

**NOTE:**

The following materials relate to preparation of the psychological assessment of Daniel Ellsberg.

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NOTE:

The first page of this affidavit was missing from  
Tab C, Volume I, Documentation Supplied by CIA 1 June 1973.

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3. On 12 August 1971, on instructions from the Director of Medical Services, the writer met with Mr. David Young, Room 16, Executive Office Building, to discuss the matter of a psychiatric write-up on the case of Daniel Ellsberg. Mr. Young, at the time the appointment was made, had stated that there was more information which he wished to discuss. The meeting lasted for approximately an hour and Mr. Young was joined by a Mr. Linney (probably Liddy), who seemed to be an assistant. Mr. Young stated that the Ellsberg study had the highest priority and had been requested by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Young also stated that the President had been informed of this study. He stated that it was a multi-faceted approach and the psychiatric report would be only one facet. He stated that he understood that the Agency was uneasy about undertaking such a study and assured me that there had been no delineation as to how information derived from the study would be utilized, and if there were any utilization that great care would be given to make it nonattributable to the Agency. Mr. Young was interested in knowing what kind of data would be needed in order to provide further study of the sort done "on Fidel Castro." Later on Mr. Howard Hunt joined the group. Mr. Hunt recognized me, being a former Agency employee, and we greeted cordially. Mr. Hunt amplified on Mr. Young's comments and stated it was his wish to "try Dr. Ellsberg in public." Other comments were made by Mr. Hunt or "Mr. Linney" to the effect that the aim would be to render Dr. Ellsberg ineffective or to make him the object of pity as a broken man. Mr. Hunt stated that he wished to see data of the sort that "psychiatrists found out about Barry Goldwater in 1964," and he expressed interest in being able to refer in a knowledgeable way to Dr. Ellsberg's oedipal conflicts or castration fears and other similar points.

4. It seemed from Mr. Young and "Mr. Linney" that there was considerable concern that Dr. Ellsberg had a great deal more sensitive information which it was feared he would from time to time periodically expose. "Mr. Linney" stated that Dr. Ellsberg thought of himself as "having the white hat and the President as having the black hat."

5. A discussion was held with the group concerning the dangers of preparing such a study in isolation and without the opportunity for the free give and take discussions among experts, as had been the case in our other studies. I was informed that more biographic material was available. I was requested to give examples of the kind of information needed. I pointed out that insofar as possible, "although possibly not available," data from early life from nurses or close relatives would be useful. I agreed with "Mr. Linney" that school progress, including testing, would be helpful. In the same way, year books, his years in college and in the military, comments from friends would be helpful. Mr. Hunt also stated that it would be useful for Dr. Ellsberg's first wife to be interviewed and he felt, "You can easily arrange that under an operational alias." It was pointed out that the first Mrs. Ellsberg would be cooperative.

6. Information was also offered by Mr. Hunt or "Mr. Linney" to the effect that Dr. Ellsberg had been in analysis although times or location were not known for certain. "Mr. Linney" pointed out that after Dr. Ellsberg gave the Pentagon papers away, he telephoned his analyst stating, "Now I am free."

7. "Mr. Linney" and Mr. Young, with Mr. Hunt's assent, pointed out that the Ellsberg study was of the highest priority, even over the SALT negotiations. It was agreed that the further biographic information regarding Dr. Ellsberg would be sent to us and Mr. Hunt agreed to manage this. Mr. Hunt would also make arrangements whereby periodic conferences would be held as necessary. Mr. Hunt did, however, offer that he did not wish to come out to the Agency if he could avoid it.

8. At this point Mr. Hunt made some comments in the presence of the group based on his previous acquaintanceship with me and he remained behind and made some further comments expressing a desire that his presence and participation in the meeting not be mentioned at the Agency. After arriving back at the Agency I informed Mr. Hunt by telephone that it was not feasible for me to avoid reporting Mr. Hunt's presence at the meeting. Mr. Hunt expressed great regret that this was necessary, stating that he had adequate contact with General Cushman and was on good

terms with the Director. He was reluctant in agreeing to my statement that it was necessary to inform the Director of Medical Services.

