. No mention was made that any part of the interview might be utilized in a possible court proceeding against the agent.

Agent did not consult with Bureau representative during course of the interview.
On August 13, 1975, former Special Agent Albert P. Clark, who was a supervisor in the San Francisco FBI Office and who retired in December of 1969, advised as follows:

He was interviewed in his home at 66 Elm, Larkspur, California, by SSC Member Lester B. Seidel from 5:40 P.M. to 6:55 P.M., August 12, 1975.

Clark was not placed under oath and no mention was made of his rights. However, Seidel was pleasant and in no way antagonistic. The interview was general, not penetrative, not in depth, and very few specific questions were asked. There appeared to be no discernible criticism of either the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) or the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) by Seidel.

Seidel was compelled on more than one occasion to declare that he was pro-FBI, that the object of his inquiries was to assist the United States Senate in understanding the problem in order that they could consider possible legislation that may eliminate any abuses in the future.

Seidel did mention the fact several times that information had been leaked to the press that Jane Seberg, the movie actress, had become pregnant by a BPP official.
Seidel finally asked Clark if he would have okayed a COINTEL proposal like this and he answered that he would have if he felt that it would have sufficiently hindered the BPP, stating that possibly in some of these occasions someone might get hurt but on the other hand, investigation of the BPP by the FBI might be made easier and it might also cut down on the number of BPP supporters.

Clark was asked to whom the main BPP case was assigned and to whom COINTEL had been assigned in the San Francisco Division. Clark replied that he did not remember but possibly during the time of his supervision, more than one Agent had handled the matters.

Seidel asked how many BPP informants the San Francisco Division had. Clark replied he did not recall and he did not believe that Seidel had a right to know.

Seidel inquired about the BPP wiretap, asking who had requested the tap, the Bureau or the San Francisco Division. Again, Clark replied that he did not recall but the San Francisco Division would not have necessarily waited for the Bureau to initiate the matter but might have requested the Bureau rather than the Bureau having initiated the matter.

Seidel wanted to have an example of a COINTEL proposal. He was not given a specific example but general conversation was had to the effect that any move that might be suggested that would aid the San Francisco Division in their investigation of the BPP in determining their supporters and financiers and possibly disenchancing those individuals might be an example.

Seidel did not ask Clark whether he had done a particular thing.

Questioned concerning whether he felt COINTEL had been effective, Clark replied he did not believe the matter was susceptible to proof but the BPP had sure gone into a steep decline.
Seidel again brought up the Seberg matter and asked if it had done any good. Clark stated he replied, "Maybe."

During this conversation, Clark got the general impression that perhaps Seidel did not feel that COINTEL had been necessary but Clark had argued that it had made the BPP more difficult to operate and possibly easier for the FBI to investigate.

Seidel then wanted to know what there was about the BPP that caused such a concentration of FBI investigative attention. Clark pointed out that this would have to be answered in the context of time, that at the time the program was initiated, there was no doubt that the BPP was a violent, racist organization opposing all law enforcement, attacking officers and generally disturbing the tranquility of the community.

Seidel then went on to discuss the business of pressure. Had Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates and the Bureau put too much pressure on the matter? Clark stated there was undoubtedly pressure because everyone was interested in doing the best type job possible and finding out everything possible concerning the BPP. There was obvious pressure from the Bureau in the matter and the Bureau, in a case like this, could never be satisfied. Clark stated that he related that perhaps too much pressure had come from the Bureau because he had felt at the time he was a supervisor that San Francisco Division knew more about the BPP than the Bureau. On the other hand, he related that Bureau officials were probably under pressure because of the national interest and the demands on them in Washington.

Seidel related that he was interested in ascertaining what Agent would make the best witness to appear in Washington to explain and testify concerning COINTEL. He specifically requested Clark's recommendation and mentioned the names of Special Agents Leo S. Brenneisen of San Francisco and Bob Baker of Los Angeles. Clark stated that he had countered by suggesting that somebody in Washington who directed the program and approved all proposals might be a better witness.
Clark recalled that near the first of the interview, Seidel probably, more to make conversation than to obtain information, asked a few questions concerning US and the Republic of North Africa (RNA). He was advised that US had not been active in this division and there had been no pertinent RNA activity brought to his attention. Seidel asked if Ron Karenga of US had visited San Francisco and Clark replied he had no exact recollection of this.

Seidel talked and asked Clark's opinion on the separation into different agencies of the Bureau's criminal and security investigations. Clark stated that he told Seidel that in the past he had considered this and felt that frankly it might have advantages, and at the same time, might have disadvantages. He pointed out that the disadvantages were that you could not be sure that it, in fact, would work and that if you remove the security investigations from the Bureau, you would undoubtedly lose a great deal, including public support.

Seidel asked if Clark had worked under former SAC Harry Morgan. He advised that he had retired prior to the time Morgan was assigned to the San Francisco Division.

Clark pointed out that during the interview, a recorder appeared prominently on his desk, and Seidel could, of course, not be sure that it was not in operation; although as the duration of the interview lengthened, it must have been obvious to Seidel that it was not operating.
On August 14, 1975, retired former Special Agent William A. Cohendet was interviewed from 9:30 A.M. to 11:15 A.M. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). The interview took place at the Holiday Inn on Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco.

Mr. Seidel mentioned that he was serving as a counsel for the SSC, investigating all phases of the United States intelligence community, and he had chosen the Black Panther Party and the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) as his field. He stated that he was hoping for full cooperation on the part of the former Special Agent.

He was advised that former Special Agent Cohendet was willing to cooperate with the committee and he trusted that something constructive would come out of the effort being put forward. Former Special Agent Cohendet also pointed out that in his opinion the Black Panther Party (BPP) had been a group devoted to violence, thievery, and fraud, and the committee should realize the type of Subjects with whom they are dealing in order to place the investigation in its proper framework.

The first question concerned the former Special Agent's background and Bureau service. This was briefly furnished.

Seidel then asked when and how the technical surveillances had been installed, who initiated them, and who approved them.

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The former Special Agent replied that he was not party to any of these arrangements and did not know any of the details.

Seidel then asked if former Special Agent Cohendet knew the origin and purposes of the COINTEL Program. He was informed that the former Agent did not know the origin of the program, and said he believed its purposes were those as set forth in the instructions which Seidel had and which spoke for themselves. The former Agent admitted that said program at one time had been assigned to him but due to the press of other functions, he had been unable to give it a great deal of time and felt that during the period that it had been assigned to him, it had been largely ineffective.

Seidel then asked if there was any connection between ELSUR and COINTEL and the reply was given that obviously there would be if the ELSUR material being reviewed could be considered as having any pertinence to a COINTEL operation. However, former Special Agent Cohendet could not recall having used this material while the case was assigned to him, at least to any significant degree. Not having the files available made it impossible to state positively if there had been any specific instance of use of this material.

Seidel asked as to the possible effectiveness of anonymous letters and he was informed that in the opinion of the former Agent, such letters, particularly having to do with personal infidelity or thievery, which were the usual suggested avenues, would have little effect on the recipients who were active in such fields themselves much of the time. In the more serious areas of perhaps trying to falsely show that an individual was an FBI or police informant, the former Special Agent said that the use of this technique would not be used for fear of causing bodily harm or death to an innocent person due to the well-known propensity of the BPP of dealing harshly with any suspected deviator let alone informant.
Seidel then asked as to the value of ELSUR to the BPP investigation and the former Special Agent stated that in his belief it was extremely valuable in many ways. For instance, it assisted and gauged the true Huey Newton, his plans, and weaknesses. It was also valuable in estimating the possible effect of a certain COINTEL program as possibly suggested by some other office. As a result of their information, the San Francisco Office usually rejected most suggestions as being unlikely to be successful.

Seidel wondered if ELSUR was not the most valuable, single investigative aid that the Bureau had had in this investigation, and the former Special Agent agreed that he was probably correct.

Seidel then wondered if the COINTEL proposals should be part of some legislation proposed by Congress and the former Special Agent replied that the Bureau officials, in his opinion, should be allowed to comment on this because the fact that the program would be ineffective against the BPP might not be a valid argument that it would not work to better advantage in other circumstances.

Former Special Agent Cohendet declined to comment on the effectiveness of COINTEL as used against the Socialist Workers Party, not having had any experience with its use in that field.

Seidel then asked about informants and asked if there had been any pressure from the Bureau in the development of such sources. Former Special Agent Cohendet acknowledged that there certainly had been great pressure in this direction, as it was well known that informants were a necessary part of any investigation and a police organization can never give up on this phase of its work no matter how difficult the circumstances were in their development. In the case of the BPP, the development of informants was particularly difficult because of the fear that many persons in the black community felt concerning the BPP as well as the lack of desire to cooperate against another black person.
Seidel asked about foreign funds being raised and given to the BPP, and former Special Agent Cohendet recalled that "Masai" Hewitt and others went to Sweden and other countries where the BPP raised money on speech making tours.

Seidel then asked about any investigation of BPP funds and former Special Agent Cohendet said that it was his recollection that investigation of BPP funds had been undertaken through legal channels but he had no personal knowledge of the investigation and declined to go further into this field.

Seidel asked about referrals of Bureau information to the Internal Revenue Service and former Special Agent Cohendet said that he had no personal knowledge of what had been done in this direction.

Seidel then asked about the affair between Actress Jean Seberg and "Masai" Hewitt, which had appeared in a Hollywood gossip column and had alleged that Seberg had become pregnant by Hewitt. Seidel said that the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had admitted leaking this information to someone in the press.

Former Special Agent Cohendet knew that this couple had been lovers for a brief period but denied any knowledge of any leak to the press by either San Francisco or Los Angeles.

Seidel asked if the former Agent thought that leaking this type of information was appropriate. No comment was offered as to this question.

Seidel, at the conclusion of the interview, said that he had noted that the "faking" of police records as suggested had never been undertaken and he observed that he believed the COINTEL abuses were being overplayed by the press. From what he learned in interviews in San Francisco, it seemed to him that the program had been mostly played down and indeed, an independent judgment had been exercised in the implementation of the program.
A general discussion of the BPP ensued in which former Special Agent Cohendet reiterated the criminal background and threatening attitude of many of the BPP members, their mendacious ways, and their lack of credibility in their public statements. The former Special Agent credited the news media with helping to build up the BPP beyond its actual strength and influence.

Seidel asked about the former Agent's knowledge of the reason for the removal of former SAC Harry Morgan from San Francisco. He said the only reason he was asking this question was in order to avoid embarrassing former SAC Morgan when he interviews him concerning his possible knowledge of BPP activities sometime in the future. Former Special Agent Cohendet had no knowledge as to why Mr. Morgan was transferred.

In summation, Seidel ventured the opinion that he thought the ELSUR technique was far more valuable in the carrying out of the investigation of the BPP than the COINTEL. Former Special Agent Cohendet had to agree to the above observation.

Former Special Agent Cohendet was not advised of any rights that he might have in declining to answer any questions and Seidel said he was actually seeking witnesses for a possible hearing in Washington, D.C. He stated that no names would be mentioned in any write-up he would make concerning his interviews.
On August 12, 1975, retired former SA David E. Todd was interviewed from 1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the SSC. The interview took place at the Holiday Inn, San Francisco.

By way of background, in all contacts with Seidel previously, former SA Todd has indicated to him great reluctance to discuss these matters without clearance from the Bureau, and pointed out to Seidel that the Bureau had released former SA Todd from the Employment Secrecy Agreement for the purpose of a staff interview, but Seidel was told that former SA Todd did not think it was either his responsibility or his prerogative to provide information or make information public; that while employed he was acting as an Agent of the Federal Government and felt it was the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide the information, and that if the Senate Committee desired information from former SA Todd, the questions should have been submitted to him in writing, and his answers should have been made in writing and first forwarded to the FBI, and then after the FBI determined it advisable to make these answers available to the Committee, that would have been the proper channel.

Seidel pointed out the Committee and the Bureau had made an agreement whereby the Bureau would make Agents available to the Committee for interview. Former SA Todd pointed out to Seidel that he is not in the category of an Agent, being a retired Agent, and at this point there was no additional discussion on this matter.

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Seidel was also told that nothing that was said by former SA Todd should be interpreted as being critical of the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) itself, and that if the Bureau felt that such a Program was necessary in the interest of national defense, he had carried it out in the best way he saw fit, and that in recommending against specific proposals as being impractical or inadvisable, these recommendations were against the specific incidents recommended and not against the Program as a whole.

Seidel's first questions dealt with former SA Todd's background and the extent of his Bureau service, and whether he had worked security or criminal matters. Former SA Todd gave him chronologically the offices in which he had served in the Bureau, and stated he had been associated from 1952 to 1956 with the Domestic Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C., and had become Supervisor in San Francisco in December, 1969, of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and that during his Bureau career he had worked both criminal and security matters.

Seidel asked the name of the squad which was originally the Racial Squad, and subsequently changed to Extremist Matters, and he asked whether the work was strictly intelligence, or whether it combined intelligence or criminal work. It was pointed out Bombing Matters were originally being handled on this Squad for a period of time, and that both the criminal activities of the Panthers, as well as intelligence activities, were combined in the assignment.

Seidel then asked when the technical surveillances on the Panthers were installed. Former SA Todd replied that they were functioning at the time he was appointed Supervisor. Seidel then asked how was the technical surveillance related to the COINTEL, if at all, and specifically whether information coming from the technical surveillance was used in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd advised that he could not recall specifically what was done in either Program without reviewing the files and comparing the information therein with the source. Seidel seemed very interested in this, but actually the question could not be answered on the basis of recollection alone, and was not.
Seidel then asked how would the Panther COINTEL be defined with regard to aims, techniques and results. The answer to this was that the aims were to counter generally the revolutionary objectives and activities of the Panthers. The question concerning techniques was left unanswered, and as far as results go, former SA Todd told Seidel that he did not feel there had been any great results from the Program as it was pursued in the San Francisco Office, but he could not speak for the rest of the Program as far as the Bureau is concerned.

Seidel asked whether the Agents working the criminal aspects of the BPP received information that was received from a technical source, and he was told procedures by which information had been routed to them in their cases, and that at the time we operated these technical surveillances, we felt they had been installed lawfully, and that the information received could be used.

Seidel asked whether there was a great deal of pressure put on the San Francisco Office for the development of informants. He was told yes, that informants were the backbone of good law enforcement and the Bureau constantly urged better informant coverage.

Seidel asked if there had been similar pressure placed on the office in the COINTEL, and former SA Todd replied that he did not feel that any great pressure had been put on the office to carry out this Program, but that the Bureau had recommended the Program, however, had left it up to the office pretty much as to how it should be carried out.

Seidel asked whether the Program had been successful in causing dissen3ion within the Party. Former SA Todd told him that he did not feel this had been particularly effective in any way, and that causing dissen3ion had not been a primary objective of the Program in the San Francisco Office, and that the policy had been to use the Program for primarily two purposes: 1) for the purpose of developing informants by attempting to dissuade them from their loyalties to the Party; and 2) to make representations to Panthers for whom outstanding arrest warrants had been issued in order to flush them out so they could be apprehended.
Seidel asked specifically about the COINTEL involving the Breakfast Program, and was told a recommendation had been made for putting some kind of contamination in the Breakfast Program food, and that this office had felt this extremely inadvisable and recommended against it, and it was not carried out here.

Former SA Todd was also asked about a COINTEL proposal relating to "The Black Panther" newspapers, and was told that such a proposal had been made involving saturating the papers with a foul smelling fish oil or some substance, however, we recommended against this as it would serve no purpose.

Seidel was advised that the San Francisco policy had been to recommend against harassment, per se, and also recommended against leaking information to the press. Seidel then raised the question about the incident where Huey P. Newton's high standard of living was given to the press, and he was told that this fell into the category of informant development on the basis it was felt that if those Panthers who were living practically in poverty could realize what Newton's standards of living were, it might change their allegiance to him and they could be contacted for informant purposes.

