

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 9, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SED/GCL
ON 216198 (JFK)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

Reference is made to the memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach dated 3/5/70, captioned as above. At that time the Director was advised this Division would make an analysis of each situation cited in the memorandum of Special Agent Sam J. Papich relative to grievances which CIA might hold in connection with relations with the FBI.

Enclosed will be found an analysis of 38 items (2 are contained in one memorandum, making a total of 37 memoranda). In substance our analysis does not show any real reason why CIA would raise any issue in connection with 37 out of the 38 items. The recommended action in each of these cases would logically close the matter. In one memorandum, the 37th item, ~~is~~, it is recommended that a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States be sent to that Agency. The purpose of this is to protect the Bureau by giving CIA a chance to make any comments, if it has any, in regard to the current utilization of sources and facilities affecting both CIA and the Bureau. If CIA replies that it is satisfied with the current intelligence conditions in this area, we will put this particular matter to rest and we will have their letter in the file.

This Division will take any and all steps to comply with the Director's wishes in this matter and in any other concerning which this Division is involved.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

Classified by CJF/3
Exempt from GDS/Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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by [unclear]*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

JFK (1)(A)

Item number one in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of [Boris Morros. (Mocase)]

JFK (1)(A)

BACKGROUND OF CASE

JFK (1)(A)

[Boris Morros] a Hollywood motion picture producer, was recruited by Soviet intelligence in 1935. From 1947 to 1957 he was operated as a double agent by the FBI. This was an extremely sensitive counterintelligence operation involving Soviet intelligence activities in the United States in which Morros traveled behind the Iron Curtain for meetings with his Soviet principals.

Information obtained by [Morros] from his Soviet contacts was disseminated to interested agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States.

JFK (1)(A)

PROBLEM WITH CIA

JFK (1)(A)

On March 16, 1954, the Bureau disseminated information received from [Boris Morros] to heads of the various intelligence agencies, including CIA. By letter of March 27, 1954, Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, Acting Director of CIA, criticized the information and, in effect, characterized it as "fabrication or the product of a paper mill," which conclusion Cabell stated had been applied to many similar disseminations in the past from apparently the same source. By letter of April 5, 1954, the Bureau informed CIA that it was believed that no useful purpose would be served in making any future dissemination to CIA of information received from this source.

On April 9, 1954, Mr. Allen Dulles, then Director of CIA, advised Liaison Agent Papich that he had been looking into the matter and there was no question in his mind but that his agency had acted stupidly in transmitting such a letter to the Bureau.

62-80750

- 1 - 100-352385 [Mocase - The Boris Morros Case] JFK (1)(A)
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. L. Whitson

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Exempt from GDS, Category 2 & 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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APR 16 1-10-01
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
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By letter of April 21, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA would appreciate it if the Bureau would kindly continue to send reports from the source [Morros] which relate to matters of foreign intelligence. By letter of April 29, 1954, the Director expressed the opinion that no useful purpose would be served by disseminating to CIA information received from the source in the future. JFK (1) (A)

JFK (1) (A)
Nevertheless, memorandum Branigan to Belmont dated April 28, 1954, pointed out that when and if the Bureau receives information in the [Mocase] in the future of a type required by National Security Council Directive to be furnished to CIA, it should be carefully evaluated and a decision made at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it should be disseminated. The Director noted "OK but before anything goes to CIA from this source I want to pass on it. This restriction does not apply to dissemination to other agencies. H"

JFK (1) (A)
Subsequent to the foregoing three disseminations were made to interested agencies, including CIA, based on information from [Morros] during October and December, 1954, and appropriate dissemination was made thereafter with the Director's approval.

JFK (1) (A)
JFK (1) (A)
As the time grew near for prosecutive action, the Department requested the Bureau to check with CIA to see if Department attorneys could interview a Soviet intelligence defector then in custody of CIA named [Peter Derjabin.] Accordingly, the Director authorized an oral briefing of Mr. Dulles and on 1/8/57 he and James Angleton of his staff were generally briefed on the [Mocase] and the contemplated prosecution. They were furnished with background data concerning subjects residing in France, [Jane and George Zlatovski.] CIA was requested to search the names of individuals involved in the case and was asked regarding identities of CIA employees who might have information of pertinence concerning the [Zlatovskis.] JFK (1) (A)

On March 4, 1957, Mr. James Angleton informed the liaison agent of resentment on the part of CIA employees and officials based upon the following:

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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(1) CIA feels it should have been advised much earlier concerning those aspects of the case relating to CIA employees.

(2) Leads were given to CIA at the same time the case was publicized and, therefore, CIA was handicapped.

(3) The failure to coordinate the French aspects of the case with CIA permitted the French intelligence agencies to play a dominant role in the European investigation.

(4) CIA fears the Bureau had not told it all there was to know about the case that CIA should have known.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA The Bureau took the position that any necessary investigation looking toward prosecution in countries where Bureau had a Legal Attache would be referred by the Legal Attache to the appropriate investigative agency of that country. In those countries where the Bureau did not have a Legal Attache, request for investigation would be channelled through CIA. Because the Zlatovskis were in France, the interrogation of the Zlatovskis was handled by request from the Legal Attache to the French. JFK(U)(A)

JFK(U)(A) Jane Zlatovski during World War II had been with the Office of Strategic Services and had contacts later with CIA personnel. Prior to decision on prosecution we did not disseminate information regarding the [Zlatovskis] because we feared the effects of compromise from possible leaks would endanger the life of our source. This was particularly true in view of CIA's expressed attitude in 1954. Some leads had been given to CIA over two weeks before the arrests of the subjects in the United States. Leads were not given earlier because of the fear of possible compromise. As far as coordinating the French aspects of the case were concerned, it is doubted that CIA could have exerted any control over the French investigation after the French had the information. There was a distinct difference in this case between intelligence information and evidence in support of prosecutive action. JFK(U)(A)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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Recently the British MI-5 ^(S) representative in Washington has made some inquiries relating to Boris Morros ^{JFK(U)(A)} indicating the British ^(S) may now believe Morros was either ^{JFK(U)(A)} known to the Soviets as our agent or was under their control. It is not known if the British ^(S) have discussed this matter with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and marks: B, J, WCL, V, J, k, DIF]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/9/70

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bermingham

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/STG
ON 1-10-01

Item number two in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 states that during the 1950's, CIA periodically complained that the operations of our office in Mexico and specifically those involving the operating of informants and the penetration of the Communist Party of Mexico violated the understanding that this office was to act only as a liaison post. He also states CIA has informally raised questions on our running informants in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives requiring coordination of overseas clandestine counterintelligence operations under CIA. He states comments by CIA officials along above lines have been casual and informal and indicate the situation has been a potential issue rather than an actual conflict or disagreement. The essence of his remarks in this item is that the Bureau is vulnerable to criticism by CIA because of our operations in Mexico.

JFK(1)(8)

Review of our files fail to reveal receipt of any formal protest by CIA concerning these matters. We have been operating [alongside CIA] in Mexico City since 1947. In 1951, Inspector V. P. Keay, after visiting Mexico City, reported that CIA was not adequately investigating matters in Mexico affecting the internal security of the U.S. and recommended that after properly advising CIA, Legat, Mexico, be instructed to undertake such investigations. The Executive Conference considered this problem on 4/19/51 and decided we should extend our coverage in Mexico but should not reach any understanding with CIA regarding these increased activities. It was decided, however, to advise CIA in writing of this problem in Mexico in order to fix responsibility on that Agency and such a letter was sent on 5/1/51. A copy is attached.

JFK(1)(8)

Enclosure

RAB:bsf/wmk Wmk
(5)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

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JFK(1)(B) In 10/51, almost simultaneously, our Legats in Mexico City, Madrid, and Paris, reported instances of CIA [field] officials openly challenging our operations, generally on the grounds that we were violating CIA overseas jurisdiction. Inspectors V. P. Keay and DeLoach personally and forcefully brought these instances to the attention of General Walter B. Smith, Director of CIA, in a heated exchange on 10/24/51. Out of this meeting developed a luncheon on 11/7/51 attended by the Director, Bureau officials and General Smith, who was accompanied by several officers of his Agency. According to a memorandum, D. M. Ladd to the Director, dated 11/7/51, CIA recognized our presence abroad and both agencies pledged cooperation and coordination through greater liaison so as to prevent conflict and competition in these closely associated operations. During the ensuing 19 years, the Bureau continued to operate in Mexico and on occasions moderately expanded its activities in order to meet its needs. During this lengthy period, there were no serious problems with CIA, with reference to our Mexico City office.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: a large scribble, WKS, ROAS, HPR, and a small scribble]

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**CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER**

Date: May 1, 1951

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Major General W. G. Wyman
(Office of Special Operations) JFK (1)(B)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES OF
AMERICAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO

JFK
(1)(B)

Reference is made to recent discussions between representatives of the Office of (Special Operations-CIA) and Special Agent C. D. DeLoach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the captioned matter. It is understood that your representatives pointed out that the (Mexico City station of CIA) with its limited personnel, attempted to follow movements of American Communists as well as possible, however, it would be impossible to guarantee an advance report in each individual case when the Communist member in question is about to return to the United States.

You will recall that the following suggestions were offered by your representatives in connection with this matter:

- (1) Utilization of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List.
- (2) Advice from FBI as to whether the Mexican Police could be used in handling cases.
- (3) Advice from the FBI to CIA indicating which cases are most important so that those cases could be given preferred attention.

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It was indicated by the CIA representatives that possibly the adoption of these suggestions would in some manner assist them in handling Communist cases in Mexico.

cc: Legal Attache, Mexico City, Mexico.
cc: Foreign Service Desk (detached)

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AIR COURIER**

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The FBI, of course, fully realizes the difficult problems involved in surveilling American Communists in foreign countries. At the same time, however, it must be pointed out that in the present emergency each individual Communist investigation, routine or otherwise, should receive proper attention when the subject concerned travels to foreign countries. As you no doubt realize, the Communist Party, U.S.A., represents a potential force as far as espionage and sabotage operations are concerned. Therefore, even minor members of the Party could become involved in delicate operations. As pointed out in the discussions between Mr. DeLoach and representatives of your agency, the travels of Communists from the United States to Mexico are very likely to become much greater, thereby proposing a more serious problem than is now faced.

The FBI has for some time utilized the Immigration and Naturalization Service Watch List as a source of information concerning the travel of Communists. Although representing an excellent method of ascertaining this type of information, at the same time the FBI is not afforded any advance warning from this source as to the return of the Communist Party member to the United States. Therefore, the investigation of that member becomes delinquent in view of the fact active investigation is not initiated at the time of his re-entry. It is, therefore, believed that this particular source of information would not be satisfactory in lieu of information from your agency which would notify us in advance of the return to the United States of the Communist Party member in question.

With respect to the FBI advising your agency when the services of the Mexican Police may be utilized in individual cases, this Bureau will be most happy to advise you of those "sensitive cases" which are considered too delicate for referral to the Mexican Police, or foreign factions. With regard to the remainder of investigations, however, we shall defer to your judgment as to whether you wish to utilize the Mexican Police or not. The jurisdiction of the Office of Special Operations in foreign intelligence matters allows for a more over-all knowledge of the Mexican Police than this Bureau presently possesses. Therefore, we suggest that you weigh the facts in each individual case and consider whether the Mexican Police should be called in or not.

Concerning the ranking importance of cases, it is the opinion of this Bureau that the facts provided your agency in each individual case will determine the methods of investigation you wish to apply. It is not, therefore, considered necessary for the FBI to point out the importance of each matter referred to your agency.