Mr. Hunt wished to know if this could be treated as confidential medical information, but could not tell the writer in what way. I discussed the entire situation--the dangers and the reservations and the gravity of the situation with the Deputy Chief, Psychiatric Staff, the Director and Deputy Director of Medical Services.

9. On 13 August 1971, additional information was received from the White House. To the best of my knowledge this was from Howard Hunt and consisted of poorly Xeroxed classified FBI reports and Department of State documents. This material provided additional data and on 20 August 1971 the Director of Medical Services and the writer met with the Deputy Director for Support concerning the White House request in the Ellsberg case and the continuing pressure and desire for a psychiatric study. The problems associated with developing the study and our continuing reservations were discussed in detail. In view of Mr. Hunt's enthusiasm, concerns existed about the checks and balances to actions based on a study if one were to be undertaken. To the best of my recall the Deputy Director for Support was in agreement with us. While the additional information furnished further suggested that Ellsberg was under emotional pressure it was not possible to arrive at any firm conclusions or comprehensive understanding of the man's personality. The additional information indicated that:

- a. He had revealed quasi-Secret information while still in the service when he was applying for a Ph.D. fellowship.
- b. He had volunteered for Vietnamese service for the State Department in 1965 while under the stress of obtaining a divorce from his first wife.
- c. He had sought psychoanalytic treatment between the fall of 1968 and 1970 with a psychoanalyst (who was determined to be professionally qualified and reputable) in California.

- d. He may have been involved in leaking information about a South Vietnamese in 1970 while he was actually in psychoanalytic treatment.

To the best of my recollection it was agreed that the implications of the above data would be orally discussed by me with Mr. Hunt, Mr. Liddy and Mr. Young. It was also agreed that there would be the greatest reluctance to undertake any interview of the former Mrs. Ellsberg, and it was hoped that after this a written document would not be necessary.

10. The Deputy Director for Support considered advising the DCI, but it was decided that I would first visit Mr. Young and inform him that the additional material basically provided for no further understanding. It was hoped that this would put an end to the situation, but if further material was forwarded the matter would have to be dealt with at that time.

11. The Deputy Director for Support stated that after the meeting with Mr. Young, the DCI would be brought up to date.

12. Following the meeting on Friday, 20 August, and in accord with the discussions on that date, a call was placed on Monday, 23 August, to Mr. David Young at the White House. Mr. Young was informed that we had received the material which had been forwarded and that we had considered it, and would be available to discuss the data further. Mr. Young stated that he would have Mr. Hunt call me. He stated that Mr. Hunt's office was elsewhere in the building and he did not have his number immediately available. As of 27 August 1971 Mr. Hunt had not called me.

13. On 30 September 1971, there is a yellow memorandum of a telephone call to me from David Young at the White House with the message that Mr. Hunt suggested meeting Wednesday, 27 October, at 11:00 a.m. On 12 October 1971 I received some more data from Mr. Hunt at the White House.

14. On 27 October 1971, I met with Mr. Hunt and with Mr. Liddy and with Mr. Young at the Executive Office Building. The essence of the observations noted above in the 20 August 1971 discussions were orally presented. I was told to prepare the material in writing. On 3 November 1971 Mr. Liddy sent me further information on Ellsberg. On 1 November 1971 Mr. Young at the White House telephoned me requesting the report the following day and he was informed that the requested report was at that time in the hands of my supervisors for their evaluation. On 12 November 1971 the material was delivered by me to the White House and to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Young and Mr. Hunt. These men were interested in obtaining information which could be used to defame or manipulate Ellsberg. While it was never expressed, it was my impression that the material and information provided were not of direct interest or usefulness to Hunt, Liddy or Young.

MA

M.D.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9<sup>th</sup> day of May

1973.

MF

Notary Public

My Commission Expires August 11, 1975



NOTE:

An unaddressed note from David Young, which transmitted three FBI memoranda, Subject: "Daniel Ellsberg - Espionage-X", dated 13 July 1971, 20 July 1971, and 22 July 1971. (These three memoranda are found at Tab B, Volume II, CIA Materials Furnished to the Special Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.)

