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<th>FROM: John M. Whitten C/mh/3</th>
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<td>24 DEC 1963</td>
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<td>Attached for your information, comment, and correction is the original, unexpurgated version of the report on CENLON covering OSWALD's stay in Mexico and including summaries of the telephone intercepts. This may be useful to your analysts who are processing the rest of the material and to the people preparing the final report. In writing this up, I have made certain comments and indulged in a certain amount of analysis, because the naked facts seemed to call for it. These thoughts are my own. Feel free to make your own analysis. If you have any corrections to make, please write them on this draft and return it to me. I will return the draft to you if you want it. This report was written for internal use only and was not meant to be used outside the Agency.</td>
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We discover Lee OSWALD in Mexico City

CIA did produce one very significant piece of information on Lee OSWALD before he shot President Kennedy. On 1 October 1963, our Mexico City Station intercepted a telephone call Lee OSWALD made from someplace in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, OSWALD was talking to the Embassy guard, OBIEKOV, who often answers the phone. OSWALD said he had visited the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had promised to send a telegram for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladimirovich) KOSTIKOV. The guard checked with someone else and said that the message had gone out but no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from a telephone tap center which we operate jointly with the office of the President of Mexico. It
is highly secret and not known to Mexican security and law enforcement officials, who have their own center. Our joint center produces great masses of telephone intercepts which are transcribed and reviewed by our small staff in Mexico City. By 9 October, the OSWALD telephone conversation of 1 October had been transcribed and a summary of it cabled to Washington. The name Lee OSWALD meant nothing special to our Mexico City Station, but in their report they did judge him to be an American male.

The cabled report was received in Washington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWALD phoning the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was probably the Lee OSWALD who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWALD's phone call to the Soviet Embassy; the report went to the FBI, the Department of State (because OSWALD was a US citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine.) The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the
likelihood that the Lee OSWALD mentioned was probably the former defector.

A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The same day a long cable went out to Mexico City informing our Station of the background of defector Lee OSWALD and asking for more information. Our Station was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices of the FBI, the Embassy, the Naval Attache, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This was done.

In its original report of 9 October, Mexico City had said it had a photograph of an apparent American male leaving the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963, the day OSWALD phone there. A very sensitive operation in Mexico City provides us with secretly taken photographs of many but not all visitors to the Soviet Embassy there, taken with telephoto lenses. Accordingly, we cabled the Navy Department on 24 October 1963 asking for a photograph of Lee OSWALD from his Marine Corps days so we could compare photos. We had not received this photograph by 22 November 1963, but in any event, it turned out that the man photographed outside the Soviet
Embassy was not OSWALD anyway. As chance would have it, none of our
several photo observation points in Mexico City had ever taken an identi-
fiable picture of Lee OSWALD.

Our Mexico City Station very often produces information like this
on US citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently
the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two
occasions we have even been able to apprehend and return to the USA
American military personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such
cases, our Headquarters desk requests and obtains the special permission of
the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the derogatory information on a US
citizen to other government agencies. Derogatory information on Americans
is not treated routinely; in each case the DDP or his Assistant personally
scrutinize the information, make sure it is credible, and decide whether and
to whom it will be passed. Only in absolute emergencies is the Mexico City
Station authorized to pass such information directly to the FBI office in
the U.S. Embassy.

At this writing (13 December 1963) we do not know what action the FBI
and other agencies may have taken based on our report. We surmise that the 

FBI may have made local checks through Mexican authorities to see if 

Lee OSWALD was actually in Mexico City on 1 October. Indeed, later in- 

vestigation has confirmed all the details of his trip, where he stayed, 

and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the FBI, our Mexico Station 

undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWALD left 

Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report was put out. 

Since this telephone tap operation is a joint one with the Mexican 

Presidency, the Mexicans also had the 1 October intercept on Lee OSWALD, 

but it apparently slumbered in their files until the assassination took 

place. 

22 November 1963

When word of the shooting of President Kennedy reached the offices 

of our operating divisions and staffs on the afternoon of Friday 22 Novem- 

ber 1963, transistor radios were turned on everywhere to follow the 

tragedy. When the name of Lee OSWALD was heard, the effect was electric. 

A phone message from the FBI came at about the same time, naming OSWALD
as the possible assassin and asking for traces. The message was passed on at once by the Chief CI, Mr. Angleton, to Mr. Birch O'Neal of his Special Investigations Unit. Mrs. Betty Haber of this Unit immediately recognized the name of Lee OSWALD and went for his file. At the same time, Mrs. Bustos of the Mexico Desk, who had written our first report on OSWALD on 10 October recognized the name from radio reports and went after the same file. Mr. Reichhardt, Mexico Desk Chief, who was home on leave, heard the news and phoned in a reminder that we had something on OSWALD. While we were preparing a cable to Mexico City asking them for more information on OSWALD, Mexico City itself heard OSWALD's name on the Voice of America broadcast and cabled to us a reminder of the information the Station had sent in on him.