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As suggested by your representatives, we will be most happy to hold a conference with your Mexican supervisory personnel at any time concerning discussions of investigations in Mexico. It is additionally suggested, however, that you advise your field representatives in Mexico City to contact the FBI's Legal Attache regarding coordination of the same matters in that locality.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

~~SECRET~~

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A.P. Litrento
1 - Liaison

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
THE ABEL CASE

Item #3 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses the Abel case.

According to Papich, CIA felt it was not given proper recognition for its contribution in the case, in that it took the risk and responsibility of transporting Hayhanen from Paris to the U. S. in 1957 after the Bureau declined to become involved in this transportation; that after a short handling period in the U. S. the Bureau dropped Hayhanen, an alcoholic, because he became a problem and CIA took the responsibility of safeguarding him, giving the Bureau free access to him and time to develop leads leading to the apprehension of Abel; that CIA was responsible for making Hayhanen mentally and physically capable to testify at the Abel trial; also, CIA incurred heavy expenses, all for the benefit of the Bureau; further, the Bureau never thanked CIA for its cooperation nor did it see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

Abel is the Soviet intelligence officer who was uncovered in the U. S. in 1957 through the defection of Reino Hayhanen, Abel's assistant.

On the night of May 7, 1957, James Angleton of CIA advised Mr. Belmont that Hayhanen had walked into the American Embassy in Paris about three days ago and was referred to CIA. He claimed he was a Soviet agent in New York since 1952 and gave certain details to back up his story. He claimed he was ordered back to Moscow and got "cold feet" in Paris and wanted to cooperate with American officials. He was in a highly emotional state which led CIA to question his mental stability. It was the opinion of Mr. Belmont that no steps should be taken to return Hayhanen to the U. S. until the story was substantiated or demolished to reflect his actual status. Our New York Office immediately instituted investigation,

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1 - 65-64538

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STG
ON 1-10-01

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
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based on Hayhanen's disclosures and was not able to prove or disprove his story. On May 8, 1957, CIA was informed of the facts developed by our investigation and asked what action it intended to take regarding Hayhanen's return to the U.S. On May 9, 1957, Angleton advised of a report received from CIA, Paris, revealing that Hayhanen had suffered almost a complete mental breakdown and that in view of his condition, arrangements were made by CIA for him to be returned to the U.S. by plane. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned to the U.S. in the company of a CIA agent. On arrival our New York Agents were at the airport to take him over, but because of his emotional state, he was confined at the U.S. Marine Hospital in Staten Island until May 15, 1957, when he was released to the custody of our Agents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorities arranged for his confinement in the U.S. Marine Hospital, Staten Island, for psychiatric examination through the U.S. Public Health Service. (Liaison Agent Papich had previously conferred with an INS official who had stated that if Hayhanen's condition warranted confinement upon his arrival in the U.S., an order would have to be issued by the U.S. Public Health Service).

Hayhanen and his wife were placed in a midtown hotel by New York Agents and were under Bureau control from May 15, 1957, until June 20, 1957, when they were taken to their residence in Peekskill, New York, at their request. All expenses for their maintenance were paid by the Bureau. During this period Hayhanen and his wife were becoming a problem because of heavy drinking and irrational behavior.

On June 13, 1957, Abel was located by Bureau Agents when visiting his studio in Brooklyn, New York. Efforts by Bureau Agents and the Department to have Hayhanen testify against Abel in a criminal prosecution were unavailing. With the Department's concurrence, we arranged for INS authorities to arrest Abel on June 21, 1957, on an alien warrant. After Abel's arrest, the Department continued to raise questions concerning Hayhanen's willingness to testify in an espionage prosecution against Abel and requested the Bureau to press Hayhanen in that regard. We took the position that any efforts to induce Hayhanen to testify should be made by the Department, as we realized that Hayhanen would undoubtedly want assurances, such as remaining in this country and financial assistance, and the Department was so advised. The Department was also advised that the Bureau would no longer pay Hayhanen's subsistence and that other arrangements would have to be made. In an effort to solicit Hayhanen's cooperation, the Department conferred with Allen Dulles of CIA to determine if CIA would be willing to sponsor the entry of Hayhanen into the U.S. under the authority granted the Director of CIA by law. Dulles indicated a willingness not only to sponsor Hayhanen but also to assist in his rehabilitation.

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Memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
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in the U.S., such as assisting him in obtaining a job and furnishing financial assistance for an extended period of time. On July 21, 1957 a CIA representative was placed in touch with Hayhanen by New York Agents for this purpose. Our Agents also arranged for FBI's access to Hayhanen whenever necessary. Subsequently, Hayhanen agreed to testify and appeared before a Federal grand jury on August 5 and August 6, 1957.

As indicated above, we located Abel on June 13 and he was taken into custody by INS on June 21, 1957. On July 21, 1957, over a month later, CIA instituted arrangements for Hayhanen's rehabilitation.

While CIA undoubtedly incurred heavy expenses on behalf of Hayhanen, it was not at the request of the Bureau but at the request of the Department.

Regarding CIA's complaint that the Bureau never thanked it for its cooperation, it is pointed out that a letter from the Director was sent to Mr. Dulles on November 19, 1957, shortly after Abel's conviction. It pointed out the excellent cooperation of James Angleton and his staff with the Bureau since the inception of this case and that the Director wished to express his personal appreciation to Angleton and his staff for their valuable assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None, we do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~ DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Liaison

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/JIG
ON 1-10-01

Item No. 4 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses belief by CIA officials that damaging publicity regarding William P. Bundy emanated from a Bureau report. Bundy was a CIA official at the time and the publicity was felt to be damaging to CIA. CIA apparently was of the belief that the Bureau leaked the information to Senator Joseph McCarthy who then released the information to the press.

Bureau files reveal that in a discussion between SA Papich and Allen W. Dulles, then head of CIA, on 7/10/53 Dulles inquired of Papich as to where McCarthy could get information such as that released concerning Bundy. Papich immediately informed Dulles that if Dulles was under any suspicion that the Bureau might be disseminating such information to Senator McCarthy he was definitely wrong and off base. Papich also told Dulles that the results of the Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had also been made available to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as well as other interested agencies. Dulles told Papich that he definitely did not feel that the Bureau was involved in the McCarthy releases to the press and that he was sorry if there had been an impression he suspected the Bureau.

There is nothing in Bureau files concerning Bundy which would indicate that the Bureau did, in fact, supply any information concerning Bundy to Senator McCarthy or the news media. There was considerable publicity concerning Bundy at the time and it is noted that due to the fact that Bundy was the son-in-law of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

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there was possibly an element of potential embarrassment to the Democratic Party attendant to publicity afforded the matter by Republican Senator McCarthy. It is also noted that copies of reports of Bureau investigation concerning Bundy had been disseminated, in addition to CIA, to Civil Service Commission, National Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Army and the Attorney General. A conflict broke out between CIA and Senator Joseph McCarthy after McCarthy publicly quoted from a document, not identified, which spelled out Bundy's contribution to the Alger Hiss fund. The files indicate that CIA alleged that the AEC had leaked the information in question to Senator McCarthy.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Harrell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-3 JLM/146
ON 1-10-01

Item number five in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich with his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a question raised by former CIA Director Allen Dulles concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone, who in the late 1920's headed the U. S. Communist Party, thereafter became completely disillusioned with the Party, and subsequently occupied an executive position with American Federation of Labor.

The particular information referred to by Mr. Dulles had been furnished FBI by Spencer Miller, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Labor. Miller made several accusations against CIA. Mr. Dulles took the position that dissemination of the allegations to the White House, Attorney General and Department of State had placed Dulles on the spot because the Miller data was not a complete story.

BACKGROUND:

CIA advised that on 12/4/53 Miller had informed CIA representatives abroad that he had evidence pointing toward Jay Lovestone's being a communist and active agent, and that Lovestone might shortly be exposed by the McCarthy Subcommittee of the Senate as the chief of the third great Soviet ring after Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White. When interviewed by Bureau 1/7/54 he furnished no information indicating that Lovestone was engaged in espionage activity and appeared to have an axe to grind insofar as Lovestone was concerned. He acknowledged everything he had come to him secondhand. Results of interview were furnished CIA by letter.

On 1/22/54 Attorney General advised the Director that Dr. Milton Eisenhower had told him of a conversation he had with Spencer Miller. The Attorney General said he told Dr. Eisenhower he would have Miller interviewed to get the whole story and asked that we conduct the interview.

On 1/25/54 we wrote the Attorney General about the previous interview with Miller and advised we would have him interviewed again to

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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secure any additional data he might have. Miller was reinterviewed the same day and results were sent to Attorney General 1/27/54.

Subsequently, on 2/19/54, Governor Sherman Adams called the Director from White House about the Miller situation. The Director advised Governor Adams that he had personally talked to Miller for two hours the previous day and had concluded that Miller was obsessed with the charges he was making and while he appeared to be a brilliant and well educated man he did not appear to have specific details.

On the day the Director spoke with Miller, 2/18/54, he referred Miller to Domestic Intelligence Division where a detailed interview was conducted and results incorporated in a 20-page memorandum, copies of which were furnished Attorney General, Governor Adams, CIA and State Department.

We interviewed Miller at the specific instructions of the Attorney General based upon a White House request and dissemination of interview results to Attorney General and White House was not only proper but required under the circumstances. CIA and State Department received results since allegations concerned officials and operations of those agencies. Miller furnished names of persons who he said could support his allegations and we interviewed them and disseminated results. Mr. James Angleton of CIA commented on 3/13/54 that when the Miller information was first received at that Agency some officials gained the impression FBI was deliberately collecting and disseminating data solely for the purpose of "hurting" CIA. Angleton said results of interviews and investigation conducted by Bureau had clearly demonstrated to CIA officials that FBI was living by its well-known tradition and reputation of developing facts and reporting information in an impartial manner. He said on the previous day all officials, including Dulles, commented the Bureau was following the Lovestone case in conformity with its well established reputation of getting all the facts. In view of this, there is no basis for believing that at this time CIA would raise any charges of unfair conduct on the part of Bureau in its handling of the Miller matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~SECRET~~

DJB
1/20

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Cotter

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Ryan

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL
 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
 BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS
 FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS

#MDR16
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 1-16-01 BY SP7 ALM/AG

Item six in material submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions occasions in the 1950's when CIA complained that officials visiting the United States under CIA sponsorship were disappointed because they had no contact with Bureau officials. CIA felt contact with Bureau officials had significant benefits, left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation, and when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials they were left with suspicions there was friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature and they would be afforded the same treatment as the public and nothing more.

Memorandum 5/31/56 from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont, captioned "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," (Bureau file 94-2-32781) recommended for Director's approval that Liaison would (1) inform CIA tours afforded to foreign police officials and security officials would continue to be of a restricted nature and the visitors will only view facilities normally seen by the public, and (2) that such foreign officials would not be interviewed unless it appeared to the Bureau's advantage. In regard to 1, the Director noted, "I thoroughly agree. I am not too keen anyway about such tours. We were 'burned' in the Johns matter." The Director noted in regard to 2, "I see no need of interviews."

Doctor Otto John was an official of the West German security service who was closely associated with CIA and who was alleged to have defected to the East Germans.