Seidel was also told that in this phase of the COINTEL, it was former SA Todd's recollection that this information regarding Newton's high standard of living had been disseminated by informants, and that the press was well aware of Newton's standards of living without having to make this information available to them.

Seidel asked what the instructions had been from the Bureau in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd told Seidel that he had reviewed this file after being appointed Supervisor, but could not recall specifically what the Bureau instructions were. The only other instructions received were at a two day conference in Washington, D.C., on BPP matters conducted by former Assistant to the Director William Sullivan, and Section Chief George Moore, at which time it was pointed out that the Bureau desired the COINTEL to be coordinated with the Bureau, but that former SA Todd did not recall any firm prohibition against
taking certain actions without Bureau authority, and that the field had some leeway in what they did, but, in general, offices made proposals to the Bureau with copies to San Francisco prior to taking any action. Seidel asked why San Francisco got copies of all proposals, and was told this was because San Francisco was office of origin in the BPP case and other offices were required to furnish a copy of all correspondence.

Seidel then asked to what extent Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates had knowledge of the COINTEL as it related to the BPP, and he was told that former SA Todd could not speak for Bates and his knowledge would be dependent upon how carefully he read incoming mail and reviewed files, and former SA Todd had no knowledge as to what extent Bates did this.

Seidel was told that under the supervisory setup in the office at the time, former SA Todd felt it was his responsibility to direct this Program in San Francisco and not Bates.

Seidel indicated that out of his investigation in the hearings, undoubtedly there would be some legislation coming out of Congress that would either enable or prohibit such things as the COINTEL, and he stated that was one reason he was asking concerning its effectiveness, and wondered what former SA Todd would recommend. Seidel was told that former SA Todd felt it essential that the Government should have the right to defend itself against individuals and groups who advocate violent revolution or who are aligned with foreign powers, and that there was a need for some sort of legislation within the framework of constitutional government which would enable the Government to do this; but, of course, it should be done under proper control. Seidel asked for suggestions as to what sort of control, and was told that this was a matter for Congress to decide, but perhaps Congress should look into some legislation similar to wiretap legislation, where the responsibility is upon a Federal judge to issue a warrant.

Former SA Todd had prepared a brief summary of what he recalled of the activities of the BPP, and he made a copy of this available to Seidel. Former SA Todd also had made a chronology to assist him in answering questions, together with
some notes concerning COINTEL policy, former SA Todd's general recollection of matters, questions of law regarding agent -
privileged information problems, ongoing litigation and national defense, and informants and sources. Seidel asked for a copy of this chronology and this, too, was given to him.

Seidel expressed great interest in receiving the one page summary of the Panthers' activities, and stated that he had chosen the Panthers for a case study, and he seemed more interested in this than in the COINTEL. He also indicated that there might be future interviews and that former SA Todd might be called as a witness before the Committee at a later date.

At the outset of the interview, Seidel asked whether former SA Todd desired his rights be read to him. Former SA Todd told him that since he did not interpret this as a custodial interview, and it was his understanding Seidel had no police power, that he could forego reading the rights.

Former SA Todd did not feel it was necessary to consult with a Bureau representative at this time.

The above information was furnished by former SA Todd voluntarily and was not solicited.
Approximate Dates


May 1970  Cointelpro letter. Suggestion rejected by S. F.
Aug 1970  Marin Court shootout (Jonathan Jackson-Judge Haley)
Aug 1970  Cleaver released from prison.

Jan 1971  Letters to Algeria to provoke Cleaver to return to U.S. so arrest could be effected.

Feb 1971  Newton becomes Supreme Commander, Cleaver expelled.


April 1971  Sam Napier murder.
April 1971  Two New York police officers wounded.
May 1971  Four New York police officers murdered.

August 1971  George Jackson killed in prison break attempt.
August 1971  Officer Kowalski murder attempt - Washington & Bottom arrest
August 1971  S. F. Ingleside Station attack - Officer Young murdered.


COINTELPRO: Recommended against many proposals. Approved recommendation to try to induce Cleaver to return to U.S.

Would have approved actions to persuade Panthers to change loyalty from Party and become informants, but cannot recall any specific ones.

Would not have approved any proposals solely for harassment or for leaking information to press; there must have been some bona fide investigative purpose behind proposal before considering it.

RECOLLECTION: Recall only generalities. Requested if could review Bureau files prior to interview. This was denied. Cannot testify with any specificity without review of files.

AGENT-PRINCIPAL PRIVILEGED INFORMATION: Sensitive techniques Informants & Sources Ongoing Investigations Foreign Intelligence
Ongoing litigation: Panthers v. FBI & IRS, USDC, S. F. Civil rights.

National Defense: Documents reviewed were classified. Does executive branch have right to defend nation against advocates of revolution (public interest issue).

Informants & sources: Cannot reveal. (Includes information that might reveal identity.)

Neither my responsibility nor my prerogative to provide or make this information public. I was acting as an agent of the Federal government, and it is responsibility of government to provide the information.

Any questions should be submitted in writing and my answers in writing should be forwarded to FBI and if FBI deems it advisable to make these answers available to Committee, that should be proper channel.
The investigation of the Black Panther Party was a National Defense matter. Information on file points to collaboration with foreign powers by leaders of the Party.

Throughout the two-year period in which I supervised the investigation there were strong liaisons between Black Panthers and dissident groups abroad as well as with the governments of foreign nations. The Black Panthers had support and/or branches in France, Germany and Scandinavia, and were international in scope. Eldridge Cleaver, wanted on felony warrants, had been granted asylum in Algeria and with his entourage was residing in a villa provided by the Algerian government. During this period he made at least one trip to Moscow, Russia. Several Black Panthers travelled to Cuba. Huey Newton, in 1971, travelled to Red China by way of Canada and Hong Kong at the invitation of the Chinese government at a time when the United States had no diplomatic relations with them.

At the time I began serving as supervisor in late 1969, the Black Panther Party was under co-leadership of Huey Newton, then confined to prison in California, and Eldridge Cleaver, living in exile in Algeria. The Black Panther Party, both in the newspaper it published weekly at San Francisco, and in public statements by its officers and leaders, advocated violent revolution; it published instructions on guerrilla warfare, directions for the use of weapons, and printed detailed drawings and instructions on the manufacture of bombs and explosive devices, and it agitated openly for the murder of police officers. The term "off the pigs," which means "kill the police," was a Black Panther catchphrase. The history of the Black Panther Party during the period I acted as supervisor is replete with incidents of murder, violence and inciting to revolution. The revolutionary quotation of Mao Tse-Tung, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," became a Black Panther motto.

Sometime in early 1971 a split occurred in the Black Panther Party. Huey Newton, following his release from prison in 1970, gained control of one faction headquartered in Berkeley, California, and he broke openly with Eldridge Cleaver, publicly expelling Cleaver and Cleaver's lieutenants from the Party. The Newton faction thereafter gradually took a more moderate approach, advocating social change through community service in place of its prior profile of violence. No change was noted in the policies of the Cleaver faction directed from Algiers, and it continued to advocate violent revolution; it began publication in New York of its own newspaper proclaiming its revolutionary policies; and followers belonging to this faction continued to commit crimes of violence.

The following crimes of violence attributed to the Cleaver faction of the Black Panthers have been documented in the book "Target Blue," by former Deputy Police Commissioner Robert Daley of New York City (Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973):

Ambush attacks against police officers which resulted in 7 officers murdered, 3 wounded, and one attempted murder thwarted, which led to the solution of the other cases and established these attacks to be a nationwide conspiracy; and the murder of two Newton-faction Black Panthers.
Memorandum 8/12/75 from Mr. Cregar to Mr. Wannall outlined discussions between the Bureau, the Department and the Senate Select Committee concerning the protection of individuals to whom we have incurred an obligation to protecting their identity and/or relationship with the FBI as related to COINTELPRO documents. Prior to furnishing copies of Bureau documents relating to COINTELPRO, we were excising the identities of individuals to whom we had incurred an obligation to protect their identity and/or relationship with the FBI and the Committee complained that this was not in line with the agreed upon procedures.

Pursuant to the instructions of the Deputy Attorney General, an attempt was made at reaching a compromise concerning this matter. As part of the compromise, it was suggested that a certain number of these individuals whose name had been deleted be furnished to the Senate Select Committee representatives for their interview by the Committee.

As a result of the preliminary discussions, SA Daly of this Division was advised on 8/15/75 by Steven Blackhurst that the Attorney General had met with Senator Church on the evening of 8/14/75 and Church had agreed that the Committee would attempt a limited number of interviews of people whose identities and/or relationship with the Bureau had been protected. As a condition precedent to interview, the Bureau was to be allowed to contact the proposed interviewees to inform them of the proposed interview to determine whether the interviewee was receptive to such an interview.
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY

On 8/18/75, SA Daly was telephonically advised by John T. Elliff, Task Force Director of the Domestic Intelligence Task Force of the Senate Select Committee, that Senator Church had reconsidered his agreement with the Attorney General to the aforementioned procedures and had drafted a letter to the Attorney General stating that these procedures were not acceptable to the Committee. Elliff stated Church was not in town on this date and that Church had not as yet signed a letter in line with the above but he anticipated such a letter to be signed and furnished the Department and the Bureau in the immediate future. Elliff stated Church's change in position in this matter was occasioned by arguments advanced by the Senate Select Committee Staff Members that this procedure was contrary to established procedures.

RECOMMENDATION:

Action. Information.

upon receipt of copy of Senator Church's letter it will be analyzed and recommendations will be submitted.

[Signature]

FWH

[Signature]
NR 003 AX CODE

6:00 PM URGENT SEPT. 8, 1975 VAN

TO: DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SAN DIEGO

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (66-217)

SENSTUDY, 1975.

RE ALEXANDRIA TELEPHONE CALL TO SAN DIEGO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1975 AND BUREAU NITEL, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

THIS WILL CONFIRM REFERENCED TELEPHONE CALL IN WHICH SAN DIEGO WAS ADVISED THAT FORMER EMPLOYEE, THOMAS E. BISHOP, RESIDES 17417 FRANCISCO DRIVE, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, 92128.

END.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/14/75 BY SPALMFLY

ST. 109

REC-37

62 116 395 = 634

12 SEP 10 1975
TO SACS MIAMI
NEW YORK

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)
SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.

THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR COVERAGE OF DR. KING.

IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC REQUEST.

1 - 100-106670 (King)

JTA: pa1/dsh
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
REQUEST. SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT EVEN IF FB HQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPING IN THE ABOVE CAPTION, ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

END

NOTE:

Pursuant to a request from the Senate Select Committee (SSC), Bureau files were reviewed and specific information pertinent to the above question was discovered.

Communications from New York and Miami disclose that both the Dade County Sheriff’s Office and New York City Police Department used electronic surveillance equipment in their coverage of Martin Luther King.

Headquarters considers it appropriate and necessary to have New York and Miami contact the local agencies involved for their position regarding possible disclosure and release of information pertaining to their electronic surveillance coverage of King to the SSC.
TO ALEXANDRIA
ATLANTA
JACKSON
RICHMOND

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED IDENTITIES
OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR WHITE HATE COINTELPROS
FOR 1964 THROUGH 1971 IN RECIPIENT OFFICES.

BY NITEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975; TO ATTENTION INTD,

W. O. CREGAR; FURNISH IDENTITIES OF SUCH PERSONNEL AND DATES
OF PERTINENT COINTEL ASSIGNMENTS. IF INDIVIDUAL IS STILL
ASSIGNED TO YOUR OFFICE, SO STATE.

END

JPT:en e td
(4)

NOTE:

Above based on SSC request dated 8/26/75, Part I,
item 9, deadline 9/12/75.

ST. 109

REG-37.
CODE

TO BOSTON
CHICAGO
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
NEWARK
NEW YORK
SAN DIEGO
SAINT LOUIS

FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)

SENSTUDY 75.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR NEW LEFT AND BLACK EXTREMIST COINTELPROS FOR 1967 THROUGH 1971 IN RECIPIENT OFFICES.

BY NITEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975; ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGER;
FURNISH IDENTITIES OF SUCH PERSONNEL AND DATES OF PERTINENT COINTELPRO ASSIGNMENTS. IF INDIVIDUAL IS STILL ASSIGNED TO YOUR OFFICE, SO STATE.

END

NOTE:

Above based on SSC request dated 8/26/75, Part I, item 8, deadline 9/12/75.
Date of Mail  9/2/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/75  BY SPY

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject  JUNE MAIL  SENSTUDY '75

Removed By  7/9 SEP 17 1975.

File Number  62-116395-630
FBI
Date: 8/29/75

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via

Airltel

Airmail

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: BUREAU SUPERVISOR THOMAS F. HOWARD,
ROOM 4052, HOOVER BUILDING

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (62-496) (C)

SENSTUDY 75

BUDED 8/29/75

Re telephone call from Bureau Supervisor THOMAS F.
HOWARD to Jackson Division Supervisor L. C. BUTEAU, 8/25/75;
telephone call from Bureau Supervisor HOWARD to SA FRANK B.
WATTS, 8/27/75, and Bureau teletype to Jackson, dated 8/25/75,
concerning information requested by the U. S. Senate Select
Committee to study governmental operations with respect to
intelligence activities. Bureau Supervisor HOWARD, in
referred telephone calls, requested certain information,
namely:

Item #1. All materials reflecting contacts and
reports of contacts (and the substance
thereof) by the and/or among the FBI, the
Meridian, Miss., or Jackson, Miss., Police
and A. I. BOTNICK, from 9/1/67 to 3/31/70.

Item #2. All materials reflecting contacts between
the FBI and TOM HENDRICKS, from 5/1/68 to
8/31/68.

Item #3. All materials reflecting the information
supplied by, and Bureau supervision of the
handling of, ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS, RAYMOND
ROBERTS and GORDON CLARK, known to the
Senate Select Committee to have been
informants, from 5/1/68 to 8/31/68.

Approved: Special Agent in Charge
Sent M Per

NW 65994 Docid:32989641 Page 181
Item #4. A synopsis of the main files only contained in the Jackson indices regarding THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III, AND KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH.

Enclosures are being submitted:

Material submitted under each of captioned items is result of Jackson indices check on 8/26/75, as it pertains to the following individuals:

A. I. BOTNICK
TOM HENDRICKS
ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS
RAYMOND LADELLE ROBERTS
GORDON LESTER CLARK
THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III
KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH

Item #1. A. I. BOTNICK

The indices of the Jackson Office reveal that this individual furnished information to this Bureau during the period 9/1/67 to 3/31/70, but was never an informant. Two copies each are enclosed of the below listed serials which contain information furnished by BOTNICK during this period:

JN 170-502-3
JN 170-502-4
JN 170-502-5
JN 170-502-6
JN 170-502-7
JN 174-135-66
JN 174-161-649
JN 174-161-656

Item #2. THOMAS M. HENDRICKS

The indices of the Jackson Office reveal that this individual furnished information to this Bureau during
the period 5/1/68 to 8/31/68, but was never an informant. Two copies each are enclosed of the below listed serials which contain information furnished by HENDRICKS during this period:

\[ \text{JN 174-161-642 not part} \]
\[ \text{JN 174-161-634 not part} \]

Item #3. A. ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS

The indices of the Jackson Office revealed no information furnished by this individual for the period May 1, 1968, to August 31, 1968.

Enclosed are two copies of an airtel entitled "BOMBING INVESTIGATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI. BOMBING MATTERS," (Bufile 174-1-54, Jackson file 174-135), which states that ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS would be agreeable to prevailing upon his younger brother, RAYMOND ROBERTS, to furnish, on confidential basis, his knowledge of acts of violence in Mississippi, and further that a series of conferences were held during June, 1968, with RAYMOND and ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS, THOMAS M. HENDRICKS, JR., an attorney and former SA, and Detective LUTHER L. SCARBOROUGH, Meridian, Miss., Police Department, regarding this matter.

