HIGHLIGHTS OF AMLEO/3'S DEBRIEFING

These are the highlights of my debriefing of AMLEO/3.
They are elaborated upon in this and other reports.

1. CASTRO may permit onsite inspection by appropriate
U. N. observers. CASTRO will then ask for a no-invasion pledge
by the U.S.

2. CASTRO is the complete master of everything and everyone
in Cuba. CASTRO's five points were extremely well received and
fully subscribed to by practically every Cuban in Cuba.

3. The professional officer cadre of the Cuban Navy and
the officers of the rebel army, as opposed to those of the militia,
are the element most likely to conspire against the Communist
oriented direction of Fidel's government.

4. The shortage of doctors in Cuba has made it necessary
for CASTRO to prohibit their further exit and in addition he has
recently raised their pay and given each a new automobile. A
further exodus of doctors from Cuba will cause a "panic" on the
Island. This is one item the Soviets cannot furnish. *Soviet doctors like not popul. in Cuba!*

5. A further departure of engineers would likewise damage
the regime, but they can be replaced by Soviet and Czech
technicians.

6. The infiltration of black teams into Cuba is futile, non-productive, and suicidal. The counter-surveillance block ⎧ Hook makes black living impossible in the cities and towns.

7. When the CRC goes, Fidel won't be able to hold the flood of Cubans seeking refuge in the U. S.

8. Fidel suspects the Communists to have an underground apparatus. Blas ROCA is the leader of this apparat.

9. Fidel is bothered considerably when Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ is made out to be the main cog of the Cuban government.

10. The death of Fidel would result in a free for all--with each army commander digging in for a show down. Calculated to go down is Raul; given a good chance for survival, in union with rebel army and navy leaders, would be "Che"; the Commies would lose out. To AMLEO/3, the death of Fidel would be the best answer to all.

11. AMLEO/3 has a group of about 10 important people:

   A. Conchita FERNANDEZ and her husband

   B. U. N. Delegate Raul PRIMELLES
        06, 04104

   C. (Cultural attache ALBERU) in Mexico

   D. Engineer Roman Luis MAYOR

   E. Lt. VASQUEZ, Army officer

   F. Augusto and Jorge ARCOS (brothers of Gustavo Arcos.
              ETC
who he ~~xxxxxxxx~~ will work with him in whatever way he asks.
   ⎣ feels certain ⎤

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12. AMLEO/3 believes these would make ideal psychological themes:

A. A subtle, careful build-up of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. This could begin with pictures of Fidel and Carlos Rafael conferring in the Sierra Maestra. I believe such pictures exist. The showing of CR as Fidel's mentor both in Marxism-Leninism and in "how to organize a country" will hurt Fidel. C.R. Rodriguez

B. Certainly the Chief/SAS's idea of doing the same with "Che" would be even more to the point. "Che" is known to be a prodigious worker, "brilliant," popular and one who does not fear Fidel. These are facets of Che's character which Fidel undoubtedly would not like to hear too often.

C. The truth must be employed--the use of materials easily proved to be "lies" are extremely damaging and extremely well exploited by Fidel.

D. Postal cards (in color) showing the food counter of a Hot Shoppe or Howard Johnson. AMLEO/3 was genuinely moved by the "beauty" of the food counter of a Hot Shoppe we visited. It was his idea to send in the back of cards. The same thing could be done of grocery stores, shoe store windows, etc.

E. The pamphlets which gave the populace instructions

in simple sabotage techniques were "bothersome" and damaging

to the Cuban government.

13. Psychological warfare which was not well received:

A. Those works showing Fidel as a beast with long,

bloody claws, or as a donkey pulling Khrushchev in a wagon.

B. The "gusano" theme has not been noticed to any

degree (at least not by AMLEO/3). He considers this "too

common" a theme to have any value.

14. There will be no revolt or uprising by elements within

Cuba, unless the "flame" of resistance is kept alive and the

hope of outside help is not lost.