In his memorandum, Papich emphasized that for the past several years there was no basis for complaints with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to U.S. under CIA sponsorship.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

SECRET

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DR:sfw/jls (6)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. J.P. Lee

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
(S) CIA - (S) DUTCH INTERESTS IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY

Item #7 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses (S) CIA - (S) Dutch interests in Soviet Espionage Activity. SA Papich notes that in 1956 the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD) wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached (S) CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. When (S) CIA approached us, we told them to have the Dutch submit the request through diplomatic channels and we subsequently told (S) CIA we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. (S) Although (S) CIA accepted this, they felt it hurt efforts to gather Soviet espionage information in Europe. Our position was based on failure of the Dutch to deal honestly with us in the case of Joseph Petersen, who was involved in collecting intelligence information at the National Security Agency for a Dutch official.

BACKGROUND OF THE SITUATION:

This question first arose when a Dutch official approached our representatives at the NATO Special Committee conference in Paris in May, 1956, and requested Bureau assistance in interviewing Mrs. Antonina Thomas in the U. S. and to have a Dutch representative present during the interview. Mrs. Thomas is the widow of General Walter Krivitsky, who operated an espionage network in Europe prior to his defection in 1937. The Dutch representative said CIA had interviewed her, but the results were unsatisfactory. He was told to submit his request through diplomatic channels. In June, a CIA representative advised SA Papich they were receiving pressure from the Dutch to have a Dutch representative bring all the material on the case to the U. S. for the Bureau's use in interviewing Mrs. Thomas and two others in the U. S., but not to participate in the interview. In accordance with instructions, SA Papich told (S) CIA to have the Dutch submit their request through diplomatic channels and to include all information in writing, and that the Bureau would not deal personally with a Dutch representative. By memorandum of June 15, 1956, it was reported that James Angleton (S) of CIA told SA Papich he was of the very strong opinion that the Bureau's position made good sense, but other CIA officials felt the Dutch should be helped in every possible way. (S)

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JPL:tdp (6)

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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PR 16 1-10-01
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Memorandum Mr. W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
62-80750

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DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM:

On June 19, 1956, then Assistant Director A. H. Belmont and SA Papich met with Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, and James Angleton of CIA. Helms asked if the Bureau would talk to a representative of the Dutch if he came over and, in lieu of that, would the Bureau accept from CIA information and leads furnished by the Dutch. (S)

Belmont pointed out the Bureau's position was very simple in that the Dutch had been caught short in the Petersen case when their representatives had been obtaining highly classified information from a friendly government and, before the FBI even requested to interview the Dutch representatives involved, the Dutch Ambassador notified State Department (S) that if Dutch representatives were to be interviewed, it should be done by State Department and not by the FBI. Helms was told that in view of this, the Bureau notified State Department that any requests for information from the Dutch to be handled by the Bureau must be channeled through the State Department. (S) Mr. Belmont said that this was a situation created by the Dutch and the Bureau had no intention of altering its position and we would not talk to a Dutch representative and did not desire to receive any leads in the Krivitsky case through CIA. (S) Mr. Helms advised that CIA respected the Bureau's position and had attempted to guide itself accordingly in dealing with the Dutch. He said he understood the Bureau's position, which in essence was that the Dutch had made their bed and could now lie in it. (S)

LIKELIHOOD OF PROBLEM ARISING NOW:

It would appear remote that this problem would arise at this time.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

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SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

Background: Item number eight in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses relations between Bureau and CIA with Grombach, head of private intelligence network (O'Brien was Grombach's aide who had liaison with Bureau).

Problem: Papich states we never informed CIA we were receiving information from Grombach which was also of interest to CIA; and that while it is possible Grombach had given same data to CIA, we do not know.

JFK(1)(B) Analysis: Grombach was financed by CIA during early 1950s (e.g., CIA budgeted \$650,000 for Grombach in 1952). (62-77306-60) There is ample evidence CIA knew we were receiving information from Grombach. We do know some information was given by Grombach to CIA and Bureau jointly. O'Brien, for example, told us of conference in early 1951 between CIA officials and Grombach when it was agreed information might be furnished directly to FBI by Grombach, provided CIA was advised by Grombach of what was given. (62-77306-23) Moreover, on 5/7/52 a CIA official requested Bureau's views regarding validity of information we were receiving from Grombach and asked for our views regarding method to be employed in channeling information from Grombach to Bureau. Significantly, under procedure then, Grombach directed communications to CIA with copies to Bureau. CIA was told that as it appeared Grombach was an appendage of CIA, Bureau was not recommending any method of dissemination and it was up to CIA to handle problem. (62-77306-25)

In the ensuing period, dispute arose between CIA and Grombach over channeling of information and Bureau made every effort to stay out of dispute. In late 1952, for example, Helms inquired if Bureau's views regarding dissemination had changed. He was told they certainly had not and again informed that Bureau's desire was to receive all information of interest no matter how received. (62-77306-27) Our position of not becoming involved in Grombach-CIA dispute reiterated on other occasions. (62-77306-36, 69, 81; 65-58725-56)

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SFP:lis
(6) *[Signature]*

Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to Mr. C.D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA
COL. JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)

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On the other hand, there were instances where we received information from Grombach which was of either an administrative or intelligence interest to CIA and we did not inform CIA. These instances covered period both prior and subsequent to the contractual relationship between CIA and Grombach which was from 4/51 to 7/54 (62-77306, unrecorded memo 11/29/55, Belmont to Boardman re Grombach). For example, Grombach wrote a confidential letter dated 7/30/48 to former Assistant to the Director D. M. Ladd which contained information of interest to CIA. This letter contains a penciled notation: "This info. not to be given to CIA. per DML--OHB" (62-77306-7). Memorandum 10/11/50 from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd contains information from O'Brien concerning Grombach's intentions to plant microphones in Finland to cover meetings attended by Russian high staff. It was observed in the memorandum that at that time O'Brien and Grombach had no relations with CIA and that Grombach's intended operation was under primary responsibility of CIA. No indication this information given to CIA by Bureau (65-58725-10).

O'Brien furnished Bureau a memorandum dated 6/29/54 entitled "Termination Memorandum to FBI" which informed of the termination of contract between Grombach and CIA. In the memorandum it is pointed out that Grombach will continue to receive raw material from the field and that while he will no longer be in a position to translate, evaluate, publish, etc., Grombach desires to forward such material to Bureau as Grombach would not trust any other agency. The memorandum also states that Grombach has continued the flow to the Bureau of all reports he felt Bureau would be interested in even though Grombach received a written order specifically directing him to not give Bureau anything. (62-77306-70).

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

B *R* *WCS* *K*

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/7/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Dix

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)
COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
(HERBERT HOOVER COMMISSION - 1954)

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP-8 ALM/JTG
ON 1-10-01

Item number nine in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Hoover Commission survey of CIA operations in 1954. According to Papich, there was talk within CIA that the Bureau had furnished the names of subversives within CIA to Senator McCarthy. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisc) was Chairman of the Senate Investigations Subcommittee.

General Mark Clark headed the Task Force which surveyed CIA operations between 9/54 and 6/55. In 10/54, CIA alleged that the McCarthy Committee was attempting to develop information regarding CIA operations. According to the Washington Star, 10/1/54, McCarthy said CIA was "one of the worst situations we have as far as communist infiltration is concerned." He said he would give his data relative to this matter to Clark's Task Force. According to the Washington Star, 1/15/55, McCarthy said he had given Clark information relative to alleged communist infiltration of CIA. As of 1/17/55, CIA had not received from Clark the names of those considered security risks but CIA believed it had done a good job of removing security risks and believed that it was in good shape.

On 1/21/55, the Task Force requested name checks on security risks named by McCarthy. Memoranda containing the results of those checks were given to the Task Force on 2/8/55. On 5/13/55, the Bureau received a letter from Clark asking for investigations relative to character, reputation, and loyalty of individuals mentioned as security risks. CIA was aware of the names as we asked it for identifying data concerning them. Clark was later advised that the investigations would entail interviews at CIA, review of its programs, inquiries in foreign countries, and the like and he withdrew his request.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)

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The talk at CIA that the Bureau had furnished McCarthy the names of subversives at CIA has not been recorded in FBI files nor is there any complaint in the matter recorded. Neither is there recorded any complaint by CIA to this effect.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. F. B. Griffith

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP2 ALM/116*
ON 11/10/01

Item number 10 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discussed our furnishing leads to our Legal Attaches (Legats) without advising Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or requesting the Agency to handle the lead.

The observations of Special Agent Papich in this matter are broad and general in nature. His presentation is hinged upon the premise advanced by the Agency that "internal security" cannot be separated from "counterintelligence," thereby necessitating our advising CIA of requests to our Legats to have leads covered in foreign countries. The Manual of Instructions, Section 102, page 23, states CIA's responsibilities include collection, collation, evaluation, coordination and dissemination of intelligence information. CIA does not have, among other things, responsibility for "internal security functions."

In the absence of unusual situations, we forward investigative leads pertaining to our cases in countries where we have liaison coverage to the particular Legal Attache concerned. Through his contacts the Legat arranges for the necessary investigation and submits the desired information according to our reporting needs. The Legat coordinates this activity on a local level.

It is more desirable to have our representatives request investigation abroad in order to achieve maximum coverage, and to maintain tight control so we can insure that we fulfill our responsibilities.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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(7)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: 3/7/70

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
[BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA] (u)

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED GMB 5/1/94 (SP8) MK/GCL-CH/AN-JFK~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that we operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there. It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. Papich also refers to a memorandum Donahoe to Mr. Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana source [used in an intercept operation between the Communist Party of Venezuela and the CPC] should be turned over to CIA to obtain complete coverage. We, of course, had no coverage [of Venezuela]. Bureau had not advised other agencies of this source since we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. The entire operation was later turned over to CIA.

CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants], the Legat noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information [concerning the CPC] and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field. [For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage. We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue [through informant sources] to obtain needed information regarding security matters which could not be supplied by CIA. Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to be sound.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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ON 1-12-01
PER CIA AND MHW/SGLD Release
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

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#MDP16 1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/316
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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

CIA-OK (S)

Item #12 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated March 5, 1970, discusses situation in Rio de Janeiro (Rio) in 1959 concerning strained relations which had developed between former Legal Attache (Legat) William G. Friedemann (now retired) and former U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs. According to Papich the Ambassador alleged that Legat had engaged in uncoordinated intelligence activity and that CIA was unhappy with Legat's activities and had told the Ambassador that Legat had disseminated information from a source who was either a fabricator or a provocator.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Friedemann was assigned as Legat in Rio on October 25, 1958, and was transferred as Assistant Legat in Havana on August 22, 1959, after Bureau concluded that he lacked sufficient administrative experience to function as Legat, Rio. In early 1959 he began to receive information from Antonio Martinez De Santos, an employee of the Political Section, Federal District Police. Martinez furnished derogatory information concerning one General Lott of the Brazilian Army who was a possible Brazilian presidential candidate in 1960, indicating that Lott had questionable contacts with the Czech Embassy in Brazil. This information was disseminated to CIA attributed to a source who had not been contacted sufficiently to determine his reliability. CIA advised Bureau that the information concerning Lott caused considerable consternation within CIA which had been unable to evaluate reliability of the information. CIA suggested possibility that the information had been fabricated or was part of a communist deception operation. CIA requested that we identify our source but we declined to do so because source did not want his identity disclosed.

