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(JFK)

LIST OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES

1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddell Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716, 1726, 1728, 1748, 1750)

2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA

The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's we encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously protested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the background of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is possible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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3. NIKOLAI KHOKHLOV (S) JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a Soviet defector who had been placed under CIA control in Europe. The Bureau had been interested in interviewing Khokhlov as soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreed to by CIA. Without notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted Khokhlov to arrive in the United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional committee. We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject in any detail. (Re: Nikolai Khokhlov) (S) JFK (1)(B)

4. CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE

In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originating in this case to CIA. The source was a key double agent in one of the most important cases handled by the Bureau, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned. (Re: MOCASE)

5. CASE OF SYLVIA PRESS JFK (1)(B)

(S) Sylvia Press was a CIA employee whom that Agency considered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its own investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. We considered this most uncooperative and we protested. (Re: Sylvia Press) (S) JFK (1)(B)

6. DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954

Dr. Otto John, a West German security official, defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954. A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director.

It is believed that if all available facts were collected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing Dr. Otto John and permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting a visit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau")

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7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954

By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.

8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955

On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)

In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in Guatemala]. This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. [Re: Fred Fimbres] (S) JFK (1) (B) (U)

10. DR. GEORGE ANASTOS (S) JFK (1) (B)

In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with [Anastos] and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA. (105-19001) (S) (U)

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11. ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA

In 1956 General Trudeau ^{(S) JFK (U) (B)} former head of G-2, made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the United States Government by "Fabian Socialists." Trudeau ^{(S) JFK (U) (B)} furnished the names of many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives.

This item is being listed in the event we felt that it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the United States Government")

12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS

By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays particularly related to investigations of applicant matters being handled by the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19, 1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA")

13. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that William P. Bundy would serve as a secretary for the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. Bundy, son-in-law of Dean Acheson, admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund. At the time of this contribution, Bundy was in the same law firm with Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss.

Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy, this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect in dealings with CIA.

14. DR. SAMUEL ABRAHAM GOUDSMIT ^{(S) JFK (U) (B)}

^{(S) JFK (U) (B)} Dr. Goudsmi ^(S) was a leading scientist assigned to the Brookhaven National Laboratory. He had been used as a consultant by such agencies as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA. In October, 1955, he met a Soviet scientist and, with the knowledge of AEC and CIA, began cultivating him. Goudsmi informed ^{(S) JFK (U) (B)}

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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-described misrepresentation. We protested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re: Dr. [Samuel Abraham Goudsmit]) (S) JFK (1)(B)

15. [ROBERT D. WIECHA] (S) JFK (1)(B)

(S) On July 20, 1956, we determined that one [Robert D. Wiecha] had been in contact with [the Czech] Military Attache, Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that [Wiecha] was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning [Wiecha's] reported contacts with [the Czechs]. We later interviewed [Wiecha], and it was indicated that [Wiecha], in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with [the Czech] Military Attache. We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956 [Colonel Frantisek Tisler"]) (S) JFK (1)(A)

16. [MARK GOLANSKY] (S) JFK (1)(A)

In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being permitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: [MARK GOLANSKY]) (S) JFK (1)(A)

17. [MARIA KRIL] (S) JFK (1)(A)

By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly protested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had interviewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956, ["Maria Kril"]) (S) JFK (1)(A)

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18. DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER (S)

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JFK(1)(A) (S) [Hammer] was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association with a Soviet assigned to the United Nations. (S) In December, 1956, [Hammer] made a trip to [Russia] where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was [a Colonel in the KGB] and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When [Hammer] returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed [Hammer] at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made. (Re: [Darrell Patrick Hammer])

19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H" (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, ["Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-Called Channels"])

20. BOSEN SUN (S) JFK(1)(A)

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned Chinese alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to Red China. CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: [Bosen Sun - 100-385852])

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21. CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES - 1957 (S)

(S) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA invitation. CIA was told that no tours would be given to the Colombians because in the past a Colombian ambassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge. (S)(u)

If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. (Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont "Representatives of Colombian Intelligence Service" - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") (S)(u)

22. REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY - 1957 (S)(u)

On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was contacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be informed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet - United Nations Delegation. The CIA representative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government. (S)(u)

Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council on Foreign Relations") (S)(u)

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23. TADEUSZ LESER (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A) In October, 1957, we received information from Leser (S) indicating that a Polish (S) scientist then visiting in the United (S) States might defect. We followed developments through Leser (S) JFK(1)(A) and we kept CIA advised. The Agency was fully aware of the situation and particularly knew that we were in contact with Leser. We subsequently received information indicating that Frederick McCann, a CIA employee, established contact with Leser for the purpose of developing information concerning the work of Polish scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by McCann possibly could have jeopardized a Bureau operation. (Re: Jerzy Leon Nowinski - 105-63094) (S) JFK(1)(A)

24. IOAN FLOREA (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A) By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the subject, a Romanian alien, without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. (Re: Ioan Florea - 105-62486) (S) JFK(1)(A)

25. ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE

JFK(1)(A) On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with Rudoph Faupl, an official of the International Association of Machinists in Washington, D. C. Faupl gave a signed statement in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a Miss Davis who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with CIA, we were informed that Miss Davis denied that she had made such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25, 1958, "Unknown Subject; Rudoph Faupl") (S) JFK(1)(A)

26. ANDREW TOGAN (S) JFK(1)(A)

By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: Andrew Togan - 105-68013) (S) JFK(1)(A)

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27. STEWART WALLACE BUCHANAN (S)

JFK(1)(B)

We received information in May, 1958, that Buchanan, (S) a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia National Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investigation being conducted by the Bureau for the White House.

(S) Buchanan furnished a signed statement indicating that he personally had no knowledge of the existence of the above information in the National Guard records. (S)

(S) (S) (Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17, 1958, "Alleged Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI")

28. CORNEL MUNTIU

By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency's interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests.

(Re: Cornel Muntiu - 105-58749)

29. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES

By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legat, Tokyo, (S) furnished information volunteered to him by Colonel James Riley (S) of G-2. (S) (S) (S) Riley was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. He indicated that the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies. He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CIA.

(Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, Tokyo, "Relations with CIA") (S) (S)

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30. GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN (S)

The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the West German Intelligence Service. CIA became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with Gehlen. Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.

We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA")

31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALIENS (S)

In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for overseas intelligence operations. Under the agreement, CIA was not to approach any Chinese alien without first checking with us. A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1958, "Recruitment of Chinese Aliens in the United States for Overseas Intelligence Operations")

32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"

Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memorandum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by John Baker, Chief of the CIA Office in Japan. In his communication Baker belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.")

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33. CIA DEVELOPMENT OF [INDONESIAN] GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (S)(U)

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In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and background data concerning three individuals - [Paul Pesik, Yassy Derachman, and Patricia O'Hara] all employees of the [Indonesian] Government and assigned to the United States. [Pesik] had been developed as a source of information by CIA in [Mexico City]. [Derachman] came to CIA in Washington, D. C. and volunteered his services. [O'Hara] had been developed as a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA that in the case of [O'Hara] we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could have considered exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset. (Re: [Indonesian] Activities - [100-254749])

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34. [MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE] (S) JFK (1)(A)
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The subject, a former member of the Polish intelligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.

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In June, 1958, we developed information indicating that CIA may have opened a letter in [Switzerland] which had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had identified himself as [Dr. Heinrich Schutze]. The writer further indicated that he might be connected with the [Polish] intelligence Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the [United States Ambassador in Switzerland]. We subsequently received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency representative that the [Ambassador] had opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that investigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy is something we may never know. ([Michal Goleniewski - 65-65192])

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35. CHEN Tseng-tao (S)

By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a Chinese alien whom CIA was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contradicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Re CHEN Tseng-tao Bureau file 134-5243)

(S) JFK (U) (K)

36. COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE (S)

On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for permission to play a recording of a telephone conversation obtained by the Bureau to King Hussein of Jordan. The recording had been developed through our sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a conversation between Mahmoud Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Egyptian Air Attache. The conversation strongly indicated that Rousan was working closely with the Egyptians. Subsequently, CIA developed information indicating that Rousan was a key figure in a revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow King Hussein.