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

Mr. David Young  
Room 16  
Executive Office Building  
The White House

Dave:

Attached is the personality assessment you requested on Ellsberg. If there are any aspects of this assessment which, in your opinion require amplification, we would be happy to arrange to make the individual who prepared it available for discussion.

I know that you appreciate that however this is used, the Agency should not become involved.

11 August 1971

EB  
Director of Security

RECEIVED FOR THE DIRECTOR  
AUG 11 1971

: SEND:71 WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Director of Security 4E60 Headquarters	11 AUG 1971	
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b> <p>This indirect assessment should be considered impressionistic and speculative, as the data on which it is based are quite sparse. If more reliable family history and personal data become available, we should be able to provide a more solid assessment. If there are aspects of this assessment which are unclear or require amplification, we would be glad to discuss them with concerned individuals.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MB</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Director of Medical Services 1D4061 Headquarters			10 Aug
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

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SECRET

13 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With Mr. David Young

1. In connection with instructions from the Director of Medical Services, an appointment was arranged for 12 August 1971 at 2:00 PM with Mr. David Young, Room 16, Executive Office Building, to discuss further psychiatric input in the case of Daniel Ellsberg. Mr. Young, on the telephone, stated that there was more information available which he wished to discuss.

2. The meeting lasted for approximately an hour and Mr. Young was joined by a Mr. Linney (?), who seemed to be an assistant. Mr. Young stated that the Ellsberg study had the highest priority and had been requested by Mr. Erlichman and Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Young also stated that the President had been informed of this study. He stated that it was a multi-faceted approach and the psychiatric report would be only one facet. He stated that he understood that the Agency was uneasy about undertaking such a study and assured the writer that there had been no delimitation as to how information derived from the study would be utilized, and if there were any utilization that great care would be given to make it nonattributable to the Agency. Mr. Young was interested in knowing what kind of data would be needed in order to provide further study of the sort done on Fidel Castro." Later on Mr. Howard Hunt joined the group. Mr. Hunt recognized the writer, being a former Agency employee, and we greeted cordially. Mr. Hunt amplified on Mr. Young's comments and stated it was his wish to "try Dr. Ellsberg in public." Other comments were made by Mr. Hunt or Mr. Linney to the effect that the aim would be to render Dr. Ellsberg ineffective or to make him the object of pity as a broken man. Mr. Hunt stated that he wished to see data of the sort that "psychiatrists found out about Barry Goldwater in 1964," and he expressed interest in being able to refer in a knowledgeable way to Dr. Ellsberg's oedipal conflicts or castration fears and other similar points.

3. It seems from Mr. Young and Mr. Linney that there is considerable concern that Dr. Ellsberg has a great deal more sensitive information which it is feared he will from time to time periodically expose. Mr. Linney stated that Dr. Ellsberg thinks of himself as "having the white hat and the President as having the black hat."

SECRET

Meeting With Mr. David Young

4. Some discussion was held with the group about the need to incorporate joint efforts in studies of this sort. A brief description was given of the seminar type of approach which our Staff has evolved over the years, and of our need to peruse the material and to discuss it in an oral manner back and forth among qualified participants. The group was agreeable to this and stated that more biographic material was available. The writer was requested to give examples of the kind of information needed. The writer pointed out that insofar as possible, "although possibly not available," data from early life from nurses or close relatives would be useful. The writer agreed with Mr. Linney that school progress, including testing, would be helpful. In the same way, year books, his years in college and in the military, comments from friends would be helpful. Mr. Hunt also stated that it would be useful for Dr. Ellsberg's first wife to be interviewed and he felt, "You can easily arrange that under an operational alias." It was pointed out that the first Mrs. Ellsberg would be cooperative.

5. Information was also offered by Mr. Hunt or Mr. Linney to the effect that Dr. Ellsberg had been in analysis although times or location were not known for certain. Mr. Linney pointed out that after Dr. Ellsberg gave the Pentagon papers away, he telephoned his analyst stating, "Now I am free."

6. Mr. Linney and Mr. Young, with Mr. Hunt's assent, pointed out that the Ellsberg study was of the highest priority, even over the SALT negotiations. It was agreed that the further biographic information regarding Dr. Ellsberg would be sent to us and Mr. Hunt agreed to manage this. Mr. Hunt would also make arrangements whereby periodic conferences would be held as necessary. Mr. Hunt did, however, offer that he did not wish to come out to the Agency if he could avoid it.