By letter dated October 1, 1959, the new Legat, Rio, recommended that Martinez be discontinued as a potential source based on his admissions to Legat that he had no sources in Czech Embassy and could not provide identities of his sources or additional details concerning information he had reported. Legat concluded that

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. L.F. Schwartz

LFS:bcw (5)

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Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL - 1959

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information Martinez had furnished was of such a nature that it could have come from public sources, the political police or could have been invented and attributed to his alleged contacts. Legat also concluded that Martinez could not have been a provocator used by Czechs to pass deceptive information. Contacts with Martinez were discontinued in November, 1959. (S)

In our dissemination of information from Martinez to CIA we were careful to state that our contacts with the source were insufficient to establish his reliability. Although subsequent events established that it was likely that CIA was correct in speculating that the information was fabricated, there was no indication that the source was a Czech-controlled provocator. (S)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 3/6/70

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

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- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. H. W. Little
- 1 - Mr. J. E. Gauzens

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV)

#MDR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/ITC
ON 1-10-01

JFK (1)(B)

Item number (13) in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses a problem presented by the Phoenix Office in June, 1957, concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the [Mexican border]. These informants were operated inside (Mexico.) The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA endeavoring to develop informants who were already being handled by the Bureau.

JFK (1)(B)

BACKGROUND:

The Director initiated BOCOV in 1948 to fill a void in the lack of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U.S.-Mexican border on the part of CIA and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The program, which at first involved 3 and subsequently 5 of our border offices including Phoenix, was designed to detect and neutralize anti-U.S. activities by subversives in that zone.

JFK (1)(B)

In June, 1956, CIA assigned a representative to the American Consulate, Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, which is in the border zone then covered by Phoenix.

PROBLEM:

JFK (1)(B)

By airtel 6/8/57, Phoenix advised that the CIA representative had endeavored to develop 3 Bureau sources in Mexico and stated that it was discontinuing these sources unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

SOLUTION:

This situation was analyzed in Bureau memorandum dated 6/14/57 wherein it was recommended that safeguards be established to continue operating already established valuable sources even though CIA also began using them; however, the information we

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- 1 - 100-356015 (BOCOV)
- 1 - 100-356015 Sub 38 (BOCOV-PX)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
BORDER COVERAGE (BOCOV)

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received from these sources was to be broken down and paraphrased in reports in such manner as to conceal as far as possible the fact that these individuals were assisting us. The Director approved these safeguards which were successfully placed into effect by Phoenix.

A review of our files since June 14, 1957, fails to reveal that this problem has been raised subsequently by CIA activity in the Phoenix BOCOV area. In addition, the CIA representative was transferred from Nogales on 7/6/59. He was not replaced by CIA and the border territory he had covered was subsequently handled by CIA on a road trip basis out of [Mexico City.] Furthermore, the participation of the Phoenix Office in BOCOV was discontinued with the Director's approval by letter dated 12/10/69.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. L. H. Martin

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CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/276
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

JFK(1)(A) [CARPORT] (S)

Item number 14 in material submitted to Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses [Carport] case. [Carport] is code name for case on our double agent, Andre Deglon, who was recruited by Soviets while on business trip to Moscow in 1954. Until discontinued in 1964 he delivered extensive material, cleared by United States Evaluation Board, to the Soviets in United States and Europe. (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

Mr. Papich's memorandum states case was being highlighted since we cannot exclude possibility Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has evidence to demonstrate we were operational in [Europe] and did not co-ordinate with CIA. The fact is CIA did know [Deglon] was meeting [The Soviets] in [Europe] and Mr. Papich's memorandum does not disclose CIA raised any objection to date. We recognized at the time there could be a jurisdictional problem. (S) We permitted CIA to interview [Deglon] in December, 1954, shortly after [his recruitment] at which time CIA learned from him he had a scheduled espionage meeting in [Switzerland] in March, 1955. (S) On [12/15/54] CIA agreed handling of [Deglon] was solely within jurisdiction of Bureau. On [2/2/55] CIA was orally informed [Deglon] would meet [Soviets] in [Switzerland] in March, 1955; that we desired CIA to take no action which would interfere with our operation and that results would be furnished CIA (approved by memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 2/25/55). Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 6/10/57, recommended we not advise CIA of a later meeting between [Deglon] and [Soviets] scheduled for [6/10-13/57] in [Switzerland] in interest of security. This was approved and this policy was followed thereafter. (S)

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

JFK(1)(A) (S)

All information from [Deglon] was disseminated to CIA and it disclosed our source was meeting [Soviets] at various points in [Europe]. (S) In December, 1968, CIA was advised it could in future contact [Deglon] for data he acquired in his world-wide travels providing it did not use him in operational capacity; [Deglon] was instructed not to disclose to CIA information on his

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A)

- 1 - [105-25453 (Carport)] (S)
- LHM:cgc cgc
- (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

SECRET

(S) relationship with Bureau. It is a fact, however, we did
(S) permit [Deglon] under our supervision, to meet [Soviet]
principals] outside the United States without clearing
with CIA. We discontinued him as an informant in 1964.

JFK(C)(A)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts
set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 JLM/AB
ON 1-10-01

Item Number 15 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the Director's refusal of a 1958 CIA request for Mr. W. C. Sullivan to lecture on communism before a CIA group. Papich stated that CIA accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies.

The files disclose that by letter 9/25/58 signed by James Angleton, CIA requested Mr. Sullivan to address a selected group of CIA personnel on the communist movement in the U. S. CIA suggested dates of 12/9,10, or 11/58. The Director by routing slip attached to Angleton's letter commented, "It seems strange that CIA should seek this when its top representative in Japan considers FBI as a bunch of mere 'flat-feet' and the dangers of communism as something conjured up in the minds of the FBI. But then again I note request doesn't come from the Director nor even the Deputy Director of CIA."

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to A. Belmont dated 10/1/58 made reference to CIA's request and the Director's comments. It recommended that the best interests of the Bureau would be served by giving this lecture, not because of the information which could be conveyed to CIA on communism in the U. S., but because it would give Sullivan an opportunity to raise a number of questions himself of the group concerning CIA's own activities in the field of communism. It was pointed out that it could be considered a bit of a challenge to see how much the FBI could learn about the operation of CIA during the course of the lecture and discussion rather than the converse. Mr. Tolson recommended that the request be declined and the Director concurred commenting, "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit."

BCR:hc
(5) hc
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Rachner

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUED OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach ~~SECRET~~
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

Pursuant to the Director's decision, a letter was directed to CIA under date of 10/7/58 advising that it was not possible to grant CIA's request for this lecture because of Mr. Sullivan's other commitments.

Nothing could be located in Bureau files to indicate CIA's reaction to this letter.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts setforth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
CASE OF [EDWARD ELLIS SMITH] JFK (1)(B)

Item Number 16 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the case of [Edward Ellis Smith] that CIA might criticize our not identifying our source. JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

BACKGROUND OF CASE Smith was the CIA employee assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, in 1956, under State Department cover. He became involved with a Russian girl, and the Committee for State Security (KGB) approached him for recruitment, using the affair with the girl and compromising photographs as leverage to carry out the approach. [Smith] reported the approach to his superiors and was returned to U. S. and ultimately removed from CIA. JFK (1)(B)

PROBLEM WITH CIA We first learned of this case on 7/9/56 from David Teeple, a consultant to Scott McLeod of State Department, who furnished the information in confidence and who indicated [Smith] might have been involved in espionage. On 7/16/56 [Robert Bannerman], Office of Security, CIA, advised SA Papich that CIA was considering requesting in writing that the Bureau identify our source. On 7/17/56 SA Papich was advised by Director of Security, CIA, that Allen Dulles had instructed that the request not be made. JFK (1)(B)

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA . This problem never officially arose in view of the instructions of Mr. Dulles. Bureau files contain no indication as to whether or not CIA documented this.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

62-80750

1 - 65-64084 [Edward Ellis Smith]

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

JFK (1)(B)

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. T. N. Goble

TNG:as:bjp (7)

SECRET

DJP

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/6/70

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J. R. Wagoner

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(THE SLIVA OPERATION) JFK(1)(A)

#MOE16 1-10-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 AUM/ JRE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

Item Number 17 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses the possible belief of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Legal Attache, Paris, had leaked sensitive information concerning the SLIVA case. SA Papich noted that perhaps CIA might question whether FBI had pursued investigation in the case vigorously enough. Memorandum is to review circumstances under which information was furnished by CIA to FBI, Legal Attache inquiries of CIA, Paris, and the effect of CIA restrictions on FBI investigations in this case.

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(B)

In February, 1963, CIA made available information from Philippe de Vosjoli, the Washington, D. C., representative of the French intelligence service (SDECE) to the effect that the French Government was planning to engage in clandestine collection of scientific and technical information in the United States. CIA insisted information not be made available to other government agencies and no investigation be conducted which might jeopardize its source. CIA then made available extensive information from coded communications from SDECE in Washington. Analysis of the communications revealed several discrepancies which would have made interview by FBI of de Vosjoli desirable. CIA refused this request. We made numerous requests to obtain clarifying data to explain items mentioned in SDECE communications and CIA failed to respond.

JFK(1)(A) (S)

JFK(1)(B) (S)
JFK(1)(S) (S)

JFK(1)(A)

(S) JFK(1)(A)

In March, 1963, CIA furnished information concerning SDECE interest in American personnel and installations in Paris. This information was made available to Legal Attache, Paris. On 4/11/63 CIA advised that its CIA station in Paris, which had not heretofore been apprised of SLIVA case had made inquiry concerning the case. Our inquiry of Legal Attache, Paris, disclosed that

JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(B) (S)

JFK(1)(S)

1 - 105-109053 (SLIVA) (S)

JFK(1)(A) (S)

LEB:bjp:jf (7)

OBSERVATIONS - OVER

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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JFK(1)(B) (S)
JFK(1)(A) (S)
JFK(1)(A) (S)
inquiry of CIA personnel [in Paris] had been made concerning one of the individuals previously identified as an [SDECE] agent and also requests had been made for certain biographical data concerning other individuals. Legal Attache noted that CIA personnel [in Paris] had indicated they were previously aware of the [SLIVA] case and were impressed with the extreme sensitivity of the case. We furnished this information to CIA headquarters and on 5/7/63 CIA referred to the incident and stated that it was a matter of serious concern to it, requesting that any future dissemination outside Bureau or to the Legal Attache be coordinated in advance with that Agency. This practice was closely followed. The Director observed in January, 1964, that he thought the whole thing had been imaginary on the part of CIA which had been played as a sucker by [de Vosjoli]. The Director added that no more time should be wasted on it, at least until CIA restrictions were removed. We continued to attempt to get the restrictions removed without success and covered outstanding leads.

JFK(1)(A) (S)
JFK(1)(B) (S)
FK(1)(A)
In September, 1964, an analysis of the case disclosed that although thirty-eight separate investigations were opened only three [SDECE] agents were uncovered. Original allegations of [French] intent to mount an espionage mission in the United States could not be substantiated. This information, coupled with the fact that CIA refused to make [de Vosjoli] available to us for the purpose of resolving discrepancies, prompted a decision transmitted by us to CIA on 9/30/64 that we were closing our investigation in this case.

Mr. Papich commented in his memorandum of 3/5/70 CIA never has been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau in this case. Our review indicates our efforts in the matter were as full and complete as possible under circumstances where CIA refused to grant us access to the source, did not respond to request for clarifying data and declined to remove restrictions making it impossible to take necessary investigative steps. Should any question be raised in the future, we are in a position to document our difficulties experienced with CIA.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/jfg
ON 1-10-01

BACKGROUND:

Item number 18 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 cites a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of leaks to the "National Review" which identified (Lyle Hugh) Munson, former CIA employee, as the leak and referred to former Assistant to the Director Lou Nichols as among his contacts. JFK (C) (B)

FK (C) (B)

PROBLEM:

Papich implies that CIA may have further information regarding Nichols' involvement.

