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R 1097

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

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DN 2/14/77
BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With respect to Intelligence Activities

The Department of State has no objection to the
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Wednesday, September 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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to the Committee for destruction)

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TESTIMONY OF

Richard N. Bissell

PAGE

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER

Bissell Exhibit No. 1
Bissell Exhibit No. 2
Bissell Exhibit No. 3
Bissell Exhibit No. 4
Bissell Exhibit No. 5
Bissell Exhibit No. 6
Bissell Exhibit No. 7
Bissell Exhibit No. 8

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(Exhibits were retained by counsel.)

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Bissell, will you stand and be sworn.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr Bissell. I do.

Senator Hart of Colorado. The same circumstances apply as applied under your previous experiences before the Committee. You have the right under our rules to have a member of the Committee present at all times if you choose. And you have also your Constitutional right to counsel if you so choose. You do understand?

Mr. Bissell. I understand.

Senator Hart of Colorado. We will be under way now.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily today without counsel?

Mr. Bissell. I am.

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1 Mr. Bissell. I don't happen to remember them, but
2 it seems to me entirely probable that they did. And if he
3 said so I would certainly accept that.

4 Mr. Baron. And would you assume that if such dis-
5 cussions took place they would have taken place in the summer
6 or fall of 1960?

7 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

8 Mr. Baron. Would such discussions have involved planning
9 for an actual assassination mission?

10 Mr. Bissell. Yes, planning for, but not necessarily
11 any authorization to take specific steps to implement such
12 a plan.

13 Mr. Baron. Would planning discussions in the sense
14 that you are using the term included sending instruments of
15 assassination to the Congo?

16 Mr. Bissell. They might have, although again I
17 don't happen to remember that. I am aware, I think, that
18 there is a record that something was said, but I had no
19 recollection that things went that far. But that still could
20 have been included in what I mean by the term "planning and
21 preparing".

22 Mr. Baron. Did you give Mr. Tweedy any specific
23 instruction as to steps he was to take to further a plan
24 to assassinate Lumumba?

25 Mr. Bissell. I may have. I don't remember them. The

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part of it.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall that being so?

Mr. Bissell. I don't specifically recall it. But since I am clear that at least in the case of O'Donnell, and I now presume in the case of Mr. Tweedy, I authorized and indeed directed this planning and preparatory activity. A major part of this would have been a search for ways in which access could be gained.

Mr. Baron. And what kind of access were you looking for at that time?

Mr. Bissell. Obviously I would say the access of an individual who for one reason or another could get close to Lumumba.

Mr. Baron. In the summer and very early fall of 1960 this would have been access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him rather than snatching him from U.N. custody?

Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have been for the purpose really of eliminating him from his then political activities. And that could have been assassination, or it could have involved some form of incapacitation, or it could possibly have been, in your words, snatching him so that he could be put into the custody of what we regarded as friendly authorities.

Mr. Baron. Would you have sought information from the Chief of Station on whether he could gain access to

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1 Lumumba for the purpose of poisoning Lumumba.

2 Mr. Bissell. It could very well have. That was one
3 method of elimination, and that was obviously thought about
4 at the time as part of the planning, and almost certainly
5 we would have been in touch with the Chief of Station to see
6 if he could gain access for that purpose.

7 Mr. Baron. Were you also in touch with the Chief of
8 Station to seek access for the shooting Lumumba?

9 Mr. Bissell. I would guess that really the questions
10 to the Chief of Station would have had to do with gaining access
11 for whatever method -- an access that could be used for
12 whatever method of eliminating Lumumba might be simple,
13 practical and workable. And I doubt if the question would
14 have been a different one, depending on the device or weapon
15 to be used.

16 Mr. Baron. To retrace something you said a moment
17 ago, if Mr. Tweedy had authored cables seeking information
18 from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville about gaining
19 access to Lumumba, you would have approved such cables?

20 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I would most certainly have.

21 Excuse me. Let me elaborate on that.

22 Given the procedures and relationships in effect, I
23 think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from
24 me, would have had the authority to send such a cable without
25 my signing off on it. But in a matter of this sensitivity

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1 or the very first days in September, he received a cable from
2 CIA headquarters to the effect that a messenger will come
3 to the Congo who you will recognize, and who will bring in-
4 structions which you are to carry out.

5 Did you send such a cable to the Chief of Station?
6 Mr. Bissell. I could have.

7 But I have perhaps a peculiar reason for questioning
8 whether in this particular case I did. And my reason is
9 the following.

10 You will notice that the cable you have just shown me
11 that was sent out by the Director of Central Intelligence in
12 late August, the cable was released by his initials. And
13 it bears the notification that the only other distribution
14 was to be to Mr. Helms, who was then, you will remember,
15 Deputy -- my deputy.

16 Now, it is virtually inconceivable to me, given my
17 knowledge of and involvement in this operation, that the
18 Director would have sent a cable, denied circulation to me
19 and had it circulated to Mr. Helms, if I had been in
20 Washington. And I suspect that we could establish on the
21 record that I was on vacation when the message you have shown
22 me was sent.

23 Mr. Wides. That was in early August?

24 Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit No. 1 for
25 this session the document that you are referring to, which

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1 is a cable dated August 26, 1960, from Allen W. Dulles to
2 Leopoldville. And this cable includes the paragraph:

3 "In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion
4 that if LLL continues to hold high office inevitable result
5 will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist
6 takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the
7 prestige of the U.N. and for the interest of the free world
8 generally. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must
9 be an urgent and prime objective, and that under existing
10 conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action."

(The document referred to was
11 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 1
12 for identification.)
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1 had such discussions with him I would have been asking him to
2 give thought to ways and means.

3 Mr. Baron. And you were asking Mr. Gottlieb, then,
4 to think about the technical means by which an assassination
5 could be carried out?

6 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

7 Mr. Wides. That is an assumption that you were, or
8 can you recall now?

9 Mr. Bissell. No, it is an assumption -- it is an in-
10 ference, if you like, from the circumstances. I think it is
11 quite likely that I would have had such discussions with him
12 assuming, as I believe to be true, that he was the science
13 advisor at that time.

14 Mr. Wides. But you have no recollection?

15 Mr. Bissell. No.

16 Senator Hart of Colorado. Excuse me, Mr. Baron.

17 I am going to have to go to vote, and I would just
18 like the record to reflect your acquiescence that there is
19 no committee member here if in fact that is the case.

20 Mr. Bissell. I do so acquiesce, and I am happy to
21 continue.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. With that understanding
23 you are willing to continue?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

25 Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much.

