

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with ANCARDON-1

XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	REF ID: A6	

ACTION REQUIRED: PARAGRAPH 10

- REFERENCES:
- A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
 - B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
 - C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
 - D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
 - E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. **INTRODUCTION.** In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with ANCARDON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with ANCARDON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMBUSK. While the relationship with ANCARDON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUDARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with ANCARDON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

- Attachments: USC
 A - Five Newspaper Clippings
 B - Identities

- Distribution:
 3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and
 declassification

DATE TYPED		DATE DISPATCHED	
19 March 64		APR 2 1964	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER			
UFGA-14781			
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER			
201-			
CLASSIFICATION			
SECRET			
ORIGINATING			
OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
COS	Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp		251
COORDINATING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
ESEC	7/11/64	DUDLEY R. WILLINGS	
RELEASING			
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
S/JMWAVE	3/30/64	Andrew K. Reuteman	
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN			

- RI Chrono
- 1 - 201 file (O/COS)
- 1 - COS Chrono

DA 11

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 was handled via ANCARDON-2. In mid-December 1962, ANCARDON-2 made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to ANCARDON-1 in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that ANCARDON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN agreed to ANCARDON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, ANCARDON-2 hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which ANCARDON-2 introduced ANCARDON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with ANCARDON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the nature of JMWAVE's relationship with ANCARDON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ANCARDON-1

When ANCARDON-2 introduced ANCARDON-1 to REUTEMAN, ANCARDON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for ANCARDON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, ANCARDON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. ANCARDON-2 made it clear to ANCARDON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, ANCARDON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, ANCARDON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, ANCARDON-2 pointed out that, if ANCARDON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. ANCARDON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which ANCARDON-1 and ANCARDON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. ANCARDON-2 advised ANCARDON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that ANCARDON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that ANCARDON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to scoring tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. ANCARDON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by ANCARDON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with ANCARDON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. ANCARDON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER.

ANCARDON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, ANCARDON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, ANCARDON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for ANCARDON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. ANCARDON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about ANCARDON-1, and he has indicated that ANCARDON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, ANCARDON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. ANCARDON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that ANCARDON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. ANCARDON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, ANCARDON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, ANCARDON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which ANCARDON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with ANCARDON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that ANCARDON-1's sources include the following persons:

- a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.
- b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.
- c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.
- d. AMBIDY-1 (201-267437)
- e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA
- f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. ANCARDON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.
- g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.
- h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.
- i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.
- j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-193272), former president of the Dominican Republic.
- k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.
- l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraiser (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. ANCARDON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter ANCARDON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

SECRET

UFGA-14781

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, ANCARDON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, ANCARDON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of ANCARDON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how ANCARDON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus ANCARDON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. ANCARDON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with ANCARDON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which ANCARDON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. ANCARDON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with ANCARDON-1, the word was soon leaked by ANCARDON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, ANCARDON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, ANCARDON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. ANCARDON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that ANCARDON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, ANCARDON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, ANCARDON-1 pointed out that he was

SECRET



CONTINUED

4.

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. ANCARDON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised ANCARDON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with ANCARDON-1. While ANCARDON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before ANCARDON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, ANCARDON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, ANCARDON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, ANCARDON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, ANCARDON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, ANCARDON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that ANCARDON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, ANCARDON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, ANCARDON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised ANCARDON-1 that KUDARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, ANCARDON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. ANCARDON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUDARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how ANCARDON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. ANCRAB-1. The ANCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted ANCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on ANCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that ANCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Gramma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. ANCARDON-1 was briefed in detail on the ANCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief ANCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on ANCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on ANCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. ANCARDON-1's story on ANCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to ANCARDON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted ANCARDON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. ANCARDON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. **POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE.** Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from ANCARDON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that ANCARDON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, ANCARDON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, ANCARDON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that ANCARDON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. **COMMENT.** In the period covered by this report, ANCARDON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that ANCARDON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUIARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness ANCARDON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with ANCARDON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with ANCARDON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned ANCARDON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

Separate Cover Attachment
B to UFGA-14781

Identities - 1 - The Miami News

2 -

3 - The Miami Herald

4 -

5 - The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Chief, SAS
- 1 - RI Chrono
- 1 - AMCARBON-1 201
- 1 - COS Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.