For the next week, a dozen people in the Agency were continuously engaged in handling incoming messages on the case, writing reports to be cabled out, tracing the names mentioned, and researching files. Within a week, 27 cabled reports had gone out to the White House, the State Department, and the FBI. Many cables of guidance and inquiry had been sent to
our overseas stations, and many pieces of information on OSWALD and his wife had been received back. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably involving OSWALD, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really up to. Many conferences were held with the FBI liaison officer who asked us for certain actions and passed us information from the FBI investigation. On the minus side, a host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these are soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FBI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The FBI was too busy to supply us with much of its own information, but answers were given to specific questions we posed to assist our investigation. The Department of State did photograph its entire
file on OSWALD and pass them to us, and the FBI gave us a copy of the
Soviet Consular file on OSWALD which had been publicly given by the Soviet
Ambassador to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy
Attorney General Katzenbach invited us to review the FBI's comprehensive
report on the case to make sure our sources were not jeopardized and that
our information was correctly quoted. We found the report highly
interesting and no threat to our security, as long as it was read only
by the authorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was
handled at Headquarters by a small staff usually charged with investigation
and analysis of the most important security cases, and by a few officers
and analysts of our Western Hemisphere Division.

Reports From Mexico

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Lee OSWALD was the
prime suspect, it began re-screening all the written telephone transcripts
in its files covering the Soviet Embassy for the pertinent period. The
actual tapes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the
normal two weeks wait. Several calls believed to involve OSWALD were discovered and their contents cabled to Washington, where they were disseminated to the White House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

OSWALD's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to him. These calls are summarized below in chronological order.

They cover the period from 27 September 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of OSWALD's visit to Mexico City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Military Attaché and says he needs a visa to go to Odessa. Man answering says he should call 15-60-55 and ask for the Consul. Caller asks for the address, and it is given to him. (There is no special reason for linking this call to OSWALD.)

27 September, 4:05 PM - The Cuban Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate. Silvia Duran, Mexican national clerk of the Cuban Consulate, talked to a Soviet official, saying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to pass through Cuba on his way...
to the Soviet Union. She wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet
Consulate and who told him he would have no problem about it. If a Soviet
visa is assured, the Cuban Consulate can grant him a transit visa and
simply notify Cuban immigration authorities. The Soviet first asks her
to wait, and then she has to explain the whole thing over again to another
Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and promises to call her
back. Silvia DURAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she herself
has moved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embassy bulletin. He
asks her to phone (Sergey Semanovich) KUKHARENKO (Second Secretary who puts
out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuban
Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Teresa
PROHRZA and adds her telephone number.

27 September, 4:26 PM - A Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN
back and tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and
shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that
he had been waiting for visas for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet
Union for a long time, but that no answer had come from Washington, adding
SECRET

that the wait was sometimes four or five months. The "American" had shown the Soviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN rejoins that they have the same problem; the "American" is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to wait there for his Soviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this note.

Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the Soviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He excuses himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right.

26 September - Silvia DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy from the Cuban Consulate. She says that she has the American with her again. The Soviet answering asks her to wait. When another Soviet takes up the phone, Silvia puts the American on. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers in English. The American asks him to speak Russian. The American says that he had been in the Soviet Embassy and spoken with the
Consul, and that they had taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American then says, somewhat enigmatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so. (In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian.)

As far as our records show, OSWALD did not phone the Soviet or Cuban Embassies again until Tuesday 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he did not contact the Soviets on these days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attaché in broken Russian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September) and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything new. The Soviets ask him to call another phone number and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October 10:45 AM - (This is the phone call in which OSWALD
used his true name and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9
October 1963.) Lee OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy and announced his
own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken
with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington,
and he wanted to know if there were anything new. He did not remember
the name of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Embassy Guard OZERKOY
replied: "KOSTIKOV; he is dark." OSWALD replied: "Yes, my name is
OSWALD." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they
hadn't received anything yet. OSWALD asked if they hadn't done anything
and the guard replied they had sent a request, but that nothing had been
received as yet." OSWALD started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet
hung up.

3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then
English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The
Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55.
The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off another
question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with OSWALD, who is now known to have re-entered the US at Laredo the same day.)

Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet Embassy phones in Mexico City is managed jointly with the office of the President of Mexico, the information on Lee OSWALD also came to the attention of President López Mateos after 22 November. The next day, 23 November, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular employee Silvia DURAN, a Mexican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSWALD.

The Mexican authorities had the same idea and she and her husband were arrested on 23 November 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 November 1963.

Silvia's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OSWALD was named as the assassin
of President Kennedy, his wife had recognized the name and recalled she
had waited on OSWALD when he came to apply for a Cuban transit visa;
he remembered she had said she dealt with the Soviet Consulate as well
to find out whether he had a Soviet visa. Horacio DURAN recalled his wife
had said OSWALD became angry and she had to call out the Cuban Consul,
Eusebio AZCUE, to quiet him.

Silvia DURAN told the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with
Cuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations.
She recalled OSWALD well, described him accurately, related how he had
wanted a Cuban visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet
visa, and remembered his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had passed
the Soviet Embassy about him.

The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was
to confirm that OSWALD was in Mexico to get a Cuban visa so he could wait
in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular files passed to the State
Department in Washington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange
between first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet
Consulate in Washington about their requests for permission to return to
the Soviet Union. OSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington
about this as late as 9 November 1963.