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1 advisor, did he take frequent trips abroad?

2 Mr. Bissell. I would say infrequent. It seemed to me
3 there were one or two others.

4 Mr. Wides. Would these trips be involved with
5 highly sensitive operations as distinct from scientific
6 evaluation?

7 Mr. Bissell. I believe that for the most part they
8 would not have been involved with highly sensitive specific
9 operations, but rather would have involved consultation with
10 people in the field on the effectiveness of devices, tech-
11 niques, procedures, underdevelopment in the Technical
12 Services Division.

13 Mr. Wides. And given the unusual of his going to the
14 Congo if he did in connection with clandestine operations
15 there, you would have no recollection of that today?

16 Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection of that
17 today, no. This is the first time I realized, since many
18 years ago, that he had made such a trip.

19 Mr. Baron. Would he also have been aware that he
20 had made such a trip?

21 Mr. Bissell. Well, the Chief of Station obviously,
22 Bronson Tweedy, obviously. Quite probably the Director,
23 but not certainly. And several others. I assume that Mr.
24 Helms would have known about it at the time, because there
25 would have been some kind of cable traffic, and I strongly

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1 suspect that Cornelius Roosevelt would have known
2 about it.

3 Mr. Baron. Did Mr. Gottlieb's trip have anything to do
4 with the assassination of Lumumba?

5 Mr. Bissell. I don't know, since I don't remember the
6 circumstances, I really can't say.

7 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that Mr. Gottlieb's trip
8 have had something to do with the assassination of Lumumba?

9 Mr. Bissell. I think it might very well.

10 Mr. Baron. And again we are talking about the plot
11 to assassinate Lumumba rather than Lumumba's ultimate demise?

12 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

13 Mr. Baron. If Mr. Gottlieb's visit related to the plot
14 to assassinate Lumumba, would such a sensitive operation
15 have been made known to Bronson Tweedy?

16 Mr. Bissell. I believe so, specially in the light
17 of the fact that apparently this possibility had been dis-
18 cussed with Bronson Tweedy more than once.

19 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that Bronson Tweedy would
20 have been cut out of the actual mounting of an assassination
21 operation despite the fact that the feasibility of an
22 assassination had been discussed with him?

23 Mr. Bissell. Yes, it is possible.

24 Mr. Baron. Was that the case?

25 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember. But if you ask me to

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1 not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also
2 as reason for at least postponing anything further along that
3 line.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Who had knowledge within the Agency of your
5 assignment to O'Donnell and its true purpose.

6 Mr. Bissell. I would guess that --

7 Mr. Schwarz. Not guess, who did?

8 Mr. Bissell. I don't know. What I was going to say is
9 that I think the Director did.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Guess, think, don't know. You have got to
11 have a basis, Mr. Bissell, for testifying to something.

12 Mr. Bissell. All right.

13 The basis is, as has been in so much of my testimony,
14 how business was conducted within the Agency at that time.
15 There had been, as the Exhibit 1 cable suggests, there had
16 already been consideration at high levels in the Agency and
17 elsewhere of the elimination of Lumumba. Obviously I had
18 been involved in conversations with the Director on that sub-
19 ject. Given the way business was conducted, I would infer that
20 I would have told the Director of my assignment to O'Donnell.

21 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, you are telling us that
22 you don't remember this, is that correct?

23 Mr. Bissell. That is right.

24 Mr. diGenoya. You have seen this Exhibit No. 1 which
25 says:

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1 "In high quarters here it is the clearcut conclusion
2 that if LLL continues to hold high office inevitable result
3 will be chaos".

4 And then it goes on and says:

5 "Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an
6 urgent prime objective and that under existing conditions
7 this could be a high priority covert action".

8 That is dated August 26, 1960, signed, according to your
9 identification of his signature, by Mr. Dulles personally.
10 And it follows by one day a meeting in the White House of the
11 Special Group attended by the President of the U.S., where
12 Dulles said he would proceed --

13 Mr. Baron. I don't think this meeting was attended by
14 the President.

15 Mr. diGenova. Excuse me, attended by Mr. Dulles --
16 where he said he would proceed as vigorously as the situation
17 permitted. And it was agreed that the planning for the
18 Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any
19 particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting
20 rid of Lumumba.

21 Does that in any way refresh your recollection about
22 what was happening at that time?

23 Do you remember anything independently of what Mr.
24 Dulles was talking to you about? We had trouble areas in the
25 world, including Cuba, and the African Continent in particular.

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1 Does that refresh your recollection in any way
2 independently?

3 Mr. Bissell. Well, my recollection, I think, is
4 pretty clear about the atmosphere at the time. And I think
5 it is quite eloquently described in the cable which you
6 have just quoted. And I have already said that I think
7 probably, from the evidence of the format of that document,
8 I was absent from Washington at the time when it was sent.
9 But I certainly would have seen that when I returned, and
10 it certainly would have been the subject of conversation
11 between Dulles and myself. It is for that reason that I
12 draw the inference that Justin O'Donnell's assignment would
13 have been reported by me to Allen Dulles.

14 Mr. diGenova. But you personally don't remember
15 discussing this with Mr. Dulles?

16 Mr. Bissell. No.

17 Mr. diGenova. You conclude now that you must have be-
18 cause of the physical evidence?

19 Mr. Bissell. Could I just interrupt for a moment to
20 say, I used to see Mr. Dulles almost daily during these years.
21 It was rare that we would meet without touching on perhaps
22 several on-going operations or plans or prospects. And this,
23 over a period of several years. It is not, I think surpris-
24 ing that rarely have I been able in the course of my testi-
25 mony to say, I specifically remember a particular meeting, and

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even roughly what was said of it.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, that is somewhat important, obviously, because the idea is to try, if possible, to establish what the precise facts were.

Now, I am sure you don't mean to say that the assassination of a foreign leader blurs into the everyday activity of the Agency because it was so commonplace -- or is that what you mean to say?

Mr. Bissell. No, I don't. But I do mean to say that, the Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating his political influence. And a conversation about this particular facet of what was a many-sided attack on the problem doesn't stand out in my mind.

Mr. diGenova. What you are saying, then, is the details of any specific day or meeting or cable you don't recollect, but you don't have any trouble recollecting the fact that the assassination of Lumumba, among others, was part of a strategy at that time, if needed?

Mr. Bissell. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And that was part of a strategy at the level of the National Security Council as well as within the Agency?