In this regard, ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS was present during a number of meetings with the above mentioned individuals; however, all information was actually furnished by his brother, RAYMOND.

ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS has never been an informant of the Jackson Division; however, he was instrumental in obtaining the cooperation of his younger brother.

ALTON WAYNE ROBERTS is presently confined in the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Texarkana, Texas, where he is serving a 10-year sentence as a result of his part in the murder of the three civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Miss., on June 21, 1964.

Serial enclosed is as follows:

\[ \text{JN 170-626-3} \]
Item #3. B. RAYMOND LADELLE ROBERTS

The indices of the Jackson Office reveal that this individual furnished information to this Bureau during the period from 5/1/68 to 8/31/68. Enclosed are two copies each of the below listed serials which contain information furnished by ROBERTS during that period. Also, included are those serials pertaining to Bureau supervision and the handling of ROBERTS.

\[\begin{align*} 
\text{JN 170-626-1} \\
\text{JN 170-626-2} \\
\text{JN 170-626-3} \\
\text{JN 170-626-4} \\
\text{JN 170-626-5} \\
\text{JN 170-626-6} \\
\text{JN 170-626-7} \\
\text{JN 170-626-9} \\
\text{JN 170-626-14} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-1} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-2} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-3} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-4} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-5} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-6} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-7} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-8} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-9} \\
\text{JN 170-626-SF1-10} \\
\text{JN 174-161-634} \\
\text{JN 174-161-642} \\
\end{align*}\]

The Bureau's attention is directed to Bureau file 170-3281. Subject of this file is known to the Bureau and was opened by the Jackson Office 6/18/68, as a Confidential Source - Racial, and case was closed by Jackson letter to the Bureau, dated 9/12/69. During the period that the case was open, this source was paid by this Bureau a total of $392. At the time this subject was developed as a confidential source, it was the distinct understanding between source and Agents contacting him that all information furnished by him would be held in strict confidence and the revelation of information furnished by him would most assuredly result in his, as well as other members of his family, immediate death. This Bureau has never violated that trust.
Source and his brother, however, were publicly identified by JACK NELSON, who was then a staff writer for the Los Angeles Times, in an article appearing on the front page of that newspaper on February 13, 1970. A copy of that article is enclosed.

Item #3. C. GORDON LESTER CLARK

The indices of the Jackson Office revealed no information furnished by this individual for period 5/1/68-8/31/68.

The Bureau's attention is directed to Bureau file 170-5883. Subject of this file is known to the Bureau and was opened by the Jackson Office January 4, 1972.

This source's identity has never been publicly disclosed. Informant was sole source of information in the proposed bombing by BYRON DE LA BECKWITH of the residence of A. I. BOTNICK, head of the Anti-Defamation League in Louisiana and Mississippi, on or about September 27, 1973. It is noted that during Federal and state trials, lasting approximately 2½ years, that it appeared the primary function of the defendants and their klan-type lawyers was to determine the identity of informant in this case. Efforts were directed at handling Agent on numerous occasions in an effort to have him make some slip which would reveal identity of informant. Numerous Federal court decisions were utilized and, in fact, Agent was excused by State Judge from testifying since he was convinced that any testimony in state court by the Agent would reveal source's identity and possibly cost him his life.

In view of the above, the Bureau should make every effort to insure source's identity is not disclosed.

Item #4. A. KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH

The indices of the Jackson Office reflect the following main files on KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH:

JN 174-159
JN 174-123
JN 174-161
JN 157-8937
Material contained in Jackson file 174-161 is synopsized under Item #4. B.

Enclosed are two copies each of the following:

\→ Synopsis of Jackson file 174-123, entitled "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH (DECEASED); BOMBING OF BETH ISRAEL CONGREGATION SYNAGOGUE, 5315 OLD CANTON ROAD, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, SEPTEMBER 18, 1967. BOMBING MATTER." - destroyed.

\→ A correlation memo dated 1/2/69, captioned "KATHY AINSWORTH. RM - KLAN," which synopsizes the contents of her investigation. - destroyed - rejected on LHS.

\→ Synopsis of Jackson file 174-159, captioned "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH (DECEASED); JOE DANIEL HAWKINS; BOMBING OF RESIDENCE OF LILLIE BYRD, RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, JUNE 6, 1968; NELSON MC INTOSH - VICTIM. BOMBING MATTER." - destroyed.

Item #4. B. THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III

The following main files on THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III, were reflected in the indices of the Jackson Office:

JN 4-5
JN 174-161
JN 157-9795
JN 44-2383
JN 91-1134
JN 91-1127
JN 88-2017
JN 174-126
JN 174-123

\→ Jackson indices reflect the following main file on THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III, captioned "SAMUEL HOLLOWAY BOWERS, JR.; THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III,". Jackson file 4-5. and enclosed are two copies each of serials 148 through 260.

\→ Enclosed are two copies of synopsis of Jackson file 174-161, captioned "KATHLEEN MADLYN AINSWORTH (DECEASED); THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; ATTEMPTED BOMBING RESIDENCE OF MEYER DAVIDSON, 2904 36TH STREET, MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI, JUNE 30, 1968. BOMBING MATTER." - destroyed.
Enclosed are two copies each of the following serials:


A summary of Jackson file 174-159 is reported appropriately under Item Number 4. A.

Enclosed are two copies of synopsis of Jackson files 44-2383 and 157-9795, captioned respectively, "UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; SHOOTING INTO THE RESIDENCE OF PIZER BUCKNER, SANDHILL COMMUNITY, RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, MAY 2, 1968; PIZER BUCKNER - VICTIM. CIVIL RIGHTS," AND "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; SHOOTING INTO THE RESIDENCE OF FLOSSIE LINDSEY, SANDHILL COMMUNITY, RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, MAY 2, 1968; FLOSSIE LINDSEY; BETTY JEAN MC LIN - VICTIMS. EXTREMIST MATTERS." - destroyed -

Enclosed are two copies of synopsis of Jackson file 157-9795, entitled "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; JOE DANIEL HAWKINS; SHOOTING INTO RESIDENCE OF FLOSSIE LINDSEY, SANDHILL COMMUNITY, RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, MAY 2, 1968; FLOSSIE LINDSEY; BETTY JEAN MC LIN - VICTIMS. CIVIL RIGHTS. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968. - destroyed -

A review of Jackson file 91-1134, captioned "JOE DANIEL HAWKINS, aka; ET AL; NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE, LAMAR-BELLEVUE BRANCH, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, 6/11/68. BANK ROBBERY," revealed upon the original investigation instituted in this matter, TARRANTS was reported as a subject; however, subsequent investigation determined that TARRANTS did not participate in the above captioned bank robbery.

Enclosed are two copies each of a synopsis of the following files:

Jackson file 91-1127, entitled, "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; SIMMONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, JEFFERSON SQUARE OFFICE, PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS, JUNE 4, 1968. BANK ROBBERY."
Jackson file 88-2017, entitled "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III, aka; MALCOLM EUGENE HOUSTON, aka; LOUIS MERCER SHADOAN (DECEASED); JOE DANIEL HAWKINS, aka; WILLIAM BURNETT WALDROP. ITS: MV; BR; PV; UFAC - ARMED ROBBERY, CHILD MOLESTATION, AND ATTEMPTED BOMBING; ASSAULTING A FEDERAL OFFICER; HARBORING - AIDING AND ABETTING - CONSPIRACY; NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT; STATE FIREARMS CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT." - dictated.

Jackson file 174-126, entitled "THOMAS ALBERT TARRANTS, III; JOE DANIEL HAWKINS; BOMBING OF FACULTY COTTAGE NUMBER 14, TOUGALOO COLLEGE, TOUGALOO, MISSISSIPPI, OCTOBER 6, 1967; DOCTOR WILLIAM T. BUSH; MARGARET BUSH - VICTIMS. BOMBING MATTER." - dictated.
FBI
Date: 8/28/75

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (66-116395)
ATTN: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

FROM: SAC, PORTLAND (66-2057)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The following is being provided for information of FBIHQ:

On 8/25/75, Captain NORMAN F. REITER (NA), Portland Police Bureau, Portland, Oregon, telephonically contacted SA HAROLD K. CLARK (police coordinator), FBI Portland, and provided the following information of possible interest to the FBI:

Last week PAT SHEA (phonetic), investigator for investigative committee headed by U.S. Senator FRANK CHURCH, telephonically contacted REITER for an interview. REITER picked up SHEA and his suitcases at the residence of JOHN HEADE (JOHN PATRICK HEADE, Bufile 100-458601, PDFile 157-639). REITER took SHEA to lunch and then to the airport. SHEA gave REITER telephone number to call in Washington, D.C. to verify position with CHURCH Committee and REITER made call. SHEA mentioned lack of sensitivity between the FBI and local authorities while discussing activities in Portland, Oregon during 1970 such as Portland State University "riots" and activities in connection with the People's Army Jamboree (Bufile 100-459278, PDFile 100-11705) both before and after the American Legion Convention which was held in Portland in 1970 (8/28/70 - 9/3/70).

2. Bureau (AM)(RM)
2. Portland
(1-66-2057)(SENSTUDY 75)
(1-57-639)(HEADE)

LBA: csa
(4)

5 SEP 1 1975


Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per
PD 66-2057

SHEA made comments that he had FBI "reports" alleging HEADE was an "informer."

ADMINISTRATIVE

No re-contact was made with REITER by Special Agents of the Portland Office knowledgeable in above matters to obtain more specific details. The attention of FBI HQ is called to Portland letters to FBI HQ dated 10/8/70 and 10/23/70 and FBI HQ letters to Portland dated 10/20/70 and 11/6/70 in matter entitled "COINTELPRO, NEW LEFT, SECURITY MATTER" (Bufile 100-449698, PDfile 100-11048).
By memorandum 8/19/75, you were advised that John Elliff, Director of the Domestic Task Force of the Senate Select Committee, indicated that the Senate Select Committee was not going to interview so-called "recipient sources" involved in COINTELPRO. Elliff indicated a letter to that effect would be drafted by him and forwarded to the Department and the Bureau.

On 8/25/75, Elliff was asked whether he had furnished a letter in connection with his decision concerning COINTELPRO "recipient source" interviews and stated he had not. Additionally, he stated that the Senate Select Committee did not intend to conduct interviews of "recipient sources" at this time. However, he did not plan to put this decision in writing.

On 8/26/75, Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination in the Department, advised that John Elliff informed the Deputy Attorney General of the Senate Select Committee's decision not to interview "recipient sources" in COINTELPRO at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.
NR 007 NF CODE

4:55 PM URGENT AUGUST 27, 1975 LLB

TO DIRECTOR
FROM NORFOLK (62-1057)

SENSUDEY 75.

RE BALTIMORE TELETYPE TO BUREAU, AUGUST 27, 1975.

ON AUGUST 27, 1975, FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE, JAMES F. BLAND, CONTACTED THROUGH HIS DAUGHTER, WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA, AND WAS ADVISED OF CONTENTS OF REFERENCED TELETYPE.

BLAND STATED HE HAS BEEN IN WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA, FOR PAST SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS ASSISTING IN BUILDING COTTAGE WHICH IS FAMILY PROJECT WITH CHILDREN. BLAND STATED THAT WHEN CONTACTED BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), HE WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. HE HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED TO DATE.

END

5:33

FH DXXX HQ DE NF DID YOU JUST RECEIVE OUR NR 007 URGENT?
U. S. Senate Select Committee (SSC) requested whereabouts of several former SAs, including Paul L. Cox. Memorandum 8/25/75 prepared for delivery to the SSC and furnished Cox's latest known address as contained in his personnel file. It was his address at time he retired several years ago in Hyattsville, Maryland.

We subsequently learned that Cox has a mailing address of a trailer court in Sarasota, Florida, and that he was currently on a lengthy motor trip, exact current whereabouts unknown. By teletype 8/26/75, we instructed Tampa to make necessary arrangements through the trailer court to eventually be in touch with Cox so he might be alerted that the SSC might contact him for an interview.

On the afternoon of 8/26/75, Cox telephonically contacted Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the SENSTUDY 75 Project from Washington, D. C. He indicated that he had been visiting the area the last couple of days in connection with a long trip he had taken through Canada and the Midwest, and had learned through a mutual acquaintance who is also employed in the Intelligence Division and has been assisting on the SENSTUDY 75 Project and thus knew of our current interest in Cox, that the Bureau was attempting to locate Cox. Phillips briefed Cox in the same manner as he would have been briefed had the Tampa Office been able to contact him. He indicated that if he was contacted by the SSC Staff he will make a collect call to the Legal Counsel Division for further information and that if he
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

eventually is interviewed he would certainly want to tell the Bureau the results of the interview. In addition to the trailer court address we have on record, Cox furnished an address where he is more apt to be located, which is also a trailer court. That address is number 353, 1300 South Airport Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32910, telephone area code 305, 724-4104. Nothing was said to Cox concerning the consultation aspects relating to interviews of former Agents, as this is a matter under current study with possible change in procedure to be effected.

In view of the conversation had with Cox on the afternoon of 8/26/75, Phillips telephonically contacted ASA C, John Beale of the Tampa Office and advised him that no action need be taken by the Tampa Office in attempt to locate Cox, as this has already been handled by FBIHQ as above.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.
FBI
Date: 8/26/75

Transmit the following in

(TYPE IN PLAINTEXT OR CODE)

Via

(PRIORITY)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
FROM: ACTING ADIC, LOS ANGELES
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

ATTN: W. O. CREGAR (Intelligence Division)

Re telephone call between Los Angeles Supervisor EDMUND J. BIRCH and Bureau Supervisor WOLFINGER on 8/26/75.

Enclosed for the Bureau are Xerox copies of following serials from Los Angeles file on DELLA COOVER, aka (100-19949):

2. FBI, Los Angeles, letters to District Director, Internal Revenue Service, Los Angeles, dated 7/25/72 and 6/5/73.
3. Newspaper article from "Los Angeles Times" by BELLA STUMBO, which appeared in the 7/19/72 edition.

For the information of the Bureau, CSIA 6596-S is a source of continuing value furnishing current information regarding matters under investigation by the Los Angeles Division.

Bureau (Enc. 4)(RM)
2 - Los Angeles
(1 - 100-19949)
(1 - 134-3171)
DDW/jla
(4)

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-19949)  
DATE: 6/5/72

FROM: SA GILBERT G. BENJAMIN

SUBJECT: "CHANGED"
BELLA STUMBO, aka Della Coover
SM - 6 (TROTSKYIST) (ADEX)
OO: Los Angeles

On 5/31/72, CSLA 6596-S advised DELLA COOVER is using the pseudonym Bella Stumbo, so this matter has been marked "changed".

CSLA indicated COOVER is using the Bella Stumbo alias in connection with her position as a staff writer for the "Los Angeles Times".

ACTION

ADEX should be changed to include the new alias and subject's position as a staff writer for the Times. Also, since subject is writing under a still different pseudonym, for the Monterey Park Progress newspapers, it is suggested that consideration be given to advising the Internal Revenue Service that she may be receiving payroll checks under these pseudonyms and not reporting her total income correctly. Appropriate investigation should be conducted to verify subject's use of the additional pseudonym.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/69 BY SG

1 - 134-3171A (CSLA 6596-S)
1 - 80-420 (LOS ANGELES TIMES)

GGB/seb.
(3)/

ENCLOSURE

02-116395-624

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
11000 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, California 90024  
June 5, 1973

District Director  
Internal Revenue Service  
Post Office Box 391  
Los Angeles, California  90053

ATTN: LYNN SULLIVAN (Field Audit #1502)

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to our letter of July 25, 1972, relating to an investigation we were conducting at that time involving Della Coover, born September 1, 1920, Social Security Account Number 557-16-3963; and to the telephone call between Special Agent Gilbert G. Benjamin of this office and Lynn Sullivan, at your office located at 9150 East Flair Drive, El Monte, California, 91731, on Monday, June 4, 1973.