ANALYSIS:

This situation was set forth in memorandum R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, 4/21/59. We do not know if CIA has additional information as to the suggested relationship between (Munson) and Nichols. We do know that they have not made an issue of this matter to date. JFK (C) (B)

JFK (C) (B)

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

HHW:kml/mst
(6)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. H. H. Wallace

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

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TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: March 6, 1970

- 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. E.R. Harrell
- 1 - Mr. R.A. Mullins

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

Item Number 19 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses the possible travel of one of our Mexican border informants to Cuba and whether our not advising CIA of this made us potentially vulnerable to charges we were operating outside the U.S. without coordinating with CIA.

BACKGROUND:

This involved our plans to send a Border Coverage Program (BOCOV) informant to a guerrilla training camp in Cuba. The trip never materialized.

In October, 1965, we were vitally interested in determining the location and extent of Cuban guerrilla training sites being used to prepare Latin American subversives to carry out revolutions in their home countries. EP 572-S, a Mexican national residing in Juarez, Mexico, which is within the area covered by the BOCOV Program, had infiltrated Cuban and Chinese intelligence operations in Mexico City and had made himself attractive to Mexican communist leaders who were planning to pay expenses of sending guerrilla trainees to Cuba.

CIA CONSIDERATIONS:

EP 572-S was an integral part of our top secret BOCOV Program which is handled on a need-to-know basis. We had previously obtained material from CIA showing its primary targets inside Cuba which allowed us to fully brief the informant as to overall U.S. Government objectives and a procedure was established for use in disseminating data to CIA if the trip materialized which would fully protect our informant and not jeopardize the BOCOV operation.

OUTCOME:

During period informant was striving to arrange the trip to Cuba his wife became mentally ill, extremely emotional and temporarily deserted the informant. This strained family relationship caused us to order El Paso to have informant cancel efforts to make the trip to Cuba and thus no trip was ever made.

RAM:drl (7)

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SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - TRAVEL OF
BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA

SECRET

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

After EP 572-S had moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, which is outside our BOCOV area, in November, 1966, we advised CIA of his past cooperation with us and interposed no objection to his use by CIA in areas outside our jurisdiction. On 11/22/66 CIA stated it would consult us should it initiate contacts with the informant. There is no indication that CIA did use the informant and on 6/24/68 we discontinued EP 572-S as he was of no further value to us. The trip never materialized.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and marks: a large 'P' on the left, a large 'M' in the center, a checkmark to the right of 'M', a signature 'J' to the right of the checkmark, and another signature 'D.L.' in the top right corner.]

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/6/70

SECRET

- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. E. J. O'Malley

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/176
ON 1-10-01

Item 20 submitted to the Director by Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions the dissemination of a Bureau monograph dated 5/5/65 and entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." Special Agent (SA) Papich stated that due to the urgency of the document Bureau did not obtain CIA clearance to include CIA information in the monograph which was disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA. According to SA Papich, CIA never made any protest although it considered our action a violation of the "third agency rule."

Although the monograph referred to by SA Papich did contain CIA data, it also set forth highly significant data obtained by Bureau through our own informants. The CIA data was biographical in nature and was used in the monograph to characterize the past, including communist contacts, of key figures in the Dominican Republic. It was taken from the 1963 CIA Biographical Handbook and CIA telegrams dating back to 1961, all of which were previously disseminated to the U. S. intelligence community by CIA. No attempt was made in the monograph to characterize CIA data as Bureau information and, in fact, this information was attributed to "another Government agency," in accordance with established procedures.

The so-called "third agency rule" provides that classified information originating in a department or agency will not be disseminated outside the receiving agency without the permission of the originating agency. However, an exception to this rule provides that the receiving agency may disseminate such data to other members of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB), of which Bureau is a member, unless the originating agency uses appropriate control markings limiting its data to the use of the receiving agency only. The CIA data used in the Bureau monograph had no such control markings and our monograph was disseminated to the President, the Attorney General and USIB members only.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIP WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

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The Bureau's monograph was a compendium of our own data, CIA data, and that received from other members of the intelligence community. It was prepared under emergency conditions for the President and had a significant bearing on the understanding and handling by the intelligence community of a serious crisis which confronted this country.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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10/7/70

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C.D. DeLoach

SECRET

- 1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
 - 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
 - 1 - Mr. D.J. Brennan
- DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. J.E. Gauzens
- 1 - Mr. A.H. Solomon

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA (S)

11/10/01 MDR/6
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM/STG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/6

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Item Number 21 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Bureau operation of informants in Guatemala and comments on our potential vulnerability for not having informed CIA at the inception of the operation of these informants. (S)

SA Papich has cited two situations. The first concerns Roberto Francisco Castaneda Felice, an attorney residing in Guatemala City. (S) Our Legat, Mexico, in the Fall of 1966, identified Castaneda as a potential source of intelligence information of importance to U.S. security; conducted appropriate background inquiry regarding him and determined his excellent potential and willingness to furnish intelligence information to U.S. Government. By memorandum 11/23/66 it was approved that we contact CIA headquarters through liaison channels to inform CIA that we planned to maintain contact with Castaneda; that CIA would be furnished the information obtained and that we would service CIA requests provided they could be handled with complete security. SA Papich so informed Jake Esterline of CIA on 11/25/66. (S) Esterline stated he saw no reason why FBI could not proceed as we desired and that CIA headquarters would so inform its representatives in Guatemala and Mexico, instructing them to give FBI all necessary support in this operation. Since that date we have operated Castaneda as a valuable and productive unpaid confidential source. Since this matter was coordinated with CIA at the outset, there appears to be no problem. (S) JFK (C) (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

The second situation cited by SA Papich concerned Legat, Mexico, informant MEX-65. This individual has cooperated with the Bureau for some 25 years. As a Guatemalan police official in 1945-47, he was most helpful to our representative assigned in Guatemala. (S) We had no contact with him thereafter until 1954 when he appeared in Mexico City as a political refugee from Guatemala. (S) For 11 years thereafter, MEX-65 was operated by our Legat, Mexico, in Mexico. (S)

AHS:drl (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - BUREAU INFORMANTS
IN [GUATEMALA] (S)

SECRET

(S) In April, 1965, MEX-65 returned to [Guatemala] (S) and by memorandum 6/7/65 it was approved that contacts with him be continued in [Guatemala] by our Central American road trip Agent. He proved to be an extremely valuable informant on criminal matters as well as those of interest to U.S. security in [Guatemala.] (S)

(S) Upon MEX-65's designation as a highly placed police official in [Guatemala] in 1967, we promptly advised CIA headquarters through liaison channels of informant's identity. We advised CIA that we had utilized MEX-65 for handling criminal leads and that he periodically volunteered information concerning political developments in [Guatemala.] (S) At that time, 10/6/67, it was agreed that Bureau would continue control of informant and that after each contact with informant by our road trip Agent, the latter would confer with [Nestor Sanchez,] (S) Head of CIA operations in [Guatemala] (who was present at CIA headquarters at the meeting) concerning political information furnished by the informant. We were assured of complete CIA cooperation in this matter. On the occasion of our road trip Agent's next contact with [Sanchez] in [Guatemala,] (S) however, [Sanchez] (S) bitterly accused our Agent of having lied to him and of having operated a source in [Guatemala] without CIA's knowledge. He stated that responsibility for the development of security information outside the U. S. is solely CIA's. It is noted that [Sanchez] (S) has been a difficult person with whom to deal and has been inclined to "pop off." Matter has been closely followed by Legat, Mexico, and there have been no further indications of difficulty with him. (S) CIA, [Guatemala,] (S) has afforded us complete cooperation (S) in our handling of MEX-65 as we were assured it would in the 10/6/67 meeting. Accordingly, no issue was made of this matter with CIA. (S) JFK (U) (B) JFK (U) (B) JFK (U) (B)

MEX-65 continues as a very valuable paid informant of our Legat, Mexico. CIA has made favorable comments regarding the excellent quality of the information obtained by MEX-65. This arrangement has worked smoothly for two and one-half years and there appears to be little likelihood of CIA raising an issue regarding this matter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the fact set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

V-2-
SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. Strain

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ITEM (22) SOLO

#m0216
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ATG
ON 1-11-01

Item (22), SOLO, in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions that the Bureau could be vulnerable and charged with failure to identify the source and coordinate with them on this matter if they were to become cognizant of the high-level foreign ramifications of this operation.

SOLO is the code word used to refer to the liaison operation performed by our informants between the Communist Party, USA, (CPUSA), and other communist parties of the world.

This operation basically is performed to gain high-level intelligence concerning the Soviet Union's financial support, domination and control of the CPUSA. Attendant to this objective, our informants have met with and discussed mutual problems with leaders of the various international departments within the Soviet Government. They have also held discussions with CP leaders from other nations.

All information received as a result of this operation which has foreign ramifications has been promptly disseminated to CIA at the highest level.

It has not been considered desirable to identify our sources in this case in view of the sensitivity of the case and the physical danger to the informants.

Considerable security precautions have been carefully built into the SOLO operation both in the field and at the Seat of Government to insure the fullest protection to its security and to the safety of the informants involved. Exposure of the identity of these sources might jeopardize the entire operation.

RS:dlm/lmj
(6)

CONTINUED - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ITEM (22) SOLO

While former Bureau Agents have gone to work for CIA, there is no information available indicating they have compromised this operation. Of course, they could have done this unknown to us.

The prompt dissemination, to CIA, of information developed through SOLO, which is of interest to that agency, completely fulfills this Bureau's responsibility without needless jeopardy. The mechanics of the operation itself are of no essential significance to CIA.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

None.

[Handwritten initials: B, W, V, K]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

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FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1 - Liaison

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HARASSMENT OF CIA

Am-Orlb
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 *REM/116*
ON 1-11-01

Item #23 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a letter dated November 15, 1967, from CIA which requested that the Bureau check telephone toll calls from the home of one Robert Kenneth Brown who was allegedly harassing CIA [in the Miami area] Brown was JFK(1)(8) supposedly seeking information concerning CIA's covert operations. SA Papich states that we told CIA that we would not check the toll calls on the basis that the information received was not sufficient to justify investigation within the Bureau's jurisdiction. SA Papich also states that "CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U.S. intelligence operations."

A review of Bureau files disclosed that a memorandum, D. J. Brennan, Jr., to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, dated November 17, 1967, was prepared. This memorandum encompassed the above facts and recommended that CIA Liaison Agent advise CIA that we would not check the toll calls as requested. This memorandum and recommendation was prepared by SA Papich. The Director noted "OK H."

In addition to the above, on December 9, 1967, Brown contacted our Miami Office and stated that he was writing a book about CIA and offered to make the material available to the Miami Office. Our Miami Office was advised that this information was of interest to CIA headquarters and instructions were furnished that if Brown did furnish Miami with the information, it would be given to CIA. Brown did not follow through with his offer.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JAM:bcw/bad (6)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

SECRET

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. R. S. Garner
- 1 - Mr. J. E. Keating (CINAL-Administrative File)

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 24 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum dated 3/5/70 discusses the restriction of dissemination of the Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prior to 10/67, some of the Government agencies on the distribution list for CINAL received multiple copies. The Director of CIA was then receiving 19 copies of CINAL as a result of requests from CIA on 3/30/62 and 10/23/62 for additional copies to expedite reading by key CIA officials and to facilitate rapid utilization of the information within CIA.