Mr. Bissell. I believe that the language quoted would

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1 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

2 Mr. Baron. "Mr. Gray commented that his associates
3 had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for
4 very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered
5 whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish
6 this.

7 "Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments re-
8 ferred to seriously, and had every intention of proceeding as
9 vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that
10 he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpret-
11 ing instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity
12 and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the
13 Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any
14 particular kind of activity which might contribute to
15 getting rid of Lumumba".

16 Then the next day after this meeting Mr. Dulles
17 sends out the telegram or the cable that we have already
18 discussed.

19 Mr. Bissell. Right.

20 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that Mr. Dulles' cable,
21 which was sent to Leopoldville, was a direct outgrowth of
22 this meeting that he had attended the previous day?

23 Mr. Bissell. Obviously, sir.

24 Mr. Dawson. Do you know?

25 Mr. Bissell. I think there is no question on the

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1 Mr. Baron. And in effect the Director is being told
2 that by the President?

3 Mr. Bissell. Right.

4 Mr. Baron. Through his representative?

5 Mr. Bissell. Right.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President
7 Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?

8 Mr. Bissell. I am sure he didn't.

9 Mr. Smothers. Did he ever tell you even circum-
10 locutiously through this kind of cable?

11 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.

12 Mr. Smothers. Was this a thing that was clearly under-
13 stood here by everyone? What was that in your experience with
14 the Agency that had prepared you to understand this kind of
15 coded dialogue, if you will? Was assassination something
16 that was discussed fairly often?

17 Mr. Bissell. No, I would say really very infrequently,
18 very infrequently even discussed, let alone attempted.
19 But I submit that the language just quoted from the minutes
20 of the Special Group was not language internal to the Agency,
21 it was language from a Cabinet level committee.

22 You may remember another document that was offered earlier
23 in my testimony which was again minutes of a Special Group
24 meeting, and it quoted Livingston Merchant, the State Depart-
25 ment representative, again asking if there was no way to get

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1 rid of the Castro leadership in that case. I am sure you
2 remember that document.

3 Now, when senior political officers meet in a Cabinet
4 Committee, especially when some kind of a record is being
5 kept, they do talk around a subject of that kind. But it
6 doesn't mean that it is obscure or not understood by anyone
7 there. I believe in both of these cases it is perfectly
8 clear -- in the first Livingston Merchant case it is clear that
9 he was raising a question as to whether physically getting
10 rid of these people was possible, and in the second case, the
11 one just quoted here, it seems to me that -- if you like to
12 call it that -- the consensus of the Special Group was that
13 "no means should be excluded in the effort to get rid of
14 Lumumba".

15 And that, I repeat, is not CIA language. If it is
16 gobbledegook it is on a good high level.

17 Mr. Dawson. Is Mr. Gray in this cable or memorandum
18 for the Special Group on August 25, 1960, conveying the feeling
19 of his associate, which we have identified clearly as
20 President Eisenhower?

21 Mr. Baron. Moving back now to the testimony of the
22 Chief of Station who was in Leopoldville in 1960, he said
23 that shortly after he received this cable that a messenger
24 would come whom he would recognize and who would give him
25 instructions to carry out. He received a visit from Mr.

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1 Gottlieb. And we have discussed that visit. He then goes
2 on to testify that Dr. Gottlieb gave to him, or told him that
3 he would very shortly thereafter receive, some lethal biologi-
4 cal substances, and the tools for administering those sub-
5 stances, namely, a syringe, gauze masks, and rubber gloves.
6 Were such lethal biological substances sent down to the
7 Congo?

8 Mr. Bissell. I don't know. I assume the record shows
9 one way or the other. I don't have a recollection of that.
10 I was really rather surprised on the occasion of
11 the earlier testimony to have it reported that they had been
12 sent.

13 Mr. Baron. Would you assume now, hearing this testimony,
14 that indeed such substances were sent to the Congo?

15 Mr. Bissell. I think what you have told me, repeating
16 the evidence of the Station Chief, that Dr. Gottlieb told
17 him to expect that, is that correct?

18 Mr. Wides. The testimony is that the materials were
19 brought by Dr. Gottlieb or essentially arrived while he was
20 there, and that he went over their use with the Station Chief.
21 That doesn't refresh your recollection at all with regard --

22 Mr. Bissell. No, it doesn't. But I am sure if the
23 Station Chief so testified it is correct, there is nothing
24 in mind that I remember that would be in conflict with that.

25 Mr. Baron. It would not have been against the policy

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Mr. Dawson. And the purpose for these stockpiles would have been --

Mr. Bissell. In case there was a sudden need for their use, so that there would not be a logistic problem.

Mr. Dawson. To use for what? To kill people?

Mr. Bissell. I suppose so, if they were truly lethal agents.

Mr. Wides. You say you suspect so.

Do you have any recollection that you were at the time aware of such stockpiles abroad?

Mr. Bissell. If there were I am sure I was aware of it, and I seem to remember that in the two biggest overseas stations there were one or two or three staff members who in effect represented the Technical Services Division. I could be wrong on this, but that, for what it is worth, is my recollection of the organizational pattern.

Now, to come back to your question again, however, it would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit, if you like, of this sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along.

Mr. Wides. Is it fair to say, then, that your dichotomy between planning and your use of the term implementation would mean that if -- let us take a different example -- a sniper rifle and special bullets were sent

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1 to the city where they were to be used, and there was re-
2 conaissance, and every step necessary to actually carry out
3 the execution, that the implementation as far as your use
4 of the material would not start until someone actually picked
5 up the rifle and pointed it at him?

6 Mr. Bissell. Let me try to sharpen it by reference,
7 if my memory serves, to the Dominican Republic. It is there,
8 if I remember, that submachine guns were sent down to the
9 Station by CIA. The State Department never authorized the
10 release of those to the anti-Trujillo plotters. And I
11 believe they never were released.

12 Now, in that case, to take that example, I would say
13 that implementation would have started at the moment that you
14 turned those over and they passed out of our control. I
15 would say that as long as any weapon of any kind remained
16 securely within the Agency's control, that you were still
17 short of what I would call --

18 Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't that turn on the nature
19 of the order to the Agency personnel who has them?

20 Mr. Bissell. It does, right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. In the Lumumba case, was the AGENCY
22 person who had the lethal agents authorized to use them to
23 kill Lumumba?