Rousan returned to Jordan and was imprisoned by King Hussein based upon information made available through CIA. Rousan denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the Jordanian Government. The King told CIA that he was on the spot and that he needed proof of Rousan's conspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the recording to be played to the King, stressing that this was the only way King Hussien could be convinced.

On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing of the recording. We maintained that if we granted such permission, our other coverage of a sensitive nature could be seriously imperiled.

On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in the Middle East. Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously considering the termination of all of our technical surveillances because we did not intend to be placed in such a position in the future.

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction. He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to

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anybody's head and he further indicated that he was deliberating whether or not the [recording] should be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the purpose of determining if the [recording] was to be used by CIA. The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. H." (S)(U)

The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan") (S)(U)

37. [CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT DEPORTATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS] (S)(U)

JFK (1)(S)

In 1958, CIA officially informed us that it was engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist activity in Mexico. We became concerned because this program was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American communists residing in Mexico. The implementation of such a program would have resulted in the return of American communists to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any operation specifically designed to oust American communists. In September, 1958, we were informed that the Mexican Government had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain Americans were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the Agency's chief in Mexico City claimed that his Agency was not involved. (S)(U) JFK (1)(S)

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The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (memorandum Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA") (S)(U)

38. [CASSIUS TULCEA] (S) JFK (1)(A)

JFK (1)(S)

We expressed our displeasure to CIA in [September, 1958] because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in the United States of a [Romanian] citizen who was here in connection with an exchange program. The [Romanian] indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the United States, but was not ready for actual defection because of a

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possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to established procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Re [Cassius Tulcea,] Bureau file [105-64024]) (S) (S) JFK(1)(A)

39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES (S) (U)

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The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated September 22, 1958, that [Colonel Tenorio, Chief of Police,] Manila, was a paid, highly regarded, and very sensitive source of CIA. This information was given to the Legal Attache by [Colonel John B. Stanley, G2 Head] in Japan. According to [Stanley], CIA did not want this information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H." (Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Hong Kong and Manila, Philippines") (S) (S) JFK(1)(B)

40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE (S)

JFK(1)(B)

During the period October [20-25] 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which was given by the U.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a lecture given by [John B. Corbett] of CIA. Subsequent to the briefing, General [Millard Young] of the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the briefing given by [Corbett]. He was particularly critical of [Corbett's] reluctance to furnish certain information, using the excuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General [Young] stated that the position taken by [Corbett] was only an excuse for incompetence on the part of CIA. (S) (S) (S)

This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, "Joint Strategic Planning Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October [20-25] 1958") (S) (S)

41. CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTHROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT

The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intelligence. Allen Dulles indicated that future developments would

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show that many more people were involved in the Castro organization than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly.

The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of [CIA in Cuba.] This could be useful if we wanted to justify the existence of a Legal Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States. (S) (U)

42. MIKHAIL N. KOSTYUK (S)

By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent. (S) The individual involved was [Dr. William Randolph Lovelace II,] a well-known expert in the field of (S) (S) (S) [medical] research as it applied to space flying. [Lovelace] was also a contract agent of CIA and had occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency. (S) In April, [1959, Lovelace] was preparing to make a trip to Moscow. CIA briefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to [Lovelace] concerning (S) his contacts with the subject without first consulting with us. (S) (S) (Mikhail N. Kostyuk,] Bureau file [105-69694] (S)

43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES

In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem.

The above is being cited in the event we desire to utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959")

44. "TRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE - SEPTEMBER, 1959

In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock," which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis

Lyman Kirkpatrick
is responsible

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JFK(1)(A) which led to an almost complete severance of liaison between the Bureau and CIA. The article was written by Paul McCarry who was connected with the International Information Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, and who had been utilized as an informant by CIA. The article was very complimentary toward CIA. The author made reference to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau for an extended period; and he related a story very critical of the Director. (S)

(S) We learned that the author had been in contact with CIA when he was preparing the article. We were told that Lyman Kirkpatrick, a CIA official, had read and approved the article prior to its publication. As a result of this information, Kirkpatrick became persona non grata with the Bureau. (S)

