

DISPATCH		DECLASSIFIED SECRET Per GSN 43-43	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
DWO			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Request for Renewal of LIENVOY Project		
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES			
Reference: HMMA-12107 dated 19 November 1963			
Attached is the LIENVOY Project Renewal for the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965. End of Dispatch			
<i>Willard C. Curtis</i> Willard C. CURTIS			
Enclosures: Left hand side h/v Right hand side u.s.c.			
Distribution: 3 - C/WHD w/enclosures (5 copies)			
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	HMMA-22679	31 December 1963	
	CLASSIFICATION	MCS FILE NUMBER	
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21 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Plans

SUBJECT : Request for Renewal of the LIENVOY Project

The LIENVOY Project is submitted for renewal for the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965, for a total of \$47,068; \$20,530 for FY 1964 and \$26,538 for FY 1965. No additional funds are required for FY 1964; however, as the equipment approved in an amendment submitted in June 1963 for \$23,000 will not be ordered during the remainder of the present Fiscal Year.

1. Objectives: The LIENVOY Project provides for a joint CIA/Mexican Government sponsored telephone tap unit, and for a non-official liaison relationship which provides access to the highest level Mexican Government officials.

2. Agents: There have been no changes in agent personnel during the past year, and none are proposed during the coming year. Arnold F. AREHART, Staff Agent, continues to do an outstanding job in managing the top center and in keeping all technical equipment in repair.

3. Changes: During the past year, Headquarters approved the Station's plan to move the LIENVOY intercept center for security reasons, and to replace the older equipment with new and more mobile equipment. This move has been held in abeyance until this operation can be discussed with LITENSOR's successor and a mutual decision is made about the future operational pattern of the tap phase of LIENVOY. LITENSOR's successor will not officially replace him until December 1964. Meantime, the security of the intercept premises has been tightened and it is believed that LITENSOR or LIELEGANT could handle any problems which might arise.

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4. Intelligence Production: LIENVOY is one of the most productive telephone tap projects in KUBARK of both FI and CE type information. From 1 February 1963 through 15 January 1964, this project has been the source of 309 positive reports, 56 of which were not disseminated. LIENVOY-2 was the source of 16 reports, and the tap intercept program accounted for the remaining 293. No customer evaluations were requested, but WH/3 evaluates the product as being valuable and covering a wide range of topics difficult to cover through other sources. The types of reports originating from this Project include such matters as:

LIENVOY-2: Communist and leftist activity in Mexico
Communist publications
International congresses
Mexican political activities

LIENVOY: Communist and leftist personalities and activities in Mexico
Travel
Soviet and Satellite Activities in Mexico
Cuban activities in Mexico and developments in Cuba
International conferences and delegates
Communist Chinese activities in Mexico

5. Effectiveness: In addition to the positive intelligence production this Project is the source of valuable CE information and operational leads. The intercept center covers 30 lines, all of which are of interest to KUBARK and approximately one-half of them are exclusively for KUBARK. These 30 lines include Mexican Communist and leftist leaders, Prensa Latina, the Local Security Service (Direccion Federal de Seguridad-DFS), 5 lines on the Soviet Embassy, 3 on the Cuban Embassy, 2 on the Czech Embassy, and since September 1963 there have been 3 on the Yugoslav Embassy. This center records an average of 525 reels per month, from which the tap center monitors prepare daily summaries of significant items gleaned from all the lines. These daily resumes total between 100 to 150 pages per month. The tap center monitors prepare full transcripts in Spanish for the Cuban, Yugoslav, and Soviet Embassy lines. The reels for the Soviet and Satellite coverage are given

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the Station for passage to Station assets who translate the Soviet, Czech and Yugoslav portions.

Coverage of the Cuban, Czech, Yugoslav and Soviet Embassies provide details of their personnel, their contacts, travel and other useful CE data. Information gained from this source has led to a successful recruitment in the Yugoslav Embassy during the past year.

Examples of some important non-disseminable information obtained through LIENVOY during the past year are:

a. During May, through LIENVOY, the Station uncovered a harrasment operation directed against the U.S. Embassy by the use of forged routine forms to embarrass the Embassy and known anti-Communists.

b. Several contacts made by U.S. citizens with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, and with Mexican Communists were recorded. This information is given special dissemination to the FBI for their action. The most significant of these contacts was that by Lee OSWALD with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico prior to the assassination of the late President KENNEDY. OSWALD's contact was cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 and this information was immediately disseminated to the appropriate ODYOKE offices.

c. During August LIENVOY contributed support to the REDWOOD AEJUMBO operation by providing information on contacts between principals involved in this sensitive SR operation.

6. Problems: There have been no significant security, cover, control, or Liaison problems during the past year.

7. Liaison: This Project encompasses an unofficial liaison relationship with high-level Mexican government officials which contributes to the friendly attitude of that Government toward ODYOKE. On 23 November, the day after the assassination of the

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late President Kennedy, the Chief of Station alerted Mexican officials to selected LIENVOY coverage of the Cuban Embassy which concerned Lee OSWALD. As a result they took immediate action favorable to PBPRIME by making appropriate arrests, conducting interrogations, rejecting a Cuban Embassy protest note, and killing a Soviet propaganda effort to place the blame on minority groups in PBPRIME.

In December 1963, a KUBARK official traveled to Mexico with a visual presentation concerning the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. There he gave a special briefing to LITENSOR, pointing out the authenticity of the Cuban origin of these arms, and thus contributing significantly to a reaction by the Mexican Government on this important inter-American matter favorable to ODYOKE.

