

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division ~~for~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~in~~ ~~for~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~the~~ code and cipher materials, ^{and information concerning such materials} in accordance with requirements issued on the clandestine services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background: needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half she was contacted ~~in~~ ~~to~~ sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~Sept.~~ ^{October} 1961

Q Jurein annual salaries :	\$ 7,200
Travel + ops expenses for	
Q Jurein + other agents & agent candidates :	2,000
Fees for services by and	
standby of agents and	
agent candidates :	2,000
Travel of staff employees &	
engaged in Zorible activity :	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles	
and other operational expenses :	1,000
	\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attach
hilité.

2) Our own experience (Ranghok) (+ effort on DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (Coorsup, Bandera group, Kholibor) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search & up/grade to pull back if mistrust or knowledge tells him
he should, ^{with minimum high output for operational security} discreet are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Khabark only (i.g., what else frequency
know?); no approach to other Soviet agencies

b. Within Khabark, one focal point for control,
search, training, case officering, etc - DDP without
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised

c. Max. security cable courses for incoming
cables only; no restrictions on travel; prohibition
of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with
owner (non-station) common word of mouth +
no backchannels re trips

d. No PA's, ^(except for beach) or intermediaries; rigid case-officer
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts.

f. No use of any agent who
ever worked for a Sov. Govt. agency. Train
by opposition using secret

g. Use of already tested assets only
in the search

h. Stand-by list of Khabark who can

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretent: ^{Not to be} ~~Not to be~~ ^{disclosed} ~~disclosed~~; this established by
f. No discussion in stations. No "team" with
ready to go if:

a. No American citizens or residents or
people who ever obtained U.S. visas.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to
person, singleton ops.

c. No meetings any candidates in home territory.

d. Exclude organization ^{e.g., ~~communists~~} ~~communists~~, those
aspect of arrests, those of metallicity of purpose
as criminals.

e. Staffer involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for
shelters houses or lodges in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following, including
security, blackmail.

7. Former residence personnel a possibility.

8. The mob who has never dealt w/ criminals; others
will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such
as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, &
document therein forged & fabricated. Should look like
a CE file.

10. Possible use of staffers for this action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

forced into travel

Legal, operational + ethical → morale problems.

- 1) Maximum ^{highly not secure enough} security, + within limits of only (e.g., how many does Air Force use - bases?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Abuse of Lowville object.
 - 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandate Overseas one-man control base with own (non-station) command.
 - 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no side-arms. PA's.
- Non-strikability:
- 4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who targeted by use by another American agency. Use of these officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.
 - 5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.
 - 6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.
 - 7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., Officer) has been examined.
 - 8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. is it above essential?
 - 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (AS archives)

12) Period of training, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~Any~~ ^{all} subjects personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silvanthone & stable in lives.

15) In what age limits on team or individuals ~~are~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For danger of standbys.

part 1 - 25/1 - Eye Chain
"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Büro ~~Handwritten scribble~~

"for a number" - 115 201 Cover
Curtain - Baubling - 100 S. L. ...
eyes - Jim A.
not a TSD problem

Contract from U-2

Offing tracks

Last report beyond last report &
a comparison of materials -
Et Remembrance - assumption

Example 3 "curry"

Transmittal of Sid's job
Elmer R & E - Memo

"Translating machines" - F.E.
basic manual project
phenomena - (4 units C13)

Comment - Gear

Anathia -

26/1 - AS - Fanfare 201 - Matter -
no pub Review

new memo written
and distributed

1. Select paper open to run -
2. Place a cover
3. Security Rules
4. Trust lines
5. Last Report - Brakes -

May 2

B-WITH-AS-3

Sid - Review

Self-stated - 10-10-48

6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers except per cases.
8. Principal Agent - AF - Project Unit 2CH - tickets 1500 - from RB - Mark spot again. Still at project - see Stebbins
9. Disposal -
10. Foreign: include information - Patent Bureau - Japan - see also report -
11. Case appearing
12. Cover file - create to prevent RIS on subject - non-sens
13. had clearance of RIS counteraction to maintain of this. No allowed -
Fol J list - Remember