The Director made a notation on the 10/4/67 CINAL: "Please look over list of distribution. I have marked with a dot those I question as to why they should receive copies and I do not think more than 1 copy should be sent anyone. Let me have your views. H." By memorandum R. W. Smith to W. C. Sullivan 10/6/67, it was stated that although security of the classified document CINAL had been maintained, if the Director so desired, we would tell recipients that they would receive only one copy each in the future. Mr. Tolson noted on this memorandum, "Yes. T 10/9." Mr. Tolson also noted, "We could never run down a leak." The Director noted, "Send only 1 copy & if any inquiry, then indicate we have had to cut costs. H."

Since 10/67 the Director's instructions have been followed and only one copy of CINAL has been furnished to those, including CIA, on the CINAL distribution list.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RSG:ekn/bad (7)

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. J. M. Fitzgerald

DATE: March 7, 1970

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY
SERVICE (BVD) - 1960

1-11-01 #m0216
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/7TG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S) Item number 25 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70, discusses a trip to Holland by Legal Attache (Legat), Bonn, in 1960 to explore arrangements for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. It is given as an instance CIA could cite as an FBI failure to coordinate with them in line with National Security Council Directives. The U.S. Ambassador to Holland reportedly raised questions, indicating FBI should first reach agreement with CIA, which he said had previously handled all relations with Dutch authorities. Papich says CIA Director, Allen Dulles, later expressed disappointment that we did not contact CIA beforehand but that an agreement satisfactory to all concerned was eventually worked out. Papich also says that in late 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legat in Denmark but did not inform CIA of our intentions.

(S) In contemplation of the stationing of a Legat in Denmark, Bulet of 12/7/59 instructed Legat, London, to broaden liaison contacts in Scandinavian countries and told Legat, Bonn, to make exploratory contacts with appropriate authorities in Holland for the same purpose. Since we had told State by letter of 3/10/55 that we would handle requests for investigations and name checks for the Dutch only when received through formal State channels, we advised State of our intention to make exploratory contacts with the Dutch regarding regular liaison arrangements, and State approved. State sent a letter to the U. S. Embassy in Holland on 12/17/59, advising of the Bureau's intention, but it apparently did not get to the Ambassador prior to Legat's trip to Holland.

(S) JFK(1)(S) On 1/4/60 Legat, Bonn, called the BVD from Germany and arranged to call on them on 1/7/60. The BVD reported the call to the CIA representative in Holland who told U. S. Ambassador Philip Young. On 1/7/60 the Director received a letter of 1/5/60 from Young in which he said he was disturbed about the manner in which he had learned of the Legat's proposed visit. While offering to assist the Bureau, Young spoke of the long standing contractual and financial arrangements CIA had with BVD and suggested the Director and Allen Dulles discuss the matter if permanent Bureau liaison with BVD was planned.

JMF:jan (5)

SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY
SERVICE (BVD)] - 1960

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(s) On 1/7/60, Legat met with Ambassador Young and the
(s) [CIA Chief of Mission] prior to visiting BVD. He explained JFK(1)(S)
that he was to explore the possibility of direct contact with
(s) [BVD] concerning exchange of information bearing on U.S. internal
security matters. He said he would not be operational and that
the contemplated liaison could not reasonably cause interference
with the existing CIA arrangement. (s) While the Embassy officials
expressed misgivings that the [Dutch] might be confused, no request
was made to refrain from contacting [BVD]. (s) The CIA representative
said he had requested his headquarters for comment on learning
of the proposed visit of Legat but had not received a reply.
(s) Legat later briefed both Embassy officials on the results of
his visit to [BVD], who were friendly but deferred a final
commitment, referring to the existing "American arrangement."

(s) By letter of 1/13/60 the Director thanked Ambassador
Young for his offer to assist, and said Bureau interests in
Scandinavian countries and [Holland] were under discussion with
Allen Dulles. Young was also assured our proposed contacts with
(s) the [Dutch] were purely liaison in nature; that while we would
keep CIA advised of items of interest to it in connection with
its responsibilities abroad, it was not believed necessary to
go beyond the U.S. Intelligence Board Directive of 12/8/59 in
coordinating with CIA matters taken up with [the Dutch]. (s) That
Directive says CIA shall be responsible for coordination of all
U.S. liaison which concerns clandestine intelligence activities
or which involve foreign clandestine services. Paragraph 10,
however, says the Directive does not apply to any liaison
relationship concerned with U.S. internal security functions,
or with criminal or disciplinary matters which are not directly
related to foreign espionage or clandestine counterintelligence.

(s) On 1/13/60 Papich explained to Allen Dulles and Richard
Helms the reasons for our contacts in Scandinavian countries and
[Holland] exploring possible establishment of a Legat in Denmark.
When Papich challenged them to cite any Bureau failure to comply
with the Directive for coordination of U.S. liaison activities
abroad, Helms immediately stated there were no such instances.
In answer to specific invitation by Papich to air any complaints
or problems, Dulles stated that neither he nor his representatives
had any complaints; that he was personally unhappy about not
being contacted in the beginning; but that he and CIA would give
all possible assistance. (Dulles did assist by writing a personal
letter to Ambassador Young which resulted in a joint FBI-[BVD]-CIA
meeting on 4/8/60, at which direct FBI-[BVD] liaison was agreed upon).

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON
WITH [DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY
SERVICE (BVD)] - 1960

(S)

SECRET

On memorandum Frohbose to Belmont of 1/14/60, concerning the 1/13/60 meeting of Papich, Dulles and Helms, Director noted : "1. Well handled by Papich. 2. All of the turmoil developing in this situation could have been avoided if we had properly contacted Dulles and also followed through with State. H."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten marks: a checkmark, a signature 'W. Helms', a signature 'J. ...', and initials 'DJF']

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3-6-70

SECRET

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN SERVICE - 1962

Item No. 26 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3-5-70 states that CIA by letter 11-7-62 raised questions concerning the propriety of our dissemination of information through our Legal Attache to the

(S) Greek Intelligence Service. This concerned certain Committee for State Security (KGB) technical equipment which was obtained from our sensitive Soviet defector in place, Bureau code name Fedora. CIA letter 11-7-62 stated that a representative of

(S) Greek Intelligence Service informed CIA it received aforementioned information from our Legal Attache. CIA claimed such dissemination abroad should have been coordinated with CIA because of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 5/2 which indicates that CIA shall be responsible for all U.S. liaison concerning clandestine intelligence activities abroad or involving foreign clandestine services. CIA claimed that pursuant above we were obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to dissemination.

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan 11-9-62 under Fedora caption reviewed this situation and indicates that on 7-13 and 8-1-62 Fedora provided information concerning several types of technical paraphernalia used by KGB. Dissemination of above was made to State Department, CIA and military intelligence agencies by letter on 7-24 and 8-16-62. Information was also furnished to Legal Attaches, London, Bern, Bonn, Paris, Rome and Madrid, with instructions to disseminate only to contacts in foreign intelligence agencies known to be reliable and cooperative and with

- 62-80750
- 1 - 105-104811
- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. J. F. Mabey

111101 *MOR16
 CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 am/3TG
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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the instructions that it be given limited distribution and handled in a manner so it would not be apparent it emanated from the Bureau or a source within the U.S. Above memorandum points out that DCID 5/2 has been controversial since its inception (12-8-59) and the subject of differences of interpretation. We recognized CIA's coordination responsibilities but, in this instance, were of the opinion there was no operational angle and no necessity for coordinating dissemination of above since we had previously given the information to CIA. This memorandum recommended approval of a letter to CIA answering CIA's inquiry according to above. Director indicated "O.K." and "It looks like CIA is throwing its weight around." On 11-13-62 we directed a letter to CIA accordingly. As indicated in memorandum of SA Papich, CIA "surrendered" and did not further contest this issue.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and signatures]
DJE

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3/6/70

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/126
ON 1-11-01

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SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
"THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY
DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

Item 27 of the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 indicates that Wise and Ross had visited the Bureau in 1963 to gather material for a book regarding U. S. intelligence agencies. It was suggested that CIA be advised of this, and the Director noted, "I see no reason for doing so."

Mr. Jones' memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, 8/28/63, reports this visit and notes that Wise had asked for data concerning the Bureau's internal security procedures and had asked concerning other FBI operations, making no reference to CIA, with one exception. He did inquire as to whether there was friction between the two agencies and was told that we cooperated closely and maintained daily liaison with CIA. It was on this memorandum that the Director said he saw no reason for informing CIA concerning the visit of Wise and Ross.

We later learned that their book, "The Invisible Government," was furnished in the form of advance proofs to CIA prior to its publication. We also received such proofs from CIA through Liaison.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Rose

BFR:mlm/mkl
(6)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
DATE: March 6, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Rozamus

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP1 JALM/TIG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 28 in memorandum of 3/5/70 from SA Sam Papich to the Director, captioned "Cases and/or Situations Involving Conflict With CIA," states that in April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting that agency toward developing coverage in Africa by providing a Negro informant or placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA for the purpose of eventually using him in Africa. His memorandum added that we told that agency the FBI had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. He claims we took the position since we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis. He states that CIA could argue that as early as 1960 it had foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage and when it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, we did not cooperate. He refers to his memorandum dated 4/7/60 concerning this matter captioned "Communist Activities in Africa."

The memorandum referred to discloses that on 4/5/60 Herman Horton, Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence, CIA, stated that communist organizations were rapidly increasing in strength on the continent of Africa and that his agency found it most difficult to establish effective penetration. Horton noted that in this connection it was almost impossible for a white man to move about Africa and establish a relationship which would enable him to develop worthwhile sources. He asked if the Bureau would consider furnishing one of its Negro informants or developing an informant in the Communist Party, USA for eventual use by CIA in Africa. Papich told Horton that if the Bureau had a good Negro informant, we certainly were not interested in having his future jeopardized nor did we want to lose his production. Papich added that it undoubtedly would be most difficult to take a Bureau informant, have him travel to Africa under some cover and still be able to satisfactorily explain such activities to his communist colleagues without becoming a target of suspicion. Horton said he recognized all this but asked if the Bureau would give consideration.

MJR:ssr
(6)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

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Addendum to Papich's memorandum dated 4/8/60 by the Internal Security Section pointed out that all of our informants were necessary for our own operations, particularly in the communist field, and it recommended and was approved that CIA be orally informed that it is not possible to provide an informant on a loan basis to be used in Africa.

Regrettably, the Bureau was not in a position to assist CIA. CIA's problem was an administrative one within that Agency.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

~~S~~ ✓ WLR JAW
DIBS
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

~~SECRET~~

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. W. J. McDonnell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE

#mORIG
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ALM/STG
ON 1-11-01

Item #29 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in memorandum of 3/5/70, states that by Bureau letter dated 10/23/64 we provided the White House information received by our Legat from U.S. Ambassador to Luxembourg wherein the latter was critical of intelligence operations, particularly the overstaffing of personnel. SA Papich comments that we do not know if CIA became knowledgeable regarding this letter but could construe same as relating to its operations.