Silvia DURAN was arrested again on 27 November and held until 29
November. She told essentially the same story over again.

Well-placed sources within the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City stated
that when Silvia DURAN was released from police arrest the first time on
25 November, she was quite pleased with herself. She told her colleagues
the same story set out above, adding only that the Mexican police had
threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Harvey
OSWALD. The reaction within the Cuban Embassy to the news of President
Kennedy's death was sombre. To date, there is no credible information in
CIA files which would appear to link Lee OSWALD with the Cuban government
or the Cuban intelligence service.

The whole question of whether Lee OSWALD had any secret connection
with the Soviets or Cubans in Mexico cannot yet be answered, but certain
parts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Silvia DURAN and the
Soviet Consular officials spoke of him as a man with "no friends in Cuba" on the one hand, and as a man not "known" in the Soviet Embassy, on the other. The very openness of his visits and the phone calls speak against any secret role. His trip to Mexico was not itself a secret act; he traveled under his real name or a close variant of it, lived openly in Mexican hotels, and corresponded with the Soviets through the open mails about it when he got back to the US. His trip to Mexico was apparently made necessary because it was the nearest Cuban diplomatic installation where he could apply for a visa.

A perplexing aspect of OSWALD's trafficking with the Cubans and Soviets in Mexico City is his assertion in his call of 26 September that he did not know his address when he was at the Soviet Consulate and came to the Cuban Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just what he meant, but it should be remembered that he was talking in Russian, a language he could not manage, and that when he came to Mexico he was in the process of moving from New Orleans to Texas. He may not have memorized his new address in Texas, whatever it was, and may not have been able to
lay hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvia DURAN and wanted to look it up on her card.

A particularly sinister aspect of OSWALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mexico City arises from the likelihood that he met with Soviet Consul Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. In his 1 October phone call to the Soviet Embassy, the guard GRYEDKOV suggests that the Consul OSWALD had talked to was KOSTIKOV if he was dark. OSWALD seems to agree with this, but the identification is very casual. In his 9 November letter to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD gives the name of the man he dealt with as "KOSTIN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. KOSTIKOV is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is believed to be a Soviet KGB officer, and it is believed that he works for Department 13 of the KGB, the Department charged with sabotage and assassinations. The suspicion that KOSTIKOV is a KGB officer arose from his work habits, and his association with other KGB officers. It was hardened when it was
found that he handled a Soviet agent who was trained to do sabotage work and that he turned this agent over to another KGB officer who is definitely known to work for the 13th Department. It is generally true in KGB work that sabotage agents are handled only by 13th Department officers.

Embassy guard Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOY is himself believed to be a KGB man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and surveillant. But unless some direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that OSWALD’s dealing with KGB men OBYEDKOY and KOSTIKOV was nothing more than a grim coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embassy are known or suspected intelligence officers. Certainly if OSWALD had been a Soviet agent in training for an assassination assignment or even for sabotage work, the Soviets would have stopped him from making open visits and phone calls to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico after he tried it a couple of times. Our
experience in Mexico, studying the Soviet intelligence service at close
range, indicates that they do make some mistakes and are sometimes insecure
in their methods, but that they do not persist in such glaring errors.

Some insight on the Cuban attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAN
and the involvement of the Cuban Consulate in the OSWALD case can be
gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuban President
Osvaldo DORTICOS and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Joaquin HERNANDEZ ARMAS on
26 November 1963, the day after Silvia DURAN was released from her first
arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DORTICOS phoned the Ambassador
from Havana and asked him several questions about a report which the
Ambassador had sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the Lee OSWALD
case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that OSWALD
merely wanted a visa. The Ambassador did mention the altercation which
OSWALD had with Consul AZCUE, and he says that Mexican police bruised
Silvia DURAN's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of
their questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with
OSWALD and she had denied it. President DORTICOS twice asked Ambassador
HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican police had asked Silvia DURAN questions about "money," and the President apparently wanted to know whether the Mexicans thought the Cubans had paid OSWALD money. HERNANDEZ insisted the Mexicans had not offered Silvia DURAN money, and DORTICOS gave up trying to put across his point. President DORTICOS instructed HERNANDEZ to keep on questioning Silvia DURAN and to phone him back.

At 7:39 PM that evening Ambassador HERNANDEZ did call President DORTICOS back, saying he had questioned "that person" again and she has nothing new to add. President DORTICOS returns to the issue of whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the man[4] "that American." But Ambassador HERNANDEZ persists in misunderstanding DORTICOS, answers in the negative, and says: "Absolutely nothing was given to her." DORTICOS seems to give up, and the conversation dies out after a few more general remarks.

We do not know for sure what made President DORTICOS press for information about Cuban money passed to OSWALD, but rumors were current in Mexico and even, we understand, in the USA, that OSWALD had returned from Mexico.
City with about $5,000. Perhaps DORIPOS was trying to learn whether
the Mexican police believed that the Cubans had financed OSWALD. In any
event, the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest
over the arrest and detention of Silvio URIAN, but the Mexicans
rejected the note.