To aid in your investigation in this matter, there are enclosed two xerox duplications of articles which appeared in the "Los Angeles Free Press," issues of March 20 and June 19, 1970, bearing the byline of Della Rosa, which is believed to be another pseudonym utilized by Mrs. Coover.

This information is being furnished for whatever action may be appropriate.

Very truly yours,

JOE D. JAMESON  
Assistant Director in Charge

Enclosures 2

2 - Addressee (RM)  
(1) - Los Angeles (100-19949)  
(3) - GGB/c11

SEARCHED —  
IN, X'D —  
CANCELED —  
FILED —
11000 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90024
July 25, 1972

District Director
Internal Revenue Service
P. O. Box 391
Los Angeles, California 90053

Dear Sir:

For your information the Los Angeles Office of the FBI is conducting an official investigation involving a Della Coover, born September 1, 1920, Social Security Account Number 557-16-3963.

It has come to the attention of the Los Angeles Office that Della Coover is a staff officer for the "Los Angeles Times" newspaper using pseudo name of Bella Stumbo and that she may not be reporting her earnings from this employment.

Enclosed is a recent article written by Bella Stumbo.

This information is being brought to your attention for whatever action you deem necessary.

Very truly yours,

WESLEY G. GRAPP
Special Agent in Charge

Enclosure 1

2 - Addressee (Rm)
(1) - Los Angeles (100-19949)
DPK/bab
(3)
"They Said He Shot a Little Girl"

BY BELLA STUMBO

Early in the evening of July 2, a 4-year-old girl named Joyce Ann Huff was shot to death as she played in a yard in Hawaiian Gardens. She was hit with 42 shotgun pellets fired from a passing car. Subsequently, three Chicano youths from the neighboring Norwalk barrio were arrested. Being held on suspicion of murder in the killing are Donald Antelo, 21, Oscar Hernandez, 22, and Michael Ramirez, 17.

Donald Antelo’s mother Beatrice, 50, is a devout Catholic. She has a makeshift altar in her bedroom where she prays each night before going to bed. She had just finished her rosary the night police came looking for her son.

"There were four of them at the door. They rushed through the house, searching for Don. I said he wasn’t home, but what did they want him for? And they said because he shot a little girl, that my boy killed a child."

Beatrice Antelo was sitting at her kitchen table, staring listlessly at a cold cup of coffee in front of her, her voice a weary whisper.

"They didn’t have uniforms on, so I thought maybe they were some of Don’s friends playing a bad joke. I told them to stop fooling around about something so awful."

Though it was nearly noon now, Beatrice Antelo still wore her houserobe and slippers. Her small kitchen was half lost in the stagnant gloom of drawn shades and closed windows.

"I said no, it was impossible. Not my son. He would never in his life do such a terrible thing."

Beatrice Antelo dropped her head into her hands. An emaciated woman who lost a lung to tuberculosis years ago, she has now taken a three-week vacation from her job. She spends most of her days in bed reliving the night she last saw her son.

"They told me I better help them find Don. They said dozens of police were searching all over the town for him and somebody might shoot him on"
A Family Reared on Welfare

Beatrice Antelo, a long-time divorcee, has two sons—now 10 years older than Don. A daughter died during infancy of encephalitis. "Until the boys were old enough to get by without me at home," she says. she roared them on welfare. Then she went to work at a local food packing plant where she earns $230 a month. Rent on her small, two-bedroom house, which is no better, no worse than most of the other dilapidated bungalows lining the narrow streets of Norwalk's half-square mile Mexican-American barrio, is $75 a month.

"I was sure they would kill him," Mrs. Antelo continued dully. "So I went with two of them. We drove everywhere I could think of looking for my boy."

During that futile search, she says, she tried to tell the two officers, who listened politely, that they had made some grotesque mistake.

She knew her son. He was a good boy. He loved children. He and his girlfriend wanted to have a big family when they got married—which would be as soon as Don found a job. It isn't easy to find a job when you don't have a car to look outside the barrio, she had explained.

Meantime, she pointed out, Don was a good student at Cerritos College. He studied hard, made good grades, "was determined to make something out of himself."

Beatrice Antelo absentmindedly stroked a tiny brown dog sleeping peacefully in her lap. He is her watchdog. When strangers approach the house, he pokes his head through a broken living room window pane and barks with comic ferocity.

Don had been in trouble before, of course, she continued, an edge of bitterness creeping into her voice as she told how he had been thrown out of Excelsior High School four years ago because "he had long hair before it was common." He had brushes with the police before, too, she said, without elaborating—but most barrio youths have similar experiences.

"Won't Care About Saving Him"

"You have to live here to know what it's like. Police everywhere, poverty you can't escape, no jobs . . ." Her voice trailed off in a resigned shrug. She makes less than $3,000 annually, so she can't afford to hire a private attorney to defend her son, she said. And she's certain the court-appointed public defender "won't care about saving him."

A cough, suddenly seized her. The doctor has warned her against interviews, she explained. She doesn't answer the telephone much anymore either because it often turns out to be somebody calling her the mother of a monster or threatening to bomb her house or, worse still, to harm her older son, 31, a father of two with a job outside Norwalk.

"I guess it makes people feel better to get the hate off their chests when something as horrible as this happens," she sighed. "I just hang up."

But her mind clearly wasn't on herself—it was still on that last night, on the scene that had awaited her when she and the two officers returned home.

"They had already found Don and the Ramirez boy," she said. "They were standing out front, surrounded by police. They had handcuffs on."

Beatrice Antelo turned her face away, toward the wall, where a huge calendar of the Ascension hung in the gloom. The police had freed his hands so she could talk to him, she said.
Helen and Antonio Hernandez are a soft-spoken, almost timid couple. They came to Norwalk from Phoenix 25 years ago. Since then, they have evidently lived according to a single, uncomplicated philosophy — namely, people who work hard, worship God, discipline their children, and mind their own business will make out accordingly. Life might be meager, but it will advance smoothly and peaceably and, perhaps, for their children, it may even become progressively richer.

And, until July, the Hernandez family had seemed a sound one. Antonio, a big solid man dressed in neat polyester slacks and a crisp button-down shirt, is a grinder in a nearby steel foundry. He has saved his money and now almost owns his modest little pink house which by barrio standards, is a comfortable one. He takes pride in it.

* Bashful Woman

Helen, a stout, bashful woman with a fresh, scrubbed, friendly face, prone to twisting nervously at her wedding rings, has always been single-mindedly devoted to her duties as a wife and mother. Never has she even considered working outside her home, though the Hernandez family, like most in the barrio, has always needed more money than they have had.

Both devoted Jehovah's Witnesses, the couple have also enforced a rigid brand of religion in their household. Their sons have been taught, among other things, that violence is evil.

It is therefore, with boundless pride that Helen and Antonio Hernandez report there are no high school dropouts in their family — and no losers, no hippies, no bums, no convicts. Only hard-working, sports-minded, clean-living, patriotic Americans. Especially the latter.

When Helen Hernandez's 19-year-old son was drafted, she beams, he went to serve his country without question. He was in the Army for a year, until an automobile accident earned him both a medical discharge and a permanent speech impediment. Now he works in a Norwalk packing plant.

Likewise, when Oscar Hernandez was drafted he went willingly, serving as a guard at Da Nang Air Force base in Vietnam until his discharge with two Bronze Stars. Last summer, he had been looking for a job ever since.

"He never really talked much about Vietnam. Except he was glad he didn't have to kill anybody," says Helen Hernandez, with voice shy, hesitant.

"Oscar never liked to box in high school either, because he didn't like to hit anybody. So he played baseball. And track." She blushed, embarrassed, it seemed, to defend her son's passive nature.

Indeed, it soon becomes amply apparent to a stranger in the Hernandez household that making excuses for Oscar — who is accused of driving the car that carried Joyce Ann Huff's killer — is considered somehow undignified, even unpatriotic, insofar as it might imply a fear that the American system of justice is incapable of discovering truth impartially and dispassionately on its own.
And, in addition to their faith that Justice will be done, the Hernandez couple have the added solace, unlike Beatrice Anello, of having a private attorney, a family friend, who will represent their son in court.

"So Easygoing"

"Oscar was so quiet, so easy going. He stayed home almost all the time," says Helen Hernandez proudly. "He watched television, he read a lot of books and magazines. And he always helped me around the house. Every morning we made the beds together and washed the dishes."

Abruptly, she vanished into a back room, returning instantly with a bulging photograph album. It turned out to be what, in her heart, Helen Hernandez considers immutable proof of her son's innocence in this bizarre episode.

The book was filled with pictures Oscar had taken in Vietnam — photos of children, Wacs, orphans, refugees who hung around with Oscar and Oscar's friends.

"I loved children," said Helen Hernandez, as Antonio nodded vigorously in agreement. She looked suddenly grim, as if she had realized, maybe for the first time, how seriously important that point might eventually become.

"I haven't visited him yet," she said, self-consciously admitting she was afraid to see that he's really locked up in jail." She would probably just cry, she said.

But, she added, she's gotten past her initial hysteria with a dose of tranquilizers — and by having her telephone number changed. Like Mrs. Anello, she was getting hate-calls at a daily rate.

"I've been trying to get up the courage to call Mrs. Huff," she said, nervously fingering the album in her lap. "But, I guess I'm afraid. I just don't know what to say to her. Except that I know how she must be feeling. And I cry for her child, too, just as I cry for Oscar."

Normally, 12 people live in the four-room household of Miguel Ramirez, 53, a disabled construction worker. At present, however, there are only 10 because his wife Rose is visiting an ailing brother in Mexico and his son Michael, 17, is in jail.

On a recent hot weekday morning, eight family members were scattered about the tiny squalid living room, dink with the sour odors of diapers, cooking foods and too many bodies packed too close together without benefit of even a fan.

There was Ramirez himself, a raw, grizzled man who sat in his undershirt in a corner chair, somehow projecting rock solid stability in an otherwise incredibly fluid human scene unfolding before him.

Three of his four daughters — all mothers, all un-married and two of them — were pregnant again, sat sprawled on the ragged, filthy chairs and couches. All were rendered inordinately ill-tempered by the miserable heat, they said.

And four of Ramirez's grandchildren — two boys and two girls, aged 2 to 4 — crawled, ran and screamed in a shrieking, laughing fury through the house, chasing a single raged dog and, more often than not, taking advantage of one of their own, too — a pathetic 4-year-old boy, the red-eyed victim of chicken pox.

Senior Daughter

On a couch, half covered by a sheet, Yolanda Ramirez, 24, the senior daughter, was an outshouting Popeye cartoon blaring on the television. Now seventeen months pregnant, for the third time, she was trying to resolve the question of a missing blouse with her sister Marina, 21, six months pregnant, who sat methodically rolling breakfast beans into tortillas, burrito style, at the end of the room.

A near-obese third daughter, Sylvia, mother of two of the rampaging children, sat bulging out of her tight shorts, fanning herself with a purple crocheted doily which she had snatched from a screaming baby who had spun it wildly in the air long enough finally to knock the fire off her cigarette and get smacked for it.

"God, they'll all get the pox and what a mess that'll be," lamented Sylvia.

"Well, hell, they all gotta get it sometime," observed Yolanda sagely, demonstrating that, of the three women, she is by far the most philosophic.

"None of us are married," she said, looking downright amused at the question, "because the guys who knocked us up are all either bums or they don't have the jobs to support families."
So, she said, they all live on AFDC to Families With Dependent Children benefits — including Ramirez himself who, for undisclosed reasons, hasn't been able to acquire welfare aid himself although he suffers from a severely arthritic back. Lately, too, he grinned, he's been suffering from a finger that was half bitten off the other night in a bar fight.

"The guy really had some set of teeth," he chuckled, relishing the memory of "the little squabble."

But seriously, he said, he would like to tell the state to go aove its welfare.

"I want to work, but all I ever knew was hard labor. Now, who's going to hire a 53-year-old Mexican for a desk job? I can barely even read."

Without AFDC aid, he added, "we'd all probably starve." As it is, he's $1,000 behind in his house payments so, sooner or later, they'll all probably be out on the street anyway.

Nobody looked very alarmed.

Nobody looked, either, like they even remembered their brother Michael, until Ramirez suddenly reminded them.

"I don't even have the money for gas to go see my son," he said.

The mood in the room changed instantly to seriousness.

What concerned everybody present, it seemed, was not so much Mike's plight, but rather the effect it would have on his mother when she returns from Mexico, sometime later this week.

She has suffered from severe nervous disorders for years, they said. And when she finds out what's happened to her son—the seventh of her eight children—it "just may push her over the edge."

"God, I wish we could get her to stay down there till this is over," lamented Sylvia, lighting another cigarette.

"Yeah, but if we try that she'll just get suspicious—something's wrong," observed Yolanda, always the realist.

Miguel Ramirez, who has a certain indisputable dignity born of uncompromising honesty, had grown somber in his corner.

"As you can see, it's mostly just a question of survival, like in a jungle, for Mexicans like us. We just live from day to day. That's why a lot of Chicanos hang on to their pride and get mad easy—it's all they got."

He shrugged, looking around at his daughters, who listened, suddenly silent.

Most of his kids had either been kicked out of school for making trouble or they had quit in disgust, he continued.

One son, 22, was in jail already, for undisclosed reasons. Only his oldest boy, 28, had ever gotten out of the Norwalk barrio, although, Ramirez digressed, he had hopes for his youngest son, 15, who was "a good student and a hard worker."

One Thing Sure

Meantime, whatever his kids had done, Ramirez said, he knew one thing for sure.

"My son Mike would never hurt a kid or be part of a rotten thing like that. He may have been mean sometimes, but he would not take it out on babies."

But, sighed Ramirez, it's out of his hands now. And the whole family expects the worst.

"They'll just figure he's a dirty Mexican capable of anything. What did the cops call it—a joy killing? They'll probably just lock him up for good, without thinking twice about it," said Yolanda, shrugging cynically, philosophically to the end.
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)
   - DOCUMENT
   - BRIEFING
   - INTERVIEW
   - TESTIMONY
   - OTHER
   8/26/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
   - SSC
   - HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum reporting results of interviews by SSC Staff Members of SAC Charles W. Bates, SA Leo S. Brennaisen and former SAs David E. Todd, Albert P. Clark and William A. Grahendel

5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)

7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)

   Counterintelligence

   ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
   DATE 8/26/75 BY:

8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)

   COUNTERPRO of the FBI as it related to the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party.

62-116395

(FMK:FMK

(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS YELLOW

3791 (6-75)
INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
The Attorney General

Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

August 26, 1975

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/13/75 BY SPY

Enclosed for your information are two copies each of five memoranda concerning interviews by Staff Members of captioned Committee of an FBI Special Agent in Charge, and one current and three former FBI Special Agents. One set of these memoranda is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

For your additional information, the following should be noted in respect to all five of the individuals interviewed.

The persons interviewed were all advised previous to the interviews that the Director of the FBI had waived their employment agreements relating to confidentiality for purposes of the interviews. Each was told that he had the right to counsel; however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. They were told that there were certain privileged areas concerning which they would not be required to answer questions. These areas concerned information which might divulge identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methods and techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing FBI investigations; and information which originated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. The individuals were also advised of the parameters of the individual interviews; that they were all concerning the FBI's Counterintelligence Program as it related to the Black Panther Party. In addition, the parameters of the interview of Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates included the subject of the Huston Plan.

Enclosures (10)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.

Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SEE NOTE PAGE 2
The Attorney General

NOTE:

LHMs being furnished to the Attorney General were received by San Francisco airtel 8/15/75 captioned "Senstudy 75." The information in the last paragraph above was to be included in the LHMs per Bureau instructions to San Francisco. However, they were not so included and this inadverstence was telephonically brought to SAC Bates' attention 8/18/75 by Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. It is believed that having this information in instant letter and not in each of the LHMs will suffice under the circumstances. Copies of the airtel and the LHMs will be designated for the respective personnel files of the personnel who were interviewed.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

August 15, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF SAC CHARLES W. BATES
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

On the evening of August 11, 1975, Mr. Lester Seidel and Mr. Loch Johnson, Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee, met with Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates of the San Francisco Office. This meeting occurred over dinner. No statements were made by either of these individuals as to any rights that SAC Bates might have in connection with the interview.

During the dinner, Mr. Seidel referred to COINTELPRO involving the FBI's investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco. Bates advised him that he was in charge of the San Francisco Office from July, 1967 until the end of April, 1970, when he was transferred to Chicago. Bates stated that he was aware of the investigation being conducted on the Black Panther Party but was not personally conversant with all the details of this investigation as such details were all contained in the FBI's file. On at least two occasions Mr. Seidel referred to specific facts occurring in other parts of the country involving anonymous letters sent to individuals under COINTELPRO. He asked if Bates agreed that these actions were proper. Mr. Seidel was told that Bates had no way of knowing the facts as he related were true or any other of the circumstances involved and that, therefore, he was unable to comment at all.

Mr. Seidel asked if Bates had any recommendations for legislation which the Committee could propose that would assist the FBI in the domestic counterintelligence field. Bates informed him that he was not fully conversant with this entire field and that it was the prerogative of FBI officials at Washington and Department of Justice officials to recommend such legislation.

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Mr. Seidel also inquired as to whether Bates felt that an extension of electronic surveillances into the domestic intelligence field would be of assistance. Bates informed him that the FBI was operating according to current court decisions as involve electronic surveillances and that the courts had recently precluded this action in strictly domestic intelligence matters. Mr. Seidel was informed that this was a decision for FBI officials in Washington.

On several occasions during the evening, Mr. Johnson asked Bates if he was aware of the "Houston Plan." On each occasion Bates informed him that he was not aware of the "Houston Plan" and his only knowledge of it is what he has seen in the public press. At one time Mr. Johnson asked if Bates thought that Mr. Hoover had turned down the "Houston Plan" because he was afraid for his job. Bates again replied that he had no firsthand knowledge having anything to do with the "Houston Plan" but he was certainly aware that Mr. Hoover was not afraid of anything or anyone.

Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the use of "black bag jobs" would be of advantage in conducting domestic counterintelligence operations. Bates replied that he had no personal direct knowledge of such matters and had never been involved in such matters.

During the evening, Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that a congressional oversight committee of the FBI was sound and proper. Bates informed that he certainly agreed with the concept of congressional oversight as long as it was constructive and not destructive. Mr. Seidel asked if Bates felt that the FBI's security operation should be completely divorced from its criminal responsibilities and handled as a separate agency or a separate part of the FBI. Bates informed him that it appeared that the FBI's efforts in both the criminal and the security field had been effective and appeared to be proper in its present context. Mr. Seidel inquired if Bates was personally acquainted with Mr. William C. Sullivan, former FBI official. Mr. Seidel was informed that Bates worked in the same division with Mr. Sullivan in the 1950's and knew him as another supervisor at FBI Headquarters.

Seidel then asked if Bates was aware of the disagreements that Mr. Sullivan had had with Mr. Hoover and he was informed that he had no details concerning this matter.
SSC;
INTERVIEW OF SAC
CHARLES W. BATES
BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS

Mr. Seidel asked if Bates knew former SAC Harry Morgan. Bates told him that he knew him as he had replaced him as SAC in San Francisco at the end of April, 1970. He then asked if Bates was aware of why Mr. Morgan was transferred from San Francisco. Bates told him that some problem had arisen in connection with his running the San Francisco Office but that he was not personally aware of the specific details.  But that they would be available at FBI Headquarters.  Seidel said the only reason he was asking was that he was thinking about interviewing Mr. Morgan but he did not want to embarrass him and then asked if Morgan's transfer from San Francisco had anything to do with a drinking problem.  Bates said again that he was not aware of the specifics.

On the afternoon of August 13, 1975, Mr. Loch Johnson came into the San Francisco FBI Office saying he had just a few more questions he wanted to ask Bates. He then asked if the San Francisco Office was involved in foreign counterintelligence work, and he was informed that we were as were many other FBI offices. He then asked if we surveilled everyone who went into or came out of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco. He was informed that Bates did not intend to discuss with him any investigative techniques or anything having to do with pending investigations. Mr. Johnson said he was attempting to find some individual who was an expert in foreign counterintelligence, particularly the Soviet threat to the United States. Bates informed him that there were probably a number of people in the United States who would qualify in this category but Bates did not consider himself as an expert in this field.

The above represents specific matters brought up during these discussions.
Prior to interview by SSC Staff Member, SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN telephonically contacted SA DENNIS MILLER at FBI Headquarters making four inquiries on August 6, 1975; on the same date, the following answers were received:

Is it permissible for an agent to give general answers concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP) as to membership number and Chapter numbers at various dates?

Answer: Yes.

Local media has previously set forth a memorandum purportedly from the FBI, San Francisco Office, suggesting consideration should be given to furnishing fabricated documents originating with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI, San Francisco, when, in fact, the memorandum came from the Bureau. If questioned concerning this memorandum, may an agent point out that this document originated with the Bureau rather than San Francisco?

Answer: Yes.

In contemplation of possible questioning concerning false correspondence directed to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER and others abroad, can an agent refer SSC Staff to Bureau when questioned concerning identity of agents preparing correspondence?

Answer: Yes.

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Is it necessary for agent to express an opinion as to morality, legality of said Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL)?

Answer: You are not obliged to answer those questions you do not desire to answer, but if you wish you may comment on the legality or morality of the plan.

SA DENNIS MILLER related that he desired that it be borne in mind that the Bureau in no way wished to impede the SSC investigation.

LESTER B. SEIDEL, SSC Staff Member, appeared at the San Francisco Office of the FBI on August 11, 1975, and interviewed SA LEO BRENNISEN from 1:03 PM to 2:30 PM. SEIDEL prefaced the interview by explaining that he had been advised that BRENNISEN was the Coordinator for the COINTEL in San Francisco from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1970. It was pointed out to him that the case was assigned to agent from May 16, 1969 to May 1, 1971.

SEIDEL asked if agent had, in fact, approved all proposals coming from the San Francisco Office. He was advised that not necessarily because if another agent made a proposal the person approving it in San Francisco would be the person signing the outgoing mail, namely, the Supervisor or Relief Supervisor.

SEIDEL asked what Squad agent had been assigned to during this Program, and he was advised S-6. He inquired if there was any COINTEL in San Francisco against US; he was advised to the contrary. He inquired as to the usual number of cases assigned agent, and was advised that to agent's best recollection probably 30 at any one time. He asked if agent's work was exclusively security during the handling of the COINTEL Program and he was advised agent did have some criminal assignments. He inquired if there was any relationship between COINTEL and criminal assignments, and he was advised no and that agent desired to limit the scope of his questioning to the COINTEL Program.

SEIDEL then asked how many suggestions the agent had submitted in COINTEL. He was advised that an estimate would be difficult but probably the nearest figure would be some two suggestions a month with possibly six months in two years when no suggestions were made. He inquired as to agent's knowledge of what percentage of total proposals from all sources submitted to the Bureau had been approved, and he was advised only a small percentage.
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SA LEO S. BRENNERSEN

At this point, SEIDEL requested agent to outline the
types of COINTEL proposals submitted by San Francisco. He
was answered that anonymous letters, letters with pseudonyms,
and letters signed with the name of an existing person had
been used.

It was pointed out that the program had included
the use of anonymous letters, including those directed to
landlords advising that the Black Panther Party was occupying
their property; letters to people supporting BPP programs,
including the Breakfast Program and enclosing copies of the
BPP color book for children encouraging the shooting of
police officers and/or articles from the "Black Panther
Party", the official BPP newspaper, showing their propensity
and advocacy of violence; letters to organizations containing
articles that showed the BPP in direct opposition to their
aims, such as a letter to a Jewish organization showing BPP
support of Palestine guerrillas.

It was pointed out that letters had been directed
to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER in Algeria in the names of BPP members.
At this point, SEIDEL interrupted to explain that he was
enlisting the complete cooperation of the interviewee, that
there had been some Congressional criticism of the COINTEL,
that there were some segments of the population that were
anti-FBI and that he desired to present the FBI in a proper
light, and that he had good friends in the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked, was it necessary to have utilized
COINTEL. Agent advised that it was difficult to correctly
judge the effect of the program but it was felt it was not
without some effect because the Black Panther Party had not
only dwindled from a membership of approximately 1,000 in
1969 to perhaps 200 in 1973, but that the organization became
split with dissension and had dropped much of its former
advocacy for violence.

SEIDEL then requested that the agent give his
recommendation on what COINTEL in the future should be;
whether there should be a division between security and
criminal investigations to different agencies in order that
a possible intrusion on the rights of an individual in
intelligence matters might not necessarily preclude his
being prosecuted by the Bureau in a criminal matter. Agent
refused to furnish his "off-the-cuff" opinion, pointing out that he felt that it was without the scope of his release.

Without further questioning agent concerning the types of COINTEL proposals, SEIDEL next asked if the Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) on the BPP was in operation at the time COINTEL was initiated, and what proposals were submitted in COINTEL based on information from ELSUR.

SEIDEL was advised agent's release would not allow him to discuss ELSUR.

SEIDEL asked if the San Francisco Division had made any "snitch" proposals. When asked to clarify the question, he stated that this was a suggestion to the effect that a Black Panther Party member be accused of being an FBI informant. Agent replied that to the best of his recollection no such recommendations had been made to the Bureau by San Francisco, and on the contrary, agent knew that it had been pointed out by San Francisco that any such allegation should be most carefully considered inasmuch as BPP history has indicated that they had dealt severely with suspected informants, even to the point of killing them.

SEIDEL then asked if the San Francisco Division had received a great deal of "flak" from the Bureau on this program. He was advised that the Bureau operates a "tickler system" for following investigations and that the program had received some priority from the FBI but agent had never considered correspondence from the Bureau as being "flak".

SEIDEL at this point instead of questioning made the statement that the Bureau gave this matter "high priority". No comment was made to this statement.

SEIDEL next questioned agent if he had read any publicity concerning a May 11, 1970 letter from the Bureau to San Francisco entitled, "Special Operations Research", in which it was suggested that some consideration be given to furnishing the BPP spurious documents that supposedly originated with the Oakland Police Department and the FBI. He explained that some newspaper had received a copy of the document under the Freedom of Information Act and thereafter published it. He inquired if a response to the letter
had been made by San Francisco. Agent advised that it was his recollection that San Francisco had responded recommending against both proposals, pointing out that the BPP had in the short past published contingency plans of the Berkeley Police Department for a raid on National Headquarters to the embarrassment of that agency. San Francisco was of the opinion that if spurious documents were furnished to the BPP they would immediately publish them, rather than attempt to develop an informant and the operation presented a great deal of possible embarrassment and publicity for the Bureau.

SEIDEL asked for agent's knowledge of why the letter had been captioned as previously described rather than Counterintelligence Program, Black Panther Party. Agent stated he had no recollection of exact caption of the letter. SEIDEL then went on to explain that he had been advised that the Bureau had several COINTELS and the one covering Special Operations Research was a COINTEL covering foreign operations. Agent made no comment.

SEIDEL requested what proposals had been made to disrupt the BPP newspaper; how did the proposals originate, and what offices submitted them. He was advised that it was agent's recollection that the Bureau may have requested suggestions from several offices but that to agent's knowledge none had been approved. When SEIDEL continued to question the agent concerning specific proposals and why their approval was not recommended by San Francisco, he was advised that one proposal was the use of a foul-smelling chemical to put on the paper. San Francisco was of the opinion it would not be practical inasmuch as it would contaminate an airplane and would subject the airline or the printing company to damages. SEIDEL was further advised that it was believed the suggestion may have been made for the changing of a first page of an issue at the printing company to embarrass the BPP, but it was pointed out that this would also merely result in a claim being filed against the printer.

SEIDEL was advised that there may have been a suggestion that some thought should be given to the possible delay of the plates for the paper, that suggestion coming at the time when the paper was being printed in New York with the master copy being filmed in San Francisco. San Francisco did not suggest approval because a mere delay would have been of little benefit because the paper was not timely.
SEIDEL asked about the disruption of the BPP Breakfast Program. The answer was given that agent had no recollection of this, and SEIDEL was asked did he have any information from the Bureau that we had attempted a disruption of the program in San Francisco. He related that he believed not and that it probably happened in San Diego.

SEIDEL asked about a suggestion that informants set up a possible confrontation between the BPP and the Republic of New Africa (RNA). Agent stated he had no recollection of such a proposal and did not believe it had been submitted by San Francisco because the membership and activity in RNA had been minimal in this area.

SEIDEL then asked if we had suggested that landlords in the San Francisco area be encouraged to insist on their rent from the BPP. Agent advised he had no recollection of this, but could see nothing wrong in it.

SEIDEL inquired as to the amount of knowledge that SAC CHARLES BATES would have had concerning COINTEL. He was advised that agent had no information, that he, himself, had never discussed the program with Mr. BATES while it was in operation. SEIDEL then inquired if former SAC HARRY MORGAN had been ill during the time he was assigned to San Francisco and the reason for his transfer. Agent replied he had no information concerning this matter.

SEIDEL was asked if he felt that any of the actions agent described as being taken by the San Francisco Division were illegal. SEIDEL stated that he did not believe that these were matters that were in violation of any existing criminal statutes, but there might be some question as to whether the FBI had the specific authority to do these things.

SEIDEL ended the interview by again reiterating that he was a friend of the Bureau, that he was making an inquiry and desired to obtain the opinions of both Headquarters and agents in the field, and that he may make a request to the Bureau to widen the scope of agent's release.
Agent was not placed under oath and when agent refused to furnish opinions in those cases noted above or to discuss ELSUR, SEIDEL suggested that he, SEIDEL, put away his pencil and pad. Agent replied that that was not necessary. The only right explained to agent was the fact that all information furnished by him was at his own volition and was entirely voluntary. No mention was made that any part of the interview might be utilized in a possible court proceeding against the agent.

Agent did not consult with Bureau representative during course of the interview.
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SA ALBERT P. CLARK BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 13, 1975, former Special Agent Albert P. Clark, who was a supervisor in the San Francisco FBI Office and who retired in December of 1969, advised as follows:

He was interviewed in his home at 66 Elm, Larkspur, California, by SSC Member Lester B. Seidel from 5:40 P.M. to 6:55 P.M., August 12, 1975.

Clark was not placed under oath and no mention was made of his rights. However, Seidel was pleasant and in no way antagonistic. The interview was general, not penetrative, not in depth, and very few specific questions were asked. There appeared to be no discernible criticism of either the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) or the Bureau's investigation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) by Seidel.

Seidel was compelled on more than one occasion to declare that he was pro-FBI, that the object of his inquiries was to assist the United States Senate in understanding the problem in order that they could consider possible legislation that may eliminate any abuses in the future.

Seidel did mention the fact several times that information had been leaked to the press that Jane Seberg, the movie actress, had become pregnant by a BPP official.

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Seidel finally asked Clark if he would have okayed a COINTEL proposal like this and he answered that he would have if he felt that it would have sufficiently hindered the BPP, stating that possibly in some of these occasions someone might get hurt but on the other hand, investigation of the BPP by the FBI might be made easier and it might also cut down on the number of BPP supporters.

Clark was asked to whom the main BPP case was assigned and to whom COINTEL had been assigned in the San Francisco Division. Clark replied that he did not remember but possibly during the time of his supervision, more than one Agent had handled the matters.

Seidel asked how many BPP informants the San Francisco Division had. Clark replied he did not recall and despite he did not believe that Seidel had a right to know.