Our Legat, Paris, in a letter to the Director dated 10/19/64, set forth the results of a conversation with Ambassador William R. Rivkin at Luxembourg. The latter was assigned by the State Department to conduct a survey of the U.S. intelligence operations in six European countries, assisted by representatives of Defense, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget. Rivkin remarked that the results of the survey were appalling, there being 23,000 military personnel in the six countries engaged in intelligence operations and numerous CIA personnel. He described the lack of coordination between the military and CIA as "scandalous." He stated the Offices of the Military Attaches were grossly overstaffed and he was recommending drastic cuts and that duplicate administrative services be combined with those of the embassies. He made no mention of specific intelligence operations nor did he elaborate on the lack of coordination. Rivkin commented that on his return to the U.S., he intended to see the President personally to bring this matter forcefully to his attention.

Rivkin's comments were incorporated in a letter to William D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, dated 10/23/64, in accordance with the Director's noted instructions. Our files disclose no indication that CIA cognizant of Bureau letter.

RECOMMENDED ACTION: None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

WJM:bcw/mkl (5)

mkl

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DJM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Haynes

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/STG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 30 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of March 5, 1970, discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of increasing wire taps on diplomatic establishments. McCone charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had indicated the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before going on record that any information had originated with him.

A review of the file in this matter discloses that in April, 1963, Mr. Belmont along with Papich had discussed with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged position with the PFIAB; that he was in favor of across the board telephone taps on diplomatic establishments. The Bureau, of course, was opposed to this and advised Helms that we would request to make our position known before the board. At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, Helms specifically asked what he should tell McCone and Mr. Belmont told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RHH:wmk/sef
(5)

sef

W.C. Sullivan
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

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TO Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 6, 1970

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SECRET

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. L. Whitson

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

Item number 31, "alleged penetration of CIA," in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum of 3/5/70 discusses allegations made by Anatoliy Mikhailovich Golitzyn regarding recruitment of four CIA employees by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), that CIA requested full investigation which we declined.

BACKGROUND OF CASE Golitzyn, an intelligence officer of the KGB who defected to CIA in 1961, alleged that the KGB had penetrated CIA through an individual having the code name "Sasha." In an effort to identify this penetration CIA provided Golitzyn with information regarding many individuals who had worked for CIA in Germany.

JFK(1)(8)

JFK(1)(A)

Golitzyn identified two individuals at various times as "Sasha" and in each instance investigation "washed out" the identification. Golitzyn finally identified "Sasha" as one [Igor Orlov, a former employee of CIA]. During the course of extensive document reviews Golitzyn became acquainted with background of various individuals who had worked in Germany at the time [Orlov] did. Golitzyn identified four present employees of CIA with unknown subjects who had come to his attention while he was active in the KGB.

PROBLEM WITH CIA CIA wanted the Bureau to undertake full-scale investigation of its four employees based solely on Golitzyn's allegations.

DISPOSAL OF PROBLEM WITH CIA By letter of February 26, 1965, CIA was informed there appeared to be no basis at that time for a full-scale investigation of these men by the FBI on the basis of allegations by Golitzyn. With regard to any investigation in the United States concerning two of the men, a conclusion would be made following completion of the investigation of [Igor Orlov] and interviews of [Orlov] and his wife. Based upon the investigation of [Orlov] and the interviews of [Orlov] and his wife, CIA was informed by letter of July 20, 1965, that nothing had been developed

JFK(1)(8)

62-80750
1 - 105-105608 (Golitzyn)
LW:as:bjphje (7)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA
62-80750

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JFK(1)(B) which supported Golitzyn's speculation that [Orlov] was
instrumental in the recruitment by the Soviets of either
[Rafael Goldfarb or Andrew Hanfman] and nothing was developed
which would support Golitzyn's allegations against the other
two suspects, [Richard Kovich and David Murphy] Furthermore,
CIA had furnished no documentary material regarding [Kovich]
[or Murphy] which would in any way support Golitzyn. The
Bureau added "Accordingly, this Bureau is conducting no
investigation of [Goldfarb, Hanfman, Kovich or Murphy.] We
will interpose no objection, since they are all employees
of your agency, if you wish to pursue Anatoliy Golitzyn's
allegations concerning them, including interviews of the
individuals concerned.

"This Bureau would, of course, be interested in
receiving the results of any investigation which would tend
to confirm Golitzyn's conclusions that one or more of these
employees of your agency had actually been recruited by the
Soviets."

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set
forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

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SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

DATE: 3/7/70

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. F. X. O'Brien

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Walters _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO
SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

#moe/6
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALD/TTG
ON 1-11-01

Item number 32 in material submitted to the Director by SA Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 mentions Bureau letter 5/16/58 sent to the then Vice President Nixon and containing a summary of CIA information concerning events in Latin America relating to Mr. Nixon's trip there during 5/58.

According to SA Papich, most of the information in above letter came from CIA. He commented that this letter could be interpreted as raising question concerning quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. Papich noted it is not known if CIA ever became aware of the letter. Papich stated that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to the then Vice President Nixon's staff. SA Papich pointed out that CIA, if aware of above letter, could raise question as to violation of Third Agency Rule.

Results of Review of Bureau Files

The letter to the then Vice President Nixon is located in Bureau file 62-88461-117. It contains summary of information relating to riots and attacks against Mr. Nixon and his party during their 5/58 Latin American trip. Letter identifies CIA as the

62-80750

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Memorandum W.C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

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#MOR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 ELM/316
ON 1-11-01

source of the information set forth in our letter. The last paragraph of this letter includes a statement that the impression gained from a review of CIA reports indicates that CIA had some coverage reflecting there were to be troubles concerning Mr. Nixon's Latin American travels. This letter also stated as follows:

"It is significant that information in the individual countries came to CIA's attention shortly before your arrival in a particular country. Therefore, there is a question as to whether or not CIA had coverage in communist organizations which would have led to the development of information concerning communist plans days or weeks ahead of your visit."

There is no indication in this file regarding instructions given to prepare our letter of May 16, 1958. The first paragraph of this letter indicates that the Director had a discussion with Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958, inasmuch as the first sentence of the above letter reads as follows:

"Apropos of our discussion today, there is set forth information contained in Central Intelligence Agency reports received from them on May 14, 1958."

The data set forth in our May 16, 1958, letter to Mr. Nixon is contained in a memorandum Mr. R. R. Roach to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated May 15, 1958, which was prepared for the Director's information. The Director noted on this memorandum, "Send summary to A. G. H." In accordance with instructions, a letter was sent to the then Attorney General under date of May 16, 1958, and this letter contained a summary of CIA information in the same manner as had been sent to Mr. Nixon on May 16, 1958. Our letter to the Attorney General, however, did not contain any observations regarding CIA coverage in Latin American countries visited by Mr. Nixon and his party.

Our file in this matter (62-88461-150) indicates that on June 9, 1958, Colonel Robert Cushman in the office of the then Vice President Nixon contacted the Bureau at the request

- 2 -
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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
Re: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

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of Mr. Nixon to determine if the contents of a letter from the Director to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, regarding Mr. Nixon's trip to South America could be leaked to the press. Colonel Cushman's request was set forth in memorandum G. A. Nease to Mr. Tolson June 9, 1958, with the recommendation that Colonel Cushman be advised that if the information were to be given to the press, it would undoubtedly create a serious problem as the FBI would then have violated CIA's confidence since CIA was aware that SA Papich had reviewed CIA's classified reports and, therefore, this information should not be given to the press. Both Mr. Tolson and the Director agreed with the recommendation, and Colonel Cushman was advised of our decision. It is noted that Colonel Cushman is identical with the individual who is now Deputy Director of CIA.

Comments on Remarks in SA Papich Memo 3/5/70

1. That most of the information in our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958, came from CIA and that this letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America.

There is no dispute as to the source of the information which was summarized in our letter to Mr. Nixon, and we clearly indicated in our letter that the source was CIA. With regard to any question being raised as to the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America, we merely pointed out to Mr. Nixon something that was readily discernible to any reader of the CIA reports - - that is, that the information from CIA popped up rather suddenly as related to the country and Mr. Nixon's arrival. Certainly Mr. Nixon himself, since he was personally involved in demonstrations directed against him during his Latin American trip, must have been aware that advance information from our responsible intelligence agency (CIA) may have been lacking.

2. We are not aware if CIA became knowledgeable of our letter to Mr. Nixon dated May 16, 1958. Under ordinary conditions, we are not aware nor do we seek to identify any CIA

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to
Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
62-80750

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personnel who might be assigned to the White House staff. As indicated above, Colonel Cushman, who was a member of Mr. Nixon's staff in 1958 and who is now a Deputy Director of CIA, was aware of our 5/16/58 letter and its contents. We have no information that CIA ever registered any type of protest in this matter.

3. That CIA technically could raise a question as to violation of the Third Agency Rule as regards our 5/16/58 letter to Mr. Nixon.

The Third Agency Rule is intended to prohibit a Government agency from disseminating information originating with another Government agency in the absence of specific authority to do so, and we follow this rule unless there are overriding reasons. With regard to our letter to Mr. Nixon dated 5/16/58, we set forth information clearly identified as having originated with CIA. This letter was apparently prepared at the specific request of then Vice President Nixon after conferring with the Director.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

DIB

✓
W.C. Sullivan
C.D. DeLoach

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Walters _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

SECRET

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. J. H. Gale
- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HERBERT ITKIN

Item number 33 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent (SA) Sam J. Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses Herbert Itkin as an individual who was operated as a criminal informant by the Bureau who furnished valuable information and who has been a key witness in the prosecution of cases being handled by the Bureau. Mr. Papich states that the Bureau acquired access to Itkin through the CIA and that although the CIA has never officially made any statements to the Bureau, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the agency considered extremely valuable.

Memorandum dated 2/20/63 from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned "James Hoffa" set out that James Angleton of CIA advised SA Papich that CIA had briefed the Attorney General concerning a source whom Mr. Angleton had used since World War II and who subsequently has developed a close association with a lawyer who does considerable work for the Teamsters Unions. Angleton's source was confident that the lawyer could be developed as a penetration which could "sink" Hoffa and all of his cohorts. The Attorney General agreed with the CIA representatives that the matter should be referred to the Bureau for handling.

Mr. Angleton set up the first contact with the individual who had the contact with the attorney and at that time Angleton stated that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects and wanted to step out of the matter as soon as possible. As a result, eventual contact was made with Herbert Itkin who developed into a very productive source. Itkin has been publicly identified as both a source of the FBI and CIA as a result of his testimony.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
HERBERT ITKIN

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The Bureau's success in handling Itkin can be attributed to the know-how of the SAs of the New York Office because Itkin is a highly emotional individual and he had aggravated marital problems, severe pressures from his many business associates; therefore, it took a high degree of skill in dealing with this source in order to achieve the success that we did.

While it is acknowledged that CIA put us originally in touch with this source, it was not believed that it is essential that we go back to CIA and explain to them our success or to thank them for giving us this original lead. It is also noted that there is an obligation upon Government agencies to cooperate in the fullest and CIA's cooperation in this matter was in accordance with the long standing policy among all Government agencies.

Review of Itkin's file does not reflect any instance where CIA indicated a displeasure in the Bureau not acknowledging CIA's assistance in placing us in touch with Itkin. This is in line with Mr. Angleton's statement in 1963 that he did not want to get involved in any investigative aspects of this matter and wanted to step out as soon as possible. In view of the above, it is not believed that CIA would have any basis to complain that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. I. W. Conrad

DATE: March 7, 1970

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. F. J. Cassidy

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Walters _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

Item number 34 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 concerns exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. Papich states CIA exhibited its equipment to us, but for many years we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. He states that CIA never made an official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange was prejudicial to overall intelligence and internal security interests and implied we were more open with the British in this area than with CIA. Papich states this situation does not exist today as there is a good exchange by the Bureau and CIA.