(S) The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles and Kirkpatrick concerning the matter. We took the position that based upon the information made available CIA had promoted, condoned, or possibly even authored the article. Dulles denied that this was so and then Kirkpatrick produced information indicating that he had been knowledgeable of the author's article before it was published. The author had contacted Stanley Grogan, one of Kirkpatrick's subordinates, and had discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised the question of strained relations between the two agencies and at that time Grogan reportedly told the author that relations were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless, the final draft of the article included the derogatory information and the facts available to us indicate that Kirkpatrick had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the article before it was published. He did not do so. He told us that this was an oversight. (S)

Consideration was given to severance of liaison relations. It was recommended and approved that liaison continue and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what course of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not immediately answer letters which had been sent to the Bureau by Dulles and Kirkpatrick in connection with this particular matter. It was also recommended and approved that we cut off all contact with Kirkpatrick. (S)

By letter dated September 11, 1959, to Dulles, the Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any concern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed

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to notify the Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to Kirkpatrick and he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, 'True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")

45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959

We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between the businessmen and visiting Soviets. CIA reportedly was interested in developing positive intelligence information, but it so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet. By letter dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner in which CIA had handled this. (Re Bernard M. Gordon, Bureau file 134-8493)

46. APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) - 1959

On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions.

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available.

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On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available.

By memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the developments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. (Bureau file 105-38958)

47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR

JFK(1)(C) On April 11, 1960, [Ray Tanner, President] of Reicco Company, Caracas, Venezuela, [informed the Bureau that he recently held a conversation with Herschel Peak, an official of the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. Peak was a CIA employee. Peak took exception to complimentary statements made by Tanner concerning the Director and the FBI. Peak stated that the Director should have retired five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960; "Herschel F. Peak, Jr.") (S) JFK(1)(B)

48. [ROBERT AMORY] CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA - 1960

JFK(1)(C) (S) In February, 1960, [Dr. Frank Barnett, Director of Research] for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by Robert Amory, a top CIA official. [Amory] allegedly advocated recognition of Red China.

This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of [Amory's] talk, and was satisfied that [Amory] had not made the statement attributed to him. (S)

The above is being cited in the event we desire to dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly established that [Amory] had made such a statement, we could use the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, [Robert Amory]) (S)

49. ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA

A State Department representative informed the Bureau that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City; that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly

had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies through technical installations. Inquiries developed information indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone.

Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, "Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA")

50. [JOSE PAZ NOVAS] (S) JFK (U) (A)

JFK (U) (A) We received information indicating that the subject, a [former Cuban] intelligence agent and the subject of a Bureau investigation, had planned to defect [in New York City.] We permitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA representative [in New York City] had been instructed by his headquarters to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, ["Jose Paz Novas"]) (S) JFK (U) (A)

JFK (U) (B) 51. [CECILIE CHABOT] (S) JFK (U) (B)

JFK (U) (B) Miss [Barbara Bullard], a CIA employee, obtained a position as a secretary in the Office of [the Tunisian Delegation] to the United Nations. Prior to receiving this job, CIA checked with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that [Bullard] had informed [the Tunisians] that she was leaving her job. The [Tunisians] inquired if she could recommend somebody else. She gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss [Cecilie Chabot.] (S) JFK (U) (B)

JFK (U) (B) The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recommending [Chabot] to [the Tunisians;] that the Bureau was interested in developing intelligence information which might be useful to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, ["Cecilie Chabot"]) (S) JFK (U) (B)

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52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT

On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensitivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961,

"SOLO") (S) (U)

53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT

In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA. It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 105-40510)

54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, [MEXICO CITY] - 1961 (S) (U)

On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, [Mexico City,] (S) (U) received information indicating that the [Czech Embassy] in that (S) (U) city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the [local CIA office] (S) that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had (S) (U) been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum L'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, [Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities] - Mexico") (S) (U)

55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES - 1961

When he defected in December, 1961, [Anatoliy Golitzyn] (S) (U) furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, [Serge Karlow] (S) (U) was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investigation. (S) (U)

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On February 7, 1962, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with Edwards on February 26, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on [Karlo] over an extended period. (S) JFK(1)(B) Edwards explained that he had been reluctant to identify this source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, furthermore, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number. Yet, there exists wistful belief that the 'leopard has changed his spots.' H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February 27, 1962, ["Unknown Subject; KGB Agent Known as 'Sasha'"]) (S)

56. ISAAC MONCARZ (S) JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(B) In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were negative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau file [105-99947]) (S) JFK(1)(B)

57. CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES

Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums. CIA established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, Sam Giancana.