In connection with a trip made by LITENSOR to several East and West European countries in March and April 1963, the Station was provided several briefing papers on these countries, prepared by KUMONK and KUWOLF, for passage to LITENSOR. LITENSOR's official party was also provided contact with a KUBARK official in each West European city so that he might send classified messages to certain trusted Mexican officials through KUBARK channels if he so wished.

8. Inter-Agency Coordination: No formal inter-Agency coordination is required in this Project. The Chief, PBSWING, Mexico, is the only ODYOKE representative in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project and its provision for a special channel to LITENSOR. Such matters as the special briefing on the arms cache in Venezuela were discussed in detail with him.

9. Plans: No significant operational changes are planned during the coming Project year. In December 1964 LITENSOR will probably be replaced by LITEMPO-2. This should cause no major adjustments since the Station is already on good terms with LITEMPO-2 under the LITEMPO Project. It is anticipated that LITEMPO-2 will continue the intercept program without change.

10. Funds: Approval is requested for the renewal of the

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LIENVOY Project for the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965 for a total of \$47 068; \$20,530 for FY 1964 and \$26,538 for FY 1965. No additional funds are required for FY 1964 since sufficient funds remain from the past approval to cover the \$20,530 required under this renewal request.

11. Recommendations: WH Division recommends renewal of this Project based upon the above memorandum and the attached field request.

R. W. Herbert

J. C. KING
C/WHD

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REQUEST FOR PROJECT LIENVOY RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives.

The objectives of this project remain the same as those stated in the last renewal request. The project continues to provide the Mexico Station with same rapid channel to Mexico's highest political figures. The only major change which will occur in the next project year is a new President. It is too early to determine how this change will affect the operation of LIENVOY. The COS Mexico has been assured that LIENVOY will remain in operation but LITENSOR wants it to continue as is for an as yet undetermined length of time. All major objectives of the project are being effectively realized.

B. Changes.

In the last project renewal request, it was planned to move the intercept center for security reasons. This move has been held in abeyance pending some indication from LITENSOR on how his successor will feel about the future of LIENVOY and the manner he wishes it to operate. The security of the premises has been tightened and it is believed that LITENSOR can handle any problems which might arise.

C. Intelligence Production.

Each month an operational report is forwarded to Headquarters listing the dispatches, cables, and intelligence reports based on LIENVOY production.

In September 1963 Paul V. LEVISTER (ps), Headquarters KUTUBE officer, came to Mexico on temporary duty to review the LIENVOY and LIFEAT projects as examples of technical operations producing a high rate of positive intelligence. It is suggested that the study prepared by this officer be reviewed in connection with this request for renewal.


D. Effectiveness.

The LIENVOY project continues to provide the same covert channel to the highest level of Mexican officialdom which is more effective with each year of operation. The daily "resumen" from the thirty target lines provides current intelligence as well as background data on prominent Mexican officials. The Cuban section at the station would be seriously handicapped without the daily transcripts on the Cuban Embassy lines. The same is true for the Soviet and Soviet Sattellite coverage. Background information from LIENVOY on these officials has lead to successful recruitments in the Cuban and the Yugoslav Embassies.

E. Problems.

There have been no significant security, cover, control or liaison problems during the past year.

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F. Liaison.

This project contributes to the friendly attitude of the Mexican Government officials. Regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, Willard C. Curtis alerted Mexican officials on 23 November to selected LIENVOY coverage of the Cuban Embassy. As a result they took immediate action favorable to PEPRIME, they made arrests, conducted interrogations, rejected the Cuban Embassy protest note and killed the Soviet propaganda effort to place the blame on minority groups in PEPRIME. With wide press play, Mexican Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello, publicly ordered the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba to return the protest note as unacceptable and not in keeping with diplomatic protocol.

G. Interagency Coordination.

The Chief, PESWING, Mexico, is the only ODYOKE representative in Mexico outside KUBARK who is aware of this project. There is no coordination in this regard.

H. Plans.

There will be no significant operational changes until LITENSOR is replaced. If this occurs during the coming project year, a project amendment will be submitted.

I. Costs.

1. For the past period.

The cost of the project (paid by Mexico Station exclusive of Headquarters costs) from 1 February 1963 through 30 June 1963 was US \$19,357.47 and from 1 July 1963 through 31 December 1963 \$19,105.14 (actual) and for January 1964 \$10,000 is estimated.

2. For the next project year.

During the period 1 February 1964 through 31 January 1965, an estimated amount of US \$47,068 will be required with US \$20,530 to be spent from 1 February 1964 through 30 June 1965 and \$26,538 to be spent from 1 July 1964 through 31 January 1965.

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3. Agent Salaries.

	FY 64	FY 65
LIENVOY-2	\$2,400	\$3,360
LIENVOY-4	1,200	1,680
LIENVOY-5	1,200	1,680
LIENVOY-6	800	1,120
LIENVOY-7	800	1,120
LIENVOY-11	1,200	1,680
LIENVOY-12	1,200	1,680
LIENVOY-14	800	1,120
LIENVOY-15	260	364
LIENVOY-16	800	1,120
LIENVOY-18	1,200	1,680
Christmas bonus one month's pay 1964	2,320	
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	950	1,334.
Operational expenses	800	1,200
Local purchase supplies & equipment	1,000	1,500
Upkeep of 2 QP vehicles	400	800
Safehouse rental	1,000	1,500
Entertainment & gifts for Mexican officials	1,000	2,000
Purchase of information via LIENVOY-2	<u>1,200</u>	<u>1,600</u>
TOTAL	\$ 20,530	\$ 26,538

J. Annex.

The equipment and Headquarters technical support furnished this project has been excellent.

K. Emergency Conditions.

There has been no change in emergency conditions arrangement since the last project renewal request.

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