24 Mr. Bissell. To that question I do not know the answer.
25 Clearly the Station Chief had been not only authorized but

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1 encouraged, as we have developed -- as you have developed --
2 in this testimony to seek out individuals who might have
3 close access to Lumumba for the purpose of hostile action
4 against him. Clearly the Station Chief was then sent, or
5 a kit was then brought out to him and put in his possession,
6 presumably so that if and when an individual with suitable
7 access and other appropriate circumstances materialized and
8 authorization was given, if it was still required, the
9 operation could proceed.

10 Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection
11 on that one point, whether authorization had been given.
12 The Chief of Station testified that when Sidney Gottlieb
13 gave him poison or instructions in the use of poison, he
14 also made it very clear that these were for the purpose of
15 assassinating Lumumba, and that he should proceed to carry
16 out the assassination of Lumumba if it were possible, that the
17 use of poison was not a sine qua non to the assassination,
18 if he could find another way to do it, that would be fine,
19 but that it was clear that he was to proceed with an assassination
20 operation if he could find a way to do it successfully.

21 Mr. Bissell. Accepting that testimony, then, the
22 authorization was given.

23 Mr. Schwarz. But we are dealing with your testimony,
24 Mr. Bissell. WE have his testimony, and your comments on his
25 testimony doesn't add much to the record.

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1 setting it forth in as many words, with you this would have
2 been identified with a project name by this time, and it is
3 most unusual that even with a highly sensitive project that
4 the nature is known to very few, probably only to the Station
5 Chief itself.

6 What I would have expected is an authorizing cable saying,
7 implement project such and such.

8 Mr. Schwarz. But in the normal course of CIA
9 assassination activity, if I may use that term --

10 Mr. Bissell. In the abnormal course.

11 Mr. Schwarz. -- you would have been instructed by
12 Mr. Dulles to do something?

13 Mr. Bissell. Instructed or authorized.

14 Mr. Schwarz. And then you would have spoken to or
15 cabled some other officer?

16 Mr. Bissell. Correct. And knowing Mr. Gottlieb,
17 it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted
18 beyond his instructions.

19 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station, to be fair to his
20 testimony, indicated that he was greatly surprised when he
21 received such instructions, and he was doubtful about the
22 practicality of pulling off such an operation, at the
23 least he was convinced it would be difficult. But he did
24 say -- he added that as a fairly junior Chief of Station he
25 might have checked back before he could have mounted such an

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1 operation. But he added that he believed the assassination
2 was expected of him, and he left Mr. Gottlieb with the im-
3 pression that he would proceed to try to perform such a mission.

4 Mr. Wides. He also cabled.

5 Mr. Baron. Now, the next step that the Chief of
6 Station took after Mr. Gottlieb departed from the Congo,
7 according to his testimony, was to cable to headquarters
8 for confirmation of such an extraordinary mission.

9 Did you receive such a cable from Leopoldville?

10 Mr. Bissell. The record would have to show that. I
11 don't remember it.

12 Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station also testified that
13 he shortly thereafter received confirmation back in cryptic
14 fashion to the effect that he was to proceed with the in-
15 structions to carry out the instructions he had been given.

16 Did you sent such confirmation to him?

17 Mr. Bissell. I assume so, if the cable went out.

18 Mr. Baron. And that confirmation would have come
19 from yourself directly as opposed to Bronson Tweedy or anyone
20 else in the African Division?

21 Mr. Bissell. Probably.

22 But again, if you have that cable, the initials would
23 show who signed off on it, and so on.

24 Mr. Schwarz. These cables have not been found.

25 Mr. diGenova. The Committee is making an effort to find

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1 them, and the Agency has not been able to produce them yet.

2 Mr. Bissell. If it is any help for me to say, this
3 sounds highly likely as an account if it is established, as
4 evidence seems to have established, that Dr. Gottlieb brought
5 such instructions, I would expect the Station to seek con-
6 firmation. And I would expect, given the background, that
7 that confirmation would have been forthcoming. And I would
8 also be almost certain that I would have signed off on such
9 a cable, or signed such a cable, initialled it, even if it
10 had been going to Mr. Dulles for final approval.

11 Mr. Baron. These events occurred in early September,
12 which was prior to your conversations with Justin O'Donnell
13 about the assassination of Lumumba?

14 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

15 Mr. Baron. So at that point an assassination mission
16 had in effect been mounted in the Congo?

17 Mr. Bissell. Right.

18 Mr. Baron. After you spoke with Justin O'Donnell,
19 did you send a cable to Leopoldville to stand down the
20 assassination mission?

21 Mr. Bissell. Again, I would have to go back to the
22 record.

23 Mr. Wides. Was it your testimony earlier that you
24 have no recollection of discussing with Mr. Gottlieb the
25 possible assassination of Lumumba?

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1 Mr. Bissell. I thought I testified earlier this
2 afternoon that I might well have discussed it with him, but
3 I don't have a specific recollection.

4 Mr. Wides. Let me read you an excerpt from your testi-
5 mony on June 11, where Mr. Schwarz was asking you about your
6 conversation with Mr. O'Donnell, and your request that he
7 investigate, in your words, the possibility of assassinating
8 Lumumba. And then on page 54 -- we should mark this --

9 Mr. Schwarz. Just read it in.

10 Mr. Wides. "Did you tell him this in connection with
11 making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?"

12 "Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did."

13 Was that a recollection at that time that you had
14 sent O'Donnell to see Dr. Gottlieb?

15 Mr. Bissell. No, I think that comes in the category
16 of inference rather than recollection, because I don't re-
17 member specifically telling Dr. Gottlieb.

18 Mr. Wides. Or speaking to Dr. Gottlieb, explaining
19 the possible means to O'Donnell?

20 Mr. Bissell. I don't recollect it.

21 Mr. Baron. In the testimony of the Chief of Station
22 in Leopoldville he said that during his visit with Dr.
23 Gottlieb, as I have related, he was extremely surprised when
24 he received these instructions. And the instructions were
25 so specific that he wanted to be very sure that the authoriza-

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1 a representation that the President of the U.S. had authorized
2 the assassination of Lumumba?

3 Mr. Bissell. I can't answer that question. But what
4 probably occurred was --

5 Mr. Dawson. Wait a minute. Let's not do it that way.
6 Is there any doubt that you would have undertaken --
7 assuming that you did so instruct Mr. Gottlieb to carry this
8 poison into the Congo -- that you would have done this with-
9 out Mr. Dulles' authority?

10 Mr. Bissell. There was no possibility.

11 Mr. Dawson. Is there any doubt in your mind that you
12 would have then assumed that Dulles had received the
13 President's okay to do so?