Our files reveal that through the years CIA has furnished the Bureau a number of technical devices for our use or inspection. They have also furnished technical manuals obtained abroad and briefed us on operational and technical aspects of some of their operations abroad. Laboratory personnel have been afforded tours and briefings concerning CIA facilities and equipment and in two instances Bureau personnel have been afforded training at CIA schools. As recently as October, 1969, CIA afforded a briefing to Bureau personnel concerning a Clandestine Transmitter Activator, developed by their technical people and offered to loan us one of these units as well as afford our personnel training in the operation of the equipment.

COMMENTS OF THE LABORATORY

Similarly, Bureau records show substantial reciprocity on the part of the FBI in developing and furnishing important technical information to CIA over a period of many years. Representative examples are cited below:

Prior to 1955 an important unsolved technical intelligence problem involved desired access to enemy intelligence and other security information

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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protected by combination-type locks (safe doors, and the like). Scientists in the FBI Laboratory were able to solve this problem by using X-rays from radioactive materials to "see" into the interior of a combination lock and thus recover the combination, without trace of tampering or other indication that the lock had been compromised. This was a scientific breakthrough of tremendous intelligence potential and, with Bureau approval, our results and techniques were made known to the appropriate CIA representatives. CIA advised that they had theretofore spent thousands of dollars in an intensive, but unsuccessful effort to solve the same problem. The impact of this scientific discovery in permitting access to previously unavailable intelligence had tremendous value for both the FBI and CIA.

In approximately the late 50's and early 60's, both CIA and FBI encountered a new, highly sophisticated type of secret writing placed into use by the Russians for communicating with espionage agents. In spite of a massive technical effort mounted by CIA, scientists of the FBI Laboratory were successful in first unraveling the basic principles and techniques underlying this new Russian system. This important breakthrough thus permitted for the first time a successful attack against the new Russian secret ink communication system. Because of its extreme intelligence potential, with prior Bureau approval, this development was made known to CIA, and its importance to CIA is reflected in part by a letter addressed to the Director of FBI by Allen W. Dulles, then Director of CIA, under date of August 19, 1961, in which Dulles said, in part, "For the past several years there has been increasingly effective technical liaison between the Technical Services Division of this Agency and corresponding components of your Bureau. . ." Dulles further commented that Bureau technical personnel had " . . . made an outstanding technical contribution for which they are to be highly commended. Their work not only has an important impact in one sensitive area, but also has revealed a chemical mechanism from which may well stem new high-level secret writing systems. The discovery will have an

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

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important influence on the discharge of responsibilities assigned both to this Agency and the FBI. I consider access to these findings to be further evidence of the value of close technical liaison between our two organizations. . ."

Subsequently, again with prior Bureau approval, whenever it could be done without jeopardizing FBI operational interests, the FBI on a continuing basis made available to CIA actual Soviet secret writing chemicals and methods of development which had come into the possession of the Bureau through investigative activity and through high-level informants. A recent example involved the Russian espionage case of Herbert William Boeckenhaupt wherein on 2/12/69 a sample of secret writing material used by Boeckenhaupt to communicate with the Russians was furnished to CIA by a representative of the FBI Laboratory.

The above items are representative outstanding examples of FBI cooperation in developing and sharing highly important technical information, and certainly the letter from CIA reflects the satisfaction and importance which CIA attached to such information received from the Bureau. Within general Bureau policy guidelines, there were, of course, on a continuing basis numerous other items of technical information shared with CIA over the years, including briefings and exchange of visits.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

JK

[Signature]

V.

Wes

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 6, 1970

- 1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. H. Atkinson

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS
EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

DECLASSIFIED BY ^{#MORIG} SP-2 ALM/JTG
ON 1-10-01

Items number 35 and 36 in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum March 5, 1970, indicated CIA has never understood why Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at our schools and CIA was unhappy regarding our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field.

CIA by letter May 19, 1950, requested it be permitted to discuss training problems with FBI training staff in view of necessity of its maintaining relations with foreign police and security agencies. Following recommendations by the Executives Conference, Bureau advised CIA by letter May 25, 1950, that we did not believe FBI training staff could intelligently discuss training methods with CIA since our staff was not knowledgeable concerning conditions encountered by CIA in various foreign countries.

Since 1962, we have taken foreign police officers into the National Academy through the Agency for International Development (AID). These officers spent two weeks of orientation with AID and after graduation certain selective officers have been in touch with CIA through AID. We are aware that CIA has used many of these graduates as sources of information.

In 1966, the Director approved a request of CIA to have one of its men attend the National Academy for purpose "to improve capabilities of CIA personnel engaged in overseas police training programs." As a result, a CIA Security Officer graduated from the 77th Session of the FBI National Academy (March 7 - May 25, 1966).

At the specific request of CIA, Bureau representatives have addressed CIA intelligence personnel attending refresher-type training courses on 31 occasions between June, 1962, and December, 1969.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach

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We loaned CIA four Bureau training films in February, 1966, one was eventually returned, but CIA continues to utilize the other three films entitled "On The Record," "Interviews," and "Burglary Investigations." We continue to use foreign language films from CIA which were loaned to us as a supplement to the Bureau's Language Training Program.

Representatives of CIA have not lectured at Bureau training schools and there is no indication in Bureau files that this has been advocated by CIA.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Training Division.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

[Handwritten initials and signatures]

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan

- Tolson _____
- DeLoach _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Casper _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

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DATE: 3/6/70

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. L. M. Linton
- 1 - Mr. E. R. Harrell

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

#MDR16 1-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/JTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the Director by Special Agent Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by Papich to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item by Papich points out CIA belief that more aggressive action should have been taken in field of collecting positive intelligence in the United States. Papich notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when political crises occur in some country. He points out CIA belief that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants and collection of cryptographic material. Papich cites two specific cases occurring in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage, suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delineated to field by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC letter calls for guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA.

Enclosure

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OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States and forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

*Our position is, we may
want to try with some
exchange*

V.

Wel

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DETAILS:

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence in the United States but he notes that there has been no law, directive, or executive order which fixes responsibility for clandestine collection of such information. He notes we investigate subversives, spies, and develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services and that facets of these investigations of violations of United States laws serve to fulfill a counterintelligence objective referred to by us as investigations of internal security matters. Papich notes, however, that most of our work in the positive intelligence field has been restricted to the compliance with requests by State Department prompted usually by a political crisis occurring in some foreign country.

Papich points out CIA feels there is unexplored field for acquiring positive intelligence requiring use of vastly increased technical surveillances, informant development and collection of cryptographic material. According to Papich, CIA does not feel Bureau has moved aggressively in this area and CIA has been thwarted in attempts to do much about the problem. Papich cites two cases (Alfred S. Gonsalves, 10/69 and (s) Zalman Shapiro 10/69) where CIA requests for technical surveillance were declined by us with the suggestion to CIA that these matters should be taken up by that Agency directly with the Attorney General. (s)

Specific Cases

(s) CIA advised that (s) Alfred S. Gonsalves, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Indian United Nations Delegation, had been under development by (s) a Soviet intelligence service partly as a result of his weakness for women when assigned in (s) Moscow (s) from (1957 to 1961) (s) Gonsalves was to participate, in bilateral talks with United States officials in (s) October, 1969. (s) By letter (s) 9/26/69 CIA requested telephone and microphone surveillances on (s) Gonsalves. (s) The Director commented "Let CIA seek the authority of the AG. I don't want them utilizing FBI as their channel." (s)

(s) (s) Zalman M. Shapiro was originally investigated by us in (1965) as a possible unregistered agent of the (s) Israeli Government due to negotiations by him with (s) Israeli officials designed to set up a semiprivate nuclear processing company in (s) Israel. (s)

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Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Our investigation showed close contact by [Shapiro] with [Israeli] officials, [strong] pro-Israel sentiments by Shapiro and details of activity by that subject to create the firm mentioned. (S)
(S) [Shapiro] headed a [Pittsburgh] firm involved in Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) work requiring "Top Secret" clearance by AEC. Our initial investigation was closed when Assistant Attorney General - Internal Security Division found that facts did not justify soliciting [Shapiro's] registration as a foreign agent. (S)

(S) In Spring of 1965, sixty-one kilograms of nuclear material were found to be unaccounted for by the firm headed by [Shapiro] but subsequent inventories and checking by AEC revealed this shortage was probably the result of cumulative process of wasteful production methods over a period of eight years and did not justify an unqualified determination of a diversion of nuclear material on the part of [Shapiro] to unauthorized persons or government. (S)

CIA, in 1968, became alarmed on receipt of information of loss of mentioned nuclear material and despite AEC findings felt it may indicate illegal diversion or at least justification for reopening investigation. Richard Helms of CIA contacted the Attorney General directly with his thoughts regarding the need for additional investigation. Attorney General contacted Bureau requesting it discuss matter with CIA and determine advisability of additional investigation. The Director, in approving conference with CIA, noted "OK but I doubt advisability of getting into this. It looks like Helms is going around us to AG as he suspects we would say no." (S)

(S) An intensive investigation of [Shapiro] conducted during late [1968] and into Fall of [1969] revealed no positive intelligence activity on his part or verifiable diversion of AEC material to [Israeli]. Our investigation included technical surveillances installed 9/27/68 and discontinued 9/4/69. [Shapiro] was interviewed by AEC 8/14/69 and disclaimed passing any classified data to [Israeli Government]. Facts of case were reviewed by Department of Justice which found no evidence of prosecutable violation by [Shapiro]. AEC felt the additional investigation produced no data upon which could be based a legitimate withdrawal of clearance for AEC contracts or information. In view of this, we closed our investigation and CIA was so advised. A 10/13/69 letter from Helms acknowledged additional investigation. (S)

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Mémorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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(S) would produce no legal evidence pertinent to the issue which prompted CIA's original request but noted he felt reinstated audio surveillances of (Shapiro) would produce positive intelligence information. He therefore requested reinstatement of this coverage. The Director's letter to Helms 10/17/69 noted that after careful review it was felt that CIA should take this matter to the Attorney General.

On October 21, 1969, a CIA official was told by Special Agent Papich that in the future CIA should transmit its requests for technical surveillance coverage in the United States to the Attorney General. This specifically covered the cases of (Gonsalves and Shapiro). (S) The Director commented "Right."

Bureau Policy of Cooperation

In 1965 and 1966, recognizing overlapping interests, changes inherent in faster communication, hysteria to facilitate international travel and in response to requests from CIA, the Director approved Bureau attendance at conferences with CIA regarding that Agency's operational activities in the United States. On a memorandum reporting the results of the conferences with CIA, the Director commented "I hope we still don't let our guard down as CIA has always outsmarted us because of our gullibility."

SAC Letter 66-10 (B) dated 2/15/66 furnished to the field and Bureau officials results of the conferences with CIA and emphasized necessity for protecting Bureau jurisdiction in the counterintelligence field. This SAC letter (copy attached) emphasized there is to be no interference with or infringement upon our jurisdiction but clearly shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA in developing positive intelligence in the United States. In approving this SAC letter, the Director noted "I hope there is no 'sneaker' in this. Time will tell."

There has been no renewed request from CIA for technical coverage in the cases mentioned above, nor has there been any indication that such requests have been sent by CIA to the Attorney General as we suggested. Due to CIA interest in the past in these matters, we cannot rule out the possibility the Agency may approach Attorney General for the desired coverage at some time in the future.