Seidel inquired about the BPP wiretap, asking who had requested the tap, the Bureau or the San Francisco Division. Again, Clark replied that he did not recall but the San Francisco Division would not have necessarily waited for the Bureau to initiate the matter but might have requested the Bureau rather than the Bureau having initiated the matter.

Seidel wanted to have an example of a COINTEL proposal. He was not given a specific example but general conversation was had to the effect that any move that might be suggested that would aid the San Francisco Division in their investigation of the BPP in determining their supporters and financiers and possibly disenchancing those individuals might be an example.

Seidel did not ask Clark whether he had done a particular thing.

Questioned concerning whether he felt COINTEL had been effective, Clark replied he did not believe the matter was susceptible to proof but the BPP had sure gone into a steep decline.
Seidel again brought up the Seberg matter and asked if it had done any good. Clark stated he replied, "Maybe."

During this conversation, Clark got the general impression that perhaps Seidel did not feel that COINTEL had been necessary but Clark had argued that it had made the BPP more difficult to operate and possibly easier for the FBI to investigate.

Seidel then wanted to know what there was about the BPP that caused such a concentration of FBI investigative attention. Clark pointed out that this would have to be answered in the context of time, that at the time the program was initiated, there was no doubt that the BPP was a violent, racist organization opposing all law enforcement, attacking officers and generally disturbing the tranquility of the community.

Seidel then went on to discuss the business of pressure. Had Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates and the Bureau put too much pressure on the matter? Clark stated there was undoubtedly pressure because everyone was interested in doing the best type job possible and finding out everything possible concerning the BPP. There was obvious pressure from the Bureau in the matter and the Bureau, in a case like this, could never be satisfied. Clark stated that he related that perhaps too much pressure had come from the Bureau because he had felt at the time he was a supervisor that San Francisco Division knew more about the BPP than the Bureau. On the other hand, he related that Bureau officials were probably under pressure because of the national interest and the demands on them in Washington.

Seidel related that he was interested in ascertaining what Agent would make the best witness to appear in Washington to explain and testify concerning COINTEL. He specifically requested Clark's recommendation and mentioned the names of Special Agents Leo S. Brenneisen of San Francisco and Bob Baker of Los Angeles. Clark stated that he had countered by suggesting that somebody in Washington who directed the program and approved all proposals might be a better witness.
Clark recalled that near the first of the interview, Seidel probably, more to make conversation than to obtain information, asked a few questions concerning US and the Republic of North Africa (RNA). He was advised that US had not been active in this division and there had been no pertinent RNA activity brought to his attention. Seidel asked if Ron Karenga of US had visited San Francisco and Clark replied he had no exact recollection of this.

Seidel talked and asked Clark's opinion on the separation into different agencies of the Bureau's criminal and security investigations. Clark stated that he told Seidel that in the past he had considered this and felt that frankly it might have advantages, and at the same time, might have disadvantages. He pointed out that the disadvantages were that you could not be sure that it, in fact, would work and that if you remove the security investigations from the Bureau, you would undoubtedly lose a great deal, including public support.

Seidel asked if Clark had worked under former SAC Harry Morgan. He advised that he had retired prior to the time Morgan was assigned to the San Francisco Division.

Clark pointed out that during the interview, a recorder appeared prominently on his desk, and Seidel could, of course, not be sure that it was not in operation, although as the duration of the interview lengthened, it must have been obvious to Seidel that it was not operating.
On August 14, 1975, retired former Special Agent William A. Cohendet was interviewed from 9:30 A.M. to 11:15 A.M. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC). The interview took place at the Holiday Inn on Van Ness Avenue, San Francisco.

Mr. Seidel mentioned that he was serving as a counsel for the SSC, investigating all phases of the United States intelligence community, and he had chosen the Black Panther Party and the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) as his field. He stated that he was hoping for full cooperation on the part of the former Special Agent.

He was advised that former Special Agent Cohendet was willing to cooperate with the committee and he trusted that something constructive would come out of the effort being put forward. Former Special Agent Cohendet also pointed out that in his opinion the Black Panther Party (BPP) had been a group devoted to violence, thievery, and fraud, and the committee should realize the type of Subjects with whom they are dealing in order to place the investigation in its proper framework.

The first question concerned the former Special Agent's background and Bureau service. This was briefly furnished.

Seidel then asked when and how the technical surveillances had been installed, who initiated them, and who approved them.

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U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SA WILLIAM A. COHENDET BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER

The former Special Agent replied that he was not party to any of these arrangements and did not know any of the details.

Seidel then asked if former Special Agent Cohendet knew the origin and purposes of the COINTEL Program. He was informed that the former Agent did not know the origin of the program, and said he believed its purposes were those as set forth in the instructions which Seidel had and which spoke for themselves. The former Agent admitted that said program at one time had been assigned to him but due to the press of other functions, he had been unable to give it a great deal of time and felt that during the period that it had been assigned to him, it had been largely ineffective.

Seidel then asked if there was any connection between ELSUR and COINTEL and the reply was given that obviously there would be if the ELSUR material being reviewed could be considered as having any pertinence to a COINTEL operation. However, former Special Agent Cohendet could not recall having used this material while the case was assigned to him, at least to any significant degree. Not having the files available made it impossible to state positively if there had been any specific instance of use of this material.

Seidel asked as to the possible effectiveness of anonymous letters and he was informed that in the opinion of the former Agent, such letters, particularly having to do with personal infidelity or thievery, which were the usual suggested avenues, would have little effect on the recipients who were active in such fields themselves much of the time. In the more serious areas of perhaps trying to falsely show that an individual was an FBI or police informant, the former Special Agent said that the use of this technique would not be used for fear of causing bodily harm or death to an innocent person due to the well-known propensity of the BPP of dealing harshly with any suspected deviator let alone informant.
Seidel then asked as to the value of ELSUR to the BPP investigation and the former Special Agent stated that in his belief it was extremely valuable in many ways. For instance, it assisted and gauged the true Huey Newton, his plans, and weaknesses. It was also valuable in estimating the possible effect of a certain COINTEL program as possibly suggested by some other office. As a result of their information, the San Francisco Office usually rejected most suggestions as being unlikely to be successful.

Seidel wondered if ELSUR was not the most valuable, single investigative aid that the Bureau had had in this investigation, and the former Special Agent agreed that he was probably correct.

Seidel then wondered if the COINTEL proposals should be part of some legislation proposed by Congress and the former Special Agent replied that the Bureau officials, in his opinion, should be allowed to comment on this because the fact that the program would be ineffective against the BPP might not be a valid argument that it would not work to better advantage in other circumstances.

Former Special Agent Cohendet declined to comment on the effectiveness of COINTEL as used against the Socialist Workers Party, not having had any experience with its use in that field.

Seidel then asked about informants and asked if there had been any pressure from the Bureau in the development of such sources. Former Special Agent Cohendet acknowledged that there certainly had been great pressure in this direction, as it was well known that informants were a necessary part of any investigation and a police organization can never give up on this phase of its work no matter how difficult the circumstances were in their development. In the case of the BPP, the development of informants was particularly difficult because of the fear that many persons in the black community felt concerning the BPP as well as the lack of desire to cooperate against another black person.
Seidel asked about foreign funds being raised and given to the BPP, and former Special Agent Cohendet recalled that "Masai" Hewitt and others went to Sweden and other countries where the BPP raised money on speech making tours.

Seidel then asked about any investigation of BPP funds and former Special Agent Cohendet said that it was his recollection that investigation of BPP funds had been undertaken through legal channels but he had no personal knowledge of the investigation and declined to go further into this field.

Seidel asked about referrals of Bureau information to the Internal Revenue Service and former Special Agent Cohendet said that he had no personal knowledge of what had been done in this direction.

Seidel then asked about the affair between Actress Jean Seberg and "Masai" Hewitt, which had appeared in a Hollywood gossip column and had alleged that Seberg had become pregnant by Hewitt. Seidel said that the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had admitted leaking this information to someone in the press.

Former Special Agent Cohendet knew that this couple had been lovers for a brief period but denied any knowledge of any leak to the press by either San Francisco or Los Angeles.

Seidel asked if the former Agent thought that leaking this type of information was appropriate. No comment was offered as to this question.

Seidel, at the conclusion of the interview, said that he had noted that the "faking" of police records as suggested had never been undertaken and he observed that he believed the COINTEL abuses were being overplayed by the press. From what he learned in interviews in San Francisco, it seemed to him that the program had been mostly played down and indeed, an independent judgment had been exercised in the implementation of the program.
A general discussion of the BPP ensued in which former Special Agent Cohendet reiterated the criminal background and threatening attitude of many of the BPP members, their mendacious ways, and their lack of credibility in their public statements. The former Special Agent credited the news media with helping to build up the BPP beyond its actual strength and influence.

Seidel asked about the former Agent's knowledge of the reason for the removal of former SAC Harry Morgan from San Francisco. He said the only reason he was asking this question was in order to avoid embarrassing former SAC Morgan when he interviews him concerning his possible knowledge of BPP activities sometime in the future. Former Special Agent Cohendet had no knowledge as to why Mr. Morgan was transferred.

In summation, Seidel ventured the opinion that he thought the ELSUR technique was far more valuable in the carrying out of the investigation of the BPP than the COINTEL. Former Special Agent Cohendet had to agree to the above observation.

Former Special Agent Cohendet was not advised of any rights that he might have in declining to answer any questions and Seidel said he was actually seeking witnesses for a possible hearing in Washington, D.C. He stated that no names would be mentioned in any write-up he would make concerning his interviews.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California
August 13, 1975

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

INTERVIEW OF FORMER SA DAVID E. TODD
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

On August 12, 1975, retired former SA David E. Todd was interviewed from 1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. by Lester B. Seidel, Investigator for the SSC. The interview took place at the Holiday Inn, San Francisco.

By way of background, in all contacts with Seidel previously, former SA Todd has indicated to him great reluctance to discuss these matters without clearance from the Bureau, and pointed out to Seidel that the Bureau had released former SA Todd from the Employment Secrecy Agreement for the purpose of a staff interview, but Seidel was told that former SA Todd did not think it was either his responsibility or his prerogative to provide information or make information public; that while employed he was acting as an Agent of the Federal Government and felt it was the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide the information, and that if the Senate Committee desired information from former SA Todd, the questions should have been submitted to him in writing, and his answers should have been made in writing and first forwarded to the FBI, and then after the FBI determined it advisable to make these answers available to the Committee, that would have been the proper channel.

Seidel pointed out the Committee and the Bureau had made an agreement whereby the Bureau would make Agents available to the Committee for interview. Former SA Todd pointed out to Seidel that he is not in the category of an Agent, being a retired Agent, and at this point there was no additional discussion on this matter.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Seidel was also told that nothing that was said by former SA Todd should be interpreted as being critical of the Counterintelligence Program (COINTEL) itself, and that if the Bureau felt that such a Program was necessary in the interest of national defense, he had carried it out in the best way he saw fit, and that in recommending against specific proposals as being impractical or inadvisable, these recommendations were against the specific incidents recommended and not against the Program as a whole.

Seidel's first questions dealt with former SA Todd's background and the extent of his Bureau service, and whether he had worked security or criminal matters. Former SA Todd gave him chronologically the offices in which he had served in the Bureau, and stated he had been associated from 1952 to 1956 with the Domestic Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C., and had become Supervisor in San Francisco in December, 1969, of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and that during his Bureau career he had worked both criminal and security matters.

Seidel asked the name of the squad which was originally the Racial Squad, and subsequently changed to Extremist Matters, and he asked whether the work was strictly intelligence, or whether it combined intelligence or criminal work. It was pointed out Bombing Matters were originally being handled on this Squad for a period of time, and that both the criminal activities of the Panthers, as well as intelligence activities, were combined in the assignment.

Seidel then asked when the technical surveillances on the Panthers were installed. Former SA Todd replied that they were functioning at the time he was appointed Supervisor. Seidel then asked how was the technical surveillance related to the COINTEL, if at all, and specifically whether information coming from the technical surveillance was used in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd advised that he could not recall specifically what was done in either Program without reviewing the files and comparing the information therein with the source. Seidel seemed very interested in this, but actually the question could not be answered on the basis of recollection alone, and was not.
Seidel then asked how would the Panther COINTEL be defined with regard to aims, techniques and results. The answer to this was that the aims were to counter generally the revolutionary objectives and activities of the Panthers. The question concerning techniques was left unanswered, and as far as results go, former SA Todd told Seidel that he did not feel there had been any great results from the Program as it was pursued in the San Francisco Office, but he could not speak for the rest of the Program as far as the Bureau is concerned.

Seidel asked whether the Agents working the criminal aspects of the BPP received information that was received from a technical source, and he was told procedures by which information had been routed to them in their cases, and that at the time we operated these technical surveillances, we felt they had been installed lawfully, and that the information received could be used.

Seidel asked whether there was a great deal of pressure put on the San Francisco Office for the development of informants. He was told yes, that informants were the backbone of good law enforcement and the Bureau constantly urged better informant coverage.

Seidel asked if there had been similar pressure placed on the office in the COINTEL, and former SA Todd replied that he did not feel that any great pressure had been put on the office to carry out this Program, but that the Bureau had recommended the Program, however, had left it up to the office pretty much as to how it should be carried out.

Seidel asked whether the Program had been successful in causing dissension within the Party. Former SA Todd told him that he did not feel this had been particularly effective in any way, and that causing dissension had not been a primary objective of the Program in the San Francisco Office, and that the policy had been to use the Program for primarily two purposes: 1) for the purpose of developing informants by attempting to dissuade them from their loyalties to the Party; and 2) to make representations to Panthers for whom outstanding arrest warrants had been issued in order to flush them out so they could be apprehended.
Seidel asked specifically about the COINTEL involving the Breakfast Program, and was told a recommendation had been made for putting some kind of contamination in the Breakfast Program food, and that this office had felt this extremely inadvisable and recommended against it, and it was not carried out here.

Former SA Todd was also asked about a COINTEL proposal relating to "The Black Panther" newspapers, and was told that such a proposal had been made involving saturating the papers with a foul smelling fish oil or some substance, however, we recommended against this as it would serve no purpose.

Seidel was advised that the San Francisco policy had been to recommend against harassment, per se, and also recommended against leaking information to the press. Seidel then raised the question about the incident where Huey P. Newton's high standard of living was given to the press, and he was told that this fell into the category of informant development on the basis it was felt that if those Panthers who were living practically in poverty could realize what Newton's standards of living were, it might change their allegiance to him and they could be contacted for informant purposes.

Seidel was also told that in this phase of the COINTEL, it was former SA Todd's recollection that this information regarding Newton's high standard of living had been disseminated by informants, and that the press was well aware of Newton's standards of living without having to make this information available to them.

Seidel asked what the instructions had been from the Bureau in carrying out the COINTEL. Former SA Todd told Seidel that he had reviewed this file after being appointed Supervisor, but could not recall specifically what the Bureau instructions were. The only other instructions received were at a two day conference in Washington, D.C., on BPP matters conducted by former Assistant to the Director William Sullivan, and Section Chief George Moore, at which time it was pointed out that the Bureau desired the COINTEL to be coordinated with the Bureau, but that former SA Todd did not recall any firm prohibition against
taking certain actions without Bureau authority, and that the field had some leeway in what they did, but, in general, offices made proposals to the Bureau with copies to San Francisco prior to taking any action. Seidel asked why San Francisco got copies of all proposals, and was told this was because San Francisco was office of origin in the BPP case and other offices were required to furnish a copy of all correspondence.

Seidel then asked to what extent Special Agent in Charge Charles W. Bates had knowledge of the COINTEL as it related to the BPP, and he was told that former SA Todd could not speak for Bates and his knowledge would be dependent upon how carefully he read incoming mail and reviewed files, and former SA Todd had no knowledge as to what extent Bates did this.

Seidel was told that under the supervisory setup in the office at the time, former SA Todd felt it was his responsibility to direct this Program in San Francisco and not Bates.