14 Mr. Bissell. Well, I might well have believed that the
15 Director was proceeding under the mandate of the Special
16 Group as reported in the minutes of the meeting.

17 Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Gottlieb anything about
18 President Eisenhower?

19 Mr. Bissell. I probably did, but I don't remember.

20 Mr. Schwarz. Did Dulles tell you anything about
21 President Eisenhower?

22 Mr. Bissell. He almost certainly would have told
23 me a good deal about that meeting.

24 Mr. Schwarz. By that meeting --

25 Mr. Bissell. The Special Group meeting.

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1 I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have
2 said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me.
3 I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest
4 quarters, and I would have known what he meant.

5 Mr. Baron. And you have communicated that to Mr.
6 Gottlieb?

7 Mr. Bissell. I could very easily.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Is all of that line that we have just
9 went through could and would and might, and inference, or
10 is any of that recollection?

11 Mr. Bissell. I am afraid it has to be described as
12 inference.

13 Mr. diGenova. But you didn't make up the minutes of
14 the Special Group meeting on August 25 and you didn't make up
15 the cable which Mr. Dulles signed either, did you?

16 Mr. Bissell. No.

17 Mr. diGenova. So that was actually sent out, wasn't
18 it?

19 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

20 Mr. diGenova. And Mr. Dulles wasn't one who used
21 highest quarters, was he?

22 Mr. Bissell. Yes -- and also the minutes of the
23 Special Group referred to Mr. Gray's associate.

24 Mr. Wides. And your testimony a moment ago in response
25 to Mr. Dawson's question was, even though this fell within

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what you regarded as the planning stage, this meaning if it occurred, Dr. Gottlieb taking the poison to the Congo, that you would not have taken that step without the approval of the Director, was that your testimony?

Mr. Bissell. What I will now say at any rate is that the mere act of taking the kit to the Congo I would classify as still in the planning stage. But if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions "to implement", I would say that we had then passed into an implementation phase.

Mr. Wides. Let me read to you from your testimony on June 11, and then ask you a question based on that.

On page 54 Mr. Schwarz said:

"Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?"

And you said: "No one".

And then Mr. Schwarz:

"Did you inform the White House of that?"

"No."

"To the best of your knowledge did anybody inform the White House of that?"

"Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.

"Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lumumba?

"Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I

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1 to Mr. O'Donnell?

2 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

3 And it is my recollection, as I have testified in
4 part earlier this afternoon, that when O'Donnell came later
5 and declined the assignment and expressed the view that this
6 was not the way to solve the problem, that I shut off the
7 O'Donnell operation completely.

8 Mr. Wides. Let me go back to that if I can. Mr.
9 O'Donnell's testimony, which I believe we went over with you
10 when you testified, we might ask you to see now if you have
11 any different recollection.

12 In essence it is the following: that you called
13 him in and asked him to go to the Congo for the purposes
14 of trying to see if Lumumba could be assassinated, that
15 very evening you asked him, right at that moment, and it was
16 toward the end of the day, as he recalled it, you asked him
17 to see Dr. Gottlieb; that he expressed reservation about
18 assassination, but did go down to see Dr. Gottlieb. And
19 Dr. Gottlieb discussed with him several lethal means, and he
20 immediately came back to your office and said, I won't
21 do it, and raised legal questions, moral questions --

22 Mr. Dawson. I don't think he testified that he imme-
23 diately came back.

24 Mr. Schwarz. The same day.

25 Mr. Wides. Same day -- and that he then went next

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door, as I say, and discussed it with Mr. Helms.

This is Mr. O'Donnell's testimony.

Mr. O'Donnell further testified that he told you he would be willing to go to the Congo to explore the possibility of neutralizing him in other ways, and that shortly thereafter in the space of a few days went to the Congo. And I believe the record suggests that he was there from October through December, and that while he was looking into the possibility of trying to get Lumumba out of the property away from effective custody of the U.N. with the thought that if the Central Congolese Government obtain control of him, they might try him for capital crimes, and this might result in his physical removal. And this was mooted by Lumumba's escape and recapture and death, and he then came back.

Is it still your recollection that there was a period of several weeks between the time you broached the subject of an assassination and the time that Mr. O'Donnell expressed his opposition to it?

Mr. Bissell. I shouldn't be firm on the several weeks. But my recollection of the course of events differs in, I think, only one -- or is inconsistent with his recollection as you reported it in only the one respect, that the impression I carried away was that at a minimum some days -- and I had thought a period of at least a week elapsed between my giving him the assignment and his coming back to decline

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1 the assignment and recommend a different approach. What
2 you further quote from his testimony I had not remembered, but
3 it does now seem to me that I do remember -- part of my
4 original recollection was that when he came back to me I have
5 several times used the phrase, this was not the way to deal
6 with the problem of Lumumba. And that is wholly consistent
7 with his having proposed other means of neutralizing Lumumba
8 short of using physical violence on him directly. I do seem
9 to recollect that.

10 And although I had not remembered it, I do now seem to
11 recollect that he went out there and with the assignment,
12 most of it in his recollection rather than mine, of looking
13 at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba. But my recollection
14 simply differs from his on the matters of the timing and how
15 soon he came back.

16 Mr. Wides. Do you recall when you proposed to Mr.
17 Harvey, in what I think we concluded was most probably very
18 early 1961, that he explore executive action capability,
19 and that two people who had been cut in in some way on earlier
20 considerations or explorations of assassination, and two
21 people whom therefore he might discuss this with, were Mr.

22 ⁰³
~~Arnold Silver~~ and Sidney Gottlieb?

23 Mr. Bissell. I can't say honestly that I recollect
24 that. But especially with respect to Gottlieb, this would
25 have been absolutely -- I am reasonably sure that is what

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I would have done.

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall suggesting -- or if he brought it up, approving -- his discussing it with them, in part from a security angle, because Mr. Gottlieb had already been cut in, so to speak, with regard to prior considerations of assassination possibilities?

Mr. Bissell. Well, I am sorry to have to retreat the inference. I think I would have encouraged him to talk to them myself. And I don't think I would have particularly worried at that point about the security implications.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall why you would have encouraged him or suggested that he speak to Arnold Silver OS

Mr. Bissell. No, unless Arnold Silver had had some connection with this operation. And I don't remember what the circumstances were.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall an agent who went by the cryptonym of QJWINN that I believe we discussed in your earlier testimony?

Mr. Bissell. I dimly remember that there was such, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that he worked for O'Donnell in the Congo and was sent there by Arnold Silver who had recruited him in Europe? OS

Mr. Bissell. I didn't recollect that.