7. At this point Mr. Hunt stated to the group [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Hunt did not wish it known of his presence at the meeting. He stated that his house was in the process of being painted by the son of the Director of Security and EB has been trying all summer to find out what I was doing." After arriving back at the Agency, the writer informed Mr. Hunt by telephone that it was not feasible for him to avoid reporting Mr. Hunt's presence at the meeting. Mr. Hunt expressed great regret that this was necessary, stating that he had adequate contact with General Cushman and was on good terms with the Director. He was reluctant in agreeing to the writer's statement that it was necessary to inform the Director of Medical Services. Mr. Hunt wanted to know if this could be treated as confidential medical information, but could not tell the writer in what way.

SECRET

Meeting With Mr. David Young

8. The entire situation was subsequently discussed with D/MS,  
with DD/MS and with DC/PS.

MA

\_\_\_\_\_, M.D.;  
Chief, Psychiatric Staff

- 3 -  
SECRET

*Howard Kent*

*David  
Young*

*16*

*145-6697*

*145-6690*

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~~SECRET~~

20 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with DD/S and D/MS Regarding Daniel Ellsberg

1. D/MS and the writer today spoke with the DD/S concerning the White House request on the Ellsberg case. D/MS made three points with which the writer is in agreement:

a) The additional information furnished provides further evidence that Ellsberg was under pressure. Nonetheless, the additional material provided does not allow for any substantive conclusions or understanding of this man's personality. He sought psychoanalytic treatment between the fall of 1968 and 1970 with a qualified and reputable psychoanalyst in California. The allegation that after leaking the Rand study that he called the analyst and stated, "now I'm free" would suggest that Ellsberg was still involved in dealing with problems which either brought him to analysis or which were uncovered in the course of the treatment. In going to Vietnam for the State Department in 1965 while involved in obtaining a divorce from his first wife, he had sought to discharge internal tension by taking action; his analytic treatment was unsuccessful in altering this propensity. Ellsberg revealed secret information in the course of applying for a Ph.D. fellowship while still in the service; he may have been involved in leaking information about a South Vietnamese in 1970 prior to leaking the Rand study. These actions may have also been the resultants of internal pressures--the 1970 incident while he was actually in analysis.

b) There is hesitation about the Psychiatric Staff undertaking to interview the former Mrs. Ellsberg. It was agreed that there would be a great professional reluctance at such a procedure.

c) There is considerable concern about the use to which the requested study would be put. In view of Mr. Hunt's enthusiasm, concerns exist about the checks and balances to actions based on a study if one were to be undertaken.

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~~SECRET~~

Meeting with DD/S and D/MS Regarding Daniel Ellsberg - 20 August 1971

2. The DD/S considered the advisability of discussing the matter at this point with the DCI. It was decided that at this point the writer would again visit Mr. Young and inform him orally that the additional material provided allows for no further understanding other than as noted above. It was agreed that the writer would not accept any requirements to undertake to interview the former Mrs. Ellsberg. It is hoped that this will put an end to the situation, but if further material is forwarded, the matter will have to be dealt with at that time.

3. The DD/S stated that after the meeting with Mr. Young, the DCI should be brought up to date.

MA

M.D.  
Chief, Psychiatric Staff

~~SECRET~~  
-2-

~~SECRET~~

27 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Mr. David Young

1. Following the meeting last Friday with the DDS on the part of the Director of Medical Services and the writer, and in accord with discussions on that date, a call was placed on Monday, 23 August, to Mr. David Young.
2. Mr. Young was informed that we had received the material which had been forwarded and that we had considered it, and would be available to discuss the data further.
3. Mr. Young stated that this would be from Mr. Hunt, and that he would have Mr. Hunt call the writer. He stated that Mr. Hunt's office was elsewhere in the building and he did not have his number immediately available, in reply to the writer's question as to Mr. Hunt's number.
4. To date, Mr. Hunt has not called the writer.