Seidel indicated that out of his investigation in the hearings, undoubtedly there would be some legislation coming out of Congress that would either enable or prohibit such things as the COINTEL, and he stated that was one reason he was asking concerning its effectiveness, and wondered what former SA Todd would recommend. Seidel was told that former SA Todd felt it essential that the Government should have the right to defend itself against individuals and groups who advocate violent revolution or who are aligned with foreign powers, and that there was a need for some sort of legislation within the framework of constitutional government which would enable the government to do this; but, of course, it should be done under proper control. Seidel asked for suggestions as to what sort of control, and was told that this was a matter for Congress to decide, but perhaps Congress should look into some legislation similar to wiretap legislation, where the responsibility is upon a Federal judge to issue a warrant.

Former SA Todd had prepared a brief summary of what he recalled of the activities of the BPP, and he made a copy of this available to Seidel. Former SA Todd also had made a chronology to assist him in answering questions, together with
some notes concerning COINTEL policy, former SA Todd’s general recollection of matters, questions of law regarding agent – principle, privileged information problems, ongoing litigation and national defense, and informants and sources. Seidel asked for a copy of this chronology and this, too, was given to him.

Seidel expressed great interest in receiving the one page summary of the Panthers’ activities, and stated that he had chosen the Panthers for a case study, and he seemed more interested in this than in the COINTEL. He also indicated that there might be future interviews and that former SA Todd might be called as a witness before the Committee at a later date.

At the outset of the interview, Seidel asked whether former SA Todd desired his rights be read to him. Former SA Todd told him that since he did not interpret this as a custodial interview, and it was his understanding Seidel had no police power, that he could forego reading the rights.

Former SA Todd did not feel it was necessary to consult with a Bureau representative at this time.

The above information was furnished by former SA Todd voluntarily and was not solicited.
Approximate Dates


May 1970 Cointelpro letter. Suggestion rejected by S. F.
Aug 1970 Marin Court shootout (Jonathan Jackson-Judge Haley)
Aug 1970 Cleaver released from prison.

Jan 1971 Letters to Algeria to provoke Cleaver to return to U. S. so arrest could be effected.

Feb 1971 Newton becomes Supreme Commander, Cleaver expelled.


April 1971 Sam Napier murder.
April 1971 Two New York police officers wounded.
May 1971 Four New York police officers murdered.

August 1971 George Jackson killed in prison break attempt.
August 1971 S. F. Ingleside Station attack - Officer Young murdered.


Cointelpro: Recommended against many proposals. Approved recommendation to try to induce Cleaver to return to U. S.

Would have approved actions to persuade Panthers to change loyalty from Party and become informants, but cannot recall any specific ones.

Would not have approved any proposals solely for harassment or for leaking information to press; there must have been some bona fide investigative purpose behind proposal before considering it.

Recollection: Recall only generalities. Requested if could review Bureau files prior to interview. This was denied. Cannot testify with any specificity without review of files.

Agent-Principal Privileged Information: Sensitive techniques Informants & Sources Ongoing Investigations Foreign Intelligence
Ongoing litigation: Panthers v. FBI & IRS, USDC, S. F. Civil rights.

National Defense: Documents reviewed were classified.
Does executive branch have right to defend nation against advocates of revolution (public interest issue).

Informants & sources: Cannot reveal. (Includes information that might reveal identity.)

Neither my responsibility nor my prerogative to provide or make this information public. I was acting as an agent of the Federal government, and it is responsibility of government to provide the information.

Any questions should be submitted in writing and my answers in writing should be forwarded to FBI and if FBI deems it advisable to make these answers available to Committee, that should be proper channel.
The investigation of the Black Panther Party was a National Defense matter. Information on file points to collaboration with foreign powers by leaders of the Party.

Throughout the two-year period in which I supervised the investigation there were strong liaisons between Black Panthers and dissident groups abroad as well as with the governments of foreign nations. The Black Panthers had support and/or branches in France, Germany and Scandinavia, and were international in scope. Eldridge Cleaver, wanted on felony warrants, had been granted asylum in Algeria and with his entourage was residing in a villa provided by the Algerian government. During this period he made at least one trip to Moscow, Russia. Several Black Panthers travelled to Cuba. Huey Newton, in 1971, travelled to Red China by way of Canada and Hong Kong at the invitation of the Chinese government at a time when the United States had no diplomatic relations with them.

At the time I began serving as supervisor in late 1969, the Black Panther Party was under co-leadership of Huey Newton, then confined to prison in California, and Eldridge Cleaver, living in exile in Algeria. The Black Panther Party, both in the newspaper it published weekly at San Francisco, and in public statements by its officers and leaders, advocated violent revolution; it published instructions on guerrilla warfare, directions for the use of weapons, and printed detailed drawings and instructions on the manufacture of bombs and explosive devices, and it agitated openly for the murder of police officers. The term "off the pigs," which means "kill the police," was a Black Panther catchphrase. The history of the Black Panther Party during the period I acted as supervisor is replete with incidents of murder, violence and inciting to revolution. The revolutionary quotation of Mao Tse-Tung, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," became a Black Panther motto.

Sometime in early 1971 a split occurred in the Black Panther Party. Huey Newton, following his release from prison in 1970, gained control of one faction headquartered in Berkeley, California, and he broke openly with Eldridge Cleaver, publicly expelling Cleaver and Cleaver's lieutenants from the Party. The Newton faction thereafter gradually took a more moderate approach, advocating social change through community service in place of its prior profile of violence. No change was noted in the policies of the Cleaver faction directed from Algiers, and it continued to advocate violent revolution; it began publication in New York of its own newspaper proclaiming its revolutionary policies; and followers belonging to this faction continued to commit crimes of violence.

The following crimes of violence attributed to the Cleaver faction of the Black Panthers have been documented in the book "Target Blue," by former Deputy Police Commissioner Robert Daley of New York City (Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1973):

Ambush attacks against police officers which resulted in 7 officers murdered, 3 wounded, and one attempted murder thwarted, which led to the solution of the other cases and established these attacks to be a nationwide conspiracy; and the murder of two Newton-faction Black Panthers.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (105-146 60)
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTN: IMM
SเรรINSTUDY, 1975.

REFERENCE NEW YORK TELETYPE TO BUREAU, AUGUST 13, 1975. I Y

[NEW YORK 6811-IA] WAS REINTERVIEWED ON AUGUST 15, 1975 BY
SPECIAL AGENTS (SAS) LEONARD HUNGARTER, JR. AND JOSEPH J. PALGUTA,
AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (C)

THE CORRECT SPELLING AND FULL NAME OF THE MEMBER OF THE SENATE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (SSCIO) WHO INTERVIEWED
HIM ON AUGUST 15, 1975 IS PATRICK ARTHUR SHEA. SHEA INFORMED SOURCE
THAT TWO MONTHS AGO SARA JAFFE (FORMERLY NEW YORK 4524-S) VISITED HIS
FRIEND, MR. WILLIAM MILLER, A LAWYER WITH SSCIO IN WASHINGTON, DC.

WHILE IN MILLER'S OFFICE, JAFFE RELATED TO MILLER THAT HE HAD A
PLEASANT RELATIONSHIP WITH FORMER SAS JOHN WILSON AND EDMOND F.
GARBER WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. (C)

RECIPIENT: (C)

CLASSIFIED BY: SIEGEL
DECLASSIFICATION: 25X-1

8/1/90

CONFIDENTIAL

10/9/00

CLASSIFIED BY: STRAUS
DECLASSIFICATION: 25X-1

8/1/86

CLASSIFIED BY: ANDERSON-FCM II, 3-2-82
DATE OF REVIEW: 8/1/95

CONFIDENTIAL
DURING THE TIME THAT JAFFE WAS RELATING TO MILLER INFORMATION ABOUT HIS ASSOCIATION WITH SAS WILLIS AND GAMBER AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FBI, SENATOR CHURCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF SSCI0, ENTERED MILLER’S OFFICE AND BECAME VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN JAFFE’S STATEMENTS. JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM HONG KONG (SOURCE BELIEVES THIS TO BE IN 1966-1968), HE LEARNED THAT HE WAS "FINGERED" BY A HIGHLY REGARDED SOVIET DEFECTOR WHO TOLD AN FBI OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON, DC THAT WHILE IN MOSCOW, USSR, HE SAW SAM JAFFE’S NAME ON A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE DESK OF A HIGHLY PLACED KGB OFFICER. SHEA TOLD SOURCE THAT JAFFE INDICATED TO MILLER THAT THIS SOVIET DEFECTOR’S NAME WAS PENT KOVSKY (SHEA PRONOUNCED THIS NAME AS PENTKOVSKIY). SOURCE INQUIRED OF SHEA IF THIS WAS THE SAME PERSON WHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THE BOOK "PENTKOVSKIY'S PAPERS", AND SHEA REPLIED "THAT'S THE ONE". SHEA DID NOT INDICATE TO SOURCE HOW JAFFE BECAME AWARE OF HIS BEING "FINGERED" BY THE SOVIET DEFECTOR OR WHEN THE SOVIET DEFECTOR SAW JAFFE'S NAME ON THE DESK OF A KGB OFFICER IN MOSCOW. JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT THE FBI, UPON LEARNING THAT INFORMATION, FELT THAT JAFFE WAS A "DOUBLE AGENT" BECAUSE OF THE COOLNESS OF BUREAU PERSONNEL TOWARD HIM WHEN HE RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES FROM HONG KONG.
JAFFE TOLD MILLER THAT EVER SINCE HIS RETURN FROM HONG KONG, HE CANNOT HOLD A JOB, AND BELIEVES THE FBI IS THE CAUSE OF HIS PREDICAMENT. JAFFE IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE FBI IS BEING VINDICTIVE TOWARD HIM IN PURSUING THIS MATTER AND DEPRIVING HIM OF MAKING A LIVELIHOOD. \( \text{(u)} \)

SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANCE TO JAFFE'S STATEMENT THAT THE FBI WAS BEING VINDICTIVE OR RESPONSIBLE FOR JAFFE'S UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. \( \text{(u)} \)

SHEA TOLD SOURCE THAT HE SPENT ABOUT FIVE HOURS DURING THE PAST WEEKEND INTERVIEWING JAFFE ABOUT THE ABOVE MATTER. SHEA TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF TWO REASONS. THE FIRST REASON BEING THAT SENATOR CHURCH WAS INTERESTED IN THE MATTER, AND THE SECOND REASON BEING THAT EVEN THOUGH JAFFE'S INFORMATION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF SSCIO'S INVESTIGATION, IT IS LOOKING INTO THE MATTER TO DETERMINE IF JAFFE'S STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND IF SO, DETERMINE IF LEGISLATION SHOULD BE PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE OR CURTAIL SUCH VINDICTIVE PRACTICES. \( \text{(u)} \)

SOURCE ADVISED THAT IN RESPONSE TO SHEA'S QUESTIONS, HE TOLD SHEA THAT HE AND GAMBER FIRST APPROACHED JAFFE WHEN JAFFE WAS \( \text{(u)} \)
EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY (NYC) AS A
CORRESPONDENT. SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT IN ADDITION TO JAFFE, HE AND
GAMBER TALKED TO MANY PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, AND
THAT PRIOR TO TALKING TO JAFFE, A BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION WAS
CONDUCTED ON JAFFE. SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS
RECOLLECTION, NO IN-DEPTH BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION OF JAFFE WAS
CONDUCTED. SHEA ASKED SOURCE IF JAFFE HAD SIGNED A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECT THAT HE WOULD KEEP CONFIDENTIAL HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
FBI. SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT HE DOES NOT RECALL IF JAFFE SIGNED SUCH
A STATEMENT, BUT THAT HE RECALLED THAT THE MATTER OF CONFIDENTIALITY
WAS DISCUSSED WITH JAFFE. \(\text{CONFIDENTIAL} (u)\)

SOURCE TOLD JAFFE THAT HE AND GAMBER WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED
IN JAFFE'S SOVIET CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, HOWEVER, WHENEVER
JAFFE WENT ABROAD, HE WAS INTERVIEWED ON HIS RETURN TO THE UNITED
STATES TO DETERMINE IF HE HAD ANY CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS WHILE
ABROAD. SHEA INQUIRED IF WHEN JAFFE WENT ABROAD, PARTICULARLY TO
THE USSR, IF THE FBI MADE HIM AVAILABLE TO THE CIA FOR OPERATIONS.
SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION IN THAT REGARD. \(\text{CONFIDENTIAL} (u)\)

SHEA TOLD SOURCE THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEW
FORMER SPECIAL AGENT GAMBER REGARDING THIS MATTER, AND ADDED THAT \(\text{CONFIDENTIAL} (u)\)
AFTER HE SUBMITS THE RESULTS OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE SOURCE, HE MAY RECEIVE AN ASSIGNMENT TO INTERVIEW GAMBER. SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT GAMBER RETIRED FROM THE FBI IN 1973, AND IS NOW EMPLOYED AS A VICE PRESIDENT OF WELLS FARGO IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA. SOURCE ADVISED THAT HE HAD NOT ADVISED GAMBER OF HIS CONTACT WITH SHEA, AND DOES NOT PLAN TO DO SO. SOURCE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS IF THE BUREAU DESIRES TO NOTIFY GAMBER THAT SOURCE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED REGARDING JAFFE. SOURCE ADVISED THE INTERVIEWING PERSONNEL THAT IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT GAMBER WOULD BE CONTACTED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF SSA REGARDING THE JAFFE MATTER, SINCE JAFFE'S STATEMENTS PERTAIN TO A PERIOD OF TIME WHEN SOURCE WAS RETIRED AND JAFFE WAS HANDLED BY GAMBER. *(u)*

SHEA INQUIRED IF JAFFE WAS PAID ANY MONEY BY THE FBI. SOURCE TOLD SHEA THAT JAFFE WAS NOT PAID FOR HIS SERVICES RENDERED, BUT WAS REIMBURSED FOR ANY EXPENSES JAFFE INCURRED IN DEVELOPING INFORMATION FOR THE FBI. *(u)*

SOURCE STATED THAT SHEA ONLY DISCUSSED THE ABOVE MATTER, AND NO OTHER TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED. SOURCE ADDED THAT SHEA DID NOT MENTION ANY OTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE FBI, NOR DID HE MENTION ANY OTHER NAMES OF FORMER OR CURRENT EMPLOYEES OF THE FBI. SOURCE ADVISED THAT *(u)*

CONFIDENTIAL
Shea told him that he may call upon source again for further information regarding Jaffe. Source told interviewing personnel that he would promptly advise the NYO should he again be contacted by a representative of SSCIO. Source stated that he did not ask and he did not furnish Shea a signed statement. $(u)$

Source advised that the last time he saw Jaffe was on January 21, 1970, when he met Jaffe at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFKIA). Source stated that Jaffe on that occasion was an American Broadcasting Company (ABC) correspondent covering the Pan American inaugural 747 flight from JFKIA to London, England. $(u)$

Source stated that on this occasion, Jaffe was very friendly and showed no animosity toward the source. Source added that the FBI was not discussed during this meeting, nor was their previous relationship mentioned during the brief conversation. $(u)$

End.