Mr. Wides. Does it ring a bell of any sort?

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1 Mr. Bissell. Well, there was an agent recruited in
2 Europe who was used against the Lumumba faction in the
3 Congo.

4 Now, the agent I have in mind, he was extremely success-
5 ful. He made a deep penetration of not only the Lumumba
6 sympathizers, but also of those individuals physically lo-
7 cated in Europe who were supplying Lumumba with money, and in
8 some cases giving him logistic support. This agent was ob-
9 viously engaged in an extremely hazardous business, because
10 if his cover had been blown he certainly would have been,
11 I think, killed.

12 Now, this may be the agent in question. I do not
13 remember that agent ever being put under O'Donnell's control.
14 But if O'Donnell was given the assignment to find ways of
15 neutralizing Lumumba, given that assignment to O'Donnell
16 when he went out there, it is very possible that this
17 agent would have been put in touch with him.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Why did you pick O'Donnell, incidentally,
19 for the initial assignment, the part that was killing him,
20 as opposed to other methods of neutralizing him?

21 Mr. Bissell. My recollection is that I regarded him
22 as highly competent in the craft, I think correctly. I
23 regarded him, I think incorrectly as the events turned out,
24 as a very tough guy in the sense this guy Harvey had, that
25 such reputation, and I think with hindsight deserved it.

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1 memo on November 2, 1960, sent by William Harvey in his
2 capacity as Chief of Staff D to Arnold Silver with a copy
3 going to Bronson Tweedy that describes QJWINN, and talks at
4 great length about his mission in the Congo, without pin-
5 pointing it. The memo talks about the fact that it is an
6 extremely sensitive operation, and that QJWINN himself wouldn't
7 be told the purpose of it before he is sent down there.

8 Does that refresh your recollection about his mission?

9 Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

10 Mr. Baron. If there were a mission in the Congo at
11 that point for Staff D purposes, what would that mission have
12 been?

13 Mr. Bissell. The Staff D was concerned with communications
14 intelligence, as you know. And I would surmise that a Staff
15 D connected mission in the Congo would have involved
16 planting means of listening to conversation or traffic or in
17 some other way intercepting communications. That is the
18 competence of Staff D and its responsibility.

19 Mr. Baron. Planting by means of surreptitious entry
20 or by other means?

21 Mr. Bissell. Yes, although Staff D wasn't concerned
22 with bugging people's rooms or this kind of thing. It is
23 concerned with true communications intelligence, or it was
24 at that time.

25 Mr. Baron. If you had informed William Harvey at the

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1 point when executive action was being sent up that ~~Arnold~~ ~~Stu-~~
2 ~~Veri~~ was already cut in on the discussions of an assassination
3 capability, would you assume that that referred to ~~Arnold~~
4 ~~Silver's~~ supervision of QJWINN.

5 Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have. It sounds that
6 way.

7 Mr. Baron: When you told Harvey that Gottlieb had
8 already been cut in on the discussions of an assassination
9 capability, fit that refer back to Gottlieb's activities in
10 reference to the Congo?

11 Mr. Bissell. Well, it probably referred to those -- and
12 perhaps to earlier discussions or more generalized discussions
13 with Gottlieb in his capacity as science advisor, and there-
14 fore someone who would be knowledgeable of weapons of various
15 kinds.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Did you have such discussions with him?

17 Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

18 Mr. Schwarz. And that, now, is a recollection, I
19 take it from the way you are speaking?

20 Mr. Bissell. It is closer to that than most
21 of what I have to say.

22 Mr. schwarz. What is your recollection of the dis-
23 cussion with Gottlieb?

24 Mr. Bissell. Over a considerable period of months
25 when he was in that capacity --

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Mr. Schwarz. Which started when?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. 1960?

Mr. Bissell. I think it was 1960. And the back-ground, as I am sure the record shows, was that Dr. Gottlieb had been in TSD, and he had then gone for a tour of duty, I believe, to 15-21 where he continued in the same kind of work. But he had a much closer connection with espionage operations and counter espionage in the field. When I brought him back his mission in effect was a very broad one, it really was to find ways and means -- to concentrate on technical ways and means, meaning by technical within the general area of the physical and biological sciences, of improving the effectiveness of all kinds of covert operations.

Now, in a sense that was the mission of the Technical Services Division itself. But Gottlieb's role was to pay special attention to the interconnections between the technical people in TSD and the operators in the rest of the clandestine service, and to find out whether the technical requirements that TSD was striving to meet were appropriate, in other words, did they really know what the operators needed and wanted, and also to find out if the operators knew what TSD had available. It was that kind of a thing.

Now, I had many conversations with him on that, because this was a success that interested me a great deal. And I

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1 had great respect for his judgment. And especially given
2 this Congo involvement, I certainly would have discussed with
3 him, probably on a number of occasions, the availability of
4 means of incapacitation, including assassination.

5 .Mr. Schwarz. And those discussions are prior to your
6 Harvey assignment?

7 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I believe so -- yes, they would
8 have.

9 Mr. Schwarz. Would have been or were?

10 Mr. Bissell. Well, Harvey's assignment wasn't until
11 January of 1961, so they obviously were.

12 Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, with regard to the earlier
13 discussion with your sense of authorization, you said that
14 you do recall the discussions with O'Donnell, and that although
15 you can't remember specific discussions with Tweedy, in
16 general you recall that you were looking into the possibility
17 of exploring and planning the possible assassination of
18 Lumumba?

19 Mr. Bissell. Right.

20 Mr. Wides. In the light of the documents from the
21 group and Mr. Dulles' cable that have been read, do you have
22 any recollection now wheher you thought at your level you
23 had sufficient authority that even though you had not done
24 so you could direct people below you to carry from the
25 planning stage into the implementation stage an assassination

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1 of Lumumba at that time?

2 Mr. Bissell. I probably so believed. I think, how-
3 ever, given the context, it is very unlikely that I would
4 have taken such a step without clearing it with Allen Dulles.

5 Mr. Wides. You say you probably so believe. Is
6 that based at all on a recollection, or simply inference?

7 Mr. Bissell. It is the way my mind worked then, and
8 probably still does. You are asking me a question about whe-
9 ther I believed I had authority?

10 Mr. Wides. Yes.

11 Mr. Bissell. A good many years ago, and I am saying
12 that given the evidence here and the background as it has
13 been developed here this afternoon, it is my recollection that
14 given the way my mind works, I probably did think I had
15 authority.

