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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSDB-3/657,597
SUBJECT	Soliciting of Funds by the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) for the Purchase of Two P-51's or Similar Aircraft	DATE DISTR.	31 October 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	25 September 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (10 October 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	UFG-3869

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports for over two years.

The following is the gist of a circular letter which Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, general coordinator of the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR, Insurrectional Movement of Revolutionary Recovery), is sending to various Cuban exiles, requesting their financial assistance for the purchase of aircraft:

25 September 1963

Esteemed compatriot:

As you must have learned by the press, our organization has begun bombing the industrial and military targets of the Castro régime, and we believe that if we have the opportunity and necessary resources we will be able to continue our softening-up attacks for a period of 90 to 120 days, supplemented by infiltrations of arms and explosives, and that consequently we shall attain the fall of the Habana régime before the end of the coming year. We would not like to fall in the disgrace of the other organizations of accomplishing an attack every 10 or 12 months because we believe that this is in detriment to our cause rather than in its benefit. In order to be successful, in accordance with the experience gained, attacks against Castro by Cubans must have two indispensable qualities: be effective and most of all be consecutive. We believe that the boats, firing against the coasts, etc., etc.

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	MRK	OCR	FBI # 2
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO #	TREASURY	USIA	I&NS				

(State: Field dist. button indicated by "#".)

SAS/EOB	1	SAS/SX	1	WE/S/R		WH/FACY	1			UFG-3869	
SAS/Intel	1	SAS/WAVE	1	WE/MAOR	2					NP (AMOT-2)	
SAS/R	2	SAS/SO/HH	1							CSDB-3/657,597	
SAS/CI	2					CI/OPS/WH	2				
SAS/MOB	1									COORDINATING	RELEASING
TOTALS DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DODS 1, SAS 10 (1), WH (1), WE 1 (2)								LIAISON *			

FORM NO. 1 REPLACES FORM 51-51 WHICH MAY BE USED.