HOLD

CONFIDENTIAL
**Memorandum**

**TO:** Mr. J. B. Adams  
**FROM:** Legal Counsel  
**SUBJECT:** STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

The purpose of the memorandum is to set forth in summary form the requests we have received from various Committees in Congress and the status of our replies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 7/14/75</td>
<td>Material pertaining to Martin Luther King.</td>
<td>Response delivered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/5/75</td>
<td>Request for FBI materials with respect to surreptitious entries.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/7/75</td>
<td>Request for briefing regarding mail openings.</td>
<td>Briefing held 8/18/75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/8/75</td>
<td>Request for materials relating to mail surveillance.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/12/75</td>
<td>Request that FBI provide third-agency clearance of FBI materials possessing by IRS.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/13/75</td>
<td>Request for access to materials pertaining to organized crime.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AUG 27 1975

**CONTINUED - OVER**

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams  
RE:  STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

Committee on the Judiciary  
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Tunney's Committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 7/25/75</td>
<td>Request concerns limited message-switching implementation plan.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management  
House Post Office and Civil Service Committee (Wilson's Committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/6/75</td>
<td>Request pertaining to mail openings.</td>
<td>Response delivered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights  
Committee on Government Operations (Abzug's Committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/16/75</td>
<td>Request for waiver of former SA George A. Berley to respond to questions regarding non-court-ordered surreptitious entries.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice  
Committee on the Judiciary (Kastenmeier's Committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/6/75</td>
<td>Request pertaining to the National Security Index.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINUED - OVER

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- 2 -
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

House Select Committee (Pike's Committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 7/22/75</td>
<td>All documents and materials provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations and request for all materials related to budgetary authority.</td>
<td>Department decided 8/19/75 to make SSC material available for review in Bureau space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 7/28/75</td>
<td>Inquiry to encompass all aspects of the FBI budget as it relates to gathering, use and dissemination of intelligence.</td>
<td>Partial response prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/11/75</td>
<td>Request for briefing of Assistant Director Wannall on general operations of the Intelligence Division.</td>
<td>Briefing held with HSC Staff Members on 8/18/75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/19/75</td>
<td>Request for information concerning Bureau informants.</td>
<td>Response delivered to the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/19/75</td>
<td>Request (7/22/75) all documents provided to SSC; (7/22/75) General Counsel's opinions of authorities; (7/29/75) most current FBI organizational chart; (7/30/75) access to all FBI information provided to GAO; and (8/13/75) proposed FBI guidelines.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/19/75</td>
<td>Request for materials relating to wiretaps and electronic surveillance.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINUED - OVER

- 3 -
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE:  STATUS OF RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REQUESTS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter, 8/19/75</td>
<td>Request for current Bureau organizational chart.</td>
<td>Response being prepared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hearings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Request</th>
<th>Nature of Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ORALLY, 7/23/75</td>
<td>Request to arrange testimony before Subcommittee on Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor established. Management of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee concerning mail covers and mail openings. Date of testimony not been established.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anticipated Hearings

We have been informally advised that there will be hearings before the Senate Select Committee on mail openings sometime in September and the House Select Committee hearings are scheduled for sometime during the first week of October. The topic for the House Select Committee hearings is not known.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.
(3) If not, please explain.

(4) If so, does the FBI assert that the same assumption of continuing intelligence investigations would apply to individuals or groups lacking the same or similar proven violent background?

(5) If yes, please explain both in general and with specific reference to any support provided by the Coyne letter.

18 2

A. Who, if anyone, has disputed that "such matters as domestic terrorism certainly affect the internal security and national welfare * * *")?

B. How was the armed attack on the President (Truman?) connected with the Coyne letter?

18 3

A. With reference to page 1 of the report to the NSC dated Mar. 5, 1954:
(1) Does an overall reading of this page reasonably convey the impression that program objectives were designed to protect against subversion by domestic groups that might be directed, or controlled by a foreign power?

(2) If yes, and since "the IIC members recognize their responsibility as assigned by the Directives * * *") does this mean that the Directives apply to only such domestic groups and the members recognized this limitation? If not, please explain.

(3) If A(1) is no, please explain giving specific consideration to the necessity for the first 3 paragraphs on the page and the need to integrate domestic and foreign intelligence. (See goal 1.)

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A. Do Mr. Hoover's Nov. 6, 1958 comments concerning the usurpation of jurisdiction from local authorities indicate his belief that the FBI was not and should not be a national police force responsible for maintaining law
and order throughout the country?

B. Was it ever the FBI's position that it
was not and/or did not desire to be a
national police?

C. Is crime prevention through the gathering
of intelligence a police function?

D. If not, please explain.

E. If yes, how do the FBI's domestic intelli-
gence gathering activities differ from
the usual police function?

F. If there is no substantive difference,
does this mean the FBI, in the area of
domestic intelligence gathering, now con-
stitutes and performs as a national
police force?

G. If not, please explain.

A. Is the Emergency Detention Law (EML) the
same as Subchapter II of the Internal
Security Act of 1950? (ISA)?

B. Mr. Hoover's testimony (Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Bill, 1940, at
304) indicates that the FBI maintained a
list or index of subversive individuals
prior to the enactment of the ISA:
(1) What did the FBI call this list or
index?
(2) Did the list contain the names or
individuals whether or not potentially
dangerous?

C. Did the EML/ISA specifically require the
FBI to maintain a list of potentially
dangerous subversives?
(1) If so, how did the EML/ISA list
differ from the subversive list
already being maintained by the FBI?
(2) If there were differences between
the two lists, what criteria was
used to determine whether to list
an individual on the EML/ISA index?
(3) If there were no significant
differences between the lists, why
was the EML/ISA list necessary aside
from any statutory requirement?
D. When and under what authority was Subchapter II of the ISA repealed?
E. Identify the specific criminal statutes covering acts of espionage or sabotage?
F. Did the ISA ever provide for the emergency detention of individuals who might possibly commit, or conspire to commit, acts other than espionage or sabotage?
   (1) If so, please identify such other acts.
   (2) If not, did the EML/ISA list ever contain the names of individuals who might engage in subversive activities other than espionage or sabotage?
   (3) If so, what authority permitted their inclusion on the EML/ISA list?

27  2  A. Is the Domestic Intelligence Division mentioned in Mr. Hoover's memorandum of May 11, 1961, an FBI or DOJ division?

27  3  A. Besides the memorandum of Attorney General Clark, dated Sept. 14, 1967, concerning urban riot activity:
   (1) How many other specific case-by-case instructions regarding domestic intelligence investigative matters have been received from the Attorney General or DOJ?
   (2) When were such instructions received?
   (3) What were the subject matter of the instructions?
   (4) Please provide copies of such instructions.

28  2  A. "* * * the FBI gradually came to be assigned intelligence investigations outside the foreign controlled espionage and sabotage matters * * *":
   (1) Does this sentence mean that initially the FBI had authority to only conduct intelligence operations of those domestic organizations or individuals that were controlled by or connected with a foreign power and could possible be used for espionage or sabotage?
(2) If not, please explain.
(3) If so, what document (describe and give date) enlarged the FBI's authority so that it could conduct investigations regarding "other intelligence matters affecting the internal security * * *".

A. Does 28 U.S.C. 533(1) provide the statutory basis for the FBI's investigation of criminal violations in the internal security area?
B. If not, what is the statute that provides such authority?
C. Exactly when did the FBI begin to use its statutory authority to conduct criminal investigations as a basis for its domestic intelligence operations?

A. Does the FBI view Attorney General Clark's Sept. 14, 1967 memorandum as a directive to:
   (1) Provide information of possible criminal violations resulting from riots that had already occurred, or
   (2) Engage in a continuing intelligence operations with respect to black nationalist groups, or
   (3) Engage in continuing intelligence operations with respect to any extremist group or individual?
B. If none of the above, what is the import of the memorandum?
C. Did this memorandum constitute additional authority for the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations?
D. If so, what additional authority in this area is conveyed to the FBI?

A. Does the FBI view the Feb. 18, 1969 DOJ memorandum as constituting any additional authority for the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence investigations?
A. The "President's proclamation" mentioned by Mr. Hoover on Nov. 30, 1939, during his testimony on the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 1940, at 304:
(1) Is the "President's proclamation" the Sept. 6, 1939 Presidential Directive?
(2) If not, to what does "President's proclamation" refer? Please provide copy if not already provided.
B. What were the "national defense statutes" referred to in Mr. Hoover's testimony, supra?
C. In his testimony, supra, did Mr. Hoover ever detail what activities constituted "subversive activities ** or any activities that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the United States"?
D. If so, please provide copy of such testimony.
E. If not, how could Congress at that time know or appreciate what the FBI was actually doing in the area of domestic intelligence investigations.

A. During Mr. Hoover's testimony on Jan. 5, 1940, on the Justice Department Appropriations Bill, 1940, at 153, did Mr. Hoover ever explain what constituted "being active in any subversive activity or in movements detrimental to the internal security"?
B. If so, please provide copy of such testimony.
C. If not, how could Congress at that time know or appreciate in detail what the FBI was doing in the area of domestic intelligence investigations?
D. Mr. Hoover's testimony of June 6, 1940 on the Supplemental National Defense Appropriation, 1941, at 180, mentions a National Defense Division. Is this the successor division to the Intelligence Division mentioned in Mr. Hoover's testimony of Jan. 5, 1940, at 153?
E. Mr. Hoover also mentions at 181, that the general intelligence index included the names of such persons as "known espionage agents, known saboteurs, leading members of the Communist party, and the bund."

(1) Can it be reasonably concluded that this listing reflects what the FBI, at that time, considered its intelligence investigation authority under the Presidential Directives to be, i.e., limited solely to espionage and sabotage matters, and domestic groups connected with foreign governments?

(2) If not, please explain.

(3) If other types of groups or individuals were included in the index, please describe their activities.

(4) If other groups or individuals were included in the general index but not mentioned in the testimony, could Congress be fully apprised of the scope of the FBI's intelligence investigation activities at that time?

(5) If so, please explain.

A. Does the FBI believe that Congress has, by receiving testimony about the FBI's domestic intelligence activities as well as intelligence information, recognized the scope of FBI domestic intelligence activities and tacitly approved of those activities?

B. If not, please explain.

C. If so, does the FBI consider this tacit approval to be an additional authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities?

D. If not, please explain.

A. Is it the FBI's position that, aside from any intelligence investigation authority granted by the Presidential
Directives, 28 U.S.C. 533, in conjunction with various criminal statutes, authorizes the FBI to infiltrate groups or otherwise engage in affirmative, active intelligence gathering operations prior to the commitment or alleged commitment of a violation of one of the criminal statutes?

B. If not, please explain.

C. If so, what language in 28 U.S.C. 533, considered in conjunction with various criminal statutes, authorizes such operations?

D. Is it the position of the FBI that the Executive Orders relating to Federal employee loyalty matters authorize the FBI to infiltrate domestic groups or otherwise conduct continuing investigations of groups or individuals for intelligence purposes?

E. If so, please identify the Executive Orders and the specific language in each that constitutes such authorization.
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May 19, 1972

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A. Besides the Sept. 14, 1967 instructions from the Attorney General and the Feb. 18, 1969 instructions from the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, has the Department of Justice (DOJ) provided any other instructions or directives, applicable to a general situation rather than a specific group or individual, that pertain to FBI domestic intelligence investigations?

B. If so, please provide copies of such instructions and directives.

C. If not:
   (1) In what manner were these two instructions amplified by other policy instructions?
   (2) Were policy instructions pertaining to specific cases ever used by the FBI as guidance for a policy in a more generalized situation where no pertinent instructions had been received from the Attorney General or DOJ?
   (3) If so, please list the areas where this was done and provide pertinent documentation.
   (4) The parenthetical information suggests that besides the above mentioned dated memoranda other policy instructions were received and not all of these concerned specific cases.
      (1) Is this correct?
      (2) If so, please explain if question A, above, was answered in the negative.

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A. Testimony by Mr. Hoover as early as Nov. 30, 1939, indicates that the FBI was maintaining indices on saboteurs, espionage agents, subversives and others:
   (1) In light of this, why was it necessary for the FBI to query DOJ about the propriety of maintaining a list similar
to the Security Index when the legal authority for the Security Index was repealed?

(2) Please provide a copy of the FBI inquiry concerning this matter and the DOJ/Attorney General response.

B. Did the FBI maintain any other index concurrently with the Security Index?

C. If so, please identify and explain the need for such index.

A. Does the statement, "There are no investigations of members of an organization which does not advocate the use of force**, mean that investigations are conducted of:

(1) Members to determine if they are leaders?

(2) Organization leaders?

B. If investigations are made of group leaders, do such investigations encompass individuals who are not officers of the organization?

C. If so, how is "leadership" determined.

D. What is the difference between:

(1) "A demonstrated propensity for violence,"

and

(2) "subversive or revolutionary activity"?

E. Are leaders or members of civil rights organizations investigated?

F. If so, what distinction is there between such an organization and its leaders and members?
A. FBI investigations under Section 87 are based on statutes and Departmental Directives.
   (1) Does this mean that no authority was conferred on the FBI by the various Presidential Directives?
   (2) If so, please explain in view of the position taken by Messrs. Wannall, Watters and Lacey that intelligence investigative authority was delegated to the FBI by Presidential Directives in addition to statutory jurisdiction.
   (3) If Presidential Directives did delegate authority to FBI, why aren’t the Directives cited as authority for investigations.

B. What are the Department instructions to which reference is made?

C. Are these the same Department instructions mentioned in Section 122, paragraph Ala, page 1a? If not, what are these instructions?

A. What considerations affect the "desirability" of conducting an investigation of possible statutory violations discovered during the course of an investigation of subversives?

B. Would these same criteria apply to possible violations discovered in the course of extremist investigations (see Section 122, paragraph Alc, page 1a.)?

C. If not, please explain.

A. What authority exists for defining "subversive activities" in the manner set forth?

A. Since specific statutes provide the basis for FBI investigations and since a preliminary inquiry can be
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<td>conducted for 90 days without a specific indication of the statutory basis for the authority:</td>
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<td>(1) Please explain how statutory authority exists for such a preliminary inquiry during the 90 day period.</td>
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<td>(2) Does such a procedure mean that a contact of unknown nature between an individual and a subversive group is sufficient in itself to constitute an activity &quot;which may result in a violation&quot; of some statute even if the statute is not specified?</td>
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### MANUAL SECTION 122: EXTREMIST MATTERS AND CIVIL UNREST

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| 1    | A    | 1a        | A. What is the purpose of the Manual?  
B. As regards 18 U.S.C. §§241, 2383, 2384, 2385, are attempts and conspiracies encompassed by the phrase "activities which may result in a violation * * *"?  
(1) If not, what activities does the phrase encompass?  
(2) If so, what other activities (describe generally) are covered by the phrase?  
(3) Where conspiracy is itself the crime (see 18 U.S.C. §§241, 2384 and 2385), what activities are covered by the phrase? |
| 1a   | A    | 1d        | A. Is the import of the first sentence that:  
(1) The various Presidential Directives charged the FBI with only responsibility for the collection and coordination of internal security information?  
(2) This coordination and collection responsibility was passive in nature, not requiring active investigations?  
(3) No intelligence investigative authority was conveyed to the FBI by the Presidential Directives?  
B. If A(1) is no:  
(1) What is meant?  
(2) Why does the third sentence state that there is a difference between the FBI's collection and coordination responsibility and its "jurisdictional authority for conducting active investigations" under various statutes. |
C. If A(2) is no, why does the third sentence emphasize that the authority for "active investigations" is derived from statutes and Departmental Directives?

D. If the Directives did convey authority
   (1) What is the difference between a "responsibility" as in "responsibility to coordinate and collect" and "authority" as in "jurisdictional authority"?
   (2) Why does paragraph Aa of Section 122, at page 1, not mention the Presidential Directives as authority for investigations?

E. If A(1),(2),(3), or any one of them is answered yes, how can such an answer be reconciled with the position found in the papers by Messrs. Wannall, Watters and Lacey that the FBI was delegated authority to conduct active intelligence investigations by various Presidential Directives both oral and written?

A. What is the authority for defining "extremist activities" in the manner set out?

B. How do "extremist activities" as defined differ from "subversive activities" as defined in Manual Section 87, paragraph A4, page 4?

C. If the definitions are the same or substantially the same, why is a distinction between extremists and subversives necessary?

A. What is a characterization of an individual or organization?

A. Please list all indices at both FBI headquarters and field office levels on which extremist individuals may be listed in addition to the ADEX and EPA.