16 But it is also very unlikely.

17 Mr. Schwarz. There are two parts of your answer which
18 were at war with each other. On the one hand you say, based
19 upon having seen some Special Group minutes and a cable,
20 both of which say in effect that killing should not be ruled
21 out as a matter of consideration --

22 Mr. Bissell. Right.

23 Mr. Schwarz. On the one hand you say that based upon
24 those two items, you probably believe you had authority to
25 order action?

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1 Mr. Bissell. Right.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Move from contemplation to action or
3 consideration of action?

4 Mr. Bissell. Right.

5 Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand you say, well, yes,
6 although I probably believed that, on the other hand I
7 probably spoke to Mr. Dulles about it, or would have spoken
8 to Mr. Dulles about it.

9 Mr. Bissell. You will recognize that here again I am
10 talking about the pattern of my relationship with him and the
11 way the Agency worked.

12 Now, here was a matter in which the authorization, such
13 as it was, had come down clearly from the Special Group to
14 Mr. Dulles personally.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, we are talking about the exhibits
16 which show an authorization -- assuming you read the words
17 as meaning killing --

18 Mr. Bissell. Not excluding, yes.

19 Mr. Schwarz. -- an authorization to consider that.

20 Mr. Bissell. Right.

21 Mr. Schwarz. And that had come down?

22 Mr. Bissell. It had come down to me via Allen
23 Dulles, and in terms that Allen was in effect being strongly
24 encouraged to pursue the course of action outlined in the
25 exhibit. I think under these circumstances that I would have

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1 gone back to him with, for instance, any cable of authoriza-
2 tion or other instruction before sending it out even if I
3 did believe him.

4 But let us say in his absence from Washington I had the
5 authority to send.

6 Mr. Dawson. You say unlike the case of the White House
7 where you would not take details back, in the case of Mr.
8 Dulles you would discuss the details of a specific operation?

9 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

10 Mr. Schwarz. But it is not really a matter of details,
11 Mr. Bissell. That is an important distinction. We have
12 been talking about a chain that starts with two memos, or three
13 memos. We have talked about contemplation or consideration,
14 don't rule out killing, it doesn't use the word killing, but
15 it could be read to mean killing, don't rule out killing from
16 the items to be considered.

17 Now, moving from doing it is not a detail, is it?

18 Mr. Bissell. No, I wouldn't call it a detail by any
19 manner of means, but I would read that language as authorizing
20 any decision by the Director or the Director's authority.

21 Mr. Schwarz. You would read the language of the two
22 exhibits, one of which comes from the Administration
23 and one of which is the Director cable --

24 Mr. Bissell. Right.

25 Mr. Schwarz. You would read the language of the Special

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1 Group minutes --

2 Mr. Baron. Of August 25, 1960.

3 Mr. Bissell. Right.

4 Mr. Schwarz. May I see that?

5 After talking about extremely strong feelings, straight-
6 forward action, and Dulles commenting on taking this ser-
7 iously, proceeding vigorously, the agreement is:

8 "It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo
9 would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any
10 particular kind of activity which might contribute to
11 getting rid of Lumumba".

12 Now, the first point, you read that to mean not
13 ruling out killing?

14 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Now, was it just your testimony that
16 you believe that the agreement that planning for the Congo
17 would not necessarily rule out possible consideration of --
18 and now I will substitute the word killing -- is authority
19 to actually order the killing -- sufficient authority?

20 Mr. Bissell. May I look again at the other exhibit,
21 Mr. Dulles' cable of the next day.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

24 There is a pending question.

25 Mr. Bissell. It is my belief on the basis of the cable

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1 drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the
2 Special Group as authorizing implementation if favorable
3 circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done
4 covertly. He speaks of targets of opportunity. He authorized,
5 as I remember the words of the cable "even more aggressive
6 action".

7 And the tone of the cable clearly gives the Station
8 Chief a lot of latitude and conveys a sense of very great
9 urgency.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And whether or not that is a proper con-
11 struction of the Special Group is not really something we need
12 to discuss.

13 Finish the Congo, then.

14 Mr. Baron. I have one more question on Mr. Gottlieb's
15 visist. And that is, in the light of the entire atmosphere
16 at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at that time,
17 Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that
18 the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this
19 mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's
20 authority at that point?

21 Mr. Bissell. No, it would not.

22 Mr. Baron. For the sake of the record, let's intro-
23 duce as an exhibit the memo that I referred to earlier as
24 November 1960. And I will ask you one question about it.
25 This is a memo going from the Chief of KUTUBE/D. And that

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1 is the Foreign Intelligence Division, which would have been
2 William Harvey at that time.

3 Mr. Bissell. I believe so.

4 (The document referred to was
5 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 3
6 for identification.)
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1 Mr. Baron. This is a cable that we reviewed, Mr.
2 Bissell, before we began your testimony today. And I will
3 turn your attention to the paragraph that says:

4 "It is still difficult to determine whether Mobutu
5 had sufficient control army to enforce decisions announced
6 night 14 September. Station advised" --

7 And then there is a sanitized paragraph --

8 "Station advised two moderate Congolese politicians
9 'try work with key Congolese contact' in effort eliminate
10 Lumumba. Fear UN protection will give Lumumba opportunity
11 organization counterattack. Only solution is remove him
12 from scene soonest".

13 Now, the night of September 14 was the night of a coup
14 in the Congo where Mobutu took power, is that correct?

15 Mr. Bissell. Correct.

16 Mr. Baron. And does this cable refresh your recollec-
17 tion as to the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba even
18 after he was in U.N. custody?

19 Mr. Bissell. Yes. It seems to say rather clearly
20 that it was still desirable to eliminate him.

21 Mr. Baron. Was it still your recollection, then, that
22 there was a continued sense of urgency about eliminating
23 Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody?

24 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

25 Mr. Baron. And this would account in part for the fact

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1 Mr. Baron. You are not listed as a participant at the
2 meeting, although Mr. Dulles is present, and the following
3 paragraph relates a remark of Mr. Dulles:

4 "Nobutu appeared to be the effective power in the
5 Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of
6 and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of".

7 Does that accord with your understanding of the policy
8 of the National Security Council toward Lumumba even after
9 he was in U.N. custody?

10 Mr. Bissell. It does.

11 Mr. Baron. And the language "disposed of" would contem-
12 plate assassination at least as one means of disposing of
13 him?