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The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada. Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications. However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, "Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memorandum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962)

58. ALWIN ODIO TAMAYO (S)

In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962, ["Alwin Odio Tamayo"]) (S)

59. THELMA KING (S)

On April 23, 1963, CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting Panamanian national. We ~~by~~ (U) immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States. CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, ["Thelma King"]) (S)

60. ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE

We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner. McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received \$6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national. Interrogation of Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone. Therefore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau. The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963. McCone vehemently denied the allegations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations With CIA")

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61. [YURI NOSENKO] (S)

The subject is a Soviet national who first made contact with CIA in [1962] (S) expressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in [1964] (S) and he is currently in the United States. He has been the source of considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in [1964] (S) CIA took a very strong position indicating that [Nosenko] was (S) a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, [Nosenko] (S) although controversial, continues to furnish voluminous information.

It is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resolved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned.

If it is finally concluded that [Nosenko] (S) is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of the subject over a period of years. [Yuri Nosenko, Bureau file (S) 65-68530] (S)

62. [JOSE RAFAEL SUAREZ-ARCOS] (S)

On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets [in Mexico.] (S) The individual in this case was serving as an [Ecuadorian Consul] (S) in Texas in 1964 (S) and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the [Ecuadorian] (S) could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the [Ecuadorian] (S) prior to his (S) (S) [consular] assignment in the United States, but CIA, nevertheless, (S) had an obligation to give us proper notification. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, [Jose Rafael Suarez-Arcos"]) (S)

63. CIA COVERT ACTIVITY [IN MIAMI] - 1965 (S) (U) JFK (U) (B)

JFK (U) (B) We received information in June, 1965, that certain [Cuban exiles in the Miami area] (S) (U) were representing themselves as (S) (U) [being with the "Department of National Security." These exiles had been interviewing Cuban refugees concerning political conditions in Cuba.] We ascertained that this activity was being (S) (U) performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the (S) (U) [exiles under the cover of "Department of National Security."] (S) (U) We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients

of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, June 21, 1965, "Central Intelligence Agency - Operations [in Miami] (S) (u)

64. JEAN HENRY ELIE (S) JFK (1) (A)

JFK (1) (A) (S)

In August, 1965, both the Bureau and CIA had an interest in assessing the potential utilization of the services of [Jean Henry Elie], a Haitian exile residing in the United States. We were interested in [Elie] because he potentially could furnish information concerning [Haitian] exiles in this country and the Agency wanted to utilize him in overseas intelligence operations. We informed CIA that [Elie] would not be made available to the Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position because of the potentially high value of [Elie] in the proposed CIA operation. While we were negotiating with CIA, we determined that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agency who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting [Elie] because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the past. We did not accept this explanation. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 2, 1965, "Jean Henry Elie") (S) JFK (1) (A)

65. INSECURE HANDLING OF TOPHAT INFORMATION (S) (u) JFK (1) (B)

By letter dated [December 2, 1965], CIA informed us that one of its representatives had notified the U.S. Ambassador in [Burma] that the newly designated [Soviet] Military Attache in [Rangoon] had cooperated with the FBI prior to leaving the United States in 1962 and that he had remained in contact following his return to [Moscow]. This all pertained to a sensitive Bureau source who had been transferred by the [Soviet] Government from [Moscow] to [the Soviet] Embassy in [Burma]. By letter dated December 3, 1965, we made a strong protest to CIA charging that Agency with violating an understanding relative to [the Tophat operation]. Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA, telephonically contacted the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged that his man had been out of line, but did express concern that the Bureau's displeasure had been placed in writing. The Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that no further operational activity be taken with regard to [Tophat] until we determined what CIA planned to do concerning the matter. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 2, 1965, "Tophat") (S) (u) JFK (1) (B)

66. K. KRISHNA RAO (S) JFK (1) (A)

In March, 1966, CIA requested coverage on a visiting official of the [Indian] Government because of information developed by the Agency indicating that the [Indian] was working for the KGB.