MA

M.D.  
Chief, Psychiatric Staff

1971-1973  
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

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MEMORANDUM  
OF CALL

TO: MA

YOU WERE CALLED BY —  YOU WERE VISITED BY —

David Young  
OF (Organization) White House

PLEASE CALL —  PHONE NO. 456-6697  
CODE/EXT.

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

1) 10-18-71 HH ? info @ EEO also  
Liddy a) com 2932700 - HUNT  
4562192

Mr. Hunt suggested  
Wed., 27 Oct.  
at 1100  
same place.

RECEIVED BY [Signature] DATE 30 Oct TIME 1135

STANDARD FORM 63  
REVISED AUGUST 1967  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

GPO : 1969-448-16-6034-1 332-339 63-108

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

*MA*

YOU WERE CALLED BY —  YOU WERE VISITED BY —

*David Young*

OF (Organization) \_\_\_\_\_

*W. House*

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. *456 6697*

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*11-2-*

*Told him in halls of my  
room - heard to have W or Thudg.*

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME
<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>1 Nov 63</i>	<i>3:50</i>

STANDARD FORM 63  
REVISED AUGUST 1962  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

GPO: 1968 O-318-527

63-108

APPROVED FOR MESSAGE ROOMS  
AS PART OF THE MESSAGE PROGRAM

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

*MA*

YOU WERE CALLED BY —  YOU WERE VISITED BY —

*David Young*

OF (Organization) \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. *456-6697*

WILL CALL AGAIN  IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

RETURNED YOUR CALL  WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*11:21 AM*

*(Reason to believe the material will be forthcoming from agent's shortly, will call immediately)*

*OK - we are anxious.*

RECEIVED BY

*[Signature]*

DATE

*9/19*

TIME

*10:00*

STANDARD FORM 63  
REVISED AUGUST 1967  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

GPO: 1969 O-318-527

63-108

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~~SECRET~~

15 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Daniel Ellsberg

On 27 October 1971, the writer met with Mr. Howard Hunt, Mr. David Young, and Mr. Gordon Liddy in Mr. Young's office in the Executive Office Building. The writer presented some of the thoughts and ideas developed from a review of material on the Ellsberg case. As a sequel, the writer was requested to prepare material in writing.

The notes were polished and were sent by way of the Director of Medical Services to the Deputy Director for Support and on to the DCI for his knowledge and agreement. It was therefore set up for the writer to visit again with the gentlemen on Friday, 12 November, to present the material.

In the course of this meeting the various details were gone over once more.

Each of these meetings with these gentlemen lasted for some three hours.

Mr. Young stated that it might be possible that further consultations would be requested on the matter.

MA

M.D. ✓

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2 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Daniel Ellsberg

The writer today requested Dr. *AB* to make a joint review of such material as he may hold concerning the evaluation of Daniel Ellsberg. Dr. *AB* initial recollection was that he held no material and that it had all been conveyed to the Office of Security. An initial check with his secretary revealed no material either that was available in the files. He then checked with Mrs. *MC*, his former secretary who is now working in the office of the OMS Registrar. Mrs. *MC* was able to locate a sealed, Eyes Only envelope, unmarked, containing a folder therein entitled "Indirect Assessment -- Ellsberg."

In the folder are contained the following documents:

1. A carbon copy of an 18 August 1971 memorandum to the writer from Dr. *AB* which begins, "In the context of a conversation with Dr. *AB* concerning the 'Aging Leaders' paper..."
2. A 10 August 1971 yellow transmittal slip to "Dr. *MD* FYI and return" from Dr. *AB* and initialed *MD* 11 August 1971, and stapled to
3. a transmittal slip dated 9 August 1971 to "Dr. *MA*" with the remarks, "I have transmitted this to D/MS for his reappraisal. The changes are in paragraph 2, page 1; in the second paragraph of page 2, and in the final sentences." It is from Dr. *AB*. In hand and dated 10 August 1971 the following is noted. "Fine. I hope that on the buck slip you are authoring that some mention will be made for more data if there is need for further and more precise consideration." This is signed *MA* and stapled thereto
4. a 9 August 1971 carbon copy of a four-page paper concerning Dr. Ellsberg, unsigned, and stapled thereto
5. a 5 August 1971 three-page carbon copy of an earlier version of the same paper, also unsigned.

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