14 Mr. Bissell. As one means, as one possible means, if
15 necessary.

16 Mr. Baron. I have one further exhibit which we
17 will mark Exhibit 6, that is, a cable dated December 17, 1960
18 sent to the Director from Leopoldville.

19 (The document referred to was
20 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 6
21 for identification.)
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1 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Bissell, I want to switch, unfortunately,
2 from the Continent of Africa and go to Cuba. This is the same
3 time period, however, it is July of 1960.

4 I had a conversation with you on August 6 over the
5 telephone. You may recall the conversation. I have in front
6 of me a cable which we will mark as Exhibit No. 7.

7 (The document referred to was
8 marked Bissell Exhibit No. 7
9 for identification.)

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1 Mr. diGenova. Now, the duty officer who had issued the
2 first cable about serious consideration, he had no personal
3 knowledge, but he had heard that Mr. Dulles had countermanded
4 the original cable, talking about the possible removal,
5 and authorizing the approach to the asset, the Cuban pilot,
6 who actually attempted the crash of the plane which would
7 carry Raol Castro from Prague to Havana.

8 Do you have any personal knowledge as to why Mr. Dulles
9 would have countermanded, assuming that he did?

10 Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection. I could
11 surmise lots of things.

12 Mr. diGenova. What I want to ask you is this: do
13 you have an independent recollection that any assassination
14 efforts against the Cuban leaders which were being considered
15 contemplated simultaneous action against all three, other-
16 wise it would be useless action?

17 Mr. Bissell. The only evidence I know of, hard evidence
18 is the Special Group minute to which I referred earlier,
19 which was an exhibit in earlier testimony.

20 Mr. diGenova. You are referring to the Merchant cable
21 exchange of November 3, 1960?

22 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

23 Mr. diGenova. Now, Mr. Hinkle, the duty officer,
24 has no personal knowledge about the rescission of that cable.

25 Does it seem to you upon reflection, knowing what you

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1 know -- for example, Mr. Dulles cable to the Congo personally
2 authorizing, apparently, the assassination of Mr. Lumumba,
3 and \$100,000 to do it -- is it inconsistent to your way of
4 thinking that he would have authorized that assassination and
5 would have rescinded this cable that would have apparently
6 authorized the assassination of Raol^u Castro.

7 Mr. Bissell. Not inconsistent at all. I think it may
8 well have embodied a judgment on Mr. Dulles part that this
9 effort concerning Raol^u Castro was altogether too risky, and
10 technically not sufficiently likely of success.

11 Mr. diGenova. During our initial telephone conversa-
12 tion on August 6 you speculated, and you clearly identified it
13 as mere speculation, that one of the reasons that Mr. Dulles,
14 assuming he did, ordered that initial cable countermanded was,
15 first, too many innocent persons on the plane would have
16 been killed, and second, that it was so risky because there
17 had been just an initial approach of the asset and it wasn't
18 known whether or not he was a double agent, and thirdly, it
19 appeared that the contemplation of all three, the assassina-
20 tion of all three was being considered, and, therefore, since
21 only Raol would be on this plane that it would have resulted
22 in the dilemma that they sought to avoid, that is, if
23 he had been killed there would have been two left over, and
24 there may have been a reason that he ordered the countermand.

25 Would you take by that as a form of speculation at this

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1 point as one of the reasons that he would have countermanded
2 that cable?

3 Mr. Bissell. I would.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Could I follow up on the Congo, Exhibit
5 2, the Dulles cable to Leopoldville.

6 Now, we apparently read to you when I was out of the
7 room the first paragraph at least, which talks about the clear-
8 cut conclusion:

9 "If he continues to hold high office the inevitable
10 result would be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist
11 takeover. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must
12 be an urgent and prime objective, and under existing conditions
13 this must be a high priority of your covert action".

14 And you have read that language as meaning killing, right?

15 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

16 Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask you if you continue to
17 read it as killing in the light of the third paragraph of
18 the cable which reads as follows:

19 "To the extent that Ambassador may desire to be con-
20 sulted you should seek his concurrence. If in any particular
21 case he does not wish to be consulted you can act on your
22 own authority where time does not permit reference here.

23 "Paragraph 4, this message has been seen and approved
24 at competent level of the Department of State".

25 Do you still believe in the light of the authorization

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1 also he made an effective penetration of Lumumba's supporters
2 both in the Congo, and as it were, in the line of funding
3 and supply in Europe.

4 Mr. Dawson. So, he was in place, so to speak?

5 Mr. Bissell. Yes.

6 In other words, he was a dual agent.

7 Mr. Dawson. Did he have access directly to Lumumba?

8 Mr. Bissell. I think he did, yes.

9 Mr. Dawson. Do you remember having been told that he
10 sometime in November or December went to Stanleyville?

11 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the specific case, but
12 it fits the pattern very well. What I do remember is one
13 operation. But he knew of, he was close enough to -- he
14 was used as a courier from Lumumba, I think, first in the
15 capitol, and then later from Stanleyville to Europe. And
16 on one occasion, because he had penetrated so effectively, he
17 was aware that a large amount of cash was being taken by two
18 other couriers down to the Congo, and as a result of his
19 awareness of that, and all the details of that trip, that
20 shipment was intercepted.

21 Mr. Dawson. The Chief of Station testified about
22 having an agent that had access.

23 Would this have been the agent that he believed he
24 would have access to?

25 Mr. Bissell. I believe he would have, yes.

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1 commercial, I will take that back, on a flight that might
2 be chartered, for Sukarno.

3 Mr. Wides. Either when you became DDP or before,
4 whether or not you were personally involved, did you ever hear
5 anything regarding any efforts by the CIA to assassinate Nasser
6 and to send teams, assassination teams into Egypt for that
7 purpose?

8 Mr. Bissell. No, I never did. I could almost go so far
9 as to say that that was one that was never even thought of.

10 Mr. Schwarz. We forgot to ask you a question which we
11 ask almost all the other high people who come down here to
12 testify.

13 Looking back on things, now, -- and I hate to use the
14 word get rid of, but let me --do you think the U.S. should get
15 rid of assassination as a tool?

16 Mr. Bissell. I think in today's atmosphere the answer
17 is yes.

18 Mr. Wides. Why do you think that?

19 Mr. Bissell. I think that to use means for the
20 advancement of policy of such a sort that in the pre-
21 vailing climate these days would be almost certainly dis-
22 approved of by a large majority of the legislative arm, and
23 the public at large, and everybody else, is unwise unless
24 you can have absolute confidence of total security. And by
25 security I mean that outside of the two or three people who

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