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Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA intentions. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, ["K. Krishna Rao"]) (S) JFK(L)A

67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966

In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established that one of its employees, [Stephen M. Quinn, Jr.] had submitted a name check request to the Bureau concerning one [Ralph D. Fertig] who was the subject of the material in question. At that time [Quinn] had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named [John Snoddy].

It is my recollection that one or both CIA employees were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning [Ralph D. Fertig] to Senator Robert C. Byrd")

68. ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT

In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a [chemist] connected with [Schering] Corporation in Newark, New Jersey. We were utilizing [the chemist] as a double agent in an operation directed against the Soviets. CIA had established a relationship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of [antibiotics]. Our [Newark] Office received information indicating that a CIA officer, without authorization, compromised our relationship with the [chemist] by discussing the matter with the president of the firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967, ["NK 2264-S, IS - R"])

69. JUSTINA MIREYA MORENO GONZALEZ

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations

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for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to respond to the communication received from Cuba. We took the position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile, the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to make its own assessment. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, July 20, 1967, ["Justina Mireya Moreno Gonzalez,]IS - Cuba") (S) (S) JFK(1)(4) (S)

70. CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL"

On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights of Government employees. We had been following developments relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions had a very definite bearing on Bureau operations. The proposed amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security Agency. These amendments were suggested by CIA without prior consultation with the Bureau. The Director made the notation, "This presumptuous action of Helms' is astounding." (M. A. Jones to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy")

71. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS

Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering satisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in following our leads. It should be noted that CIA, organizationally, has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed. This evaluation is made in light of standards followed by the Bureau. We continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection of CIA operations. CIA has given the following types of responses: hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries; limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police, and security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority

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targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign countries. Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the point, it is believed that in many instances it has not produced satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence of reliable sources.

72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION

Although there has been decided improvement in recent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on the part of CIA employees. They do receive some training in this regard, but the impression is left that such training could be much more extensive. The Bureau's Liaison Agent has lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits. CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities. Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement.

73. CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES

There has been a sore spot in connection with CIA policy relating to its dissemination of information [at a local level in our embassies.] This policy allegedly has applied to all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has maintained that unless the information it develops or receives is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an example, if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S. criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate to the Legal Attache. However, if the information falls within the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities, the Agency has stated that under its system the information is considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been received from other countries, and then disseminated to interested customers. We have not raised an issue, but dissemination regarding political conditions in a country where the Legal Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further orient him in his dealings with foreign officials. There have been exceptions where the CIA [chief in an area, on his own initiative.] has given such information to our Legal Attache. After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position to communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This helps, but it would be much more convenient for the Legal Attache to receive it [at the local level.]

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There are situations where CIA offices abroad receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged spy traveling to the United States, or the case abroad simply has ramifications in this country. In these instances, CIA has followed a definite pattern over the years of not furnishing such information to the Legal Attache, but disseminating to us at Seat of Government. Here again, CIA has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised an issue. We could be claiming that the Legal Attache could be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities abroad which might present risks or operational headaches.

For several years there existed a coordinating mechanism in Germany headed by CIA. This was a committee headed by the Agency and composed of representatives of other U.S. agencies. The committee reviewed espionage and counter-espionage developments in Germany which had a bearing on U.S. interests. If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used to establish an agreed-to operating agreement. Quite often various responsibilities were divided among the different agencies. It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been interested in becoming a part of such a committee. If we did, we could end up with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us. (S)(u)

74. SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT

When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from OSS. William Donovan, who was the head of OSS, has been referred to as the "Father of CIA."

There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters. There was a number of CIA officials who obviously had a definite dislike for the Bureau. The loose administration of OSS, its employment of known subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets, and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed serious problems to the Bureau. At one point OSS was actually giving serious consideration to establishing liaison with the

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NKVD. Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not circumspect, in dealings with the Agency.

When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau rightfully cannot forget the troubles with OSS. At the same time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the role played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations in 1947. In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a large number of sources and informants. There have been many ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar with the file destruction operation, and who later became connected with CIA. It is possible that the Agency could argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U.S. interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired coverage in Latin America.

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